Criminal Law & Procedure Learning Questions
____________ is an element of __________. A Obtaining title; larceny by trick B Intent to defraud; false pretenses C Trespass; false pretenses D Trespass; embezzlement
B. Intent to defraud is an element of false pretenses. The offense of false pretenses generally consists of: (i) obtaining title; (ii) to the property of another; (iii) by an intentional (or, in some states, knowing) false statement of past or existing fact; (iv) with intent to defraud the other. Trespass is not an element of false pretenses or embezzlement. Embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of the property of another by a person in lawful possession of the property. Obtaining title is not an element of larceny by trick; rather with larceny by trick, the defendant merely obtains possession, not title.
In most states, a defendant may be convicted of the principal offense and _______. A. A solicitation to commit that offense B. A conspiracy to commit that offense C. An attempt of that offense D. A conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation to commit that offense
B. The doctrine of merger has been abandoned in many jurisdictions in cases involving a conspiracy, allowing an accused to be convicted of both conspiracy and the principal offense. However, an accused cannot be convicted of either attempt or solicitation and the principal offense.
Set 7
Set 7
An employee of the state government always received his state paycheck on the last workday of the month. The employee was not a good money manager, and just barely managed to make it from paycheck to paycheck each month. On the second to the last workday of the month, the employee had $45 in his checking account, and, needing to buy a birthday gift for his sister, he wrote a check to a gift boutique for $100. He knew that he would be receiving his paycheck the next day, so he could deposit the paycheck before the check would be sent to the bank. However, unbeknownst to the employee, the state legislature was having a budget impasse. Because the state constitution prohibited any deficit spending, state employees were not paid as usual. Without a paycheck to deposit, the check written to the gift boutique was returned for insufficient funds. The merchant complained to the police, who arrested the employee and charged him under a statute that prohibited "issuing a check knowing that it is drawn against insufficient funds, with intent to defraud the payee of the check." What should be the outcome of the employee's prosecution? A Not guilty, because the employee intended to deposit his paycheck the next day. B Not guilty, because it was reasonable for the employee to expect that he would receive his paycheck as usual. C Guilty, because the employee knew when he wrote the check that he did not have sufficient funds in his account to honor it. D Guilty, because reliance on a future source of income does not vitiate the employee's violation of the statute when he wrote the check.
A. Given that the employee intended to deposit his paycheck before the checks cleared, he lacked the intent to defraud required by the statute. The statute under which the employee is being prosecuted is a variation of the offense of false pretenses. As with false pretenses, the statute requires a specific intent, i.e., an intent to defraud. If the employee intended to deposit sufficient funds to honor the check before it reached his bank, then the employee did not intend to defraud the gift boutique. Thus, the employee lacked the specific intent that is a necessary element of the crime charged. (B) is incorrect because the employee's expectation that he would receive his paycheck as usual need not have been reasonable. Even if such an expectation were unreasonable, the employee would not be guilty if he did not intend to defraud the payees, as required by the statute. (C) is incorrect because it would result in a verdict of guilty without requiring intent to defraud. Knowledge that the check was drawn against insufficient funds is just one element of the statute. The intent to defraud is also required to convict under the applicable statute. (D) also incorrectly assumes that the employee violated the statute merely by knowingly writing a check on insufficient funds. As explained above, the requisite intent to defraud is absent. Thus, there is no "violation" to be vitiated.
The defendant and the victim got into a minor verbal altercation, concluding with the defendant lightly shoving the victim. The victim lost his balance and struck his head on the pavement, causing serious bodily injury. The defendant was charged with battery, which is defined in the jurisdiction as "purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to another." Should the defendant be convicted of battery? A No, because the defendant did not know that the victim would be seriously injured. B No, because the defendant did not strike a serious blow to the victim. C Yes, because the defendant purposely shoved the victim. D Yes, because the victim suffered serious bodily injury.
A. The defendant should not be convicted of battery. Under the statute's fault standards, a defendant must have acted purposely (i.e., with conscious intent to cause the result) or knowingly (i.e., with knowledge that his conduct will necessarily or very likely cause the result) as to the harmful result. The apparent inference to be drawn from the facts is that the defendant did not consciously desire, nor contemplate to a practical certainty, the serious injury to the victim that actually occurred. Had the defendant intended to cause such severe harm, he no doubt would have dealt the victim a strong blow rather than simply giving the victim a light shove. Therefore, as to the nature of the result, the defendant did not act with "purpose" or "knowledge" as those terms are defined in the Model Penal Code and modern criminal codes. (B), while close, is not as good an answer as (A) because it does not address the state of mind issue in the problem. A light shove might be sufficient for a battery as defined under a different set of facts (e.g., if the defendant believes that the victim would fall down stairs with a light shove). (C) is incorrect because it addresses the act but not the result. As defined in this question, battery must not only be committed by a purposeful act, but also be done with a "purposeful" or "knowing" state of mind as to the result. (D) is incorrect for much of the same reason—the state of mind requirement also applies to the result, as discussed above. The injury must have been purposely or knowingly caused, and that concept is not contained within choice (D).
In a property settlement after a divorce, the wife was awarded all personal property that had been accumulated during the marriage, including the husband's classic 19-inch black-and-white TV set. In order to get his prized TV set back, the husband lied to his friend, telling him that the wife took the TV set in violation of the property settlement. The friend remembered that the wife gave the friend's wife a key to her new home, and he volunteered to go with the husband to get the TV back while the wife was at work. The husband and the friend went to the wife's house, but, unbeknownst to them, the wife had taken the day off work. After the friend noisily opened the back door with his wife's key, the wife called the police, who quickly arrived and arrested the husband and the friend. As to a charge of common law conspiracy to commit larceny, how should the friend be found? A Not guilty, because he did not intend to steal. B Not guilty, because he did not have a corrupt motive. C Guilty, because there was an agreement, and the opening of the locked door was sufficient for the overt act. D Guilty, because good motives are not a defense to criminal liability.
