Criminal Law Units 1-3

R v White [1910] 2 KB 124

'But for the defendant's conduct, would the victim's death have occurred in the way that it did?'

R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61

'Substantial impairment' means 'important or weighty'.

Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL 38

A defendant was not to be treated as causing the victim to act in a certain way if the victim made a voluntary and informed decision to act in that way. Here, the defendant handed the victim the drugs.

Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 and Malcherek; Steel [1981] 2 All ER 422

A defendant will be the legal cause of the consequence if his conduct was the 'operating and substantial cause' of that result

R v O'Grady [1987] QB 995 and R v Hatton [2005] All ER (D) 308

A mistaken belief in the need for force is no defence if that mistake is based on voluntary intoxication where the defendant has chosen to take drink or drugs.

Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510

A police officer who catches hold of a person, not for the purpose of arresting him but in order to detain him for questioning, is acting unlawfully.

R v Ireland; Burstow

ABH includes psychiatric harm

Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277

Actus reus must be voluntarily performed. A driver's conduct in driving dangerously might be involuntary if he was stunned by a blow on the head from a stone, or if he was attacked by a swarm of bees.

White (1910) and Mitchell [1983] QB 741

But for test

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821

Confirmed that doctors should seek court permission before withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment such as artificial feeding. Confirmed that if a patient has refused life-saving treatment, for example for religious reasons, not only is a doctor released from their duty to act but they would be committing a criminal offence of assault if they did. There is still no legal right for a doctor to take positive steps for the purpose of ending a patient's life, for example by deliberately administering an overdose of medication to a terminally-ill person.

R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212

Consent can be a defence to activities such as ritual circumcision, tattooing and ear-piercing (but not more extreme body modifications), even though harm is caused. The law does not permit a person to consent to serious harm being caused to them for the purpose of sexual gratification.

Burrell v Harmer [1967] Crim LR 196

Consent is only valid if it is freely given by a fully informed and competent adult. Consent obtained from a minor is invalid

R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411

Defendants take their victims as they find them.

R v Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670

Dor AR of homocide, the acceleration of death must be 'significant'. I.e. 'more than negligible'.

R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359

Established 'transferred malice'.

DPP v Smith (1961)

GBH means really serious harm

DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290

GBH means really serious harm

Moriarty v Brooks (1834)

Held that in order to constitute a wound, the continuity of the whole skin must be broken.

R v Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37

If a contract of employment specifies certain obligations to act, a failure to comply with those obligations can lead to criminal liability.

R v Miller [1983] 1 All ER 978

If you create a dangerous situation, you are criminally liable if you do not act.

R v Moloney [1985] 1 AC 905 (HL); R v Hancock and Shankland [1986] 1 AC 455 (HL); R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 (CA); and R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL).

Indirect intent: Was the consequence virtually certain to occur from the defendant's act (or omission)? If so, did the defendant foresee the consequences as virtually certain to occur?

M'Naghten's Case (1843) [1843-60] All ER Rep 229

Insanity defence

R v P [2005] EWCA Crim 1960

It acknowledges horseplay as a scenario where consent can afford a defence, even where serious - and even fatal - injury results. It seems that with the right evidence, the consent of the victim, or, indeed, an honest belief in consent on the part of the defendant, can afford a defence to a charge of manslaughter.

Zebedee [2013] 1 Cr App R (S) 37

Looking after your father with dementia will not constitute 'circumstances of an extremely grave character'

R v Malcherek and Steel [1981] 1 WLR 690

Lord Lane CJ stated the generally accepted legal definition of death as: '... the irreversible death of the brain stem, which controls the basic functions of the body such as breathing. When that occurs it is said that the body has died, even though by mechanical means the lungs are being caused to operate and some circulation of blood is taking place.'

R v Moloney [1985] 1 AC 905

Murder: either an intention to kill [express malice] or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm [implied malice].

R v Savage/Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699

OAPA offences. To satisfy the mens rea element of "maliciously," it is not necessary to demonstrate that the defendant intended the level of harm inflicted. It is sufficient that the accused foresaw that some physical harm to some person, no matter of how minor a character envisaged, might result from the conduct.

Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 and Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82

Oblique intent does not involve a person's aim or purpose, nor does it involve the desire to do an act. It does, however, require the defendant to foresee the consequences of his actions as virtually certain to occur

R v Cunningham (1957)

Recklessness is subjective

Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 341

Recklessness test is objective. Overruled in R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034.

R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396

Recklessness test is subjective. Did the defendant foresee the harm that in fact occurred, might occur from his actions, but nevertheless continue regardless of the risk.

R v Larsonneur (1933) 97 JP 206

Sometimes, the defendant will fulfil the actus reus of an offence in circumstances over which they have no control. In other words, there are some offences that can be established if a certain state of affairs exists. Here, a French citizen was deported from Ireland to England against her will. She was convicted of an offence of being found illegally in the United Kingdom despite the fact that she had no choice in the matter.

Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328

The Court distinguished Richardson and held that, in this case, the complainants had consented to the nature of the act (the touching) because they thought that it was for a medical purpose, but they had not consented to its quality as indecent behaviour.

R v Melin [2019] EWCA Crim 557

The Court of Appeal held that 'it would be undesirable for the law to treat all false or fraudulent representations as vitiating consent because that would lead to, at least potentially, trivial lies about the person or the conduct ... as giving rise to criminal liability' (at [29]). However, the Court distinguished Richardson [1998] 2 Cr App R 200 and held that 'there may be cases where a person's identity is inextricably linked to his or her professional status' (at [30]). In this case, there was 'potentially a deception as to identity rather than merely qualifications or attributes' (at [33]).

