CivPro Quick-Quiz
A customer, a citizen of State A, ate dinner at a restaurant. The restaurant is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in State B. After dinner, the customer ate dessert at an ice cream shop, which is incorporated and has its principal place of business in State B. That night, the customer became ill and was hospitalized for food poisoning. He brought an action against the restaurant for negligence in federal court for $100,000.The restaurant owner believes that the customer became ill from the dessert that he ate at the ice cream shop, and therefore wants to bring it into the action. Which of the following statements is true? A-The restaurant may not implead the ice cream shop because it and the restaurant are not diverse. B-The restaurant may not implead the ice cream shop because the claim is not a proper third-party claim. C-The restaurant may move to join the ice cream shop as a defendant because it is a necessary party. D-The restaurant may implead the ice cream shop.
A defendant may implead a nonparty, but only if the nonparty is or may be liable to him for any part of a judgment that the plaintiff may recover against him. Usually, such an impleader claim will be for indemnity or contribution. Here, the restaurant is not alleging that the ice cream shop may be liable to it in indemnity or contribution. Rather, it is alleging that the customer sued the wrong party. This also makes (D) incorrect. (A) is incorrect. Had the claim been a proper third-party claim, the restaurant could implead the ice cream shop despite the fact that both are citizens of the same state, as supplemental jurisdiction could be invoked. (The withdrawal provisions in the supplemental jurisdiction apply, if at all, only to claims by the plaintiff.) (C) is incorrect because the ice cream shop is not a necessary party. A party is necessary if complete relief cannot be accorded among the parties in the lawsuit. Here, the customer's claim against the restaurant can be resolved without making the ice cream shop a party.
To avoid an accident with a motorcyclist from State A, a truck driver from State B drove his truck off the road, damaging the front porch of a home in State C. Immediately after the accident, the truck driver and the homeowner got into a heated argument, and the truck driver assaulted the homeowner. The homeowner sued the truck driver in a federal court in State C, seeking $50,000 for property damage caused by the truck driver's negligent driving and $30,000 for personal injuries caused by the assault. The truck driver then impleaded the motorcyclist, alleging that the motorcyclist's negligent driving caused the truck driver to swerve into the homeowner's porch. Under the law of State C, joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the entirety of the plaintiff's loss regardless of each tortfeasor's degree of fault. May the homeowner assert a claim for $50,000 against the motorcyclist in this case, based on the motorcyclist's negligent driving? A-Yes, because the claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of one of the homeowner's claims against the truck driver. B-No, because the homeowner waived his right to assert a claim against the motorc
A party may not assert a claim in a federal action unless (i) the Federal Rules allow for such a claim and (ii) there is subject matter jurisdiction for the claim. Under the Federal Rules, a plaintiff may assert a claim against a third-party defendant so long as that claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff (i.e., the defendant). Thus, the homeowner may assert his claim against the motorcyclist because the claim is related to his claims against the truck driver; hence, (B) and (C) are incorrect. However, there is no subject matter jurisdiction for the claim. First, there is no federal question jurisdiction because the claims are state law negligence claims. Second, there is no diversity of citizenship; although the homeowner (from State C) and the motorcyclist (from State A) are diverse, the claim for $50,000 fails to meet the amount in controversy requirement of more than $75,000. Third, there is no supplemental jurisdiction for the claim. Supplemental jurisdiction exists for a claim if it meets two requirements: (i) the claim must be sufficiently related to claims in the action for which federal question or diversity jurisdiction exists; and (ii) the claim must not be excluded under 28 U.S.C. 1367(b), which prohibits the use of supplemental jurisdiction when it would be contrary to requirements of diversity jurisdiction. Claims excluded under section 1367(b) include, among other things, claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14. Although the homeowner's claim against the motorcyclist is closely related to his claims against the truck driver's diversity claims, the grant is withdrawn under section 1367(b) because the homeowner's claim is a claim by a plaintiff against a person (the motorcyclist) made a party under Rule 14.
