AP Gov Court Cases

Powell v. Alabama (1932)

1. 9 Black men were accused of raping two white women. The Alabama court system sped through the trial, so the men were not given much time to prepare for the trial. They argued they were not given due process and having an attorney. This was a capital case, which is something that could result in the death penalty. 2. Did the trials violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Supreme Court ruled that they had not had the proper right to counsel through the sixth amendment.

Robinson v. California (1962)

1. A California statute made it a criminal offense to be addicted to the use of narcotics. Lawrence Robinson was convicted under the law, which required a sentence of at least 90 days in jail. 2. Was the California law a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment? 3. Yes, it was a cruel and unusual punishment to punish someone who is afflicted with the "illness" of being addicted to narcotics. This violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The states could not punish people merely because of their status of their addiction.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

1. A New York state law gave individuals the right to operate steamboats on interstate waters, and thus allowed states to manage interstate commerce. These rights led to friction, as some states would require out-of-state vessels to pay fees for navigation privileges. In this case, Thomas Gibbons, a steamboat owner, challenged the monopoly license granted by the state of New York to Aaron Ogden. 2. Did the state of New York have the power to regulate interstate commerce, or is that a power solely granted to Congress? 3. The Court decided that the New York monopoly on interstate trade was void, since it violated federal law. Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that managing interstate trade was a power granted by the Constitution to Congress. From that moment onward, states had much less say in the regulation of interstate commerce.

Rostker v. Goldberg (1981)

1. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that the draft be amended to include females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the draft. 2. Did the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment based on gender distinctions? 3. The Court held that Congress's decision to exempt women from registration was not a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women were not "similarly situated" for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress's judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the MSSA.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)

1. After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. 2. Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-imposed segregation? 3. The Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. The Court ruled that remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts, non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers, and no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools.

U.S. v. Lopez (1995)

1. Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, brought a concealed firearm into school in San Antonio, Texas. He was charged with possession of a firearm on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a statute, the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, which forbids individuals from bringing firearms into place they know are school zones. Lopez was found guilty after a trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. 2. Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? 3. The Court found that yes, the Gun-Free School Zones Act is unconstitutional. The possession of firearms in a local school zone is not something that, even when repeated elsewhere, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with economic activity. This case once again reaffirmed the power of Congress in relation to its role in interstate commerce, and the limits of individuals in relation to the interstate commerce powers of Congress.

Regents of the University of CA v. Bakke (1978)

1. Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year old white man, twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places for qualified minorities as part of an affirmative action program designed to make up for the lack of such minorities in the medical field. Bakke's qualifications, such as GPA and test scores, were higher than those of the minority students admitted. Bakke held that he was being excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. 2. Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by twice denying Bakke acceptance into its medical school in order to reserve spaces for qualified minorities through affirmative action? 3. The Court determined that the affirmative action program in place at the University of California both was and was not unconstitutional. There was no single majority opinion. Four justices held that any racial quota system supported by the government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bakke was admitted to the medical school anyway under orders from Justice Powell, who argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed by the school was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The other four justices, however, felt that the use of race in admissions criterion for higher education was constitutionally permissible. This case represents a longstanding argument about the merits and constitutionality of affirmative action programs. The case failed to entirely reach a concrete solution; it only minimized white opposition to affirmative action.

Craig v. Boren (1976)

1. An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxictaing" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed vendor, challenged the law as discriminatory. 2. Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? 3. The Court held that yes, the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case.

Benton v. Maryland (1969)

1. Benton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary, and he was thus sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the basis that the grand and petit juries that had indicted him were selected unconstitutionally. Benton chose to confront a new grand jury, which indicted him for larceny and burglary. The petit jury also found him guilty of both charges. Benton appealed, arguing that re-indicting him on the larceny charged after he had been acquitted was double jeopardy. 2. Did Benton's second indictment, trial, and conviction for larceny violate the Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy? 3. The Court decided that yes, the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment was violated in this case. As a result, Benton's larceny conviction was overturned. The opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall was the last major provision of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states by incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)

1. Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's witnesses were promoting their religion in a neighborhood in Connecticut. They were going door-to-door. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to seeing anti-Roman Catholic materials, and Cantwell and his son were arrested for disturbing the peace. 2. Did the solicitation ordinance or the "breach of peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights? 3. Yes, the Court ruled that the statute and ordinance did violate the Cantwells' right to free speech. While the maintenance of public order was important, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views."

