Con Law

Congress enacted a statute that purported to ban all discrimination against African-Americans in any commercial transaction taking place within the United States. The statute would most likely be held: (A) Constitutional, under Thirteenth Amendment provisions barring badges or incidents of slavery. (B) Constitutional, because the federal government has an important interest in furthering the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. (C) Unconstitutional, because Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause do not extend so far as the statute would require. (D) Unconstitutional, because commercial transactions are not among the privileges or immunities of national citizenship.

(A) Constitutional, under Thirteenth Amendment provisions barring badges or incidents of slavery.

A city owned and operated a municipal bus system. The city sold space on its buses for the posting of placards. Under the relevant city ordinance, the administrator of the bus system had sole discretion to decide which placards could be posted on the buses, and the administrator's decision was final. Although most of the placards that appeared on city buses were commercial advertisements, the administrator had often sold space on the buses for placards promoting various political, charitable, and religious causes. After a circus bought space on the buses for placards advertising its upcoming performances, an animal rights organization asked to buy space for a placard with photographs showing the mistreatment of animals in circus shows. The administrator denied the organization's request, stating that the proposed placard would be offensive to the circus, which had paid a substantial sum to place its placards on the buses, and that a circus employee had told her that none of the photographs on the organization's placard depicted animals belonging to this particular circus. The organization sued the administrator in an appropriate court for a declaration that her denial of the organization's request for placard space for the reasons she gave violated the First Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Is the organization likely to prevail? (A) No, because the administrator's denial of space to the organization was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction of speech. (B) No, because a public official may not allow the use of public facilities for the propagation of a message that he or she believes may create a false or misleading impression. (C) Yes, because a public official may not refuse to permit the dissemination of a message in a public forum solely on the basis of its content unless that denial is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. (D) Yes, because a public official may not refuse to allow the use of any public facility to publish a message dealing with an issue of public concern.

(C) Yes, because a public official may not refuse to permit the dissemination of a message in a public forum solely on the basis of its content unless that denial is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.

Congress enacted a statute directing U.S. ambassadors to send formal letters to the governments of their host countries, protesting any violations by those governments of international treaties on weapons sales. The President prefers to handle violations by certain countries in a less formal manner and has directed ambassadors not to comply with the statute. Is the President's action constitutional? (A) No, because Congress has the power to implement treaties, and therefore the statute is binding on the President. (B) No, because Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and therefore the statute is binding on the President. (C) Yes, because Congress has no jurisdiction over matters outside the U.S. borders. (D) Yes, because the President and his subordinates are the exclusive official representatives of the United States in foreign affairs.

(D) Yes, because the President and his subordinates are the exclusive official representatives of the United States in foreign affairs.

Congress enacted a statute that authorized the construction of a monument commemorating the role of the United States in liberating a particular foreign nation during World War II. Another statute directed that $3 million be spent on the construction. When the United States became involved in a bitter trade dispute with the foreign nation, the President announced that he was canceling the monument's construction and that he would not spend the appropriated funds. Although the actual reason for the President's decision was the trade dispute, the announcement stated that the reason was an unexpected rise in the federal deficit. Assume that no other statutes apply. Is the President's decision constitutional? A. No, because the President failed to invoke his foreign affairs powers in his announcement. B. No, because the President is obligated to spend funds in accordance with congressional directions. C. Yes, because the President is vested with inherent executive power to control federal expenditures. D. Yes, because the President's decision is a valid exercise of his foreign affairs powers.

B. No, because the President is obligated to spend funds in accordance with congressional directions.

Congress passes a statute permitting persons with claims arising out of the recent war to bring suit against the U.S. government in federal court. If the federal court rules in favor of the claimant, the statute authorizes the Department of Defense to pay such claims if the Department of Defense determines that the judicial award was "just and equitable." Otherwise, the Department of Defense may reject such claims. Is this statute constitutional?

No, because the statute, in effect, renders federal court decisions non-final, advisory opinions.

The Supreme Court issues an opinion in which it determines that the statute of limitations for securities fraud (which has heretofore been uncertain) is three years. As a result, lower federal courts dismiss all pending cases that had not been filed within the three-year limitations period. Congress thereafter passes a statute requiring federal courts to reinstate these cases. Is the statute constitutional?

No, the federal judiciary has the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them conclusively, subject to review only by superior courts. The Constitution forbids the legislature from interfering with the final judgments of courts. This new statute clearly violates the foregoing principle by retroactively commanding federal courts to reopen final judgments.

The State of Tennessee passes a law requiring that all medical malpractice suits be tried by an administrative panel comprised of lawyers and physicians. The statute also provides that such suits may not be filed in state courts. A plaintiff with standing challenges the law in federal court, arguing that it violates the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it denies plaintiff the right to a jury trial. How will the court rule?

The suit will be dismissed because the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial in civil cases has not been incorporated into the 14th Amendment.

The president is considering selling arms to Israel. There is an old statute on the books prohibiting arms sales to "Middle-Eastern" countries. The president is unsure whether this statute applies to Israel, so he asks the Supreme Court for advice. What result?

The president is seeking an advisory opinion, which federal courts cannot issue.

The County of Guernsey adopted a Pure Milk and Dairy Act which provided that "no milk products could be sold within the County which had not gone through a pasteurization process in plants inspected by a licensed County inspector." The local inspectors had no authority to inspect pasteurization plants outside of the County. As a consequence, under the County ordinance, milk and dairy products from neighboring states were prohibited from sale within the County boundaries even though just as rigid pasteurization standards were employed in those areas. If the ordinance is constitutionally challenged in federal court by a plaintiff with proper standing, the court would most likely: a. Uphold the ordinance as a valid exercise of the County's power to protect the local health interests of its residents. b. Invalidate the ordinance as a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. c. Uphold the ordinance under the 10th Amendment which reserves to the states the power to protect the health and safety of their residents. d. Uphold the ordinance under the Ninth Amendment.

b. Invalidate the ordinance as a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce.

A city ordinance states that anyone who wishes to make a speech in a public park must have a permit to do so. The ordinance prescribes definite standards for the prompt granting of a permit, and it gives the mayor no discretion to deny such permits. The mayor has never denied a permit to anyone wishing to speak on any topic. Mike does not apply for a permit, but instead goes to a public park and makes a ten-minute speech in which he accuses the mayor and city council of gross incompetence. After Mike has completed his speech, the police arrest him and charge him with violating the permit ordinance. Would a conviction of Mike be constitutional? a. Yes, because he did not apply for a permit to speak. b. Yes, because a city park is not a traditional public forum. c. No, if Mike proves that the mayor would not have issued him a permit to speak. d. No, because a city park is a traditional public forum.

a. Yes, because he did not apply for a permit to speak.

Congress recently passed, with the President's signature, the Smog Control Act. The law creates the Smog Alert Agency, and empowers the Agency to promulgate rules and regulations governing air quality standards for the nation. Shortly thereafter, the Agency issued a regulation requiring that every new motor vehicle operating in the United States be equipped with a specified air/fuel control device. In accordance with the statute, the President is authorized to appoint six members to the Agency. The other three positions are to be appointed by the Senate. Which of the following arguments provides the strongest constitutional challenge to the law? a. The President may not appoint a majority of members to an administrative agency. b. Congress may not vest in itself the appointment of inferior officers. c. An administrative agency may not promulgate regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce. d. An administrative agency that exercises executive power may not have a majority of its members appointed by the President.

b. Congress may not vest in itself the appointment of inferior officers.

The County of Guernsey adopted a Pure Milk and Dairy Act which provided that "no milk products could be sold within the County which had not gone through a pasteurization process in plants inspected by a licensed County inspector." The local inspectors had no authority to inspect pasteurization plants outside of the County. As a consequence, under the County ordinance, milk and dairy products from neighboring states were prohibited from sale within the County boundaries even though just as rigid pasteurization standards were employed in those areas. In an action challenging the constitutionality of the Pure Milk and Dairy Act of Guernsey County, which of the following would have the best standing? a. A Guernsey County milk and dairy inspector. b. A resident-consumer of Guernsey County. c. A milk producer from a neighboring state. d. A Guernsey County milk producer.

c. A milk producer from a neighboring state.

The Commonwealth of Transylvania has a statute providing that females convicted of prostitution and sentenced to prison must serve their time in a minimum security penal institution. The same statute provides that males convicted of prostitution and sentenced to incarceration must serve their terms in a maximum security prison. Conditions at the maximum security prison are far inferior to those at the minimum security facility. Convict, a male, has been sentenced to prison at a maximum security institution, following his conviction for prostitution. Convict has instituted a challenge to his confinement on equal protection grounds, alleging that it invidiously discriminates against him on the basis of gender. Which of the following accurately summarizes the burden of persuasion on the constitutional issue? a. Convict must demonstrate that the classification is not substantially related to an important state interest. b. Convict must demonstrate the lack of a rational relation between the scheme and a legitimate state interest. c. The Commonwealth must demonstrate that the scheme is substantially related to an important state interest. d. The Commonwealth must demonstrate that there is a rational relation between the classification and a legitimate state interest.

c. The Commonwealth must demonstrate that the scheme is substantially related to an important state interest.