A carload of gang members, armed with automatic rifles, sped into the rival gang's neighborhood one night looking for a store that its rival gang used as a hangout. The gang members knew that the store closed at 6 p.m. and that the rival gang usually went elsewhere after nightfall. As the gang members drove by, they sprayed the building with bullets. One of the bullets struck and killed a six-year-old girl who was asleep in an apartment located on the second floor above the corner store. A few days later, the police arrested the defendant, who admitted to being a member of the gang and to having been in the car when the gang members shot up the store. The defendant was placed on trial for the girl's murder. If the defendant takes the stand in his own defense, and the jury believes the defendant's testimony, which of the following assertions by the defendant would be his best defense to the murder charge? A-"I was the driver of the car and did not actually shoot into the building." B-"I took a lot of drugs that night, and I was so high that I don't even remember the incident; I did not intend to kill somebody." C-"Another member of my gang pointed a gun at me. I was really scared that if
If the defendant believed that the building was abandoned, he probably will not be found to have had the requisite mens rea for murder. Murder is the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought. Malice aforethought exists when the defendant has (i) intent to kill, (ii) intent to inflict great bodily injury, (iii) reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life ("abandoned and malignant heart"), or (iv) intent to commit a felony (under the felony murder doctrine). Here, the jury could find that spraying a building with gunfire from a submachine gun demonstrates a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life even though the defendant was not intending to shoot anyone. However, if the jury accepts his assertion that he believed that the building was abandoned and had no idea that there would be any people inside it, the jury will probably find that he did not have a sufficient awareness of an unjustifiably high risk to human life to be liable for murder. (A) is not as strong a defense as (D) because the defendant may still be found liable for the murder as an accomplice. The defendant will be an accomplice to the drive-by shooting even if he was only the driver because he assisted the principal in the commission of the crime and had the intent to do so. An accomplice is liable not only for the crime he intended to aid but also for any other crimes committed during commission of the intended crime if the other crimes were probable or foreseeable. Here, even though the gang members knew that the store was closed, a jury could find that it was foreseeable that someone would be killed when they sprayed the building with gunfire. Even if the defendant was only the driver, his best defense would be his belief that the building was abandoned.
A corporation has been the subject of several news reports charging that the pollution put out by its factory endangers 5,000 residents of a subdivision. The corporation filed an action naming all 5,000 residents as defendants and seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not liable for damaging their health, and the court properly certified the action as a class action. Per court order, detailed notice of the suit is posted on every lightpole throughout the subdivision, but the residents are not notified individually. Was notice in this case constitutional? A-Yes, because the posting was reasonably calculated to give notice to all 5,000 residents. B-Yes, if a state statute authorizes such process. C-No, because all residents could reasonably be notified by mail. D-No, because individual defendants must always be notified by personal service of a summons.
Notice here was not constitutional. Due process requires that the method of giving notice must have a reasonable prospect of giving actual notice. Posting of notice is insufficient to notify persons whose names and addresses are known. These persons must be notified at least by ordinary mail. Thus, (A) is incorrect. (B) is incorrect because, even if authorized by statute, due process requirements would not be met. (D) is incorrect because personal service is not always required.
A company refused to hire a woman based on her religious beliefs in violation of federal civil rights laws. The company was incorporated in State A, and its principal place of business was in State B. The events relating to the woman's claim occurred in State B. Thereafter, the woman found employment in State A. She moved to State A and commenced an action against the company in the federal court for State A. She hired a process server to serve the company, who served the company's treasurer at its offices in State B. State A and B each authorize service of process on corporations only by personal delivery of the summons and complaint on its president, vice president, or secretary. The company has timely moved to dismiss the complaint based on improper venue and improper service of process. How should the court decide the motion? A-The court should grant the motion because venue and service of process are improper. B-The court should grant the motion because service of process is improper. C-The court should grant the motion because venue is improper. D-The court should deny the motion.
Service on the treasurer was effective service. Under the Federal Rules, a corporation may be served by serving any corporate officer or managing or general agent. Alternatively, service may be made under state rules or by mail under the waiver of service provision. Here, service is proper because the treasurer, an officer of the corporation, was served. Service need not comply with state law as well. Service in accordance with state law is an authorized alternative to the service methods specified in the Rules. Venue is proper because the corporation resides there. Venue is proper in (i) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; (ii) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or in which a substantial part of property at issue is located; or (iii) if there is no district anywhere in the United States which satisfies (i) or (ii), a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. A corporate defendant resides in any federal judicial district in which it is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. Here, for venue purposes, the company resides in the federal district of State A because it would be subject to that district court's personal jurisdiction in this action. Specifically, it would be subject to the court's general personal jurisdiction because it was incorporated in State A, meaning it could be sued in State A on any claim, including the civil action in question, which arose from acts in State B.
