Constitutional Law

What are the four theories for the president's constitutional power?

(1)There is no inherent presidential power; the president may act only if there is express constitutional or statutory authority. (2)The president has inherent authority unless the president interferes with the functioning of another branch of government or usurps the powers of another branch. (3)The president may exercise powers not mentioned in the Constitution so long as the president does not violate a statute or the Constitution. (4)The president has inherent powers that may not be restricted by Congress and may act unless the Constitution is violated. (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer)

What are the three categories of activities Congress may regulate?

Congress may regulate the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce.(United States v. Lopez)

What is the test for holding an amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment?

By precedent, the test for holding an amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment is whether the right protected is among those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." (Duncan v. Louisiana)

Is discriminatory impact enough to violate the Equal Protection Clause, or must there also be discriminatory intent?

Discriminatory impact alone isn't enough to invalidate an otherwise neutral law under the Equal Protection Clause. The challenged provision must have been motivated by invidious discrimination. (Washington v. Davis)

Does the Equal Protection Clause permit public institutions of higher education to make admissions decisions based on race?

No. Although the school's admissions may consider race when evaluating an application, it cannot make a facially racial quota. (Regents of University of California v. Bakke)

Is a state law prohibiting marriage exclusively on the basis of race constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment?

No, State interracial marriage bans violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Use of racial classifications must be necessary to further a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest. The restriction on the freedom to marry violates the principal purpose of the Equal Protection Clause: to eliminate state discrimination. (Loving v. Virginia)

If a state or local regulation equally affects all people within a jurisdiction, does it violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

No, a state or local regulation that equally affects all people within the jurisdiction doesn't violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause states that State and local governments must govern impartially. Questions arise if the rule impacts fewer than all persons within a jurisdiction. (New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer)

Does a state regulation violate the Equal Protection clause by regulating only some types of conduct but not all similar conduct?

No, a state regulation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by regulating only some types of conduct but not all similar conduct. The Equal Protection Clause does not p recent discriminatory laws if they do not discriminate in ways prohibited by the Clause. (Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York)

Does a statutory scheme that results n a woman receiving more benefits than a similarly situated man violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?

No, a statutory scheme that results in a woman receiving more benefits than a similarly situated man does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Clause. The Social Security gender classification serves an important governmental objective, and is substantially relate d to achieving an important governmental objective, thus it satisfies the Due Process Clause. (Califano v. Webster)

Does a state law requiring all voters to present photo identification unduly burden the right to vote?

No, as long as the burden on voters is justified by a relevant and significant state interest, a photo-ID requirement isn't an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. The voter-ID law was both neutral and sufficiently strong to survive a facial challenge.(Crawford v. Marion County Election Board)

Does a requirement that men register for the draft but not women violate the Fifth Amendment?

No, because men and women aren't similarly situated in the military, requiring only men to register for the draft doesn't violate the Constitution. (Rostker v. Goldberg)

May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, create civil remedies for victims of gender-based violence to sue their attackers in civil court?

No, gender-based violence is a non-economic activity. No legislative history or other findings indicate that gender-based violence has an effect on interstate commerce. Congress cannot regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. (United States v. Morrison)

Does a military order excluding certain races of Americans from designated areas of the United States violate the equal Protection Clause?

No, the exclusion order does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Race-based classifications can survive strict scrutiny if there is a critical public necessity. (Korematsu v. United States)

Does a law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause violate separation-of-powers principles?

No. A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer (an independent counsel) and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles. The Constitution divides federal officers into "principal" and "inferior" officers. The Appointments Clause requires principal officers to be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, but allows inferior officers to be appointed by the President, department heads, or the judiciary. There is not a precise line separating principal and inferior officers, but some factors affecting an officer's characterization include whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher department official and whether the scope of the officer's duties and jurisdiction is limited. (Morrison v. Olson)

Is a state statute that limits jury service to white persons constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. A state statute limiting jury service to white persons only is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to protect a race of people, recently freed from slavery, from adverse action by the states, and to prevent the states from denying them their civil rights. It further authorized Congress to enforce these provisions by appropriate legislation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a declaration that all persons, regardless of race or color, must be held equal under the laws of the states. No state may discriminate by law against a person because of his race. This court does not hold that states are prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment from designating other qualifications for jurors, such as limiting jury selection to males, citizens, landowners, or persons of a certain age or with a certain level of education. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to prohibit discrimination based on race or color.(Strauder v. West Virginia)

May the President of the United States assert an absolute claim of privilege over all confidential communications?