A state university adopted a new regulation prohibiting certain kinds of speech on campus. Students, staff, and faculty convicted by campus tribunals of violating the regulation were subject to penalties that included fines, suspensions, expulsions, and termination of employment. The regulation was widely unpopular, and there was a great deal of public anger directed toward the two tenured professors who had drafted and promoted it. The following year, the state legislature approved a severable provision in the appropriations bill for the university declaring that none of the university's funding could be used to pay the two professors, who were specifically named in the provision. In the past, the professors' salaries had always been paid from funds appropriated to the university by the legislature, and the university had no other funds that could be used to pay them. If the professors challenge the constitutionality of the appropriations provision, is the court likely to uphold the provision? (A) No, because it amounts to the imposition by the legislature of a punishment without trial. (B) No, because it is based on conduct the professors engaged in before it was enacted. (C) Yes, because the Eleventh Amendment gives the state legislature plenary power to appropriate state funds in the manner that it deems most conducive to the welfare of its people. (D) Yes, because the full faith and credit clause requires the court to enforce the provision strictly according to its terms.

(A) No, because it amounts to the imposition by the legislature of a punishment without trial. (Bill of Attainder here, which are not allowed)

A state law that restricted abortion was challenged in state court as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and as a violation of a similar due process provision of the state constitution. The case made its way to the state's highest court, which ruled that "the law violated the due process provisions of both the U.S. and the state constitutions." If petitioned to do so, may the U.S. Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction to review the state court decision? (A) No, because the state court's decision in this case rests on adequate and independent state law grounds. (B) No, because the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction only over state court decisions that determine the constitutionality of federal laws. (C) Yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over any ruling of a state's highest court based on an interpretation of federal law. (D) Yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over decisions that find state laws in violation of the federal Constitution.

(A) No, because the state court's decision in this case rests on adequate and independent state law grounds.

The President issued an executive order in an effort to encourage U.S. citizens to use the metric (Celsius) system of temperatures. Section 1 of the executive order requires the U.S. Weather Bureau, a federal executive agency, to state temperatures only in Celsius in all weather reports. Section 2 of the executive order requires all privately owned radio and television stations giving weather reports to report temperatures only in Celsius. No federal statute is applicable. Is the President's executive order constitutional? (A) Section 1 is constitutional, but Section 2 is not. (B) Section 2 is constitutional, but Section 1 is not. (C) Sections 1 and 2 are constitutional. (D) Sections 1 and 2 are unconstitutional.

(A) Section 1 is constitutional, but Section 2 is not.

Congressional committees heard testimony from present and former holders of licenses issued by state vocational licensing boards. According to the testimony, the boards had unfairly manipulated their disciplinary proceedings in order to revoke the licenses of some license holders as a means of protecting favored licensees from competition. In response, Congress enacted a statute prescribing detailed procedural requirements for the disciplinary proceedings of all state vocational licensing boards. The statute requires the state boards to provide licensees with adequate notice and opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing in all disciplinary proceedings. The statute also prescribes membership criteria for state vocational licensing boards, designed to ensure that the boards are likely to be neutral. Which of the following provides the best source of authority for this federal statute? (A) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. (B) The general welfare clause of Article I, Section 8. (C) The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2. (D) The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.

(A) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A man bought an antique car from a car dealer in State A. Under State A law, a person who buys from such a dealer acquires good title, even if the property was stolen from a previous owner. The man showed the car at an antique car show in State B. A woman recognized the car as having been stolen from her. Under State B law, a person whose property is stolen may reclaim it, even if the current possessor is an innocent purchaser. The woman sued the man in a State B court to reclaim the car. In his defense, the man claimed that he had good title under the law of State A. Nevertheless, the State B court applied State B law, and the woman prevailed. The man did not appeal. The sheriff had the car returned to State B and gave the woman possession of the car. Several months later, the woman moved to State A, bringing the car with her. The man brought a new suit against the woman in a State A court, claiming that the State B court in the prior suit should have applied the State A law, which protects innocent purchasers. The woman appeared and moved to dismiss the suit. What should the State A court do? (A) Apply the federal law of sale of goods, because the car has moved in interstate commerce. (B) Apply State A law, because the car is currently located in State A. (C) Dismiss the suit, because the State A court must give full faith and credit to the State B judgment. (D) Remove the case to federal court, because the car has moved in interstate commerce, and therefore the case raises a federal question.

(C) Dismiss the suit, because the State A court must give full faith and credit to the State B judgment.

The open-air amphitheater in the city park of Rightville has been utilized for concerts and other entertainment programs. Until this year, each of the groups performing in that city facility was allowed to make its own arrangements for sound equipment and sound technicians. After recurring complaints from occupants of residential buildings adjacent to the city park about intrusive noise from some performances held in the amphitheater, the Rightville City Council passed an ordinance establishing city control over all sound amplification at all programs held there. The ordinance provided that Rightville's Department of Parks would be the sole provider in the amphitheater of sound amplification equipment and of the technicians to operate the equipment "to ensure a proper balance between the quality of the sound at such performances and respect for the privacy of nearby residential neighbors." Which of the following standards should a court use to determine the constitutionality on its face of this content-neutral ordinance? (A) The ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. (B) The ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. (C) The ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and restricts the expressive rights involved no more than is reasonable under the circumstances. (D) The ordinance is substantially related to a legitimate governmental interest and restricts the expressive rights involved no more than is reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.

(A) The ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression.

A federal statute enacted pursuant to the powers of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from discriminating against state employees on the basis of race. The statute expressly authorizes employees to sue the state government in federal district court for any damages resulting from that state action. On the basis of this federal statute, Employee sues State X in federal district court. State X moves to dismiss the suit on the ground that Congress lacks authority to authorize such suits against a state. Which of the following is the strongest argument that Employee can offer in opposition to the state's motion to dismiss this suit? (A) When Congress exercises power vested in it by the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enact appropriate remedial legislation expressly subjecting states to private suits for damages in federal court. (B) When Congress exercises power vested in it by any provision of the Constitution, Congress has unlimited authority to authorize private actions for damages against a state. (C) While the Eleventh Amendment restrains the federal judiciary, that amendment does not limit the power of Congress to modify the sovereign immunity of the states. (D) While the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits in federal court by citizens of one state against another state, it does not apply to such suits by citizens against their own states.

(A) When Congress exercises power vested in it by the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enact appropriate remedial legislation expressly subjecting states to private suits for damages in federal court.

Senator makes a speech on the floor of the United States Senate in which she asserts that William, a federal civil servant with minor responsibilities, was twice convicted of fraud by the courts of State X. In making this assertion, Senator relied wholly on research done by Frank, her chief legislative assistant. In fact, it was a different man named William and not William the civil servant, who was convicted of these crimes in the state court proceedings. This mistake was the result of carelessness on Frank's part. No legislation affecting the appointment or discipline of civil servants or the program of the federal agency for which William works was under consideration at the time Senator made her speech about William on the floor of the Senate. William sues Senator and Frank for defamation. Both defendants move to dismiss the complaint. As a matter of constitutional law, the court hearing this motion should (A) grant it as to Frank, because he is protected by the freedom of speech guarantee against defamation actions by government officials based on his mere carelessness; but deny it as to Senator, because, as an officer of the United States, she is a constituent part of the government and, therefore, has no freedom of speech rights in that capacity. (B) grant it as to both defendants, because Senator is immune to suit for any speech she makes in the Senate under the speech or debate clause of Article I, Section 6, and Frank may assert Senator's immunity for his assistance to her in preparing the speech. (C) deny it as to both defendants, because any immunity of Senator under the speech or debate clause does not attach to a speech that is not germane to pending legislative business, and Frank is entitled to no greater immunity than the legislator he was assisting. (D) deny it as to Frank, because he is not a legislator protected by the speech or debate clause; but grant it as to Senator, because she is immune from suit for her speech by virtue of that clause.

(B) grant it as to both defendants, because Senator is immune to suit for any speech she makes in the Senate under the speech or debate clause of Article I, Section 6, and Frank may assert Senator's immunity for his assistance to her in preparing the speech.

Several years ago, the State of Nevada issued bonds in order to pay for new road construction. In offering these bonds for sale, Nevada stated in its public offering material that tolls collected from the roads built with these bonds would not be used, by statute, for any purpose other than repayment of the bonds or for general improvement of the roads built with the bonds. Nevada knew this limitation on the use of tolls was important to bond holders because it protected state revenue designated for repayment of the bonds. Several years later, but before the bonds had been repaid, Nevada repealed the statute discussed above, and passed new legislation that allowed use of the tolls for a light rail project. At that time, other methods of financing the light rail were available that would not impair existing contracts, but the legislature rejected these other alternatives. This action by Nevada: (A) likely violates the Contracts Clause because it alters the underlying assumptions relied upon by the bond holders. (B) likely violates the Contracts Clause because the statutory change does not seem necessary to funding a light rail project. (C) likely does not violate the Contracts Clause because that Clause only applies when a contract is between private parties, and does not apply when, as here, the contract is between a state and a private party. (D) likely does not violate the Contracts Clause because the Supreme Court has displayed great deference in allowing states to exercise their police power without running afoul of the Contracts Clause.

