Democratic transition
Top down transition game
According to this game, we should never see top down transitions to democracy!•So what does this game tell us?•Transitions happen when leaders miscalculate the strength of the opposition.
Top down from the bottom up?
Anti-regime protests can coerce top down transitions •Threatening regimes and forcing concessions as a survival strategy•Forming elite splits between hard-liners and soft-liners resulting in negotiated concessions. •Encouraging coups and coercing concessions from the new leader.
apply tipping models
Arab Spring•Began in Tunisia following the self-immolation of a protester in December 2010.•Protests spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.•"Twitter revolution"•Allowed the coordination of protests and interaction with the outside world.•However, governments can also use social media.
collapse
At the time, the collapse of communism came as a complete surprise to almost everyone.•Communist regimes seemed very stable. There had been very few uprisings or revolts in Eastern Europe.•Berlin uprising in 1953•Poland's National Road to Socialism in 1956•Hungary 1956•Czechoslovakia in 1968•Poland 1981
game
Broadened dictatorships with quasi-democratic institutions are increasingly common among dictatorships.•While some see this as a positive sign, others mention the stability of these "hybrid" regimes.•Dictators with multiparty legislatures and elections stay in office longer on average
example
Cameroon •Paul Biya (1982-present)•Single party rule from 1966 to 1992•Cameroon National Union (Ahmadou Ahidjo)•Personalist authoritarian regime under Paul Biya.
apply tipping models
Collapse of communism•Structural changes in the 1980s lowered revolutionary thresholds.•Gorbachev and his policies of reform•Poor economic performance•Gorbachev's statement of non-intervention•Demonstration effects and revolutionary diffusion•Success in one country produces revolutionary cascades in others.•Inevitability of communism's collapse?•Pent-up pool of opposition waiting to break out?•But remember, preference falsification works both ways!
East Germany, 1989
Collective action theory can help explain why protests are relatively rare, but it does not explain why the protests that eventually brought down communism occurred in 1989.•Participation, not non-participation, is thus the puzzle we will focus on now.
East Germany seemed particularly stable.
Communist government in the German Democratic Republic was one of the most hard-line in Eastern Europe.•No real crisis since the Berlin Uprising in 1953, when protests calling for the resignation of the communist government were met with force and martial law.•Huge secret police force called the Stasi.•One officer for every 90 citizens!•2.4 per 1000 citizens in the US (2011)•East Germany was relatively prosperous compared to other Eastern European countries.
Bottom up transitions
Crowds and protests have been important in other transitions to democracy.•Overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986•End of South Korea's military dictatorship in 1987•Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989•Overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania in 1989•Arab Spring protests in Tunisia in 2011
Conclusion
Democratic transitions can occur through either bottom up or top down processes. •Collective action problems•Preference falsification•Incomplete information on opposition strength•However, top down processes often involve a bottom up component. •Nonviolent citizen movements are more conducive to democratic transitions than violent citizen movements. •Violent movements often lead to new autocracies.
Top down transitions
Democratic transitions initiated by authoritarian regimes. •Often attempts to broaden the base of support for the authoritarian regime. •Democratic transitions can happen when leaders miscalculate.
Tipping models
Despite preference falsification, there is probably a size of protest at which people would be willing to reveal their true preferences.•Reason: As protests become larger, it becomes harder for dictatorships to monitor and punish each individual.•We will refer to the protest size at which an individual is willing to participate as her "revolutionary threshold."•Naturally, individuals have different revolutionary thresholds.•Low thresholds vs. high thresholds
Collective action problem formally
Equilibrium 1: No one participates•If no one is participating, no one will want to individually deviate by participating because they will pay the cost of participating but the one-person rally will be a failure.•Equilibrium 2: Exactly K people participate•If exactly K people participate, none of the participants will want to individually deviate by staying home, because the rally will fail, and none of the non-participants will want to participate because the rally is already successful without them.
Collective action theory
Focuses on explaining collective action (or a lack thereof) •Examples of collective action•Protests•Strikes •Civil war•Elections•Typically, collective action concerns the pursuit of "public goods" by groups of individuals.