No. Although there is a presumptive presidential privilege for his confidential communications, when the communications do not concern military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, that presumption may be rebutted due to the constitutional need to produce all relevant evidence in a criminal case. Thus there is no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege. Separate powers were not meant to operate with absolute independence. (United States v. Nixon)

If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, does the state law govern?

No. Congress is granted the power to regulate interstate commerce in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The word "commerce" includes traffic, intercourse, and navigation, as well as commodities associated with interstate commerce. Congress may regulate all commercial activities occurring between states. (Gibbons v. Ogden)

May Congress compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs?

No. Congress may not compel state officials to administer federal programs. Firstly, no clear evidence exists that historical Congresses believed they had the power to compel state executives into federal service. Secondly, the Constitution creates a system of dual sovereignty whereby the states and the federal government are independent entities with different governmental functions. Thus, the Constitution's structure suggests that it is inappropriate for the federal government to violate states' status as separate entities by compelling their officials to perform federal roles. Additionally, the Constitution clearly states the execution of the laws is the responsibility of the President. (Printz v. United States)

May Congress compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program?

No. Congress may not pass regulations that have the effect of "commandeering" states' legislative processes. There are two ways Congress may urge a state to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests: (1) as part of its spending powers, Congress may attach conditions on states' receipt of federal funds, or (2) where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, Congress may offer states the choice of regulating that same activity according to federal regulations or having state law preempted by federal regulations. (New York v. United States)

May a state limit the availability of welfare benefits to families residing in the state for less than twelve months with regard to the Privileges and Immunities Clause?

No. Even though the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV has been a subject of significant debate in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), one uncontested point was always its protection of the right to travel. The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right to travel in three ways: allowing citizens to move freely between states; securing the right to equal treatment in all states when visiting; and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated the same as long-term citizens living within the state. (Saenz v. Roe)

May individual states tax a federally created bank?

No. Federal laws are supreme to state laws. A federally created institution may not be inhibited by a state law. (McCulloch v. Maryland)

Is a state law limiting government funding for abortions and not childbirth for indigent women unconstitutional?

No. Indigent women denied abortion funding do not constitute a suspect class for which discrimination is unconstitutional. Roe does not create an unlimited, unqualified right to an abortion; it merely protects a woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide when to terminate her pregnancy. Thus, Roe implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and to allocate scarce public funding accordingly. Additionally, the determination of whether to expand or deny funding for abortions for indigent women is a question best left for state legislatures, not courts. (Maher v. Roe)

When social workers and county officials are confronted with evidence of child abuse, does a failure to stop such abuse constitute a violation of the child's liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. Rather, the Due Process Clause limits a state's power to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The language of this Clause cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. The Due Process Clause functions solely to protect individuals from abuses of power by the government, rather than protecting individuals from each other. (DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services)

May Congress pass an act such as the Civil Rights Act that prohibits discrimination by individuals?

No. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment functions as a restraint on abuses by state actors of the rights and freedoms of United States citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment also gives Congress the power to pass whatever legislation is necessary to enforce those restrictions on state actors. Thus, had the businesses implicated in the present cases been state or local governments, Congress would have acted constitutionally. However, because all defendants in the cases are private individuals accused of discriminating against African American patrons in privately-owned businesses, Congress acted outside the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment powers. The Civil Rights Act is therefore unconstitutional. (The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley)

May Congress regulate the discriminatory conduct of private actors under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. The Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory state action, not private action. (United States v. Morrison)

Does the Fourth Amendment extend to telephone wires and the telephone calls that travel over them?

No. The Fourth Amendment does not extend to telephone wires and the telephone calls that travel over them. Telephone wires are distinguishable from paper letters at issue in Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). The United States government runs the post office, but does not have the same modicum of control over telephone calls. Telephones allow individuals to speak to each other from all corners of the country and, indeed, the world. It cannot be said that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy from his home or office to each part of the world that telephone wires may take his conversation. (Olmstead v. United States)

Is the Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 a constitutional use of Congress's spending powers?