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2008)

1. Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission (FED) to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The movie expressed opinions about whether or not Senator Hillary Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate campaign contributions, the BCRA restriction "electioneering communications." Section 203 prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication. Other sections require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when it is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that Section 203 violates the First Amendment when applied to the movie and its related advertisements, and the other sections are also unconstitutional. 2.Did the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell, recognizing that disclosure of donors might be unconstitutional if it imposes a burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause, resolve all constitutional as-applied challenges to the BCRA when it upheld the disclosure requirements of the statute as constitutional? Do the BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering requirements? If a communication lacks a clear plea to vote for or against a particular candidate, is it subject to regulation under the BCRA? Should a feature length documentary about a candidate for political office be treated like the advertisements at issue in McConnell and thus be subject to the regulations of the BCRA? 3. For these questions, the Court decided: no, no, yes, yes. The majority of the Court held that under the First Amendment, corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. It also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to the movie were constitutional, given that the disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the electoral with information about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)

1. Clarence Earl Gideon was charged with a felony in Florida state court for breaking into a poolroom in order to commit a misdemeanor offense. He was forced to appear in court without a lawyer because according to Florida state law, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant. Gideon represented himself in court and was found guilty. He filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court and argued that he had the constitutional right to be represented by counsel. 2. Do felony defendants in state courts still have the right to counsel in criminal cases through the Sixth Amendment? 3. The Court decided that felony defendants in state courts still have the right to be represented by an attorney. Additionally, if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, the state must provide one for them. The decision established that in every court proceeding, the defendant has the right to an attorney, and if they cannot afford one, one must be provided for them, as is consistent with the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.

Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County (1899)

1. Cumming, along with other citizens of color, filed suit against the Board of Education of Richmond County, claiming that a $45,000 tax levied against the county for education was illegal since the high schools of the county were exclusively for white students. The plaintiffs were seeking an injunction barring the collection of the total amount that was earmarked for the white only school system. 2. Is the tax levied against the people of color in Richmond County forcing them to pay for the white education system a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? 3. The Supreme Court decided that this tax was not unconstitutional. It claimed that there were many more children of color than white children in the area, and the Board could not afford to supply everyone with education. The court argued that there was a choice between educating 60 white children and education no one. The Court also denied that it had any jurisdiction to interfere with the decisions of the state courts, since the issue had to do with taxation.

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

1. Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality. 2. Does the Constitution include a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal? 3. No, there is no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and states could outlaw those practices. The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet the standard of being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."

DeJonge v. Oregon (1937)

1. Dirk Dejonge addressed an audience regarding jail conditions in the community at a communist rally. While the rally was going on, DeJonge was arrested. He was tried for violating the state's syndicalism statute- trying to teach under a communist watch. Criminal syndicalism is syndicating ideas that are not part of the ideals of the government. He moved to be acquitted for the trial, saying he was not actually teaching them, he was only assisting in a meeting where the meeting believed in those values. The right to assemble and petition is what's being incorporated in this case. 2. Does criminal syndicalism violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Supreme Court ruled that yes, criminal syndicalism does violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Schenck v. U.S. (1919)

1. During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees, urging them not to join the draft because it was a wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars advised peaceful action, such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempt to obstruct military recruitment. 2. Were Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment? 3. Schenck is not protected in this situation, according to the Supreme Court. The words he used were a "clear and present danger," as the actions had taken place during wartime. From this ruling, it was found that utterances once tolerable in peacetime can be punished during wartime.

Korematsu v. United States (1944)

1. During World War II, Presidential Executive Order Number 9066 declared that the military had the authority to prohibit Americans of Japanese descent from entering areas deemed critical to national defense and security. Korematsu remained in one of these areas (San Leandro, California) and thus was arrested for violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army. 2. Did the President and Congress have the ability to limit the freedoms of and exclude Japanese Americans during wartime? 3. The Court determined that the exclusion of Japanese Americans was lawful. Siding with the government, the Court decided that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that the exclusion was justified in such a time of "emergency and peril." This decision perpetuated racism against Japanese Americans, as well as other Americans of Asian descent. Additionally, it helped establish a trend of the government overruling people's rights during times of crisis, such as World War II.

