Comparative Comps Notecards
Ethnic groups
"A group of people that belong to a certain ascriptive category (e.g. race, ethnicity, language, tribe, religion, etc.)" (Brancati 2006).
Nation
"A nation is a group of people who share some sort of common identity like a language, a religion, or an ethnicity" (CGG)
Clan
"An informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds. Affective ties of kinship are its essence, constituting the identity and bonds of its organization. These bonds are both vertical and horizontal, linking elites and non-elites, and they reflect both actual blood ties and fictive kinship" (Collins 2004)
Indigenous peoples groups
"Concerned most fundamentally about issues of group autonomy, they have other characteristics that distinguish them from typical ethno-nationalists, noted above. Culturally these 82 groups are more sharply distinct from the distant centers of state or colonial authority. Most have lived a low-energy- technology existence as subsistence cultivators, herders, or hunter-gatherers. Until recent decades most lacked modern political organization, cohesion, or a sense of common purpose. And their political actions have been mainly reactive rather than proactive, aimed at protecting what is left of their lands and culture against the intrusive demands of larger societies." Example: Kurds
Communal contenders
"Consist[s] of heterogeneous collections of competing ethnocultural groups in which political power at the center is based on intergroup coalitions, usually dominated by an advantaged group that uses a mix of concessions, cooptation, and repression to maintain its leading role in the coalition...Communal conflict in these systems usually arises from group efforts to improve their position in ruling coalitions. While such conflicts usually are of low intensity, they can escalate into intense and protracted communal rebellions." Example: Lebanon
Cultural heterogeneity
"Cultural mix" - citizens are a mixture of participant, subject, and parochial orientations. The civic culture is a mix of these citizens, subjects, and parochial (Almond and Verba 1963).
Endogenous democratization
"Democracies are more likely to emerge as countries develop economically. The basic assumption of the theory is that democratization is the final stage of the modernization process, which consists of the gradual differentiation and specialization of social structures that culminates in a separation of political structures from other structures and makes democracy possible," (Pavone)
Exogenous democratization
"Democracies emerge independent of development but are more likely to be sustained in developed countries. If democracies emerge at random vis-à-vis development levels, it is still possible, as Lipset (1959) also wrote, that those democracies that emerge in more economically developed countries are more likely to survive than in their poorer counterpart," (Pavone)
Ethnic conflict
"Encompasses all forms of small- and large-scale acts of violence between and among different ethnic groups" (Brancati 2006)
Ethnicity
"Ethnicity is connected to birth and blood, but not absolutely so...ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity," (Horowitz 1985).
Identity
"Identity can be understood as an aspect of one's cognitive map" that structures the self in relation to the social world. Humans need to feel connected. This is satisfied by culture, which the authors conceive of as a process that is constantly undergoing transformation (Greenfeld and Eastwood 2009)
Rebellion
"May involve the revolt of subordinate classes - but do not eventuate in structural change," (Skocpol 1979)
Militant Sect Groups
"Most of the 49 politicized minorities that are defined wholly or in part by their religious beliefs." Although not specifically mentioned in the definition, the militarization of these groups is key in addition to their religious beliefs.
Political Identity
"One's identity in relation to the distribution of power (or the structure of relationships of domination) in a given community." (Greenfeld and Eastwood 2009)
Regional parties
"Parties that compete and win votes in one region of a country" (Brancati 2006).
Social revolution
"Rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures, and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class revoluts from below," (Skocpol 1979).
Multiculturalism
"Refers to the different policies designed to deal with ethnocultural diversity. Although these policies differ substantially from one another, they all seek to extend rights and protections beyond the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in liberal democracies, including the recognition and support for the maintenance and expression of varied cultural practices and identities...they are also part of broader political and economic projects."
Political decentralization
"System of government in which there is a vertical division of power among multiple levels of government that have independent decision-making power over at least one issue area" (Brancati 2006).
Hegemony
"The political forging (through either coercion or elite bargaining) and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense"
State
"The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 1946) "[States are] relatively centralized, differentiated organizations, the officials of which, more or less, successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large contiguous territory." (Tilly 1985) "A state is an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents." (North 1981 )
Relative deprivation theory
"The tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence," (Pavone 2015).