No. The Medicaid expansion provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is an unconstitutional use of Congress's spending powers. With respect to the Medicaid extension, the federal government cannot withhold existing Medicaid funding from states that choose not to participate. The Act does not offer the states a genuine choice, because they need to accept a basic change in the nature of Medicaid or risk losing all Medicaid funding.(National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius)

May a state regulate the working hours of certain classes of workers without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The general right of an employer to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this Amendment, unless there are circumstances that exclude the right. States may impose reasonable conditions on the right to contract that further the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens. Pursuant to their constitutional police powers, states may prohibit contracts which violate either a federal or state statute, or contracts to use one's personal property for immoral or illegal purposes. Additionally, precedent decisions permit states to regulate certain types of employment when the nature of the work or the character of the employees warrants it. Specifically, states have previously been permitted to regulate the hours of employees in the smelting and mining fields. However, state police power is not absolute and must be balanced against individual liberty concerns protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Lochner v. New York)

Is a state restriction on abortion that requires informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period unconstitutional?

No. The holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is reaffirmed. Stare decisis operates as a governing principle in nearly all of the Court's decisions. Precedent holdings should be overturned only if changing circumstances render the established rules unworkable. Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense proven unworkable in its limitations of state restrictions on abortion. However, it is improper to completely prohibit a state from regulating abortion before the end of the first trimester. Before the first trimester ends, a state can constitutionally issue reasonable regulations for abortion to help ensure that women are properly informed about their decision to abort. Instead of adhering to the trimester framework for judging the constitutionality of such regulations, a new undue burden test is hereby created for determining whether a regulation impermissibly interferes with a woman's right to an abortion. An undue burden exists if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. (Planned Parenthood v. Casey)

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrict the actions of a privately-owned electricity company?

No. The law is clear on the fact that state actions are subject to constitutional regulations and private actions are not, but it is often difficult to determine which actions are truly "state" and which are "private." The fact that Pennsylvania granted a monopoly to Metropolitan Edison over its service area is not enough to show that the private company was acting as the state. Additionally, it is overbroad to hold that every action of a state-regulated business provides an essential public service, or serves the public interest in some way that is somehow converted into state action. An action of a private entity would only be treated as state action if there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the private entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself. (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.)

May a state control its waste by prohibiting out-of-state waste from crossing its borders?

No. Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, if Congress has not acted to regulate an area of interstate commerce, states are presumably free to regulate that area. Any state regulation is subject only to Commerce Clause restrictions and may not burden interstate commerce. A state may not prohibit activity of other states simply for being a different state.(City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey)

May Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, pass a law that prohibits the possession of a gun near a school?

No. While Congress has broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, this power does not extend so far as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns, particularly when doing so has no clear effect on the economy overall.(United States v. Lopez)

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confer a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy?

OVERRULED by Lawrence v. Texas. No, the Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, none of this Court's previous cases have determined that the Constitution provides a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy. The kinds of rights that deserve heightened protection despite not being expressly identified in the Constitution are those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." (Bowers v. Hardwick)

Is a study that demonstrates racial disparities in a capital sentencing decision sufficient to render a sentence unconstitutional?

Such studies are insufficient to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protections Clause or the Eight Amendment's Prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. (McCleskey v. Kemp)

What power is given to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause?

The Necessary and Proper Clause only gives Congress the power to do things that are incidental to the valid exercise of some enumerated power(National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius)

Does a city's denial of a permit for a group home for mentally disabled persons violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and does the review of such a denial required intermediate scrutiny?

Yes and no. The court of appeals erred in applying heightened scrutiny to the denial of the permit application. The mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class, and thus rational basis review of the City's decision is appropriate. Firstly, it is undeniable that mentally disabled persons require special care for functioning in the everyday world, so legislative judgments are likely to be rational and should not be scrutinized more closely. Secondly, on a national scale, federal lawmakers have shown great appreciation for the plight of the mentally disabled and enacted significant legislation prohibiting discrimination against them. Applying heightened scrutiny and requiring the legislature to show that these efforts are substantially related to an important governmental purpose might actually discourage the legislature from continuing to act to protect the mentally disabled. Thirdly, the existence of so many regulations make it clear that the mentally disabled are not politically powerless, but have already been able to attract the attention of lawmakers to provide for their rights. Fourthly, finding the mentally disabled a quasi-suspect class would pose problems in the future for classifying other groups as such that possibly share some but not all characteristics with mentally disabled persons as a group. For these reasons, rational basis review is appropriate for any legislative determinations affecting mentally disabled persons. (City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.)