(B) likely violates the Contracts Clause because the statutory change does not seem necessary to funding a light rail project.

Congress passed a bill prohibiting the President from granting a pardon to any person who had not served at least one-third of the sentence imposed by the court which convicted that person. The President vetoed the bill, claiming that it was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Congress passed it over his veto by a two-thirds vote of each house. This act of Congress is (A) constitutional, because it was enacted over the President's veto by a two-thirds vote of each house. (B) constitutional, because it is a necessary and proper means of carrying out the powers of Congress. (C) unconstitutional, because it interferes with the plenary power of the President to grant pardons. (D) unconstitutional, because a Presidential veto based upon constitutional grounds may be overridden only with the concurrence of three-fourths of the state legislatures.

(C) unconstitutional, because it interferes with the plenary power of the President to grant pardons.

Insurance is provided in the State of Shoshone only by private companies. Although the state insurance commissioner inspects insurance companies for solvency, the state does not regulate their rates or policies. An insurance company charges higher rates for burglary insurance to residents of one part of the county in Shoshone than to residents of another section of the same county because of the different crime rates in those areas. Foster is a resident who was charged the higher rate by the insurance company because of the location of her residence. Foster sues the insurance company, alleging that the different insurance rates unconstitutionally deny her the equal protection of the law. Will Foster's suit prevail? (A) Yes, because the higher crime rate in Foster's neighborhood demonstrates that the county police are not giving persons who reside there the equal protection of the laws. (B) Yes, because the insurance rate differential is inherently discriminatory. (C) No, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies. (D) No, because there is a rational basis for the differential in insurance rates.

(C) No, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies.

After the release of various news stories about the President's possible violation of political campaign funding laws, a federal grand jury investigation was initiated. The grand jury subpoenaed documents and records from several top officers of the executive branch. Learning of the subpoenas, the President ordered all executive officials to refuse to turn over materials, claiming "executive privilege." Which of the following statements is most accurate? (A) The subpoena violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. (B) The President's executive privilege is absolute, except in cases of impeachment. (C) The presidential papers are presumptively privileged, but the privilege must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence in a grand jury investigation. (D) The President's executive privilege applies only to congressional investigations.

(C) The presidential papers are presumptively privileged, but the privilege must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence in a grand jury investigation.

A state legislature received complaints from traffic accident victims who, in the days immediately following their accidents, had received unwelcome and occasionally misleading telephone calls on behalf of medical care providers. The callers warned of the risks of not obtaining prompt medical evaluation to detect injuries resulting from accidents and offered free examinations to determine whether the victims had suffered any compensable injuries. In response to these complaints, the legislature enacted a law prohibiting medical care providers from soliciting any accident victim by telephone within 30 days of his or her accident. Which of the following arguments would be most helpful to the state in defending the constitutionality of the law? (A) Because the commercial speech that is the subject of the law includes some speech that is misleading, the First Amendment does not limit the state's power to regulate that speech. (B) Because the law regulates only commercial speech, the state need only demonstrate that the restriction is rationally related to achieving the state's legitimate interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and in regulating the medical profession. (C) The state has substantial interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and in regulating the practice of medical care providers, and the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objectives. (D) The law is a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.

(C) The state has substantial interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and in regulating the practice of medical care providers, and the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objectives.

A man intensely disliked his neighbors. One night, intending to frighten them, he spray-painted their house with racial epithets and threats to kill them. The man was arrested and prosecuted under a state law providing that "any person who threatens violence against another person with the intent to cause that person to fear for his or her life or safety may be imprisoned for up to five years." In defense, the man claimed that he did not intend to kill his neighbors, but only to scare them so that they would move away. Can the man constitutionally be convicted under this law? (A) No, because he was only communicating his views and had not commenced any overt action against the neighbors. (B) Yes, because he was engaged in trespass when he painted the words on his neighbors' house. (C) Yes, because his communication was a threat by which he intended to intimidate his neighbors. (D) Yes, because his communication was racially motivated and thus violated the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment.

(C) Yes, because his communication was a threat by which he intended to intimidate his neighbors.

The legislature of the state of Gray recently enacted a statute forbidding public utilities regulated by the Gray Public Service Commission to increase their rates more than once every two years. Economy Electric Power Company, a public utility regulated by that commission, has just obtained approval of the commission for a general rate increase. Economy Electric has routinely filed for a rate increase every ten to 14 months during the last 20 years. Because of uncertainties about future fuel prices, the power company cannot ascertain with any certainty the date when it will need a further rate increase; but it thinks it may need such an increase sometime within the next 18 months. Economy Electric files an action in the federal district court in Gray requesting a declaratory judgment that this new statute of Gray forbidding public utility rate increases more often than once every two years is unconstitutional. Assume no federal statute is relevant. In this case, the court should (A) hold the statute unconstitutional, because such a moratorium on rate increases deprives utilities of their property without due process of law. (B) hold the statute constitutional, because the judgment of a legislature on a matter involving economic regulation is entitled to great deference. (C) dismiss the complaint, because this action is not ripe for decision. (D) dismiss the complaint, because controversies over state regulated utility rates are outside of the jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by Article III of the Constitution.

(C) dismiss the complaint, because this action is not ripe for decision.

To encourage the growth of its population, the state of Axbridge established a program that awarded $1,000 to the parents of each child born within the state, provided that at the time of the child's birth the mother and father of the newborn were citizens of the United States. The Lills are aliens who are permanent residents of the United States and have resided in Axbridge for three years. When their first child was born two months ago, they applied for and were denied the $1,000 award by Axbridge officials on the sole ground that they are not citizens of the United States. The Lills filed suit in federal court contending that their exclusion from the award program was unconstitutional. Assume no federal statute addresses this question. In this case, the court should hold that the exclusion of aliens from the Axbridge award program is (A) constitutional, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states plenary authority over the spending of state funds. (B) constitutional, because Axbridge has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of its population, and a rational legislature could believe that families in which both parents are United States citizens are more likely to stay in Axbridge and contribute to its future prosperity than those in which one or both of the parents are aliens. (C) unconstitutional, because strict scrutiny governs judicial review of such state classifications based on alienage, and Axbridge cannot demonstrate that this classification is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. (D) unconstitutional, because state classifications based on alienage are impermissible, unless explicitly authorized by an act of Congress.

(C) unconstitutional, because strict scrutiny governs judicial review of such state classifications based on alienage, and Axbridge cannot demonstrate that this classification is necessary to advance a compelling state interest.

The Federal Family Film Enhancement Act assesses an excise tax of 10% on the price of admission to public movie theaters when they show films that contain actual or simulated scenes of human sexual intercourse. Which of the following is the strongest argument against the constitutionality of this federal act? (A) The act imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. (B) The act is not rationally related to any legitimate national interest. (C) The act violates the equal protection concepts embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it imposes a tax on the price of admission to view certain films and not on the price of admission to view comparable live performances. (D) The act imposes a tax solely on the basis of the content of speech without adequate justification and, therefore, it is prohibited by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment.

(D) The act imposes a tax solely on the basis of the content of speech without adequate justification and, therefore, it is prohibited by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment.

A purchaser bought land in the mountain foothills just outside a resort town and planned to build a housing development there. Soon thereafter, the county in which the land was located unexpectedly adopted a regulation that, for the first time, prohibited all construction in several foothill and mountain areas, including the area of the purchaser's property. The purpose of the county's regulation was "to conserve for future generations the unique natural wildlife and plant habitats" in the mountain areas. Since the adoption of the regulation, the purchaser has been unable to lease or sell the property at any price. Several realtors have advised the purchaser that the property is now worthless. The purchaser has sued the county, claiming that the regulation has effected a taking of the purchaser's property and that the county therefore owes the purchaser just compensation. Is the court likely to rule in favor of the purchaser? (A) No, because the county did not take title to the property from the purchaser. (B) No, because the regulation has not caused or authorized any uninvited physical invasion or intrusion onto the property. (C) Yes, because the conservation objective of the county ordinance is not sufficiently compelling to justify the substantial diminution in the property value. (D) Yes, because the effect of the county's regulation is to deny the purchaser essentially all economically beneficial use of the property.

(D) Yes, because the effect of the county's regulation is to deny the purchaser essentially all economically beneficial use of the property.

A protester entered an IRS office during business hours. He denounced the income tax and set fire to pages from his copy of the Internal Revenue Code. The fire was extinguished before it caused any other damage. The protester was arrested and charged with violating a federal law that prohibited igniting a fire in a public building. He claimed that his prosecution was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. May the protester constitutionally be convicted? (A) No, because he was exercising his right to freedom of speech by burning a copy of the code. (B) No, because the copy of the code belonged to him, and thus burning it did not infringe upon a legitimate government interest. (C) Yes, because the burning of the code was conduct rather than speech. (D) Yes, because the state law is narrowly drawn to further a substantial government interest in prohibiting the non-communicative aspects of the act in question.