Ethnoclasses groups
"These 43 groups are ethnic minorities, usually descended from immigrants or slaves, who occupy caste-like positions in which they specialize in certain economic roles. In the advanced industrial societies they are situated at or near the bottom of the economic hierarchy...The main issues of conflict for these groups are usually their quest for political and economic equality and for cultural rights." Example: People of color in the US and UK
Ethnonationalists groups
"These 81 groups are relatively large, regionally concentrated peoples who historically were autonomous and who actively seek to improve their status in the modern state system...Not are all separatist in the literal sense that they seek independence; many of their leaders demand or are willing to settle for greater regional autonomy." Example: Sri Lankan Tamils
Communal group
"Those whose core members share a distinctive and persistent collective identity based on cultural and ascriptive traits that are important to them and to others with whom they interact." "These identities are politically salient, if the group meets one or both of these primary criteria: (1) the group collectively suffers,, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-A-vis other groups in a state; and/or (2) the group is the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests."
Political revolutions
"Transform state structures but not social structures and they are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict," (Skocpol 1979).
Progressive deprivation
"Value expectations and value capabilities initially both increase monotonically, but whereas value expectations continue to rise value capabilities eventually level off and may even decrease," (Pavone 2015).
Decremental deprivation
"Value expectations remain constant but value capabilities decrease with time, causing a frustrating divergence," (Pavone 2015).
Aspirational deprivation
"Value expectations rise with time, but value capabilities remain constant, again causing a frustrating divergence," (Pavone 2015).
Populist multiculturalism
A project that incorporates the population based on broadly defined categories while simultaneously fragmenting it by granting significant group rights; it also seeks to prevent autonomous civil society while promising to implement indigenous autonomy.
Social movement
Actions based on dense social networks, effective connected structures, draw on legitimate and action oriented cultural frames, movements that are sustained over time, even in contact with powerful opponents (Tarrow 2011).
Oriented Action
Actors respond to situations by mediating them through orientations. A way of processing
Religious Identity
An identity "somehow linked with or oriented towards this other, transcendental world."
Structural/Institutional
Analyzes the development of institutions/norms and their influence on political systems/situations
Rational Choice
Assumes actors act to maximize their utility. Critique: Condorcet's paradox suggests that individual rationality does not equate to group rationality
Conceptualization of conflict
Both a temporal and a spatial dimension Intergroup conflict must be sustained, covering at least 5 years Must occur in given locality Excludes short-term anti-immigrant agitation that accompanies initial immigrant settlement (Dancygier 2010)
Cultural Discontinuity
Change so rapidly and transformative that social discontinuity has cultural consequences. Rapid reorientation- culture loses coherent structure 796. People respond to authority through conformity that is ritualistic or self serving, retreatism, or rebellion 797
Political subculture
Component parts of political cultures (Almond and Verba 1963).
National Identity
Connected to how the world is divided and constructed into nations. It is secular, divided into human communities, and intertwined with popular sovereignty (Greenfeld and Eastwood 2009)
Historical institutionalism
Define institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy Four features: Tends to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in broad terms. Asymmetries of power associated with operation and development of institutions Institutional development emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences. Concerned with integrating institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors such as ideas, can make to political outcomes. Less careful about identifying the causal chain through which institutions deemed important are affecting the behavior they are meant to explain
Culturalist
Emphasizes the importance of culture and norms on politics. Often used in case studies. Critiques attempts by political scientists to generalize. Critique: Issues of reliability due to the use of case studies. Deemphasizes the importance of generalizable explanations.
Sociological institutionalism
Explores the way in which existing institutions structure the field; new institutions borrow from existing ones Define institutions much more broadly than political scientists to include symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates Understanding of the interaction of institutions and individual action Institutional practices form because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organization and or its participants Specifies the ways in which institutions can affect the underlying preferences or identities of actors that rational choice institutionalists must take as given
Subject culture
High frequency of orientations toward differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the systems, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero (Almond and Verba 1963).
Rational choice institutionalism
Highly functionalist, voluntarist, and intentionalist with how institutions are created. Four key features: Employ a characteristic set of behaviors - set of preferences and tastes. Frames politics as a set of collective action problems. Emphasis the role of strategic interaction in the determination of political outcomes. Distinctive approach to the problem of explaining how institutions originate. Has developed a more precise conception of the relationship between institutions and behavior and a set of highly generalizable concepts.
