DV400 Development in Theory and Practice

Runge (1986) "Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development"

1. Although common property has proved to be a stable form of resource management in some traditional societies, the combination of population growth, technological change, climate and political forces has destabilized many existing property institutions 2. Argues that common property may be as viable as private property on grounds of both efficiency and equity 3. In developed economics of the West, the substantial social overhead necessary for a system of private rights is often hidden from view 4. The free-rider problem may not be as extreme as is sometimes thought

Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock(2013) "Escaping capability traps through problem driven iterative adaptation (PDIA)"

1. "Isomorphic mimicry": the tendency to introduce reforms that enhance an entity's external legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably improve performance, is one reason for the failure of development in state building: these strategies add up to "capabilities traps" 2. Once the "capability trap" is sprung there is no incentive—and often no possibility—for any one organization or leader or front-line agent to break out 3. Proposes the "Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation" (PDIA) which argues that activities should aim to solve particular problems in particular local contexts, as nominated and prioritized by local actors, via the creation of an "authorizing environment" for decision-making which gives rise to incremental reforms focused on addressing problems frequently result in hybrid combinations of elements that work together to get the job done

Zoomers (2011) "Introduction: Rushing for Land: Equitable and sustainable development in Africa, Asia and Latin America"

1. 'Foreignization' of space is driven by the acquisition of land for biofuels, food and nature conservation and in many cases, land transfers take place in a context of informal property rights; situations often lack transparency and sometimes end up in conflict situations 2. Adaptation purchases to meet climate change: attempts by some countries to gain possession of new territories ahead of the rise in sea level

Fischer (2012) "the Perils of Paradigm Maintenance in the Face of Crisis"

1. 1982 debt crisis market beginning of return to US global hegemony (Economic, Political and Militaristic) 2. Increase in international & liquidity (60s) due to US fiscal deficits routed in the disequilibria related to breakdown of Bretton Woods caused crisis. Oil shocks (73) convenient scapegoat 3. Latin America fell into crisis only after U.S. changed game (1980s) by sharply raising interest rates - Breakdown of international markets & abrupt changes in conditions/rules for international lending 4. Greenspan then Bernanke repeated this blame in 2008 (blamed Chinese capital surplus inflation) - but, until 2004 Chinese surplus grew slowly, US debt has been growing quickly for sometime 5. Economics (e.g. Krugman & Wade) give rightful attention to these global imbalances - they do not address power structures of production, distribution, & ownership that create them.

Palma (2009) "The Revenge of the Market on Rentiers"

1. 2008 crisis is an outcome of use of 'neo-liberalism' as tool for capitalist growth without compulsion. 'Tool' effective into trans. state into a facilitator of growing rent-seeking oligopolistic practices 2. 'Neo-liberal counter rev. (Marxist perspective) as attempt to shift economy to 'unstable equilibrium'. Created environment where capital could exercise more effective politics of dispossession and a more rent-seeking form of accumulation (Natural Selection: environment best suited to capitalisms' features) 3. Foucaultian view: Neo-liberalism as a new and effective tool of power 4. Need to shift from current neo-liberal state of affiars in which 'state under surveillance of the market' to Keynesian one where 'market under surveillance of state' (Foucalt) 5. 'Low intensity democracy' now effective instrument to block any attempt to implement progressive nationalist development agendas, or exercise of Keynesian or more radical form of state agency

Stewart & Brown (2009) "Fragile States"

1. 3 ways a state can become 'fragile': Authority failure, Service-entitlement failure (state fouls to provide basic services) and Legitimacy failure 2. There is an 'inverted-U' relationship between democracy and conflict, suggest conflict is less likely in authoritarian & establish democracy states: most common in transitioning. 3. There is an interrelationship between HR & fragility that can flow either way. 4. Service entitlement failures (particularly relating to poverty & HIs) strongly linked to conflict especially in countries where percentage of population suffering from HIs is high. 5. One relatively easy way for state to move away from fragility is through the promotion of legitimacy - because this does not typically cost economic resources.

