animal law part 1

Children

-1st part of lives depend on society for protection -considered property of parents -parents right over kids, even to terminate life -control and custody guaranteed by DP of 14th -movement to remove kids from unsafe conditions in 1850s -societal and judicial intervention -attack on parental property rights -est. minimal standards of care parents should comply w. childrens rights movements -legal doctrine of emancipation - freeing of minor from control of his/her parents

Bough v. Beaty

-4 yr old bitten by chimp -at animal tent in circus -father puts child down and child gains access to be close to monkey -Ct holding: knowledge of dangerous propensities on part of circus -jury instruction reversed bc wild animal at issue -if you have wild animal in cage you should know wild animals are dangerous, and you will be responsible for the harm caused by that animal -circus strictly liable for the harm caused by the chimp

Common Provisions anti cruelty statutes

-50 states have them -many have felony provisions -some apply to neglect -for companion animals

US v. Park (2008)

-Parks own dog kennel in Idaho -were dogs "livestock?" -dog kennel and training business violated terms of easement -Parks argued dog kennel was livestock farming -Ct ruled term of easement = unambiguous livestock, broad but Parks can't be defined as such

Intentional Torts: Burgess v. Taylor

-Question: whether the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can apply to conversion/slaughter of pet horses -conduct of offender determines if conduct was outrageous -Judy Taylor owned 2 horses - got sick - made a free lease agreement w. Burgess -Burgess to take care of horses in exchange for having them around -Burgess tried to sell horses - sold to known horse slaughterer - lied to Taylor and did not let her have contact with them -would not tell Taylor where horses went -Taylor filed action in Jefferson circuit ct, awarded 126k -emotional treatment inflicted by Burgess on Taylor -Taylors health got worse, had panic attacks -Burgess said proper award for damages was the value of the horses (1k) -Burgess claimed it was excessive reward, Ct said it was not

Mental Incompetents

-Terri Schiavo - vegetative state 15 yrs - died -husband to discontinue life support -issue: is vegetative state "legally human?" -Schiavo entitled to protection of law as person -disability rights movement 1960-1970

Strict liability

-actor responsible for action without regard to intent or negligence -applicable to animal law -known propensities of wild animals General rule: owners are not liable for acts of wild animals on their property unless they have reduced the wild animals to possession or control - strict liability may apply

4th amendment claims for tortious harm to companion animals by public officials

-cases involving shooting of companion animal -many times guardians don't pursue legal action in response -when file suit, may be required to follow specialized procedures for suing officials in tort -may allege violation of 4th amendment rights

People v. Dunn

-charged w/ killing/maiming animals property of someone else -appellant lived on land/ planted fruit, Cabezuts animals ate it -fired at and killed animals -4 wounded, 3 died -trial Ct said malice was an element of the crime -appellant argued malice had to be against the owner and not animals -Ct said could've driven animals away w/out killing

City of Rowling Meadows v. Kyle (1986)

-city brought action against def Kyle for keeping monkey at home -not domesticated animal -Ct in favor of plaintiff -Ct said monkey is wild animal not domestic -Ct then found Yondi was domesticated, potty trained, living w/ Kyle for 13 years, and not dangerous -judgement of circuit Ct reversed

Tort law

-civil wrongs, not criminal violations -people suing people

People v. Voelker

-const law dimensions covered so far: -standing/jurisdiction(art II) -vagueness -due process -1st amendment (recording decapitation of iguana) -criminal protection - anti cruelty prevailed over freedom of speech -animal suffering (real/perceived) -purpose of cruelty -cultural tolerance factors Daniel F. Lynch, New York City, for defendant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Kings County (Todd Davis, of counsel), for plaintiff. Can a defendant insulate himself from prosecution on First Amendment grounds by televising the criminal acts of decapitating three live, conscious iguanas in violation of the state's anti-cruelty statute? 1 Defendant was arrested on October 2, 1996 and charged with three counts of Overdriving, Torturing and Injuring Animals pursuant to § 353 of the Agriculture and Markets Law ("AML"). These charges stem from a videotaped incident wherein defendant is alleged to have cut off the heads of three live conscious iguanas without justification. Defendant was arraigned in Criminal Court on November 19, 1996. A superseding complaint was filed on November 22, 1996. Defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 170.30(1)(a) and § 170.35(1)(a) upon the ground that it is facially insufficient in that it fails to adequately allege every element of the offense charged pursuant to CPL § 100.15 and § 100.40. Defendant also maintains that dismissal is required because the statute is being unconstitutionally applied. The complaint in this case alleges, in pertinent part, that on or about and between February 6, 1996 and August 2, 1996 at 85 Havemeyer Street, apartment 1L in Brooklyn, the defendant allegedly cut off the heads of three live, conscious iguanas without justification. The complaint alleges further that Assistant District Attorney Todd Davis (hereinafter "deponent") is in possession of and has viewed a videotape showing the defendant committing the acts alleged. Additionally, the complaint alleges that deponent was informed: by Michael Pescatore that informant is the owner of the building at the above location, that he has viewed the videotape mentioned above, that the room pictured in said videotape is inside the above location, and that informant leased the apartment that includes said room at the above location to Eric Voelker from February 6, 1996 to the present; This Court holds that the acts of cutting off the heads of three conscious iguanas are acts which certainly injure, maim, mutilate and kill. This Court holds further that the term "without justification" is not a legal conclusion but a factual allegation that means what it says, i.e., with no apparent justification; to demand that the People address an infinite number of justification defenses would place an undue burden on the People requiring them to supply trial quality evidence in the body of an accusatory instrument. Whether or not the People can prove that defendant "unjustifiably" committed these acts is a matter best left to the trier of fact. See People v. Bunt, supra; People v. Downs, supra; See also People v. Gore, 143 Misc.2d 106, 540 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1989) (whether the People can prove elements beyond a reasonable doubt is a question of fact for the jury to decide).