Eventual collapse of communism in East Germany had much to do with the election of Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union in 1985.•
Glasnost•Political openness•Perestroika•limited economic liberalization•These reforms were meant to save the Soviet Union.•However, Gorbachev's reforms ended up encouraging reformists and opposition groups in Eastern Europe.
Garbachev
Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would not intervene in East Germany.•Eventually, the East German government responded to the growing protests by opening the Berlin Wall in November 1989.•In March 1990, multiparty elections were held and won by parties promoting reunification.•Reunification finally took place in October 1990.
Difference between K and N
If K = N, then there is no incentive to free-ride.•Everyone must participate to obtain the public good and everyone knows this. Thus, the public good will be attained.•If K < N, then there is an incentive to free-ride.•All know that their contribution may not be necessary. If enough people free-ride, then the public good will not be obtained.•The larger the difference between K and N, the greater the incentive to free-ride.•Only a few people are required to contribute, so why not be a free-rider?
The decision to not participate is very appealing.
If the pro-democracy rally fails, you will not have paid any costs or run the risk of incurring the dictatorship's wrath.•If the pro-democracy rally succeeds, you can "free-ride" on the participation of others because everyone gets to benefit from the establishment of democracy whether they participated or not.•This is the basic logic of the collective action problem.
Would you participate?
Imagine a group of N individuals.•If K people contribute or participate, then the public good is provided.•If the public good is provided, all group members get the benefit, B.•If a group member contributes or participates, then he or she pays a cost, C.•To capture the notion that the public good provides more benefits than the cost of participating, we'll assume that B > C.•
Implications
In some circumstances, small shifts in thresholds produce revolutionary cascades. In others, no cascade occurs.•Somewhat problematic for structural explanations that argue revolutions and protests are caused by relative deprivation, grievances, or oppression.•Recessions may shift revolutionary thresholds, but those shifts may not produce a revolution.•Preference falsification means that the distribution of revolutionary thresholds is unknown to individuals in society.•We could be on the brink of revolution and not know it.•Makes prediction extremely difficult.
Size of N
Influences the likelihood that you think of yourself as critical to successful collective action.•Should you run the risk of participating in a pro-democracy protest if N is large?•What if few are protesting?•What if many are already protesting?•Suggests that small groups may be more powerful than large groups.•Challenges the common concern in democratic theory that the majority will tyrannize and exploit the minority.
Preference falsification elsewhere
Iraq under Saddam Hussein•North Korea since independence (1948)
Citizen movements and democratization
Is there general evidence that anti-regime citizen movements bring about democratic change?•Democratic transitions require a two-step process•Overthrowing the authoritarian regime•Installing democracy
Preference falsification
Kuran (1991) writes that people in East Germany "routinely applauded speakers whose message they disliked, joined organizations whose mission that they opposed, and signed defamatory letters against people they admired."•Preference falsification provides another reason why protests were so rare in Eastern Europe.
Hungary
Made cautious moves to ease censorship and legalize an independent trade union in 1989.•Soviet Union did not respond•Hungarian Communist Party renamed itself the Socialist Party•The country changed its name to the Republic of Hungary•Multiparty elections were scheduled for 1990
A public good has two characteristics
Non-excludable: If the good is provided, everyone gets to enjoy it. Nobody can be excluded from it.•Non-rivalrous: If someone consumes the good, there is still just as much for everyone else to consume.•Examples: Lighthouse, fire station, national park, democracy, etc.