Chang (2002) "Kicking Away The Ladder

1. According to the Washington Consensus, developing countries should adopt a set of "good policies" and "good institutions" to improve their economic performance 2. These policies and institutions are very different from the ones the developed world previously relied on 3. Rather, developed countries grew through implementing high tariffs and sectoral industrial policies, lagging in the introduction of democratic reforms, stealing industrial technologies from one another, not having independent central banks, and so on 4. Developed countries are hypocritical when they seek to deny developing countries access to these same policy tools and when they urge them to adopt democratic reforms and protect intellectual property

Mkandawire (2005) "Maladjusted African Economies and Globalization"

1. Africa is being globalized, but under what conditions is the process taking place, and why, despite such relatively high levels of integration into the world economy, has growth faltered? 2. While there is some evidence that IMF interventions 'worked' in Africa, the types of intervention taken means that the countries who took them saw/see no long term benefit 3. Rather than being indebted, many African countries are net creditors vis-à-vis the rest of the world because their private external assets (as measured by cumulative capital flight) are greater than their public external debts

Calhoun (2011) "From the Current Crisis to Possible Futures"

1. Analyzing 2008 crisis through conc. frame. that shaped financialization itself was a choice 2. Referring to crisis as 'global' obscures that it was simply a moment of acceleration in longer-term shift in econonomic momentum from West to East, possibly North to South 3. 'Post-industrialisation' exported economic leverage to developing countries, became basis for growing debt. 4. Globalisation could better be described as regionalisation - E.U. trade blocs etc. 5. Globalisation has given rise to geopolitics (role of religion, 9/11, etc) is a reminder that 'the spreading of markets' is not the only consequence of growing connections

Amsden (2010) "Say's Law, Poverty Persistence, and Employment Neglect"

1. Argues that Sen's belief surrounding increasing freedoms will only lead to a situation of more free unemployed people: "May simply force people to 'hire' themselves at starvation wages, as in many micro-enterprises" 2. Grass roots methods of poverty alleviation will fail unless jobs are created or stimulated by governments 3. Three Changes to Increase Productive Employment: heavy reliance on volunteer, unpaid labor must be replaced with non-voluntary organizations; strengthening of the alliance between grassroots activists who are not hostile to government intervention and the government; tie foreign aid to job creation (For every dollar spent on poverty alleviation, a dollar should be spent in the poorest regions on employment creation)

Blackden et al. (2006) "Gender and growth in sub-Saharan Africa"

1. Argues that gender inequality acts as a significant constraint to growth in sub-Saharan Africa, and that removing gender-based barriers to growth will make a substantial contribution to realizing Africa's economic potential 2. The importance of gender issues may not be as directly visible as some other issues affecting growth, due to the fact that a considerable share of the economic contribution of women is not included in national income aggregates and income-based poverty measures

Cincotta (2009) "Half a chance: Youth bulges and transitions to liberal democracy"

1. Argues that recent leveling-off in measures of global democracy is temporary, and as youthful demographic profiles mature, new and more stable liberal democracies are likely to arise before 2020 in Latin America, North Africa, and Asia 2. In places where democratization occurred after the decline of youth-bulge (East Asia) democracy was stable, where democratization occurred before youth bulge shrinkage (Fiji, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, etc.) democracy failed to stabilize

Collier & Dercon (2014), "African Agriculture in 50 Years: Smallholders in a Rapidly Changing World?"

1. Argues that the current agendas for developing Africa's agriculture, which favors large-holder farming, is unlikely to bring about adequate changes 2. Economies of scale for technology in agriculture is not a given: there are plenty of examples of failed technology in large scale framing having to do with governance, the wrong technology (e.g. groundnut scheme) or political considerations 3. Most agricultural technologies (such as fertilizer of improved seeds) are scale-neutral 4. High transactions costs in agricultural markets, combined with large price fluctuations, affecting incentives for smallholder productivity growth more than it would large-holders 5. The authors argument that there is a good case for commercial agriculture, at a larger scale, does not extend to mega-farms

Sumner (2012) "Where do the Poor Live?"

