Community Property

Burdens of Proof

(1) Preponderance of evidence (2) Clear and convincing evidence Community Property presumption must be rebutted

Statute on when property was missed or omitted when first divided

2556: In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal separation of the parties, the court has continuing jurisdiction to award community estate assets or community estate liabilities to the parties that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding. A party may file a postjudgment motion or order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment. In these cases, the court shall equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds upon good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset or liability.

Setting aside a judgment Statute

2122: The grounds and time limits for a motion to set aside a judgment, or any part or parts thereof, are governed by this section and shall be one of the following: (a) Actual fraud where the defrauded party was kept in ignorance or in some other manner was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding. An action or motion based on fraud shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either did discover, or should have discovered, the fraud. (b) Perjury. An action or motion based on perjury in the preliminary or final declaration of disclosure, the waiver of the final declaration of disclosure, or in the current income and expense statement shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either did discover, or should have discovered, the perjury. (c) Duress. An action or motion based upon duress shall be brought within two years after the date of entry of judgment. (d) Mental incapacity. An action or motion based on mental incapacity shall be brought within two years after the date of entry of judgment. (e) As to stipulated or uncontested judgments or that part of a judgment stipulated to by the parties, mistake, either mutual or unilateral, whether mistake of law or mistake of fact. An action or motion based on mistake shall be brought within one year after the date of entry of judgment. (f) Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 2100). An action or motion based on failure to comply with the disclosure requirements shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either discovered, or should have discovered, the failure to comply. Period for motion setting aside judgment distributing community property → 1 year after entry of judgment Courts has inherent power to set aside a judgment, even after the six-month period After 1 year when relief is no longer available under this section, valid judgment may only be set aside for extrinsic fraud or mistake After 1993 - fiduciary duty extended to spousal relationship which imposed duty for each spouse to disclose all CP to the other. 437(b) motion → within 6 months after entry of judgment to set aside j

Statutes on Reimbursement

910: (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which spouse has the management and control of the property and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt. (b) "During marriage" for purposes of this section does not include the period after the date of separation, as defined in Section 70, and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties. 911: (a) The earnings of a married person during marriage are not liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before marriage. After the earnings of the married person are paid, they remain not liable so long as they are held in a deposit account in which the person's spouse has no right of withdrawal and are uncommingled with other property in the community estate, except property insignificant in amount. (b) As used in this section: (1) "Deposit account" has the meaning prescribed in paragraph (29) of subdivision (a) of Section 9102 of the Commercial Code. (2) "Earnings" means compensation for personal services performed, whether as an employee or otherwise. 912: For the purposes of this part, quasi-community property is liable to the same extent, and shall be treated the same in all other respects, as community property. 913: (a) The separate property of a married person is liable for a debt incurred by the person before or during marriage. (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute: (1) The separate property of a married person is not liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before or during marriage. (2) The joinder or consent of a married person to an encumbrance of community estate property to secure payment of a debt incurred by the person's spouse does not subject the person's separate property to liability for the debt unless the person also incurred the debt. 914: (a) Notwithstanding Section 913, a married person is personally liable for the following debts incurred by the person's spouse during marriage: (1) A debt incurred for necessaries of life of the person's spouse before the date of separation of the spouses. (2) Except as provided

Quasi (Like)-Community Property:

All personal property acquired by either spouse anywhere in the world that would have been community property if it was acquired in California Purchased property in New York during marriage with their paychecks which was not CP under the laws of New York. But couples are getting divorce in CA: treated the same as it was acquired in CA, so the property purchased would be CP. The requirement for quasi- community property is that the couple would be domiciled in CA at the time of divorce or at the time of death 125: "Quasi-community property" means all real or personal property, wherever situated, acquired before or after the operative date of this code in any of the following ways: (a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition. (b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, which would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition.

Marriage of Brandes

FULL CASE READS AS AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY Rule: Under California's community property law, the characterization of property as separate, community, or quasi-community is an integral part of the division of property on marital dissolution. Courts recognize several factors relevant to this task, but the most basic characterization factor is the time when property is acquired in relation to the parties' marital status. With certain exceptions, property acquired during the marriage and before separation is presumptively community property under Fam. Code, § 760, and property acquired before the marriage, and rents, issues, and profits from such property are presumptively separate property. Facts: Charles founded a company, BIP, to provide investment advisory services in exchange for fees based on the percentage of clients' assets under management. Charles and Linda met in 1983, when BIP was only marginally successful. Charlie and Linda got married and eventually separated. The issue was how the community's interest in BIP should be characterized. Linda argued the community owned 100 percent of BIP because during the marriage it became a completely different business. In other words, Charles effectively "started a new business during the marriage." Issue: Did the trial court err when it awarded a husband a business he founded before the marriage as his separate property? Answer: No Conclusion: A business did not lose its separate property character under Fam. Code, § 770, subd. (a), by substantial growth because a stipulation to the separate property value on the date of marriage meant there was no community property presumption under Fam. Code, § 760, based on commingling. There was no evidence that BIP was a different business after the marriage, BIP remained the same business, it became only bigger and more successful. Growth cannot and does not alone cause a complete transmutation of the character of a business.

How to deal with CP when someone whom you married to dies

Half the money from the community property goes to the surviving spouse despite the decedent having a will and appointing an executor other than the surviving spouse If separate money, then does not need spouse's consent If community property, you cannot just give away the CP without the other spouse's consent. If you do, the spouse can go after the ½ of the community property

Marriage of Walrath

Procedural Posture Appellant husband sought review of the judgment of the Lake County Superior Court (California), which denied him reimbursement from community property for his contribution of separate property, because his separate property was used as collateral to acquire other community assets. Appellant argued that Cal. Fam. Code § 2640 did not restrict reimbursement from only the specific property contributed. Overview In an action for distribution of community property following divorce, appellant sought review of the trial court's judgment denying him full reimbursement of his contribution to the community estate from his separate property. Appellant argued that the trial court misapplied Cal. Fam. Code § 2640. The court affirmed, ruling that, although later financing of the contributed separate property to acquire additional community assets with respondent wife depleted the equity, § 2640 only allowed reimbursement from the specific property to which the contribution was made. The court also ruled that the intent of § 2640 was quite clear and did not allow for judicial variance to permit full reimbursement from other community assets where the contributed property was encumbered to acquire other community assets. Outcome The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court ruled that reimbursement for separate property contributed to the community estate was limited to the specific asset to which the contribution was made, even where the value of that asset was diminished by encumbrances incurred to acquire other community assets. Cal. Fam. Code § 2640 applies where one spouse deeds separate property to both spouses in joint tenancy during the marriage. In such cases, the property is presumed to be community property under Cal. Fam. Code § 2581, and the measure of the separate property contribution is its equity value at the time of conversion to joint tenancy.

Marriage of Fonstein

Procedural Posture Appellant sought review of an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) dividing the community property, challenging the court's valuation, as community property, of cross-appellant's interest in his law partnership. Overview Appellant sought review of that portion of an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage that divided the parties' community property. Appellant challenged the trial court's valuation, as an item of community property, of cross-appellant's interest in his law partnership. The court held that in valuing cross-appellant's interest in the law partnership on the basis of his contractual right to withdraw from the firm, the trial court erred by taking into account the tax consequences that he might incur if he did withdraw at some later time, and by reducing the value of his interest accordingly, even though cross-appellant had not withdrawn and had no intention of withdrawing. The amount of taxes that cross-appellant would incur depended upon a number of variables, the variety of which made impossible anything more than a speculative approximation of the potential tax liability. Outcome The judgment of dissolution was reversed in part because in valuing cross-appellant's interest in his law firm based on his right to withdraw, the court improperly considered the tax consequences that might be incurred if he withdrew at a later date, thereby reducing the value of his interest. In dividing the community property equally under the mandate of Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 (a), the court must distribute both the assets and the obligations of the community so that the residual assets awarded to each party after the deduction of the obligations are equal. The obligations to be allocated are those that could be enforced against one or more assets included in the division, either because the obligation is secured by an encumbrance on the asset or because the asset could be reached on execution if the obligation were reduced to judgment. However, once having made such equal division, the court is not required to speculate about what either or both of the spouses may possibly do with his or her equal share and therefore

Marriage of Epstein

Procedural Posture Appellant wife and respondent husband challenged various rulings in a judgment of dissolution entered by the Superior Court of Marin County (California), under which respondent was allowed reimbursement from community property for money spent to maintain the marital home after the parties separated, but was not required to reimburse the community for funds used to pay taxes on his separate income. Overview Both appellant wife and respondent husband challenged the trial court's rulings in a marital dissolution proceeding. The court affirmed the ruling that respondent was entitled to reimbursement for separate funds used to meet community obligations subsequent to separation, but held that he could not recover sums paid for support obligations, and remanded for factual findings on that issue. The court affirmed the ruling that the family residence was to be sold and the proceeds, after reimbursement to respondent, divided in a way that would equalize the division of community property, but the court ordered on remand that the capital gains tax liability incurred, if any, was owed equally by both spouses. The court reversed as erroneous the ruling that respondent was not required to reimburse the community for funds used to pay taxes on his separate property income. The court affirmed the amount of the spousal support award but found that the trial court abused its discretion in fixing a date for termination of its jurisdiction to modify the support order in the absence of evidence that appellant would be self-supporting by that date. Outcome The court affirmed the ruling that respondent husband could be reimbursed for funds used to maintain the family home, but held that he could not recover funds used for support of appellant wife. The court reversed the ruling that the community could not recover money used to pay taxes on respondent's separate property, and found that the trial court abused its discretion in fixing a termination date for spousal support. "In the present case, the amount of the tax liability may have been fixed by events pending the decision of this appeal, so the trial court, upon the remand of this case made necessary by our holding on the husband's right of reimbursemen

Marriage of Varner

Procedural Posture Appellant wife sought review of an order by the Superior Court of Riverside County (California), which denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment of dissolution of marriage to respondent husband based on a stipulation of the parties. Appellant contended that respondent failed to disclose the value of community property in violation of Cal. Fam. Code § 2120 et seq. Overview Appellant wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage to respondent husband. Appellant signed a stipulation to division of the community property when she was unrepresented, and the court entered judgment on the stipulation. After she retained counsel, she filed a motion to set aside the judgment entered on the stipulation which the trial court denied. On appeal, appellant claimed that the judgment should have been set aside pursuant to Cal. Fam. Code § 2120 et seq. The court agreed, finding that under Cal. Fam. Code § 2122, appellant's motion to set aside a stipulated judgment was timely. The court further found that respondent's failure to disclose the correct value of community assets or to give appellant's accountants access to the information from which the value could have been derived was a violation of Cal. Fam. Code § 2105(b)(2). The court reasoned that Cal. Fam. Code § 2102 created a fiduciary duty as to the accurate disclosure of community assets. Therefore, respondent's failure to disclose accurately constituted a basis for setting aside a judgment on the ground of mistake under Cal. Fam. Code § 2122. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. Outcome The court reversed the order denying appellant wife's motion to set aside the judgment of dissolution of marriage to respondent husband. The court found that respondent had not disclosed the correct value of community assets, which constituted a basis for setting aside the judgment of dissolution. Marriage of Varner: former wife appealed from a trial court denying her motion to set aside judgment distributing CP based on the stipulation signed by both parties. Wife contends that at the time she signed the stipulation, the husband failed to disclose all information related to CP. May of 1992, wife filed for an amended petition for dissolution, a

Marriage of Feldman

Rule: Neither Fam. Code, § 2107, subd. (c), nor Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a), sets forth any requirement of separate injury to the complaining spouse as a precondition to the imposition of sanctions. Fam. Code, § 2107, subd. (c), indicates that sanctions are to be imposed to effectuate compliance with the laws that require spouses to make disclosure to each other. The statute is not aimed at redressing an actual injury. Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a), authorizes sanctions to advance the policy of promoting settlement of litigation and encouraging cooperation of the litigants. This statute, too, does not require any actual injury. Indeed, as expressed in Fam. Code, § 2100, subd. (b), the legislature has indicated that sound public policy favors the reduction of the adversarial nature of marital dissolution and the attendant costs by fostering full disclosure and cooperative discovery. In light of this legislatively expressed intention, the authority to impose sanctions for nondisclosure is plainly aimed at effectuating the goal of reducing the adversarial nature of marital dissolution rather than at redressing any actual harm inflicted on the complaining spouse. Facts: Aaron (husband) and Elena (wife) were married in 1969 and separated after 34 years of marriage. Elena filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in August 2003. The trial court required the husband to pay sanctions and attorney fees based on his nondisclosure of financial information in a marital dissolution proceeding. During the marriage, the husband created a large number of privately held companies of substantial value. The parties disputed their characterization as separate or community property. The husband provided responses to interrogatories and a schedule of assets and debts. The wife alleged that the husband failed to disclose financial transactions that included the purchase of a personal residence through one of his companies, the existence of several entities, the purchase of a bond, and the existence of a 401(k) account. The trial court, in sanctioning the husband, found that he intentionally sought to circumvent the disclosure process and frustrated the policy of promoting settlement. The husband appealed from the trial court's ord

CA Fam 1102

(a) Except as provided in Sections 761 and 1103, either spouse has the management and control of the community real property, whether acquired prior to, or on or after January 1, 1975, but both spouses, either personally or by a duly authorized agent, are required to join in executing an instrument by which that community real property or an interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered. (b) This section does not apply to a lease, mortgage, conveyance, or transfer of real property, or of an interest in real property, between spouses. (c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), both of the following shall apply: (1) The sole lease, contract, mortgage, or deed of the husband, holding the record title to community real property, to a lessee, purchaser, or encumbrancer, in good faith without knowledge of the marriage relation, shall be presumed to be valid if executed prior to January 1, 1975. (2) The sole lease, contract, mortgage, or deed of either spouse, holding the record title to community real property to a lessee, purchaser, or encumbrancer, in good faith without knowledge of the marriage relation, shall be presumed to be valid if executed on or after January 1, 1975. (d) An action to avoid an instrument mentioned in this section, affecting any property standing of record in the name of either spouse alone, executed by the spouse alone, shall not be commenced after the expiration of one year from the filing for record of that instrument in the recorder's office in the county in which the land is situated. (e) This section does not preclude either spouse from encumbering that spouse's interest in community real property, as provided in Section 2033, to pay reasonable attorney's fees in order to retain or maintain legal counsel in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal separation of the parties.

General Rules of Transmutation

1. Partial performance and oral agreement not valid after 1985. 2. Life insurance is community property if bought with community funds 3. Joint tenancy, after 1985, is presumed to be community property in bankruptcy and creditor proceedings

Fiduciary Duty and Management of Property Statute

1100: (a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) and Sections 761 and 1103, either spouse has the management and control of the community personal property, whether acquired prior to or on or after January 1, 1975, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse. (b) A spouse may not make a gift of community personal property, or dispose of community personal property for less than fair and reasonable value, without the written consent of the other spouse. This subdivision does not apply to gifts mutually given by both spouses to third parties and to gifts given by one spouse to the other spouse. (c) A spouse may not sell, convey, or encumber community personal property used as the family dwelling, or the furniture, furnishings, or fittings of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of the other spouse or minor children which is community personal property, without the written consent of the other spouse. (d) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), and in Section 1102, a spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a business that is all or substantially all community personal property has the primary management and control of the business or interest. Primary management and control means that the managing spouse may act alone in all transactions but shall give prior written notice to the other spouse of any sale, lease, exchange, encumbrance, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the personal property used in the operation of the business (including personal property used for agricultural purposes), whether or not title to that property is held in the name of only one spouse. Written notice is not, however, required when prohibited by the law otherwise applicable to the transaction. Remedies for the failure by a managing spouse to give prior written notice as required by this subdivision are only as specified in Section 1101. A failure to give prior written notice shall not adversely affect the validity of a transaction nor of any interest transferred. (e) Each spouse shall act with respect to the other spouse in the management and control of the community assets and liabiliti

Premarital Agreement Statute

1611: A premarital agreement shall be in writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without consideration. 1612: (a) Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to all of the following: (1) The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located. (2) The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property. (3) The disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event. (4) The making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement. (5) The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy. (6) The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement. (7) Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty. (b) The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement. (c) Any provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support, including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement of the spousal support provision is sought was not represented by independent counsel at the time the agreement containing the provision was signed, or if the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. An otherwise unenforceable provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support may not become enforceable solely because the party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent counsel. 1613: A premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage. 1614: After marriage, a premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties. The amended agreement or the revocation is enforceable without consideration. 1615: (a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves either of the following: (1) That party did not exe

Division of Property

2550: Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall, either in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment of legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division, divide the community estate of the parties equally.

