Con Law: Civil Rights & Liberties Midterm

Sweatt v. Painter

The University of Texas Law School tried to set up a separate facility for African-American law students, but the Court ruled otherwise

Intermediate scrutiny test

Legislation is valid if it serves an important purpose and is substantially related to that purpose

Missouri Compromise (1820)

Land acquired by the Louisiana Purchase threatened to upset the delicate ratio between slave and non-slave states→ the Compromise admitted Missouri as a slave state but prohibited slavery in future states north of the 36º 30' line

Constraints that operate on the judiciary

a. Constitutional amendments b. Statutory reversals c. Changing the number of Justices (court packing) d. Withdrawing jurisdiction e. Noncompliance with court rulings

McCain-Feingold Act (2002)

AKA Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; prohibited the national political parties from raising and spending soft money (contributions to political parties for administrative costs and party-building activities)

Three-fifths formula

Article 1, § 2; representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states according to the formula

De facto vs. de jure segregation

De facto: in fact; resulting from "effect" De jure: by law; resulting from "intent"

Affirmative action

Differs from Title VII, in that it applies only to federal government contractors; it includes the provision that employers take "affirmative action" to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment in hiring and on the job

Amicus brief filed in Brown

Emphasized: a) The importance of civil rights transcends domestic politics b) The persistence of segregation in America undermines its claim to democratic values and provides an easy target for exploitation by communist nations

Shapiro v. Thompson (1969)

Facts A number of states, citing budgetary reasons, established a one-year waiting period before residents could qualify for welfare assistance. In this dispute, Thompson moved from Massachusetts to Connecticut and applied for welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Denied assistance, she sued the Commissioner of Welfare, Shapiro. Issue Does the imposition of a one-year residency requirement as a condition for receiving welfare assistance violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Held (Brennan) Yes. Appellants justify the one-year waiting period on the ground that people who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence are likely to become continuing burdens on state welfare programs. Although the Court recognizes that the state has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs, it holds that the requirement is not "well suited" to the state's interest. Furthermore, the statutory provisions constitute an unconstitutional interference with the *right of interstate travel*. Dissent (Warren) Congress, acting under one of its enumerated powers, may impose minimal nationwide residence requirements or authorize the states to do so.

Miller v. Johnson (1995)

Facts After the 1990 census increased the number of congressional seats in Georgia from ten to eleven, the state legislature prepared a districting plan that provided for two majority-black districts. The Justice Department refused to clear this plan, and the legislature eventually redrew the lines to provide for three black seats. Issue Whether the constitutionality of Georgia's racial gerrymandering requires the strict scrutiny standard of review. Held (Kennedy) Yes. "Just as the state may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches and schools, a state may not separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race." Even though the Eleventh District's redistricting plan was not any more irregular in its shape than other districts within the state, the racial redistricting plan is invalid for failing to pass strict scrutiny standards. Georgia failed to put forth a compelling interest for the racial redistricting plan, such as addressing the harms of past discrimination.

Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)

Facts After the Court decided in Baker v. Carr to accept jurisdiction in reapportionment cases, it had to determine whether judicial scrutiny would cover only malapportionment in state legislatures or in Congress as well. Georgia's Fifth congressional district had a population that was two to three times greater than the populations of other Georgia districts. Yet, each Georgia district was represented by one congressman in the House. Accordingly, Fifth district voters believed that their political voice was less, or "debased," when compared to other voters in Georgia. Issue Did Georgia's congressional districts violate the 14th Amendment or deprive citizens of the full benefit of their right to vote? Held (Black) Yes. Debasement of the right to vote as a result of a state congressional apportionment law is justiciable. The apportionment statute is invalid because it violates the requirement of Article 1, § 2 of the Constitution that the House shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states. Dissent (Harlan) The Constitution expressly provides that state legislatures and Congress have exclusive jurisdiction over problems of congressional apportionment of the type involved in the case. The Court is not only undertaking to exercise a power which the Constitution reserves to Congress but is also overruling congressional judgement expressed in previous statutes and legislative history.

Craig v. Boren (1976)

Facts An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Suit was brought against the state, alleging that the law constituted a gender-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Statistical evidence was offered in support of the discrimination based on gender and the state claimed the discrimination was substantially related to achieving the government's interest in traffic safety. Issue Does a statue denying the sale of alcohol to an individual based on gender violate the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held (Brennan) Yes. The appropriate standard of review of discrimination on the basis of gender is *intermediate scrutiny*. Boren claims the statute is related to achieving the government's goal of traffic safety through statistical evidence. Thus, the law serves an important government purpose; however, it fails to substantially relate to the achievement of that purpose. The evidence shows that .18% of females under the age of 21 are arrested for driving under the influence, in contrast 2% of males in the same age bracket are arrested. Although the difference is significant, it is not enough to justify a broad rule to prohibit the sale of alcohol to males and not females in the relevant age group. Furthermore, there is no evidence that has been offered to show the dangerousness of 3.2% alcohol use as opposed to alcohol generally. As a result, no justification exists and the Oklahoma law equates to a denial of Equal Protection to males between the ages of 18 and 20. Concurrence (Stevens) The Court adds an additional tier to the existing "two-tier" analysis (rational basis & strict scrutiny) of the Equal Protection Clause; however, there is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every state to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Dissent (Rehnquist) A rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender-based classification.