A plaintiff sued a defendant in federal court for $200,000 in damages arising from an automobile accident involving the plaintiff's vintage sports car. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had run a red light and caused the accident. The defendant claimed that the light was green. The plaintiff files a motion for summary judgment supported by an authenticated surveillance video that clearly shows the defendant driving through the red light, as well as an affidavit from a vintage car expert who described the value of the plaintiff's car and the cost of repairing the damage. The defendant opposes the motion for summary judgment but offers no supporting evidence regarding the color of the light. He does, however, offer affidavits from two car experts who stated that the plaintiff's car was not nearly as valuable as he claimed and that only $50,000 worth of damage was done to it. Can the court grant the motion for summary judgment? A-Yes, the court can grant complete summary judgment. B-Yes, the court can grant partial summary judgment on the matter of liability. C-No, because there is a genuine dispute of material fact. D-No, because federal courts do not have the power to grant partia
The court can grant partial summary judgment on the matter of liability and give the issue of damages to a jury. Summary judgment may be partial as well as complete. Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the cause of the car accident, the court can grant partial summary judgment on that issue. (D) is therefore incorrect. (A) and (C) are incorrect because there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the monetary value of the damage to the plaintiff's car. (B) is Correct.
A winery properly filed a diversity action in federal court against a retailer, alleging damages for breach of warranty regarding the sale and advertising of several of the winery's more expensive brands of wine. Following the presentation of all evidence, each party moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"). The district court granted the retailer's motion and returned a judgment in its favor. Two weeks after the judgment was entered, the winery filed a motion for a new trial, but it did not renew its motion for a JMOL. The winery claimed that there were several contested issues of fact that the jury should have considered. Specifically, the parties had disputed whether evidence of all, or certain material parts, of a deposition was properly introduced before the district court. The district court determined that the judgment in favor of the retailer should be set aside and ordered judgment to be entered for the winery. Did the district court act properly? A-Yes, because federal law permitted the court to set aside the verdict and enter a judgment in accordance with the winery's JMOL. B-Yes, because the court had the option to join the winery's motion for a new trial, or, in t
The court did not act properly because the winery failed to move for a renewed JMOL following the trial court verdict. The moving party may renew its request for JMOL by filing a motion no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial. If a verdict was returned by the district court, the court may either (i) allow the judgment to stand, (ii) order a new trial (if a post-trial motion for a new trial was filed), or (iii) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law (if a post-trial motion for a renewed JMOL was filed). After the retailer's motion for JMOL was granted, the winery, the losing party, simply moved for a new trial, but did not seek a renewed motion for JMOL. Thus, it was an error for the district court to enter a judgment for the winery. (B) is incorrect because the options presented to the court apply only where the moving party has filed a renewed motion for a JMOL. (A) is incorrect for the same reason, since the winery never renewed its motion for a JMOL following the district court's decision. (D) is incorrect. Although it provides a plausible reason for the court to grant a new trial before a different jury, it fails to address the improper action of the court based on failure of the winery to file a renewed motion for a JMOL.
A plaintiff sued a defendant in federal court for medical malpractice. During jury selection, the defendant's attorney asked the potential jurors whether they had ever been involved in a medical malpractice lawsuit. One potential juror stated that he had been a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case and was distrustful of doctors because of his experience. The defendant's attorney used a peremptory strike against this potential juror. Another potential juror, a doctor, had been sued for medical malpractice twice in the past, but she denied ever being involved in a medical malpractice suit. She was selected for the jury along with 11 others. During the course of the trial, one juror was excused because he became ill. The case went to the jury, and the 11 jurors returned with a unanimous verdict for the defendant. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff discovered through independent investigation that the juror who was a doctor had lied. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the defendant's attorney had exercised his peremptory strike for an improper reason, that a juror lied during the jury selection process, and that the verdict was rendered by less than the requir
The court is likely to grant the plaintiff's motion because the juror lied during the jury selection process. A new trial is appropriate if a juror gave false testimony on voir dire or concealed material facts relating to her qualifications to serve. (D) is therefore incorrect. (A) is incorrect because a party may exercise a peremptory strike for any reason as long as it is race- and gender-neutral. (C) is incorrect because a jury must have at least six and no more than 12 jurors. A juror may be excused for good reason without causing a mistrial so long as at least six jurors participate in reaching the verdict.