Everson v. Board of Education (1947)

1. Everson was a taxpayer who did not find it constitutional to reimburse both public and private schools for busing. He argued that it violated the Due Process Clause. 2. Did the New Jersey statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court ruled that no, it did not violate the establishment clause. The Court ruled that the law was not supporting or paying for religious schools. Buses are separate from religion.

Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

1. Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio, who was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized organizations to set quotas for production of wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment, and thus was penalized. He claimed he wanted to use it for his own farm, arguing that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it from his own use. 2. Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions unconstitutional because Congress has no power to regulate local activities? 3. The Court ruled that Filburn was still subject to the acreage restriction, since the act regulated consumption and production, which was local. Even though the activity was local, it was still subject to be reached by Congress, since it affected interstate commerce.

Washington v. Texas (1967)

1. Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, was actually the one that shot the victim, while Washington had tried to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. 2. Is the Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. Does a state statute prohibiting persons charged for the same crime from testifying for each other violate the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process? The Court answered yes to both questions. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington was denied that right in this case.

Duncan v. Louisiana (1968)

1. Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. His request for a jury trial was denied. 2. Was the State of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury in a case such as Duncan's? 3. The Court ruled that yes, the State of Louisiana was required to provide a trial by jury in such cases. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury. Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, as it works to combat governmental oppression.

Reynolds v. U.S. (1878)

1. George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal law against bigamy. 2. Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause based on the assumption that plural marriage is part of religious practice? 3. The Court found that no, the statute is not a violation of freedom of religion. The statute can punish criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protects religious belief, but not practices that are judged to be criminal. Those who practice polygamy cannot be exempt from the law.

In re Oliver (1948)

1. Oliver was needed to appear in Michigan court and he had to testify in front of a one man grand jury. Michigan has a one man grand jury law, so he was only testifying in front of one person. The person didn't believe him, so he said his right to public trial by jury was being violated. 2. Does Michigan's one man grand jury law violate the Sixth Amendment protection of public trial? 3. Yes, it does violate the Sixth Amendment, according to the Supreme Court.

Gitlow v. New York (1925)

1. Gitlow, a socialist, was imprisoned for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" calling for the establishment of socialism through class action and strikes. Gitlow was punished for advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there had been no action resulting from the distribution of the manifesto, his arrest violated his freedom of speech. 2. Is the New York law punishing advocacy of overthrowing the government a violation of the free speech clause of First Amendment? 3. The Court decided that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment did not protect Gitlow from being prosecuted. Even though his utterances had no resulting action, they still threatened the public security, according to the Court. This rationale is sometimes called the "dangerous tendency" test; the legislature may decide that a specific class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. This ruling defined the limits of the First Amendment in reference to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. This helped establish the trend of suppressing traditionally preserved freedoms (such as the freedom of speech) during wartime or times of nationwide tension.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

1. Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director gave advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized giving counselling or other medical treatments to married couples for the purpose of preventing conception. 2. Does the Constitution protect the right of privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to seek counsel regarding the use of contraceptives? 3. Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to privacy, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create a new constitutional right to marital privacy. The Connecticut statute is thus null and void.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

1. Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence. There, they found Lawrence engaging in a private, consensual sexual act with another man. Lawrence and Garner (the other man) were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in specific intimate sexual conduct. 2. Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick be overruled? 3. The Court said no, no, and yes to these questions. The Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.

Fletcher v. Peck (1810)

1. In 1795, a Georgia legislature passed a land grant giving territory to four companies. The year after, the legislature voided the claim and declared all rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck required land that was part of the original land grant. Three years later, he sold the land to Robert Fletcher, claiming that past sales of the land had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the land grant had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land. 2. Could the contract between Fletcher and Peck be invalidated by the Georgia legislature? 3. The Court ruled that because the land had been legally passed into the hands of a purchaser for valuable consideration, the Georgia legislature could not invalidate the contract. The Court held that laws annulling contracts or grants made by previous legislative acts were unconstitutional.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

1. In 1816, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. The state of Maryland then decided to impose taxes on the bank. However, James McCulloch, the cashier of the bank, refused to pay the taxes. 2. Did Congress have the authority to establish a bank? Was Maryland interfering with the powers of Congress by imposing taxes on the bank? 3. The Court determined unanimously that Maryland did not have a right to impose taxes on the bank, since it was an instrument of the national government used to carry out federal powers. Chief Justice Marshall extended the decision to declare that the Supreme Court had more powers than simply those stated in the Constitution. The impact of the case was the confirmation that the Supreme Court had the power to control the way the Constitution is implemented.