State v. Cleve (1999)

-def convicted of 2 counts of cruelty to animals, 2 counts of unlawful hunting and negligent use of firearms -Sup Ct held - "any animal," within meaning of animal cruelty statute, applied only to domesticated animals and wild animals previously reduced to captivity. didn't apply to deer

Holcomb v. Van Zylen

-def dog raised havoc w/plaintiffs turkey -is turkey an animal within meaning of statute? -"animal" should include fowls

Women

-degraded historically "legal nonexistence" -no right to land or contract -Planned parenthood v. Casey - view of women having full rights

Drake v. Dean

-dog knocks over victim and causes injuries -would have been strict liability if there had been a bite -not strict liability bc dog knocked person over and did not bite

Affirmative acts of cruelty- People v. Bunt

-focus on wording of statute "unclear" on what animal means -use of modifiers made it unclear as to whether this conduct was covered Defendant moves this court for a judgment declaring section 353 of New York's Agriculture and Markets Law to be unconstitutional. This motion is being made pursuant to CPL 170.35 (subd 1, par [c]). The primary question presented here is: whether section 353 Agric. Mkts. of the Agriculture and Markets Law is unconstitutional on the ground that the statute is too vague for the ordinary person to know what conduct is proscribed by the statute? The court holds that the statute in question is not unconstitutional. Defendant is charged in an information filed in this court, that without provocation, and not in self-defense, he brutally beat a dog with a baseball bat on February 23, 1983. The supporting deposition attached to the information by a witness who observed the event states that she heard what sounded to be a dog fight. She looked out the window toward defendant's residence and saw defendant come out of his house with a baseball bat. He "raised the bat above his head and hit Spunky in the back * * * Spunky tried to run away but got caught in Shana's [female dog in heat owned by defendant and tied outside] chain." Defendant "continued hitting Spunky with the bat. I couldn't believe it and I opened my window and leaned out and screaming at him to stop but he kept hitting Spunky. Even after Spunky was lying on the ground not moving, Bruce [the defendant] repeatedly hit him in the head and body with the baseball bat. He finally stopped hitting Spunky and he walked into the house." The statute which is the subject of this motion reads in part as follows: "A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, whether wild or tame, and whether belonging to himself or to another * * * or causes, procures or permits any animal to be overdriven, overloaded, tortured, cruelly beaten, or unjustifiably injured, maimed, mutilated or killed * * * or who wilfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal or any act tending to produce such cruelty, is guilty of a misdemeanor". In his application defendant sets forth three arguments: (1) That the statute is irreconcilable with the due process requirement since the series of acts specified in the introductory lines are not qualified while subsequent thereto they are qualified by the adverb "unjustifiably". (2) That by virtue of the words "wilfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal" absent the adverb qualifier unjustifiably "prohibits virtually any and all human conduct" towards animals. (3) "That the Legislature did not know what the word `animal' means * * * how is anyone to guess which animals are to be included?" This court holds that section 353 Agric. Mkts. of the Agriculture and Markets Law is constitutional, although it is not well drafted. The defendant is amply informed of the prohibited activity and the statute contains provisions to allow the question of justification to be raised and considered. It sets forth a legitimate legislative activity in prohibiting the unjustified, needless and wanton inhumanity towards animals. The statute is not so broad that it fails to meet the standard of due process, yet it allows sufficient room for application to varied situations. Within its perimeters there is room for the expression of community standards and morals. Statutes similar to New York's have been upheld as constitutional by other State courts and certainly represent a reasonable extension of the State's police powers.