A woman who had been living in a foreign country for many years traveled to the United States to assist her brother, who had been indicted for a serious crime committed in State A. She retained a lawyer who resided in State A to represent her brother, and then she returned to the foreign country. Thereafter, the lawyer sent the woman a bill for $100,000 for his services, but she refused to pay. Before she moved to the foreign country, the woman had resided in State B. Although the woman is still a citizen of the United States, she had moved to the foreign country 10 years ago, intending to live there permanently. May the lawyer commence an action against the woman for breach of contract in the federal court for State A? A-Yes, because the action is between citizens of different states. B-Yes, because the action is between a citizen of a state and an alien. C-No, because the federal court for State A may not exercise personal jurisdiction over the woman. D-No, because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the action because the lawyer's state law claim is supported neither by diversity of citizenship jurisdiction nor by alienage jurisdiction. Although the woman is a citizen of the United States, she is not a citizen of any state of the United States. A person is a citizen of the state or country where she is domiciled. The question tells us that the woman moved from State B to a foreign country and has been living there for many years. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that she changed her domicile from State B to the foreign country. However, the woman is not an alien; rather she is a United States citizen without a state citizenship.
A farmer brought a federal diversity action against a feed distributor, alleging that the feed deliveries sent by the distributor were less than the agreed-upon amount bargained and paid for. Following discovery, the farmer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling solely on the issue that the contract had been breached. In support of the motion, the only evidence the farmer cited was the distributor's discovery responses, and noted that no evidence was presented to establish that the distributor complied with the contract. The distributor filed a response denying breach of contract, but did not provide any evidence in support of his response. If no other evidence is offered by either party, how should the court rule on the motion? A-Deny the motion, because the farmer failed to carry his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. B-Deny the motion, because the distributor's response created a dispute of fact that precludes the grant of summary judgment. C-Grant the motion, because the evidence is so one-sided that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the distributor. D-Grant the motion, because the distributor has not carried his bu
The court should deny the motion. Summary judgment may be granted if, from the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery materials, it appears that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the plaintiff to prevail on a summary judgment motion, he must satisfy the burden of production on every element of its claim. If neither party offers any evidence on an issue, the party with the burden of production loses. Here, the moving party is the farmer, who moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of breach. As such, it is the farmer's burden to present substantial evidence of breach (lack of compliance), not the defendant-distributor's burden to present evidence to prove compliance. Therefore, the farmer failed to meet the prima facie standard for summary judgment.
An identity thief broke into a manufacturer's data storage facility and accessed private information about its customers. The thief used the information to obtain a loan from a bank in the name of one of the customers. The customer, a citizen of State B, sued the manufacturer in a State A court. In his complaint, the customer demanded damages in excess of $75,000 based on a State A statute providing for treble damages for victims of identity theft against businesses that wrongfully disclose private information about their customers. In his complaint, the customer also alleged that a recently enacted federal statute restricting damages to actual damages did not preempt the state statute because the federal statute was unconstitutional. The manufacturer's executive offices are in State A but its sole manufacturing plant and its data storage facility are located in State B. It was incorporated in State C. The manufacturer timely removed the action to the federal court for State A. In response, the customer timely moved to remand the action to the State A court. Should the court remand the action to the State A court? A-No, because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exce
The court should remand the action to the State A court because the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity and the removing defendant is a citizen of State A. Generally, a defendant can remove an action that could have originally been brought by the plaintiff in the federal courts. A defendant cannot remove on the ground that he has a defense grounded in federal law, since the existence of a federal defense is insufficient to confer original federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, when the jurisdiction of the federal court is based solely on diversity and one of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the state action was brought, the action is not removable. Here, there is no federal question jurisdiction because the customer's claim is a claim arising under a state statute. Although the customer alleges in his complaint that the federal statute restricting recovery is unconstitutional, this allegation is in the nature of a defense (i.e., it is not an element of his claim) and therefore does not create federal question jurisdiction; hence, choice (B) is incorrect. Although diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists (making choice (C) incorrect), the manufacturer's removal violates the in-state defendant rule. The customer, a citizen of State B, is diverse from the manufacturer, a citizen of both State A, where it has its executive offices, and State C, where it was incorporated. However, under the in-state defendant rule, the manufacturer cannot remove from a State A court to federal court because it is a citizen of State A; hence, choice (A) is incorrect.