1. Argues that the distribution of global poverty has changed and that most of the world's poor no longer live in countries officially classified as low-income countries and instead live in middle-income countries (MICs) 2. Given the recent changes to middle-income status, the author assess whether the global poverty "problem" has substantially changed in its nature 3. Most of the countries moving from LIC to MIC status in the last decade had actually achieved MIC status previously (in the 1990s) but slipped back to LIC status at least once

Duflo (2012) "Women empowerment and economic development"

1. Argues that the interrelationships between women's empowerment and economic development are too weak to be self- sustaining, and that policy commitment to equality for its own sake is needed to bring about equality between genders 2. There is a bidirectional relationship between economic development and women's empowerment: development alone can play a major role in driving down gender inequality and continued gender discrimination can hinder development (Sen)

Davis, K & van den Oever (1982) "Demographic foundations of new sex roles"

1. Asks whether all ascription of status on the basis of sex will disappear or whether some division of labor between men and women will be retained 2. Social responses to sex imbalances in marriage: argues all would fail because hypergamy is too deeply rooted in the species to be extirpated by legislation

Dyson (2012) "On demographic and democratic transitions"

1. Before the demographic transition, all political systems were mainly autocratic 2. The emergence of democracy occurs during the second half of the demographic transition, once birth rates have dropped and well after mortality rates have dropped 3. While some authors (e.g., Moore 1967; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001) argue that urbanization is linked to democratization, others (e.g., Huntington 1968) find that large amounts of urban poor can be receptive to authoritarianism 4. In general, countries that experienced larger increases in median age became more democratic

Booth & Unsworth (2014) "Politically smart, locally led development"

1. Being "politically smart" means that actors must be political informed of the environments they work in and politically astute, which refers to ways of working that use information about the politics (including political economy) with intelligence and creativity 2. Locally led initiatives entail being locally owned (focused on issues and problems that have local salience) and locally negotiated and delivered (giving priority to local leadership and local capacity in the search for solutions to contextually identified problems)

Wade (1989) "What Can Economics Learn from East Asian Success?"

1. Capital accumulation matters: measured by the amount of paid hours by unskilled male laborer to by one quintal of food rain (300 considered to be famine). The fastest growers also tended to have the highest levels of investment 2. Protection can help the emergence of internationally competitive industries. Author shows that cited "low" protection in japan is incorrect, japan did not have unusually low protection (13% cited 49% actual according to wade) 3. Sectoral industrial policy which lead the market can improve upon the growth outcome of self adjusting markets. Because changes in the real exchange also affect non tradable (like labour( a change in the real exchange also means a change in the real wage.

Kohli (2004) "State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery"

1. Challenges neoclassical economics framework in discussions on the critical role of the 'development state' and the nature of state-society coalitions in development. 2. Distinguishes between "Cohesive Capitalistic states" (e.g. Korea), neopatrimonial states (Nigeria) and "fragmented, multi-class states" (India) - strong focus on colonialism 3. Case of Korea (under Japanese colonialism) seems to contradict Sen's "development as freedom" 4. Cohesive Capitalist State most effective for rapid industrialization because they favor business and can succeed in keeping out competing (the workers) interests.

Péclard & Mechoulan (2015) "Rebel governance and the politics of Civil War"

1. Civil wars do not simply destroy political orders, they contribute to shaping and producing them, they are part and parcel of processes of state formation 2. Rebel movements must be viewed not simply through the lens of their military strength, capacities and activities, but also as political actors exerting power over civilian populations 3. Peace-building treated "peace as an uncontroversial, ahistoric 'end', and peace-building as the means to get there" 4. Civil wars need to be seen as part and parcel of historical processes of state formation and not, as the expression of states' inability to maintain their monopoly over the use of violence, or as the result of their structural "weakness"

Harrison & Sundstrom (2007) "The Comparative Politics of Climate Change"

1. Climate change represents a "tragedy of the commons" on a global scale 2. Central to the Kyoto discussions for each country was a desire to address the common pool problem, but in a way that did not entail accepting greater costs than other parties 3. Hw political institutions affect an issue (like climate change) rely on the ways in which electoral systems express voters' interests, and the degree to which institutions concentrate or diffuse authority

World Bank: World Development Report 2011

1. Conflict-affected states often begin their recovery from lower development levels than is "natural," given their human and physical capital 2. Violence today comes in many forms and on many sub-national levels 3. Violence often recurrent: many countries now experiencing repeated cycles of civil conflict/ criminal violence (Every civil war that began since 2003 was a resumption of a previous civil war) 4. Violence is often linked to other violence, sometimes through underlying institutional weaknesses 5. The direct impact of violence falls primarily on young males, the majority of fighting forces, but women and children often suffer disproportionately from indirect effects

Frank (1966) "The Development of Underdevelopment"