Does VMI's policy of excluding women from admission deny women equal protection of the laws, and, if so, is the creation of an alternative school for women the proper remedy for this denial?

Yes and no. The standard of review for any governmental gender classification is intermediate scrutiny. This standard requires the government to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification for policies that discriminate against women. Inherent differences exist between men and women, but these differences can be used only for purposes such as remedying the history of sex discrimination against women, or promoting equal employment opportunities, not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity. The VWIL is different and substandard when compared to VMI on many levels. The creation of this school does not provide a meaningful educational alternative for women seeking to attend VMI. Thus Virginia's policy of excluding women from VMI is unconstitutional. (United States v. Virginia)

Is a State's abortion-related law unconstitutional on its face if "it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion" in "a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant."?

Yes, a State's abortion-related law is unconstitutional on its face if "it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion" in "a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant." . . . That standard, not an "every woman" standard, is the standard that must govern in this case. (June Medical Services LLC v. Gee)

Does a state law that is facially neutral violate the Equal Protection Clause if that law is unequally applied solely based on a person's race or nationality?

Yes, a facially neutral law this is applied in a discriminatory manner based on race or nationality violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause is not limited to racial discrimination, but also prohibits discrimination based on a person's nationality or alienage. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins)

Must a federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism be justified by current needs?

Yes, a federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism must be justified by current needs. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires covered jurisdictions to obtain federal approval before enacting any changes to voting procedures. Without this statute, these jurisdictions, like the jurisdictions not within § 4(b)'s coverage, would be permitted to enact changes to voting procedures immediately. Additionally, this requirement only impacts the sovereignty of a few states. This is a departure from the principle of equal sovereignty among the states. The drastic measures of these provisions were warranted in 1965. However, there is no longer a substantial disparity in voter registration or turnout between white citizens and African American citizens in the states covered by the formula contained in § 4(b). This coverage formula is based on 40-year-old data and does not reflect modern reality. Congress must justify these restrictions using the current conditions, not those of 40 years ago. Therefore, § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. (Shelby County v. Holder)

Does a point-based system giving preference to specific races in university admissions violate the Equal Protection clause and relevant civil rights statutes?

Yes, a point-based system giving preference to specific races in university admissions violates the Equal Protection clause and relevant civil rights statutes. A persons race cannot automatically guarantee them acceptance into university, but could be considered as one of many factors in an individual review of an applicant. (Gratz v. Bollinger)

Must racial classifications made by the federal government pass strict-scrutiny review?

Yes, all racial classifications made by state, local, and federal government must pass strict-scrutiny review. (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña)

Do courts lack judicial power to address partisan gerrymandering?

Yes, courts lack judicial power to address partisan gerrymandering. The question is whether it is judicable as a legal issue or must find resolution elsewhere as a political issue. (Rucho v. Common Cause)

May a public school consider race as a factor in its admissions process without violating the Due Process Clause?

Yes, institutions of higher educations may consider race as one of many factors in their admissions schemes in an effort to reap the educational benefits that accompany a diverse student body. (Grutter v. Bollinger)

Does a housing ordinance that limits the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, and narrowly defines the term "family" to include only a few categories of related individuals, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes, it violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The CEC ordinance limits blood relatives from living together. When a city attempts such an intrusive regulation of family as that present in the CEC ordinance, the court must carefully examine the importance of the government's objective and the extent to which the objective is advanced by the ordinance. CEC seeks to justify its ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on the CEC's public school system. Although these are all legitimate public purposes, the housing ordinance serves them only marginally and is not necessary to their accomplishment. The right of family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Constitution. (Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio)

Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant by a state court amount to state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause?

Yes, state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action, which violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Clause guarantees equal treatment of all people under the law, including in their exercise of various property rights. There is no question that restrictive covenants that discriminate solely on the basis of race would be invalid on equal protection grounds if created by a state or local law. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The issue here is whether state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants entered into by private actors constitutes state action. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to purely private discrimination. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Thus, people are free to enter into and voluntarily abide by racially restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, the Court has long held that the actions of state courts and judicial officers are state actions within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Improper state action does not only occur when a court practices unfair procedures. A court is also a state actor when it enforces a substantive rule that violates individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Shelley v. Kraemer)

Does a statute that permits the sale of alcohol to women of a certain age, but not to men of the same age, violate the Equal Protection Clause?