A manufacturer sold to a consumer an expensive laser printer that never worked properly. Therefore, the consumer never fully paid for the printer. The manufacturer sued for specific performance of the contract of sale of the printer. The consumer filed a counterclaim for a breach of warranty, asking for $85,000 in damages. The consumer demanded a jury trial, but the manufacturer objected. Assuming that the demand for a jury trial was timely made, how will the court rule on the availability of a jury trial? A-For the consumer, because the underlying dispute is legal in nature. B-For the consumer, because a defendant may always request a jury trial. C-For the manufacturer, because it filed suit first. D-For the manufacturer, because an action for specific performance is equitable in nature.
The court will grant a jury trial because the underlying dispute is legal in nature. The court will look to the basic substance of the case to see if a jury trial is appropriate. Although the manufacturer's suit is equitable in nature, the consumer's counterclaim for breach of warranty is an action at law, in which a jury trial is available on demand. Thus, (D) is incorrect. (B) is an incorrect statement of law, and (C) is incorrect because filing suit first would not guarantee a jury (or nonjury) trial.
After a single vehicle accident, the passenger filed a negligence action in federal district court against the driver to recover for a whiplash injury allegedly suffered in the accident. On the advice of his attorney, the passenger consulted and retained five physicians in search of one who would serve as an expert witness on his behalf at trial. Four of the physicians determined that the passenger had suffered no injury. Obviously, the passenger does not intend to use those four physicians as witnesses at trial. May the driver obtain in discovery the opinions of the four physicians whom the passenger does not intend to have testify at trial? A-Yes, the passenger must disclose in his required disclosures the identity of the four physicians and provide a written report concerning their qualifications and opinions. B-Yes, the driver may obtain information concerning their opinions through interrogatories, but the driver may not depose the four physicians. C-No, the driver will not be permitted to discover the facts known and opinions held by these four physicians unless the driver can demonstrate exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable to obtain facts or opinions on the
The driver may not obtain in discovery the opinions of the four physicians unless he can demonstrate exceptional circumstances. The opinions of experts who are retained in anticipation of litigation but who are not expected to testify at trial may be discovered only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable to obtain facts or opinions by other means or when a medical report for an exam conducted under FRCP 35 is requested. (D) is therefore incorrect.
A writer registered under federal copyright law his copyright in certain song lyrics he wrote. The writer later entered into a contract with an advertiser in which the writer granted the advertiser a license to use the lyrics in radio advertisements. When the writer heard the advertisement using lyrics, the writer was incensed at how lyrics had been used. Believing that the advertiser had lied to him about how the lyrics would be used, the writer filed an action in federal district court claiming that the advertiser had made false representations that fraudulently induced the writer into entering the contract to license the lyrics. Writer is a citizen of State A. The advertiser is a partnership comprised of citizens of State A, State B, and State C. The partnership's headquarters and most of its operations are in State B. Does the federal court have subject matter jurisdiction over the action? A-No, because the action does not arise under federal law and the parties are citizens of the same state. B-Yes, because the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states. C-Yes, because the action arises under federal law. D-Yes, because the transaction involves interstate commerce.
The federal court does not have jurisdiction because neither diversity of citizenship jurisdiction nor federal question jurisdiction exists. A partnership is a citizen of each state of which its partners, both limited and general, are citizens. Here, the writer is a citizen of State A, and the advertiser's partners are citizens of State A, State B, and State C. Given the State A-State A connection, complete diversity does not exist. Federal question jurisdiction is available when the plaintiff, in his well-pleaded complaint, alleges a claim that arises under federal law. Anticipation of a federal defense or the fact that federal law is implicated by the plaintiff's claim do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction; the plaintiff's claim must arise under federal law. Here, although federal copyright law is peripherally involved, the writer's cause of action is actually based on state contract law. As a result, no federal question has been presented by the writer's complaint, making (C) incorrect.
Pursuant to a contract, a landscaper performed $30,000 of landscape work for a homeowner. By coincidence, the homeowner and the landscaper were involved in an automobile accident that was unrelated to the landscape work. The homeowner was injured in the accident and sued the landscaper in federal district court for negligence, seeking $100,000 in damages. The homeowner and the landscaper are citizens of different states. May the landscaper assert and maintain a counterclaim against the homeowner for breach of contract, seeking the $30,000 due under the landscape contract? A-No, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a counterclaim only if the counterclaim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's initial claim. B-No, because, while the court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over the homeowner's negligence claim and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the counterclaim, the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the landscaper's contract claim. C-Yes, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the counterclaim, and the court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over both claims. D-Yes, because the co
The landscaper cannot assert and maintain a counterclaim against the homeowner for breach of contract because the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim. The court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over the negligence claim because there is complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. A compulsory counterclaim (a claim that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim) does not need to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement for diversity jurisdiction. However, a permissive counterclaim (a claim that arises out of an unrelated transaction) must meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. Here, the landscaper's contract claim would be a permissive counterclaim because it is unrelated to the negligence claim arising from the accident. Therefore, the claim's amount in controversy would have to exceed $75,000. The claim is only for $30,000; therefore, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim.
