Ancient Philosophy
Parmenides suggests that there might be a problem with the notion of particular objects "partaking" of unified Forms, since each partaking seems to partake of only a part of the Form, and this means that the Form isn't unified, but instead divisible. Socrates defends himself with an analogy (that it turns out doesn't quite avoid the problem). What is the analogy that Socrates offers?
A Form is unified the way that a single day is a unity, present in many moments, but still the same day throughout all of those moments
Which are answers to the question "what is virtue" proposed by Meno?
A man's virtue consists of managing public affairs, a woman's virtue consists of managing the home, and there is a different virtue still for a child, and one for a slave, and for every action and every age. Virtue is to be able to rule over other people. Virtue is desiring beautiful things and having the power to acquire them.
In book III, Aristotle takes up the question of free will and choice, first addressing the difference between voluntary and involuntary acts, noting that we can only be praised or blamed for what it done voluntarily. He considers a variety of types of scenarios, including actions done in ignorance which he says are generally neither voluntary nor involuntary, but "non-voluntary," except in certain instances. What are these exceptional instances?
Actions from ignorance are counted as involuntary if they are occasioned by regret after the fact.
Following Cebes's expression of doubt that the soul lives on after the body dies, but instead may, perhaps, dissipate like smoke, Socrates offers an argument for the immortality of the soul that is sometimes called the Argument from Opposites. Which of the following best captures this argument?
All things come to be from their opposites, e.g. becoming taller comes from having first been shorter, and becoming warmer comes from having first been colder. The opposite of being alive is being dead, and just as one becomes dead from having previously been alive, once becomes alive from having previously been dead.
Socrates claims that a good person would not be motivated to rule in pursuit of money or honor. What, then, does he say IS the motivating factor for a good ruler?
Avoiding the punishment of being ruled by someone worse than themselves.
Glaucon demands that Socrates offer up an attempt at an account of the Good, even though Socrates protests that he has no real knowledge of this, and that his opinion is likely to be less than altogether trustworthy. Nonetheless Socrates offers up a depiction of the Good through an analogy to the sun. Socrates points out that this analogy holds in at least two notable ways. Which of the following capture these two ways?
Both make knowledge of things possible and also nourish and bring all things into existence.
Perhaps no other thinker amongst the Pre-Socratics manages to seem as simultaneously ridiculous and profound as Heraclitus does in some of the surviving fragments of his thought. He is sometimes portrayed as espousing the notion that everything is "fire," which would seemingly place him in good company with the Milesians. However, in reading through his fragments, it is clear that "fire" represents a more abstract concept for Heraclitus. Which of the following offers a better depiction of what Heraclitus seems to think the fundamental principle of reality is?
Change
which of the Sophists the following statement is attributed to. "The ancient lawgivers invented God as a kind of overseer of the right and wrong actions of men, in order to make sure that nobody injured his neighbors privily through fear of vengeance at the hands of the Gods."
Critias
Possibly the most difficult aspect of the divided line concerns distinguishing between dianoesis (frequently translated as "thinking") and episteme (usually translated as "knowledge). Which of the following best captures the distinction that Socrates tries to make between these two activities of the soul?
Dianoesis makes use of sensible particular images while episteme is a completely abstract and ultimately unified form of understanding.
Assuming that Euthyphro can deal with the first issue Socrates raises with his "piety is what is loved by the gods" definition, there is still another deeper issue. This is easily the most famous exchange in this dialogue - so much so that it is generally referred to as the "Euthyphro Dilemma." What is this dilemma that Socrates poses to Euthyphro? (hint, it begins at line 10a of the Stephanus pagination in the margins)
Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because the love it?
How does Anaxagoras explain the way that the "seeds" he proposes give rise to the great and changing diversity of qualities we observe in "all Things?"
Each of the seeds contains a portion of all things, such that all things that will ever be are already present in each seed.