Nonhumans

-if nonhuman animals deserve rights, one must assume status as human or person isn't necessary for possessing legal rights. -being human isn't needed to obtain personhood contrast: being human doesnt always guarantee status as person -illegal aliens? rights under 4th? -historic position of animals attributed to their commercial value -status of animals? property or nonhumans with rights? -law recognizes 2 types of titles: legal and equitable 1. private lawsuit brought by owner, where owner transfers equitable title to animal 2. judicial or legislative action granting animals equitable title in themselves -"substituted judgement" - to reconcile self ownership of animals w/ guardians who make decisions for them -"sentient property" - animals who are between property and legal persons: doesn't include farm animals, doesn't give them full personhood

Lock v. Falkenstein (1963)

-issue of cockfighting -is it protected by animal cruelty statute? is gamecock considered an animal statutorily? -holding: roosters are not animals as defined by statute, cockfighting not illegal -"men of "ordinary intelligence" can't be expected to presume cocks are animals for purposes of fighting prohibition

Sierra Club v. Morton (1972)

-lacked standing (majority opinion) -non economic interests were not adequate to secure standing -aesthetic/environmental interests are potentially valid basis for injury, but those asserting harm must be "Among the injured" Facts of the case The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case. Question Did the Sierra Club adequately establish that it had a sufficient stake in the development of the Mineral King Valley to establish standing for a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act? The Sierra Club did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to show that any of its members had suffered or would suffer injury as a result of the defendants' actions. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 4-3 majority, in which the Court held that, in order to have standing to sue under the APA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they had directly suffered an injury as a result of the actions that led to the suit. Although building roads and high voltage power lines through the wilderness upsets the beauty of the area and the enjoyment of some, such "general interest" in a potential problem is not sufficient to establish that a plaintiff has been injured in the manner that standing doctrine requires.

Animal legal defense fund v. Glickman

-major victory for animal law standing -Ct recognizes aesthetic injury for witnessing animal suffering in nontraditional manner -plaintiffs lost all claims on the merits, but progress slow -is aesthetic injury too subjective? -strategies to broaden animal law standing: -aesthetic harm - door appears to be open to broaden notion of aesthetic history -AWA reflects moral concern about animal captivity -building moral considerations into animal standing seems proper -public trust- state stewardship responsibilities could extend to wild life protection -possible public trust in wildlife is consistent w/ expansion of public doctrine in other contexts

Potential Humans

-not persons in eye of law - not completely -have legal status between property and personhood -during 1st trimester anyone can abort -potential humans status never answered decisively -many states have fetal protection acts -fetus born alive can sue for potential, pre viability injury -homicide charge can be brought where state can demonstrate fetus was killed

Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012)

-plotnik sued neighbors alleging contract and tort claims - Meihaus injured their dog _Meihaus seen with bat, hit Plotniks dog -superior court entered judgement on jury verdicts that warded D. plotnik over $175k and J. plotnik over $225k -in response to def. motion for new trial (meihaus), superior ct entered amended judgement after plaintiffs accepted a remitter reducing damage awards -def. appeal from original and amended judgements -California law allows pet owner to recover from mental suffering -meihaus intentionally harmed the dog (Romeo) -Ct reversed damages awarded for negligence but upheld economic and emotional distress damages plaintiff recovered for trespass to personal property from meihaus hitting dog

Waters v. People

-prosecution instituted by humane society -def part of country club in CO -club had 40 doves to use as targets -shot/killed some -"used as food" after -def to pay fine ????

Oliver v. city of Anaheim

1The officers had no probable cause to arrest C.B. and Oliver because the act the officers believed C.B. committed—trying to kill the opossum by hitting it with a shovel—isn't a crime. While section 597(a) of the California Penal Code prohibits the intentional and malicious killing of animals, section 599c provides, "No part of this title shall be construed . . . as interfering with the right to destroy. . . any animal known as dangerous to life, limb, or property." Cal. Penal Code §§ 597(a), 599c. Regulations confirm that opossums are dangerous by explicitly permitting their killing. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 472(a). The regulations do prohibit certain ways of killing animals, but hitting them with a shovel is not among them. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 475. Indeed, if section 597(a) were construed as prohibiting the killing of wild opossums, it would impermissibly nullify California's laws that permit killing them. See Cal. Penal Code § 599c; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 472(a). People v. Thomason, 84 Cal.App.4th 1064 (2000), held that mice bought at a feed store were not "dangerous to life, limb, or property," as required by section 599c. Id. at 1067-68. By contrast, wild opossums are dangerous to property. See T.P. Salmon et al., Univ. of Cal., Pub. No. 74123, Pest Notes: Opossum 2 (2005). Indeed, the opossum C.B. allegedly struck had injured the family's bulldogs. Thomason is also inapposite because the defendant there tortured the mice. 84 Cal. App. 4th at 1065-66. The police here had no evidence that plaintiffs did anything more than try to kill the opossum, which they were entitled to do. Because C.B.'s act wasn't criminal, there was no cause to arrest him. And, without an underlying criminal act, Oliver couldn't have been an accessory or an aider and abettor. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 31, 32. The arrests violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Therefore, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. Nor are they entitled to immunity under state law because a reasonable officer could not have believed that the arrests of C.B. and Oliver were lawful. See Cal. Penal Code § 847(b)(1); Edgerly v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2010). REVERSED and REMANDED.