(D) Yes, because the state law is narrowly drawn to further a substantial government interest in prohibiting the non-communicative aspects of the act in question.

A state criminal statute provides that "No person shall utter to another person in a public place any hostile, bullying, annoying, infuriating, or aggravating language." Larry followed a pregnant woman for four blocks down a public street, yelling in her ear offensive four-letter words. The woman repeatedly asked Larry to leave her alone, but Larry refused. 1. Does Larry's speech constitute fighting words? 2. Can Larry be prosecuted for such speech under the above-quoted statute?

1. Yes 2. No. Although Larry's speech is considered unprotected "fighting words," Larry may not be punished for such speech under this statute because it is overbroad. If a regulation of speech punishes a substantial amount of protected speech, the regulation is facially invalid. This means it may not be enforced against anyone—not even a person (like Larry) who engaged in unprotected speech.

A federal law provides that all motor vehicle tires discarded in this country must be disposed of in facilities licensed by the federal Environmental Protection Agency. Pursuant to this federal law and all proper federal procedural requirements, that agency has adopted very strict standards for the licensing of such facilities. As a result, the cost of disposing of tires in licensed facilities is substantial. The state of East Dakota has a very large fleet of motor vehicles. It disposes of its used tires at a state-owned and operated facility. This state facility is unlicensed, but its operation in actual practice meets most of the standards imposed by the federal EPA on facilities it licenses to dispose of tires. Consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, may the state of East Dakota continue to dispose of its used tires in this manner? A) No, because a state must comply with valid federal laws that regulate matters affecting interstate commerce. B) No, because some of the tires come from vehicles that are used by the state solely in its commercial activities. C) Yes, because some of the tires come from vehicles that are used by the state in the performance of core state governmental functions such as law enforcement. D) Yes, because the legitimate needs of the federal government are satisfied by the fact that the unlicensed state disposal scheme meets, in actual practice, most of the federal standards for the licensing of such facilities.

A) No, because a state must comply with valid federal laws that regulate matters affecting interstate commerce.

Congress declared war on a nation in Asia. Congress also passed a statute making it a crime "to make public statements in support of the Asian nation and against the United States." A United States citizen subsequently spoke out against the war at a rally in front of a federal building. During her speech, the citizen urged people to "smash the windows of the federal building like U.S. troops are doing" in the Asian nation. Several members of the frenzied crowd did as the speaker urged. The speaker was immediately arrested and charged with violating the statute. Can the speaker successfully defend by asserting that the statute violates her First Amendment speech rights? A) Yes, because the statute is substantially overboard. B) Yes, because her speech involved core political speech. C) No, because she incited imminent lawless action. D) No, because the ongoing war constitutes a compelling interest that justifies the statute.

A) Yes, because the statute is substantially overboard.

A federal statute prohibits the sale or resale, in any place in this country, of any product intended for human consumption or ingestion into the human body that contains designated chemicals known to cause cancer, unless the product is clearly labeled as dangerous. The constitutionality of this federal statute may most easily be justified on the basis of the power of Congress to A) regulate commerce among the states. B) enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. C) provide for the general welfare. D) promote science and the useful arts.

A) regulate commerce among the states.

Based on Supreme Court precedent, which of the following most accurately describes the state of law regarding the "right to die": A. A majority of the justices have opined that a competent individual has a fundamental right to end his or her life by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. B. The court has held that an incompetent individual has a fundamental right to end his or her life by refusing life-sustaining food and hydration. C. The court has held that terminally ill individuals have a fundamental right to commit suicide with the assistance of a physician. D. Both a and b.

A. A majority of the justices have opined that a competent individual has a fundamental right to end his or her life by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.

Congress passes the following statute: -"The appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court shall not extend to any case involving the constitutionality of any state statute limiting the circumstances in which a woman may obtain an abortion." The strongest argument against the constitutionality of this statute is that A. Congress may not exercise its authority over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a way that seriously interferes with the establishment of a supreme and uniform body of federal constitutional law. B. Congress may only regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases initially arising in the federal courts. C. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may only be altered by constitutional amendment. D. The statute violates the equal protection clause.

A. Congress may not exercise its authority over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a way that seriously interferes with the establishment of a supreme and uniform body of federal constitutional law.

A statute of the state of Texona prohibits any retailer of books, magazines, pictures, or posters from "publicly displaying or selling to any person any material that may be harmful to minors because of the violent or sexually explicit nature of its pictorial content." Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor. Corner Store displays publicly and sells magazines containing violent and sexually explicit pictures. The owner of this store is prosecuted under the above statute for these actions. In defending against this prosecution in a Texona trial court, the argument that would be the best defense for Corner Store is that the statute violates the A. First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute is excessively vague and overbroad. B. First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because a state may not prohibit the sale of violent or sexually explicit material in the absence of proof that the material is utterly without any redeeming value in the marketplace of ideas. C. equal protection of the laws clause, because the statute irrationally treats violent and sexually explicit material that is pictorial differently from such material that is composed wholly of printed words. D. equal protection of the laws clause, because the statute irrationally distinguishes between violent and sexually explicit pictorial material that may harm minors and such material that may harm only adults.

A. First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute is excessively vague and overbroad.

A public high school publishes a weekly newspaper as part of its journalism class. The student editor-in-chief of the paper wrote an article supporting the legalization of marijuana and showed it to his faculty advisor. The advisor told the editor that while the issue was receiving a lot of media attention in their community, in order to discourage drug use, school policy prohibited the paper from including any drug-related articles. The advisor then told the editor not to include the article in any edition of the paper. A few days later, the editor and faculty advisor were preparing to upload the electronic files for the paper to their printer. The advisor was momentarily called away, and the editor quickly replaced an article on clothing styles with his article on the legalization of marijuana. When the paper came out, the article was the talk of the school. After a brief investigation, the student was removed from his position as editor-in-chief. The student brought suit against the school, claiming that his removal was in violation of his First Amendment rights. How should the court rule on this issue? A. For the high school, because the newspaper involved was a public high school newspaper published as part of a journalism class. B. For the high school, because students do not have constitutional rights while the school is acting as parens patriae. C. For the student, because the issue involved a matter of public concern. D. For the student, unless the school can show that the removal was necessary to achieve a compelling interest.

A. For the high school, because the newspaper involved was a public high school newspaper published as part of a journalism class.

John is a licensed barber in State A. The State A barber licensing statute provides that the Barber Licensing Board may revoke a barber license if it finds that a licensee has used his or her business premises for an illegal purpose. John was arrested by a federal narcotics enforcement agent on a charge of selling cocaine in his barbershop in violation of federal laws. However, the local United States Attorney declined to prosecute and the charges were dropped. Nevertheless, the Barber Licensing Board commenced a proceeding against John to revoke his license on the ground that John used his business premises for illegal sales of cocaine. At a subsequent hearing before the board, the only evidence against John was affidavits by unnamed informants, who were not present or available for cross-examination. Their affidavits stated that they purchased cocaine from John in his barbershop. Based solely on this evidence, the board found that John used his business premises for an illegal purpose and ordered his license revoked. In a suit by John to have this revocation set aside, his best constitutional argument is that A. John's inability to cross-examine his accusers denied him a fair hearing and caused him to be deprived of his barber license without due process of law. B. the administrative license revocation proceeding was invalid, because it denied full faith and credit to the dismissal of the criminal charges by the United States Attorney. C. Article III requires a penalty of the kind imposed on John to be imposed by a court rather than an administrative agency D. the existence of federal laws penalizing the illegal sale of cocaine preempts state action relating to drug trafficking of the kind involved in John's case.

A. John's inability to cross-examine his accusers denied him a fair hearing and caused him to be deprived of his barber license without due process of law.

The National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the U.S. without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the U.S. Government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission of the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be A. constitutional, because the property clause authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions. B. constitutional, because Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to advance the general welfare. C. unconstitutional, because Congress may not use its delegated powers to override the 10th Amendment rights of the state of Arkota. D. unconstitutional, because Congress violates the full faith and credit clause when it punishes conduct that has been authorized by state action.

A. constitutional, because the property clause authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions.

The King City zoning ordinance contains provisions restricting places of "adult entertainment" to two specified city blocks within the commercial center of the city. These provisions of the ordinance define "adult entertainment" as "live or filmed nudity or sexual activity, real or simulated, of an indecent nature." Sam proposes to operate an adult entertainment establishment outside the two-block area zoned for such establishments but within the commercial center of King City. When his application for permission to do so is rejected solely because it is inconsistent with provisions of the zoning ordinance, he sues the appropriate officials of King City, seeking to enjoin them from enforcing the adult entertainment provisions of the ordinance against him. He asserts that these provisions of the ordinance violate the First Amendment as made applicable to King City by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the court hearing Sam's request for an injunction would probably hold that the adult entertainment provisions of the King City zoning ordinance are A. constitutional, because they do not prohibit adult entertainment everywhere in King City, and the city has a substantial interest in keeping the major part of its commercial center free of uses it considers harmful to that area. B. constitutional, because adult entertainment of the kind described in these provisions of the King City ordinance is not protected by the free speech guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. C. unconstitutional, because they prohibit in the commercial area of the city adult entertainment that is not "obscene" within the meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. D. unconstitutional, because zoning ordinances that restrict freedom of speech may be justified only by a substantial interest in preserving the quality of a community's residential neighborhoods.