Division of Liability Statutes

2551: For the purposes of division and in confirming or assigning the liabilities of the parties for which the community estate is liable, the court shall characterize liabilities as separate or community and confirm or assign them to the parties in accordance with Part 6 (commencing with Section 2620). 2620: The debts for which the community estate is liable which are unpaid at the time of trial, or for which the community estate becomes liable after trial, shall be confirmed or divided as provided in this part. 2621: Debts incurred by either spouse before the date of marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse who incurred the debt. 2622: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), debts incurred by either spouse after the date of marriage but before the date of separation shall be divided as set forth in Sections 2550 to 2552, inclusive, and Sections 2601 to 2604, inclusive. (b) To the extent that community debts exceed total community and quasi-community assets, the excess of debt shall be assigned as the court deems just and equitable, taking into account factors such as the parties' relative ability to pay. 2623: Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of separation but before entry of a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties shall be confirmed as follows: (a) Debts incurred by either spouse for the common necessaries of life of either spouse or the necessaries of life of the children of the marriage for whom support may be ordered, in the absence of a court order or written agreement for support or for the payment of these debts, shall be confirmed to either spouse according to the parties' respective needs and abilities to pay at the time the debt was incurred. (b) Debts incurred by either spouse for nonnecessaries of that spouse or children of the marriage for whom support may be ordered shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse who incurred the debt. 2624: Debts incurred by either spouse after entry of a judgment of dissolution of marriage but before termination of the parties' marital status or after entry of a judgment of legal separation of the parties shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse who incurred the debt. 2625: Notwit

Valuation of Assets at time of trial

2552: (a) For the purpose of division of the community estate upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, except as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial. (b) Upon 30 days' notice by the moving party to the other party, the court for good cause shown may value all or any portion of the assets and liabilities at a date after separation and before trial to accomplish an equal division of the community estate of the parties in an equitable manner.

Anti-Lucas Laws

2581. For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property, is presumed to be community property. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted by either of the following: (a) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by which the property is acquired that the property is separate property and not community property. (b) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is separate property. 2640. (a) "Contributions to the acquisition of property," as used in this section, include downpayments, payments for improvements, and payments that reduce the principal of a loan used to finance the purchase or improvement of the property but do not include payments of interest on the loan or payments made for maintenance, insurance, or taxation of the property. (b) In the division of the community estate under this division, unless a party has made a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or has signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for the party's contributions to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source. The amount reimbursed shall be without interest or adjustment for change in monetary values and may not exceed the net value of the property at the time of the division. (c) A party shall be reimbursed for the party's separate property contributions to the acquisition of property of the other spouse's separate property estate during the marriage, unless there has been a transmutation in writing pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 850) of Part 2 of Division 4, or a written waiver of the right to reimbursement. The amount reimbursed shall be without interest or adjustment for change in monetary values and may not exceed the net value of the property at the time of the division.

Equitable Division of Property

2601: Where economic circumstances warrant, the court may award an asset of the community estate to one party on such conditions as the court deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of the community estate.

Fiduciary Duties of Spouse

721: (a) Subject to subdivision (b), either spouse may enter into any transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either might if unmarried. (b) Except as provided in Sections 143, 144, 146, 16040, 16047, and 21385 of the Probate Code, in transactions between themselves, spouses are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying. (2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction that concerns the community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and records of community property transactions. (3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse that concerns the community property.

Date of Separation Statutes

771: (a) The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, after the date of separation of the spouses, are the separate property of the spouse. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the earnings and accumulations of an unemancipated minor child related to a contract of a type described in Section 6750 shall remain the sole legal property of the minor child. 70: (a) "Date of separation" means the date that a complete and final break in the marital relationship has occurred, as evidenced by both of the following: (1) The spouse has expressed to the other spouse the intent to end the marriage.(2) The conduct of the spouse is consistent with the intent to end the marriage. (b) In determining the date of separation, the court shall take into consideration all relevant evidence. (c) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to abrogate the decisions in In re Marriage of Davis (2015) 61 Cal.4th 846 and In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152.

Transmutation CA Law

850. Subject to Sections 851 to 853, inclusive, married persons may by agreement or transfer, with or without consideration, do any of the following: (a) Transmute community property to separate property of either spouse. (b) Transmute separate property of either spouse to community property. (c) Transmute separate property of one spouse to separate property of the other spouse. 851. A transmutation is subject to the laws governing fraudulent transfers. 852. (a) A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected. (b) A transmutation of real property is not effective as to third parties without notice thereof unless recorded. (c) This section does not apply to a gift between the spouses of clothing, wearing apparel, jewelry, or other tangible articles of a personal nature that is used solely or principally by the spouse to whom the gift is made and that is not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage. (d) Nothing in this section affects the law governing characterization of property in which separate property and community property are commingled or otherwise combined. (e) This section does not apply to or affect a transmutation of property made before January 1, 1985, and the law that would otherwise be applicable to that transmutation shall continue to apply. 853. (a) A statement in a will of the character of property is not admissible as evidence of a transmutation of the property in a proceeding commenced before the death of the person who made the will. (b) A waiver of a right to a joint and survivor annuity or survivor's benefits under the federal Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-397) is not a transmutation of the community property rights of the person executing the waiver. (c) A written joinder or written consent to a nonprobate transfer of community property on death that satisfies Section 852 is a transmutation and is governed by the law applicable to transmutations and not by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 5010) of Part 1 of Division 5 of the Probate Code.

Undue Influence

A rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises when one spouse has gained an advantage over the other in an interspousal transaction. The spouse who obtained the advantage bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. Showing there was a benefit to both parties overcomes presumption.

Community Property

Any property acquired in certain states by purchase, or as compensation by either spouse during the period of marriage, is considered to be owned in an undivided half interest by each. 63: "Community estate" includes both community property and quasi-community property. 760: Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.

recapitulation

Big picture view of accounts. Total in and total out instead of looking into the accounts. How the husband in See v See wanted it to play out. No record required if no record can be obtained through no fault of the offending party.

Statutes on Debt and Liability

CA Fam 902: "Debt" means an obligation incurred by a married person before or during marriage, whether based on contract, tort, or otherwise. 913: (a) The separate property of a married person is liable for a debt incurred by the person before or during marriage. (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute: (1) The separate property of a married person is not liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before or during marriage. (2) The joinder or consent of a married person to an encumbrance of community estate property to secure payment of a debt incurred by the person's spouse does not subject the person's separate property to liability for the debt unless the person also incurred the debt. 914: (a) Notwithstanding Section 913, a married person is personally liable for the following debts incurred by the person's spouse during marriage: (1) A debt incurred for necessaries of life of the person's spouse before the date of separation of the spouses. (2) Except as provided in Section 4302, a debt incurred for common necessaries of life of the person's spouse after the date of separation of the spouses. (b) The separate property of a married person may be applied to the satisfaction of a debt for which the person is personally liable pursuant to this section. If separate property is so applied at a time when nonexempt property in the community estate or separate property of the person's spouse is available but is not applied to the satisfaction of the debt, the married person is entitled to reimbursement to the extent such property was available. (c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the statute of limitations set forth in Section 366.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply if the spouse for whom the married person is personally liable dies. (2) If the surviving spouse had actual knowledge of the debt prior to expiration of the period set forth in Section 366.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the personal representative of the deceased spouse's estate failed to provide the creditor asserting the claim under this section with a timely written notice of the probate administration of the estate in the manner provided for pursuant to Section 9050 of the Probate Code, the statute of limitation

Joint Tenancy and Community Property

Joint Tenancy are separate interests while community property is a shared interest. Joint Tenancy is presumed to be community property AT DIVORCE ONLY. Family Code section 2581 creates a presumption that property which is acquired in joint names during the marriage, whether or not the title document uses the words "community property", is in fact presumed to be CP. It applies both to real property (i.e., the home) and personal property (i.e., vehicles). But, if debtors come, they can't come after separate property of the other spouse 2581: For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property, is presumed to be community property. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted by either of the following: (a) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by which the property is acquired that the property is separate property and not community property. (b) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is separate property.

Marriage of Moore equations

Page 278 Marriage of Moore - famous and used all the time Rule 1st paragraph page 280 (in red below) In California gives the community a pro tanto (such an extent) community property interest in such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the payments made with separate property Formula on page 281 - prorated ownership % (Amount which CP payments reduced principal)/Purchase Price = Community property Percentage (Down Payment + (full amount of loan - amount which CP payments reduced principal))/Purchase Price = Separate property Percentage · Let us figure out a prorated percentage - there is a formula · Down payment + (full amount of loan - amount which CP payment reduced principal/purchase price = SP Mortgage Even though these are Separate property, the court wants the community property to be taken care of. So, there is equitable percentage dedicated to the community property Equitable considerations - there to make sure community property is taken care of even when there is separate property Pre 1/1/85 -Community property acquired during marriage -Lucas Put down sep. prop. Money -Gift unless written agreement Post 1/1/85 -Community Property Acquired during marriage -FC 2640 Anti-Lucas Statute Used separate property to purchase stuff during marriage - Down Payment Improvements Principal Payment Reimbursement w/o interest Separate property -moore/marsden What to do with Community Property? How much of the purchase price paid with the community property v. how much of the purchase price paid by the separate property In California gives the community a pro tanto (such an extent) community property interest in such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the payments made with separate property Page 282 4a example 600k - split Loan 160k - community (based on his paycheck 500k in equity Reimburse husband - 40k 230k each 4b Joe's/moore formula Professor providing printout of formula 4d Fair market value = Moore & Marsden

Apportionment of Business Growth and Profits

Pereira Method: Allocate fair return on spouse's income as separate property and allocate any excess to the community property (When the business is based on spouse's work) -You compare the property in dispute with other similar businesses. You can also calculate the rate of growth. If the business is doing better than comparable businesses, the excess is owed to the community. So, business is worth $1 million and other comparable businesses are $800k, then the difference of $200k is community. Van Camp Method: Determine reasonable rate of return on income (salaries) and allocate the excess of income as separate (When business is attributable to unique nature of business and not spouse's work). Beam adds family expenses to this. (How?) Court has discretion to pick approach that will achieve substantial justice.

Personal Injury Awards

Personal Injury Awards: Pp. 290-291 Any funds leftover after marriage, these funds will be the separate property of the injured party

Gilmore v. Gilmore

Pg 256

Married Woman's Presumption

Prior to 1975, there was a presumption that if the property was in a woman's name, then it is her separate property. The husband would have the burden to show that the property was community property. No longer applicable but may come up. 803: Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, whenever any real or personal property, or any interest therein or encumbrance thereon, was acquired before January 1, 1975, by a married woman by an instrument in writing, the following presumptions apply, and are conclusive in favor of any person dealing in good faith and for a valuable consideration with the married woman or her legal representatives or successors in interest, regardless of any change in her marital status after acquisition of the property: (a) If acquired by the married woman, the presumption is that the property is the married woman's separate property. (b) If acquired by the married woman and any other person, the presumption is that the married woman takes the part acquired by her as tenant in common, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument. (c) If acquired by husband and wife by an instrument in which they are described as husband and wife, the presumption is that the property is the community property of the husband and wife, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument.

In Re Marriage of Cary

Procedural Posture Appellant ex-husband challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of San Mateo County (California), which determined that property acquired was divided equally. Overview Appellant ex-husband and respondent ex-wife, never married to each other, lived together for more than eight years, had children and held themselves out as man and wife so that their relationship was deemed that of a family under California's Family Law Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4000- 5138. Appellant, after petitioning for nullity of marriage under Cal. Civ. Code § 4001, challenged the order that equally divided the property acquired. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment as modified to correct a promissory note sum. The court held that the Family Law Act superseded contrary pre-1970 judicial authority and disregarded evidence of the guilt of the parties, dividing their property evenly, when there was not only an ostensible marital relationship, but also an actual family relationship, with cohabitation and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations attending marriage. The court held that there was no abuse of discretion, or error, in awarding custody of the children to respondent as there was substantial evidence that appellee was a fit person for such custody, and that the best interests of the younger children called for such custody. Outcome The court affirmed the lower court's judgment that equally divided acquired property, as modified to correct a conceded error in the amount of cash or promissory note to be delivered by petitioner to respondent. The court held that California's Family Law Act superseded contrary pre-1970 judicial authority, disregarded evidence of the guilt of the parties and divided their property evenly. The Family Law Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4000- 5138, applies not only to valid marriages. It expressly covers a family relationship based on a void or voidable marriage where either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 4452. If the parties know they aren't married, then family law doesn't apply.

Marriage of Hebbring

Procedural Posture Appellant ex-husband sought review of a decision by the Superior Court of Napa County (California), which ordered that respondent ex-wife was entitled to a continuation of spousal support, reserved jurisdiction with respect to continued spousal support, found that nine guns were appellant's separate property and awarded him the community property portion of the collection, and found that jewelry was respondent's separate property. Overview Appellant ex-husband challenged both the community property division and a spousal support award. The trial court awarded respondent ex-wife spousal support, reserved jurisdiction as to spousal support, found that nine guns were appellant's separate property and awarded him the community property portion of the collection, and found that jewelry was respondent's separate property. The court affirmed the orders as to the value of the community property interest in the gun collection and for reimbursement for destroyed jewelry. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's valuation of the collection and appellant's wilful destruction of respondent's jewelry meant unclean hands and precluded his seeking judicial relief. The court reversed the orders as to the retention of jurisdiction over spousal support and the failure to order reimbursements for post-separation separate property payments on community obligations. Retention of jurisdiction over spousal support was error as a matter of law, and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 4800.2, which provided for the division of community property, did not apply to post-separation separate property payments on community obligations. Outcome In dissolution proceedings, the court reversed the trial court's order as to the retention of jurisdiction over spousal support because such retention was error as a matter of law. The court also reversed the order as to reimbursement for post-separation payments of community debts with separate property because the statute did not apply to post-separation property payments on community obligations. If it can be proven that the spouse intentionally destroyed separate property of the injured spouse, then the injured spouse can be reimbursed.