Yes, the states gender-based classification violates the Equal Protection Clause. The appropriate standard of review for governmental gender-based classifications is intermediate scrutiny. The classification must be substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose. (Craig v. Boren)

Does Congress have the constitutional authority to regulate the wages and hours of state employees under the Commerce Clause?

Yes. Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the wages and hours of state employees under the Commerce Clause.(Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority)

Does the Bill of Rights contain an implied right of privacy that permits the use of contraceptives by married persons?

Yes. A "right of privacy" protecting the intimate relations of married couples is implied in the Bill of Rights. For example, the First Amendment protects the right to association. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in a person's house without their consent. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination. The Ninth Amendment provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The protected activities in each of these Amendments are "penumbras" that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, but instead represent various "zones of privacy" into which the government cannot intrude. The marital relationship is located within a "zone of privacy" impliedly created by these various fundamental constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights. The Connecticut law seeks to prohibit the use of contraceptives in the marital relationship and in doing so violates this area of protected freedoms. (Griswold v. Connecticut)

When a U.S. citizen is labeled as an enemy combatant, is he entitled to the constitutional protections of due process?

Yes. A U.S. citizen accused of being an enemy combatant must be afforded an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker. The government must provide basic procedures for the citizen-detainee to challenge his detention. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the right to due process under the law. Furthermore, absent suspension, all persons detained in the United States have the right to habeas corpus. This means that an individual accused of criminal activity cannot be detained indefinitely, with no trial, no counsel, and no ability to petition for freedom if he is wrongfully imprisoned. (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld)

Does a law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. A law prohibiting anti-discrimination protections for the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no person may be denied the equal protection of the laws. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the law will pass constitutional muster under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. (Romer v. Evans)

Was Trump's presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational basis review?

Yes. A presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries is sufficiently justified by national-security concerns to survive rational basis review. Section 212(f) of the act permits the President to suspend the entry of foreign nationals if the President deems such entry to be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from discriminating based on religion. If the President exercises his constitutional power on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, courts will not look behind the exercise of that discretion. Courts also will not test the President's discretion by balancing its justification against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. citizens. (Trump v. Hawaii)

May a state law prohibit the fitting of lenses by an optician without prescriptive authority from a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist without violating the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. Although the Oklahoma law might be arbitrary and wasteful in many cases, it is absolutely necessary in other cases where directions from a prescription are required for fitting glasses. Regardless, it is a decision for the state legislature, not the judiciary, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the prescription requirement. In conducting this balancing, the legislature could have reasonably concluded that prescriptions are needed often enough to justify requiring them in every case where lenses are brought to an optician. Prescriptions might not be required in every case, but this is not the test under the Constitution for upholding the law. Rather, it is sufficient that there is a particular health and safety evil at hand for correction and that the particular legislative measure is a rational way to correct it. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.)

Does a law prohibiting the possession of usable handguns in the home violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Yes. Although the Second Amendment appears to have been created for the purpose of ensuring the creation of a future militia, this purpose ultimately does not change the fact that the Second Amendment was designed to create an individual right to keep and bear arms. However, states must be free to regulate who can possess firearms based on certain safety concerns. The District of Columbia's prohibition on handgun possession in the home, as well as its requirement that lawful handguns in the home be rendered inoperable for self-defense, is unconstitutional. (District of Columbia v. Heller)

May Congress ban a specific type of partial-birth abortion provided its restrictions on the practice are narrow and clear and the ban does not constitute an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion?

Yes. Before viability, a state cannot prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy. Additionally, a state cannot impose upon this right an undue burden. An undue burden exists if the purpose or effect of a regulation is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. However, a regulation that merely creates a structural mechanism by which the state, or the parent or guardian of a minor, can express profound respect for the life of the unborn is permitted if the regulation is not a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose. (Gonzales v. Carhart)

In exercising its remedial and preventive power to enforce a constitutional right under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, may Congress enact only legislation that utilizes congruent and proportional means for achieving that legislative purpose?

Yes. Congress has broad, but not unlimited, enforcement powers. Specifically, Congress's powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are strictly remedial and not plenary. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enforce laws to prevent the violation of a constitutional right, but it does not have the power to define the substance of that constitutional right. There must be congruence and proportionality between the means Congress uses and the preventive or remedial ends it hopes to achieve. Without this congruence and proportionality, Congress's actions may cross the line into unacceptable substantive legislation. This interpretation of Congress's powers is supported by the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. (City of Boerne v. Flores)

Does Congress have *implied* constitutional power to create a bank?