Participant culture
Members of society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and admin structures and processes (to both the input and output aspects of a political system) (Almond and Verba 1963).
Intermediate Groups
Members who could choose to withhold their contribution but this would be noticeable to all (Olson 1965).
Latent Groups
Members who have the ability to withhold contributions without the wider group noticing (Olson 1965).
Parochial culture
No specialized political roles, comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system (Almond and Verba 1963).
Immigration regime
Official/unofficial rules that guide the recruitment, arrival, settlement processes of immigrants (Dancygier 2010)
Cultural Socialization
Orientations are learned through external socializers
Orientational Variability
Orientations vary and are not just subjective reflections of objective conditions
Situational Change
Pattern maintaining- changes in culture occur as adaptation to changed structures and keep culture consistent; change toward flexibility- culture changes so it can accommodate social fluidity.
Legitimacy
Political authority conferred by law or by a state or national constitution
Political culture
Political orientations (attitudes towards the political system and its various parts/system itself) The authors use this term because to understand the relationships between nonpolitical and political attitudes and developmental patterns they must separate political v. nonpolitical (Almond and Verba 1963).
Alberti, Carla. 2019. "Populist Multiculturalism in the Andes: Balancing Political Control and Societal Autonomy."
RQ: "How is it possible, then, to incorporate the population based on broadly defined categories while simultaneously fragmenting it by granting significant group rights? More important, how are populist governments able to thwart an autonomous civil society while at the same time promising to implement indigenous autonomy?" Argument: "I argue that populist multiculturalism is a discursively radical political and cultural project, which endorses a broad set of group rights, but fails to implement those rights that weaken the power of the populist leader by granting autonomy and fragmenting their support base." Evidence: Case study analysis of Bolivia, with extensions made to Venezuela. Bolivia; over 40% of the population self-identifies as indigenous, the Morales government has granted several cultural rights while simultaneously seeking to consolidate the political hegemony of the MAS, thereby strengthening the role of the party and the state.
Laitin, David D. 1986. Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba.
RQ: "Under what conditions does a single cultural divide in a society come to be seen as deep, while other cultural divides become to be seen as shallow and unimportant for collective political action?" Argument: Theories concerned with the "primordial" nature of ethnic identities (embedded values affect political and economic behavior + focus on the meaning of culture) and the "instrumental" (rational choice utility maximization of culture) natures of religious identities are limited. Hegemony explains the non-politicization of religious difference in Yorubaland. Evidence: Cultural subsystems do contain symbolic repertoires that provide social meaning, and these repertoires do not automatically create readjustment in other subsystems
Berti, Benedetta. 2011. "Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics."
RQ: "Why do armed groups decide to establish political wings to compete in elections? And, under what conditions does the political wing develop to become the primary means of expression of the armed group, thus ultimately leading to the relinquishment of the group's weapons?" Argument
Eckstein, Harry. 1988. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change."
RQ: Can the political culturalist approach produce a theory of political change consistent with the assumptions ? Argument: Assumptions are consistent with three kinds of change: Situational Change and Cultural Discontinuity. Assumptions: - Oriented Action - Orientational Variability - Cultural Socialization
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. "How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers you Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics."
RQ: Does the selection of cases for study on the basis of the dependent variable bias conclusions? Argument: - Selecting on the DV encourages bias and heightens the chance of a wrong conclusion. - Case studies are great for insight but should not be used to test theories.
Tarrow, Sydney. 2011. Power in Movement
RQ: First, what are the dynamics of mobilization once it has begun; second, why are movement outcomes so varied; and, third, why do they so often fail to achieve their stated goals? Argument: Contentious Politics: "The most forceful argument of this study will be that people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and constraints change, and then by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities which are used by others in widening circles of contention," (Tarrow 2011). Social Movements: "When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society; when they bring people together around inherited cultural symbols; and when they can build on- or construct- dense social networks and connective structures, these episodes of contention result in sustained interactions with opponents in social movements," (Tarrow 2011).
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945."
