Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Six Day War 1967

Historiographical interpretations

(1) Liberal (a) Pro-Israel = Conflict was clearly provoked by Nasser = Closure of Tiran Straits. (b) Nasser did not necessary aim to antagonize Israel, but to show Arab governments that he was a champion of Pan-Arabism. (2) Structuralist = attributes the escalation of conflict to regional developments rather than one particular player. (3) Cold War = Cold War was the defining context = Six Day War was the result of US and USSR manipulation of regional powers.

Deterioration of US-Egypt Relations

(1) Tense relationship between President Johnson and Nasser (2) Nasser allows the Viet Cong to open office in Cairo while the US is completely embroiled in the 1955-1975 Vietnam War (similar to Nasser's recognition of Communist China 1956) (3) Johnson a strong supporter of Israel: supplies Israel with tanks (offensive weapon)

Outcome of the Six Day War

(A) Israel = (1) Resounding military victory = dominant country in the region; (2) increased its territory threefold; (3) increased sense of security. (3) Israel's strong position after the war did not encouarage concessions to Arab neighbors. (B) Arab = (1) Egypt suffered a resounding military and political defeat; no longer considered the hero of Arab nationalism; (2) Syria under the Baathist regime started to emerge as Israel's main rival = launches the Israeli-Syrian arms race, which attracts greater superpower involvement. The Arab world's defeat after the Six Day War precluded its capacity to negotiate with Israel on an equal playing field. The scales had tipped in Israel's favor. (C) International = (1) USSR's reputation as an ally is tarnished because of the Arab countries' resounding defeat. (2) US sees Israel as a valuable asset in the fight against Soviet influence as Israel resisted its Arab neighbors who were considered to be Soviet clients. (D) Palestinians = for them the Six Day War illustrated yet again that Arab leaders were not committed to liberating Palestine. The Arabs' defeat in the war had caused the Palestinians even greater territorial losses and had compounded the Palestinian refugee problem.

Long-term causes

1. "No war- no peace" era that the 1948 armistice agreements had introduced = made war between Israel and Arab countries prospective. 2. Cleft between radical and moderate Arab governments (linked to the rise of the Baathist Party in Syria; Nasser pushed into radicalism) 3. Increasing tension on Israeli-Syrian Border (Water Wars)

Short-term causes

1. Egypt's Defense Treaties with Syria and Jordan 2. False Soviet Intelligence Report 3. Expulsion of the UNEF forces 4. Closure of Tiran Straits 5. US condonation of an attack

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

1964. Founded by Nasser. First head of PLO = Ahmad al-Shakuyri (chosen by Nasser. al-Shakuyri did not support PLO infiltration into Israel. Motives: (1) Nasser's attempt to integrate Palestinian nationalism under his control; especially the activities of the fedayeen, which were based in Egypt (2) Nasser's way to boost his own leadership credentials in his regional rivalry with Syria and Iraq = with the PLO Nasser was able to appear the spearhead of the Arab nationalism. (3) Attempt to diffuse Syrian demands for military challenge against Israel in light of Water Wars = by supporting Palestinians, the opposition to Israel was implicit Consequences: Reaction from Syria: (1) Syria accuses Nasser of forming the PLO so as to exploit the Palestinian grievances for his own political reputation and simultaneously to be able to shelve the Palestinian issue later. (2) The PLO's activities were perceived by Syria as a "façade of activism" because al-Shaqayri did not sanction raids into Israel. (3) Syria begins to support Fatah instead as its plan to eclipse al-Shaqayri, PLO and Nasser. Reaction from Jordan: (1) Alarmed by the formation of PLO: (a) since King Husayn ruled over a population that was comprised on app. 60% Palestinians, the formation of the PLO might give fuel to a Palestinian uprising against Jordanian monarchy; (2) PLO planned to make advances on West Bank, i.e. a territory that Husayn annexed and needed in order to manage economy. Significance: (1) Became the official international representative for Palestine and the Palestinian refugee problem = served as an umbrella for other Palestinian resistance groups. (2) PLO became embroiled in the inter-Arab struggle for influence between Eygpt, Syria and Iraq in this period.

USSR Increases Aid to Egypt

1965. USSR aid to Egypt, Syria and Iraq exceeded US aid to Israel; however, USSR provided defensive weapons while the US supplied offensive weapons, so qualitatively Israel still had the upper-hand. Motives: (1) In light of US' bombing of Norther Vietnam, USSR reckoned that by continuing aid to Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the USSR could solidify its presence in the Middle East. USSR had an incentive to do so considering the mounting tension between China and USSR and the obvious rivalry between US and USSR Consequences: (1) Strengthened US-Israel ties and weakened US-Egyptian ties. (2) Increased Israel's suspicions that Eygpt had a belligerent intent and thus contributed to Israel's perception that a preemptive war was necessary. Significance; (1) Relevant to the Cold War interpretation fo the Six Day War.