A reporter, who is a citizen of the United States, has lived in England for many years. Prior to living in England, he resided in State A. However, he no longer maintains any home in the United States and has few contacts there. The reporter falsely wrote that the plaintiff, a citizen of State B, stole a Greek artifact from a foreign museum. The plaintiff sued the reporter for libel in federal court in State B, one of the states where the false story was published. The plaintiff claimed damages of $500,000. The reporter was properly served while on a brief trip to State B. The reporter moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Will the reporter's motion be granted? A-No, because the reporter is considered to be a citizen of State A. B-No, because the reporter committed a tort in State B and is subject to jurisdiction in State B. C-Yes, because the reporter is not a citizen of any state, and he is not an alien. D-Yes, unless the reporter is employed by a newspaper based in the United States.
The reporter's motion will be granted. A United States citizen domiciled abroad is not a citizen of any state and is not an alien, and thus cannot be sued on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The reporter appears not to be a citizen of any state. (A) is incorrect. A person's domicile may change to that of a foreign country. (B) is incorrect. Although the reporter may be subject to jurisdiction in state court in State B (assuming statutory authorization of jurisdiction plus constitutionality of the exercise of such jurisdiction), jurisdiction in federal court would not be authorized by statute because the requirements for diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction are not met. (D) is incorrect. The employer may be subject to jurisdiction in federal court; however, this does nothing to gain jurisdiction over an employee.
A homeowner entered into a contract with a builder to construct an addition to the homeowner's house. The builder engaged a subcontractor to perform the carpentry and framing work. The homeowner filed a valid breach of contract action against the builder for defective work on the house in federal court. The builder in turn impleaded the subcontractor, claiming the subcontractor was responsible for any defects and seeking indemnity for any sum to which the homeowner is entitled. The subcontractor some months before had done some carpentry work for the homeowner on an apartment building that the homeowner owned, and the subcontractor was never paid for that work. May the subcontractor file a breach of contract claim in the pending action to recover from the homeowner the money due for the apartment building work? A-No, because the subcontractor can assert a claim against the plaintiff only if the claim arises under federal law. B-No, because the claim does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the homeowner's initial claim. C-Yes, because the subcontractor must assert the claim in the pending action and will be barred from later asserting the claim as an independent action,
The subcontractor cannot assert a breach of contract claim in the pending action. A third-party defendant may assert a claim against the original plaintiff only if the claim arises from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the plaintiff's original claims. Here, the subcontractor's claim arises out of the work he did on the homeowner's apartment building, but the homeowner's claim arises out of the work the subcontractor did on the addition to the homeowner's house. Therefore, the subcontractor cannot assert his claim in the pending action, and (C) and (D) are incorrect. As a side note, had the subcontractor asserted some sort of valid claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence against the homeowner, it could have then asserted the claim for the carpentry work under Rule 18(a) if there would be subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. In this case, it would have to be diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, but the facts are not clear whether there is complete diversity or whether the amount in controversy would be satisfied. (Thankfully, Rule 18(a) has not been a hot bar exam topic.)