In Re Marriage of Slater

Procedural Posture Appellant ex-wife sought review of an order by the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), which set a value of zero on the goodwill of respondent ex-husband's group medical practice, distributed the community property by awarding her a five-year promissory note, and awarded her spousal support in a divorce action. Overview In divorce action between appellant ex-wife and respondent ex-husband, the trial court set a value of zero on the goodwill of respondent ex-husband's group medical practice, distributed the community property by awarding her a five-year promissory note, and awarded her spousal support. On appeal, the court reversed the decision for a reconsideration of the value of respondent's interest in his medical partnership. The court held that the trial court was not bound by a partnership agreement signed by both parties which listed the amount of goodwill upon respondent's withdrawal from the partnership as the agreement was not signed for the purposes of dissolution. The court held that the rule in evaluating community goodwill contemplated any legitimate method of evaluation that measured its present value by taking into account some past result. Insofar as the professional practice was concerned it was assumed that it would continue in the future. The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding a five-year promissory note because appellant suggested it, and the trial court had wide discretion in determining the amount of spousal support. Outcome The court reversed the decision for a reconsideration of the value of the respondent ex-husband's interest in his medical partnership in plaintiff ex-wife's divorce action. The trial court was not bound by a partnership agreement signed by both parties which listed the amount of goodwill upon respondent's withdrawal from the partnership as the agreement was not signed for the purposes of dissolution. For purposes of a marital dissolution, the parties are primarily concerned with the existence, value and consequences of goodwill in an economic sense, as distinguished from legal or accounting concepts. The expectancy of future earnings is not synonymous with, nor shall it be the basis for determining the value of the

Marriage of Poppe

Procedural Posture Appellant former husband sought review of a decision by the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which denied his request to decrease or terminate spousal support and granted respondent former wife's application for "modification" of her interest in appellant's pension. Appellant contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify respondent's interest in the pension because it had been divided in the judgment of dissolution. Overview Appellant former husband sought a modification of spousal support. The trial court declined to modify spousal support, however, it granted respondent former wife's application for "modification" of her interest in appellant's pension. The court rejected appellant's contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter the pension division. The court found that respondent's application for a "modification" of the judgment of dissolution was in reality a request to the trial court to exercise its reserved jurisdiction to make an order specifying the proportion and amount of her interest in the pension, which had not been previously divided because appellant was not receiving pension benefits at the time of judgment of dissolution. However, the court reversed the apportionment made by the trial court, finding that it was erroneous because the basis upon which it was made, years of service during the marriage before separation compared to qualifying years in service, had no substantial relationship to the amount of the pension. The court also found that though there was a showing of changed circumstances, it did not necessarily mandate a modification of spousal support. Outcome The court reversed the order insofar as it established respondent former wife's interest in appellant former husband's pension. The court found that, while the trial court had jurisdiction to determine respondent's interest in the pension, its apportionment was erroneous because it had no substantial relationship to the amount of the pension. The court also found that it was proper to decline to modify the amount of spousal support. Facts Josephine Poppe (plaintiff) and Daniel Poppe (defendant) were married for just over 27 years, during which time Daniel served in

Robinson v. Robinson

Procedural Posture Appellant former husband sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which granted the husband's complaint for divorce, ordered a division of the community property, and granted respondent former wife a life estate in real estate that was separate property of the husband. The husband also appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Overview The wife filed an action for separate maintenance, which the husband had converted to an action for divorce. The trial court granted the complaint for divorce and divided the community property. The court also granted the wife a life estate in real estate that the wife admitted was the separate property of the husband. The husband filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court that granted the wife a life estate. The court found that the power of the trial court in disposing of the property of the parties in a divorce action was limited to their community property. Thus, the trial court had no power to dispose of the husband's real estate, even by only granting the wife a life estate therein. Outcome The court reversed the judgment awarding the wife a life estate in the husband's real property and dismissed the husband's appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial.

In re Marriage of Stenquist

Procedural Posture Appellant husband and appellant wife sought review of an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, (California) dividing husband's disability pension rights between the spouses and in limiting its jurisdiction over the matter of spousal support to 24 months. Overview Appellant husband was injured during his military service. He declined a disability retirement and continued to work for several years. When husband finally decided to retire, he received a "disability" retirement which paid him a greater share than an ordinary retirement pension. The trial court found that only the excess of the disability pension rights represented additional compensation attributable to the husband's disability and that the balance of the pension rights acquired during the marriage served to replace ordinary retirement pay and was, thus, a community asset subject to distribution. The trial court also limited its jurisdiction as to alimony to 24 months. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court's order of distribution was correct because husband could not unilaterally elect a disability pension to transmute community property into his own separate property where his disability pension was actually retirement pay. However, the trial court erred in limiting its jurisdiction as to alimony to 24 months because any assertion that appellant wife would attain economic self-sufficiency in that time was pure speculation. Outcome The order was affirmed to the extent that the trial court divided appellant husband's disability pension rights between the spouses, but was reversed to the extent that the trial court unjustifiably limited its jurisdiction over the matter of spousal support to 24 months. Facts Mr. Stenquist (plaintiff) and Mrs. Stenquist (defendant) were married in 1950. Mr. Stenquist had served with the Army since 1944. In 1953, Mr. Stenquist became disabled as a result of a service injury. Mr. Stenquist had the option of leaving military service with a disability pay of 75 percent of his base pay as of 1953 based upon his rank at that time. Instead, Mr. Stenquist continued to serve actively until 1970, at which time Mr. Stenquist was eligible for either regular reti

Marriage of Beltran

Procedural Posture Appellant husband challenged an order of the Superior Court of Marin County, which specified, as part of a property distribution in a divorce proceeding, that he reimburse the community for the amount of a military pension and accrued leave which was forfeited as part appellant's sentence in a military court-martial. Overview Appellant husband sought relief from an order, rendered in a divorce proceeding, that he reimburse the community for the amount of the military pension and accrued leave which was forfeited following his military court-martial. Appellant was convicted of having committed lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under 14. Appellant claimed that his military pension was exempt from division under the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (FUSFSPA), 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408, because his marriage had only lasted five years. On appeal, the court affirmed and found that appellant's separate conduct resulted in the loss that diminished respondent ex-wife's share of the community property to which she would have otherwise been entitled. The court ruled that military pension benefits were community property, subject to division on dissolution, under both state law and the FUSFSPA. The court found that 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408(d)(2), did not limit respondent's eligibility to receive benefits in a marriage lasting less than 10 years. The court did not address appellant's objection to respondent's attorney's fees award because appellant failed to raise it in his brief. Outcome The court affirmed the reimbursement because state and federal law provided that military pensions were divisible upon marital dissolution, respondent wife would otherwise have been entitled to benefit of the pension and accrued leave, and she should not be forced to bear the penalty arising from appellant husband's court martial. A wife shall not be made to share a penalty imposed upon her husband for his criminal conduct. As a matter of equity that criminal conduct on the part of husband which directly causes forfeiture of pension benefits justifies reimbursement to the wife for her share of such lost community property.

Marriage of Schultz

Procedural Posture Appellant husband challenged the order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) made after an interlocutory judgment of dissolution that adjusted a division of community property and resolved most of appellant's objections to the adjustment in favor of respondent wife. Overview Respondent wife's counsel prepared an accounting to divide $ 23,011.22 of community property whereby, after deduction of debts owed by the parties, appellant husband was entitled to $ 7,238.77 and respondent to $ 11,502.77. The trial court ordered the community property divided according to the accounting except for one adjustment made in appellant's favor. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion because this was not a case where the family was rendered bankrupt by the dissolution and the trial court had power to divide the property unequally. The trial court should have divided the community property equally pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §4800. The court also held that a community debt of $ 4,250 was improperly unequally divided. The debt was not evidenced by appellant deliberately misappropriating funds in violation of Cal. Civ. Code §4800(a), but only by a default judgment caused by appellant's failure to appear in a municipal court. Finally, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that respondent was entitled to a credit for debts paid on behalf of the community property of $ 1,844.67. Outcome The court reversed the order of the trial court that adjusted a division of community property after an interlocutory judgment of dissolution was entered. The court ordered the trial court to modify the interlocutory judgment to reflect the determinations made in favor of appellant husband because the trial court improperly divided the community property. Cal. Civ. Code §4800(a) mandates equal division of assets, and, in subdivision (b), states that, as an exception to equal division, the court may award, from a party's share, any sum it determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by such party to the exclusion of the community property. No evidence of deliberate misappropriation. Just negligence. Guy didnt show up to a trial.

Wilcox v. Wilcox

Procedural Posture Appellant husband challenged the order of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which dismissed his action for violations of his right to manage, control, and dispose of community funds, following an order sustaining defendant wife's demurrer without leave to amend. Overview Plaintiff husband alleged that defendant wife took exclusive possession of community funds, that he demanded the money back, and she refused to pay the money to him. Wife's demurrer to the complaint contended that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and that there was no statutory authority which allowed a spouse to sue the other for mismanagement of community funds. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed husband's complaint. On appeal, the court reversed, because it found that the right of a husband to maintain an action for a violation of his rights to manage, control, and dispose of community funds was not dependant on statutory authority to sue his wife. Outcome The dismissal of appellant husband's action following an order sustaining defendant wife's demurrer was reversed, because husband had a cause of action against wife for a violation of his rights to manage, control, and dispose of community funds. By statute a husband has the management and control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate, subject to certain exceptions. Cal. Civ. Code § 5125.

In Re Marriage of Lehman

Procedural Posture Appellant husband sought review of the judgment of the court of appeals (California), finding that because respondent wife owned a community property interest in appellant's retirement benefits under a defined benefit plan she owned a community property interest in the retirement benefits as enhanced by a voluntary retirement incentive. Overview Several years after the entry of a final judgment dissolving the marriage of appellant husband and respondent wife, appellant's employer offered an enhanced retirement program as an incentive for employees to retire early. Respondent filed several motions in the trial court, seeking a declaration that she owned a community property interest in the retirement benefits from the defined benefit plan, as enhanced. In response, appellant admitted that respondent owned an interest in his retirement benefits, but denied that she owned one in them as enhanced. The trial court and the court of appeals held that respondent owned the benefits as enhanced. The court affirmed. The fact that the nonemployee spouse might happen to enjoy an increase, or suffer a decrease, in retirement benefits because of postdissolution events was justified by the nature of the right to retirement benefits as a right to draw from a stream of income that began to flow on retirement, as that stream was then defined. Because the nonemployee spouse was compelled to share the bad with the employee spouse she must be allowed to share the good as well. Outcome The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal that found that respondent wife owned a community property interest in the retirement benefits as enhanced. The court held that the nature of the right to retirement benefits required that the nonemployee spouse be included in increases and decreases resulting from a postdissolution change in the benefits. Community property may include the right to retirement benefits accrued by the employee spouse as deferred compensation for services rendered. If the right to retirement benefits accrues, in some part, during marriage before separation, it is a community asset and is therefore owned by the community in which the nonemployee spouse as well as the employee spouse owns an inter

In re Marriage of Sullivan

Procedural Posture Appellant wife and respondent husband each sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which, in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, refused to award appellant compensation for her contributions to respondent's education, but did award appellant attorney fees and costs of litigation. Overview In a dissolution proceeding, appellant wife attempted to introduce evidence of the value of respondent husband's medical education, but the court rejected appellant's arguments and granted respondent's motion in limine to exclude all evidence pertaining to the value of education. Both parties appealed, with appellant arguing that it was error to exclude the value of education, and respondent claimed that it was error to award attorney fees and costs to appellant. On review the court found that, prior to final judgment, the family law act was amended at Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.3 to provide for reimbursement for community contributions to education or training of a party that substantially enhanced the earning capacity of the party. The court also noted that Cal. Civ. Code § 4801 required the trial court, in determining spousal support, to consider the extent to which the spouse contributed to the attainment of an education, training, or a license. The court reversed and remanded as to the value of education issue, but affirmed as to the attorney fee and cost award because evidence showed that respondent had a greater ability than appellant to pay the expenses. Outcome The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and costs because evidence showed appellant wife was unable to meet those expenses and respondent husband had a greater ability, but the court reversed and remanded as to the education issue because the family law act had been amended to provide for reimbursement for appellant's contribution to respondent's education. Professional education does not constitute community property. The amendments to the family law act provide for the community to be reimbursed, absent an express written agreement to the contrary, for community contributions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party. Cal. Civ. Code §4800.

In re Marriage of Devlin

Procedural Posture Appellant wife challenged a divorce judgment of the Superior Court of Shasta County, No. 70586 (California), which awarded the bulk of the parties' community property to respondent husband on the basis that the property was acquired with respondent's personal injury proceeds. Overview Respondent husband was awarded the bulk of the community property when appellant wife divorced him. The evidence showed that all of the community property at the time of their separation was purchased with personal injury proceeds that respondent had received as the result of an accident that rendered him a paraplegic. Most of the property consisted of real property and a mobile home placed thereon that was specially adapted for respondent's benefit. On appeal, the court affirmed judgment for respondent and held that personal injury damages were community property because they were received during the marriage, and that Cal. Civ. Code § 4800(c), provided that such proceeds go to the injured spouse unless the court determines that the interests of justice require another disposition. The court held that respondent's personal injury damages were not so commingled with other community property as to be impossible to trace the source of the funds, and thus these proceeds did not lose their character as community property personal injury damages. Outcome The court affirmed the order granting respondent husband the bulk of the community property in a divorce, holding that the funds that purchased the property could be traced to respondent's personal injury damage award, and that he was statutorily entitled to community property personal injury damages. Marriage of Devlin - p. 291 Recovery of damage is either separate or community property depending on property insured. If individual injured during marriage, that is presumed to be community property during marriage. Once divorced, whatever fund left over from the money recovered from the damage would considered to be separate property of the injured person CA Family Code 2603 (a) "Community estate personal injury damages" as used in this section means all money or other property received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for

Marriage of Jones

Procedural Posture Appellant wife challenged a judgment of the Superior Court of Monterey Count (California), which held that respondent husband's military disability pay pursuant to 10 U.S.C.S. § 1201 was respondent's separate property and was not subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. Overview After respondent husband and appellant wife were married, respondent lost a leg in combat and was retired for disability. When appellant filed for dissolution of marriage, she claimed respondent's lifetime disability payments, to which he was entitled under 10 U.S.C.S. § 1201, as a community asset. The trial court found the benefits to be respondent's separate property. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court determined that respondent's disability pension was separate property because respondent acquired his right to a pension by disability rather than by longevity. Thus, the court found that respondent's disability pay did not serve primarily as a form of deferred compensation for past service but served to compensate respondent for the loss of military pay caused by his premature retirement and for his diminished ability to compete for civilian employment. In the court's view, so long as respondent and appellant's marriage lasted, respondent's reduced earnings worked as a loss to the community. Under Cal. Civ. Code § 5119, the loss did not continue after dissolution, and respondent's benefits disability earnings then became respondent's separate property. Outcome The court affirmed the trial court's order that respondent husband's disability pension was respondent's separate property upon the dissolution of the marriage with appellant wife. The court found that respondent's disability pension compensated respondent for a loss of earnings but was not deferred compensation. Respondent's disability earnings were therefore separate property after dissolution of marriage. Facts Sumiko Jones (plaintiff) and Herschel Jones (defendant) were married in 1964. Herschel had been in military service since 1957 but became fully disabled through the loss of a limb in 1969. Herschel was discharged with disability pay of $379.12 per month. Herschel had no vested right in any retirement pay, and his payments were entire

Harris v Harris

Procedural Posture In an action by plaintiff estate executor to recover community property that was transferred by the decedent's husband without valuable consideration in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 172, defendant gift recipients appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), which determined that the estate executor should recover one-half of all gifts of community property made by the husband to the gift recipients. Overview Prior to her death, the decedent was adjudged an incompetent, and her husband was appointed her guardian. While guardian, her husband made gifts of community property to the gift recipients. He subsequently was replaced as guardian by the estate executor, and the decedent and her husband died. The estate executor filed an action to recover the community property that had been transferred by the decedent's husband. The trial court determined that the estate executor was entitled to recover one-half of the gifts of community property that were made by the decedent's husband. The court affirmed and found that Cal. Civ. Code § 161a applied to the property involved and that the decedent's interest in the community property and her right to dispose of one-half of it by will were property rights that were invaded by her husband's gifts made without her consent, which the decedent was incapable of giving. The husband, as guardian, did not secure prior court permission to make the gifts without his wife's consent, nor did the gift recipients establish that the decedent would have approved of the gifts had she been competent. Outcome The court affirmed the determination that the estate executor should recover one-half of the gifts of community property that were made by the decedent's husband, without his wife's consent, to the gift recipients. Cal. Civ. Code § 172 provides that a husband has the management and control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate, provided, however, that he cannot make a gift of such community personal property, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration without the written consent of the wife. Gifts made without the consent of the

Marriage of Connolly

Procedural Posture Appellant wife challenged an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which denied her motion pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 473 for relief from a judgment, and which awarded respondent husband stock as part of dissolution of property pursuant to a divorce. Appellant argued that respondent withheld information not generally available to the public regarding the value of the stock. Overview The court affirmed the trial court's denial of appellant wife's Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 473 motion for relief from an order, which awarded certain stock to respondent husband. The court rejected appellant's argument that respondent, a director of the company, withheld information, which was not generally available to the public, in violation of Cal. Corp. Code § 25402 and held that there was substantial evidence before the trial court, such as news articles, that revealed such information. The court affirmed as consistent with Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 the trial court's decision to value the stock at $ 7.50 per share, although the stock was later offered publicly at a much higher price, because at the time of the order the stock had traded only in the $ 5 to $ 10 range. Because the parties were adversaries and negotiated at arms length, the court rejected appellant's argument that respondent owed her a fiduciary duty to inform her of the initial public offering. The court also rejected appellant's argument that § 4800 required an equal division of the stock and held that the section gave the trial court discretion regarding dividing "in kind" high risk assets. Outcome The court affirmed the trial court's order, which denied appellant wife's motion for relief from a judgment that awarded respondent husband stock as part of dissolution of property pursuant to a divorce. The court held that information regarding a planned public offering of the stock was publicly available and that respondent had no duty to inform appellant of the potential public offering. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800 was intended to, and does, vest in the court considerable discretion in the division of community property in order to assure that an equitable settlement is reached.