Sweatt v. Painter (1950)

1. In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. A state law mandated that the university was only accessible to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students. 2. Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the law school intended for black students, intended to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate schools would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

1. In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for the University of Michigan Law school with the appropriate test scores and GPA. She was denied admission. The law school admits that it uses race as a factor in student admissions in order to increase student diversity. Michigan's respective courts had conflicting verdicts on the case. 2. Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 3. The Court found that the University of Michigan Law School's consideration of race was not unconstitutional, since it was to promote diversity at the school and thus maximize educational benefits. The Court reasoned that, because the admission procedure was based on more than simply race, race would not be the deciding factor for whether or not one was admitted. This case once again upheld the practice of affirmative action in higher education, supporting the verdict of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.

Parker v. Gladden (1966)

1. In 1961, Lee Parker was convicted of second-degree murder in an Oregon County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to prison for the maximum remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon confirmed this conviction. During the trial, the bailiff said to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, "Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty." Two regular jurors overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and thus did not bring them to the attention of the court. After contacting the jurors, Parker's wife asserted that the bailiff had indeed said that Parker was guilty. Parker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff's statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed this. 2. Was Parker's right to due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments violated when a bailiff told two jurors, "Oh, that wicked fellow, he guilty," and "If you find him guilty and there is anything wrong, the Supreme Court will correct it"? 3. The Court found that yes, Parker's right to due process had been violated, since the jury was no longer impartial. There was no dispute over what the bailiff said, nor that it was private talk. The Court rejected the government's argument that no prejudice was shown.

Richmond v. Croson (1989)

1. In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies that were given city construction contracts to subcontract thirty percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.S. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, sued the city. 2. Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. The decision noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to any specific injury suffered by anyone, and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. The Court further held that the basis for racial quotes would actually subvert constitutional values.

South Dakota v. Dole (1987)

1. In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to to withhold 5% of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old drinking age. South Dakota, a state that allowed a minimum drinking age of only 19, challenged the law. 2. Did Congress exceed its spending powers and violate Amendment 21 by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds to only states that adopted a 21-year-old minimum drinking age? 3. The Court found that the legislation was constitutional in acting indirectly to encourage higher drinking ages in most states. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of the "general welfare," and that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not outright forcing states to adopt the minimum drinking age.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989)

1. In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed many restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "the life of each human being begins at contraception," and the law made the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. 2. Did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court held that none of the provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. The Court held that the preamble had not been applied in order to restrict abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court, held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not approve the right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of hte law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability.

Alden v. Maine (1999)

1. In 1992, a group of probation officers sued their employer, the state of Maine, alleging that it had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. After numerous appeals, courts found that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in its own court. 2. Can Congress use its own powers under Article I of the Constitution to repeal a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts? 3. The Court decided that no, Congress cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. The terms and history of the Eleventh Amendment protect the states from private suits in their own courts. The terms of the Tenth Amendment also confirm that states retain much of their sovereignty despite agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

U.S. v. Morrison (2000)

1. In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Christy Brzonkala alleged that two male students (Antonio Morris and James Crawford) at the university had raped her. She filed a complaint against them under the school's sexual assault policy. After a hearing, one of the boys was found guilty and suspended for two semesters, while the other boy was not punished. A second hearing found the first boy guilty once again. After an appeal, his punishment was dropped as it was "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university, and sued the boys who attacked her in Federal District Court, alleging that their attack violated the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. The boys moved to overturn this claim on the grounds that the federal civil remedy provided through the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional. They said Congress lacked the authority to enact one section of it under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court held that it did not have the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate or affect interstate commerce.

Wolf v. Colorado (1949)

1. Wolf was convicted by a state court by conspiring to perform an abortion. At the trial, evidence is used that he claims has been obtained illegally, without a search warrant. 2. Are states required to exclude illegally obtained evidence from the trial under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? 3. No, states are not required to exclude all illegally obtained evidence from trial. There are specific limitations on illegally obtained evidence; not all of it must necessarily be excluded. It is on a case by case basis, and it is up to the judge to decide what evidence is and is not admissible

Gonzales v. Carhart (2006)