East Germany
Polish "Roundtable talks" between government and the opposition group Solidarity began in 1988. •Solidarity, an independent trade union, was legalized. •Nationwide elections were held, electing the first non-communist Prime Minister in Eastern Europe in 40 years. •Success in Poland gave hope to others in Eastern European communist dictatorships.
game
Potential reforms to broaden support for the dictatorship:•Allowing multiple political parties, holding elections, writing a constitution, opening a legislature to multiple parties, establishing a judiciary, etc.•Reforms are meant to co-opt and divide the opposition•This goal can be called broadened dictatorship.
history of the top down game
Prehistory of the game•Something disrupts the authoritarian regime•Declining economy, social unrest, etc.•Soft-liners and hard-liners are divided over what to do about the disruption to the popularity of the authoritarian regime.•Hard liners support the status quo•Soft liners promote reforms that broaden support for the dictatorship
East Germany, 1989
Protests in Berlin and Leipzig in 1989 forced the East German government to open up the Berlin Wall and allow free elections. •The end result was German reunification. •From our vantage point, the collapse of communism in East Germany, and Eastern Europe more generally, is seen as inevitable. But...
Tipping models
Start with an individual who must choose whether to publicly support or oppose the dictatorship.•The individual has a private and a public preference.•Her private preference is her attitude toward the dictatorship.•Her public preference is the attitude toward the dictatorship that she reveals to the outside world.•It can be dangerous to reveal opposition to a dictatorship. Individuals thus have an incentive to falsify preferences.
Results
The differences between society A and society B show that a slight shift in one person's threshold can produce a revolutionary cascade.•Two more examples•C = {0,2,3,3,4,5,6,7,8,10}•Result?•D = {0,1,3,3,4,5,6,7,8,10}•Result?
example
The distribution of revolutionary thresholds is crucial to determining whether a revolution occurs or not.•Do we expect a revolution to occur in society A?A={0,2,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10}
change
Things began to change in East Germany when Hungary decided to open its border with Austria.•Thousands of East Germans fled to the West across Hungary's border.•East German officials confiscate their passports •A fledgling opposition group called the New Forum started organizing protests in Leipzig and Berlin.•Change in slogans from "We want to leave!" to "We are staying here"•Gorbachev attended an East German anniversary parade in 1989. •Crowds chanted for help from Gorbachev!•East German leader Erich Honecker soon ordered protesters to be shot. •East German Politburo overruled the order and ousted Honecker.
Public goods are clearly desirable (for most).
This might make you think that individuals who are likely to benefit from public goods would be enthusiastic contributors to the provision of that good.•In other words, you might expect groups of individuals with common interests to act collectively to achieve those interests.
Collective action problem formally
Thus, for a pro-democracy rally to succeed, exactly K individuals must believe that they, and only they, are likely to participate.•This suggests that two factors are crucial for determining the likely success of collective action:•The difference between K and N•The size of N
Top down transition game
Two groups within an authoritarian regime•Hard liners•Soft liners
Why was unification problematic?
Unification involves economies as well.•Essentially, monetary unification was equivalent to an enormous one-time subsidy to East Germans.•This also drastically increased the money supply.•Similar to the Eurozone crisis today, a fixed exchange rate (EMS) made responding to economic shocks difficult.
What if we change the revolutionary thresholds
What if we change the revolutionary thresholds. What happens here:B={0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10}
An example
magine a 10 person society (A) with the following threshold sequence:•A = {0,2,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10}•T1 = 0: always supports the opposition•T5 = 4: supports the government if the size of the protest is less than 4, but supports the opposition if size ≥ 4.•T10 = 10: always supports the government.
bottom up process
people rise to overthrow an authoritiatirian regime in a popular revolution
Bottom up transitions
process in which the people rise up to overthrow an authoritarian regime in a popular revolution;East Germany, 1989
However,
there are compelling reasons to doubt whether individuals will take collective action to achieve their common interests.•The difficulty that groups have in providing public goods that all members of the group desire is known as the collective action problem or free-rider problem.
Citizen movements and democratization
•Tactics are important•Nonviolent versus violent tactics•Costs of participation•Costs of repression•Perceived legitimacy •Organizational structure•Location •Governance costs
top down
dictatorial ruling elite introduces liberlizing reforms that ultimately lead to a democractic transitino
Applying the collective action problem to East German protests.
Would you join a pro-democracy protest or would you stay at home?•You know that one person is unlikely to be the decisive factor in determining whether the protest is going to be successful.•You also know that it is costly to participate in the protest.