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

Facts Gratz was a Caucasian who was denied undergraduate admission to the University of Michigan. She sued the university under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The admissions office admitted students according to a point scale, which ranked applicants based on several factors such as standardized testing scores and academic achievements, but there was an additional 20 points added to an applicant belonging to an underrepresented minority. Held (Rehnquist) The university's admissions policy makes race the decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant. Although the admissions policy serves a compelling state interest (diversity of education), it is not narrowly tailored (not individualized). It thus fails to pass a *strict scrutiny* standard of review and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Shaw v. Reno (1993)

Facts As a result of the 1990 Census, North Carolina was entitled to a 12th seat in the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the state devised a redistricting plan that created one majority-black district. Under the VRA, the state had to get approval for any congressional redistricting plan. Upon seeking approval, the Attorney General objected to the fact that North Carolina had only one majority-black district despite blacks comprising 20% of the state's population. Therefore, North Carolina created a plan that resulted in two majority-black districts. The second district was strangely shaped to incorporate as many black voters as possible: It was approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider that the I-85 corridor. The Attorney General did not object to the revised plan. However, five white voters filed suit, alleging that the district lines were so dramatically irregular that they constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Issue Did the North Carolina voters raise a valid Equal Protection claim that the state created a racially gerrymandered congressional district? Held (O'Connor) Yes. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries and who have little in common with one another, but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance of political apartheid. When a district is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, the elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. Dissent (White) The creation of a majority-black district makes up for centuries of discrimination. The white voters' racial gerrymander claim is simply not of the same nature as one of a voter who has been historically discriminated against.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)

Facts By 1971, there had been little progress in desegregating public schools, despite the Supreme Court's historic decision in 1954. School boards were under pressure from the courts to come forward with desegregation plans now. Here the Court focuses on remedies available to federal district courts to produce a school system free of state-imposed segregation. James Swann and other black students challenged the desegregation plans of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district. Issue What is the scope of district court remedial authority? Held (Burger) Once a constitutional violation is found, the school board has an obligation to take steps to remedy both present de jure segregation and the present effects of past de jure segregation. The Court approved the following remedies: - Districtwide racial percentages may be implemented as "a starting point" - Redefining school district lines - Busing of children to schools not in their own neighborhoods - Single-race schools are NOT impermissible, but should be addressed with strict scrutiny

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966)

Facts By passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress acted against states that used various tests and devices to prevent blacks from registering and voting. The Act suspended literacy tests for a period of five years, required advanced federal approval of proposed changes to voting regulations (coverage applied to states with both a test/device & <50% of eligible voters registered to vote), and authorized the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners to oversee voter registrations. South Carolina filed suit to have the Act declared unconstitutional as an encroachment on states' rights. Issue Does the VRA violate the Constitution or exceed the scope of congressional authority? Held (Warren) No. § 2 of the 15th Amendment provides Congress with the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation" and thus provides it with "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting. Concurrence-Dissent (Black) The preclearance provisions violate state sovereignty and the principles of federalism. A justiciable controversy cannot arise from a desire by the government to "determine in advance what legislative provisions a state may enact or what constitutional amendments it may adopt." There are a number of due process violations here: a) Court issues an advisory opinion b) States are sent to trial in a distant forum c) This is a bill of attainder (declared guilty by Congress)

Citizens United v. FEC (2010)

Facts Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation that produced a documentary film critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton. Citizens United released the film and began running advertisements regarding the future release of the video on demand. Both the film and advertisements raised concerns under section 441(b) of the Act of 2002. Under the above section, it is a felony for all corporations either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election. The section states an exception for Political Action Committees (PAC) and permits the political speech of these groups, even when formed by corporations. Citizens United challenged the constitutionality of section 441(b) in terms of freedom of speech. Issue Does the section 441(b) prohibition on express advocacy by corporations within a specific period of time before an election violate the 1st Amendment right of freedom of speech? Held (Per Curiam) Yes. Precedent: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce-- 1st Amendment does not protect political speech by corporations→ overruled Permitting a corporation to politically speak under the guise of a PAC does not fulfill the 1st Amendment requirement of freedom of speech for corporations. The Court holds the rationale of the Austin Court to be unsound due to the fact that it is overly broad. Included are millions of corporations that do not possess large aggregations of wealth in addition to media corporations which are excluded from the Act's ban on political speech. As a result, the FEC's reliance on Austin in its argument against corporate political speech is rejected. The government's interest in preventing corruption does not outweigh the corporation's interest in free speech. In addition, there is no factual showing that corporate speech promotes corruption. Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part (Stevens) The majority is being activist and misreads the opinion in Austin as advocating a categorical ban on all corporate political speech. In the context of a public election, there is a substantial difference between corporate and human speakers. Corporations have limited liability for their owners and managers, perpetual life, separation of ownership and control, and may be foreign controlled.

Civil Rights Cases (1883)

Facts Congress passed the *Civil Rights Act of 1875* to extend to blacks the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations, including inns, transportation on and off water, theaters, and other places of amusement. The statute also provided penalties for anyone who denied these privileges to black people. Five cases were consolidated and decided by the court here. The question for the Court was whether the 13th and 14th Amendments prohibited only state action or private action as well. Issue Do the 13th and 14th Amendments empower Congress to legislate in matters of racial discrimination concerning the private sector? Held (Bradley) No. § 5 of the 14th Amendment empowers Congress only to enforce the prohibitions placed upon the states. Congress can regulate only "state action," not discrimination by private parties. Thus, § 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 are unconstitutional because they exceed Congress's authority under the 14th Amendment by purporting to regulate the conduct of private individuals. The Act likewise exceeds Congress's authority under the 13th Amendment, which bars involuntary servitude as well as the badges & incidents of slavery and is restricted to prohibiting ownership of slaves, not other forms of discriminatory conduct. Dissent (Harlan) The substance and spirit of the 13th and 14th Amendments have been sacrificed by the decision in this case. For centuries, the common law has prohibited private parties from acting in a discriminatory fashion toward travelers who need access to inns and restaurants. Furthermore, these private places of accommodation serve a *quasi-public* function.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)