Taub v. State

AWA -fed law provides minimum standard of protections -state law seeking to add protection to animals in research (cooperative federalism)

CEASE v. New England Aquarium

Abstract In the recent case Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. (CEASE) v. New England Aquarium, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts prohibited a dolphin and several animal rights groups acting on behalf of the dolphin from bringing suit in federal court. The parties were protesting the transfer of the dolphin (Kama) in a manner alleged to be inconsistent with the permitting requirements of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). The court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that none of the named plaintiffs had standing to sue. Although the court summarily dismissed Kama's claim, it thoroughly discussed whether or not the plaintiffs' individual members, as individuals, had met the requirement of "injury in fact" necessary for the plaintiffs to have standing. The court concluded that they had not. With less discussion, the court reached the same conclusion regarding the organizational plaintiffs. The MMPA was passed in 1972 for the purpose of prohibiting the harassing, catching, and killing of marine mammals so that they would continue to be "a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of which they are a part." Essentially, the MMPA gives the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce the guidance and authority necessary to establish general limitations on the taking of all marine mammals, and within those limits, the power to issue permits that allow the transport of certain marine mammals. The MMPA also requires that the public be informed of the action to be taken and the evidence upon which that decision was reached. Section 1374 of the MMPA outlines the permit procedures for public display and scientific research of marine mammals. It sets forth requirements for application, public notice and hearing, and permit review. In order to transport a marine mammal an individual or organization must obtain a permit from the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce must publish notice in the Federal Register of any application for a permit. This allows interested parties to review permit applications and request a hearing on the matter. The Secretary is authorized to conduct a hearing if it is requested. Plaintiffs in this case argued that the Secretary's modification of the required permitting process denied them the right to request a public hearing. The court dismissed this claim without discussing whether a genuine issue of material fact indeed existed. In so doing, the court furthered the government's ability to act without public knowledge, contrary to the explicit provisions of the MMPA. A permit, once issued, must specify the methods of capture and subsequent care of the marine mammal. An interested party may request judicial review of any permit issued under section 1374 of the MMPA. The legislative history of the Act clearly emphasizes the public's right to information. If the district court had granted plaintiffs standing and had reached the merits of the case, the court would have been unable to reconcile the inconsistencies between the clear mandates of the MMPA and the permit process and the Letter of Agreement that the Secretary utilized in allowing Kama to be transported without a permit. New England Aquarium acts in conjunction with recent Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions to close the courtroom doors to environmental groups on grounds of standing. This Note will discuss the ramifications of the New England Aquarium decision on the ability of environmental groups to exercise their rights to challenge governmental actions under the MMPA. It will examine the various requirements for standing by tracing several lines of cases, particularly those involving environmental plaintiffs. The Note will then demonstrate that those decisions cannot be reconciled with the court's reasoning in the subject case.

Commonwealth v. Missouri (1963) Commonwealth v. Comella (1999)

C v. Missouri- def. shot and killed neighbors cat cat isn't one of the animals defined in the statutory construction act as "domesticated animal" def didn't violate provision C v. Comella comella guilty of harboring dangerous dog her dog attacked another comella tries to argue that dog isn't included in domesticated animal definition her interpretation is rejected

Rabideau v. City of Racine

Dakota was shot by a City of Racine police officer. He subsequently died from the injury. Dakota lived with Julie Rabideau, who witnessed the events leading to his death. Rabideau subsequently filed a claim for damages against the City of Racine (the City). Racine County Circuit Court Judge Allan B. Torhorst granted summary judgment to the City, and the court of appeals affirmed. [FN1] FN1. Rabideau v. City of Racine, No. 99-3263, unpublished slip op., 2000 WL 726552 (Wis.Ct.App. June 7, 2000), was decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(a)(1997-98). 2 The primary question presented in this case is whether Rabideau is entitled to damages for emotional distress. Although the question of whether or not a bystander may recover damages after witnessing an accident is a legal question that this court has previously addressed, this particular case is distinguishable from others: Dakota was a dog, a companion to Rabideau. 3 At the outset, we note that we are uncomfortable with the law's cold characterization of a dog, such as Dakota, as mere "property." [FN2] Labeling a dog "property" fails to describe the value human beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to other items of personal property. [FN3] A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room furniture. This term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and a dog. 4 The association of dog and human is longstanding. Dogs have been a part of human domestic life since 6,300 B.C. Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1059, 1064 (1995). Archaeologists have uncovered a 12,000-year-old burial site in which a human being and a dog lay buried together. "The arm of the person was arranged on the dog's shoulder, as if to emphasize the bonds that existed between these two individuals during life." Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). Dogs are so much a part of the human experience that we need not cite to authority when we note that dogs work in law enforcement, assist the blind and disabled, perform traditional jobs such as herding animals and providing security, and, of course, dogs continue to provide humans with devoted friendship. 5 Nevertheless, the law categorizes the dog as personal property despite the long relationship between dogs and humans. To the extent this opinion uses the term "property" in describing how humans value the dog they live with, it is done only as a means of applying established legal doctrine to the facts of this case. 6 Two theories are proffered by Rabideau as grounds for the recovery of emotional damages: negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to the first, as a predicate matter to bringing a claim for damages based upon the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must be related to the victim as spouse, parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, or sibling. [FN4] Because the relationship between Rabideau and Dakota didnot fall within one of these categories, we find that she cannot maintain a claim on this basis. 11 Third, we reverse the determination by the circuit court that this complaint was frivolous. We conclude that Rabideau's complaint for damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress was one that could properly be brought, although the elements for that claim were not satisfied so as to survive a motion for summary judgment. As to Rabideau's claim for damages based upon the negligent infliction of emotional distress, her brief to the court of appeals and this court set forth a good faith argument for an extension of the law. Under these circumstances a finding of frivolousness was erroneous.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992)

Facts of the case The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law. Question Do the respondents have standing to sue? No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.