A. The friend should be found not guilty because he did not intend to steal. At common law, conspiracy consists of (i) an agreement between two or more persons, (ii) an intent to enter into an agreement, and (iii) an intent to achieve the objective of the agreement. The object of the agreement must be something unlawful. Here, the friend did not intend to achieve the objective of the conspiracy—to permanently deprive the owner of her property—because the friend thought the husband was the true owner of the TV. (C) is incorrect because there must be an agreement to reach an unlawful objective. Because the friend thought he was achieving a lawful objective, he did not have the intent required for conspiracy. (B) is incorrect because a "corrupt motive" is not an element of a crime. A person could be found guilty of a crime even if he did not have a corrupt motive, assuming all required elements for a crime are present. (D) is incorrect for a similar reason. "Good motive" is largely irrelevant; the intent, or lack thereof, is what is important.
Voluntary manslaughter is a killing committed: A During the course of a crime not amounting to a felony B Under adequate provocation C During the course of a felony D Without express malice
B. A killing committed under adequate provocation is voluntary manslaughter. A killing committed during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony is involuntary manslaughter. Committing a felony that results in death is murder. The intent to commit a felony satisfies the malice requirement to classify a killing as murder. A killing committed without express malice may be murder if malice is implied. "Malice aforethought" for common law murder can be satisfied by (i) the intent to kill; (ii) the intent to inflict great bodily injury; (iii) a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life; or (iv) the intent to commit a felony. The intent to kill is deemed to be "express malice," whereas, in the latter three, malice is implied. Although "implied," the latter three states of mind also satisfy the malice requirement for common law murder.
The Model Penal Code defines acting purposefully as when: A. The defendant is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that certain circumstances exist B. It is the defendant's conscious object to engage in certain conduct or cause a certain result C. The defendant consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a prohibited result will follow, and this disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation D. The defendant fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances
B. A person acts purposefully when it is his conscious object to engage in certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts negligently when he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances. A person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that certain circumstances exist. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a prohibited result will follow, and this disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. Recklessness is one of the four categories into which the Model Penal Code classifies the mental component of a criminal offense (i.e., the element of fault).
Under the Model Penal Code, consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk indicates a person acted __________. A knowingly B recklessly C purposefully D negligently
B. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a prohibited result will follow, and this disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. Recklessness is one of the four categories into which the Model Penal Code classifies the mental component of a criminal offense (i.e., the element of fault). A person acts purposefully when it is his conscious object to engage in certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that certain circumstances exist. A person acts negligently when he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances.
Under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, which of the following is not required? A The item must be evidence, contraband, or a fruit or instrumentality of a crime. B The police must have inadvertently discovered the item. C The police must be legitimately on the premises where the item is found. D It must be immediately apparent that the item is evidence, contraband, or a fruit or instrumentality of a crime.
B. For the warrantless seizure of an item under the plain view exception, it is not required that the item be inadvertently discovered. Formerly, this exception to the warrant requirement applied only if the item was inadvertently discovered. Inadvertence, however, is no longer a requirement. To make a warrantless seizure, the police (1) must be legitimately on the premises where the item is found; (2) the item must be evidence, contraband, or a fruit or instrumentality of a crime; (3) the item must be in plain view; and (4) it must be immediately apparent (i.e., probable cause) that the item is evidence, contraband, or a fruit or instrumentality of a crime.
Which of the following is most likely to be found to be a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment? A A police officer approaches a suspect, orders the suspect to stop, and the suspect runs. B A police officer approaches a suspect and draws her revolver, orders the suspect to stop, and the suspect complies. C A police officer turns on his squad car's overhead lights as the squad approaches a suspect, and the suspect runs. D A police officer boards a bus, asks a suspect for identification and consent to search his luggage, and the suspect agrees.
B. If a police officer approaches a suspect and draws her revolver, orders the suspect to stop, and the suspect complies, this will most likely be found to constitute a seizure. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he is not free to leave. The courts consider the totality of the circumstances in making this determination. If a police officer turns on his squad car's overhead lights as the squad approaches a suspect and the suspect runs, a court will not likely find that there was a seizure. A seizure requires a physical application of force (e.g., handcuffing or otherwise subduing a person) or submission to an officer's show of force. If a police officer approaches a suspect, orders the suspect to stop, and the suspect runs, there is no application of force and no submission to the show of force, which would require, at the least, stopping in response to the officer's order. Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would find a seizure under the Fourth Amendment in these circumstances. If a police officer boards a bus, asks a suspect for identification and consent to search his luggage, and the suspect agrees, a court would not likely find a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Police officers may ask people for permission to search and for identification; such requests do not involve the physical application of force or submission to a show of force.
Which of the following statements regarding embezzlement is true? A The defendant must take and carry away the property. B If the defendant intends to restore the exact property taken, it is not embezzlement. C The misappropriation of property occurs at the time the defendant obtains wrongful possession of the property. D The conversion must result in direct personal gain to the defendant.
B. If the defendant intended to restore the exact property taken, it is NOT embezzlement. But if he intended to restore similar or substantially identical property, it is embezzlement, even if it was money that was initially taken and other money—of identical value—that he intended to return. In embezzlement, the misappropriation of the property occurs while the defendant has lawful, NOT wrongful, possession of it. On the other hand, in larceny, it occurs generally at the time the defendant obtains wrongful possession of the property. In embezzlement, since the defendant is already in possession of the property, there is NO need that he take and carry away the property. Rather, embezzlement requires a fraudulent conversion of the property. The conversion need NOT result in direct personal gain to the defendant. The conversion required by embezzlement requires only that the defendant deal with the property in a manner inconsistent with the trust arrangement pursuant to which he holds it.
Miranda warnings __________ need to be given before a suspect is interrogated by a civilian working for the police. A Always B May C Never
B. Miranda warnings may need to be given, depending on whether the suspect knows this person is employed by the police. Miranda generally applies only to interrogation by the publicly paid police. It does not apply where interrogation is by an informant who the defendant does not know is working for the police. The rationale is that the warnings are intended to offset the coercive nature of police-dominated interrogation, and if the defendant does not know that he is being interrogated by the police, there is no coercive atmosphere to offset.