A. constitutional, because they do not prohibit adult entertainment everywhere in King City, and the city has a substantial interest in keeping the major part of its commercial center free of uses it considers harmful to that area.

A state enacted a gross receipts tax on all businesses operating in that state. The tax was a proportional tax based on revenue derived by businesses in the state. A leading manufacturer of widget assembly devices had its corporate headquarters and most of its manufacturing plants in the state. Its products were sold to widget users throughout the country. If the company challenges the constitutionality of the state's assessment of the tax against it, what is its strongest argument? A) Eighty percent of its revenue is derived from purchases of its products by the federal government. B) The tax applies to revenue derived from all of the company's manufacturing plants, including those not located in the state. C) The state also imposes a use tax on component parts purchased by the company outside of the state to make its widget assembly devices that is equivalent to the state's sales tax for similar purchases within the state. D) Sales taxes are imposed by other states on the company's widget assembly devices sold in those states.

B) The tax applies to revenue derived from all of the company's manufacturing plants, including those not located in the state.

A federal statute provides that the U.S. Supreme Court has authority to review any case filed in a U.S. Court of Appeals, even though that case has not yet been decided by the court of appeals. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an important environmental rule. Companies that would be adversely affected by the rule filed a petition for review of the rule in a court of appeals, seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid solely because it was beyond the statutory authority of the EPA. A [second] statute specifically provides for direct review of EPA rules by a court of appeals without any initial action in a district court. The companies have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court requesting immediate review of this case by the Supreme Court before the court of appeals has actually decided the case. The EPA acknowledges that the case is important enough to warrant Supreme Court review and that it should be decided promptly, but it asks the Supreme Court to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The best constitutional argument in support of the EPA's request is that A. the case is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by Article III, and it is not a proper subject of that court's appellate jurisdiction because it has not yet been decided by any lower court. B. the case is appellate in nature, but it is beyond the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, because Article III states that its jurisdiction extends only to cases arising under the Constitution. C. Article III precludes federal courts from reviewing the validity of any federal agency rule in any proceeding other than an action to enforce the rule. D. Article III provides that all federal cases, except those within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, must be initiated by an action in a federal district court.

A. the case is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as defined by Article III, and it is not a proper subject of that court's appellate jurisdiction because it has not yet been decided by any lower court.

Current national statistics show a dramatic increase in the number of elementary and secondary school students bringing controlled substances (drugs) to school for personal use or distribution to others. In response, Congress enacted a statute requiring each state legislature to enact a state law that makes it a state crime for any person to possess, use, or distribute, within 1,000 feet of any elementary or secondary school, any controlled substance that has previously been transported in interstate commerce and that is not possessed, used, or distributed pursuant to a proper physician's prescription. The federal statute is A. unconstitutional, because Congress has no authority to require a state legislature to enact any specified legislation. B. unconstitutional, because the possession, use, or distribution, in close proximity to a school, of a controlled substance that has previously been transported in interstate commerce does not have a sufficiently close nexus to such commerce to justify its regulation by Congress. C. constitutional, because it contains a jurisdictional provision that will ensure, on a case-by-case basis, that any particular controlled substance subject to the terms of this statute will, in fact, affect interstate commerce. D. constitutional, because Congress possesses broad authority under both the general welfare clause and the commerce clause to regulate any activities affecting education that also have, in inseverable aggregates, a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

A. unconstitutional, because Congress has no authority to require a state legislature to enact any specified legislation.

State Y has a state employee grievance system that requires any state employee who wishes to file a grievance against the state to submit that grievance for final resolution to a panel of three arbitrators chosen by the parties from a statewide board of 13 arbitrators. In any given case, the grievant and the state alternate in exercising the right of each party to eliminate five members of the board, leaving a panel of three members to decide their case. At the present time, the full board is composed of seven male arbitrators and six female arbitrators. Ellen, a female state employee, filed a sexual harassment grievance against her male supervisor and the state. Anne, the state's attorney, exercised all of her five strikes to eliminate five of the female arbitrators. At the time she did so, Anne stated that she struck the five female arbitrators solely because she believed women, as a group, would necessarily be biased in favor of another woman who was claiming sexual harassment. Counsel for Ellen eliminated four males and one female arbitrator, all solely on ground of specific bias or conflicts of interest. As a result, the panel was all male. When the panel ruled against Ellen on the merits of her case, she filed an action in an appropriate state court, challenging the panel selection process as a gender-based denial of equal protection of the laws. In this case, the court should hold that the panel selection process is A. unconstitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case does not satisfy the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. B. unconstitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case denies the grievant the right to a jury made up of her peers. C. constitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case satisfies the requirements of the strict scrutiny test. D. constitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorne3y in this case satisfies the requirements of the rational basis test.

A. unconstitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case does not satisfy the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.

Water District is an independent municipal water-supply district incorporated under the applicable laws of the state of Green. The district was created solely to supply water to an entirely new community in a recently developed area of Green. That new community is racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse, and the community has never engaged in any discrimination against members of minority groups. The five-member, elected governing board of the newly created Water District contains two persons who are members of racial minority groups. At its first meeting, the governing board of Water District adopted a rule unqualifiedly setting aside 25% of all positions on the staff to the District and 25% of all contracts to be awarded by the District to members of racial minority groups. The purpose of the rule was "to help redress the historical discrimination against these groups in this country and to help them achieve economic parity with other groups in our society." Assume that no federal statute applies. A suit by appropriate parties challenges the constitutionality of these set-asides. In this suit, the most appropriate ruling on the basis of applicable United States Supreme Court precedent would be that the set-asides are A. unconstitutional, because they would deny other potential employees or potential contractors the equal protection of the laws. B. unconstitutional, because they would impermissibly impair the right to contract of other potential employees or potential contractors. C. constitutional, because they would assure members of racial minority groups the equal protection of the laws. D. constitutional, because the function and activities of Water District are of a proprietary nature rather than a governmental nature and, therefore, are not subject to the usual requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A. unconstitutional, because they would deny other potential employees or potential contractors the equal protection of the laws.

Modality City has had a severe traffic problem on its streets. As a result, it enacted an ordinance prohibiting all sales to the public of food or other items by persons selling directly from trucks, cars, or other vehicles located on city streets. The ordinance included an inseverable grandfather provision exempting from its prohibition venders who, for 20 years or more, have continuously sold food or other items from such vehicles located on the streets of Modality City. Northwind Ice Cream, a retail vender of ice cream products, qualifies for this exemption and is the only food vendor that does. Yuppee Yogurt is a business similar to Northwind, but Yuppee has been selling to the public directly from trucks located on the streets of Modality City only for the past ten years. Yuppee filed suit in an appropriate federal district court to enjoin enforcement of this ordinance on the ground that it denies Yuppee the equal protection of the laws. In this case, the court will probably rule that the ordinance is A) constitutional, because it is narrowly tailored to implement the city's compelling interest in reducing traffic congestion and, therefore, satisfies the strict scrutiny test applicable to such cases. B) constitutional, because its validity is governed by the rational basis test, and the courts consistently defer to economic choices embodied in such legislation if they are even plausibly justifiable. C) unconstitutional, because the nexus between the legitimate purpose of the ordinance and the conduct it prohibits is so tenuous and its provisions are so under-inclusive that the ordinance fails to satisfy the substantial relationship test applicable to such cases. D) unconstitutional, because economic benefits or burdens imposed by legislatures on the basis of grandfather provisions have consistently been declared invalid by courts as per se violations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B) constitutional, because its validity is governed by the rational basis test, and the courts consistently defer to economic choices embodied in such legislation if they are even plausibly justifiable.

A federal statute prohibits the construction of nuclear energy plants in this country without a license from the Federal Nuclear Plant Siting Commission. The statute provides that the Commission may issue a license authorizing the construction of a proposed nuclear energy plant 30 days after the Commission makes a finding that the plant will comply with specified standards of safety, technological and commercial feasibility, and public convenience. In a severable provision, the Commission's enabling statute also provides that Congress, by simple majorities in each house, may veto the issuance of a particular license by the Commission if such a veto occurs within 30 days following the required Commission finding. Early last year, the Commission found that Safenuke, Inc. met all statutory requirements and, therefore, voted to issue Safenuke, Inc. a license authorizing it to construct a nuclear energy plant. Because they believed that the issuance of a license to Safenuke, Inc. was not in accord with the applicable statutory criteria, a majority of each of the two houses of Congress voted, within the specified 30-day period, to veto the license. On the basis of that veto, the Commission refused to issue the license. Subsequently, Safenuke, Inc. sued the Commission in an appropriate federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's refusal to issue the license. In this suit, the court should hold the congressional veto of the license of Safenuke, Inc. to be A) invalid, because any determination by Congress that particular agency action does not satisfy statutory criteria violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution because it constitutes the performance of a judicial function by the legislative branch. B) invalid, because Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has been interpreted to mean that any action of Congress purporting to alter the legal rights of persons outside of the legislative branch must be presented to the President for his signature or veto. C) valid, because Congress has authority under the commerce clause to regulate the construction of nuclear energy plants. D) valid, because there is a compelling national interest in the close congressional supervision of nuclear plant siting in light of the grave dangers to the public health and safety that are associated with the operation of such plants.