Facts Dred Scott, a negro slave, belonged to Dr. Emerson, who in 1834 took him from Missouri to the free state of Illinois. In 1836 Dr. Emerson brought Dred Scott to a military post in the territory known as upper Louisiana, situated north of 36º 30' line. In 1838 they returned to Missouri. Dred Scott and his wife and two daughters were later sold to John Sanford. Dred Scott brought suit, claiming that as a result of his stay in free territory he was a citizen of Missouri capable of suing for his freedom. Issue Is a person who was born a slave and later taken by his owner to live in a free state with the intent of becoming a permanent resident considered a citizen of the United States? Held (Taney) No. At the time the Constitution was drafted, African Americans were viewed as an inferior race not entitled to constitutional rights and freedoms. The Court held that regardless of its opinion on the classification, their role is not to judge the policy but interpret the application of the Constitution: "No one supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, should induce the Court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted." Taney employed an *originalist interpretation* of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court stated that just because someone is a citizen of a certain state, they are not entitled to all the same protections as a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, Taney held that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional; Congress was not empowered to pass legislation to exclude slavery from lands that were not included in the territories belonging to the U.S. at the time of constitutional ratification. Dissent (McLean) The requirements to bring suit are not the same as those required to vote and participate in civil society. Several states-slave and free-have admitted persons of color to the right of suffrage, and in this view have recognized them as citizens. Furthermore, the Court has no business deciding whether Congress is empowered to exclude slavery from certain states.

San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973)

Facts Elementary and secondary schools in Texas are financed by state and local contributions. In this case, almost half of the revenues came from the state in order to provide a basic minimum for schools. Supplemental funds were derived from a property tax adopted by each school district. A class action was brought on behalf of schoolchildren from members of poor families, who claimed that the Texas system of relying on local property taxes favored the more affluent neighborhoods and violated the Equal Protection Clause. Issue Does the Texas system violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Held (Powell) No. "Where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." This is not a proper case in which to examine a state's laws under standards of strict judicial scrutiny. This case rather merits a *rational basis* standard of review since the Texas system is not found to disadvantage any suspect class nor does it impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right or liberty. Furthermore, this Court lacks specialized knowledge with regards to educational policy and has no place interfering with local fiscal policy. Reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various states; the Court's intervention would undermine the principles of federalism and the separation of powers. Dissent (Brennan) Education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the 1st Amendment. This being so, any classification affecting education must be subjected to strict scrutiny.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995)

Facts Federal agency contracts contain a subcontractor compensation clause, giving a prime contractor a financial incentive to hire subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Adarand, a non-certified construction company managed by a white person, submitted the lowest bid on a federal highway project. When it lost out to a certified competitor who had submitted a higher bid, Adarand alleged that this happened only because the subcontractor compensation clause in federal agency contracts favored contractors who were members of racial minorities. Such preferences, Adarand alleged, violated the *equal protection component of the 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause*. Issue Does the 5h Amendment's guarantee of equal protection require the federal government's racial classifications to withstand strict scrutiny? Held (O'Connor) Yes. All racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass *strict scrutiny* review. Compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards; however, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. There are three propositions with respect to governmental racial classifications: - Skepticism - Consistency - Congruence Concurrence (Thomas) The subcontractor compensation clause and other similar programs "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are entitled to preferences."

Cooper v. Aaron (1958)

Facts Federal courts approved a plan of gradual desegregation of the races in the public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas to admit black children to a previously all-white high school. The state legislature and Governor Faubus opposed the plan, leading to threats of mob violence. John Aaron, a black student prevented from attending the high school, filed suit. Issue Can a state be allowed to postpone implementation of a Supreme Court order because of defiant actions of the State's Governor and Legislature? Held No. The unanimous Court fully understood the dilemma of the School Board. It knew that the School Board was trying to implement the Court's desegregation plan in good faith. However, it was also aware that the Arkansas governor and the legislature were doing everything in their power to openly defy the Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling. The Governor and Legislature are wrong to think that they are not bound by the Court's decision in Brown. The Constitution is the "supreme law of the land," and the states are bound to follow the Supreme Court's authority to say what the law is.

Richmond v. Croson Co. (1989)

Facts Following the precedent established by Congress and upheld by the Court in Fullilove, the city of Richmond, Virginia, adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan requiring government supported construction contractors to set aside 30% of its subcontracts to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs). The Plan defined an MBE as a business from anywhere in the country at least 51% of which is owned and controlled by black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens. Issue Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Held (O'Connor) Yes. That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society wide discrimination (as in Fullilove) does not mean that the states/cities are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate. The Richmond law cannot withstand *strict scrutiny*. The Court found that there was no compelling governmental interest because Richmond failed to identify the need for remedial action; generalized assertions of past racial discrimination do not justify *rigid racial quotas* for the awarding of public contracts. Furthermore, none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. The Court found that the business plan was not narrowly tailored because it gave minorities who just moved to Richmond (who had never been discriminated against) the same bonus as long-time residents who could (theoretically) show that they had been the victims of past discrimination. Furthermore, "it may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen. This random inclusion of racial groups suggests that the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination." The Court found that the business plan did not use the least restrictive means possible because Richmond failed to make a showing that other non-discriminatory means would be insufficient. Concurrence (Scalia) Racial discrimination should not be used to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Facts Grutter was a Caucasian who was denied admission to the University of Michigan's Law School. The law school's admissions policy used a flexible assessment of applicants' talents, experiences, and the contribution they make to the diversity of the overall class. Applicants were evaluated individually with no guaranteed admissions for anyone, even those with the highest test scores. The policy gave substantial weight to the ability of an applicant to contribute to the diversity of the class, but it defined diversity very broadly to include not only race and ethnicity but also such things as economic class, talents and unusual life experiences. As to race and ethnicity, it sought to ensure a *"critical mass"* of students from underrepresented groups. Issue Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Held (O'Connor) No. The law school's admissions policy passes the *strict scrutiny* standard of review. First, the law school has a compelling interest in enrolling a diverse student body: attaining a diverse student body leads to cross-racial understanding and prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce. Second, the law school's use of race is narrowly tailored: Its policy does not amount to a racial quota but rather engages in an *individualized, holistic review* of each applicant. This individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way, unlike Gratz. Dissent The phrase "critical mass" amounts to an unconstitutional racial quota.