Which of the following statements is true regarding a detainee's Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda? A All doubts about a request for counsel are construed in favor of the detainee. B The right applies only at custodial interrogations by the police or one known to be an agent of the police. C The police may question the detainee about an unrelated crime if they scrupulously honor the request by waiting a few hours and rewarning the defendant before the new questioning begins. D A detainee cannot waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel.
B. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations by the police or one known to be an agent of the police. The purpose of the rule is to protect the right against self-incrimination by preventing the police from badgering a suspect until he talks. The warnings are intended to offset the coercive atmosphere of custodial police interrogation, and so the right does not apply when the suspect is not in custody or is not being questioned by a police officer or one known by the suspect to be an agent of the police. If a detainee invokes his Miranda right to counsel, the police may NOT question him about an unrelated crime. This is different from the rule for when the detainee merely invokes his right to remain silent, in which instance the police may question about a different crime if they scrupulously honor the request. It is not true that all doubts about a request for counsel are construed in favor of the detainee. A request for counsel must be unambiguous and specific.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, which of the following people is least likely to be found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched? A A person who lives in the premises that were searched but does not own it. B A person who came to the premises that were searched to buy illegal drugs. C A person who owns the premises that were searched but does not live there. D A person who was an overnight guest at the place searched.
B. The Supreme Court has held that a person who was on the premises that were searched to buy illegal drugs does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. A claim that a search violated the Fourth Amendment can be raised only by a person who has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. The Supreme Court has held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy any time she owns the place that was searched or has a right to possession of it; whether or not she lives there would not affect this interest. The Court has also held that if the place searched is the person's home, then she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless if she owned or had a right to possess it. Finally, the Supreme Court has held that an overnight guest at the place searched also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises for Fourth Amendment purposes.
An art restorer, after attending art school for a number of years, secured a job restoring the paintings for an art museum. After several years on the job, the artist discovered that he could imitate the artwork of nearly any artist. He decided that he could make some extra money copying the artwork of up-and-coming artists, while staying away from more well-known artists to reduce his chance of getting caught. An art collector searching for a painting by a new artist saw the restorer at an art fair selling various paintings, one of which appeared to be by the new artist. The restorer was selling the painting for $100. The collector thought that the price was very low and that the painting should probably sell for around $500, but she bought the painting anyway, giving the restorer $100 after the restorer confirmed that the painting was an original from the new artist. After taking it to an art appraiser for insurance purposes, she discovered that the painting was a forgery. However, she also discovered that the painting's frame was worth about $125. With which theft offense may the art restorer be charged? A Larceny by trick. B False pretenses. C Embezzlement. D No theft offense.
B. The art restorer has committed false pretenses because his misrepresentation concerning the authenticity of the painting induced the collector to convey title to the $100. The offense of false pretenses consists of obtaining title to the property of another by an intentional (or knowing) false statement of past or existing fact, with intent to defraud the other. The art restorer falsely represented to the collector that the painting he sold her was an original from a new artist, intending that the collector would rely on such a misrepresentation by paying money for the painting. The collector, acting in reliance on this misrepresentation, conveyed to the art restorer title to the $100. Thus, all of the elements of false pretenses are present in the restorer's dealings with the collector. Because the restorer has committed false pretenses, which is a theft offense, (D) is incorrect. Monetary loss on the part of the victim is not an element of the crime. Thus, although the lack of damages might prevent the collector from suing in civil court, the fact that the collector suffered no monetary loss from the crime is irrelevant for criminal law purposes. (A) is incorrect because the restorer obtained title to the $100 rather than mere possession. If a victim consents to someone's taking possession of property, but such consent is induced by a misrepresentation, the consent is not valid. The resulting offense is larceny by trick. False pretenses differs from larceny by trick in what is obtained. If the victim intends to convey only possession of the property, the offense is larceny by trick. However, if the victim intends to convey title, the offense is false pretenses. Here, the collector intended to convey title to the $100, acting in reliance on the restorer's false representation that the painting was an original. Because the restorer obtained title, the offense of which he can be convicted is false pretenses rather than larceny by trick. (C) is incorrect because embezzlement consists of the fraudulent conversion of property of another by a person in lawful possession of that property. In embezzlement, misappropriation of the property occurs while the defendant has lawful possession of it. Here, the restorer did not convert the $100 while he was in lawful possession of it; rather, he obtained title to the money by means of a misrepresentation. Because the restorer did not have lawful possession of the money, he has not committed embezzlement.
A thief was passing by a house under construction when he noticed that the ladder being used by workers on the roof had copper braces supporting the rungs. After making sure that the workers on the roof could not see him, the thief used pliers that he had in his pocket to remove all of the copper braces that he could reach from the ground. A short time later, a worker climbed down the ladder and it collapsed. He fell to the ground and severely injured his back. The thief was apprehended a few hours later trying to sell the copper for scrap. A statute in the jurisdiction makes it a felony for "maliciously causing serious physical injury to another." The thief was charged with malicious injury under the statute and was also charged with larceny. After a jury trial in which the above facts were presented, he was convicted of both charges. If he appeals the conviction for the malicious injury charge on grounds of insufficient evidence, how should the court rule? A Affirm the conviction, because the thief was engaged in criminal conduct at the time of the act that resulted in the injury. B Affirm the conviction, because the jury could have found that the thief acted with malice. C Reverse the conviction, because there was no evidence that the thief intended to injure anyone. D Reverse the conviction, because there was no evidence that the thief bore any malice towards the workers on the roof.