1. In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. Partial-birth abortion is defined as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when "the entire fetal head...or... any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother." Dr. Carhart and other physicians who performed late-term abortions sued to stop the Act from going into effect. The Act would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional "undue burden" on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional. 2. Is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 an unconstitutional violation of liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment, because it lacks an exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother? 3. The Court found that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was not unconstitutional. The Court ruled that Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion. The Act's application was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician delivers the still-living fetus past specific "anatomical landmarks." Because the Act applies only to a specific method of abortion, it was not unconstitutionally vague.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)

1. In December 1965, a group of student planned to wear black armbands to school in order to protest the Vietnam War. The school learned of this plan, and devised a policy saying that anyone wearing the armband in school would be asked to remove it, and would be suspended if they refused to. Mary Beth Tinker and Chris Eckhardt wore their bands to school anyway, and were suspended; the following day, John Tinker did the same, and met the same results. Through their parents, the students sued the school for violating the students' freedom of expression. 2. Does the prohibition of wearing armbands in public school as a form of protest violate students' First Amendment right to freedom of speech? 3. The Court ruled that the school was violating the students' First Amendment right to freedom of speech, which continued onto school property. In order to prevent the students from wearing the bands, it would have to be proven that the bands were disrupting the school process in some way. This case limited what school administrations could do to limit students' expression on school grounds. It also set a precedent for what students can do regarding protests on school grounds, and what the limits of their First Amendment rights are.

New York Times Company v. U.S. (1971)

1. In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding United States action in Vietnam. Nixon argued that prior restraint (censorship) was necessary to protect national security. 2. Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it deemed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? 3. The Court ruled that yes, the Nixon administration was violating the First Amendment by trying to prevent the publication of so-called "classified information." Since the publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate even putting the safety of American forces in danger, prior restraint was unjustified in this case.

Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972)

1. Jon Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail along with a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney. He was then convicted and sentenced to serve 90 days in jail. 2. Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right to counsel to defendants who are accused of committing misdemeanors? 3. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court found that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide an attorney to indigent defendants in cases involving serious crimes. In this case, the Court extended that right to cover defendants charged with misdemeanors who faced the possibility of a jail sentence. In order to guarantee fairness in trials involving potential jail times, no matter how petty the charge, the Court found that the state was obligated to provide the accused with counsel.

Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)

1. Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzer were all prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public school until the age of 16. All three children were Amish, with Yoder and Miller belonging to the Old Order Amish religion, and Yutzy a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs. 2. Did Wisconsin's requirement that children attend school until at least age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons? 3. The Court held that the individual's interests in the freedom of religion outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond eighth grade. The values and programs of secondary school were in sharp conflict with the mode of life mandated by the Amish religion.

Wabash v. Illinois (1886)

1. Many railways were crisscrossing the nation in 1886, and it was undecided who would regulate them. Many states established their own regulatory boards, but since the rail companies operated between states, enforcing laws on them seemed cumbersome and impractical. When the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company challenged the state of Illinois with interfering in its business, the case went to the Supreme Court. It cost more to ship a short distance (in New York) than a long distance (to outside of New York), which would hurt farmers. 2. Do the states have the power to regulate interstate commerce? 3. The Court ruled that no, the states could not regulate interstate commerce; that was a power solely vested in Congress.

Pointer v. Texas (1965)

1. On June 16, 1972, Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. Pointer then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers to the front of a nearby residence, where pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed $81 in his billfold, and a later search found $65 dollars hidden in a discarded shoe. The police arrested Pointer and the man he was talking to, Dillard, and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing. The state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury. Neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Pointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, he testified on his own behalf. He denied ever being at the 7-11. In response, the state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence. Pointer was convicted of murder. 2. Did Texas violate Pointer's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by admitting evidence drawn from a preliminary hearing where Pointer was not represented by counsel? 3. The Court found that yes, Pointer's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation required Texas to allow Pointer an opportunity to confront Dillard through counsel. Justice Black emphasized the importance of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

1. Police came to Mapp's door with a faulty search warrant that they said was legitimate. They were looking for a fugitive that they thought she was housing. When they went in with the fake search warrant, they found obscene materials that they confiscated 2. Was the confiscated material obtained protected by the First Amendment? Was evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth Amendment admissible in court? 3. The Court ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was not admissible in a state court under the Fourth Amendment.

Roe v. Wade (1973)

1. Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy through abortion. However, she was prohibited from doing so, since Texas law did not allow abortions unless they were to save the woman's life. 2. Is it unconstitutional for a woman to terminate her pregnancy through the means of abortion? 3. The Court ruled that a woman's right to an abortion was protected by the right to privacy mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of this case, women in all states are now able to legally terminate pregnancies through the means of abortion.