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966)

Facts Harper and other Virginia residents brought this action to have Virginia's poll tax declared unconstitutional. Issue Does the poll tax violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Held (Douglas) Yes. Once the ability to vote in state elections is created, the state may not establish standards that invidiously discriminate in violation of the 14th Amendment. A person's wealth or ability to pay a tax has no relation to his qualifications as a voter. Dissent (Black) There should be a stricter adherence to precedent and the text of the 14th Amendment. (Harlan) The poll tax passes the rational basis test: the state has a legitimate interest in collecting revenue, and it is reasonable to think that people who are willing to pay to vote will have a greater interest in directing the course of state policy.

Colegrove v. Green (1946)

Facts Illinois voters objected to the disparity in population sizes among the state's congressional districts (9:1 rural vs. urban vote). It had been four decades since the state had redrawn its districts even though there had been significant population shifts during that time period. The voters alleged that the congressional districts lacked compactness of territory and approximate equality of population. Issue Can federal courts decide inherently political questions? Held (Frankfurter) No. The Illinois voters are asking this Court to decide a political question, which the political branches have the constitutional authority to resolve. Moreover, the political branches are in a better position to offer a solution. Thus, the "courts ought not to enter this political thicket" if there is no good judicial remedy. Dissent The complaint presents a justiciable case and controversy. The appellants have standing to sue, since the facts show that they have been injured as individuals.

Plyler v. Doe (1982)

Facts In 1975 Texas revised its education laws to withhold state education funds from children who were not "legally admitted" to the United States. It authorized school districts to deny admission or charge tuition to students who could not prove their legal status. Issue Is it a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to deny a free public education to undocumented school-age children? Held (Brennan) Yes. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall deny "any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Accordingly, an undocumented child is a "person" who is "within the jurisdiction" of the state of Texas. Therefore, that child is entitled to equal protection of the laws of Texas. Further, "education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests. Illiteracy is an enduring disability." Putting undocumented children at an educational disadvantage would be unjust particularly because the children are in the country illegally through no fault of their own. Brennan employed a *hybrid test* here under which Texas bears the burden of proof. No record evidence indicates that excluding undocumented children from school would save Texas any educational resources or have any impact on illegal immigration at the border. Concurrence (Marshall) Education is a *fundamental right*. Thus, a strict scrutiny test should have been employed. Dissent (Burger) "The Constitution does not constitute us as 'platonic guardians.' We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today." Further, the "Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons," and Texas had a legitimate reason to distinguish between individuals who were residing in the country with and without legal permission.

Rostker v. Goldberg (1981)

Facts In 1980, Congress reactivated the registration process for military service but denied President Carter the authority he requested to permit the registration and conscription of women as well as men. After Carter ordered the registration of specified groups of young men under the Military Selective Service Act, several men, including Goldberg, brought a lawsuit challenging the statute's constitutionality. Issue May the federal government require only males to register with the Selective Service? Held (Rehnquist) Yes. Courts have very little competence in the area of war and the military. Thus, the decisions of the legislative and executive branches are given great deference. The purpose of registration is to prepare for a draft of combat troops. *Since women are excluded from combat, they are not "similarly situated" for the purposes of draft registration*. Congress's decision to exempt women from registration was not the "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females" and thus did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.

Brown II (1955)

Facts In Brown I, the Court held that racial discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional. Having announced the constitutional principle, the Court had to issue instructions on the means used to implement its ruling. Held (Warren) School authorities have the primary responsibility of desegregating their schools "*with all deliberate speed*." The courts will then determine whether the action of the school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for future hearings, the district courts which originally heard the cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. The courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start towards full compliance with Brown I. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. *The burden rests on the school authorities* to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest.

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)

Facts In Brown, the Court struck down "separate but equal" public schools in the states, relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. What was to be done about segregated schooling in the District of Columbia, which is not subject to the 14th Amendment? The Court could invoke the 5th Amendment, which did apply to D.C., but the 5th Amendment lacks an Equal Protection Clause. Bolling and other students from a junior high school brought this action against Sharpe and the other members of the D.C. Board of Education. Issue Does segregation of the public schools in the District of Columbia violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Held (Warren) Yes. *The concepts of "due process" and "equal protection," while not synonymous, are not mutually exclusive*. They both stem from the American notion of fairness. Accordingly, racial segregation is so unjustifiable that it violates not only equal protection but due process as well. Further, segregation in public schools is not reasonably related to any legitimate governmental objective.

Reynolds v. Sims (1964)

Facts In this case, the Court faces the question whether the principle of equal representation applies to both houses of a state legislature, or whether one house-following the federal model (the Senate)-may be apportioned on a basis other than population. Under the state constitution, each county was entitled to at least one state representative, no matter how small the population. Although the state constitution required that the legislature be apportioned every ten years, the last apportionment was based on the 1900 census. Sims and other Alabama voters brought suit to challenge the apportionment of the state legislature as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Issue Does the Equal Protection Clause require a State to have substantially equal representation by population in both houses of a bicameral legislature? Held (Warren) Yes. Dilution of a person's vote infringes on his or her right of suffrage. "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres." Therefore, having some votes weigh less than others just because of where a person lives violates equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, both houses in a state's bicameral legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply because one of Alabama's proposed apportionment plans resembles the federal set up does not mean that such a system is appropriate in a state legislature. The reason for a non-population-based federal Senate has more to do with a compromise that allowed for the creation of a national government. Any one state does not have such issues. Dissent (Harlan) The history of the Equal Protection Clause has nothing to do with a state's choice in how to apportion their legislatures. This ruling has the effect of "placing basic aspects of state political systems under the pervasive overlordship of the federal judiciary."

Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991)

Facts Johnson Controls, a manufacturer of batteries, prohibited fertile women from working in jobs that would expose them to lead and possible health hazards to the fetus a woman might conceive. The question for the Court was whether the company's policy was barred by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended the sex discrimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Issue Does Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy constitute sex discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Held (Blackmun) Yes. Even *well-intentioned* proposals are not permissible if they are discriminatory. Despite evidence about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the harms that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees. Its policy is *facially discriminatory* because it requires only a female employee to produce proof that she is not capable of reproducing. Furthermore, this discrimination cannot be justified as a *BFOQ*. Discrimination under the safety exception to the BFOQ is allowed only in narrow circumstances. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn child, Johnson Controls furnishes no proof that it detracts from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks. Concurrence (White) A fetal protection policy would be justified if an employer showed that "exclusion of women from certain jobs was reasonably necessary to avoid *substantial tort liability*."

Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987)

Facts Johnson, a male employee, was passed over for promotion to the position of road dispatcher. Instead the Transportation Agency selected a female employee, Diane Joyce. Both were rated as well qualified for the job, but Joyce was picked in part because the Agency took into account her gender as a factor. Johnson filed suit on the ground that the Agency had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Issue Did the Agency impermissibly take into account the sex of the applicants in the promotion process and subsequently violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Held (Brennan) No. The Santa Clara County Transportation Agency adopted an affirmative action plan in December of 1978, after noticing that the agency's higher positions were disproportionately filled by white males. The plan would consider race and gender as relevant factors-but not the only factors-in evaluating each case for hiring or promotion. No quotas were established, and no positions were set aside exclusively for women or minorities. The Court ruled that the Agency's program was a temporary one that did not make it impossible for males to advance. It allowed for gender to be one factor in evaluating an applicant, but female applicants still needed to meet the same experience and skill requirements as men to be competitive candidates. Dissent (Scalia) The Court converts Title VII from a guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment determinations, to a guarantee that they will.

Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court (1981)

Facts Michael M., a 17-year-old male, was charged with violating California's "statutory rape" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." He sued on the ground that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since it made men alone criminally liable for such conduct. Issue Does California's statutory rape law unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender? Held (Rehnquist) No. California's statutory rape law is sufficiently related to the state's objectives to pass a *rational basis test*. "Because virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, the legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. The risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males." Dissent (Stevens) Since both parties are equally guilty of the conduct, it is perversely partial for the State to only punish a single party. It is irrational to exempt 50% of potential violators.

Bradwell v. State (1873)

Facts Myra Bradwell, a resident of Illinois, applied to the judges of the Illinois Supreme Court for a license to practice law. It rejected her application. In taking her case to the Supreme Court, she asserted that she was entitled to the license by virtue of the *privileges and immunities* guaranteed to U.S. citizens under the 14th Amendment. Issue Does the 14th Amendment provide that one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens is to engage in any profession? Held (Miller) No. There are privileges and immunities belonging to U.S. citizens that a state is forbidden to abridge; however, the right of admission to practice in the courts of a state is not one of these privileges and immunities. Concurrence (Bradley) Historically the right to engage in every profession has not been one of the established fundamental privilege and immunities of the sex. The law has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. The harmony of interests and views that belong to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from her husband. The paramount destiny of women is to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.

Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)

Facts Private agreements, known as restrictive covenants, were used in Missouri to prevent blacks from owning property. The Kraemers, a couple in the neighborhood subject to the terms of the restrictive covenant, brought suit to prevent the Shelleys, a black couple, from taking possession of property. Issue Does judicial enforcement by state courts of the terms of restrictive covenants violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Held (Vinson) Yes. The restrictive covenants acting alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment; however, a state court enforcing such an agreement constitutes *state action* and is thus prohibited.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

Facts Respondent Allan Bakke, a white applicant, applied to the medical school at UC Davis two years in a row and was rejected both times. The University's admissions process included a regular admissions program and a special admissions program. There was room for 100 new students each year, and 16 of those seats were reserved for special admissions students. The special admissions program was the school's affirmative action program meant for economically or educationally disadvantaged applicants, and members of a minority group, including Black, Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian candidates. Bakke's college GPA and test scores were higher than any of the special admissions students admitted in the two years that Bakke applied and was rejected. Issue Was the school's special admissions program constitutional? Can race be considered a factor in the admissions process? Held (Powell) No. Classifications based on race call for a *strict scrutiny* analysis. The goal of achieving a diverse student body is compelling enough to allow race to be considered as a factor in admissions decisions. However, the special admissions program was not necessary to achieve that goal, because it foreclosed consideration to applicants like Bakke and implemented a *quota*. Accordingly, the special admission program violated the Equal Protection Clause. Concurrence (Marshall) Race should be considered when making admissions decisions, and the school's special admission program does not violate the Constitution because it is meant to remedy the effects of a legacy of discrimination. Thus, race should be allowed as a single determining factor.

Milliken v. Bradley (1974)

Facts Ronald Bradley and other parents and students in Detroit, Michigan, brought a class action suit against Governor Milliken. They alleged that the Detroit public school system was racially segregated as a result of the official policies and actions of state and city officials. A district court ordered both the creation of a Detroit-only desegregation plan, and desegregation plan that encompassed the surrounding three-county metropolitan area. Even though there was no claim that the schools in the surrounding metropolitan area had a segregation problem in their school systems, the district court adopted a plan for desegregation that encompassed 53 of the 85 school districts surrounding Detroit as well as the Detroit school district itself. Issue Can a federal court impose a multi-district remedy when there is only evidence of a single district engaging in activities that perpetuated segregation in schools? Held (Burger) No. In essence, the evidence showed that the segregation problem was only in Detroit. Therefore, the district court went too far in fashioning a remedy that included other districts, where there was no evidence of segregation policies in those schools. The lower courts were wrong in the following ways: 1. Local control of school districts has some importance, thus a multi-district remedy cannot simply ignore district lines. 2. A multi-district remedy dramatically alters the way education is provided in the state, and it improperly puts the district court in the position of legislative authority and school superintendent rolled into one. The court is not qualified for those roles and, in turn, it takes away local control, which is where school decisions should really be made. 3. Before including other districts in a remedy, there should be a showing that the offending district has some effect on perpetuating segregation in those other districts. Dissent (Douglas) The inner core of Detroit is predominantly black, and that area of the city is likely to be poorer. The Court's decision now makes sure that the schools in Detroit will not only be separate, but inferior. (White) While the Court acknowledges the federal court's obligation to fashion a remedy, it cripples its ability to perform the task by holding that segregation remedies must stop at the school district line. Undue administrative inconvenience is not enough to justify halting a desegregation remedy. (Marshall) The Court strips the Equal Protection Clause of its meaning. The rights at issue are too fundamental to be abridged on something so superficial as school district lines. The state of Michigan has created segregated schools in Detroit, and now the state has an obligation to remove all vestiges of racial segregation. That cannot be done without involving the districts outside of Detroit.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007)