B. The court should affirm the thief's conviction. Crimes imposing a mens rea of malice generally do not require the proof of intent that specific intent crimes require. It is sufficient if the defendant recklessly disregarded an obvious or high risk that the particular harmful result would occur. Here, the facts presented were sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the thief knew of the probability that the ladder would collapse without the braces when someone climbed down it, and acted in reckless disregard of that risk by removing the braces. (A) is incorrect because the fact that the thief was committing larceny when he removed the braces does not establish malice for purposes of the malicious injury charge. Even if his conduct were otherwise legal, he could be liable for that charge if he acted with reckless disregard of the high risk of injury. (C) is incorrect because, as discussed above, it is generally not necessary to show an intent to injure for a crime requiring a mens rea of malice; reckless disregard of an obvious risk will usually suffice. (D) is incorrect because crimes requiring a mens rea of malice do not refer to malice in the dictionary sense; a showing of ill will or hatred of the victim is not required.
A police officer learned from a reliable informant that a major drug deal was about to take place at a local restaurant. The officer obtained a search warrant for the restaurant and arrived with other uniformed officers to search the premises. While conducting the search, the officer searched several of the customers. While searching one of the restaurant's regular customers, the officer felt an object in the customer's pocket and pulled out a container filled with heroin. The customer was arrested and later convicted of possession of heroin. A state statute permits officers executing a search warrant to search persons on the premises if the officers reasonably expect danger to themselves or a risk of disposal or concealment of anything described in the warrant. If the customer challenges his conviction on the ground that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, will he be successful? A Yes, because the statute is vague and overbroad. B Yes, because his presence in the place to be searched by the police does not negate the requirement of probable cause. C No, because the search was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. D No, because the search was authorized by statute.
B. The customer will be successful. To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, most searches must be pursuant to a warrant. The warrant must describe with reasonable precision the place to be searched and the items to be seized. A search warrant does not authorize the police to search persons found on the premises who are not named in the warrant. In Ybarra v. Illinois (1979), a case based on similar facts, the Supreme Court held that "each patron of the tavern had an individual right to be free of unreasonable searches, and presence at a location subject to search does not negate the requirement of probable cause to search the person present." (A) is incorrect because the validity of the statute is not the primary issue. Even in the absence of a statute, the search of the customer by the officer violated the customer's Fourth Amendment rights. (C) is incorrect because, as discussed above, the search warrant did not override the customer's Fourth Amendment rights. While the police would be able to search a person discovered on the premises for whom they had probable cause to arrest, because the search would be incident to a lawful arrest, here they searched the customer prior to an arrest and without probable cause. (D) is irrelevant; if a search is unconstitutional, it does not matter that it was authorized by statute. To the extent that the statute authorizes a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is unconstitutional.
The owner of a garage and one of his mechanics had a dispute over the amount of wages due for work that the mechanic had done on cars. The owner alleged that he paid the mechanic for work that the mechanic did not perform, while the mechanic contended that she did the work. After arguing over the matter for over an hour, the mechanic quit. The owner did not allow the mechanic to take her tools with her, stating that he was keeping her tools until she repaid the money that he had overpaid her. The mechanic met with a friend and discussed the situation with him. After hearing what had happened, the friend, believing that the owner was unlawfully retaining the mechanic's tools, suggested that he could pose as a garage client and retrieve the tools for the mechanic, and the mechanic agreed. The plan succeeded, except for the fact that the friend took tools that belonged to a new employee. The owner immediately realized what had happened, and he gave the friend's license number to the police. The friend was arrested before he could show the tools to the mechanic. Of the following, which is the best argument for the friend as a defense to a charge of larceny in a common law jurisdiction? A He had the consent of the tools' owner. B He thought the tools belonged to the mechanic. C He intended to return the tools to the mechanic rather than keep them. D He was apprehended by the police before the mechanic could inspect the tools.
B. The friend's best argument is that he thought the tools belonged to the mechanic. Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the tangible personal property of another by trespass with the intent to permanently (or for an unreasonable time) deprive the owner (or person in possession) of his interest in the property. Thus, larceny is a specific intent crime, in that the defendant must intend to permanently deprive the person of his interest in the property. Importantly, this intent generally must exist at the time of taking (save for the continuing trespass doctrine). In this case, the friend believed that the mechanic was being unlawfully deprived of his property, and his intent was to return the tools to their rightful owner. Thus, when he took the tools, he lacked the intent to permanently deprive another of his interest in the property. This would be true even if the garage owner factually had a lawful right to retain the tools, as the mistake of law would negate the friend's intent to permanently deprive another of his interest in the property. (A) is wrong, of course, because he did not have the consent of the owner of the tools he took. (C) is wrong because it is not a defense to a charge of larceny that the defendant did not intend to keep the item taken for his own use. (D) is wrong because it prematurely raises the continuing trespass doctrine. Under the continuing trespass doctrine, a defendant may be convicted of larceny when he initially takes property with a wrongful state of mind, but without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property, and then later forms the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Here, the friend had not yet had the opportunity to form that later intent (even assuming the initial taking was with a wrongful state of mind). Thus, (D) does not address the correct issue.
While walking on patrol in a commercial district in the early evening, a police officer noticed that a light was on in the back window of a machine shop. Curious about what was going on inside, the officer went to the back of the building and tried to look through the window of the shop, but it had been painted on the inside so that only a strip about three inches at the top, eight feet above ground level, was still transparent. The officer quietly brought two trash cans from a neighboring business over to the window, stood on them and saw, through the strip of unpainted window, that the shop owner's son was inside with a friend, sucking white powder into his nose through a rolled-up tube of paper from off a small mirror. Recognizing that the shop owner's son was snorting cocaine, the officer knocked at the front door to the shop, and the son let him in. The officer immediately arrested the owner's son and his friend. In the back room of the shop through whose window he had peered, the officer found and seized several grams of cocaine, a razor blade, and a mirror. In the subsequent prosecution of the shop owner's son for possession of cocaine, the owner's son seeks to bar introduction of the cocaine, mirror, and razor blade into evidence. Will his motion be granted? A Yes, because the officer could not have known that the owner's son was snorting cocaine absent a chemical test of the substance being snorted. B Yes, because the officer violated the owner's son's reasonable expectation of privacy. C No, because the search was incident to a valid arrest. D No, because the owner's son consented to the officer's entry into the shop.