Rise to Power of the Baathist Party in Syria

1966. Radical (left-wing) party that pushed for offensive stance towards Israel (especially in light of the Israeli-Syrian Water Wars/ border tensions) Motives: (1) To radicalize Arab society and to bring Nasser within its orbit despite previous disagreements (2) To use Fatah's raids to destabilize King Husayn.

Khartoum Conference

1967. Convened between Arab countries in light of the Six Day War. The resolution called for: (1) a continued state of belligerency with Israel. Famous for the "Three No's": "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it." Significance: (1) The debate on how to proceed in the wake of the Six Day War was won in favor of the hardliners. (2) Illustrates real Arab intransigence on the issue of Israel after Six Day War (not like during the 1948 war) (3) Precludes conditions that are conducive to forging peace settlements

Resolution 242

Adopted by the UN in the aftermath of the Six Day War. The resolution refers to the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East". Also calls for the just settlement of the refugee problem. Problems: (1) Clause pertaining to refugees is vague = fails to really address the plight of the Palestinian refugees (2) "All territories vs. territories" (a) Arab states call for Israeli withdrawal from all territories; (b) Israel insists it must hold on to some territories. The resolution adopts the phrasing "territories" which implies that Israel need not withdraw from all of them (pro-Israel). Consequences: (1) Stalemate

US Delay of the Pressing of Ceasefire June 6-7

After the outbreak of the Six Day War, Israeli diplomats persuade the US to wait with pressing a ceasefire. Motives: (1) June 6 Israel on its way to occupy West Bank and Jerusalem. To occupy this territory was a historical opportunity that the arrangement of a ceasefire would ruin. Consequence: (1) Israel occupies the West Bank. Significance: (1) Victory for revisionist Zionism (Begin insisted on Israeli expansion on the West Bank). (2) Illustrates how Israel exploited the Six Day War to expand its borders and not for reasons directly related to the casus belli (Straits) or national security.

Israeli-Syrian Air-battle

April 1967. Syrian-Israeli air-battle over DMZ. Culmination of Syrian-Israeli tension (due to Water Wars etc.) Motives: (1) Syrian Baathist president considered the battle to be a useful = (1) Action against Israel; (2) An incitement to Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine. (2) Egypt alarmed (defense treaty with Syria implicated Nasser) = Nasser sent officials to consult with Syria

Palestinian National Charter

Drafted by the PLO's main political institution, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), in May 1964. (1) Outlines Zionism as an imperial/colonial movement. (2) Declares that an armed struggle will be taken up by the Palestinians to retrieve Palestine as their homeland. During the peace processes of the 1990s, mediators included a revision of the National Charter as a prerequisite for peace. (?)

Nasser's "Face-Saving Compromise"

June 2, 1967. Nasser agrees to dispatch his vice president to negotiate with the US about the reopening of the Tiran Straits. Meeting scheduled to take place on June 7. Consequences: (1) Interpreted as Nasser's "face-saving compromise" by Israel = Israel was determined to deny Nasser any political victory. Significance: (1) Explains the timing of the Six Day War: Israel stood to gain from a confrontation with Eygpt and was justified due to the closure of the Trian Straits. Wanted to attack Egypt preemptively before Egypt had the chance to negotiate with the US, whereafter the international community would pressure Israel into backing down.

Israel attacks U.S. Liberty

June 8, 1967. Israel destroys an American intelligence-gathering ship stationed in the Sinai. Israel explains it was an accident and President Johnson accepts this apology. Motives: (1) In order to prevent US intelligence from knowing their plans to expand borders (Syria) = America condoned preemptive attack against Egypt and not a campaign of territorial expansion. (According to Johnson, Israel assures the US they do not intend to expand borders with war.) Significance: (1) Illustrates how American support for Six Day War was tacit. (2) Demonstrates how Israel exploited the Six Day War to expand territory and not for reasons directly related to the casus belli or national security.

The Six Day War

Lasted from June 5-10 1967. During the course of six days, Israel occupies and secures Sinai, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights Consequence: (1) New territorial frameworks. Newly occupied territories become a main point of contention in the subsequent peace arrangements. (2) 100, 000 additional Palestinian refugees cross from West Bank to East Bank (Jordan) (3) Israel begins to build "facts on the ground" in the newly occupied territories, i.e. Muslim settlements are evicted and replaced by Jewish ones. = part of Israel's realpolitik.