1. Contemporary underdevelopment is a product of a history of interactions between underdeveloped countries and metropolises: not solely produced by underdeveloped economies, policies etc. 2. Historical evidence suggests underdeveloped countries must develop independently of their relationship with global metropolises. 3. Policy recommendations based on "dual society thesis" will only make things worse. 4. Underdevelopment was/is produced by capitalism (which also produced development) 6. Author agrees with reversal of fortunes hypothesis: "The regions which are the most underdeveloped today are the ones which had closest ties with the metropolises of the past"

Rodrik (2008) "Normalizing Industrial Policy: Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper"

1. Countries such as the Republic of Korea and economies such as Taiwan, China have developed not by suddenly perfecting their institutions, but by coming up with policies that overcame the market obstacles that their investors faced in modern tradable industries 2. There is a strong case for industrial policy in theory, but a more ambiguous case in practice

Kabeer (2016) "Economic growth, gender equality and women's agency: the 'endless variety' and 'monotonous similarity' of patriarchal constraints"

1. Criticizes Duflo's analysis on the grounds that it is firmly rooted in neo-classical rational choice model of human behaviours as motivated by a desire to maximize individual utility 2. Studies reviewed (in Duflo's article) are confined to micro-level studies using RCTs or quasi-experimental approaches and hence very thin empirical base (wipe out memory banks of past knowledge)

Uvin (1998) "Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda"

1. Development aid system may contribute to the processes of structural violence either indirectly (growing income inequality and land concentration) or directly (condescending attitudes towards poor people) 2. In Rwanda (with high rural population density) aid project often acted in 'land-grabbing' ways (through homes, offices, storage, etc.) 3. Through massive blindness and failure, the development community contributed to Rwanda's violence

Sen (1999) "Development As Freedom

1. Development as the 'expansion of freedoms that people enjoy' 2. Freedoms are both the means and the ends of development 3. Freedoms depend also on other determinants e.g. social and economic arrangements (e.g. education and health facilities), political and civil rights 4. Development requires the removing of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance 5. Free markets are an essential method of achieving freedoms (market mechanism): economic unfreedom breeds social unfreedom and vice verse

Hodge (2007) "Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development..."

1. Development is a framework of ideas and practices which emerged from efforts to manage the social economic and ecological crises of the late colonial world. 2. Post-depression changes in British imperial goals a result of increasing awareness of complexities articulated by technical officers. 3. This lead to the 20th century rise of 'technical' approaches to development management 4. Gap between rhetoric of science in development and reality in practice was often wide.

Kay (2002) "Why East Asia Overtook Latin America: Agrarian Reform and Development"

1. Differences in agrarian roots account for difference in development trajectories of EA and LA 2. In EA agrarian reform took place before industrialization -> Key to success 3. EA reforms also had greater redistribution -> LA reforms still highly politicized 4. In Korea and Taiwan, Landlords successfully integrated (by semi-forced investments) into the new development model, whereas in LA they continued to influence agriculture 5. Overall, EA governments exerted greater centralized control while LA, even in the period of ISI lacked the ability to control industry, or force truly redistributive land reforms (Which only happened in the exhaustion phase of ISI)

Das Gupta. Bongaarts & Cleland (2011) "Population, Poverty, and Sustainable Development: A Review of the Evidence"

1. Does high fertility affect low-income countries' prospects for economic growth and poverty reduction? (Harrod-Domar model shows that in the absence of diminishing returns to capital, growth in income-per-capita is affected negatively by population growth and positively by savings as well by increases in the output-capital ratio, Kuznet's work diverged from the Coale Hoover findings and he concluded that technology could allow even the most underdeveloped countries to maintain sustained economic growth even with high population rise, for two or three decades) 2. Does population growth exacerbate pressure on natural resources? (Simon (1981) argues that people and markets respond to resource shortages and that there is no reason that this this cannot go on indefinitely, but the view that resource scarcity can be overcome by technological innovations fails to take into account the generations of suffering that occurs in the transition period) 3. Are family planning programs effective at lowering fertility, and should they be publicly funded? (Pritchett (1994a) argues that family planning programs have little impact on fertility but Bongaarts (1997) points out that even with Pritchett's low estimate of fertility reduction per woman, substantial population shrinkage would occur)

Li et al (2013) "What Can Africa Learn from China's Experience in Agricultural Development"