B. The shop owner's son had a reasonable expectation of privacy, as evidenced by the obscuring of the window so that neighbors could not see into the shop. Hence, the officer's search would have to be based on a valid warrant or qualify under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Putting trash cans next to a back window to climb upon and peering into the window through a narrow opening eight feet above the ground would be considered a violation of the owner's son's Fourth Amendment rights and not a "plain view" of criminal activity. Because the seizure of the cocaine, mirror, and razor was based on the illegal search, the evidence could not be used by the state. (A) is wrong; absolute certainty of illegal activity is not required for a valid search. A reasonable belief is required. (C) is wrong. The arrest itself is probably invalid, and in any event a search of the next room would not be an area within the immediate control of the defendant. (D) is wrong. Consent to enter the shop is not a consent to search the back room.
A man and woman agreed to burn down a neighbor's house in retribution for some wrong the neighbor allegedly committed against them. Both the man and woman were arrested shortly after they poured gasoline on the neighbor's front porch. The man revealed to the police that he participated in the plan to ensure that nothing bad would happen to the neighbor, and that he had made an anonymous telephone call to the police alerting them to the crime, which enabled the police to arrest him and the woman "in the act." The woman stated that she would not have participated if not for the man's encouragement. If the woman is charged with a conspiracy at common law to commit arson, how should she be found? A Not guilty, because she was not predisposed to commit the crime but for the man's encouragement. B Not guilty, because the man did not intend to commit arson. C Guilty, because there was an agreement, and pouring gasoline on the front porch was sufficient for the overt act. D Guilty, because arson is not a specific intent crime.
B. The woman should be found not guilty of a conspiracy to commit arson. To be convicted of a conspiracy at common law, it must be shown that at least two persons agreed to achieve an unlawful objective. Having two or more persons is a necessary element of conspiracy under the traditional bilateral approach. Here, the facts indicate that the man did not intend to achieve the objective of the conspiracy—to burn the dwelling house of another. Thus, the woman cannot be guilty of conspiracy to commit arson. (C) is incorrect. The man feigned his agreement, making the answer factually inaccurate. (D) is also incorrect. Although it is true that arson is not a specific intent crime, conspiracy is a specific intent crime, in that the prosecution must show that the defendant intended to agree and intended to achieve the unlawful objective. Thus, the fact that the underlying crime is not a specific intent crime is irrelevant. (A) is incorrect. Even if the woman would not have committed the crime without the man's inducement, that is not a defense for the woman. A person cannot be entrapped by a private citizen.
Felony murder generally requires that: A The killing be committed during the course of the felony, the death must have been a foreseeable result of the felony, and the defendant must be convicted of the underlying felony B The killing be committed during the course of the felony, the felony must be independent of the killing, and the death must have been a foreseeable result of the felony C The killing be committed during the course of the felony, the felony must be independent of the killing, and the defendant must be convicted of the underlying felony D The death must have been a foreseeable result of the felony, the felony must be independent of the killing, and the defendant must have been convicted of the underlying felony
B. To convict a defendant of felony murder, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed a felony (i.e., he is factually guilty of the felony). However, the defendant need not actually be convicted of the underlying felony if the statute of limitations for the felony has expired. The killing must take place while the felony is being committed. When the defendant reaches "a place of temporary safety," the felony is deemed terminated. The felony must be independent of the killing (e.g., the felony of manslaughter cannot be the underlying felony for felony murder). Finally, most states require that the death must be a foreseeable result of the commission of the felony.
Assuming all other elements are met, in which of the following circumstances would the defendant most likely not be convicted of homicide? A The defendant stabs the victim in the heart; at exactly the same time, another person shoots the victim in the head. Either act would have independently caused the victim's death, but it is unclear which act caused the victim's death. B The defendant stabs the victim but does not kill him; due to construction at the hospital where the victim is admitted for treatment of the stab wound, the victim contracts asbestosis and dies from it one year later. C The defendant stabs and kills a victim who has terminal cancer. D The defendant stabs the victim, who has hemophilia; the victim bleeds to death as a result of the stabbing.
B. f the defendant stabs the victim but does not kill him, and due to construction at the hospital where the victim is admitted for treatment of the stab wound, the victim contracts asbestosis and dies as a result one year later, the defendant is not likely to be convicted of homicide. To be convicted of homicide, the defendant must have actually and proximately caused the death of the victim. An intervening act that presents a foreseeable risk will generally not break the chain of causation. However, an unforeseeable risk, such as an injury due to hospital construction, will most likely break the chain of causation. Stabbing and killing someone with terminal cancer is likely to be considered homicide. A defendant may be guilty of killing a victim who was going to die anyhow. Actual and proximate causation is not broken if the defendant ends the victim's life prematurely, even by a short time. If a defendant stabs a victim while another person shoots the victim, the defendant is likely to be found guilty of homicide. Simultaneous acts by multiple persons may be considered independent, sufficient causes of a single result. Thus, multiple persons may be convicted of homicide even though there was only one death. A defendant who stabs a victim with hemophilia who bleeds to death is likely to be found guilty of homicide. Any preexisting conditions that make a person more susceptible to death are essentially disregarded. The defendant "takes the victim as he finds him."
A man and a woman were arrested and charged with conspiring to blow up a federal government building. After being given Miranda warnings, they were questioned separately and each of them gave a written confession. The confessions interlocked with each other, implicating both of the defendants as being involved in every stage of the conspiracy. Subsequently, the woman attempted to retract her confession, claiming that it was false. At a preliminary hearing, the judge rejected her claim. Both defendants were tried together, and the prosecutor introduced both confessions into evidence. At trial, the woman testified that she was not involved in any conspiracy and that her confession was fabricated. Both defendants were found guilty by the jury. The woman challenges her conviction on appeal because of the admission of the man's confession. If the woman succeeds, what is the likely reason? A The man's confession was more incriminatory to her than her own confession. B The jury was not instructed to consider the man's confession as evidence only of his guilt and not of the woman's. C The man refused to testify at trial and therefore was not subject to cross-examination regarding his confession. D The man testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination but denied making the confession attributed to him.