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

1. Several same-sex couples sued their state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Each state had bans on same-sex marriages that the couples wanted to challenge. States refused to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The couples argued that the laws against same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a same-sex marriage? Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? 3. The Court said yes to both questions, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as opposite-sex couples. The right to marry is considered a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, protects the intimate association between two people, safeguards children and families, and has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Since a same-sex union and opposite-sex union are the same with regard to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority (2002)

1. South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services) asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times if it could berth a ship at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by the Maritime Services allowed gambling on board, which caused SCSPA to deny it permission, since it said it had a policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission, alleging that SCSPA was violating the Shipping Act by its denials. 2. Does a State's sovereign immunity prevent the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984? 3. The Court ruled that a state's sovereign immunity prevents the Federal Maritime Commision from adjudicating the Maritime Services' complaint that the SCSPA has violated the Shipping Act of 1984. Historically, states were not subject to private suits, as they were immune from such actions.

Engel v. Vitale (1962)

1. The Board of Regents for the state of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer to be read at the start of the school day. This was an attempt to defuse the controversy of the religion issue by taking it out of the hands of communities. 2. Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of a school day violate the freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment? 3. The Court ruled that the prayer was unconstitutional; though it was nondenominational and voluntary, it still violated the First Amendment. By allowing the prayer, the state of New York officially approved religion. This was the first of many cases to eliminate religious practices from public ceremonies, setting a precedent for doing so.

Printz v. U.S. (1997)

1. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background checks on prospective gun purchasers until a federal system is provided for this purpose. County sheriffs in and on behalf of Montana and Arizona both challenged the constitutionality of this provision. 2. By the Necessary and Proper Clause, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to perform background checks on prospective gun purchasers called for the by the Brady Bill? 3. The Court ruled that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress the authority to require state CLEOs (state employees) to perform background checks on handgun purchasers, even temporarily. Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly by creating its own system for performing background checks, but it cannot force states to do it themselves, even temporarily. The overall issue was that the state employees were doing background checks for a federal law.

Reed v. Reed (1971)

1. The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, Sally and Cecil Reed both sought to be appointed administrators of their son's estate. The two were separated. According to the Probate Code, Cecil was the administrator. Sally challenged the law in court. 2. Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? The Court found that the law's 3. dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that to give mandatory preference to members of either gender over members of the other is to make an arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

1. The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion rights in 1988 and 1989, adding the following new provisions: required informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, parental consent for minors, and indication that the woman had informed her husband of the procedure. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. 2. Can a state require women seeking an abortion to provide informed consent, wait 24 hours and, if minors, obtain parental consent without violating their right to an abortion? 3. The Court determined that some of the provisions provided in the Pennsylvania legislature were constitutional, while the others were not. It mostly affirmed provisions consistent with Roe v. Wade. Most importantly, the case set up a new standard for the validity of laws restricting abortions. If a law presented an "undue burden" for the woman trying to obtain an abortion, it was thus unconstitutional. Out of all the Pennsylvania procedures, the only one deemed an "undue burden" was the indication of notification of the woman's spouse. Thus, the remaining provisions of the Pennsylvania legislature remained intact.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973)

1. The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which allocated reimbursement for nonpublic religious schools. In 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. On remand, the district court ordered that the schools be reimbursed anyway, despite the Supreme Court decision. Lemon and others challenged the Supreme Court's decision. 2. Can a court provide reimbursement for nonpublic religious schools, even though such allocations were previously found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court? 3. The court decided that yes, a court could provide reimbursement for secular services provided at nonpublic religious schools during the 1970-1971 school year. The Court also recognized that failing to provide this reimbursement would likely yield great financial consequences for the school districts involved who relied on the statute and funds. This case set the precedent for religious schools' connection with government; such schools could now legally be allotted funds for secular services provided. Funds provided could now no longer be claimed a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District (2007)

1. The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points, the racial tiebreaker went into effect. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents) sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2. Do the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger apply to public high school students? Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? Does a school district violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying a student admission to his/her chosen school because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance? 3. No, no, and yes. The Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "the present cases are not governed by Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, the District's plan did not involve individualized consideration of students, and employed a very limition notion of diversity ("white" vs. non-white"). The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race. The District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted towards demographic goals, not racial diversity. The District also failed to show that is objectives could have been met with non-race-conscious means.