1. Due to a steady increase of population over time in China, agriculture has been developed largely based on land-saving systems that focus on intensive farming such as poly-culture and inter-cropping. In Africa, a much less intensive form of agriculture evolved, making use of larger land areas 2. In China, smallholder farmers have accumulated farming technology, a basis for modern technological innovation. In Africa, due to the impact of colonialism, technological change was mainly concentrated on cash crops and large commercial farms, rather than smallholder farming 3. Unlike China, most SSA agricultural systems were influenced by external development interventions, and shaped by colonial experiences 4. Unlike China's incremental reform towards market liberalization for agriculture, the African liberalization of markets, privatization and restructuring of government institutions and removal of subsidies were radically and rapidly undertaken under the 'conditionality' that concessional finance would only be available for compliant countries

Friedman (1962) "Capitalism and Freedoms: Chapter One"

1. Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society: freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom and; economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom 2. Only certain arrangements of economic and political freedoms are possible: it is possible to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalists and political arrangements that are not free 3. It is possible to push for socialism in a capitalist society but not to push for capitalism in a socialist society

Eriksen (2009) "The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peace-building, State-building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo"

1. Existing programmes of state-building do not simply aim to build a state in this minimal sense but to establish a particular kind of state, a liberal one ((a) upholds the rule of law, (b) is democratic and (c) is based on a market economy) 2. MONUC was created by the Security Council in November 1999 and tasked to monitor the implementation of the peace process in the DRC 3. Four reasons why MONUC's attempts at state-building in the DRC have failed: (insufficient resources; policies hampered by a lack of knowledge of local conditions; attempts at state-building have run counter to the interests of key domestic actors; and the flawed and contradictory nature of the liberal peace theory (both the possibility and the desirability of the establishment of a liberal-democratic state are taken for granted))

Englebert & Tull (2008) "Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa"

1. Extent to which state failure is African phenomenon, substantial disconnect between scholarly work & reconstruction, and common dysfunction of African states before collapse requires attention. 2. Three flawed assumptions that underpin reconstruction (& its failure) in Africa: (1) Implicit assumption that Western state institutions can be successfully transferred to Africa (2) Reconstruction falsely pressures shared understanding of failure and cooperation in reconstruction (3) Donors will be able to harness material, military and symbolic resources needed for reconstruction. 3. "Reconstruction" in Africa means re-creating structures that led to original failure. 4. Political engineering & democratization from without is likely to failure 5. Centralizing desire overlooks local institutional initiatives which enabled conflict survival 6. Neotrusteeship agenda calls for larger/more engaged reconstruction - not feasible for donors.

Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) "Reversal of Fortunes: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income"

1. Finds significant and negative association between economic prosperity (using proxies of urbanization and population density) in 1500 and today 2. Finding hold when controlling for dist. from equator, identity of colonial powers, regional variables, and presence of natural resources. 3. Due to "institutional reversal" and effects of European colonialism. 4. Whether a society has institutions of private property or extractive institutions may matter much more when new technology requires broad based economic participation: extractive institutions become much more inappropriate with arrival of new technologies. 5. The reversal of fortunes occurred in late 18th and early 19th century and was closely related to industrialization

Van de Walle "Introduction: African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis"

1. First SAP in Africa went to Senegal in 1979 - since almost all have failed 2. Despite loans economic reforms not implemented (or almost fully reversed) 3. WB/IMF have failed to recognize that the key problem behind the crises of Africa is governance. Governance considered only in second phase of reform (SAPs) after stabilization. Even these second phase reforms focused on civil service rather than transparency, accountability or judicial reform 4. Suggests that IMF and SAPs prioritize short term economic growth over long term

Kaplinsky (2000) "Globalisation and Unequalisation: What Can Be Learned from Value Chain Analysis?"

1. Many countries that have suffered in distributional terms have seen a substantial increase in trade/GDP ratios 2. Declining country shared in global income in the context of growing participation can be found in the concentration of developing countries in the commodity sectors which have experienced declining terms of trade (TOT) in past decades (Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1950) 3. Three Important Components of GVC: VC are repositories for rent and these rents are dynamic; effectively functioning VCs involve some degree of 'governance'; and effective VCs arise from systemic, as opposed to point, efficiency 4. The growing areas of rent are increasingly found in the intangible parts of the chain (copyright, brand names, etc.)