RQ: How and why doe minorities mobilize to defend and promote their collective interests? Argument: "Protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status and by the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as formulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs." Evidence: Cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy contribute to their grievances Political mobilization, grievances, and international diffusion and communal conflict jointly explain political action in the 1980's Combination of democracy, state power, and institutional change helps determine when conflict takes the form of protest or rebellion
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
RQ: How do institutions change? What are institutions and how are they different from organizations? How do institutions influence the transaction and production costs? How have societies diverged? What accounts for widely disparate performance characteristics? What accounts for societies experiencing long-run stagnation or an absolute decline in economic well-being? Under what conditions can voluntary cooperation exist without Hobbesian solution of the imposition of a coercive state to create cooperative solutions? Argument: Institutions together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the institutions. The resultant path of institutional change is shaped by: (1) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions (2) the feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set Institutions alter the price that individuals pay and lead to ideas, ideologies, dogmas frequently playing a role in the choices that individuals make
Przeworski, Adam, et al. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990.
RQ: How do we classify regimes? "Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare?" Argument: There are three types of democratic regimes: presidential, parliamentary, and mixed. Democratic regimes have "ex-ante uncertainty (anyone can win), ex-post irreversibility (losers don't try to reverse results), and repeatability." Operationalized as: - chief executive and legislature are popularly elected - there is more than one party - peaceful alteration of power Dictatorships are anything outside of the above definition. There are two types of dictatorships: bureaucratic and autocratic. Economic development supports the survival of democracy but does not necessarily support democratic emergence. Evidence: Support for the survival story of democracy. "For one, even if democracies do occasionally spring up in poor countries, they are extremely fragile when facing poverty, whereas in wealthy countries they are impreg- nable. Hence, poor people are much more likely to be ruled by dicta- tors. Obviously, poverty means that people consume less. They also live shorter lives, have more children, see more of them die and fewer of them become educated, and are more likely to suffer from collective violence."
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries.
RQ: In a democracy, who will do the governing, whose interests should be represented, and what do we do when people have divergent preferences? Argument: There are two main approaches to democratic government- the majoritarian model or the consensus model (seeks to maximize the size of the majority). Though scholars often assume a majoritarian model, most democracies have predominantly consensus traits. (7). The biggest argument: Majoritarian and consensus approaches are incompatible- majoritarianism thinks majorities should govern and minorities should oppose, while consensus approach argues that all who are affected should have a stake and a chance to participate. In a homogeneous society, this might be mitigated by a flip-flopping of who is in charge because the parties tend to represent the political center anyway In heterogeneous / pluralist societies, majority rule is undemocratic and dangerous because minorities will feel denied power, excluded, discriminated against. The consensus model is more appropriate. Evidence: Case study analysis of the UK, New Zealand, Barbados (majoritarian systems). And Switzerland, Belgium, and the EU (consensus systems).
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China.
RQ: What are social revolutions, why and how do they happen? What is the influence of structural forces on revolutions Book Argument: "In contrast to the models of explanation used by currently prevailing theories, social revolutions should be analyzed from a structural perspective, with special attention devoted to international contexts and to developments at home and abroad that affect the breakdown of the state organization of old regimes and the buildup of new, revolutionary state organizations...Comparative historical analysis is the most appropriate way of developing explanations of revolutions that are both historically grounded and generalizable," (Skocpol 1979). Case Study Argument: "Social revolutions in France, Russia, and China emerged from specifically political crises centered in the structures and situations of the old regime-states...the revolutionary crisis developed when old-regime states became unable to meet the challenges of evolving international situations," (Skocpol 1979). Evidence: Case studies in China, France, and Russia compared to Japan and Prussia.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy."
RQ: What are the social conditions that support a stable democracy? Argument: Wealth and economic indicators (in addition to the legitimacy and the effectiveness of government) are inextricably tied to the level of democracy. Findings: Education, wealth and national income are related to the level of democracy.