The dialogue begins with Euthyphro asking Socrates what he is doing at the king archon's court (a special court dedicated to dealing with cases of alleged religious impiety). In the ensuing conversation we find out what business each of them has at the court. Why are Socrates and Euthyphro at the king archon's court?
Euthyphro is there to prosecute his own father for murder, and Socrates is there to defend himself against accusations that he corrupts the youth and invents false gods.
Aristotle opens up Book II of On the Soul noting that substance (the greek here is ousia, which is sometimes translated "being") is spoken of in several ways - as matter, as form/essence, and as the composite of both matter and form. Which of these three does he say is most closely associated with the "soul?"
Form
As was the custom in such trials in Athens at the time, Socrates's trial was divided into two phases - one to determine his guilt/innocence, and another, if he is found guilty, to determine the punishment. It is notable that while the vote in the first phase is fairly close (261-220), approximately 80 more jurors vote for his execution than voted for his guilt. Some of this might be chalked up to what appears to be a rapid shift in demeanor on Socrates's part, a shift from an ambivalent sort of defense of himself to outright provocation. As an alternative to Meletus's suggested punishment of death, Socrates eventually proposes a small fine of 30 minae of silver (most of which would be paid by his friends), but not before proposing another punishment which he seems to think is far more appropriate. What is this first punishment that Socrates suggests he would be willing to abide by?
Free meals for the rest of his life at the prytaneum, as was the reward for all Olympic victors
Socrates embarks on a peculiar little side conversation with Meno's slave, in which he tries to "teach" him a geometric principle (how to find the length of the side of a square that is double the area of another given square). This conversation is offered by Socrates as an answer by way of demonstration to a really nasty problem put forth by Meno, which is usually referred to as "the riddle of inquiry." Which of the following best captures this "riddle?"
Genuine inquiry seems impossible, since we either know something or we don't. If we know it, we can't search for it (since we already have it), and if we don't know it, we can't search for it (since we wouldn't recognize it even if we found it).
which of the Sophists the following statement is attributed to. "Reality is not the object of thought, and cannot be comprehended by it."
Gorgias
The young Socrates proposes a rough version of the theory of Forms as an alternative to the Eleatic position that "all is one." Parmenides, taking on a role we are used to seeing from the older Socrates in other dialogues, probes Socrates's position by asking for some clarification of what he means. He offers three groups of possible Forms, the first of which Socrates agrees with and says this is what he has in mind, the second of which Socrates says he's not sure about, and the third of which Socrates says he doesn't think count as forms. Which of the following are members of the third group of proposed "forms" that Socrates denies as genuine examples of the Forms?
Hair, Mud, and Dirt
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle begins with the observation that every action or choice aims at some good, and that the key question at hand in this discussion is what the highest good of all human action is. What does Aristotle say that this highest good is?
Happiness
Socrates responds to the charge of corrupting the youth with a fairly ingenious argument. Notably, he does not engage in any dispute regarding what, precisely, corrupts young people and what makes them good. What does he say instead in his defense?
He either does not corrupt them or does so unintentionally, since no one would willingly make the people they have to live with worse.
Socrates compares himself to a "gadfly" and the city of Athens to a horse. What does he mean by this analogy?
He provokes the city to make it less lazy, and though this may seem like an annoyance, it is for the city's own good.
After Parmenides's student, Zeno has finished reading his treatise, Socrates asks him a question. Which of the following best captures Socrates's question for Zeno?
He wants to know whether Zeno is basically offering another argument for the same claim that both he and Parmenides have made in the past, namely that there is no plurality and all is one.
In the midst of a long and complicated discussion regarding whether or not wisdom (in either its practical or theoretical forms) is useful or necessary for virtue and happiness, Aristotle remarks that Socrates was partly right and partly wrong about the relationship between wisdom and virtue. Which of the following capture the ways that Aristotle says Socrates was partly right but partly wrong?