Singer (1950) "The Distinctions of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries"

1. Foreign trade proportionally most important when incomes become lowest. Fluctuations in value/volume of trade also proportionally most violent 2. There is a discrepancy in productivity in developing countries between export and dom. industries. Export industries often promoted by foreign technologies (often foreign owned). This indicates that prod. export industries have not become real part of the economy 3. Foreign own productive facilities in developing countries should be considered dominant outposts of foreign 4. When developing country productivity increases equal lower prices for foreign consumers developing countries lose 5. "The industrialised countries have best of both worlds (consumers of primary commodities and producers of manufactured goods, Whereas underdeveloped countries have the worst of both worlds"

Gerschenkron (1952) "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective

1. History is relevant and should be drawn upon, but should not be assumed to hold any answers for contemporary issues 2. Using examples of European late industrializers; argues that the 'early' model of English development can't be repeated, the path is not directly transferable 3. The industrialization process of different countries varies with regard to productive and organizational structures: Counters Marx's argument of the past as a blueprint for the future 4. In Germany, France, Russia, the state played a large role in finance and industrialization. Capitalism alone was 'too uninspiring' (Backwards development, simply adoption of technology) 5. Common argument that developing countries have an abundance of labour doesn't generally account for the fact that this labour is almost entirely unskilled (arguably unhelpful)

Quisumbing (2003) "What have we learnt from intra-household allocation"

1. Households do not act as one when making decisions, the distribution of resources relates to individual bargaining power within the household 2. New Models of Household Behavior: Pareto optimal or Pareto efficient assumption: an individual within the household can only be made better-off at the expense of another household members 3. Regardless of the measure used, the distribution of power and resources within the household almost always favors men 4. Increasing women's control of resources has favorable effects for both the household and the woman herself 5. Evidence from South Africa suggest that women's social capital networks are wider than men's but with fewer resources

Seguino (2000) "Gender inequality and economic growth: a cross-country analysis" AND "Accounting for Asian Economic Growth: Adding Gender to the Equation"

1. Hypothesizes that gender inequality which contributes to women's relatively lower wages was a stimulus to growth via the effect on exports during 1975-95 2. If women are crowded into industries that produce price elastic goods, this practice may have implications for trade patterns and economic growth as a result of lower bargaining power 3. Gendered Growth Theory: examines the macro effects of gender discrimination that influences job access and wage payments and hypothesizes that gender wage differentials that reflect the degree of discrimination against women will be positively correlated with growth, assuming male wages accurately reflect labor productivity and thus serve as a benchmark 4. Gender wage inequality has stimulated growth, with Asian economies that disadvantaged women the most growing the fastest from 1975 to 1990 5. Suggests that gender discrimination in wages is easier to maintain in highly patriarchal societies characterized by social institutions that curtailed women's mobility in the public domain and facilitated their 'crowding' into a narrow range of poorly-paid jobs or unpaid household work

Weber (2012) "Demography and Democracy: The Impact of Youth Cohort Size on Democratic Stability in the World"

1. Hypothesizes that the probability of a democratic breakdown rises with the amount of young men aged 15- 29 within a society 2. Strong evidence supporting the 'youth-bulge' hypothesis is found using data for 110 countries in the period from 1972 - 2009 3. Regimes matter more for the growth of population than for the growth of income. Regimes have more to do with demography than with economics 4. The socio-economic approaches assume that the opportunity costs for political violence are lower for adolescents, because they are more frequently unmarried and not yet integrated into the job market: 'societal bottleneck' 5. The socio-biological approach postulates a higher propensity to intergroup hate and political extremism among young men as a result of the latter's alienation from the values of their parents

Lal (1985) "The Misconception of Development Economics"

1. ISI starts with manufacture of finished consumer goods that were previously imported then moves on rapidly and successfully to the later stages of manufacturing 2. The existence of bottleneck industries is a powerful argument for special protection or promotion and for exporting excess product.

Walsh, et al. (2011) 'China and India's participation in global climate negotiations'

1. If China and India fail to respond to climate change and other environmental issues, their economies will suffer in the medium to long run as global warming takes its toll 2. The use of absolute targets, as was the case for developed countries under Kyoto, is something that developing countries and China in particular, feel will cause undue harm 3. Rapidly developing countries would ideally desire a short time frame and small incremental targets over time (circumstances within these countries change rapidly and the viability of a long-term goal for emissions reductions in the face of economic, social and political uncertainties is questionable)

Wiggins (2009) "Can the Smallholder Model Deliver Poverty Reduction and Food Security for a Rapidly Growing Population in Africa?"