B) invalid, because Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has been interpreted to mean that any action of Congress purporting to alter the legal rights of persons outside of the legislative branch must be presented to the President for his signature or veto.

A citizen who is unhappy about a recent decision of his city council stood in front of city hall and gave an extemporaneous speech belittling each member of the city council. During the diatribe, the citizen made the following statement: "if there is a God, the city council members will surely burn in hell forever." A state statute, enacted in 1898, prohibited "the public utterance of any blasphemy or sacrilege," and provided criminal penalties for its violation. On hearing the citizen's utterances, a police officer arrested him for violating the 1898 statute. The local district attorney decided to proceed with prosecution of the case, only the third recorded such prosecution in the state's history. Which of the following arguments would not be helpful for the citizen's defense? A. Application of the statute to the citizen infringes his freedom of speech in violation of the 14th amendment. B. Application of the statute to the citizen denies him equal protection of the law in violation of the 14th amendment. C. The statute violates the 14th amendment because it is an establishment of religion. D. The statute violates the 14th amendment because it is vague.

B. Application of the statute to the citizen denies him equal protection of the law in violation of the 14th amendment.

A generally applicable state statute requires an autopsy by the county coroner in all cases of death that are not obviously of natural causes. The purpose of this law is to ensure the discovery and prosecution of all illegal activity resulting in death. In the 50 years since its enactment, the statute has been consistently enforced. Mr. and Mrs. Long are sincere practicing members of a religion that maintains it is essential for a deceased person's body to be buried promptly and without any invasive procedures, including an autopsy. When the Longs' son died of mysterious causes and an autopsy was scheduled, the Longs filed an action in state court challenging the constitutionality of the state statute, and seeking an injunction prohibiting the county coroner from performing an autopsy on their son's body. In this action, the Longs claimed only that the application of this statute in the circumstances of their son's death would violate their right to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Assume that no federal statutes are applicable. As applied to the Longs' case, the court should rule that the state's autopsy statute is A. Constitutional, because a dead individual is not a person protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. B. Constitutional, because it is a generally applicable statute and is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. C. Unconstitutional, because it is not necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. D. Unconstitutional, because it is not substantially related to an important state interest.

B. Constitutional, because it is a generally applicable statute and is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.

In an attempt to stop the growth of North Korea's nuclear capability, the president has placed a naval blockade around North Korea, halting all ships coming into or leaving North Korea and inspecting these ships for nuclear material. Under international law, a blockade is considered an act of war. The president did not seek congressional approval of the blockade. A federal lawsuit is filed challenging the president's authority to impose a naval blockade without a congressional declaration of war. In this suit, the court will A. Declare the president's action constitutional because the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed services. B. Dismiss the case because it involves a nonjusticiable political question. C. Dismiss the case because federal courts do not get involved in foreign policy matters. D. Declare the president's action unconstitutional because the president failed to get a congressional declaration of war before imposing the blockade.

B. Dismiss the case because it involves a nonjusticiable political question.

Kelly County, in the state of Green, is located adjacent to the border of the state of Red. The communities located in Kelly County are principally suburbs of Scarletville, a large city located in Red, and therefore there is a large volume of traffic between that city and Kelly County. While most of that traffic is by private passenger automobiles, some of it is by taxicabs and other kinds of commercial vehicles. An ordinance of Kelly County, the stated purpose of which is to reduce traffic congestion, provides that only taxicabs registered in Kelly County may pick up or discharge passengers in the county. The ordinance also provides that only residents of Kelly County may register taxicabs in that county. Which of the following is the proper result in a suit brought by Scarletville taxicab owners challenging the constitutionality of this Kelly County Ordinance? A. Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the fact that private passenger automobiles contribute more to the traffic congestion problem in Kelly County than do taxicabs indicates that the ordinance is not a reasonable means by which to solve that problem. B. Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the ordinance unduly burdens interstate commerce by insulating Kelly County taxicab owners from out-of-state competition without adequate justification. C. Judgment for Kelly County, because the ordinance forbids taxicabs registered in other counties of Green as well as in states other than Green to operate in Kelly County and, therefore, it does not discriminate against interstate commerce. D. Judgment for Kelly County, because Scarletville taxicab owners do not constitute a suspect class and the ordinance is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose of reducing traffic congestion.

B. Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the ordinance unduly burdens interstate commerce by insulating Kelly County taxicab owners from out-of-state competition without adequate justification.

Doctor, a resident of the city of Greenville in the state of Green, is a physician licensed to practice in both Green and the neighboring state of Red. Doctor finds that the most convenient place to treat her patients who need hospital care is in the publicly owned and operated Redville Municipal Hospital of the City of Redville in the state of Red, which is located just across the state line from Greenville. For many years Doctor had successfully treated her patients in that hospital. Early this year she was notified that she could no longer treat patients in the Redville hospital because she was not a resident of Red, and a newly adopted rule of Redville Municipal Hospital, which was adopted in conformance with all required procedures, stated that every physician who practices in that hospital must be a resident of Red. Which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to Doctor in an action to challenge her exclusion from the Redville hospital solely on the basis of this hospital rule? A. The bill of attainder clause. B. The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. C. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. D. The ex post facto clause.

B. The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.

A federal statute provides that the cities in which certain specified airports are located may regulate the rates and services of all limousines that serve those airports, without regard to the origin or destination of the passengers who use the limousines. The cities of Redville and Greenville are located adjacent to each other in different states. The airport serving both of them is located in Redville and is one of those airports specified in the federal statute. The Redville City Council has adopted a rule that requires any limousine serving the airport to charge only the rates authorized by the Redville City Council. Airline Limousine Service has a lucrative business transporting passengers between Greenville and the airport in Redville, at much lower rates than those required by the Redville City Council. It transports passengers in interstate traffic only; it does not provide local service within Redville. The new rule adopted by the Redville City Council will require Airline Limousine Service to charge the same rates as limousines operating only in Redville. Must Airline Limousine Service comply with the new rule of the Redville City Council? A. Yes, because the airport is located in Redville and, therefore, its city council has exclusive regulatory authority over all transportation to and from the airport. B. Yes, because Congress has authorized this form of regulation by Redville and, therefore, removed any constitutional impediments to it that may have otherwise existed. C. No, because the rule would arbitrarily destroy a lucrative existing business and, therefore, would amount to a taking without just compensation. D. No, because Airline Limousine Service is engaged in interstate commerce and this rule is an undue burden on that commerce.

B. Yes, because Congress has authorized this form of regulation by Redville and, therefore, removed any constitutional impediments to it that may have otherwise existed.

Congress wishes to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of the sexual orientation of the potential purchaser or renter. Congress wishes this statute to apply to all public and private vendors and lessors of residential property in this country, with a few narrowly drawn exceptions. The most credible argument for congressional authority to enact such a statute would be based upon the A. general welfare clause of Article I, Section 8, because of the conduct the statute prohibits could reasonably be deemed to be harmful to the national interest. B. commerce clause of Article I, section 8, because, in the aggregate, the sale or rental of almost all housing in this country could reasonably be deemed to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. C. enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, because that amendment clearly prohibits discrimination against the class of persons protected by this statute. D. enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because that amendment prohibits all public and private actors from engaging in irrational discrimination.

B. commerce clause of Article I, section 8, because, in the aggregate, the sale or rental of almost all housing in this country could reasonably be deemed to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is A. unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress. B. unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II. C. constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states. D. constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members.

B. unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.

Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the use of mechanical power hammers on all construction projects in the U.S. Subsequently, a study conducted by a private research firm concluded that nails driven by mechanical power hammers have longer-lasting joining power than hand-driven nails. After learning about this study, the city of Green enacted an amendment to its building code requiring the use of mechanical power hammers in the construction of all buildings. This amendment to the city's building code is A. unconstitutional, because it was enacted subsequent to the federal statute B. unconstitutional, because it conflicts with the provisions of the federal statute C. constitutional, because the federal statute does not expressly indicate that it supersedes inconsistent state and local laws D. constitutional, because the long-term safety justifies some additional risk to the people engaged in the construction of the buildings

B. unconstitutional, because it conflicts with the provisions of the federal statute

The governor of the state of Green proposes to place a Christmas nativity scene, the components of which would be permanently donated to the state by private citizens, in the Green Capitol Building rotunda where the Green Legislature meets annually. The governor further proposes to display this state-owned nativity scene annually from December 1 to December 31, next to permanent displays that depict the various products manufactured in Green. The governor's proposal is supported by all members of both houses of the legislature. If challenged in a lawsuit on establishment clause grounds, the proposed nativity scene display would be held A. unconstitutional, because the components of the nativity scene would be owned by the state rather than by private persons. B. unconstitutional, because the nativity scene would not be displayed in a context that appeared to depict and commemorate the Christmas season as a primarily secular holiday. C. constitutional, because the components of the nativity scene would be donated to the state by private citizens rather than purchased with state funds. D. constitutional, because the nativity scene would be displayed alongside an exhibit of various products manufactured in Green.