Facts School districts in Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County, Kentucky, voluntarily adopted school assignment plans that relied on race in order to maintain integrated schools. Seattle classified children as white and non-white for the purposes of assignment and used this classification as a "tiebreaker" to allocate slots in particularly popular high schools. Jefferson County, which had been under a court-ordered desegregation plan, adopted its plan after the district court released it from the earlier decree. Parents, whose children were affected by the plans, sued, arguing that the use of race in the assignment plans violated the 14th Amendment. Issue Whether a public school that has not operated a legally segregated school or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. Held (Roberts) No. The burden rests on the state concerning issues that deal with race. Racial balancing is not transformed from patently unconstitutional to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it racial diversity. Thus, the assignment plans should be the subject of *strict scrutiny*. The only interests recognized by this court are (1) to remedy past intentional discrimination and (2) to achieve exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. As to the first interest, Seattle has never been ordered to desegregate and Jefferson County has since become unitary so the need is no longer present here. As to the second interest, both schools separate the students based on specific racial demographics and not based on the diversity of the individual. Dissent (Breyer) The majority opinion ignores the context of the case and announces legal rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and it undermines Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary education that local communities have sought to make a reality.

Smith v. Allwright (1944)

Facts The Democratic party of Texas adopted in a state convention a resolution permitting only white citizens of the state to participate in the Democratic primary. Lonnie Smith, a black voter, sued for damages. Issue Can a person be excluded from voting in a primary election on account of race? Held (Reed) No. The 14th and 15th Amendments are clear that no citizen should be denied the right to vote because of race. Although the county officials in this case argue that the Democratic party is a voluntary, non-governmental organization, the Court believes they are State actors for purposes of primary elections. Thus, the State permitting the Democratic party to allow only white voters to participate in the Democratic primary constitutes *state action* in violation of the 15th Amendment. The Court thus overrules Grovey v. Townsend which previously held that political parties are not state actors. Dissent (Roberts) The Court was wrong to overturn the recent decision in Grovey. The Court's reputation for stability and consistency is challenged if decisions can so easily be overruled.

Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980)

Facts The congressional spending program in dispute, the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act, required that 10 percent of the federal funds granted for local public works projects be used by grantees to procure services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by members of minority groups. Construction contractors sought to enjoin enforcement of the MBE provision, alleging that they sustained economic injury and that the MBE provision violated, on its face, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment. Issue Is there a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment due to a statute's provision pertaining to the minority business enterprises? Held (Burger) No. The spending power allows Congress to "provide for the general welfare" and the MBE provision does just that. What's more, Congress could have drawn on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of contractors on federally funded projects. Further, in attempting to right past discrimination, Congress need not act in a wholly "color-blind" fashion. Even though groups are receiving preferential treatment under the law, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated because the preferential treatment is necessary to boost the opportunities of those groups. The majority exercised a *rational basis test*. Dissent (Stewart) The majority's ruling is wrong for the same reason that Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong. Any time a law concerns race, the Court should exercise strict scrutiny. (Stevens) Even if we assume that each minority group has suffered its own special injury at some time in our history, surely it does not follow that each of those subclasses suffered harm of identical magnitude.

Shelby County v. Holder (2013)

Facts The coverage formula instituted by § 4 of the VRA of 1965, requiring states with a history of discrimination to receive preclearance from the Attorney General or a federal court of three judges, was challenged by Shelby County. This case raised the question whether the conditions that existed in 1965 still prevailed to justify the decision of Congress in 2006 to reauthorize this preclearance procedure for another 25 years. Issue Is the coverage formula defined in § 4 of the VRA facially unconstitutional? Held (Roberts) Yes. The burdens imposed by the Act must be justified by current needs. In 1966, the Court upheld the Act based upon exceptional conditions present at that time. The coverage formula made sense under those conditions and was rational in both practice and theory. Now, things have changed dramatically. Voter turnout and registration in covered jurisdictions have grown and African American turnout is almost equal to white voter turnout. While the Act is likely the reason for many of these changes, it has not been updated to reflect them. § 4 must be analyzed in light of current conditions. The coverage formula in use today is based on decades-old data and practices no longer in use. § 4 thus is unconstitutional and must be struck down. The other provisions of the Act remain. Dissent (Ginsburg) Congress created a record establishing current examples of discrimination before reauthorizing the Act in 2006. Congress must be given substantial deference in enforcing the 14th and 15th Amendments. So long as the means used is rational, the Court may not question whether it is wise and substitute its judgment for Congress.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)

Facts The owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, who refused to accept black customers, filed suit, alleging that the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constituted an invalid exercise of Congress's constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. The owner also claimed that the title violated the 5th Amendment's guarantees of due process and just compensation for the taking of private property because it deprived him of the right to choose his customers and that it violated the 13th Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude because it compelled him to rent rooms to blacks. Issue Was Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority? Held (Clark) a) The Commerce Clause gives Congress authority in this case. The movement of persons between the states is "commerce," and racial discrimination has a disruptive effect on that interstate commerce. Furthermore, the appellant solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia in the form of magazines and billboards, it is positioned near two interstate highways, and 75% of its guests are from out of state. b) The Motel owner's other constitutional arguments are unavailing. The Act mandating equal access to public businesses does not deprive the appellant of liberty or property. Also, the notion that business owners would invoke the 13th Amendment "involuntary servitude" language that ended slavery in order to discriminate against African Americans is not worthy of consideration. c) Test: rational basis