What is the difference between standing and jurisdiction? What elements must be satisfied for a party to have standing under the "cases or controversies" requirement of Article III of the Constitution? What policy goals are promoted by a strict reading of this requirement?

Introduction The Supreme Court first considered Article III's "case or controversy" limitation on the judicial power when President George Washington forwarded to the Court a request for guidance as to how best to maintain neutrality, during an outbreak of hostilities between England and France, consistent with international law and treaties to which the United States was a party. Chief Justice Jay responded by informing the President that the Court was without power to help (the President had said he would be "much relieved" if the Court answered his questions). Jay said that the Constitution authorized the Court to interpret the law only in the context of a real case or controversy--it had no power to render an advisory opinion about the law. (Note that this limitation on the judicial power is not shared by many state supreme courts, which often do issue advisory opinions.) STANDING Among the essential elements of what the Court considers a case or controversy is an injured plaintiff. The requirement that a plaintiff show that he or she has suffered "injury in fact" is a key requirement of the Court's doctrine of standing. (Note: Since standing is necessary to establish jurisdiction, courts will undertake to examine the issue even if not raised by either of the parties.) Standing doctrine confuses both lower courts and litigants, because the Court manipulates the doctrine to serve other objectives. When the Court wants to reach the merits of a case, the standing doctrine is often relaxed. Conversely, when the Court wishes to avoid deciding the merits of a case--or perhaps, when it wants to shut a whole category of cases out of court--, the requirements for standing are tightened. The standing doctrine consists both of constitutionally-derived rules and judicially-created gatekeeping ("prudential") rules. **The Court has found Article III to require that plaintiffs demonstrate injury-in-fact, that the injury in question is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action, and that the injury is one that could be redressed by a favorable decision.** "Article III, Section 2: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;-- between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the United States Constitution (found in Art. III, Section 2, Clause 1) as embodying two distinct limitations on exercise of judicial review.[1] First, the Court has held that the clause identifies the scope of matters which a federal court can and cannot consider as a case (i.e., it distinguishes between lawsuits within and beyond the institutional competence of the federal judiciary), and limits federal judicial power only to such lawsuits as the court is competent to hear. For example, the Court has determined that this clause prohibits the issuance of advisory opinions (in which no actual issue exists but an opinion is sought), and claims where the appellant stands to gain only in a generalized sense (i.e. no more or less than people at large), and allows only the adjudication of claims where (1) the plaintiff has actually and personally suffered injury or harm "in fact", (2) the injury or harm suffered by the plaintiff is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions and (3) the injury or harm would be capable of redress by the court. As with all parts of the law, there are exceptions. One of the most significant deals with free speech and free expression cases involving the First Amendment where a party suing over a restriction on freedom of speech issues can argue the unconstitutionalty of a statute restricting certain types of speech or expression, even where the restriction might not directly affect them, such as a bookseller or video game dealer may argue that a restriction on some media restricts their customer's ability to choose various works and the restrictions could have a "chilling effect" on some publishers who might not release some works that would be affected by the law. Other than this, generally, there are usually no exceptions to the standing issue at the Federal level. Secondly, the Court has interpreted the clause as limiting Congress' ability to confer jurisdiction on federal courts. It does so by establishing an outer limit of the types of matters within which Congress may constitutionally confer jurisdiction. Historically, the Court has not interpreted this Clause to limit Congressional power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

Torts: Theories of liability Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)

NIED: elements of claim: -family member/intimate partner -be at the scene, located within the zone of danger applied to animals: -considered property -claims not actionable for property damage IIED: elements: -extreme and outrageous conduct -focus is on the actor not the victim -high damages = available but hard to secure *Rabideau brought NIED, IIED alternatives to NIED, IIED: -malicious injury to a pet -intentional interference w/ primary interests of an animal (causes of action to protect animals)

Elements of Standing to Sue

Standing in State Court A state's statutes will determine what constitutes standing in that particular state's courts. These typically revolve around the requirement that plaintiffs have sustained or will sustain direct injury or harm and that this harm is redressable. Standing in Federal Court At the federal level, legal actions cannot be brought simply on the ground that an individual or group is displeased with a government action or law. Federal courts only have constitutional authority to resolve actual disputes (see Case or Controversy). In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (90-1424), 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Supreme Court created a three-part test to determine whether a party has standing to sue: The plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," meaning that the injury is of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct brought before the court It must be likely, rather than speculative, that a favorable decision by the court will redress the injury Prudential requirements: zone of interest, no third party stdg, no generalized grievances. Promote judicial efficiency, fairness (proper plaintiffs),) not required w citizens suit provisions, only meet Art III