Marriage of Brown

Procedural Posture Appellant wife sought review from an interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County (California), which declared that respondent husband's pension rights were not community property and were not subject to division by the court. Overview Respondent's employer maintained a noncontributory pension plan in which the rights of the employees depended upon their accumulation of points. The parties sought a dissolution of a marriage and the trial court, relying on the French rule, held that respondent's non-vested pension rights were not property, but a mere expectancy, and thus not a community asset subject to division. On appeal, the court overruled the French rule concluding that it erred in characterizing non-vested pension rights as expectancies and in denying the trial courts the authority to divide such rights as community property. The court concluded that pension rights, whether or not vested, represented a property interest. Therefore, to the extent that such rights derived from employment during coverture, they comprised a community asset subject to division in a dissolution proceeding. Outcome The court reversed and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. Facts Gloria Brown (plaintiff) and Robert Brown (defendant) were married from 1950 to 1973. During their marriage and at the time of their divorce, Robert was employed by General Telephone Company (General Telephone). General Telephone had a pension plan through which employees could earn points as a result of their years of service. A General Telephone employee was required to earn a minimum of 78 points in order to have a vested right to a retirement pension. If an employee left his or her employ before accumulating 78 points, the employee did not have the right to any retirement pension. At the time that Gloria and Robert were separated, Robert had 72 points with General Telephone and would have achieved 78 points within three years of his separation from Gloria. The trial court found that because Robert had not achieved 78 points, Robert's interest in his pension with General Telephone was not vested, and there was no community property interest in his pension. Gloria appealed the trial court's find

Marriage of Baragry

Procedural Posture Appellant wife sought review of part of the interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County (California) in a marriage dissolution action, which fixed the date of the parties' separation as the date upon which respondent husband moved out of the family home. Overview Following an argument, appellant wife and respondent husband lived apart for approximately four years before respondent filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage. During those years, respondent had a live-in girlfriend, but ate dinner at the family home, sent appellant cards and gifts, took her to social occasions, had her do his laundry, and otherwise kept up the appearance of being married. The trial court granted an interlocutory judgment of dissolution fixing the date of parties' separation under Cal. Civ. Code § 5118 as the date respondent moved out of the family home for the purposes of determining community property. On appeal of the separation date determination, the court reversed, finding that during the period that the parties preserved the appearance of marriage, they both reaped its benefits, and their earnings remained community property. Because there was no sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive status of a legal marriage, the court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings with costs to appellant. Outcome The judgment fixing the parties' legal separation date as that date when respondent husband moved out of the family home was reversed and remanded for further proceedings with costs to appellant wife, because living apart for four years with extra-marital relations was not sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive status of a legal marriage continuing until respondent husband filed a motion for dissolution of the marriage. Living separate and apart refers to that condition when spouses have come to a parting of the ways with no present intention of resuming marital relations. That husband and wife may live in separate residences is not determinative of separation.

Estate of Logan

Procedural Posture Appellant, former wife, challenged the decision of the Superior Court of San Mateo County (California) denying her any community property interest in the proceeds of her former husband's employment-related term life insurance policy. Overview Appellant, former wife, brought action seeking a portion of the proceeds of her former husband's term life insurance. Appellant's former husband was employed with respondent airline, which deducted premiums for the company sponsored group term life insurance plan from his salary. As part of their interlocutory judgment of divorce, appellant's former husband was ordered to maintain the life insurance with the couple's minor children as beneficiaries until they reached the age of majority. The trial court denied appellant's request for a 39.583 percent share in the proceeds of the term life insurance policy, reasoning that she had no community property interests in these proceeds. The court affirmed and held that appellant had no community interest in her former husband's term life insurance policy since he was insurable when he commenced paying the premiums with his post-separation property earnings. The court further noted that when the former husband remained insurable, the term policy did not constitute a divisible community asset since the policy was of no value and the community had fully received what it had bargained for. Outcome The court affirmed the trial court's decision denying term life insurance benefits to appellant, former wife, and held that appellant did not have an interest in her former husband's term life insurance policy because the policy was not a divisible community asset because the former husband was insurable when he commenced payment of premiums with his post-separation property earnings. "Term Life Insurance covering a spouse who remains insurable is community property only for the period beyond the date of separation for which community funds were used to pay the premium." p. 302 Depends on source of funds (community or separate) that pays the premium

Marriage of Margulis

Procedural Posture Cross-appeals were taken from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which, in a marital dissolution proceeding, awarded a house to the wife, ordered her to make an equalizing payment, and sanctioned the husband for a breach of fiduciary duty. Overview The husband controlled the parties' finances during the marriage. He continued to manage the community investments after separation and to pay community obligations. The wife offered into evidence a list of assets prepared many years earlier. The husband asserted that the assets no longer existed because of stock market losses and community expenditures, but he offered no evidence to corroborate this claim. The court held that the burden of proof should have been shifted to the husband to show the disposition and valuation of the community assets in his control after the separation. The parties' unequal access to evidence justified shifting the normal burden of proof in Evid. Code, § 500, to ensure the equal division of property required by Fam. Code, § 2550. In accordance with Fam. Code, §§ 721, subd. (b), 1100, 1101, 2100, 2102, subd. (a)(1), 2552, subd. (b), a spouse managing community assets had fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting that included those specified in Corp. Code, § 16403, and the trial court had the authority to use an alternate valuation date. Commingling precluded reimbursement for payment of community obligations without tracing of separate funds. Outcome The court reversed the judgment. Taken together, Fam. Code, §§ 721, subd. (b), 1100, 1101, 2100, impose on a managing spouse affirmative, wide-ranging duties to disclose and account for the existence, valuation, and disposition of all community assets from the date of separation through final property division. These statutes obligate a managing spouse to disclose soon after separation all the property that belongs or might belong to the community and its value, and then to account for the management of that property, revealing any material changes in the community estate, such as the transfer or loss of assets. In a trial where community assets are missing, these statutory duties of disclosure and accounting serve to shift the burd

Marriage of Dellaria

Procedural Posture In a marital dissolution action, the Superior Court of Marin County, California, found that after appellant husband and respondent wife separated, they entered into a valid and enforceable oral agreement to divide the major assets in the marital estate, and then adjudicated their community property rights in accordance with that agreement, even though it resulted in an uneven distribution of property. The husband sought review. Overview The court of appeal held that Fam. Code, § 2550, rendered the parties' post-separation oral agreement void and unenforceable. Once a petition for dissolution was filed, the community property had to be divided, either by the parties or by the court. If the court divided the community property, it had to do so equally. If the parties themselves wanted to agree upon another disposition, they had to do so either in writing or in open court. Neither requirement was met. Therefore, the trial court erred in enforcing the parties' oral property settlement agreement. In light of that disposition, it was necessary for the trial court to reconsider whether the husband's refusal to settle was unreasonable and recalcitrant, justifying an award of sanctions under Fam. Code, § 271. Outcome The court reversed the judgment and vacated the trial court's imposition of sanctions. The case was remanded for further proceedings including a reconsideration of the sanction award. Fam. Code, § 2550, contemplates that the parties in a marital dissolution action can agree on a lopsided division of community property, but only if it is evidenced: (1) by a written agreement of the parties; or (2) by an oral stipulation of the parties in open court. If such an agreement is entered into, the court must accept the parties' written agreement and/or in-court oral stipulation regarding the disposition of their property. The court's only role with regard to a proper stipulated disposition of marital property is to accept the stipulation and, if requested, to incorporate the disposition into the judgment.

In re Marriage of Czapar

Procedural Posture Plaintiff husband and defendant wife both appealed from the Superior Court of Orange County (California), which deducted the value of a future covenant not to compete from the value of a family business awarded to plaintiff in their dissolution action. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in reclassifying certain amounts paid to defendant during separation as spousal support and in finding plaintiff wasted community assets during separation. Overview The trial court concluded that should plaintiff husband sell the family business, plaintiff would be required to give a covenant not to compete that diminished the value of the asset to the community. The court reversed the trial court's decision to reduce the value of the future covenant not to compete from the value of the family business award to defendant wife in the parties' dissolution action. It was inappropriate to reduce the value of the business by the speculative value of a hypothetical noncompetition agreement. A covenant not to compete was an asset that was part of the value of a business only when the covenant was negotiated and received by the business. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding interim support to defendant because there was evidence that defendant had a significantly reduced income and that plaintiff had the ability to pay. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff abused his management right by using the family business for personal expenditures. Payment of a salary to plaintiff's girlfriend and a gift to plaintiff's alma mater were inappropriate. Outcome The court reversed the deduction of the value of a future covenant not to compete from the value of the family business awarded to plaintiff husband because a covenant not to compete could only be valued when the covenant was actually negotiated. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding interim support to defendant wife and in concluding plaintiff abused his management right by using the family business for personal expenses. Consideration paid for a noncompetition agreement, or the value of that agreement, is the separate property of the covenanting spouse if such a covenant actually has bee

Grolemund v. Cafferata

Procedural Posture Plaintiff wife appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which ruled that community property was subject to execution to satisfy a judgment against her husband alone arising from a tort. Overview Plaintiffs husband and wife filed suit seeking an injunction against the husband's creditors and sheriffs who were executing on community property to satisfy a tort judgment against the husband alone. The trial court ruled for defendants, creditors and sheriffs, that the community property was liable for the husband's separate debt and plaintiff wife appealed. The court affirmed the order, concluding that Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 161a, which defined the rights of husband and wife in community property, did not change the established rule that the husband had management and control rights with regard to the entire community property. Because the husband could voluntarily convey community property to satisfy the judgment, it followed that the property could be subjected to execution to satisfy the judgment. The court cited several examples in the California code which implicitly recognized the principal that the husband's debts could be satisfied from community property. Outcome The court affirmed the judgment. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 172, while it does not specifically create a liability or an exemption for any particular type of community property, gives to the husband the management and control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate. It reasonably follows from the express language above quoted that this section in effect subjects the entire community personalty to any and all contracts of the husband, as well as to judgments arising out of his tort. Furthermore, since the only limitation upon the husband is to refrain from making a gift of such property without consideration, he is not prevented from paying it out in compromise or satisfaction of a tort claim, for payment of a tort claim is not payment without consideration.

Williams v Williams

Procedural Posture Plaintiff wife appealed from a portion of a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) disposing of the community property made pursuant to a divorce awarded to her and defendant husband. Overview Plaintiff wife and defendant husband were each awarded a divorce. Immediately prior to the divorce, defendant withdrew $ 39,251.50 from a savings and loan association account and received $ 73,237.76 from the dissolution of a stock account. The trial court failed to consider the $ 100,489.26 when dividing the community property pursuant to the divorce. Plaintiff argued on appeal that she was not awarded one-half of the community property as required by law because her award did not include any portion of the $ 100,489.26. The court reversed and remanded that portion of the judgment disposing of the community property and the trial court was ordered to conduct further proceedings in accordance with the views of the court. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to make a finding with respect to whether some or all of the $ 100, 489.26 was community property and whether defendant had used it for unauthorized purposes. Assuming it was, defendant would be liable to plaintiff for the loss. Outcome That portion of the judgment disposing of the parties' community property was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views of the court; in all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. Failure of the trial court to make finding with respect to whether some or all of the $ 110,489.26 was community property and whether defendant husband had used it for unauthorized purposes was error. If the husband uses community property for the purpose of preserving or improving his own separate property, the wife is entitled to be reimbursed for her share

Tracing

Process of determining if property is either separate property or community property. Unless there is an agreement to change the property from community to separate or vice versa, the property is always separate or community

Severance Pay

Rule - no community property interest after separation

Fields v. Michael

Rule: A gift made in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 172 is, as against the donee, voidable by the beneficiary in its entirety during the donor's lifetime, and to the extent of one-half after his death. The beneficiary of a trust, however, is not required to pursue the trust property, but may elect to hold the trustee (or after his death, his estate) personally liable; and the latter may not escape such liability by showing that the trust property has been dissipated. Manifestly, a wife whose community property rights have been violated is entitled to pursue whatever course is best calculated to give her effective relief. Where the amount of the gifts and identity of the donees are known, and the property can be readily reached, the former remedy may be decidedly more advantageous to the plaintiff than an action against the husband's estate, since the assets of the latter may be insufficient to satisfy a judgment. On the other hand, where recourse against the donees would be ineffective to give relief a denial of the alternative remedy would not only be in disregard of rudimentary principles applicable to persons acting in a fiduciary capacity, insofar as the husband stood in that relation, but would also amount to a concession that the law is powerless to accord to the wife's community interest the full protection which § 172 was evidently designed to ensure. Facts: A husband made extensive transfers of money by way of gifts from his personal earnings for services rendered during his marriage. Following the husband's death, the wife filed an action against the husband's personal representative for disaffirmance of the gifts and an accounting. The personal representative filed a demurrer, which was sustained upon the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action maintainable against the personal representative. Issue: May the wife proceed directly against the estate of her husband to secure relief from his dissipation of the community funds through secret and unauthorized inter vivos gifts? Answer: Yes. Conclusion: The court reversed the judgment because the wife alleged sufficient facts to bring the action within the provisions of the probate law. The court found that the wife's allegation of actua

Marriage of Watt (Professional License)

Rule: Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.3(b)(1) mandates that absent a written agreement to the contrary, and subject to certain limitations, the community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party. The statute defines compensable community contributions as payments made with community property for education or training or repayment of a loan incurred for education or training. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.3(a). Additionally, Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(1)(C) requires the court to consider, when making a spousal support determination, the extent to which the supported spouse contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the other spouse. Facts: In a marital dissolution action, the trial court denied the wife spousal support and reimbursement for community funds expended in the husband's education. During the marriage, most of the direct expenses attributable to the education were paid with the husband's loans and grants, but the majority of the living expenses were borne by the wife. At the end of the marriage, the wife was employed, but intended to begin a culinary arts training program. Appellant challenged the decision. Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying spousal support on the basis that the wife only made a "de minimis" contribution to the husband's attainment of an education and career position? Answer: Yes. Conclusion: The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions. It held that the trial court must consider the totality of one spouse's contribution to the other's attainment of an education, including contributions for living expenses, when making a spousal support award decision pursuant to Civ. Code, § 4801. It also held that, in applying the spousal support criterion, the trial court improperly focused exclusively on the actual marital standard of living, without taking into account the reasons for the low standard (expectation of a higher standard when the husband's education was completed). It also held that reimbursable community expenditures for the student spouse's education under Civ. Code, § 4800.3 did not include or

In re Marriage of Rossi

Rule: Cal. Fam. Code § 1101(h) provides that, where a spouse conceals assets under circumstances satisfying the criteria for punitive damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 3294, a penalty representing 100 percent of the concealed asset is warranted. The statute is unambiguous and no exception is provided. Facts: The trial court in dissolution proceedings entered a judgment awarding all of the lottery winnings concealed by the wife during the proceedings to her ex-husband, based on the trial court's findings that the concealment constituted fraud under Civ. Code, § 3294, and came within the penalty provisions of Fam. Code, § 1101, subd. (h). The ex-wife appealed, arguing that the ex-husband had unclean hands and therefore was not entitled to a share of the lottery prize, and that her conduct did not meet the statutory definition for the penalty because she believed the prize to be her separate property. Issue: Did the wife's concealment of her lottery winnings constitute fraud under Civ. Code, § 3294, and come within the penalty provisions of Fam. Code, § 1101, subd. (h)? Answer: Yes. Conclusion: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order awarding the ex-husband all of the concealed lottery winnings. Section 1101(h) unambiguously provided that, where a spouse concealed assets under circumstances satisfying the criteria for punitive damages under Cal. Civ. Code § 3294, a penalty representing 100 percent of the concealed asset was warranted. The record supported the trial court's conclusion that the ex-wife had engaged in conduct constituting fraud within the meaning of § 3294 when she intentionally concealed the lottery winnings during the dissolution proceedings. The record also supported the trial court's conclusion that the winnings were community property. Also, Cal. Fam. Code § 1101(h) did not provide an exception to the penalty provision contained therein because of the supposed unclean hands of the spouse from whom the asset was concealed.