He was right to say that wisdom is necessary for virtue, but wrong to say that all virtues are forms of wisdom
Through Parmenides, Plato lodges one particular potential critique of his own theory of Forms that many scholars today believe to be a fairly incisive one. This argument is commonly referred to as the "Third Man Argument" despite the fact that it is articulated in the dialogue in terms of the Form of Largeness rather than the Form of Man (it is Aristotle who first articulates this argument in terms of a "third Man"). This argument begins with Socrates's agreement that like the particular large things that partake of it, the Form of Largeness is large. Where does it proceed from there?
If the Form of Largeness is large, just as large things are large, then there would have to be another Form of Largeness above the first Form that covers all the large things and the initial Form of Largeness. But then this second form of Largeness is presumably also large, so there would have to be another Form of Largeness over that as well, and so on ad infinitum.
Which of the following best describes Glaucon and Adeimantus' intent in telling the "Myth of Gyges" story at the beginning of Book II?
It illustrates how difficult it is to believe that Justice is better than Injustice when we take away all of the beneficial consequences for being just and the harmful consequences of being unjust.
Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates seems to get Euthyphro to agree that piety is a kind of "justice." What kind of justice do they seem to agree that it is?
It's the type of justice concerned with caring for the gods, the way a slave cares for his master.
It seems like Socrates has a particular notion of Justice in mind throughout Books I & II of the Republic. Which of the following definitions best fits this notion.
Justice is the art of ruling such that everyone involved (including the ruler and those who are ruled) is benefited.
After noting that both are equally good guides to action, Socrates refers to a distinction between "knowledge" and "true opinion." Which of the following does Socrates say marks this distinction?
Knowledge is "tied down" while true opinion might be forgotten and lost.
Empedocles, along with all the pluralists, were responding directly to monists like Parmenides and Zeno to attempt an explanation of how the great diversity of things and change occur. In a striking anticipation of the attitude common in contemporary physics, Empedocles proposed fundamental material elements as well as fundamental forces. The material elements he proposed were the four natural elements, earth, water, air, and fire. What were the two fundamental forces?
Love and hate
Just after Socrates makes the case that virtue seems to be teachable, since it is a sort of knowledge, he presents a counter argument giving reasons for why it is not teachable. Which of the following is part of this argument?
Many of the most virtuous men of Athens, despite their wealth and good judgment, seem to have been unable to teach their sons to be virtuous.
All three of the "solitary figures" discussed in this reading assignment make a marked departure from the Milesians, who all claimed that the fundamental governing principle of the cosmos was one material substance. Instead, they all seem to shift their take on a unifying principle toward abstract things. This is perhaps clearest with Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, who focused upon which of the following?
Mathematical ratios
Book I of Nicomachean Ethics ends with a distinction between intellectual virtue and moral virtue, namely that moral virtue concerns the part of the irrational soul that is influenced by reason while intellectual virtue concerns the activity of the rational soul by itself. Book II begins with a slightly different distinction between these two types of virtue - what is it?
Moral virtue is acquired through habit, while intellectual virtue is acquired through learning
Socrates relates a story told to him by his friend Chaerephon, regarding a proclamation made by the Oracle at Delphi that no one is wiser than Socrates. At first he didn't believe this, as he believed himself to have no real knowledge of anything, but after some time of trying to find someone wiser than himself, he began to understand how it was true. How does Socrates interpret the words of the Oracle?
No one possesses any knowledge of great importance, but many people think themselves wiser than they actually are. Socrates at least knows that he does not know these things that other claim to know, and this represents the highest form of human wisdom.
In books I & II of Nicomachean Ethics, we saw that moral virtue concerns the part of the irrational soul that interacts with the rational soul. In that discussion, Aristotle gestured toward another sort of virtue, namely intellectual virtue, that concerns excellence in the activity of the rational soul by itself. In book VI, we get a discussion of these intellectual virtues and one of the first things Aristotle does is make a distinction between two categories of intellectual virtues. What are these two categories?