Jones v. Beame (legal standing)

Summary: In Jones v. Beame (45 NY2d 402 [1978]), the cause of action for a summary inquiry into the conditions of the City zoos was part of a larger complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by private persons and organizations concerned with the generally inadequate treatment of animals in municipal zoos as a result of New York City's then fiscal crisis. The Court dismissed the complaint, stating that plaintiffs, no matter how sincerely motivated, could neither utilize the courts to intervene in the fiscal choices made by the City, nor assume the management or operation of administrative agencies. The appellate decisions in Jones (supra) provide little guidance for addressing the questions presented here. While the trial court in Jones sustained as viable the cause of action for a summary inquiry pursuant to New York City Charter § 1109 (86 Misc 2d 832, 842-843), the claim was never separately addressed by the Appellate Division, First Department (56 AD2d 778 [1977]), or even mentioned by the Court of Appeals (45 NY2d 402 [1978], supra). The thrust of both appellate decisions, under the doctrines of standing or justiciability, was that the "judicial process is not designed to or intended to assume the management and operation of the executive enterprise." ( Jones v. Beame, 45 NY2d, at 408.) Even if that holding were treated as limiting the scope of section 1109 in some circumstances, it has no application here, where the summary inquiry is sought with respect to allegations of specific misconduct in relation to specific statutory provisions. (See Jones v. Beame, 56 AD2d, at 779.)

Womack pg. 181

Summary: In this Washington case, a cat owner sued a minor and his parents after the minor set her cat on fire. While this Court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Ms. Womack's private nuisance, tort outrage, and statutory waste claims, it held that the lower court incorrectly calculated the measure of damages. Noting that the Division 2 Appellate Court left open the question of emotional distress damages where a pet has been maliciously injured in Pickford v. Masion , 124 Wash.App. 257, 262-63, 98 P.3d 1232 (2004), this Court held that the general allegations include sufficient facts to find both malicious conduct toward Ms. Womack's pet and her resulting emotional distress. Thus, "[f]or the first time in Washington, we hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a person's emotional distress damages."

Animal legal defense fund v. espy

Summary: In this case, animal welfare groups and two individuals challenged the regulation promulgated by Department of Agriculture that failed to include birds, rats, and mice as "animals" within meaning of Federal Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (FLAWA). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and subsequently granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs could not demonstrate both constitutional standing to sue and statutory right to judicial review under the APA. The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss. Two individuals and two organizations jointly brought suit against the Secretary of Agriculture under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1988). The plaintiffs alleged that one of the Secretary's regulations violates the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. (1988), and that the Secretary's refusal to initiate a *498 **190 rulemaking to correct the regulation was unlawful. On the Secretary's motion to dismiss, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to sue and that the regulation was reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter, 760 F.Supp. 923 (D.D.C.1991). The court later granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the merits. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Madigan, 781 F.Supp. 797 (D.D.C.1992). The Secretary now appeals. After a thorough review of the record, it appears that none of the plaintiffs can demonstrate both constitutional standing to sue and a statutory right to judicial review under the APA. We therefore vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case with directions to dismiss.

Kennedy v. Byas

Summary: Plaintiff filed for a Writ of Certiorari requesting that his case be transfered from circuit court to county court. He was seeking damages for emotional distress, following alleged veterinary malpractice by the defendant. The Court held that Florida would not consider pets to be part of an actual family, that damages for emotional distress will not be permitted, and therefore the plaintiff did not have sufficient damages to met the circuit court jurisdictional amount. Petition denied..

Corso v. Crawford dog and cat hospital

Summary: Plaintiff sued for mental suffering after she discovered a dead cat in the casket that was meant for her dead dog in an elaborate funeral for the dog. In ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to damages beyond market value for this actionable tort, the court found that plaintiff Ms. Corso did suffer shock, mental anguish and despondency due to the wrongful destruction and loss of the dog's body. The court specifically distinguished a pet from other sentimental inanimate objects as they are not capable of returning love and affection.

Damages & evaluation: La Porte v. Associated independents

Summary: Respondent was a corporation engaged in the garbage collection business. One of its employees maliciously hurled an empty garbage can at plaintiff's pet pedigreed dog, who was tethered at the time, killing it. The issue before the court was the reconsideration not of the issue of liability, but for determination only of compensatory and punitive damages. The court stated that it was obvious from the facts that the act performed by the representative of the respondent was malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the rights of the petitioner. Having this view, there was no prohibition of punitive damages relative to awarding compensation for mental pain, as would be the case if there had been physical injury resulting only from simple negligence. The court went on to say that the restriction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such as the ones before us is a principle we cannot accept and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal because of its special training.