Gionis v. Superior Court

Rule: Consistent with the legislative policy favoring no fault dissolution of marriage, only slight evidence is necessary to obtain bifurcation and resolution of marital status. Facts: Petitioner husband and real party in interest spouse were married for slightly more than one year before filing for marital dissolution. Petitioner moved the trial court to bifurcate the issue of marital status from the issues of custody, support and property division. Petitioner's declaration therefore stated that the marriage irrevocably failed, that reconciliation was impossible, and that trial of the dissolution would be brief while the remaining issues required discovery and a lengthier trial. The trial court denied petitioner's request on the ground that no compelling reason was stated to bifurcate. Petitioner challenged the decision. Issue: Should the trial court have granted petitioner's motion to bifurcate? Answer: Yes. Conclusion: On appeal, the court reversed, holding that petitioner's declaration contained sufficient reasons supporting his motion to bifurcate and that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant it. The court noted that with a strong legislative policy favoring no fault dissolution, only slight evidence was necessary to obtain bifurcation and resolution of marital status.

Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc.

Rule: Construing Cal. Civil Code § 5127 (current version at Cal. Fam. Code § 1102) with reference to, and in harmony with, the various statutory schemes governing the liability of community property for marital debts, it does not appear that the purpose or effect of § 5127 is to exempt community real property from liability for satisfaction of marital debts incurred unilaterally by one spouse, for which the community otherwise is liable. Thus, the creditor who loses its security interest under § 5127 retains the rights of any other unsecured creditor to resort to the community real property for satisfaction of the underlying debt. Facts: In an action by a wife against her husband and two trust deed beneficiaries, the trial court determined that two trust deeds securing loans encumbered by the couple's residence were void because they were executed without the wife's knowledge or consent, in violation of Civ. Code, former § 5127. The trial court further determined, after the couple's divorce became final, that the residence, awarded to the wife as her separate property, was not subject to the lien of a money judgment awarded to one of the trust deed beneficiaries at the time the trust deeds were found to be void. The trial court also entered an order extinguishing the judgment lien encumbering the property filed by one beneficiary before the division of community property. The Court of Appeal, Second Dist., Div. Five, No. B075088, reversed. Issue: Did the setting aside of the security interest in the community real property pursuant to Civ. Code, former § 5127, in and of itself, cancel the underlying obligation or the liability of the community real property for satisfaction of that obligation? Answer: No. Conclusion: The court held that the setting aside of the security interest in the community real property pursuant to Civ. Code, former § 5127, in and of itself, did not cancel the underlying obligation or the liability of the community real property for satisfaction of that obligation. The beneficiary's recordation of the abstract of judgment, prior to the division of property in the marital dissolution proceeding, created a judgment lien that attached to the property and was enforceable for satisfaction of

Marvin v. Marvin

Rule: Courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may, when appropriate, employ principles of constructive trust or resulting trust. Finally, a non-marital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable value of support received if the non-marital partner can show that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward. Facts: Michelle Marvin brought an action against Lee Marvin, a man with whom she had lived for approximately six years, in which she alleged that she and Lee entered into an oral agreement that during the time they lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and share equally the property accumulated through their individual or combined efforts, and that Michelle would render services to Lee as companion, housemaker, housekeeper and cook, give up her career as an entertainer and singer, and that Lee would provide for all her financial support for the rest of her life. Michelle further alleged that later she was forced to leave Lee's household at his request; he refused to pay any further support to her and refused to recognize that she had any interest in the property accumulated while they were living together. Michelle prayed for declaratory relief, asking the court to determine her contract and property rights, and also to impose a constructive trust upon one-half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. The trial court denied Michelle's motion to amend her complaint to allege that she and Lee affirmed their agreement after Lee's divorce became final, and thereafter granted Lee's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Issue: Did the trial court err in its decision to grant Lee Marvin's motion for judgment on the pleadings? Answer: Yes. Conclusion: The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held the terms of the contract as alleged by Michelle did not rest upon any unlawful consideration, that it furnished a suitable basis upon which the trial court could

In re Marriage of Grinius

Rule: Loan proceeds acquired during marriage are presumptively community property; however, this presumption may be overcome by showing the lender intended to rely solely upon a spouse's separate property and did in fact do so. Without satisfactory evidence of the lender's intent, the general presumption prevails. Facts: Victor Grinius and Joyce Grinius signed an antenuptial agreement distinguishing the separate property of the parties. After the marriage, they opened a restaurant. Later, the parties separated. Before trial, Victor stipulated that the restaurant business was community property and the business was sold. The trial court found all of the contested assets, except the restaurant real property, to be community property. The restaurant property was determined to be Victor's separate property. Joyce sought review of the judgment of dissolution contending that there was insubstantial evidence to rebut the presumption that property acquired during marriage had a community nature. Victor relied on the antenuptial agreement to support his separate property claim. Issue: Did the trial court err in determining that the restaurant was Victor's separate property? Answer: Yes. Conclusion: The Court of Appeal held that the restaurant was community property. The Court determined that the antenuptial agreement could not support Victor's claims because it lapsed six years after the date of marriage and reinvested the spouses with all communal rights retroactive to the date of marriage. The Court effected the property division, with directions to determine whether Victor should be reimbursed for separate property contributions and affirmed the trial court's denial of Joyce's request for attorney's fees. The court held that the SBA loan was extended on both the ability of the community to repay the note and to manage the restaurant, and, in absence of any evidence to the contrary, was a community asset. The failure of Victor to present evidence to rebut the community presumption on the second purchase money loan also required a finding that the loan was an asset of the community. The court held that Victor's taking of the title in his name, believing he was entitled to do so under the antenuptial agreement, did no

Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Mahoney

i. Rule: There is a presumption that property acquired after marriage, other than by gift, devise, or descent, is community property. Where the marriage relation has existed a short period of time the presumption that property acquired after marriage is community property is of less weight than in the case of a long-continued marriage relation. There is no presumption, however, as to when property was acquired. ii. Facts: The insured purchased an airplane-travel accident insurance policy from the insurance company and designated his son as the beneficiary. The insured perished during the subsequent airplane flight. The insurance company filed an interpleader action, deposited the policy proceeds, and the widow and the son litigated their rights and interests. The widow claimed one half of the policy proceeds on the basis that the policy was purchased with community property funds. The son claimed the entire policy proceeds on the basis that the policy was purchased with separate property funds. The superior court issued judgment in favor of the son awarding him half of the proceeds of the policy of insurance. iii. Issue: Did the presumption, under section 164 of the Civil Code, that property acquired after marriage (other than by gift, devise, or descent) is community property, determinative that the money used to pay the insurance premium was community property? iv. Answer: No. v. Conclusion: The court affirmed, as modified, the contested judgment that the son and not the widow would receive one half of the policy proceeds. The court found that there was no evidence as to whether the money used to pay the premium was community property or separate property. The court did not accept the presumption of Cal. Civ. Code § 164 as determinative that the money used to pay the insurance premium was community property. The court found that the widow failed to prove either that the policy premium was paid from community funds or that she did not consent to the payment of the premium.

Marriage of Lucero

Rule: The duties of spouses to deal fairly with each other do not terminate when they separate and obtain dissolution of their marriage. In particular, one spouse cannot, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse. Thus a serviceman's election of a disability pension in lieu of a pension based on length of service does not defeat the community interest in the pension based on length of service, nor will an employee spouse be permitted to defeat the other spouse's community interest in a pension by converting it to a joint and survivor annuity. Facts: In a marriage dissolution proceeding, the trial court denied spousal support to either party and determined that the wife was entitled to a community interest in her husband's retirement benefits attributable to the second marriage of the parties only to the extent of the benefit the husband would have received absent his redeposit of previously withdrawn contributions, the redeposit having been made with his separate funds after the parties' separation. The court retained jurisdiction over the community property interest in the wife's retirement benefits based on a finding she had been employed for a period of six years during the parties' second marriage. Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to consider community property rights in husband's retirement benefits attributable to his employment during the first marriage? Answer: No. Conclusion: The Court of Appeal modified the judgment and affirmed it as modified. The court held that the trial court's finding of the circumstances justifying its denial of spousal support to the wife was adequate and that any error therein was nonprejudicial. The court also held the redeposit right was a community property pension right subject to division on dissolution and that therefore the wife was entitled to elect to share in the increased retirement benefits upon payment by her of her pro rata share of the redeposit. The court further held that the trial court properly limited the community property interest in the husband's retirement benefits to the parties' second marriage, since their first marriage was terminated by a final judgment of divorce and a subsequen

Spreckels v. Spreckels

Rule: The husband has the management and control of the community property, with the like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however, that he cannot make a gift of such community property, or convey the same without a valuable consideration, unless the wife, in writing, consent thereto. Facts: Claus Spreckels acquired properties during his marriage with Anna C. Spreckels, forming part of the community property. In the eight years between 1896 and 1905, Claus made gifts to two of his sons, defendants John D. Spreckels and Adolph B. Spreckels, of large amounts of this community property. The gifts aggregated in value about $ 25 million. At the time of his death, Claus held other property with the approximate value of $ 10 million. Anna did not, in her husband's lifetime, consent to the making of any of these gifts, either in writing or otherwise. Claus died in Dec. 1908. Anna died in Feb. 1910. Plaintiffs Claus A. Spreckels and Rudolph Spreckels, as executors of Anna's will and as executors of Claus' will, and joined by plaintiff Emma C. Ferris, filed a lawsuit in California state court seeking to compel an accounting by defendants with respect to the gifts made to them by Claus in his lifetime. Plaintiff sought restitution of the gifts, insofar as it exceeded one-half of the community property of Claus and Anna, and if restitution was not possible, then for judgment for the value of the gifts. Plaintiffs alleged that Claus made the gifts with the intent and purpose of depriving Anna of her right to one-half of the community property upon his death. The superior court entered judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the gifts were void, as they were made without Anna's consent. Issue: Did the lack of consent from Anna render Claus' disposition of community property void? Answer: No. Conclusion: The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court observed that the controlling law in the case was § 172 of the Civil Code, which provided that the husband had the management and control of the community property with the like power of disposition. The proviso added in 1891 to § 172—to the effect that the hus

Estate of Vargas

Rule: The theory of quasi-marital property equates property rights acquired during a putative marriage with community property rights acquired during a legal marriage. Facts: Appellant first wife married husband who subsequently married respondent second wife. Neither appellant nor respondent knew of their husband's marriage to the other. In an heirship proceeding after the husband died, his estate was divided equally between appellant and respondent. Appellant challenged the order, contending that the evidence did not establish respondent as a putative wife and that even if she were so considered, an equal division was erroneous. Issue: Was it an error to divide the estate of the decedent equally between appellant first wife and respondent putative wife? Answer: No. Conclusion: The court affirmed the order dividing the estate equally between appellant and respondent. The court held that as innocent wives of a deceased practicing bigamist, appellant and respondent were entitled to equal shares of his estate which accumulated during the active phase of the bigamy. An innocent participant who has duly solemnized a matrimonial union which is void because of some legal infirmity acquires the status of putative spouse. Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and, if the division of property is in issue, shall divide, in accordance with Cal. Civ. Code § 4800, that property acquired during the union which would have been community property or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable. Such property shall be termed quasi-marital property. The innocent putative spouse in a putative marriage is in partnership or a joint enterprise with his or her spouse, contributing his or her services to the common enterprise. Thus, their accumulated property is held in effect in tenancy-in-common in equal shares. Upon death of the one, only his or her half interest is considered as community property, to which the rights of the lawful spouse attach.

In re Marriage of Watts (Goodwill)

Rule: The value of community goodwill is not necessarily the specified amount of money that a willing buyer would pay for such goodwill. In view of exigencies that are ordinarily attendant a marriage dissolution the amount obtainable in the marketplace might well be less than the true value of the goodwill. Community goodwill is a portion of the community value of the professional practice as a going concern on the date of the dissolution of the marriage. In a matrimonial matter, the practice of the sole practitioner husband will continue, with the same intangible value as it had during the marriage. Under the principles of community property law, the wife, by virtue of her position of wife, made to that value the same contribution as does a wife to any of the husband's earnings and accumulations during marriage. She is as much entitled to be recompensed for that contribution as if it were represented by the increased value of stock in a family business. Facts: Carol D. Watts and John D. Watts were married in 1975. In 1979, Carol filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. An interlocutory judgment was filed in 1982. Thereafter, carol brought a motion for temporary spousal support pending appeal, attorney fees and costs on appeal and an injunctive order. The trial court entered judgment, finding that John's medical practice had no goodwill value at the date of separation of the parties. Also, the trial court concluded that it did not have the authority to require John to reimburse the community for his exclusive use of the family residence and the medical practice between the date of separation and the date of trial, even though the court found that John had the exclusive use of such community property after such separation. Both parties appealed. Issue: Did the trial court err in finding that John's medical practice had no goodwill value? Did the court err in failing to reimburse the community for the reasonable value of the use of community property by John from the date of separation to the time of trial? Answer: 1) Yes. 2) Yes. Conclusion: The Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter. The court held that the trial court erred in finding that the husband's medical pract

Vieux v. Vieux

Rule: Under Cal. Civ. Code § 163, the "ownership" in the husband through and by virtue of which the wife's interest would be entirely excluded, is necessarily an absolute ownership, as distinguished from a limited ownership, and that, so far as community funds might participate in the acquisition or protection of vested rights, to that extent proportionally should the property be considered as "community." Facts: Before the parties married they both examined a home and decided to purchase it. The husband purchased the lot. The parties married and took possession of the home. One-fifth of the principal was paid using community funds. In the parties' divorce action, it was held that the wife had no title or interest in the aforementioned property, and that the husband had entire ownership of the same. The wife appealed. Issue: Under the circumstances, did the husband have the entire ownership of the home? Answer: No. Conclusion: The court found that a married couple could by agreement change the status of separate property to community property and vice versa. While the parties had no agreement to treat the home as community property, by their actions it was reasonable to find that they considered the property community. Under Cal. Civ. Code § 163, "ownership" by the husband required absolute ownership and to the extent community funds were used to acquire property in which the husband initially had partial ownership, proportionally was the property considered community. Thus, the community interest was entitled to a share of title to the property in the same proportion as the amount contributed to the purchase price by the community. Proportion of community property If you have SP that you bring into the marriage and community pays down loan on it then community gets percentage · Property purchased by the husband before marriage · Husband received money from the property during the marriage · Trial Court confirmed that the property was the husband's separate property · Proportion of community property · If you have separate that you bring into marriage and you have loan on it that is being paid y the community property, CP gets a percentage of proportionate amount

In re Marriage of Moore (Reimbursement of Community Property)

Rule: Where community funds are used to make payments on property purchased by one of the spouses before marriage the rule developed through decisions in California gives to the community a pro tanto community property interest in such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the payments made with separate funds. This rule has been commonly understood as excluding payments for interest and taxes. The community is entitled to a minimum interest in the property represented by the ratio of the community investment to the total separate and community investment in the property. Facts: In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court concluded that a residence purchased by the wife before marriage was her separate property but that the community had an interest in it by virtue of the community property payments made during the course of the parties' marriage. The trial court further concluded that the community interest was to be determined according to the ratio that the reduction of principal resulting from community funds bears to the reduction of principal from separate funds. No credit was given for the amount paid for interest, taxes and insurance. The community interest was calculated by multiplying the equity value of the house by the ratio of the community's reduction of principal to the total amount of principal reduction by both community and separate property. The wife's separate property interest was calculated by multiplying the equity value of the house by the ratio of the separate property reduction of principal to the total amount of principal reduction. The trial court also found that the husband deliberately misappropriated items of community personal property by disposing of them without valuable consideration and without the consent of his wife in order to purchase alcoholic beverages, and made a compensatory award to the wife pursuant to Civ. Code, § 4800, subd. (b)(2). The husband sought review. Issue: Did the trial court properly compute the interest obtained by the community in the wife's separate property? Answer: No. Conclusion: On review, the Court reversed the trial court's determination of the community property interest in th

Marriage of Moore

Rule: Where community funds are used to make payments on property purchased by one of the spouses before marriage the rule developed through decisions in California gives to the community a pro tanto community property interest in such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the payments made with separate funds. This rule has been commonly understood as excluding payments for interest and taxes. The community is entitled to a minimum interest in the property represented by the ratio of the community investment to the total separate and community investment in the property. Facts: In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court concluded that a residence purchased by the wife before marriage was her separate property but that the community had an interest in it by virtue of the community property payments made during the course of the parties' marriage. The trial court further concluded that the community interest was to be determined according to the ratio that the reduction of principal resulting from community funds bears to the reduction of principal from separate funds. No credit was given for the amount paid for interest, taxes and insurance. The community interest was calculated by multiplying the equity value of the house by the ratio of the community's reduction of principal to the total amount of principal reduction by both community and separate property. The wife's separate property interest was calculated by multiplying the equity value of the house by the ratio of the separate property reduction of principal to the total amount of principal reduction. The trial court also found that the husband deliberately misappropriated items of community personal property by disposing of them without valuable consideration and without the consent of his wife in order to purchase alcoholic beverages, and made a compensatory award to the wife pursuant to Civ. Code, § 4800, subd. (b)(2). The husband sought review. Issue: Did the trial court properly compute the interest obtained by the community in the wife's separate property? Answer: No. Conclusion: On review, the Court reversed the trial court's determination of the community property interest in th

Stocks in Community Property

Stocks are compensation and are determined to be separate or community depending on when labor being compensated for occurs.