Anderson, Benedict. 1987. Imagined Communities
RQ: What explains nationalism? Argument: The creation of nationalism was the result of historical forces, which are mobile across social contexts resulting in variation in political and ideological constructs.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
RQ: What explains the creation and consolidation of democracies as opposed to autocracies? Argument: There are four main paths to political development: Consolidated democracy - From nondemocracy to democracy - once created, democracy is never threatened (e.g. Britain) Unconsolidated democracy - Democracy collapses quickly. Then the same forces that attempted to lead democracy the first time reassert themselves, democracy collapses again. The cycle repeats. (e.g. 20th century Argentina) Persistent nondemocracy (without serious repression) - Democracy never is created - society is relatively egalitarian and prosperous. The non-democratic status quo is stable, people are satisfied (e.g. Singapore) Persistent nondemocracy (with repression) - Society is highly unequal/exploitative, democracy is highly threatening to elites. Elites use whatever means possible (violence, repression) to avoid democratization (e.g. apartheid regime South Africa) Whether societies transition to democracy depends on the conflict that exists between elites and citizens over politics, as these groups have different preferences regarding political institutions, democracy and dictatorship - these lead to different social choices. However, institutions do not determine the extent of redistribution/who benefits from policies today. Institutions also play a role in the regulation of future political power allocation. Theory of democratic consolidation/coups: Citizens are more pro-democracy than elites (beneficial, redistributive) Elites may back a military coup to increase their de jure political power (this opportunity may be available today, but not tomorrow. Tomorrow, coup threat may be gone and democratic politics favor the majority) - de facto power in transitive Evidence: Case studies of Britain, Argentina, South Africa, and Singapore
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
RQ: What explains the variance in developmental trajectories? Argument: There are three routes a society can take to development. - The Capitalist-Democratic Route (ex: England, US, France) (1) Peace between crown & aristocracy (2) Capitalist agriculture (3) Destruction of peasantry (via Enclosure Movement)(4) Emergence of strong bourgeoisie (5) Convergence of interests between aristocracy & bourgeoisie (6) Bourgeois-aristocratic alliance (7) Parliamentary democracy - The Capitalist-Reactionary Route (ex: Germany and Japan) (1) Peasantry poses threat to aristocratic & bourgeois interests (2) Bourgeoisie & aristocracy are independently too weak to suppress threat (3) Aristocratic-bourgeois alliance turns to the state to protect their economic interests (4) Autonomous, mildly authoritarian state emerges (5) Economic crisis strikes & regime is unable to reform (6) Fascist leader brings about revolution from above (7) Fascist dictatorship - The Communist Route (ex: Russia and China) (1) Weak commerce (2) No bourgeoisie (3) Powerful peasantry (4) Strong agrarian bureaucratic state (5) Peasants become dependent on state rather than aristocracy (6) State infuriates peasants via arbitrary extraction → (7) peasant-led revolution from below (8) Communist dictatorship Bumper Sticker: No bourgeoise, no democracy
Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism."
RQ: What explains the variance in institutional setups ability to produce policy change? Argument: As the number of veto players within a given system increases, policy stability increases. We should not conceive of institutions as separate entities, which might suggest variance in the outcomes of different institutional constructions (e.g., multiparty v. two party, parliamentary v. presidential, etc.). Rather we should conceptualize institutions as playing a part in a broader framework of veto players. Decision-making is similar in various institutions setups under this framework. Evidence: "I demonstrate that policy stability increases with: 1) the number of veto players, 2) their incongruence (the difference in their political positions) and 3) the internal cohesion of each one of them."
Sartori, Giovanni. 1997[1984]. Comparative Constitutional Engineering
RQ: What explains the variation in democratic regime stability? More specifically, how do formal institutions shape outcomes? What system is best for regime stability? Argument: Electoral systems and executive-legislative relationships influence regime stability. Electoral systems influence representation and the party system (e.g., two parties or more). "Assuming undivided government is the major working condition of presidential systems, one must also consider party discipline (or conversely its lack) in Congress, the degree of opinion polarization, and other factors. As for French-type semi-presidentialism, the major asset of its dual authority structure appears to be that the formula can cope with divided government." Parliamentarism is not the unified structure typically considered, rather there are a variety of parliamentary systems. England - premiership system, German - controlled parliamentary, France circa III and IV republics - assembly systems. Alternating or intermittent presidentialism is the solution to issues within presidential and parliamentary systems. Evidence: Case study analysis of different systems.
Dahlum, Sirianne, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Tore Wig. 2019. "Who Revolts? Empirically Revisiting the Social Origins of Democracy."