B. unconstitutional, because the nativity scene would not be displayed in a context that appeared to depict and commemorate the Christmas season as a primarily secular holiday.

The State of Tennessee recently passed a law that reduced the speed limit on its state highways from 70 to 60 miles per hour. The state highway department had just completed a 10-year study that showed overwhelmingly that traffic accidents and fatalities were lower on state highways with a 60 mile per hour speed limit. Many of Tennessee's state highways go to the Tennessee state border and connect to roadways in adjacent states. Each of the states bordering Tennessee has a speed limit of 70 mph on its state highways. A national trucking company filed a federal lawsuit claiming that the new Tennessee speed limit violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because it forces interstate traffic to slow down when it enters Tennessee. The Tennessee speed limit is most likely: A. Unconstitutional, because Tennessee has discriminated against out-of-state traffic for the benefit of in-state traffic. B. Unconstitutional, because Tennessee's legitimate interest in traffic safety does not clearly exceed the speed limit's burden on interstate commerce. C. Constitutional, because the speed limit's slight burden on interstate commerce does not clearly exceed Tennessee's legitimate interest in traffic safety. D. Constitutional, because the safety of state highways is a purely local matter that may be regulated by the states as they please.

C. Constitutional, because the speed limit's slight burden on interstate commerce does not clearly exceed Tennessee's legitimate interest in traffic safety.

Old City police officers shot and killed J's friend as he was attempting to escape arrest for armed robbery. J brought suit in federal court against the Old City Police Department seeking only a judgment declaring unconstitutional the state statute under which the police acted. The statute authorized the police to use deadly force when necessary to apprehend a person who has committed a felony. In his suit, J alleged that the police would not have killed his friend if the use of deadly force had not been authorized by the statute. The court should A. Decide the case on the merits, because it raise a substantial federal question. B. Dismiss the action, because it involves a nonjusticiable political question. C. Dismiss the action, because it does not present a case or controversy. D. Dismiss the action, because the 11th Amendment prohibits federal courts from deciding cases of this type.

C. Dismiss the action, because it does not present a case or controversy.

In an effort to impose national speed limits, Congress recently passed the following act: "Any state that does not enact legislation creating a maximum speed limit of 55 MPH before January 1, 2019, will forfeit 10% of the federal funds it receives from the U.S. Department of Transportation." After this legislation is signed into law, the State of Tennessee challenges the constitutionality of the act. What is the most likely outcome of such challenge? A. The Act is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. B. The Act is constitutional under the Taxing Clause. C. The Act is constitutional under the Spending Clause. D. The Act violates the principles of federalism.

C. The Act is constitutional under the Spending Clause.

Due to budgetary constraints, State X passes a law requiring individuals to reside in the state for at least one year to be eligible for welfare benefits. If a plaintiff with standing brings a constitutional challenge against the new law, the court is most likely to find: A. The restriction does not have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest as required by the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. B. The restriction improperly burdens the fundamental right of interstate travel in violation of the equal protection clause of the 5th Amendment. C. The restriction improperly burdens the fundamental right of interstate travel in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. D. The restriction deprives the plaintiff of a property interest without due process of law in violation of the due process clause of the 14th amendment.

C. The restriction improperly burdens the fundamental right of interstate travel in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

The state has a statute providing that an unsuccessful candidate in a primary election for a party's nomination for elected public office may not become a candidate for the same office at the following general election by nominating petition or by write-in votes. Sabel sought her party's nomination for governor in the May primary election. After losing in the primary, Sabel filed nominating petitions containing the requisite number of signatures to become a candidate for the office of governor in the following general election. The chief elections officer of the state refused to certify Sabel's petition solely because of the above statute. Sabel then filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the statute. As a matter of constitutional law, which of the following is the proper burden of persuasion in this suit? A. Sabel must demonstrate that the statute is not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. B. Sabel must demonstrate that the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. C. The state must demonstrate that the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. D. The state must demonstrate that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

C. The state must demonstrate that the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.

The state of Green imposes a tax on the "income" of each of its residents. As defined in the taxing statute, "income" includes the fair rental value of the use of any automobile provided by the taxpayer's employer for the taxpayer's personal use. The federal government supplies automobiles to some of its employees who are resident in Green so that they may perform their jobs properly. A federal government employee supplied with an automobile for this purpose may also use it for the employee's own personal business. Assume there is no federal legislation on this subject. May the state of Green collect this tax on the fair rental value of the personal use of the automobiles furnished by the federal government to these employees? A. No, because such a tax would be a tax on the United States. B. No, because such a tax would be a tax upon activities performed on behalf of the United States, since the automobiles are primarily used by these federal employees in the discharge of their official duties. C. Yes, because the tax is imposed on the employees rather than on the United States, and the tax does not discriminate against persons who are employed by the United States. D. Yes, because an exemption from such state taxes for federal employees would be a denial to others of the equal protection of the laws.

C. Yes, because the tax is imposed on the employees rather than on the United States, and the tax does not discriminate against persons who are employed by the United States.

Alex contracted for expensive cable television service for a period of six months solely to view the televised trial of Clark, who was on trial for murder in a court of the state of Green. In the midst of the trial, the judge prohibited any further televising of Clark's trial because he concluded that the presence of television cameras was disruptive. Alex brought an action in a federal district court against the judge in Clark's case asking only for an injunction that would require the judge to resume the televising of Clark's trial. Alex alleged that the judge's order to stop the televising of Clark's trial deprived him of property - his investment in cable television service - without due process of law. Before Alex's case came to trial, Clark's criminal trial concluded in a conviction and sentencing. There do not appear to be any obvious errors in the proceeding that led to the result in Clark's case. After Clark's conviction and sentencing, the defendant in Alex's case moved to dismiss that suit. The most proper disposition of this motion by the federal court would be to A. defer action on the motion until after any appellate proceedings in Clark's case have concluded, because Clark might appeal, his conviction might be set aside, he might be tried again, and television cameras might be barred from the new trial. B. defer action on the motion until after the Green Supreme Court expresses a view on its proper disposition, because the state law of mootness governs suits in federal court when the federal case is inexorably intertwined with a state proceeding. C. grant the motion, because the subject matter of the controversy between Alex and the defendant has ceased to exist and there is no strong likelihood that it will be revived. D. deny the motion, because Alex has raised an important constitutional question—whether his investment in cable service solely to view Clark's trial is property protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. grant the motion, because the subject matter of the controversy between Alex and the defendant has ceased to exist and there is no strong likelihood that it will be revived.

A statute in the state of East Dakota requires each insurance company that offers burglary insurance policies in the state to charge a uniform rate for such insurance to all of its customers residing within the same county in that state. So long as it complies with this requirement, a company is free to charge whatever rate the market will bear for its burglary insurance policies. An insurance company located in East Dakota files suit in federal district court against appropriate East Dakota officials to challenge this statute on constitutional grounds. The insurance company wishes to charge customers residing in the same county rates for burglary insurance policies that will vary because they would be based on the specific nature of the customer's business, on its precise location, and on its past claims record. In this suit, the court should: A. hold the statute unconstitutional, because it deprives the insurance company of its liberty or property without due process of law B. hold the statute unconstitutional, because it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce C. hold the statute constitutional, because it is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power D. abstain from ruling on the merits until the state courts have had an opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of the statute

C. hold the statute constitutional, because it is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power

The legislature of State X enacts a statute that it believes reconciles the state's interest in the preservation of human life with a woman's right to reproductive choice. That statute permits a woman to have an abortion on demand during the first trimester of pregnancy but prohibits a woman from having an abortion after that time unless her physician determines that the abortion is necessary to protect the woman's life or health. If challenged on constitutional grounds in an appropriate court, this statute will probably be held A. constitutional, because the state has made a rational policy choice that creates an equitable balance between the compelling state interest in protecting fetal life and the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive choice. B. constitutional, because recent rulings by the United States Supreme Court indicate that after the first trimester a fetus may be characterized as a person whose right to life is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. C. unconstitutional, because the state has, without adequate justification, placed an undue burden on the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive choice prior to fetal viability. D. unconstitutional, because a statute unqualifiedly permitting abortion at one stage of pregnancy, and denying it at another with only minor exceptions, establishes an arbitrary classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. unconstitutional, because the state has, without adequate justification, placed an undue burden on the fundamental right of a woman to reproductive choice prior to fetal viability.