Yes. Congress has the constitutional power to create a bank. This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution's grant to Congress of the general power to "tax and spend" for the general welfare. However, in addition to its enumerated powers, Congress is also given general powers under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, which states that Congress may create laws it deems necessary and proper to help carry out its enumerated powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause functions to expand, not limit, Congress's enumerated powers. (McCulloch v. Maryland)

May Congress regulate, under the Commerce Clause, local activity if that activity exerts a *substantial* economic effect on interstate commerce.

Yes. Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. (Wickard v. Filburn)

Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible factors are equal, deprive the children of the minority group of educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. In deciding the issue it is not possible to rely on the original intent surrounding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment because prior cases and the legislative history involved in its enactment are inconclusive as to the true extent of its meaning. Additionally, it is not helpful to look at the status of public education at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, as most Caucasian children were then educated by private schools, and most African American children were not educated at all. Very few public schools existed at the time, which adds to the difficulty in determining the historical intentions surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on public education. An examination of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself is utilized to determine the intent behind the Amendment's application to public education. The basic language of the Amendment suggests that it was passed to prohibit all forms of discriminatory legislation against African Americans. To determine whether the segregated schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted, it is necessary to examine the actual effect of this segregation on the institution of public education as a whole. Public education has, over the years, become one of the most valued and important public services performed by state and local governments. Children can hardly be expected to succeed in life if they are not educated. (Brown v. Board of Education)

May Congress regulate the use and production of homegrown marijuana?

Yes. It would be near impossible to prevent homegrown marijuana from crossing state lines, so Congress may regulate it to protect interstate commerce.(Gonzales v. Raich)

Is legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the executive branch unconstitutional?

Yes. Legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the executive branch is unconstitutional because it does not meet the constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism. Article I of the Constitution requires that all legislation be presented to the president before becoming law. The Framers carefully crafted this requirement into the Constitution. Additionally, the Framers required bicameralism in the enactment of any law, i.e., a law could not be passed without gaining support from a majority of both houses. The requirements of presentment and bicameralism under Article I do not apply to every action taken by either house of Congress; rather, they apply only to an exercise of legislative power. To be an exercise of legislative power, an action must be legislative in its purpose and effect. (Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha)

Must states issue marriage licenses and recognize lawful out-of-state marriages for same-sex couples?

Yes. Same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the four principles underpinning the protection of the right to marry apply equally to opposite and same-sex couples: (1) the right to choose whether and whom to marry is "inherent in the concept of individual autonomy"; (2) the right serves relationships that are equal in importance to all who enter them; (3) assuring the right to marry protects children and families, which implicates the myriad of rights related to procreation and childrearing; and (4) lastly, marriage is the very "keystone of our social order" and foundation of the family unit. Further, states must recognize lawful out-of-state marriages between same-sex couples. (Obergefell v. Hodges)

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment include a right to liberty in individual decisions concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship?

Yes. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right to liberty in individual decisions concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship. This right to liberty has also been extended to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. The key issue is whether the majority may use the power of the state to enforce its views of morality on the whole society through operation of criminal law. The answer is no. The fact that the governing majority in a state has traditionally viewed a particular practice is immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice. The private, consensual activity at issue in this case is within the realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. (Lawrence v. Texas)

Does the United States Constitution permit the President of the United States to be sued while in office for actions occurring prior to assuming office.

Yes. The President is not immune while in office from suits for alleged acts occurring before his time in office. The United States Constitution does not grant the President of the United States immunity while in office from suit for actions allegedly occurring prior to his assuming the presidential office. The policy basis for providing immunity for public officials acting in their "official" capacities is to permit them to perform the full range of their official duties without being hindered by the threat of or actual litigation. However, the policy reasons behind providing immunity for "official" acts do not transfer to justifying immunity from suit for "unofficial" conduct. (Clinton v. Jones)

Does the Second Amendment apply to the states, thereby invalidating a City of Chicago law prohibiting residents from possessing handguns?

Yes. The Second Amendment applies to the states, thereby invalidating Chicago's law prohibiting residents from possessing handguns. Under the process of selective incorporation, a particular Bill of Rights guarantee will apply to the states if it is fundamental to the nation's scheme of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. The court found that ownership of handguns was deeply rooted in the nation's history. (McDonald v. City of Chicago)

Does the Supreme Court of the United States have the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution?

Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to review laws and legislative acts to determine whether they comply with the United States Constitution. The legislative branch must operate within these Constitutionally defined limits in passing laws. The role of the judicial branch is to identify, interpret, and apply the law to decide cases. If there is a conflict between a law passed by Congress and the Constitution, then the Constitution must control, and the offending law will be void. (Marbury v. Madison)

Does the United States Supreme Court have the authority to exercise appellate review of state-court decisions?

Yes. The United States Supreme Court has authority to review the decisions of the state courts. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has authority to exercise appellate review of state-court decisions. Article III does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to particular lower courts. (Martin v. Lessee)

Does the constitutional right to privacy protect a woman's right to choose to have an abortion?

Yes. The constitutional right to privacy protects a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. However, abortions may be regulated by a state after the first trimester of pregnancy and may be completely prohibited after the point of "viability" of a fetus unless necessary to preserve the health of the mother. The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to personal privacy, but such a right is implied from various aspects of the Bill of Rights. The "zone of privacy" implied in the Constitution is broad enough to encompass a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. However, this holding is qualified by noting that the right is not unlimited and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Regulation limiting a "fundamental right" of privacy must be justified by a compelling state interest, and legislative enactments must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. (Roe v. Wade)

Does a state have the authority under its police power to enact reasonable laws to protect the public health and safety of its citizens?

Yes. The enactment of the Massachusetts statute allowing cities to require its citizens to be vaccinated against smallpox is a valid exercise of the state's police power. Jacobson claims that the mandatory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive. However, a state may enact reasonable regulations to protect the good of all of its citizens, not just an individual. Additionally, delegating that authority to the cities is a reasonable means of furthering the state's interest in protecting the public health. The liberty provided to each individual as secured by the U.S. Constitution does not instill an absolute right in each person to be completely free from all restraint. There are some restraints designed to protect citizens as a group, at the expense of individual freedom. (Jacobson v. Massachusetts)

Is the individual mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 a valid use of Congress's power to tax?

Yes. The individual mandate contained in the Act is a valid use of Congress's power to tax. The individual mandate cannot be justified as a valid exercise of commerce power, because the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to compel individuals to engage in commercial activity. The individual mandate's penalty provision operates more like a tax imposed on those opting against purchasing coverage. Because the tax is assessed just like other taxes, based on income, and collected by the IRS, the fact that Congress calls it a penalty is irrelevant. The Court interprets legislation as constitutional if possible, and the individual mandate can be saved by interpreting the penalty provision as a valid exercise of Congress's power to tax.(National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius)

May Congress regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate commerce?

Yes. The power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and is vested solely in Congress. The power to regulate commerce includes the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection or advancement; to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety; and to foster, protect, control, and restrain interstate commercial activities. (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.)

Does a state statute violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding voters from school-board elections because they neither own nor lease taxable property, or because they aren't the parents of children attending the schools?

Yes. The right to vote is fundamental. Therefore, the exclusion of population groups from voting in school-district elections must promote a compelling state interest. The challenged restrictions aren't necessary to achieve this interest because they are poorly tailored to the state's goals. (Kramer v. Union Free School District)

May Congress enact the Civil Rights Act as a measure to regulate interstate commerce?

Yes. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to remove obstructions and restraints to interstate commerce. The unavailability to African Americans of adequate accommodations interferes significantly with interstate travel. Moreover, evidence shows that racial discrimination has a disruptive effect on commercial intercourse. (Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States)

Is a state law that burdens interstate commerce while only marginally furthering a health and safety purpose unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause?

Yes. Under the principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state law must further a health and safety purpose if it heavily burdens interstate commerce to be constitutional. Although state judgments about health and safety issues are normally entitled to great deference by the courts, if a state's safety interest is found to be illusory, and its regulations are found to significantly impair the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation, the state law violates Commerce Clause principles. (Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.)

May Congress prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce made by workers in unfair employment conditions and the employment of such workers in manufacturing goods for interstate commerce?

Yes. While manufacturing is not itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods between states falls within the definition of commerce and is thus capable of regulation by Congress under its plenary Commerce Clause powers. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is absolute and is subject only to limitations prescribed by the Constitution.(United States v. Darby)