Transmutation of Property

The result of an agreement between the spouses to change the status of an asset from either separate to community or community to separate. The agreement may be oral but must be consented to or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected

Separate Property

Under community property law, property owned solely by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by gift or inheritance after the marriage, or purchased with separate funds after the marriage. 770: (a) Separate property of a married person includes all of the following: (1) All property owned by the person before marriage. (2) All property acquired by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. (3) The rents, issues, and profits of the property described in this section. (b) A married person may, without the consent of the person's spouse, convey the person's separate property. 771: (a) The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, after the date of separation of the spouses, are the separate property of the spouse. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the earnings and accumulations of an unemancipated minor child related to a contract of a type described in Section 6750 shall remain the sole legal property of the minor child.

MacDonald Test

When making an "express declaration" for transmutation of property, there needs to be a special kind of writing in which the adversely affected spouse expresses a clear understanding of the document and that it changes the character or ownership of a property. Partial performance doesn't matter

Family Expense Presumption

i) it is presumed that expenses for family expenses were made with CP funds. ii) In EXAMPLE: Here because of commingling some expenses may have been made with SP funds, and the presumption is that the SP expenses were a GIFT TO THE COMMUNITY WITH NO REINBURSEMENT INTENDED. To defeat this presumption need an agreement to reimburse. To satisfy the BOP, H can use 1 of 2 accounting methods. Exhaustion accounting method: Need to show NO CP funds left when he made his SP property purchases . 1. Commingled account of $6k, $5k is community and $1k is separate 2. Need to exhaust community funds of $5k 3. then show that the remaining separate funds was used to buy the separate property Direct tracing method: Quick in / quick out: at a time: 12k in, 12k out. Direct tracing requires 1. Sufficient funds available And 2. Intended to use the SP funds to buy the asset.

Estate of Raphael

i. Procedural Posture: Appellant administrator challenged a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California) decreeing that his decedent brother's entire estate was community property of decedent and respondent widow on date of his death. ii. Overview: The administrator alleged that all of the decedent's estate was the decedent's separate property and that the administrator and the widow were entitled to have the estate split between them. The widow filed written objections to the administrator's petition, asserting that a substantial part of the estate was community property. The widow filed a petition to determine the community property interest in the estate. The trial court found that the decedent had, by oral agreement, fully executed and corroborated by income tax returns, transmuted all of his property into community property, and that all of the estate was community property. Affirming, the court held that it was for the trial court to weigh the widow's testimony as to the decedent's oral agreement, and that the income tax returns were proper documentary evidence of the agreement. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the trial court's judgment finding that the decedent's entire estate was community property based on an oral agreement between the decedent and the widow. Transmutation based on oral agreement. However, likely won't be applicable on its own now

Painter v Painter

i. Procedural Posture: Appellant ex-wife sought review of a decision of the trial court (New Jersey), which made an equitable distribution of the marital property of appellant and respondent ex-husband. ii. Overview: The lower court made an equitable distribution of the marital property of appellant ex-wife and respondent ex-husband. On appeal, the court remanded for reconsideration of the property distribution. The court held that the divorce statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23, was constitutional. The court held that the title of the statute was not defective under N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, para. 4, even though there was no specific reference to equitable distribution, because of the close and clear connection between divorce and property division. The court determined that the term "equitable distribution" was not unduly vague and that the statute provided sufficient guidelines for allocating marital assets. The court held that the statute sufficiently indicated what property was eligible for equitable distribution, even though it was expressed in general terms. The court held that the trial court erred in limiting the definition of marital property to exclude property acquired during the marriage that was not attributable to the effort of a spouse, such as gifts or inheritance. The court noted that marital property only included property acquired before the filing of the divorce complaint. iii. Outcome: The court remanded the order of equitable distribution because the trial court erred in limiting the definition of marital property to exclude property acquired during the marriage that was not attributable to the effort of appellant ex-wife or respondent ex-husband, such as gifts or inheritance. iv. Notes: Husband had $230,309 in assets including gifts and inheritance while the wife had $99,709. After excluding the gifts and inheritance, it reduced to $82,571 and $58,199 respectively. Awards were allocated per this change and the case is about if that was fair.

Dunn v. Mullan

i. Procedural Posture: Appellant husband's estate challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of San Joaquin County (California) in a suit to quiet title to certain property. ii. Overview: Suit to quiet titled to certain real property was brought by the husband's estate. The suit was opposed by the wife's estate. The trial court found that the wife was the absolute owner of one-half of the property and the remaining interest was community property. It ordered that the husband's estate was entitled to possession of the community interest in the property for the purpose of estate administration and the wife's estate was entitled to the remaining interest for purposes of the administration of her estate. The court affirmed. It found that the deed naming both husband and wife as grantees presumptively vested the property in the spouses as tenants in common, the interest conveyed to the wife was presumed to be her separate property, and the interest conveyed to her husband was community property of the marriage. Further, husband's expenditure of community funds for improvements was not intended to create a lien on the property nor did he expect repayment of the funds expended to improve the property. Finally, a quiet title action was not the proper action to determine whether the marital community was entitled to reimbursement. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment finding that one-half of the real estate was the separate property of the wife and the remaining interest was community property. If Husband and Wife are co-tenants, then Husband's interest is community property and the Wife's interest is separate.

In re Marriage of Dawley

i. Procedural Posture: Appellant wife challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County (California) upholding an antenuptial agreement and finding no community property in a divorce proceeding against respondent husband. ii. Overview: The husband and wife executed an antenuptial agreement, which protected the husband's property rights and earnings from the wife's claims, while providing support for the wife and her daughter from a previous marriage until the wife could resume employment after the birth of the child. After the baby was born, the couple remained together, and the wife eventually resumed working. Years later, the husband filed for divorce. The trial court granted the dissolution of the marriage and, in relying upon the antenuptial agreement, found no community property. The wife appealed the trial court's failure to find the existence of any community property. The court affirmed the trial court, holding the antenuptial agreement valid because it did not encourage or promote the dissolution of the marriage. The court further held that the antenuptial agreement was never rescinded by the parties, and the wife freely and voluntarily entered into the agreement. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding the antenuptial agreement enforceable as the agreement did not promote or encourage the dissolution of the marriage, the agreement was not procured by undue influence, and the parties did not rescind the agreement.

Gudelj v. Gudelj

i. Procedural Posture: Appellant wife challenged those portions of the decision of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which entered an interlocutory decree of divorce from respondent husband, relating to support, custody of the minor child, and the disposition of the property of the spouses. ii. Overview: Most of the issues before the court concerned the disposition of the property of the spouses. The court held that the presumption that the husband's purchase of an interest in a dry cleaning business was community property because it was acquired during the marriage was rebutted by the testimony of the husband that the cash portion of the purchase price came from funds received from the sale of his separate property. However, the part of the purchase price of the partnership interest that was in the form of a note signed by husband created a rebuttable presumption that the property acquired on credit was community property. Further, the form of the instrument under which husband and wife held title to the marital home was not conclusive as to its status. Husband's testimony of his undisclosed intention not to make a gift of a present interest in the property was not evidence of a mutual understanding to negate the express terms of the title taken in the parties' names as "joint tenants." The court found that the portions of the interlocutory decree purporting to make an immediate disposition of property were erroneous. iii. Outcome: The court stated that the portions of the interlocutory divorce decree that disposed of the real property, and concerned the rights and obligations of the parties thereto, and that disposed of the partnership interest were reversed and remanded for a new trial. In all other respects, the decree was affirmed. Rule: Loan is community property unless the lender relied on separate property to issue out the loan.

In re Marriage of Noghrey

i. Procedural Posture: Appellant, former husband, challenged a judgment from the Superior Court of Santa Clara County (California), which determined that a premarital agreement was valid. In the event of a divorce, the agreement entitled respondent former wife to a house and $ 500,000.00 or one-half of appellant's assets, whichever was greater. ii. Overview: Appellant former husband challenged a trial court judgment finding that a premarital agreement was valid. Under the agreement, appellant contracted to give respondent former wife a house and $ 500,000.00 or one-half of his assets, whichever was greater, in the event of a divorce. After seven months of marriage, respondent sought a divorce. At trial, appellant testified that he did not wish to sign the agreement but was coerced into doing so by respondent's mother who forced him into doing so by stating on the day of the wedding that there would be no wedding if he did not sign. The trial court found that the agreement was valid, binding, and enforceable. The appellate court disagreed and reversed the judgment, holding that an antenuptial agreement such as the one at issue, the terms of which encouraged or promoted divorce, was against public policy and was unenforceable. While noting that not all antenuptial agreements violated public policy, the appellate court held that in this case the prospect of receiving a house and a minimum of $ 500,000 would menace the marriage of the best-intentioned spouse, especially since neither respondent nor her family possessed great wealth. iii. Outcome: The judgment of the lower court upholding the validity of the antenuptial agreement was reversed because such agreements that facilitated divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in the event of such an occurrence were void as against public policy.

Estate of Baer

i. Procedural Posture: Appellants, the parents of the decedent, sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which found in favor of respondent, the decedent's husband, in a proceeding to settle the account of an administrator and directing distribution of the estate. The trial court determined that the estate property was community property of the decedent and her husband and not the separate property of the decedent. ii. Overview: At the time of the marriage, the decedent had no substantial estate of her own, while the husband was well off. Through her own efforts, the decedent acquired some funds, which she deposited in a separate bank account. She used those funds to purchase the stock. In his petition for distribution of the estate, the husband alleged that all property of the estate was community property, and he prayed for distribution of the entire estate to him. The decedent's parents objected to the account and petition on the ground that the property of the estate was the separate property of the decedent, of which the parents would receive one-half. The property in question was corporate stock, which stood in the decedent's name alone. The court held that although Cal. Civ. Code § 164 provided a presumption that property standing in the name of the decedent alone was her separate property, the husband's testimony that he did not intended to relinquish his community interest in the funds was sufficient to overcome the presumption. The court concluded that the trial court's finding that stocks were not the separate property of the decedent was supported by sufficient evidence. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Wife was a puzzle gambler, got some money, and had an account in her name. Husband helped with that account buying stocks. Husband worked with that account as community property and court found it to be community property

Marriage of Frick

i. Procedural Posture: Both husband and wife appealed the decision from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which determined the distribution of property, spousal support, and attorney fees. ii. Overview: Husband owned certain real property prior to the marriage which he used to operate the business which was the source of income during the marriage. He used community property funds to reduce the principal balance of the encumbrance on the real property. The trial court made a determination of the community property and the separate property, distributed the value of the real property, the value of the business, and other assets, and awarded spousal support and attorney fees to wife. Both parties appealed. The court found no error in computing the pro tanto community and separate property interests in husband's separate property based on the value of the business and the real property at the time of the marriage and the amount of community funds expended. Husband was not entitled to credit for rents paid by business on separately owned real property because he had control over the amount and he had commingled these funds. There was no error in requiring husband to repay money lent to him by wife, as statute of limitations did not apply. The court, however, found it error to divest itself of jurisdiction to address spousal support after five years. iii. Outcome: The court reversed and remanded that portion of the decision which granted the community entitlement to income from the business and divestment of jurisdiction over spousal support, but affirmed the decision which computed the pro tanto community and separate property interests of husband based on the value of his business and real property at the time of the marriage. H owned hotel that was community property and the land that the hotel was on, which was separate. Funds were commingled and court weren't persuaded by H's arguments for separate property when he was his own landlord

Bowman v Bowman

i. Procedural Posture: Defendant, former husband, sought review of portions of a judgment from the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), which found that a home owned by the husband and plaintiff, former wife, was community property and awarded the wife a monthly allowance for child support of the parties' three children. ii. Overview: After 13 years of marriage, the wife filed an action for divorce. The wife asked for custody of the parties' three children and a division of the community property, which included the family home. The husband filed a cross-complaint for divorce, which asked for custody of the children and alleged that the home was owned in joint tenancy. The trial court granted the divorce, found the home to be community property, awarded the home and its furnishings to the wife, granted custody of the children to the wife, and ordered the husband to pay monthly child support for each child. The husband claimed on appeal that the portion of the decree that found the home to be community property was erroneous and that the amount of child support was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected the father's claims. The court found that there was substantial evidence to overcome the presumption that the home was owned in joint tenancy and that it was considered to be community property by the parties and that there was no indication that the amount of child support ordered by the trial court was an abuse of discretion. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the portions of the divorce decree that held the home was community property and fixed the amount of child support for the parties' children.

Wirth v Wirth

i. Procedural Posture: In a claim for property distribution arising from a divorce, appellant ex-wife sought review of the order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, Broome County (New York), which granted respondent ex-husband's motion to dismiss the ex-wife's complaint seeking a judgment declaring that she was half owner of real and personal property held by the ex-husband in his own name and purchased with his own earnings. ii. Overview: The ex-wife obtained a foreign judgment of divorce against the ex-husband. The parties stipulated that the ex-wife's pending New York divorce action would abate except with respect to the ex-wife's property claims. The ex-wife sought a judgment declaring that she was half owner of real and personal property held by the ex-husband in his own name and purchased with his own earnings. The ex-wife contended that she was entitled to equally share the ex-husband's assets because she spent her own earnings on family expenses during the marriage so that the ex-husband's earnings could be invested. The trial court granted the ex-husband's motion to dismiss the ex-wife's complaint. On appeal, the court affirmed. Although the husband had the duty to support his family if he was able to do so, the ex-wife was not entitled to seek reimbursement for money she expended on necessities because the ex-husband did not expressly or impliedly promise to repay her. No constructive trust was formed because there was no concealment or misrepresentation involved. The ex-wife was not entitled to obtain a community property division under the guise of equitable relief. iii. Outcome: In the ex-wife's claim for property distribution arising out of a divorce, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting the ex-husband's motion to dismiss the ex-wife's complaint.