RQ: What explains the variation in democratic transitions? Argument: Revolts led by the urban middle class and industrial workers are most likely to result in democratic transitions because of their ability to maintain collective action movements and their ability to leverage their grievances on the on the government. Evidence: They find support for their hypothesis "Most middle class and worker-dominated campaigns are associated either with no change (on diagonal) or democratic improvements (above diagonal). In contrast, peasant-dominated campaigns are often succeeded by democratic backsliding," (1496). "We find that urban campaigns are more often followed by democratization than other campaigns, but the relationship is clearer for industrial worker [campaigns] than middle-class campaigns," (1496)
Brancati, Dawn. 2006. "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?
RQ: What explains the variation in levels of ethnic conflict in decentralized states? Argument: Decentralization is successful in reducing ethnic conflict and secessionism in some cases, but not others. It may indirectly increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by encouraging the formation of regional parties Regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities -> produces legislation that favors certain groups, mobilizing groups to engage in EC/secessionism. Evidence: The strength of a regional party conditions likelihood of experiencing conflict. Countries with decentralized systems are less likely to experience antiregime rebellion than those with centralized; likelihood of not experiencing decreases substantially as regional party vote increases. Likelihood of countries experiencing "protracted civil war" is lower for decentralized systems than centralized - likelihood of centralized/decentralized of experiencing "protracted civil war" increases as regional party vote share increases (more so for centralized) Countries with decentralized systems less likely to experience intercommunal conflict. Both decentralized/centralized systems more likely to experience intercommunal conflict as regional party vote share increases - decentralized systems experience a more dramatic increase in conflict Lower probability of experiencing "large-scale intergroup violence" in decentralized states. The probability of experiencing this kind of violence increases for both centralized and decentralized as regional party vote increases
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies.
RQ: What explains the variation in political stability? Argument: Institutional growth must be proportional to the growth of social forces (e.g. political participation) otherwise political decay begins.
Gurr, Theodore R. 1970. Why Men Rebel.
RQ: What explains the variation in rebellion? Argument: People rebel when they experience relative deprivation. "Specifically, when "value expectations" - the basic goods and conditions of life which all people are entitled to - outflank "value capabilities" - the goods and conditions people think they can get - the risk of collective violence increases...The greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the potential for collective violence, for a frustrated individual will lash out at the attackable source of frustration," (Pavone 2015).
Herbst, Jeffery. 1990. War and the State in Africa
RQ: What explains the variation in state development in Africa as opposed to Europe? Argument: The classical argument is that Europe's institutions benefited from war because war increased efficiency. African state's relative peace with external entities resulted in a failure to coalesce around national identities and inefficiencies in institutions.
Dancygier, Rafaela. 2010. Immigration and Conflict in Europe.
RQ: What explains the variation in sustained confrontations between immigrant and the state/natives Argument: Economic scarcity and immigrant electoral power account for incidences of both types of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict. Evidence: Dancygier conceptualizes immigration and conflict as (1) immigrant-native conflict and (2) immigrant-state conflict. The author examines a few cases throughout the book, but the case of Greater London might be the most striking. In the London case, Dancygier notes that the immigration of political powerful South Asian immigrants reinforces violent attacks towards the group. Compared to South Asian immigrants in London, Caribbean and African migrants are far less politically powerful and do not experience such attacks. Dancygier notes that the differences are due to the disparity in each group's economic conditions. The second argument is that racist violence is not only a product of immigrant-native conflict, but is due to a much larger "fabric of such conflict" (pp. 19) - immigrant-state dynamic. Economic conditions and immigrant political behavior causes conflict (more than immigrant ethnic origins) - Tower Hamlets and Ealing (two London boroughs), Birmingham and Leicester cases National differences in immigrant conflict - German and French cases Immigration policy regulations define immigrants' arrival, stay within the country, and economic entitlements are responsible for immigrant conflict
Przworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts."
RQ: What influences the development and dissolution of political regimes? Argument: Economic factors influence the survival of democratic regimes, but not the emergence. Findings: There is no universal threshold at which all dictatorships fall. Development (measured as per capita income) supports democratization. Contribution: Elucidates survival theory or the theory of exogenous democratization
Weber, Max. 1946. "Politics as Vocation (What is a State?)"