Thabo-Meli v R [1954] 1 All ER 373

The Privy Council rejected the defendant's argument that the actus reus and the mens readid not coincide, stating that the acts were to be viewed as one series of acts carried out in order to achieve the defendant's plan.

Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462

The burden of proving that a defendant is guilty of a criminal offence usually rests with the prosecution

Richardson [1998] 2 Cr App R 200

The consent of patients was not valid if it had been obtained by fraud as to the identity of the defendant, but this did not extend to lying about one's qualifications.

Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321

The defendant must suffer a total loss of voluntary control to plead the defence of automatism.

Holland (1841) 2 Mood & R 351

The defendant will not be absolved of liability on the basis that the victim could have done more to minimise the risk of death.

R v Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 119

The doctrine of transferred malice will only apply if the actus reus committed is the same type of crime as the defendant originally had in mind.

Donovan [1934] All ER 207 and Attorney General's Reference (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057.

The general rule is that consent is only a defence to assault and battery. Consent is no defence to any injury amounting to ABH

Jewel [2014]

The loss of control is 'a loss of the ability to act in accordance with considered judgment or a loss of normal powers of reasoning'

Cato[1976] 1 WLR 110, Notman [1994] Crim LR 518, and Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35

The prosecution must prove that the defendant's conduct was a more than minimal cause of the prohibited consequence.

R v Clarke and Morabir [2013] EWCA Crim 162

The question of legal causation is left to the jury to decide as a matter of common sense

Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411

The thin skull rule extends beyond mere physical conditions and encompasses religious beliefs. Here, a Jehovah's Witness was injured and refused a blood transfusion. She died from loss of blood.

R v Broughton [2020] EWCA Crim 1093

There can be concurrent causes of death. The prosecution must prove that the defendant's act (or omission) was a significant contributory cause of death, rather than the sole or principal cause of death.

R v Bird [1985] 2 All ER 513

There is no rule of law which states that the defendant must retreat before resorting to self- defence, nor do they have to wait for their assailant to hit them first

Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994] 2 All ER 403

There may be emergency situations where prior approval of withdrawing treatment is impracticable.

R v Hayward (1908)

Thin skull rule. Where the victim suffers from some latent, pre-existing physical condition, which renders him unusually susceptible to injury, the defendant remains liable for the consequences of his conduct, no matter how unusually serious they are.

Re MB (An Adult) (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541.

Those with a mental disorder or learning difficulty may lack sufficient capacity to give consent

R v Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329

To be given the protection of the law of homicide the child must be wholly expelled from the mother's body and be alive

Wiffin v Kincard (1807) 2 Bos & PNR 471; Coward v Baddeley (1859) 4 H & N 478. Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 WLR 562

Touching a person for the purpose of engaging his attention has been held to be acceptable

R v Brown (Richard) [2013] UKSC 43

UKSC emphasised the importance of the presumption of mens rea, stating that it was a 'constitutional principle' that should only be displaced where the statutory wording was either very clear or it was an 'unmistakably necessary implication'.

R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690

Victim suffered an acid attack and later requested voluntary euthanasia. The doctors lawfully administered it and the defendant was charged with murder. The intervening acts of the victim and doctors were 'a direct response to the inflicted injuries and to the circumstances created by them for which the defendant was responsible'

R v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281

Voluntary intoxication cannot, on its own, establish diminished responsibility

R v Le Brun [1991] 4 All ER 673

Where the unlawful application of force and the eventual act causing death are part of the same sequence of events, the fact there was a lapse in time between the two did not enable the defendant to escape liability.

R v Ruffell [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 330

You can be liable for an omission where responsibility is assumed. Here, a friend reviving another who took drugs.

R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354

You can be liable for an omission where responsibility is assumed. Here, taking in a relative to live with you.

R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134

You can be liable for an omission where there is a special relationship. Here - a father and child.

R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706

a person's consent to the risks of contracting the HIV virus can only provide a defence to an assault charge if their consent is informed.

R v Miller [1954]

defined ABH as 'any hurt of injury calculated to interfere the health or comfort of the victim' e.g. minor broken bones, bruising, sprains, scratches

Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132.

f a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, judges must read in words appropriate to require mens rea.

Dear [1996] Crim LR 595

he defendant would be liable if his conduct 'made an operative and significant contribution to the death'. As long as the defendant's act was a cause of the victim's death, it did not matter that it was not the sole cause. Here, bleeding had stopped, and then started again for an unknown cause. (Suggested the victim did it).

R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279

in law, the defendant's act need not be the sole cause, or even the main cause, of the victim's death, it being enough that his act (or omission) contributed significantly to that result ...

R v Dica [2004] 3 All ER 593

just because the victims consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant, that did not mean they had consented to any risk of infection from that sexual intercourse. The question of whether the victims had consented was a question of fact for the jury to decide.

R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844

only where the negligent medical treatment was: ... so independent of [the defendant's] acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that [the jury] regard the contribution made by [the defendant's] acts as insignificant ...will the defendant be said not to have caused the victim's death.

Clinton; Parker; Evans [2012] EWCA Crim 2

sexual infidelity may be considered as part of the contextual background to a case where there is another potential qualifying trigger, but it may not be considered as a potential qualifying trigger in itself.

H v CPS

the court rejected the submission that teachers in special needs schools must by their post 'impliedly consent' to the use of violence against them by pupils.

R v Wood [2008] 2 Cr App R 507

the defence of diminished responsibility was not precluded by the mere fact that the defendant consumed alcohol voluntarily before committing the fatal act. In deciding whether the defendant's mental responsibility for the killing was substantially impaired as a result of his alcoholism, the jury should focus exclusively on the effect of the alcohol consumed as a direct result of the defendant's illness and ignore the effect of any alcohol consumed voluntarily