Road Lines is an interstate bus company operating in a five-state area. A federal statute authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to permit interstate carriers to discontinue entirely any unprofitable route. Road Lines applied to the ICC for permission to drop a very unprofitable route through the sparsely populated Shaley Mountains. The ICC granted that permission even though Road Lines provided the only public transportation into the region. Foley is the owner of a mountain resort in the Shaley Mountains, whose customers usually arrived on vehicles operated by Road Lines. After exhausting all available federal administrative remedies, Foley filed suit against Road Lines in the trial court of the state in which the Shaley Mountains are located to enjoin the discontinuance by Road Lines of its service to that area. Foley alleged that the discontinuance of service by Road Lines would violate a statute of that state prohibiting common carriers of persons from abandoning service to communities having no alternate form of transportation. The state court should A) dismiss the action, because Foley lacks standing to sue. B) direct the removal of the case to federal court, because this suit involves a substantial federal question. C) hear the case on its merits and decide for Foley because, on these facts, a federal agency is interfering with essential state functions. D) hear the case on its merits and decide for Road Lines, because a valid federal law preempts the state statute on which Foley relies.

D) hear the case on its merits and decide for Road Lines, because a valid federal law preempts the state statute on which Foley relies.

A young prosecutor was assigned to a widely publicized murder case in which many people believed the police arrested an innocent person for the crime. After interviewing the defendant and reviewing the file, the prosecutor agreed with that opinion, and told her supervising attorney that she thought the defendant was innocent. The supervisor instructed the prosecutor to keep her opinions to herself, put on the best case she could, and let the jury decide the issue of guilt. At the first hearing of the case, the prosecutor told the judge that, in her opinion, the defendant was innocent. Immediately after the hearing, the supervisor fired the prosecutor for insubordination. After exhausting all administrative remedies available to her, the prosecutor filed suit in federal court, claiming that her firing violated the First Amendment because it was triggered by her expression of belief on a matter of public concern. How should the court rule? A. For the prosecutor, because a government employee cannot be fired for stating an opinion on a matter of public concern. B. For the prosecutor, because the prosecutor's right to comment on a matter of public concern in this case outweighs the government's interest in efficiency. C. For the government, because the courts give government employers wide deference whenever employees speak critically of government action. D. For the government, because the speech occurred while the employee was performing her official duties.

D. For the government, because the speech occurred while the employee was performing her official duties.

Shortly before taking the oath of office as President of the United States, Jeb Bartlett is sued for damages arising out of a car accident. According to the complaint, the accident occurred two months earlier when Bartlett lost control of his SUV. After assuming office, Bartlett promptly moves the trial court to halt discovery proceedings in the case. The asserted justification for the request is that, during the time in which a President is in office, the Constitution affords him "temporary immunity" from civil litigation arising out of events that occurred prior to assuming office. How is court likely to rule on the President's motion? A. Grant the motion, because the litigation relates to unofficial conduct. B. Grant the motion, because civil litigation carries with it the potential to distract the President from his constitutional responsibilities. C. Reject the motion, because Congressional silence on the matter should be construed as disapproval. D. Reject the motion, because the trial court retains the power to manage the case in such a way as to minimize the harm imposed on the President.

D. Reject the motion, because the trial court retains the power to manage the case in such a way as to minimize the harm imposed on the President.

The United States Department of Interior granted Concessionaire the food and drink concession in a federal park located in the state of New Senora. Concessionaire operated his concessions out of federally owned facilities in the park. The federal statute authorizing the Interior Department to grant such concessions provided that the grantees would pay only a nominal rental for use of these federal facilities because of the great benefits their concessions would provide to the people of the United States. The legislature of the state of New Senora enacted a statute imposing an occupancy tax on the occupants of the real estate within that state that is not subject to state real estate taxes. The statute was intended to equalize the state tax burden on such occupants with that on people occupying real estate that is subject to state real estate taxes. Pursuant to that statute, the New Senora Department of Revenue attempted to collect the state occupancy tax from Concessionaire because the federal facilities occupied by Concessionaire were not subject to state real estate taxes. Concessionaire sued to invalidate the state occupancy tax as applied to him. The strongest ground upon which Concessionaire could challenge the occupancy tax is that it violates the A. Commerce clause by unduly burdening the interstate tourist trade. B. Privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the fundamental right to do business on federal property. C. Equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the tax treats him less favorably than federal concessionaires in other states who do not have to pay such occupancy taxes. D. Supremacy clause of Article VI and the federal statute authorizing such concessions.

D. Supremacy clause of Article VI and the federal statute authorizing such concessions.

A state statute makes criminal all "speech-making, picketing, or distribution of leaflets of any sort in public libraries." A citizen upset about the library's recent decision to purchase adult-themed books stands in the lobby of a public library handing out leaflets and exhorting passersby to boycott the library. If the citizen is prosecuted for violation of the statute, which of the following best describes the applicable burden of proof? A. The state will have to show that there was a compelling need for the statute and that no less restrictive alternatives existed to meet that need. B. The state will have to show that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest and leaves open alternative channels of communication. C. The citizen will have to show that there was no compelling need for the statute and that less restrictive alternatives were available to accomplish the same goals. D. The citizen will have to show that there was no reasonable basis for enacting the statute.

D. The citizen will have to show that there was no reasonable basis for enacting the statute.

The Virginia state legislature recently enacted the Waste Control Act which provides: "No person shall bring into this state, or accept for disposal in this state, any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of this state." For years, the City of Mount Airy, North Carolina, has been dumping in Virginia garbage that can't be handled by its incinerators. A suit is brought in federal district court by the Mayor of Mount Airy to enjoin application of the Virginia Waste Control Act. The law will probably be held: A. Constitutional because it is a justifiable exercise of the Virginia's police powers. B. Constitutional under the 10th Amendment. C. Unconstitutional because it violates the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment. D. Unconstitutional because it discriminates against interstate commerce.

D. Unconstitutional because it discriminates against interstate commerce.

An ordinance of Central City requires every operator of a taxicab in the city to have a license and permits revocation of that license only for "good cause." The Central City taxicab operator's licensing ordinance conditions the issuance of such a license on an agreement by the licensee that the licensee "not display in or on his or her vehicle any bumper sticker or other placard or sign favoring a particular candidate for any elected municipal office." The ordinance also states that it imposes this condition in order to prevent the possible imputation to the city council of the views of its taxicab licensees and that any licensee who violates this condition shall have his or her license revoked. Driver, the holder of a Central City taxicab operator's license, decorates his cab with bumper stickers and other signs favoring specified candidates in a forthcoming election for municipal offices. A proceeding is initiated against him to revoke his taxicab operator's license on the sole basis of that admitted conduct. In this proceeding, does Driver have a meritorious defense based on the United States Constitution? A. No, because he accepted the license with knowledge of the condition and, therefore, has no standing to contest it. B. No, because a taxicab operator's license is a privilege and not a right and, therefore, is not protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. C. Yes, because such a proceeding threatens Driver with a taking of property, his license, without just compensation. D. Yes, because the condition imposed on taxicab operators' licenses restricts political speech based wholly on its content, without any adequate governmental justification.

D. Yes, because the condition imposed on taxicab operators' licenses restricts political speech based wholly on its content, without any adequate governmental justification.

The mineral alpha is added to bodies of fresh water to prevent the spread of certain freshwater parasites. The presence of those parasites threatens the health of the organisms living in rivers and streams throughout the country and imperils the freshwater commercial fishing industry. Alpha is currently mined only in the state of Blue. In order to raise needed revenue, Congress recently enacted a statute providing for the imposition of a $100 tax on each ton of alpha mined in the United States. Because it will raise the cost of alpha, this tax is likely to reduce the amount of alpha added to freshwater rivers and streams and, therefore, is likely to have an adverse effect on the interstate freshwater commercial fishing industry. The alpha producers in Blue have filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging this tax solely on constitutional grounds. Is this tax constitutional? A. No, because only producers in Blue will pay the tax and, therefore, it is not uniform among the states and denies alpha producers the equal protection of the laws. B. No, because it is likely to have an adverse effect on the freshwater commercial fishing industry and Congress has a responsibility under the clause to protect, foster, and advance such interstate industries. C. Yes, because the tax is a necessary and proper means of exercising federal authority over the navigable waters of the United States. D. Yes, because the power of Congress to impose taxes is plenary, this tax does not contain any provisions extraneous to tax needs or purposes, and it is not barred by any prohibitory language in the Constitution.

D. Yes, because the power of Congress to impose taxes is plenary, this tax does not contain any provisions extraneous to tax needs or purposes, and it is not barred by any prohibitory language in the Constitution.

The Housing Code of the city of Brook Hills limits the occupancy of all dwelling units to members of a single family. The Code defines "family" to mean a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the household or to his/her spouse living as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling, but limits that definition as follows: 1. husband or wife of the nominal head of the household; 2. married or unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or his/her spouse, provided that such children have no children of their own living with them; 3. father or mother of the nominal head of the household or his/her spouse. Jim lives in Brook Hills with his son Ike and Ike's two children, Jake and Edith. The city has informed Jim that Jake and Edith are illegal occupants of his home. In Jim's challenge to the constitutionality of the Code provision, a court most likely will find the provision: a. constitutional, because it furthers a permissible state objective. b. constitutional, under the state's police power. c. unconstitutional, because it violates the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. d. unconstitutional, because it constitutes a taking of Jim's property.

c. unconstitutional, because it violates the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.