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber (1979)

1. The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-acted training program to increase the number of skilled black workers at the company. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program, and claimed he was a victim of reverse discrimination. 2. Did the United and Kaiser training program violate the Civil Rights Act preventing discrimination on the basis of race? 3. No, the Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the Act did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.

United States v. Virginia (1996)

1. The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) had a long tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public higher learning institution. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's finding the policy unconstitutional proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. 2. Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? 3. The Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. It failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its gender-based admissions policy, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to show that VMI's male-only admission policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer the same benefits as VMI offered to mean. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, which required that all gender-based classifications be evaluated with heightened scrutiny.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

1. The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy, who was ⅞ white and only ⅛ black, took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks, and was thus arrested. 2. Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains a violation of the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court found that the state law is not unconstitutional. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, which states that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment as long as they were equal. Overall, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.

Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967)

1. The state of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The state planned to suspend its prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future through a nolle prosequi. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The judge granted the state's request. 2. Does the nolle prosequi deny Klopfer his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial? 3. The Court decided that yes, indefinitely suspending a trial violates a defendant's right to a speedy trial. The Court also held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Sixth Amendment to the states.

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

1. This case consolidated four cases from different states, all focusing on the issue of racial segregation of schools. In each case, African Americans had been denied entry into schools based on racial segregation. They argued that this violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the lower courts, the plaintiffs had been denied relief based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which had ruled that segregation of schools through "separate but equal" education for blacks and whites did not directly constitute discrimination. As long as the schools were "substantially equal," African American students could be denied entry into traditionally white schools. 2. Did the racial segregation of schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. The Court determined that "separate but equal" facilities are unconstitutional because they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the segregation of public schools was detrimental to the education and personal growth of African American children. This Supreme Court decision began the integration of African American students into traditionally white schools. Also, this decision led to the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, as more people recognized racial disparities between whites and people of color in America.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

1. This case was a consolidation of four different cases; in each case, the defendant confessed to guilt after being interrogated without being informed of their Fifth Amendment rights. On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house based his suspected involvement with a kidnapping and rape. He was taken to a police station and interrogated about his connection, after two hours of which he produced a written confession. The confession was used as evidence at trial, despite the fact that the police officers admitted they had not informed Miranda of his right to have an attorney present at the investigation. The jury found Miranda guilty. 2. Does the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment extend to a suspect being interrogated by police? 3. The Court decided that law enforcement officials are required to inform someone being taken into police custody of their right to remain silent and to have a lawyer present during interrogations. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause extends to all situations, including police interrogations. This decision set the precedent for the reading of so-called "Miranda rights" when a suspect is arrested. Those taken into police custody must be reminded that: they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of law, the right to a lawyer, and the fact that if at any point they request a lawyer, police must stop their interrogation.

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)

1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination in places of public accommodation if it should disrupt commerce. The Heart of Atlanta motel in Atlanta, Georgia refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II. 2. Did Congress exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels of the right to choose their customers through the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 3. The Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional, and that Congress had not exceeded the powers of the Commerce Clause. The Court ruled that places of public accommodation did not have the right to select customers as they saw fit if it would disrupt the interstate flow of goods and people.

Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1989)

1. Two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private drug rehab organization ingested peyote, a powerful hallucinogen, as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result, the organization fired the counselors, who then filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was work-related "misconduct." 2. Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? 3. The Court found that yes, the state can deny unemployment benefits for such a work. The Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to state laws affecting religion would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations such as compulsory military service and payment of taxes.

Malloy v. Hogan (1964)

1. William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1954 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, he was sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of $500. The sentence was suspended after 90 days, and he was placed on two years of probation. 16 months later, a Superior Court referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When he refused, he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. 2. Does the Fourteenth Amendment protect a state witness's Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding? 3. Yes, it does, according to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state. The Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment secures defendants against self-incrimination and compels state and federal officials to establish guilt by evidence that is free and independent of a suspect's or witnesses' statements.

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

The University of Michigan's Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, include race. The OUA admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be "underrepresented minorities." Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority. In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of Michigan. Both were white. Both were denied admission. Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, Lee Bollinger, the LSA, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2. Did the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 3. Yes; the OUA's policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Because the policy did not provide individual consideration, but rather results in the admission of nearly every applicant of "underrepresented minority" status, it was not narrowly tailored in the manner required by previous jurisprudence on the issue.1.