C. If the woman prevails in her challenge to the admission of the man's confession, it will be because the man could not be cross-examined regarding his confession. Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to confront adverse witnesses at trial. If two persons are tried together and one has given a confession that implicates the other, the right of confrontation generally prohibits the use of that statement because the other defendant cannot compel the confessing co-defendant to take the stand for cross-examination. A co-defendant's confession is inadmissible even when it interlocks with the defendant's own confession, which is admitted. If the man refused to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination, his confession was not properly admitted because it violated the woman's Confrontation Clause rights. (A) is incorrect because the fact that the man's confession incriminates the woman more than her own confession is not relevant. Just the interlocking nature of the man's confession with the woman's confession makes it more damaging by making it harder for the woman to claim that her confession was false. (B) is incorrect because the Supreme Court has held that instructing the jury to consider the confession only as going to the guilt of the confessing defendant is inadequate to avoid Confrontation Clause problems, because the risk that the jury will not follow the limiting instructions is too great in this context. (D) is incorrect. Confessions of a co-defendant may be admitted if (i) all portions referring to the other defendant can be eliminated (so that there is no indication of that defendant's involvement), (ii) the confessing defendant takes the stand and subjects himself to cross-examination regarding the truth or falsity of the statement, or (iii) the confession of the nontestifying co-defendant is being used to rebut the defendant's claim that his confession was obtained coercively, and the jury is instructed as to that purpose. Even if the co-defendant denies ever having made the confession, as stated in choice (D), the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the co-defendant satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
A student and a few of his friends were making their way to spring break. Along the way, the old van that they were driving broke down. Not wanting to miss any part of spring break festivities, the student asked the mechanic on duty at the repair shop for a rush job. The mechanic provided the student with a repair estimate, and the student, on the basis of the estimate, authorized the repair and promised to pay when he came back to pick up the van. When the mechanic called the student to tell him that the van was repaired, the student, rather than paying for the repair, told one of his friends that the mechanic had agreed to finance the repair charges and that the only thing left to do was pick up the van in the garage's parking lot. The student handed the friend a key to the van and told him to go pick the van up so that they could continue their trip to spring break. The friend did so. The mechanic makes a criminal complaint against the student for larceny of the van. If the case is prosecuted, will the student likely be found guilty? A No, because it was the student's van to begin with. B No, because the friend took the van. C Yes, because the friend took the van from the mechanic without the mechanic's knowledge or permission. D Yes, because the student promised to pay the mechanic for his work when he came to get the van.
C. The student will most likely be found guilty. Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the personal property of "another" with the intent to permanently deprive the other person of the property. It is possible to commit larceny of your own property if another person, such as a bailee, has a superior right to possession of the property at that time. Because the mechanic had a right to possession of the van until he was paid, the student committed larceny when he had his friend take the van without the mechanic's consent. (B) is wrong because a person can be guilty even though he did not personally engage in the behavior if he acts through an innocent agent. (D) is also incorrect. The student is guilty, but not for the reason stated in (D). He would be guilty even if he had not made the promise to pay for the van; he incurred an obligation to pay by having the repairs done.
A husband who believed that his wife was having an affair with his brother hired an arsonist to burn down the brother's house. They planned for the husband to take his brother to a ballgame so that the arsonist would be able to set the house on fire without detection. After the husband and brother left for the ballgame, however, the arsonist decided to abandon the plan and immediately left town without doing anything further. When the husband returned from the ballgame with the brother, he saw the house still standing and blurted out what was supposed to have happened. The husband and the arsonist were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit arson. At the arsonist's trial, his attorney argued that he was innocent of the conspiracy because he decided not to go ahead with the plan, and nothing criminal had in fact occurred. At common law, how should a jury find the arsonist? A Not guilty of conspiracy, because going to a ballgame is not a criminal overt act. B Not guilty of conspiracy, because the husband, not the arsonist, committed the overt act. C Guilty, because the husband executed his part of the plan. D Guilty, because the arsonist agreed to set the brother's house on fire.
D. The arsonist should be found guilty. A conspiracy is a combination or agreement between two or more persons to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful act by unlawful means. The mens rea required for conspiracy is specific intent, in that both parties must intend to agree to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose. Thus, once the arsonist was hired by the husband and they came up with a plan to burn down the brother's house, the crime of conspiracy was completed. (C) is incorrect because it implies that carrying out the plan by at least one party is required; the conspiracy was complete even before the husband fulfilled his duties under the plan. Note that, while most states now require an overt act for conspiracy, the common law version does not. (A) is incorrect. Even if an overt act were required, it need not be in and of itself criminal. (B) is also incorrect. If an overt act were required, it need only be performed by one of the co-conspirators, not necessarily the conspirator on trial.
Three thieves agreed to rob a bank. The first was to steal a car to be used for the getaway, the second agreed to procure weapons, and the third would check the bank for cameras. The car thief stole a car and parked it in a lot behind his girlfriend's apartment building. While visiting her the night before the robbery, the car thief suffered a series of convulsive seizures. He was rushed to the hospital where he was placed in the intensive care unit and heavily sedated. Meanwhile the two other thieves, unaware of their accomplice's illness, met and decided to rob the bank on their own, despite the absence of a getaway car and driver. They robbed the bank, but were quickly apprehended as they tried to escape and implicated the car thief under police questioning. The car thief can be charged with: A Theft of the car only. B Conspiracy to commit robbery and theft of the car only. C Robbery and theft of the car only. D Theft of the car, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery.