Bush v. Gore (2000)

Facts The presidential election of 2000 was one of closest elections in US history. Although Gore won the popular vote, the outcome of the election was dependent upon the 25 electoral votes from the state of Florida. After the deadline passed for counting votes and no winner was determined from Florida's electoral votes, Gore relied on a Florida statute to request a manual recount of the Florida votes. The Supreme Court issued a stay on the manual recount after the Florida Supreme Court ordered canvassing boards to determine the standards for judging the "clear indication of the intent of the voter." Issue Does the use of manual recounts, absent any standard, violate the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held (Per Curiam) Yes. Here, the counting dispute is driven by the procedure of voting with a ballot machine designed to record votes by perforating each ballot by a stylus. In some cases, a portion of the ballot remained hanging or merely indented rather than fully perforated. The Court held that the Florida Supreme Court's ruling for a manual recount is abstract and standardless and fails to satisfy the minimum requirements for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right of voting. Formulation of uniform rules determining intent based on recurring circumstances is practical and necessary. Application of different standards would result in impermissible inequality in the treatment of votes. Concurrence (Rehnquist) In addition to the majority's decision, grounds exist for invalidating the Florida Supreme Court's decision on account of its violation of the Safe Harbor provision, which requires that a state's determination of electors in a presidential election is final if decided prior to election day. In Florida, the electors were determined after the election day. Thus, the Court is not disrespecting the Florida Supreme Court but is rather deferring to the Florida state legislature, which previously determined electors in accordance with the safe harbor provision. Dissent (Breyer and Souter) Both agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Supreme Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake; thus, an appropriate remedy would be instead to remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court. Additionally, the state Supreme Court was the only court qualified to hear the claim because Bush sought relief on the interpretation of state law, not federal law. (Ginsburg and Stevens) For reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. The Supreme Court rarely rejects an outright interpretation of state law by a state court as it did here. "Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."--Stevens

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Facts This case involved a Louisiana law, enacted in 1890, that required separate railway cars for whites and blacks. Homer A. Plessy, one-eighth black, was arrested for attempting to sit in a railroad coach reserved for whites. Issue Is a state law providing for separate railway cars for African Americans and Caucasians valid without violating the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held (Brown) Yes. "A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races." Although the 14th Amendment was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. The legislature cannot force desegregation to encourage race equality because it must occur organically. In other words, the law does not impose social equality; the Court may only enforce political equality. Furthermore, laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. If the law "stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority," it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the state's police powers. Dissent (Harlan) "*The Constitution is color-blind*: it neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." The underlying reason for a separate railway car is obviously a belief by the Louisiana legislature that African Americans are an inferior race.

Personnel Administrator of Mass v. Feeney (1979)

Facts Under a Massachusetts statute, all honorably discharged veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveteran. Feeney, a woman who was not a veteran, passed a number of competitive civil service examinations but was ranked below male veterans who had lower test scores. Issue Did the law discriminate against women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? Held (Stewart) No. The law was enacted to serve legitimate purposes and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefited from the scheme, veteran status is not uniquely male. Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women. Dissent (Marshall) There are a number of less discriminatory means by which Massachusetts could achieve its compensatory purposes (i.e. a point preference system or an absolute preference for a limited duration).

United States v. Virginia (1996)

Facts Virginia Military Institute (VMI) operated as the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning. The United States sued VMI on the ground that the school's exclusively male admission policy violated the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. To remedy the constitutional problem, Virginia proposed a parallel program for women: Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL). Issue (1) Does the Virginia Military Institute's policy excluding women violate the Equal Protection Clause? (2) Does establishing a new school specifically for women remedy the violation? Held (Ginsburg) (1) Yes. The Court set out that the gender classification must be reviewed under a *heightened scrutiny* level of review, under which the government must provide an *exceedingly persuasive justification* for implementing gender-based classifications. Here, Virginia has failed to show a persuasive justification for the exclusion of women from its leadership program. The Court rejects the school's argument that constructing a single-sex school furthers the important government purpose of keeping diverse public education institutions. In addition, the school argued that the adversative method of training provides educational benefits which cannot be made to women without modification. The school fails to state a reason as to why their goal of training competent leaders cannot extend to women. (2) No. The Court further points out that the school created specifically for women is substandard when compared to the men's program; VWIL would receive a smaller endowment and its students would not be exposed to the same alumni network. Dissent (Scalia) The majority's decision disregards the factual findings of two lower courts, precedent, and history.

Exceptions Clause

Gives Congress plenary power to determine the Court's appellate jurisdiction Leading case: Ex parte McCardle-- Congress withdrew the Court's jurisdiction to review circuit court judgements on habeas corpus actions

Lilly Ledbetter

Ledbetter filed a claim against Goodyear Tire for pay discrimination on grounds of gender, and the Supreme Court held that, to comply with statute of limitations, she should have filed her charge within 180 days after the allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made→ Congress performed a statutory reversal to ensure that employees in the future would not be undermined by the ruling in Ledbetter

Strict scrutiny

Legislation is valid if it achieves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to satisfy that interest

Rational basis test

Legislation is valid if the legislature's purpose is legitimate and the law is rationally related to that purpose

Enforcement Act of 1870

Passed in the same year that the 15th Amendment was ratified; banned the use of terror, force or bribery to prevent people from voting because of their race

The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974

Placed limits on contributions and expenditures, created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the law, and provided optional public funding for presidential elections

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)

Precedent: Reed v. Reed-- the Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates→ the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional Facts Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, sought increased allowances for quarters and housing and medical benefits for her husband on the ground that he was her "dependent." The law provided that wives of servicemen automatically were treated as dependents, but husbands of servicewomen were not dependents unless they depended on their wives for more than one-half their support. Lt. Frontiero and her husband brought suit on the ground that the congressional statute deprived servicewomen of due process under the 5th Amendment. Issue Did the congressional statute violate the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment by having different requirements for military spousal benefits based on whether the serviceperson was male or female? Held (Brennan) Yes. The government's interest in administrative convenience cannot justify discriminatory practices. Sex is tied to the accident of birth, is immutable, and is subject to invidious and pernicious discrimination. Thus, classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to *strict scrutiny*. Concurrence (Powell) It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification. The Equal Rights Amendment has been approved by Congress and is waiting for ratification by the states; therefore, the Court is acting prematurely and unnecessarily and not allowing the issue to be resolved through the normal democratic process.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Prohibits employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin

Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854)

Repealed the Missouri Compromise and left the decision of slavery to the new territories (and future states), a policy known as the doctrine of congressional noninterference or "popular sovereignty"

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Synopsis Rule of Law A unanimous Court in this case resolved that the "separate but equal" doctrine has no place in the field of education. Facts Linda Brown and other plaintiffs were denied admission into a public school attended by white children. Brown claimed that the segregation deprived minority children of equal protection under the 14th Amendment. Brown filed a class action, consolidating cases from Virginia, South Carolina, Delaware and Kansas against the Board of Education in a federal district court in Kansas. Issue Does the segregation on the basis of race in public schools deprive minority children of equal educational opportunities, violating the 14th Amendment? Held (Warren) Yes. At the time the 14th Amendment was enacted, almost no African American children were receiving an education. As such, trying to determine the historical intentions surrounding the 14th Amendment is not helpful. Over the past few years, public education has turned into one of the most valuable public services both state and local governments have to offer. Since education has a heavy bearing on the future success of each child, the opportunity to be educated must be equal to each student. Segregated education has a profound and detrimental effect on the hearts and minds of children. Social science studies showed that segregated students felt less motivated, inferior and have a lower standard of performance than non-minority students.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

Synopsis Rule of Law Aliens are "persons" entitled to protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Facts San Francisco enacted an ordinance that made it illegal to operate a laundry that was not constructed of stone or brick without the consent of the board of supervisors. The board of supervisors granted licenses to operate to eighty white owners but denied licenses to two hundred Chinese owners. Issue May a race-neutral law be found to violate the 14th Amendment when it is enforced in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner? Held (Matthews) Yes. Even if the law is impartial on its face, "if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." A law may be deemed unconstitutional on its face OR as applied; in this case it is unconstitutional based on its application.

Buckley v. Valeo (1976)

Synopsis Rule of Law The Court concluded that the restrictions on contributions were legitimate means to accomplish the purpose of combating campaign corruption, but held that the limits on expenditures violated the 1st Amendment. Facts In response to the scandals uncovered by the Watergate affair, Congress rewrote campaign finance laws to impose stricter limits on contributions and expenditures. Issue Do federal limits on specific political expenditures from different sources violate the 1st Amendment? Held (Per Curiam) Yes. The limitation on the amount to be contributed towards a candidate or political committee is only a marginal restriction on the contributor's free speech. This contribution serves as a general expression of support, not a communication of the basis for the contributor's support. As a result, the limitations on individual contributions are constitutional. However, a restriction on the total a person or group may spend during a campaign on political communications reduces the quantity of expression because it restricts the number of issues discussed, the size of the audience, and the depth of research into the issues. Since the FECA provisions equate to a substantial restraint on both the quantity and diversity of political speech, they violate the 1st Amendment. Dissent (White) Limiting self-expenditures by a candidate helps to ensure that only individuals with "a modicum of support from others will be viable candidates." These limitations also tend to equalize access to the political arena, encouraging the less wealthy to run for political office.

Mobile v. Bolden (1980)

Synopsis Rule of Law The Voting Rights Act of 1965 only prohibits states from purposefully discriminating against the rights of black voters. There has to be an *intent* on the part of the states to abridge voting rights. Facts Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action against the city on behalf of all black citizens in the city. They alleged that the practice of electing city commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of blacks in violation of the 14th and 15th Amendments. Issue Does the at-large voting system violate the 14th and 15th Amendments? Held (Stewart) No. The purpose of the 15th Amendment is to protect an individual's right to vote. Thus, proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary element of a 15th Amendment claim. Moreover, multimember legislative districts are not unconstitutional on their face and only violate the 14th Amendment if they operate as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination. Facially neutral actions are unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes. Dissent (Marshall) A standard based solely upon the motives of official decision-makers creates a significant burden of proof for plaintiffs. Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to allow plaintiffs to show discrimination solely on the *effects* of a voting plan

Baker v. Carr (1962)

Synopsis Rule of Law This case opened the door to the *"one person, one vote"* rule for reapportionment. Facts Under the Tennessee Constitution, legislative districts were required to be drawn every ten years. The purpose was to adjust to changes in the state's population. Baker brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the state had not been redistricted since 1901. The weight of rural votes superseded that of urban votes and thus denied Baker equal protection under the law. Issue Is an equal protection challenge to a malapportionment of state legislatures considered a non-justiciable political question? Held (Brennan) No. 14th Amendment Equal Protection issues raised by Baker and other cases merit judicial evaluation. Brennan defines issues that constitute political questions: - Respect for other coequal branches of government (here, the Court is not dealing with a coequal branch) - Dates of war - Recognition of indian tribes - International scandal/embarrassment Dissent (Frankfurter) The ultimate remedy lies within the people to insist on fair apportionment. (Harlan) This is a question of federalism; thus, the Court ought to accommodate the states.

McLaurin v. Oklahoma

The Court held that African American students must receive the same treatment as all other students in the realm of higher education

Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canada

The Court struck down a Missouri scheme whereby the state excluded African Americans from its state university's law school and paid their tuition to attend a public law school in a contiguous state

Quid pro quo

The notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money

Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)

Under Title VII, an employer may discriminate on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise"

Ex parte McCardle

William McCardle had been arrested under the Reconstruction Acts and tried before a military commission for publishing articles considered libelous→ his habeas petition was denied by a circuit court, so he appealed to the Supreme Court→ it was speculated that the Court would hold the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutional, so Congress passed legislation to withdraw its appellate jurisdiction