RQ: What is a state? Argument: A territory where the government maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Evidence: - The state determines the acceptability of the use of force in a given situation - Legitimacy is conferred by citizens, legality, and perceptions of leadership
Lijphart, Arend. 1969. "Consociational Democracy."
RQ: What is consociational democracy? How does it apply to Almond's 1956 typology of democracies? Argument: "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy...Successful consociational democracy requires: (I) That the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. (2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleav- ages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. (3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. (4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation," (Lijphart 1969) Evidence: "Under what conditions are they likely to be fulfilled? An examination of the successful consocia- tional democracies in the Low Countries, Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon suggests a number of conditions favorable to the establish- ment and the persistence of this type of democracy. These have to do with inter-subcultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, and elite-mass relations within each of the subcultures," (Lijphart 1969).
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms."
RQ: What is new institutionalism? How does it differ from other approaches? What sort of promise does it display? Argument: The three new institutionalism are historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. They were developed in reaction to the behavioral perspectives that were influential during the 1960s to determine the role of institutions in social and political outcomes.
Laitin, David D. 2002. "Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline."
RQ: What is the current state of the subdiscipline of comparative politics? Argument: The use of cross-sectional data, theory, and case study analysis (the Tripartite methodology) is important. However, "researchers relying on each of the three elements of the tripartite methodology are interdependent, whether they want it that way or not, as all are addressing the common question of variance on these dependent variables."
Hudson, Valerie M., et al. 2015. "Clan Governance and State Stability: The Relationship between Female Subordination and Political Order."
RQ: What is the influence of clan governance on state stability? Argument: Clans have strong patrilineal practices that emphasize the subordination of women. These practices are associated with certain political acts, which decrease state stability. - Develops an index for clan influence. - Asserts a key step of the modernization process is a more equitable distribution of power to women.
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics.
RQ: What is the influence of different executive-legislative relations on the stability of the regime? Argument: Presidential systems do not break down more often than parliamentary systems. There are institutional factors within both presidential and parliamentary systems that influence regime stability. Evidence: Parliamentarism is beneficial for divided states but so is presidentialism. Presidentialism is good for divided societies if: 1) proportional representation elects the legislature and presidential powers are weaker than legislative powers; 2) electoral mechanisms ensure broad coalitions and the president has limited powers that are difficult for the legislature to unilaterally override.
Laitin, David D. 2007. Nations, States and Violence
RQ: What is the relationship of nationalism/nationhood (and it's cultural foundations) to violence (especially ethnic violence) and civil war? Argument: Ethnic heterogeneity does not accurately predict violence and civil war. Rather our definition of nation-state is outdated, emphasizing the idea that the nation and state should be the same. Comparably, diversity is natural and multilingualism is embedded. Although cultural heterogeneity can negatively impact states, political scientists should emphasize ""a set of democratic institutions imbued with the rule of law such that these institutions are strengthened by participation rather than emasculated by it"
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Goods.
RQ: What is the role of groups in the provision of collective goods? How do distinctions between groups matter? Argument: Large groups are more inefficient at providing collective goods than small groups (Olson's Small groups are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from large groups Existence of large associations cannot be explained in terms of these same factors that explain the existence of small groups Book is focused on large groups specifically) the larger number available to share the benefits and costs the better, as increasing group size does not bring competition to any one individual, and may lower the total costs for those already in the group Whether groups are exclusive or inclusive groups is important for the provision of collective goods In large groups, no individual contribution makes a perceptible difference to group as a whole, or the burden/benefit of any group, the collective group will not be provided unless there is coercion or some inducements that will lead members to act in their common interest.
Almond, Gabriel, and Sydney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture.