D. The car thief can be charged with theft, conspiracy, and robbery. The facts clearly show that the car thief is guilty of the theft of the car that was to be used for the getaway. Conspiracy requires: (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the intent to enter into the agreement; and (iii) the intent to achieve the objective of the agreement. Most states also require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The car thief conspired to commit robbery, because he entered into an agreement with the two other thieves to rob the bank, intending both to enter into such an agreement and to achieve the objective thereof. The car thief's theft of the car constituted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, the car thief can be charged with conspiracy. Furthermore, each member of a conspiracy is liable for the crimes of all other conspirators if: (i) such crimes were committed in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy; and (ii) such crimes were a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. A conspirator may limit his liability for subsequent acts of the other members of the conspiracy if he withdraws from the conspiracy by performing an affirmative act that notifies all members of the conspiracy in time for them to have the opportunity to abandon their plans. The car thief's absence from the robbery scene with the getaway car was due to his sudden illness, rather than any voluntary decision on his part to withdraw from the conspiracy. Thus, the car thief failed to make a legally effective withdrawal from the conspiracy. Certainly, the robbery of the bank, which was the sole object of the conspiracy, was a crime committed in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives and was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Therefore, the car thief is liable for this robbery committed by his co-conspirators. Because the car thief can properly be charged with all three crimes, (A), (B), and (C) are incorrect.
Acting on a hunch, a police officer went to a young woman's apartment, broke in, and searched it. The officer found exactly what she was looking for under the woman's bed: a sack filled with jewels. The attached note read, "Sweetheart, here are the goods from the estate heist. Your loving boyfriend." It was well known in the community that the woman's boyfriend was a jewel thief. The officer also knew that the estate of a local socialite had been burglarized three days ago. Just as the officer finished reading the note, the woman returned. The officer immediately placed the woman under arrest as an accessory to the estate burglary. Based on the evidence obtained from the woman's apartment, a search warrant was issued for her boyfriend's apartment. The search yielded burglar tools and more jewels from the estate. The boyfriend was immediately arrested and charged with the estate burglary. At the boyfriend's trial for the estate burglary, his attorney files a motion to suppress the evidence consisting of the bag of jewels and note, the tools, and the jewels from the boyfriend's apartment. How should the court rule on the motion? A Grant the motion as to the bag of jewels and note, but deny it as to the evidence found in the boyfriend's apartment. B Grant the motion, because all of this evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. C Deny the motion, because the police would have caught the boyfriend with the goods eventually. D Deny the motion, because the police had a warrant to search the boyfriend's apartment.
D. The court should deny the motion to suppress because the police had a warrant to search the boyfriend's home. The boyfriend's expectation of privacy extended only to his own home, which was searched under a warrant. He does not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of his girlfriend's apartment because her apartment was not his home, and he did not own it or have a right to possession of it. Thus, (A) is incorrect. Because the boyfriend cannot object to the search that provided the probable cause for the search of his apartment, (B) is also incorrect. (C) is not a valid justification because there is nothing to indicate that the seizure would fall under the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.
The defendant's neighbor owned an authentic major league baseball signed by Babe Ruth. The defendant asked if he could show it to some friends who were visiting. The neighbor agreed as long as he kept it in the display case, which the defendant promised to do. In fact, the defendant intended to use the ball in a pickup game. During the game, the ball was hit over the fence and into a yard with a guard dog, which had chewed up several other balls that had previously landed in the yard. The dog did the same to that ball. When the neighbor learned what happened to the ball, he pressed charges against the defendant. If the defendant is convicted, he will most likely be found guilty of what crime? A Common law larceny. B Embezzlement. C False pretenses. D Larceny by trick.
D. The defendant is guilty of larceny by trick because he obtained possession of the baseball by means of a misrepresentation. Larceny is the taking and carrying away of tangible personal property of another by trespass, with intent to permanently (or for an unreasonable time) deprive the person of her interest in the property. The taking must be without the consent of the person in possession of the property. If such consent is induced by a misrepresentation of a past or existing fact, the consent is not valid. The resulting larceny is called larceny by trick. Here, the defendant obtained possession of the baseball with the owner's consent. However, this consent was obtained by means of the defendant's misrepresentation about friends visiting. This was a false statement of an existing fact, made with the intent that his neighbor rely on the statement, and the misrepresentation induced his neighbor's consent. At the time of this taking, the defendant intended to deal with the baseball in a manner that involved a substantial risk of damage or loss. This suffices as intent to permanently deprive. Therefore, all the elements are in place for larceny by trick. (A) is not as good a choice as (D) because the taking in this case is better characterized as larceny by trick rather than larceny, given that the defendant induced his neighbor to consent to his taking possession of the baseball. (C) is incorrect because the defendant obtained only possession of the baseball, not title. False pretenses differs from larceny by trick in what is obtained. If the defendant obtains only possession of the property, the offense is larceny by trick, whereas obtaining of title means that false pretenses has been committed. What the victim intended to convey to the defendant is determinative. The neighbor intended only to let the defendant borrow the baseball for a short time, not to convey title to him. Consequently, the only thing the defendant obtained was possession of the baseball. Because title to the baseball was not obtained, there can be no conviction of false pretenses. Regarding (B), embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of property of another by a person in lawful possession of that property. In embezzlement, misappropriation occurs while the defendant has lawful possession of the property, while in larceny, it occurs generally at the time the defendant obtains wrongful possession of the property. Here, as detailed above, the defendant's taking of possession of the baseball was trespassory due to the manner in which he obtained consent to such possession. The crime of larceny was complete on the defendant's taking possession with the requisite intent to permanently deprive. Thus, at the time the baseball was destroyed, the defendant had already misappropriated it and was not in lawful possession of it. As a result, there can be no conviction for embezzlement.
Acting on an anonymous telephone call, police went to the defendant's apartment, knocked on the door, and demanded to search it for narcotics. When the defendant refused, the police forced the door open and placed him under arrest. As they were removing him from the apartment, the defendant offered to give the officers "valuable information" in exchange for his release. Before he could say anything else, the defendant was given Miranda warnings by the police. Thereafter, he told the police that he had stored some heroin in his friend's apartment and that he and his friend had been going to sell it. The heroin was recovered, and the defendant was prosecuted for conspiracy to sell narcotics and for possession of narcotics. At his trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements. Which of the following is the defendant's best argument in support of the motion to suppress? A The defendant is entitled to know the identity of his accuser, and the state cannot supply this information. B The police should have given the defendant Miranda warnings prior to entry into the apartment, and the warnings were ineffectual once the defendant offered to give the police information. C The defendant was intimidated by the forced entry into the apartment, and because the statements were involuntary and coerced, their use against him would violate due process of law. D The statements were fruits of an unlawful arrest, and though the Miranda warnings may have been sufficient to protect his right against self-incrimination, they were not sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest.