Vet malpractice: Price v . Brown

Summary: The issue presented in this appeal is whether a complaint based upon an alleged breach of a bailment agreement states a cause of action for injury or death suffered by an animal that has been entrusted to a veterinarian for surgical and professional treatment. The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose for which an animal is entrusted to the care of a veterinarian is a material fact that must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law, and that Price's complaint failed to state a cause of action for professional negligence. The court held that allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive the surgery.

Humane Society v. US postal service + Havens standing

Summary: The question in this case centers on whether a response from the United States Postal Service (USPS) to the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) qualifies as a "final agency action" for purposes of judicial reviewability under the APA. At issue is the HSUS's petition to the USPS to declare a monthly periodical entitled The Feathered Warriror unmailable under the AWA. While the USPS has been broadly exempted from judicial review under the APA, there are exceptions, which include "proceedings concerning the mailability of matter." While the term "proceedings" is largely undefined in the Act, the Court held that it would not limit the term to the post hoc meaning ascribed by the USPS that limits it to only "formal" proceedings. Despite finding that the actions taken by the USPS were indeed judicially reviewable, the court remanded the matter because, after the Humane Society initiated this lawsuit, Congress amended § 2156 of the Animal Welfare Act again, further defining issue of nonmailable animal fighting material. Havens standing: ????????

Brousseau v. Rosenthal

Summary: This small claims action presents the question of how to make plaintiff whole in dollars for the defendant bailee's (a boarding kennel) negligence in causing the death of plaintiff's dog. While the dog was a gift and a mixed breed and thus had no ascertainable market value, the court contravened common law principles and assessed the dog's actual value to the owner in order to make the owner whole. While resisting the temptation to romanticize the virtues of a "human's best friend," the court stated it would be wrong not to acknowledge the companionship and protection that Ms. Brousseau lost with the death of her canine companion of eight years.

Animal Welfare Act (AWA)

The Animal Welfare Act (Laboratory Animal Welfare Act of 1966, P.L. 89-544) was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on August 24, 1966.[1] It is the only Federal law in the United States that regulates the treatment of animals in research and exhibition. Other laws, policies, and guidelines may include additional species coverage or specifications for animal care and use, but all refer to the Animal Welfare Act (otherwise known as the "AWA") as the minimally acceptable standard for animal treatment and care. The USDA and APHIS oversee the AWA and the House and Senate Agriculture Committees have primary legislative jurisdiction over the Act. Animals covered under this Act include any live or dead cat, dog, hamster, rabbit, nonhuman primate, guinea pig, and any other warm-blooded animal determined by the Secretary of Agriculture for research, pet use or exhibition.[2] Excluded from the Act are birds, rats of the genus Rattus (laboratory rats), mice of the genus Mus (laboratory mice), farm animals, and all cold-blooded animals.[3] As enacted in 1966, the AWA required all animal dealers to be registered and licensed as well as liable to monitoring by Federal regulators and suspension of their license if they violate any provisions of the Animal Welfare Act and imprisonment of up to a year accompanied by a fine of $1,000.[4]:276, col. 2 As of the 1985 AWA amendment, all facilities covered by the Animal Welfare Act have been required to establish a specialized committee that includes at least one person trained as a veterinarian and one not affiliated with the facility. Such committees regularly assess animal care, treatment, and practices during research, and are required to inspect all animal study areas at least once every six months. The committees are also required to ensure that alternatives to animal use in experimentation would be used whenever possible.

People v. Garcia

The evidence at trial established that on August 2, 2003, defendant Michael Garcia, wielding a gravity knife, assaulted Emalie Martinez in her home, and also committed various other crimes against Jesus Rabassa, who was her roommate at the time, and Ms. Martinez's three children, Juan Torres, age 9, Crystal Torres, age 8, and Emalie Ann Torres, age 4. Earlier on that day, defendant had picked up a 10-gallon fish tank containing three pet goldfish belonging to Ms. Martinez's three children and hurled it into a 47-inch television screen, smashing the television screen and the fish tank, and damaging other property items in the process. Defendant then called nine-year-old Juan into the room and, said, "Hey, Juan, want to see something cool?" Defendant then proceeded to crush under the heel of his shoe one of the three goldfish then writhing on the floor. Indeed, the actions defendant took against the goldfish in this case speak to defendant's understanding that he was killing a companion animal. After awakening Emalie Martinez by threatening to smash the fish tank into her head, defendant hurled it into the family's entertainment center. Defendant then made a point of summoning Juan into the room to witness defendant's sadistic and depraved act of destroying a family pet. After piquing the boy's interest and gaining his attention, and in full view of Emalie Martinez, his mother, defendant then killed the goldfish under his shoe. These actions clearly evince defendant's understanding and intention of inflicting emotional pain on both the boy and his mother. Indeed, defendant's killing of Junior, the fish, under these circumstances could only have been undertaken for the purpose of destroying a creature the boy held dear, namely, his pet. As Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, there is at least one person to whom the statute is properly applied, and defendant's as-applied and facial challenge to the statute must fail. ( Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, supra ; People v Stuart, supra .) Accordingly, defendant's motion is denied in its entirety. Conclusion For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion is denied in its entirety.