1. In conditions of low development with relatively cheap labour, small agricultural units may have advantages over larger ones 2. Africa's physical geography (soils, climate, hydrology) means that the technical challenge of breeding higher-yielding crop varieties is more daunting and that the possibilities for irrigation are less 3. Small farms have significant advantages over large farms in labour costs and productivity 4. Almost all the technical advances described have been applied by small farmers to good effect: in no case have the innovations been adopted by larger-scale farms solely or disproportionately 5. Large farms face more challenges as they are formal companies expected to comply with regulations that are rarely if ever applied to small farms: payment of legal minimum wages, provision of housing, education and health care to hired workers and their families, and taxation 6. Necessities for smallholder development: A favourable investment climate for farming, investment in public goods that support agriculture, developing economic institutions to allocate and protect property rights, demand that is transmitted effectively to the farm gate, good conservation measures by farmers

Snyder (2010) "Elections as Milestones and Stumbling Blocks"

1. In high risk circumstances, elites tend to turn to ideological appeals (nationalism, ethnicity, sectarianism) to win mass-support 2. Countries with conducive conditions (competent & impartial inst.) have good chance of not relapsing (conflict) Additional facilitating conditions: no deep identity-based divisions, prior democracy. higher economic development 3. Elections should not be too soon after conflict: careful sequencing of reforms necessary. However, this can be used as an excuse by authoritarian ruler to postpone indefinitely. Past-conflict elections occur sooner today than in past: additional risk 4. There is some evidence that even failed democratic bids can lay good groundwork for later success 5. Peaceful transitions of Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Poland, South Korea and Taiwan show that transitions need not be violent.

McCormick (2008) "China and India as Africa's New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development"

1. India and China have different patterns of aid: India concentrates on non monetary aid mainly in the form of technical assistance and scholarships, China offers a wider range of monetary and non-monetary aid packages, which include grants and loans for infrastructure, plant and equipment, as well as scholarships, training opportunities, and technical assistance 2. 'Country-to-country development aid' is a fairly recent phenomenon and a major study of the giving patterns of western donors suggests that colonial past and political alliances were major aid determinants in the last quarter of the 20th century 3. Aid for manufacturing investment is more likely to come from China than from India, and to be interlinked with FDI

Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) "Problems of Industrialization in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe"

1. Industrialization good way of achieving more equal distribution of incomes 2. East and Southeast Europe should industrialize on "Russian Model" without foreign investment without this will be a slow and painful process 3. Cannot look to the past for examples because: self-liquidating int. invest. of 19th century no longer self evident, existing forms (floating of shares/loans) inappropriate, no need to 'create' tech can simply adopt, increased overhead costs, etc. 4. To industrialize South and Southeast Europe, "Skilling" 'training' of peasants necessary.

Herbst (2004) "Let The Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice"

1. International legal protection is inadequate to understanding the realities of a failed state. 2. While there is significant international protection for states threatened by neighbors there is strong reluctance to interfere in internal conflicts: Africa characterized by relative peace w/neighbors, significant internal turmoil 3. States should not be de-facto unit of analysis 4. International organizations should revoke sovereignty from states failing to control certain parts of their territories (does not address "control" or "certain parts") 5. International communities must recognize new nation states once they emerge. Argues that "the diminishing value of size" that there is no need for geographically large countries.

Rodrik (2007) "One Economics, Many Recipes)

1. It is possible for governments to set up good policy and affect economic growth for the better (successful reforms tend to be selective, sequential, and often unorthodox) 2. Government has a role to play in stimulating economic development beyond simply enabling markets 3. Policies should attack the 'binding constraints': generic policy prescriptions (e.g. Washington Consensus) fail (The problem with the W.C. was not just that it overlooked institutional underpinnings of policy, but that it overlooked the impossibility of removing all distortions simultaneously) 4. Economic integration has damaged poor countries by shrinking the 'policy space' that have to maneuver. WTO should instead strive for a better mix of enhanced market access and policy space to pursue appropriate development strategies

Lin & Chang (2009) "Should Industrial Policy Conform to Comparative Advantage or Defy It?"