Freitas v. Freitas

i. Procedural Posture: In an action on a life insurance policy, defendant, an insured's children, appealed from a decision of the Superior Court of Alameda Count (California), which entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, the insured's widow. ii. Overview: The complaint alleged, and the trial court found, that the widow was induced to marry the insured by an antenuptial agreement, wherein he promised that he would make her the beneficiary of a life insurance policy if she married him. Although the insured initially caused the widow to be named as the beneficiary in a policy, he subsequently caused the children to be substituted as beneficiaries. After defendant beneficiary corporation deposited the proceeds of the policy in court, the trial court rendered judgment for the widow. On appeal, the court held that the complaint stated a cause of action because, under the facts pleaded, the widow acquired an equitable right to the sum secured by the policy, which right the insured could not defeat by any act of his; and (2) as a matter of pleading, the antenuptial agreement was presumed to be in writing. The court further held that the statute of frauds did not apply because, although the evidence showed that the antenuptial agreement was not reduced to writing, the insured, in keeping with such agreement, procured the widow to be designated as the beneficiary of the policy. Thus, the agreement became fully executed. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Statute of Frauds doesn't apply to oral agreements that have been executed.

Estate of Murphy

i. Procedural Posture: Petitioner husband's estate sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County (California), which awarded respondent wife's estate a half interest in all property of petitioner's probate estate claimed to be community. ii. Overview: Decedent husband's will placed all of his and decedent wife's community property, as well as his own separate property, into two trusts in which decedent wife would have life interests plus a general testamentary power of appointment in the trust that included her community property interest. Decedent wife died without ever having exercised the power of appointment and she never declared any election to accept or reject decedent husband's testamentary disposition of her community property interest. The court held that decedent wife's community property interest was beyond decedent husband's power of testamentary disposition and could not be subjected to the will's provisions in the absence of her affirmative election to accept its benefits; therefore, respondent wife's estate was entitled to decedent wife's community property despite her failure to reject decedent husband's testamentary disposition of her community property. Finally, the court found that petitioner husband's estate failed to show that certain income of decedent husband's was separate income where he commingled the income with the couple's community property. The court affirmed the judgment. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment awarding respondent wife's estate a half interest in all property of petitioner husband's estate, holding that decedent wife's community property interest was beyond decedent husband's power of testamentary disposition and could not be subjected to the will's provisions in the absence of her affirmative election to accept its benefits. iv. RULE: There are two methods to determine if property was separate during marriage, direct tracing or proof that the community income was exhausted by family expenses. If a spouse has commingled community and separate property, then the spouse has the burden of keeping adequate records to establish if an asset was acquired with community or separate property. v. Case: H had two farms and stock that provide

Estate of Sheldon

i. Procedural Posture: Petitioner son challenged the decision of the Superior Court of Merced County (California), which granted claimant daughter and husband's motion for a new trial after the jury determined that claimants were not entitled to an intestate share of the decedent's estate. ii. Overview: Decedent was married and subsequently died with a will that left her estate in equal shares to petitioner son and claimant daughter. There was no mention of a surviving husband. However, husband assigned his interest in decedent's estate to claimant and her husband. The jury found that husband had no right to inherit any of decedent's property and that there was an oral antenuptial agreement whereby husband agreed not to accept any inheritance from her estate. The trial court granted claimants' motion for a new trial, and petitioner appealed. Contestants cross-appealed from the judgment. On appeal, the court found that the oral agreement between decedent and her husband satisfied the requirements of Cal. Prob. Code §§ 70 and 220. Furthermore, the evidence showed that decedent changed her position to her detriment in reliance upon the oral contract. Accordingly, the jury's decision was not against the law, and the order granting a new trial was reversed iii. Outcome: The trial court's decision which granted claimants, decedent's daughter and her husband, a new trial after jury determined that claimants were not entitled to an intestate share of decedent's estate was reversed. Decedent entered into a valid oral antenuptial agreement with her husband, who agreed he would not inherit from decedent's estate. Therefore, husband's assignment of his interest in the estate to claimants was void. Estoppel to assert Statute of Frauds Deceased relied on her detriment on oral promise of husband that he didn't want an interest in her estate. The detriment is this lawsuit.

Louknitsky v. Louknitsky

i. Procedural Posture: Plaintiff ex-wife challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which awarded the ex-wife a divorce from defendant ex-husband on the ground of extreme cruelty. The trial court found that all the property belonged to the community, and it did not award alimony to the ex-wife. The ex-husband moved to strike the ex-wife's reply brief. ii. Overview: The parties had resided in China before moving to America. Before the ex-wife left for America, the ex-husband executed a document that stated that he had no objection to her leaving and that he had no claim to the money that she had in her possession. The ex-husband moved to America later. The ex-wife argued that the document converted the money to her separate property. On appeal, the court held that the major portion of the funds invested in the parties' home was derived from the earnings of the ex-husband. The court deemed the funds acquired in China to be community property. Further, the court stated that the document did not change the community character of the funds and property because the document was merely to allow the ex-wife to show immigration officials that in seeking to enter the United States she possessed a substantial sum of money available for her support. The court noted that the ex-husband did not know at the time of the purchase of their house that the ex-wife was the sole grantee, and the trial court properly found that the home belonged to the community. The court ruled that the trial court properly did not award alimony to the ex-wife. iii. Outcome: The court affirmed the trial court's award to the ex-wife of a divorce from the ex-husband and the finding that the property belonged to the community. The court struck a portion of the ex-wife's reply brief. Wife bought house with community funds while husband was out of country. Wife lost married woman's presumption

In re Marriage of Jafeman

i. RULE: All property owned by a husband prior to marriage, together with the rents, issues, and profits arising from the property after marriage, is his separate property. The character of the property is fixed as of the time it is acquired and it is not altered by the occurrence of marriage or by the subsequent use of the property in the marital relationship. However, a husband and wife may change the character of property from separate to community by an oral agreement. No particular formalities are required for an effective agreement. The agreement may be either express or implied. If the wife acquires possession of the property and manages and controls it, this does not in and of itself demonstrate that the husband intended to alter the character of his property. However, the nature of the transaction or the surrounding circumstances may establish the existence of such an intent on the part of the husband. The acts of the parties and their dealing with the property may also establish that they intended a community interest. ii. FACTS: In a dissolution of marriage action, the court found that a home acquired by the husband prior to his marriage was community property, based primarily on the fact that for 14 years community funds, managed and controlled by the wife, were used to make payments on the home and for improvements, implying an agreement by the husband that the home was to be community property. The court also found that a savings account in the wife's name, and the cash surrender value of her pension plan, were her separate property. The court entered an interlocutory judgment of dissolution and awarded the wife attorney's fees over the objection of the husband that such award violated the provision of the Family Law Act that the community property be divided equally. iii. ISSUE: Was there an implied agreement to change the character of the residence acquired by the husband prior to marriage into community property? iv. ANSWER: No. v. CONCLUSION: The Court of Appeal reversed that portion of the interlocutory judgment awarding and dividing the community property, finding that there was no implied agreement to change the character of the residence acquired by the husband prior to marriage into com

In re Marriage of Benson

i. RULE: Cal. Fam. Code § 852(a) provides that a "transmutation," or an interspousal transaction changing the character of community or separate property, pursuant to Cal. Fam. Code § 850, is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration approved by the adversely affected spouse. A writing satisfies the "express declaration" requirement only if it states on its face that a change in the character or ownership of the subject property is being made. This construction of Cal. Fam. Code § 852(a) precludes the use of "extrinsic evidence" to prove that the writing effected a transmutation. ii. FACTS: A wife petitioned for dissolution. The husband claimed he conveyed to the wife his community property interest in their home after she orally promised to waive, in writing, her community property interest in his retirement accounts, although no such writing was ever made. Notwithstanding Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a), the trial court ruled that the husband's performance of his part of a bargain, as evidenced by a deed he signed in the wife's favor, served as an adequate substitute for the wife's express written statement changing the character of the retirement accounts into his separate property. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, adopting and applying the reasoning of the trial court. In seeking review, the wife claimed the lower courts erred in finding a valid transmutation of the husband's retirement accounts under Cal. Fam. Code § 852(a), and in denying her a community property interest in those accounts. iii. ISSUE: Did the lower courts err in finding a valid transmutation of the husband's retirement accounts and in characterizing such property as separate rather than community in nature? iv. ANSWER: Yes. v. CONCLUSION: The instant court held that § 852(a) did not operate like the general statute of frauds, Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a), in which the requirement of a basic writing was subject to an implied exception for "part performance" of the contract's terms. Even assuming the husband's transfer of the deed constituted part performance of the wife's promise to transmute the retirement accounts, Cal. Fam. Code § 852(a) required the transmutation agreement to be both writt

In re Estate of Clark

i. RULE: California law specifically provides that any person interested may appear and contest a will and includes heirs as among those interested. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1307. Broadly speaking, a contest of a will is in its essence an action for the recovery of property unlawfully taken or about to be taken from the ownership of the contestant. While the mere expectancy of an heir is not usually regarded as property, the moment the ancestor has died, that expectancy is changed into a vested interest in property. It becomes thus vested by virtue of the death. The contest of a will therefore goes to establish upon the part of the contestant that his right to property has been violated. This right is such as Cal. Civ. Code § 954 declares upon: A thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property may be transferred by the owner. ii. FACTS: Major Clark fathered three children by his first marriage. On July 29, 1923, his son, Edwin Howard Clark died; about two weeks after Edwin's death, Major Clark married Eliza Simpson Clark. Major Clark would have inherited his son's entire estate, which consisted chiefly of such mineral rights and the revenues that flowed from those mineral rights, had Edwin died intestate. Edwin, however, left a document, purporting to be a will, leaving nothing of consequence to his father, Major Clark, and instead left the entire estate to other persons. Major Clark contested the will, which was admitted to probate but eventually, Major Clark and the other heirs entered into a settlement where Clark would get half of Edwin's estate. Major Clark passed on February 12, 1926, leaving his two children and his widow as his heirs. After Major Clark's death, his surviving children petitioned for partial distribution of his estate under his will, which established a trust fund for the widow but left the bulk of his property to the children. The widow relinquished her rights under the will and elected to take her share of the couple's community property. She sought to have the mineral rights and revenue acquired from Edwin's estate to form part of the couple's community property, arguing that Major Clark received the property from his son's estate after the couple's marriage. The t

Andrews v. Andrews

i. RULE: Cases of this kind are not favored, and when the promise rests in parol are even regarded with suspicion, and will not be enforced except upon the strongest evidence that it was founded upon a valuable consideration, and deliberately entered into by the deceased. But while not favored and rarely enforced upon oral proofs, the power to make a valid agreement to dispose of property by will in a particular way has long been recognized. ii. FACTS: Plaintiff son filed an action to establish and enforce an alleged oral contract with the decedent to the effect that the decedent would will the son all of the property he owned at his death. The lower court found for the respondent wife of the decedent. Plaintiff appealed. iii. ISSUE: Can the plaintiff enforce an oral contract to the effect that his father would will him all the property he owned? iv. ANSWER: No. v. CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Upon review, the court found that there was no valid evidence in the record that showed the contract alleged by the son was ever made. Although the son's wife testified to the existence of the contract, her testimony should have been excluded under Rem. Comp. Stat. § 1211 because she was a party-in-interest. Because any property the son received would have been as a result of the alleged contract with the decedent, the property the son sought to acquire would have been community property pursuant to Rem. Comp. Stat. § 5917. vi. Had it not been a contract and a gift instead, then it would have been separate property and the wife could have testified.

Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc.

i. RULE: Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (b), defines a "putative spouse" as the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid. The good faith inquiry is a subjective one that focuses on the actual state of mind of the alleged putative spouse. While there is no requirement that the claimed belief be objectively reasonable, good faith is a relative quality and depends on all the relevant circumstances, including objective circumstances. In determining good faith, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the efforts made to create a valid marriage, the alleged putative spouse's personal background and experience, and all the circumstances surrounding the marriage. Although the claimed belief need not pass a reasonable person test, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of one's belief in the face of objective circumstances pointing to a marriage's invalidity is a factor properly considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the belief was genuinely and honestly held. In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988), and its progeny are disapproved to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein. ii. SUMMARIZED RULE: The good faith inquiry for the putative spouse is a subjective one that looks at the totality of the circumstances iii. FACTS: Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against defendant, claiming she was the putative spouse of decedent. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. It found the undisputed material facts established that plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the validity of her marriage to decedent. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60's requirement of a good faith belief referred to the alleged putative spouse's subjective state of mind. According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff's claims that she believed and acted as if her marriage were valid and that she had not read the marriage license or the final divorce papers, if found credible by the trial court, could support a finding of a go

Estate of Bray

i. RULE: Consideration may be either (1) a benefit conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor or some other person; or (2) a detriment suffered or agreed to be suffered by the promisee or some other person. Cal. Civ. Code § 1605. It must be an act or a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise. ii. FACTS: The co-executrix was the decedent's widow. The co-executor, the decedent's son from a prior marriage, had worked as a salaried employee in the decedent's business. Without the knowledge or consent of the co-executrix, the decedent opened a joint tenancy savings account with the co-executor, depositing therein community funds, and also used community funds to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds jointly registered to the decedent and the co-executor. The co-executor knew of the bonds and the savings account, but did not know the balance in the savings account or when the bonds were purchased. In proceedings for distribution of the decedent's estate, the co-executor claimed the bank account and bonds as surviving joint tenant. The co-executrix claimed the joint tenancies had been created by the use of community funds, without her consent and without valuable consideration, and therefore, the co-executor should restore to the estate one-half the value of such joint tenancies. The probate court found that the co-executor had rendered valuable consideration to the decedent in return for the creation of the joint tenancies in the bank account and bonds and that no part of such joint tenancy property belonged to the estate of the decedent. The co-executrix challenged the decision. iii. ISSUE: iv. Did the co-executor render valuable consideration to the decedent in return for the creation of the joint tenancies in the bank account and bonds? v. ANSWER: No. vi. CONCLUSION: The court held that there was no substantial evidence in record to show that the co-executor rendered any valuable consideration to the decedent or gave any consideration at all for the creation of the joint tenancies in either the bank account or the bonds. The court noted that consideration may be either (1) a benefit conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor or some other person; or (2) a detriment suffered

Downer v. Bramet

i. RULE: Earnings or property attributable to or acquired as a result of the labor, skill and effort of a spouse during marriage are community property. ii. FACTS: In December 1972, a marital settlement agreement was executed between plaintiff former wife, Gloria Alice Bramet Downer, and defendant former husband, George Keith Bramet. The agreement, which was later incorporated in the judgment of dissolution, provided that all income and earnings of Gloria or George after March 4, 1972, should be the separate property of the acquirer and that each party released any claim to such earnings or after acquired property. In August 1972, before the parties executed the agreement, but clearly five months after the date specified in the settlement agreement, defendant George's employer conveyed to him an interest in real property.Gloria learned of the conveyance when the property was sold. Gloria filed a complaint to determine her interest in the property and for fraud. The trial court rendered a judgment of nonsuit. Gloria appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have granted the nonsuit. Moreover, Gloria argued that the trial court should have allowed her to introduce expert testimony as to whether the conveyance by the employer constituted a gift or a deferred compensation. iii. ISSUE: 1. Should the former wife be allowed to introduce expert testimony in order to determine if the conveyance to her former husband was a gift or a deferred compensation? 2. Did the conveyance from the former husband's employer form part of the community property? iv. ANSWER: 1) No. 2) Yes, but only to the extent that defendant former husband's services were rendered during marriage. v. CONCLUSION: On appeal, the California appellate court affirmed as to fraud but reversed on the property issue. The Court held that the expert testimony, on the issue of whether the transfer constituted deferred compensation or a gift, was properly excluded because Cal. Evid. Code § 804 did not authorize an expert to testify to legal conclusions. The Court agreed with the trial court's finding that the transfer was legally in the form of a gift. However, the Court found that there was substantial evidence that the gift was made in recognition of

In re Brace

i. RULE: Evidence Code § 662 provides that the owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. The law does not reference the Family Code, nor does it explicitly characterize property as separate so as to provide an exception to Family Code section 760. ii. FACTS: A bankruptcy case was filed by Brace, but his wife did not join the case. The couple acquired properties with community funds and took title to each property as "husband and wife as joint tenants." The bankruptcy trustee sought a declaration that the properties are community property under Family Code § 760, so the entirety of the husband's interests in the properties becomes part of his bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled that the properties were community property. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. iii. ISSUE: Was the form of title presumption in Evidence Code § 662 applicable when it conflicted with the community property presumption in Family Code § 760? iv. ANSWER: No. v. CONCLUSION: The form of title presumption in Evidence Code § 662 was held inapplicable when it conflicted with the community property presumption in Family Code § 760. To conclude that Evidence Code section 662 and not Family Code section 760 applies outside the context of divorce would run counter to the intent of the pivotal 1973 legislation that prospectively eliminated separate property inferences from form of title. Presumption of community property is not overcome with joint tenancy unless there is express declaration sufficient to transmute property into separate property.