RQ: What will the emerging political character/culture world culture have in the coming decades? Argument: The emerging political culture will be one of political participation. A sense of civic culture is a necessary prerequisite for effective democracy. We have to "specify the content of what has to be diffused" to better understand what a democratic culture constitutes. Arguments concerning modernization theory omit the psychological basis of democratization and can't explain deviant cases. Evidence: The authors look at democratic systems in 5 countries: the US, Germany, Mexico, Italy, and the UK, and interview 1000 people in each country. Civic orientation is widespread in Britain/US, infrequent in others Differences related to characteristics of social environment and patterns of social interaction (particularly political memories Case selection - Italy and Mexico included as examples of less well-developed democracies, Germany has a history of robust local institutions before consolidation/centralization under Prussia, US and UK examples of developed democracies with differing attitudes towards centralized bureaucracy/authority
Posner, Daniel N. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukus are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi."
RQ: When does ethnic identity become politically salient? Argument: "The political salience of a cultural cleavage will depend on the sizes of the groups that it defines relative to the size of the arena in which political competition is taking place. If the cultural cleavage defines groups that are large enough to constitute viable coalitions in the competition for political power, then politicians will mobilize these groups and the cleavage that divides them will become politically salient." Evidence: "In Zambia: Neither the Chewa nor the Tumbuka community alone has the size to be an effective political vehicle (they constitute 20% of the national population). These groups therefore go unmobilized by Zambian politicians and the cultural differences between them remain politically inconsequential," (Pavone 2015). In Malawi: "Both the Chewa and the Tumbuka communities are sufficiently large as to constitute viable political coalitions in the competition over national power. Thus, when Malawian politicians from the Northern and Central Regions seek to build political support bases, they find the Chewa and Tumbuka groups to be useful building-blocks, and their mobilization of these communities renders the cultural cleavage between them politically salient."
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy.
RQ: Why and how do people vote? Argument: Voters are rational and pick their candidates and parties by comparing utility income from the government currently in office to those they would have received from another party. Contributions: The rational model of voting. If voters are truly rational they would rarely vote.
Lichbach. Mark I., and Alan S. Zuckerman. 1997. Comparative Politics
Review Book Traditions of Comparative Politics: - Rationalist - Culturalist - Structuralist
Parochial-participant
Structural norms introduced are participant, but in countries with a parochial political culture (Almond and Verba 1963).
Parochial-subject culture
Substantial portion of population has rejected exclusive claims of diffuse tribal, village, or feudal authority and developed allegiance toward a more complex political system with specialized central government structures (e.g. Ottoman Empire, loosely articulated African kingdoms) (Almond and Verba 1963).
Immigrant-state conflicts
Sustained confrontation between members of the local immigrant population and state actors (Dancygier 2010)
Secessionism
The pursuit of an independent state by certain groups within an already established state/nation (Brancati 2006).
Immigrant-native conflicts
The sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant and native populations in a given locality (Dancygier 2010)
Political Transformation
The use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures, and therefore culture patterns and themes 798. This may lead to short term change, but can't necessarily replace socialization and culture on a comprehensive scale.
Downsian voting in the event of a tie
The voter abstains if their preferences are tied between two parties with differing platforms. If the parties are tied in terms of preference and have identical platforms the voter chooses their vote based on the past performance of the incumbents. If history favors the incumbents (meaning they performed well), the voter chooses the incumbents; but if history favors the opposition party (meaning the incumbents did terribly), the voter chooses the opposition party.
Subject-participant culture
The way in which societies shift from parochial to subject is solved affects the way in which the subject from subject to participant takes place. If parochial/local autonomies survive, may contribute to the development of democratic infrastructure Cultural patterns influenced by structural instability and cultural stalemate - participant orientations have only spread through part of society, the participant-oriented stratum of the population cannot become competent/self-confident (authoritarianism) (Almond and Verba 1963).
Privileged Groups
Those who stand to gain more from the public good than it would cost them to provide it (Olson 1965)
Downsian model of voting in a two party system
Voters compare utility income from the government currently in office to those they would have received from another party. This creates voter preferences. The voter uses the established preferences to determine their vote choice.
Downsian model of voting in a multi-party system
Voters compare utility income from the government currently in office to those they would have received from another party. This creates voter preferences. Based on estimates of fellow voters, the voter determines the likelihood of their preferred party winning: If it seems likely then they cast their vote for their preferred party If it seems highly unlikely, the voter votes for the party they think can win. This type of voting is done to prevent another party, which the voter hates more from winning. If the voter looks to the future, they may vote for their initially preferred party to "improve the alternatives open to [them] in future elections," (50).