One category that deals with things that cannot be otherwise than they are, and another that deals with things that can be otherwise than they are
After a first introduction, framing the dialogue as the recollection of the following events by Phaedo, we get a second introduction from Socrates. This introduction ends and the topic of the rest of the dialogue begins when Socrates suggests that any true philosopher should not fear death, but welcome it, as philosophy itself is a practicing for death. Which of the following is a reason that Socrates gives for this seemingly strange claim?
Philosophers disregard the pleasures of the body, instead focusing on those things that benefit the soul and in so doing have already begun to separate their bodies and souls. Philosophers disregard the bodily senses as an unreliable tool for knowledge, and in so doing, have already begun to separate their bodies and souls. Those things that a philosopher inquires into, such as Justice, Beauty, and Virtue, are grasped not by the bodily senses, but with the soul/intellect, and in this way, the philosopher's work is the activity of the soul by itself, and death will only further enable the soul's activity unencumbered by the body.
which of the Sophists the following statement is attributed to. "Man is the measure of all things."
Protagoras
Socrates says that he had a dream that fits with the news that Crito brings him. What is this news?
That his execution will take place soon.
There is an interesting exchange between Socrates and Crito following Crito's point that the opinions of "the many" should be heeded, since, as their present situation proves, one may be killed as a result of those opinions. This exchange begins with a bit of cross examination between Socrates and Crito regarding the health of one's body. What conclusion does Socrates elicit, which answers to Crito's point about being killed by "the many?"
That it is not merely life, but a good life that is valuable, and that death is preferable to a bad life.
Consider the scenario of Achilles on the racetrack. Which of the following seems to be a key assumption that makes this scenario paradoxical?
That space is infinitely divisible
Socrates and Crito come to an agreement on how to respond to those who harm us that Socrates advises Crito to think carefully about, as it is not a very popular opinion. What do they agree is the proper response to those who harm us?
That we must never retaliate, for it is always wrong to harm another
The fact that Parmenides' poem describes and encounter with the goddess suggests that position laid out is put forward as a product of divine inspiration or revelation, but at the same time, there is an argument made here by the goddess. That argument rests upon a single premise, from which everything else is inferred, and which seems difficult to deny. What is this premise?
That which is, is, and that which is not, is not.
When Socrates admits that there are some difficulties with the Theory of Forms as he has currently (in the dialogue) worked it out, Parmenides notes that he hasn't even come to the "worst" difficulty yet - that the Forms seem to be unknowable to any human. This difficulty begins with Parmenides getting Socrates to agree that insofar as the Forms have "real" being that is independent of those particular concrete things that partake of them, no such real being exists in our world of particular concrete things. How does Parmenides get from this to the conclusion that the Forms must be unknowable to humans?
The Forms are knowable only through an ideal Knowledge, but we are particular concrete people and can only possess a lesser sort of knowledge that merely partakes of the ideal Form of Knowledge.
Aristotle identifies a special case of voluntariness that applies only to human actors, namely choice. He notes that actions done on a whim are not chosen, nor are actions stemming from passion. Furthermore wishing and having an opinion are not the same as choosing. What, then, does Aristotle claim that the hallmark of making a "choice" is?
The actor deliberated about what to do before acting.
One of the key aspects of Aristotle's "virtue" approach to ethics is in the way that he maintains that doing what a virtuous person does is not enough to count as being in possession of virtue. Which of the following is NOT something that Aristotle mentions that virtue requires in addition to virtuous action?
The actor must not find pleasure in their actions, but rather do what is right simply because it is right
Following a discussion of the theory of recollection, Simmias and Cebes note that while this supports the notion that our souls existed before we were born, it doesn't necessarily mean that they will live on after we die. So, Socrates offers another argument for the immortality of the soul that is sometimes called the Argument from Affinity. Which of the following best captures this argument?
The body, and other things that can be destroyed are changing, made of composite parts, and perceivable by the senses. But things like the absolute form of Justice, or the Beautiful, or the Good, are eternal, unchanging, unified, and invisible. The soul is more like this second class of things, and so is likely to not be the sort of thing that can be destroyed.