False Soviet Intelligence Report

May 13, 1967. USSR report that falsely stated Israel had mobilized and intended to invade in Syria. Motives of report are subject to much speculation: (1) The report was simply poorly evaluated and misunderstood (2) The USSR wanted a war involving Egypt in order to demonstrate Egypt's ability to fight with USSR arms (e.g. Evengy Pyrlin (Head of the Egypt Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry) (3) USSR deliberately issued false information in order to involve the US in another conflict and thus to weaken their position in Vietnam War. (Cold War interpretation) (4) The USSR wanted to diffuse Syrian claims for a military confrontation by issuing this information because both Israel and the other (moderate) Arab countries would stop short of war. (5) Israel deliberately misled the USSR in order to intimidate Syria by issuing such a report. Consequences: Nasser takes swift action due to defense pact with Syria. (1) Mobilizes troops in Sinai (May 14th) (2) Expels UN forces that were stationed in Sinai since 1957.

Jordanian-Egyptian Defense Treaty

May 1966. Defense agreement between Egypt and Jordan. King Husayn mobilizes and places his troops under Egypt's military command. Motives: (1) Jordan was in light of the Samua Raid more willing to consider an alliance with Arab rivals. Consequences: (1) By placing Jordanian troops under Eygpt's military command, Jordan was implicitly associated with Syria due to the defense treaty Egypt also had with Syria. (Jordan and Syria were archrivals in the region). (2) Mobilization and defense treaty confirmed Israel's suspicions of Egypt's belligerent intent.

Eshkol's hesitation to attack after the closure of Tiran Straits

May 1967. Although by closing the Straits, Nasser officially gave Israel a casus belli, Eshkol did not attack. The US wanted to avoid a war and assured Israel it would try to reopen the Straits. Motives: (1) Did not want to attack without support from the US. Consequences: (1) Israeli public was outraged: they wanted a minister who would wage a war in response to Arab aggression. They were convinced they could win against Egypt and thus have the opportunity to expand Israel's borders. (2) IDF pressures Eshkol for the inclusion of Rafi (Ben-Gurion; Dayan) and Gahal (Begin) parties in the cabinet = much more eager to wage war. Eshkol succumbs to the pressure and includes Rafi and Gahal on June 1st, 1967.

Closure of the Tiran Straits

May 22 1967. Huge impediment to Israeli trade = Israel's casus belli during the Suez Crisis. Motives: (1) Because Nasser did not occupy Sharm al-Sheikh immediately after the expulsion of the UNEF forces, Arab rivals still considered Nasser to be cowardly in his stance toward Israel = pushes Nasser to occupy Sharm al-Sheikh by closing the Tiran Straits in order to blunt Arab criticism. Nasser was convinced his brinkmanship did not imply war; his goal was a political victory. Consequences: (1) Gave Israel a casus belli, but Eshkol hesitated to attack as he did not yet have US support.

Syrian-Egyptian Defense Treaty

November 1966. Defense agreement between Egypt and Syria. Motives: (1) Military alliance with Syria purported to give Nasser some control over future Israeli-Syrian confrontations. (Nasser wanted to avoid confrontation with Israel). (2) Nasser was eager to assert his own authority within the Arab nationalist movement in light of Syria's very active stance towards Israel and the Palestinian issue. Consequences: (1) Automatically implicates Egypt if Syria attacks Israel or Israel attacks Syria (Link to False Soviet Intelligence Report May 1967) (2) Egyptian-Jordanian relations deteriorate = Jordan hostile to Syria and vice-versa (3) Syria's confidence for an attack on Israel is boosted (3) Increases Israel's threat perception in the region = contributes to the tension Significance: (1) Nasser joins radical camp on Israeli issue

Samua Raid

November 1966. Massive retaliatory raid on a town (Samua) in the West Bank = 125 homes blown up. Israeli retaliation in response to Fatah land mine raid near the West Bank border, which killed 3 Israeli soldiers on a border patrol. Motives: (1) Israel's response to the Syrian-Egyptian military alliance. (2) Some speculate that the Samua Raid was ordered by Eshkol (Israeli PM) in order to show that firm action was taken against Arab hostility. Consequence: (1) Palestinian demonstrations break out = protest against their exposure to Israeli retaliation and the inadequate protection provided by King Husayn. (2) King Husayn accuses Nasser of hiding behind UN troops in Sinai. Significance: (1) Indicative of Israel's hardline defense strategy.