In re Marriage of Bonds (2000)

i. RULE: In California, a premarital agreement generally has been considered to be enforceable as a contract; however, when there is proof of fraud, constructive fraud, duress, or undue influence, the contract is not enforceable. ii. FACTS: Prior to their marriage, the parties entered into a written premarital agreement in which each party waived any interest in the earnings and acquisitions of the other party during marriage. In a subsequent dispute, the trial court held that the agreement was valid, but the appellate court reversed and held that the premarital agreement was involuntary because the wife lacked independent counsel, determining she had not waived counsel effectively, and concluding evidence needed to be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny to determine voluntariness of agreement. The husband sought review. iii. ISSUE: Does the absence of an independent counsel on the part of the wife render a premarital agreement invalid? iv. ANSWER: No. v. CONCLUSION: The court reversed and held that the wife failed to meet burden of showing premarital agreement was involuntary, even though she was not represented by independent counsel, absent the presence of other factors including evidence indicating coercion or lack of knowledge. The court held that lack of independent counsel alone was not reason to subject voluntariness determination to strict scrutiny as the wife did not forgo separate legal advice out of ignorance. Instead, she declined to invoke her interests under the community property law because she agreed, for her own reasons, that respondent's and her earnings and acquisitions after marriage should be separate property.

In re Marriage of Valli

i. RULE: Married persons may, through a transfer or an agreement, transmute - that is, change - the character of property from community to separate or from separate to community. Fam. Code, § 850. A transmutation of property, however, is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected. Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a). To satisfy the requirement of an express declaration, a writing signed by the adversely affected spouse must expressly state that the character or ownership of the property at issue is being changed. The express declaration requirement does not apply to a gift between the spouses of clothing, wearing apparel, jewelry, or other tangible articles of a personal nature that is used solely or principally by the spouse to whom the gift is made and that is not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage. § 852, subd. (c). ii. FACTS: After a 20-year marriage, Frankie Valli (husband) and Randy Valli (wife) separated in September 2004. Their three children were minors at the time of separation but have since become adults. Before the separation, in March 2003, the husband used community property funds from a joint bank account to buy a $ 3.75 million insurance policy on his life, naming his wife as the sole owner and beneficiary. Until the parties separated, the policy premiums were likewise paid with community property funds from a joint bank account. At the marital dissolution proceeding, the wife testified that she and husband, while he was in the hospital for "heart problems," had talked about buying a life insurance policy. The wife said that her husband and their business manager, Barry Siegel, told her that they would make her the policy's owner. Husband testified that he "put everything in [wife's] name, figuring she would take care and give to the kids what they might have coming" and that he had no plans to separate from his wife when he bought the policy. The trial court ruled that the insurance policy was community property because it was acquired during the marriage with community funds. The court awarded the policy to the husband and ord

In re Marriage of Mix

i. RULE: Property acquired by purchase during a marriage is presumed to be community property, and the burden is on the spouse asserting its separate character to overcome the presumption. This presumption applies to property purchased during the marriage with funds from a disputed source, such as an account or fund in which one of the spouses has commingled his or her separate funds with community funds. The mere commingling of separate with community funds in a bank account does not destroy the character of the former if the amount thereof can be ascertained. If the property or the source of funds with which it is acquired, can be traced, its separate property character remains unchanged. But if separate and community property or funds are commingled in such a manner that it is impossible to trace the source of the property or funds, the whole will be treated as community property. ii. FACTS: Respondent wife filed for a dissolution of her marriage to appellant husband. The trial court found that at the time of her marriage, respondent owned considerable property including income producing real property, a residence, a life insurance policy, and various bank accounts. The trial court granted a dissolution of marriage, awarded custody of the minor child of the parties to respondent, and divided the community property. The court ruled that all property held in the wife's name or in her possession at the time of the separation was her separate property. The husband challenged the decision. iii. ISSUE: Was there substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the wife adequately traced and identified the sources of her separate property? iv. ANSWER: Yes. v. CONCLUSION: The court affirmed and held that the wife overcame the presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was community property. The court upheld the trial court's finding of substantial evidence that the wife adequately traced the source and funds of her separate property.

Beam v Bank of America (1971)

i. RULE: The courts have evolved two distinct, alternative approaches to allocating earnings between separate and community income. One method of apportionment, commonly referred to as the Pereira approach, is to allocate a fair return on the husband's separate property investment as separate income and to allocate any excess to the community property as arising from the husband's efforts. The alternative apportionment approach, the Van Camp approach, is to determine the reasonable value of the husband's services, allocate that amount as community property, and treat the balance as separate property attributable to the normal earnings of the separate estate. ii. FACTS: During the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Beam, Mr. Beam owned separate property from which community expenses were paid and to which Mr. Beam devoted more than minimal effort to manage and develop. In an interlocutory judgment awarding a divorce, the trial court held that the skills, efforts, and labors expended by Mr. Beam during the marriage to manage his separate estate constituted Mr. Beam's separate property and not community property. On appeal, Mrs. Beam attacked the judgment primarily on the grounds that the trial court (1) failed adequately to compensate the community for income attributable to Mr. Beam's skill, efforts and labors expended in the handling of his sizable separate estate during the marriage, and (2) erred in suggesting that community living expenses, paid from the income of Mr. Beam's separate estate, should be charged against community income in determining the balance of community funds. In addition, Mrs. Beam challenged the court's categorization of several specific assets as separate property of Mr. Beam. iii. ISSUE: Did the skills, efforts, and labors expended by Mr. Beam on separate property during the marriage constitute community property? iv. ANSWER: No v. CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the judgment and held that there was no net community property resulting from the skills, efforts, and labors expended by Mr. Beam during the marriage because community living expenses and expenditures during the marriage exceeded community income. Mr. Beam was entitled to reimbursement for the use of his separate property instead of

Schindler v. Schindler

i. Rule: As between husband and wife, a community estate and a joint tenancy estate cannot exist at the same time in the same property. Use of community funds to purchase the property and the taking of title thereto in the name of the spouses as joint tenants is tantamount to a binding agreement between them that the same shall not thereafter be held as community property but instead as a joint tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate. The statutory presumption that property acquired after marriage except by gift, bequest, devise, or descent is community property, Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 162-164, is successfully rebutted by evidence that the property was taken in joint tenancy. The fact that a deed was taken in joint tenancy establishes a prima facie case that the property is in fact held in joint tenancy. There is actually a presumption that the property is as described in the deed and the burden is on the party who seeks to rebut the presumption. The form of the deed cannot be lightly disregarded. Even with evidence of contrary intent, the deed alone creates a conflict of fact. The form of the conveyance is itself some evidence of the intent to change it from community property, and creates a rebuttable presumption to that effect. ii. Facts: Respondent wife initiated a divorce action against the appellee husband. In her complaint, respondent wife alleged that certain real property known as 14041 Roblar Road, Sherman Oaks, California, was community property. Her specific averment in that regard was that the title to said property stood of record in the names of respondent and appellee as joint tenants for the purpose of convenience only and for no other reason, and said property was intended between the parties to be at all times as their bona fide community property. The trial court granted a divorce to the respondent wife and awarded the property to her on the ground of extreme and habitual cruelty. The appellee husband sought review and contended that the property should have been divided evenly. iii. Issue: Did the trial court properly determine that the subject property was in fact community property, and therefore, subject to disposition in the divorce proceedings? iv. Answer: No. v. Conclusio

Lynam v. Vorwerk

i. Rule: Cal. Civ. Code § 164 declares that all property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, except that acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent (Cal. Civ. Code § 163), is community property. The section expressly provides that all property acquired by either husband or wife after marriage is community property. ii. Facts: The husband and wife, during their lives, had money on deposit with a bank under a writing that provided that the bank would pay any money on deposit on demand of either the husband or the wife. There was no evidence concerning the source of the money. After the husband died, the wife withdrew the deposit and did not account for the money as administratrix of the estate of the husband. After she died, an action was brought to determine rights to the money. iii. Issue: Did the writing given to the bank have the effect of creating a joint tenancy in the husband and wife, with the right of survivorship? iv. Answer: No. v. Conclusion: In affirming the judgment in favor of the administratrix, the court reasoned that under Cal. Civ. Code § 164, all property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, except that acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, was community property. The possession of money by either or both husband and wife after marriage, in the absence of other evidence, raised a presumption that it is community property. The writing did not make the bank deposit a joint tenancy in the husband and wife with right of survivorship and did not create a right in favor of the husband and wife to the money but was a mere authority to the bank as to paying the deposit. vi. Case is about overcoming the presumption of community property

In re Marriage of Heikes

i. Rule: Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.2 (later Family Code Section 2640) requires reimbursement for separate property contributions to the acquisition of any property that the court divides as community property. The court holds that the applicability of that requirement is limited by the due process clause to property acquired on or after January 1, 1984. The acquisition may be of any property in joint form, whether tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or community property, so long as the acquired property is eventually divided as community property upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation. Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.1(b). ii. Facts: In a marital dissolution proceeding commenced in 1990, the trial court ruled that two parcels of real property were community property. The husband had owned the parcels as his separate property, but in 1976, during the marriage, he conveyed them to himself and the wife in joint tenancy. There was no oral or written agreement that the husband would retain any interest in the parcels other than the interests created by the deeds. Six days after entry of judgment, the California Supreme Court held that Civ. Code, former § 4800.1 (now Fam. Code, §§ 2580, 2581) (presumption that property acquired during marriage in joint form is community property), applies retroactively. The husband moved for a new trial, asserting that Civ. Code, former § 4800.2 (now Fam. Code, § 2640) (party is entitled to reimbursement for separate property contributions to community property unless right to reimbursement waived in writing), also should be applied retroactively. The trial court ordered a new trial on the issue of the parties' respective interests in the parcels. The Court of Appeal affirmed. iii. Issue: Can the requirement of reimbursement for separate property contributions to the acquisition of any property that the court divides as community property as provided in Cal. Civ. Code § 4800.2 be applied to property acquired prior to January 1, 1984? iv. Answer: No v. Conclusion: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It held that the trial court erred in granting the husband a new trial. Although Civ. Code, former § 4800.2, enacted in 1984, was amended

See v. See

i. Rule: Property acquired by purchase during a marriage is presumed to be community property, and the burden is on the spouse asserting its separate character to overcome the presumption. The community property presumption applies when a husband purchases property during the marriage with funds from an undisclosed or disputed source, such as an account or fund in which he has commingled his separate funds with community funds. One may trace the source of the property to his separate funds and overcome the community property presumption with evidence that community expenses exceeded community income at the time of acquisition. If he proves that at that time all community income was exhausted by family expenses, he establishes that the property was purchased with separate funds. ii. Facts: The parties were married on October 17, 1941, and they separated about May 10, 1962. Throughout the marriage they were residents of California, and Plaintiff Laurance A. See was employed by a family-controlled corporation, See's Candies, Inc. For most of that period he also served as president of its wholly-owned subsidiary, See's Candy Shops, Inc. In the twenty-one years of the marriage he received more than $ 1,000,000 in salaries from the two corporations. Laurance and cross-complainant Elizabeth Lee See appealed from an interlocutory judgment that granted each a divorce. Laurance attacked the finding that he was guilty of extreme cruelty, the granting of a divorce to Elizabeth, and the award to her of permanent alimony of $ 5,400 per month. Elizabeth attacked the finding that there was no community property at the time of the divorce. Neither party contested the provisions regarding custody and support of the three minor children. iii. Issue: Was the trial court correct in its determination that there was no community property at the time of the divorce? iv. Answer: No v. Conclusion: The court found that Laurance had not met his burden of proving an excess of community expenses over community income at the times the other assets purchased during the marriage were acquired and reversed the part of the judgment finding them to be his separate property because property acquired during marriage was presumed community. The co

Holmes v Holmes

i. Rule: This presumption under Cal. Civ. Code § 164 is disputable and may be controverted by any competent evidence tending to overcome it. Community funds may be the subject of a gift from husband to wife; and where property deeded to the wife is purchased with community funds, a presumption, since it is essential to the theory that the property is, as provided in Cal. Civ. Code § 164, the separate property of the wife, arises that the husband, knowing the effect of such transaction, intended, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to give it to the wife. ii. Facts: The action was brought by plaintiff stepmother Susan T. Holmes to obtain a decree against defendant stepson George Bettes Holmes quieting her title to certain real estate consisting of three pieces of property, all situate in Los Angeles County. The plaintiff's claim to ownership of the property was based upon the alleged fact that it was all purchased with her separate funds. It conclusively appeared that parcel 1 was acquired under a deed, whereby the grantors conveyed the title thereto to plaintiff and her husband, who, as shown by deed, conveyed his undivided one-half interest therein to his son, defendant herein. Upon this fact, and other evidence sufficient to justify the same, the court found that plaintiff and defendant were the owners of said parcel of land as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest therein. As to the property described as parcels 2 and 3, the court found that it was community property acquired during the marital relation existing between the husband and plaintiff, and at the time of the former's death, title thereto was vested in plaintiff in trust for the community interest of herself and said husband, and that by his last will and testament, duly admitted to probate, all of the interest of the husband was by him devised to defendant. Upon these findings the court rendered judgment to the effect that plaintiff and defendant were each the owner of an undivided one-half interest in and to the property described herein as parcel 1; and that the property described as parcels 2 and 3 constituted the community estate of plaintiff and her deceased husband, and that, subject to the administratio

In re Marriage of Lucas

i. Rule: When a single family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them during marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property upon divorce or separate maintenance only, the presumption is that such single family residence is the community property of said husband and wife. ii. Facts: In November 1968, Brenda and Gerald Lucas bought a house for $23,300. Brenda used $6,351.57 from her trust for the down payment, and they assumed a loan of $16,948.43 for the balance of the purchase price. Title to the house was taken as "Gerald E. Lucas and Brenda G. Lucas, Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants." Brenda paid $ 2,962 from her trust funds for improvements to the property; the remainder of the expenses on the property was paid for with community funds. In the case of their separation trial, the trial court issued a judgment dissolving the marriage, awarding child custody, fixing spousal and child support and dividing property. The trial court concluded that Brenda did not intend to make a gift to Gerard of any interest in the home purchased with her separate funds, deducted her payment for improvements from the equity, and awarded appellee Brenda 75 percent of the community property interest. The court also determined that a motorhome, titled and registered in Brenda's name and largely paid for with her separate funds, was her separate property. On appeal, Gerald argued the trial court's determination of the parties' ownership interests in their residence and in a vehicle, both of which were purchased with a combination of community and separate funds. Gerald also challenged the trial court's determination that a 1976 Harvest Mini-Motorhome, purchased in January 1976 for a cash price of $10,388, was Brenda's separate property. iii. Issue: 1. Was the house purchased in 1968 a separate property of the wife? 2. Was the motorhome a separate property of the wife? iv. Answer: 1. No. 2. Yes. v. Conclusion: 1. The Court held that the parties had failed to overcome the presumption that the subject property was a community property. There was no evidence of an agreement or understanding that Brenda was to retain a separate property interest in the house. Nor was there any finding by the tri