Aristotle notes that deciphering what the highest good that all human action and choice aims at is demands that we sort out what the function of a human is. How does he end up answering this question?
The function of a human must be in conformity with reason.
After Euthyphro's first definition of piety gets picked apart by Socrates, we get another definition, namely that the pious is what is loved by the gods and the impious is what is hated by them. Socrates points out that something that Euthyphro previously said raised a problem with this definition. What is this problem?
The gods quarrel with one another, and love and hate different things, making some things both pious and impious at the same time.
When Xenophanes says things like "if oxen, horses, and lions had hands or could paint with their hands and fashion works as men do, horses would paint horse-like images of gods and oxen ox-like ones, and each would fashion bodies like their own," what is he trying to illustrate?
The human tendency to create gods in their own images blinds us to the true nature of god.
Parmendes' student, Zeno, seems to accept his teacher's view that change and plurality must be illusory. Specifically, Zeno offers as many as four paradoxes of motion. Which of the following is NOT one of these paradoxes?
The paradox of the Millet seeds
At the end of the day, this is a dialogue about the concept of "piety," and like many of Plato's early dialogues, most of the conversation revolves around attempts to pin down a definition of the concept in question. Euthyphro claims to know what piety is, and offers many prospective definitions. What is the first definition he offers?
The pious is what he (Euthyphro) is doing, prosecuting the unjust no matter who they may be, and the impious is to fail to prosecute wrongdoers.
Crito offers up an argument for why Socrates should take the opportunity to escape. What is that argument?
The reputations of his friends will suffer as people will think that they had not done all they could to save him.
The very first counter argument that Socrates makes against Thrasymachus' definition of Justice as "the advantage of the stronger" (essentially a "might makes right" conception of justice) is that we seem to end up in a contradiction if a ruler mistakenly commands their subjects to do something that would actually be harmful to them (the ruler). Which of the following is Thrasymachus' answer to this seeming contradiction?
The ruler, in the strictest and most precise sense of the word, is not a ruler when they make a mistake like the one Socrates is describing.
After the Argument from Affinity, Simmias and Cebes still have some doubts, though they are hesitant to share them with Socrates because they don't wish to disturb someone who is about to die by suggesting that his soul will not, as he seems to believe, not outlive his body. After Socrates urges them to voice their concerns, each of them offers up an alternative conception of the relationship between the body and soul through the use of a different analogy. Which of the following pairs of analogies are offered by Simmias and Cebes?
The soul is to the body as a harmony is to a harp, and the soul is to the body as a weaver is to his coat/cloak.
Aristotle's conception of the soul holds that all living things are ensouled, but still makes a distinction between the souls of plants, the souls of animals, and the souls of humans. Plants have a nutritive soul, animals a soul that is both nutritive and perceiving/desiring, and humans have a soul that is nutritive, perceiving/desiring, and also capable of thinking. In chapters 4 & 5 of book III of On the Soul, he turns his attention to this faculty of thought (the Greek here is nous/noein) and what it's nature is. A key question that he takes up in chapters 4 & 5 of book III concerns whether the thinking part of the soul is separable from the other parts of the soul and from the body. What conclusion does Aristotle come to on this question?
The thinking part of the soul is separable from the other parts and from the body.
Meno complains that Socrates has made him numb, and compares him to the "broad torpedo fish" [aka a stingray]. Which of the following is a reason Socrates brings up to show how he is, in fact, not like the torpedo fish in an important way.
The torpedo fish makes others numb but is not itself also numb, whereas Socrates is just as perplexed as Meno is.
Later on in book I of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that "happiness is a certain activity of the soul in conformity with perfect virtue," and accordingly moves his inquiry to the task of determining what "virtuous" activity of the human soul is like. To answer this, he returns to some of the distinctions made in On the Soul, noting that there is an irrational part of the human soul, and a rational part. He then goes on to make a distinction between two parts of the irrational soul, a distinction that is adds something new to the discussion we saw in On the Soul and is particularly relevant to what he calls "moral virtue" (as opposed to "intellectual virtue"). What is the substance of this distinction between the two parts of the irrational soul?