A homeowner entered into a contract with a builder to construct an addition to the homeowner's house. The builder engaged a subcontractor to perform the carpentry and framing work. The homeowner filed a valid breach of contract action against the builder for defective work on the house in federal court. The builder in turn impleaded the subcontractor, claiming the subcontractor was responsible for any defects and seeking indemnity for any sum to which the homeowner is entitled. The subcontractor some months before had done some carpentry work for the homeowner on an apartment building that the homeowner owned, and the subcontractor was never paid for that work. May the subcontractor file a breach of contract claim in the pending action to recover from the homeowner the money due for the apartment building work? A-No, because the subcontractor can assert a claim against the plaintiff only if the claim arises under federal law. B-No, because the claim does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the homeowner's initial claim. C-Yes, because the subcontractor must assert the claim in the pending action and will be barred from later asserting the claim as an independent action,
The subcontractor cannot assert a breach of contract claim in the pending action. A third-party defendant may assert a claim against the original plaintiff only if the claim arises from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the plaintiff's original claims. Here, the subcontractor's claim arises out of the work he did on the homeowner's apartment building, but the homeowner's claim arises out of the work the subcontractor did on the addition to the homeowner's house. Therefore, the subcontractor cannot assert his claim in the pending action, and (C) and (D) are incorrect. As a side note, had the subcontractor asserted some sort of valid claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence against the homeowner, it could have then asserted the claim for the carpentry work under Rule 18(a) if there would be subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. In this case, it would have to be diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, but the facts are not clear whether there is complete diversity or whether the amount in controversy would be satisfied. (Thankfully, Rule 18(a) has not been a hot bar exam topic.) (A) is incorrect because whether the subcontractor's claim arises under federal law is not the test for determining whether the subcontractor can assert a claim.
A homeowner hired a termite company to treat an older house to protect it from termite infestation. The termite company determined that it had to remove dirt from around part of the foundation in order to treat the house properly, and hired a subcontractor to remove the dirt with a backhoe. While removing the dirt, the subcontractor damaged the foundation of the house. The homeowner filed an action against the termite company in federal district court. The case went to trial, the termite company was found liable, and it paid the plaintiff $90,000 in damages. Because it was the subcontractor who actually damaged the house, the termite company now wants to sue the subcontractor to recover the money it had to pay the homeowner. May the termite company maintain its claim against the subcontractor in an independent action? A-Yes, because, while the termite company could have asserted its claim as an impleader claim in the prior action, the impleader claim was not compulsory. B-Yes, because the termite company could not have maintained its claim as an impleader claim in the prior action and thus could only assert the claim as an independent action. C-No, because the termite company could have
The termite company may now assert and maintain its claim against the subcontractor in an independent action. The termite company could have asserted an impleader claim in the prior action because it is seeking recovery for the termite company's liability to the homeowner. (B) is therefore incorrect. However, because impleader claims are not compulsory, the termite company may assert its claim now in an independent action. (C) and (D) are therefore incorrect because the termite company is not barred from asserting its claim.
A driver collided with a bicyclist, severely injuring her. The bicyclist sued the driver in the federal court for State A, properly invoking diversity of citizenship. In his answer, the driver raised the defense of contributory negligence, which is a complete defense under the law of State A, where the accident occurred. The court instructed the jury to return a general verdict with answers to written questions. In its written answers, the jury found that both the driver and the bicyclist were negligent. Nonetheless, it returned a general verdict awarding the bicyclist damages for her medical expenses and for her pain and suffering. Which of the following options is NOT available to the court to redress the inconsistency between the general verdict and the jury's finding of contributory negligence? A-The court may dismiss the jury and order a new trial. B-The court may enter a judgment in favor of the driver, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. C-The court may direct the jury to further consider its verdict and its answers to the court's written questions. D-The court may enter a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, provided there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis f
Under the Federal Rules, when the jury's answers accompanying a general verdict are consistent with each other but are inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may (i) enter a judgment that is consistent with the answers, disregarding the general verdict; (ii) instruct the jury to deliberate further regarding its verdict and answers; or (iii) order a new trial. These options are set out in choices (A), (B), and (C). It may not, however, enter a judgment in accordance with the verdict itself, which is set out in choice (D).
The plaintiff, who resides in the Southern District of State A, was involved in a three-car accident in the Northern District of State A. The plaintiff intends to file a negligence action against the other two drivers in federal district court. One defendant resides in the District of State B and the other resides in the District of State C. In which federal district(s) is venue proper? A-The Northern District of State A only. B-The District of State B and the District of State C. C-The Northern District of State A, the District of State B, and the District of State C. D-The Northern District of State A, the Southern District of State A, the District of State B, and the District of State C.
Venue is proper only in the Northern District of State A. Federal venue is proper in (i) the district in which any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; and (ii) the district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Here, the accident occurred in the Northern District of State A, making that district a proper venue under prong (ii). However, given that the defendants here reside in different states, venue cannot be based on the residence of the defendants. Thus, choices (B), (C), and (D) are incorrect. Choice (D) is also incorrect because venue is not based on the residence of the plaintiff.