D. The entry into the defendant's apartment and his arrest, without a warrant, probable cause, or circumstances permitting an exception from these requirements, were unconstitutional. The statements he made thereafter were fruits of the original unconstitutional arrest and must be suppressed unless the taint was purged. The giving of Miranda warnings was not sufficient. Hence, (D) is the best answer. If probable cause for a warrant is based on information from an informer, usually that informer's identity need not be revealed. Thus, (A) is incorrect. (B) is a misstatement of law. There was no interrogation by the police to trigger the Miranda requirements. (C) is attractive but not as accurate an answer as (D). If the police had been acting with probable cause to arrest, their forced entry into the apartment would not have made the defendant's statements involuntary.
A motorist drove home from work late one night, and fell asleep behind the wheel of his car. His car drifted across the middle of the road and struck another car. The other driver was killed instantly in the collision. Angered by the noise of the collision, a homeowner fired a gun out the window of his house at the car. The bullet struck and killed a bystander. Both the motorist and the homeowner were arrested and charged with common law murder. Which of the defendants likely would be found guilty? A Both the motorist and the homeowner. B The motorist. C Neither the motorist nor the homeowner. D The homeowner.
D. The homeowner likely would be found guilty. At common law, murder was the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Malice aforethought could be established with any one of the following states of mind: intent to kill; intent to cause serious bodily harm; the depraved heart killing (a reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life); or the commission of a felony. The homeowner would be guilty of murder. Firing a gun out of his window at a car would demonstrate a reckless indifference to a high risk to human life. Thus, (B) and (C) are incorrect. It is unlikely that the motorist would be guilty of murder. While his action might be classified as negligent or even reckless, it would not represent a depraved heart (reckless indifference to life) state of mind. Thus, (A) and (B) are incorrect.
A wife suffered from a particularly virulent form of cancer, and had lapsed into a nearly comatose state. Because the doctors had indicated that any treatment they could prescribe would be of little value, her husband decided to administer various poisons to his wife, thinking that they might stimulate her natural body defenses, or kill the cancer cells, resulting in her recovery. He tried doses of many different types of poison. Despite his ministrations, his wife died three days later. An autopsy performed by the county coroner established the cause of death as cancer. If the husband is prosecuted for the murder of his wife, which of these is the best reason why he would be acquitted? A He was trying to save her life. B He did not have the necessary malice for his actions to constitute murder. C Medical science had given her up for dead. D He did not cause her death.
D. The husband cannot be convicted because he did not cause his wife's death. Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought. To be guilty of murder, the defendant's action must be both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the victim's death. The defendant's act will be a cause in fact of death if, but for the defendant's action, the victim would not have died as and when she did. Here, the victim would have died when she did even if the husband had not administered the poison, because she died not from the poison, but only from her cancer. Thus, the husband's actions were not the cause in fact of death, and (D) is correct. (A) and (B) are incorrect because if the other elements of murder are established, administering poison might be sufficient to establish malice aforethought. Malice aforethought for murder can be established by conduct done with the awareness of an unjustifiably high risk to human life, and the husband knew that the poisons were dangerous and could kill. (C) is incorrect because the law forbids shortening a life even for one second, so it is not a defense that medical science had given the victim up for dead. If the defendant's action in any way shortened the victim's life, he can be held liable for murder.
A 12-year-old girl entered a grocery store. When she believed that no one was looking, she grabbed two candy bars and concealed them under her coat. As she attempted to leave the store, a security guard employed by the store grabbed the girl by the arm. He told her, "You're too young to be a thief!" The girl began crying and blurted out, "I lost my lunch money on the way to school and I was really hungry!" If the girl is charged with shoplifting, what is the prosecution's best argument that her Miranda rights have not been violated by the security guard? A The guard's statement was not interrogatory. B It is discretionary whether to give juveniles Miranda warnings. C The girl has not yet been arrested and formally charged with any crime. D The security guard was not a government agent.
D. The prosecution's best argument is that, because the security guard was not a government agent, he need not have given the girl Miranda warnings. As a means of protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, a person must be informed prior to custodial interrogation that: (i) she has the right to remain silent; (ii) anything she says can be used against her in court; (iii) she has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (iv) if she cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for her if she so desires. These Miranda warnings must be given only if the detainee is being questioned by someone known to be working for the police. Here, the security guard is employed by a private business (the grocery store). Thus, since the guard was not required to inform the girl of the Miranda warnings, he could not possibly have violated the girl's Miranda rights. (A), (B), and (C) all reflect matters that would come into play only if the guard were a government agent. However, they would also be incorrect even if the guard were a government agent. (A) is incorrect because the guard's statement might be deemed to be interrogatory. "Interrogation" refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Although it is not an express question to say "You're too young to be a thief," such words are reasonably likely to bring forth some sort of incriminating response. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that the guard's statement was not interrogatory. (B) is incorrect because, in a delinquency proceeding, a juvenile must be afforded the right not to testify, including all aspects of the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda warnings are a very important aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, a juvenile court may determine that a child should be transferred to adult court for trial as an adult on criminal charges. Certainly, in such an instance, the requirement of Miranda warnings would be applicable. Consequently, regardless of whether a child is treated by the courts as a juvenile or an adult, it is incorrect to state that giving the Miranda warnings to juveniles is discretionary. (C) is incorrect because an actual arrest and formal charges are not a prerequisite to triggering the need for Miranda warnings. All that is required is that an interrogation be custodial in nature. An interrogation may be considered custodial if a reasonable person under the circumstances would feel that she is not free to terminate the interrogation and leave. The security guard grabbed the girl by the arm before making his statement. Thus, it could be argued that what followed was custodial interrogation, because the girl did not believe she was free to leave.
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