There is the part of the irrational soul which does not follow reason, and the part of the irrational soul that does follow reason.
What did Democritus have to say about human perceptions, such as sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch?
These are the result of atoms that leave objects and impinge upon the atoms of our sense organs. The way things appear to us by perception only exist by convention and do not exist in reality. Perception is a bastard form of knowledge, rather than genuine knowledge.
In book VII, Socrates gives us another slightly different take on what he was talking about with the "Divided Line," this time employing the famous "Allegory of the Cave." What is it that Socrates says those who eventually make it out of the cave must do?
They must go back and try to help others find their way out of the cave, which will be difficult because the others will resist
No primary source writings by the Sophists have survived to this point, so our understanding of these figures come primarily from Plato, who positioned himself and Socrates in sharp opposition to them. Which of the following is taken as a common trait of all three of the sophists you read about?
They taught the art of rhetoric, or speaking well in public, to anyone who would pay their fee.
There are three people who are formally accusing Socrates at this trial, Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon, but Socrates mentions another group of people that he must defend himself against, whom he fears more than his present accusers. Who is he talking about?
Unnamed people who have spread gossip and untrue stories about him that may prejudice the jury.
Democritus adds something new to the pluralism of Empedocles and Anaxagoras by arguing that the fundamental material particles are "atomos" or "indivisible," and accordingly is regarded as the first to articulate an "atomistic" theory of the world. Crucial to his theory is the inclusion of one other principle in addition to these atoms. What is it?
Void
A dispute arises between Socrates and Thrasymachus over whether or not being a "ruler" is like being a "shepherd." Both seem to think that a ruler is like a shepherd, but they seem to understand the art of shepherding differently. Which of the following issue lies at the heart of their disagreement?
Whether the work of shepherding is essentially done for the benefit of the sheep or the benefit of the shepherd
Anaxagoras took a step beyond Empedocles's pluralism by proposing more than four fundamental material components that make up all things, saying "one must believe that there are many things of all sorts in all composite products, and the seeds of all Things..." How many of these "seeds of all Things" did he propose?
infinite number
Scientific Knowledge (episteme) is described by Aristotle as concerning those things which cannot be otherwise and proceeds from some first principles to a conclusion (either by induction from particulars to a universal, or by syllogistic deduction from universals to particulars). But this leaves us with a question regarding how it is that we come to know these first principles that episteme begins with, a question that Aristotle answers with another intellectual virtue. Which intellectual virtue is this, which concerns how we grasp those first principles that seemingly neither require nor admit of demonstration?
nous
The other intellectual virtue concerning things that can be otherwise deals with those things with respect to "action." This intellectual virtue seems to be the one that is most closely related to moral virtue, and deals with how we deliberate about how to acheive the ultimate aims of all human choices (i.e. eudaimonia). What is this intellectual virtue?
phronesis
In book VI, Aristotle identifies 5 intellectual virtues. "Scientific Knowledge" (episteme), Art/Craft/Applied sciences (techne), Practical Wisdom/Prudence (phronesis), Intellect/Intuition (nous), and Theoretical Wisdom (sophia). Two of these are classified as intellectual virtues that concern things that can be otherwise. Which of these is the intellectual capacity concerned with things that can be otherwise with respect to "production."
techne
Book VI opens up with a discussion of the highest sort of knowledge that the rulers of the beautiful city must possess - knowledge of the Good. Immediately, a question regarding the nature of the Good pops up, and two main competing perspectives are identified. Which of the following are best captures these two perspectives on the nature of the Good?
the good as knowledge vs the good as pleasure
Ultimately, the decision regarding whether Socrates should escape or not seems to hinge on whether he would be harming anyone in doing so. Who does Socrates say his escaping would harm?
the laws of athens
Parmenides' poem, "Peri phuseos" (or On Nature) talks of two paths. What are those two paths?
the path of Truth and the path of the opinions of mortals