Fatah

Palestinian guerrilla organization founded 1957. (1) Principals leaders: Yasser Arafat. (2) Supported by Syria, especially Baath party. Began to undertake Syrian-back air raids from 1965 onwards (especially on Israeli water diversion projects) = app. 40 operations were organised in 1965. Motives: (1) The Suez Crisis had, in addition to the 1948-war, shown the Palestinian refugees that Arab leaders tended to focus their efforts on their personal foreign political and domestic goals, rather than the Palestinian issue. (2) The international community too seemed to have forgotten the plight of the Palestinian refugees Significance; (1) An event of Palestinian political and military revival. (2) Arafat and the Fatah were later to become the core of the PLO

Rafi and Gahal Included in Israeli Cabinet

Since the closure of the Tiran Straits, the IDF had pressured Eshkol for the inclusion of Rafi and Gahal parties in the cabinet = much more eager to wage war. Eshkol succumbs to the pressure and includes Rafi and Gahal on June 1st, 1967. Dayan = defense minister Begin = minister without portfolio Consequences: (1) Once Dayan and Begin were in key positions, direct confrontation inevitable

Israeli-Syrian Water Wars

Tension between Syria and Israel over Isreal's access to water diversion installments from the Jordanian River located in the Israeli-Syrian DMZ. Syria was outraged by this behavior from Israel, because by diverting water in the DMZ, Israeli de facto claimed sovereignty of area. Motives: (1) The river was crucial for Israel's, Jordan's and Syria's agricultural plans. (2) Some claim that Israel did this in a DMZ in order to provoke Arab retaliation, which Israel could use to justify its accusations concerning Arab hostility. Consequences: (1) Frequent confrontations between Israel and Syria starting in the 1950's and continuing well into the 1960's. (2) Reprisals increased when the Baathist regime came to power in 1966. (See (3) Arab neighbors afraid that Syria would demand support in a military confrontation with Israel. This was something Arab states were unprepared to do. (a) Nasser attempted to diffuse Syrian demands for anti-Israeli military challenge by sponsoring the formation of PLO (see formation of the PLO).

Nasser expels UNEF forces in Sinai

UNEF forces were stationed in the Sinai to act as a buffer between Israel and Egypt since 1957. Between 1965 and 1966 both Syria and Jordan had accused Nasser of hiding behind the UN. (a) Syria = in order to push Nasser into taking more radical action against Israel (b) Jordan = after the Samua Raid 1966. Nasser opts for a complete withdrawal of UNEF forces after the False Soviet Intelligence Report; also in the Sharm al-Sheikh region from where Egypt could once against close the Tiran Straits. However, Egypt did not occupy Sharm al-Sheikh right away. Motives: (1) To respond to intelligence report (2) To show Arab rivals that Nasser was not afraid to face the Israelis Consequences: Israeli reaction: (1) Israel interprets this as an act of belligerence as the UNEF troops (a) served as a buffer and (b) prevented Egypt from re-closing the Tiran Straits (which was the casus belli during the Suez Crisis). (2) The UN urged Israel to deploy troops on their side of the border, but because this did not prevent the closure of the Tiran Straits, Israel refused = no buffer. (3) Eshkol (Israeli PM) responds by actually mobilizing IDF forces.

US Involvement

US intelligence bodies eclipsed the State Department and supported an Israeli attack on Egypt. (1) Abe Fortas (Supreme Court Justice) and Arthur Goldberg (UN Ambassador) assure Israel that the US would not object to an attack against Egypt. (May 25, 1967) (2) Meir Amit (head of Mossad = Israeli intelligence) flies to the US and discusses the imminent attack with the CIA and Pentagon (not with State Department officials who were ready to negotiate with Egypt). (June 2-3, 1967) (3) Johnson administration supplies Israel with arms (i.e. tanks, very offensive weapons). Motives: (1) Americans assumed that as a result of attack on Egypt, there would be an opportunity for peace (= some sort of "Land for Peace" settlement that would push Arab countries to negotiate) (2) US-Eygpt relations deteriorated in the period leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day War. Consequences: (1) Undermines the case of Israeli officials (like Eshkol) who wanted to avoid confrontation with Arab neighbors by pending American approval. (2) Although this did not come from official US government officials, the new Israeli cabinet (with Dayan and Begin) took this as the condonation of attack that they needed from US (that Eshkol did not have in the weeks prior). Significance: (1) Contributes to the outbreak of the Six Day War.