McDougall v. Lamm

The opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether a pet owner should be permitted to recover for emotional distress caused by observing the traumatic death of that pet. Asserting that pets have achieved an elevated status that makes them companions in the lives of human beings, plaintiff Joyce McDougall asks this Court to hold that pets should no longer be considered to be mere personal property. With that fundamental shift in the way that pets are seen in the eyes of the law as her backdrop, plaintiff asks us to permit her to recover for the emotional distress she endured after she watched her dog as it was shaken to death by a larger dog. The basis in our law for recovering emotional distress damages arising out of observing the traumatic death of another was first expressed by this Court in Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). Since that time, the doctrine has been narrowly applied and we have carefully limited the circumstances in which such relief is available. In considering potential expansions of the relief permitted under Portee, we have never concluded that it can be applied to the observation of a death, however traumatic, by one who did not share a close familial relationship or intimate, marital-like bond with the victim. The question that we confront today is whether a bond with a pet meets that carefully circumscribed criteria. Although we recognize that many people form close bonds with their pets, we conclude that those bonds do not rise to the level of a close familial relationship or intimate, marital-like bond. We therefore decline to expand the traditionally and intentionally narrow grounds established in Portee to include claims arising from the death of a pet. We reach this conclusion for three essential reasons. First, we do so because expanding the cause of action recognized in Portee to include pets would be inconsistent with the essential foundation of the Portee claim itself. Second, creating a cause of action based on observing the death of a pet would result in an ill-defined and amorphous cause of action that would elevate the loss of pets to a status that exceeds the loss of all but a few human beings. Third, creating a new common law cause of action of this type would conflict with expressions of our Legislature found in both the statutory cause of action designed to address wrongful death of humans and in the statutes that govern rights and responsibilities of dog owners. The bond shared between humans and animals is often an emotional and enduring one. Permitting it to support a recovery for emotional distress, however, would require either that we vastly expand the classes of human relationships that would qualify for Portee damages or that we elevate relationships with animals above those we share with other human beings. We conclude that neither response to the question presented would be sound.

One Bite Rule

The principle provides that a defendant's dog is allowed "one bite" before liability can attach to the owner because (in theory) the owner was not aware of the dog's dangerous propensity until the first attack occurs. Probably the worst common law rule ever -- DOGS BITE -- owners are on notice of this reality! Just imagine all of the uncompensated victims out there who were unfortunate to be the first leg on the menu for these dogs who unleashed their first free bites!

Tilikum v. Seaworld

Tilikum v. Sea World (Tilikum et al. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012)) was a legal case heard in the US Federal Court in 2012 concerning the constitutional standing of an orca. It was brought by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) on behalf of Tilikum, an orca kept in the SeaWorld Orlando park, against the SeaWorld corporation. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the terms of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution applied to Tilikum, and thus that the orca's confinement amounted to involuntary servitude or slavery. The court held that the Thirteenth Amendment only applied to persons and that Tilikum was not a person, and so was not afforded constitutional protections.[1] Complaint[edit] On 25 October 2011 animal rights organization PETA brought a constitutional lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California as next friends of the orcas. They asserted the wording of the US Constitution is not expressly limited to humans, and that orcas are entitled to protection under 13th Amendment.[1][3] Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. — Thirteen Amendment PETA said that the whales "were born free and lived in their natural environment until they were captured and torn from their families." The complaint alleged the circumstances in which the whales are held results in them experiencing "extreme physiological and mental stress" and that their lifespans were shortened from "8.5 years in captivity versus up to 65 years in the wild." The lawsuit asked the court to rule that the orcas were held in illegal involuntary servitude.[1] SeaWorld called the action "baseless" and a "publicity stunt", and defended the treatment of orcas in its parks, saying "no facility sets higher standards in husbandry, veterinary care and enrichment".[3][5] The court's decision[edit] The court dismissed the action due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Dismissing the petition after two days of hearings, US District Judge Jeffrey T. Miller wrote "As 'slavery' and 'involuntary servitude' are uniquely human activities, as those terms have been historically and contemporaneously applied, there is simply no basis to construe the Thirteenth Amendment as applying to non-humans".[1][5]

assumption of risk doctrine

a person who understands and recognizes the danger inherent in a particular activity cannot recover damages in the event of an injury

Knox v. Massachussets (1981)

goldfish awarded as prize at fair -def. MSPCA stated - violation of statute -Court: does "animal" in statute include goldfish? -decision: applies to goldfish, protect animals from possible neglect of prizewinners

animals = property

lawyers: 1. need to ensure protections for animals 2. provide substitute if can't make it to Ct 3. enable human clients to have gifts for animals in testament 4. increase the amount of damages available from wrongful death/injury to plaintiffs animal

Common Exemptions (anti cruelty)

limitations: don't apply to agriculture animals limited in hunting/fishing context poorly defined protections (rule of lenity) 1st amendment limitations

Chap 2: Slaves

slaves = property (Dredd Scott v. Sanford)