1. Lin (New Structural Economics): argues that industrial upgrading and technological advance are best promoted by what he calls a facilitating state - a state that facilitates the private sector's ability to exploit the country's areas of comparative advantage 2. Chang (Old Structural Economics): argues that comparative advantage, while important, is no more than the baseline, and that a country needs to defy its comparative advantage in order to upgrade its industry

Ellis (2006) "Agrarian change and rising vulnerability in rural sub-Saharan Africa"

1. Livelihood diversification: while diversity of income sources is prevalent across different income classes, the diversification differs between better-off and poorer households: the better-off tend to have non-farm salaried employment, while the poor have casual wage work 2. Supermarkets have expanded in poor districts as rapidly as their earlier spread in high income areas due to supply chain systems that reduce costs across volume traded, enabling them to out-compete fresh produce markets and small shops even in low income settings 3. Overall levels of vulnerability are rising in SSA and this was shown in the southern African food crisis of 2001-2002

Chang (2016) "Theoretical Perspectives on Industrial Policy"

1. Mainstream view insists that industrial policy should be of 'general' rather than 'selective': Argue that state should concentrate on providing things like education, R&D, and infrastructure that benefit all industries equally rather than trying to 'pick winners' 2. The more targeted a policy is, the easier the monitoring of the beneficiaries becomes: this means reduced leakages 3. The decline in the importance of manufacturing is partly an illusion: Much of the apparent fall in the manufacturing sector's share of GDP in advanced economies is due to the decline in the prices of manufactured goods, relative to the prices of services 4. Diversifying towards more manufacturing will reduce the macroeconomic risks associated with dependence on primary commodities 5. Even when a country tries to develop a number of comparative-advantage-defying industries, the bulk of its export earnings and jobs have to come from comparative-advantage conforming industries

Agrawal & Gibson (1999) "Enchantment and Disenchantment: the role of community in natural resource conservation"

1. Mainstream views community as a unified, organic whole→ fails to attend to differences within communities and ignores how these differences affect resource management outcomes, local politics, and strategic interactions within communities, as well as the possibility of layered alliances that can span multiple levels of politics

Mkandawire (2009) "Institutional Monocropping & Monotasking in Africa"

1. Monocropping/monotasking both restricted range of possible institutions and in most cases insisted on inst. neither necessary nor sufficient (e.g. China developed without these) 2. Monotasking did away with understanding that different economies or sectors within a society could be driven by anything other than neoclassical utility maximization 3. Institutions (particularly the state) condemned as mechanisms restraining economy despite evidence from EA suggesting they can be economically transformatory 4. The mismatch between institutions and tasks means governments must do more with less - institutional reform overload. 5. Aid in Africa no longer a way fo filling gaps, but a way of fulfilling inst. objectives 6. "One costly feature of the lost decades was the reduction in the space experimentation within Africa and the one size fits all approach to institutions building, which has produced a size which fits no-one"

Polanyi (1944) "The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time"

1. Myth of the self-regulating market: Argues that there is nothing natural about markets 2. Fictitious commodities (land, labour and capital): unlike in pre-capitalist societies where these were embedded (regulated by customs, morals, etc) they are now 'regulated' by the market. Their fictitiousness is key to understanding how their markets are organized. Fictitious commodities arose partly because as industry became more complex, protection of these became required 3. The 'utopian springs of the dogma of laissez-faire': the three tenets: competitive labour market, automatic gold standard, and free trade: useless without one another 4. Dual movement: movement towards greater market liberalization will lead to a countermovement by society seeking better protection from the worst of the free market's effects 5. The 'self-regulating' market (which divorces the political and economic realms) will lead to the destruction of society

Mkandawire (2001) "Thinking About Developmental States in Africa"

1. Neither Africa's post colonial history not actual practice of developed states rule out he possibility of African dev state - Contradicts many economists beliefs 2. There have been post colonial African states that have displayed dev state practices at one time or another - suggests that these do not lack ideological frame needed - success of these attempts (at time) suggest necessary structures also possible

North (2003) "The Role of Institutions in Economic Development"

1. Neoclassical economics never intended to deal with economic development: was development in late 19th century and its objective was to explain efficient resource allocation in developed economies 2. Three fundamental dilemmas in applying smiths wealth of nations principles today 2.1: There has been a fundamental shift from personal to impersonal exchanges - Thus people today have different incentives - Insts. needed to regulate economic behaviour today 2:2:Division/specialization of labor has become specialization of knowledge 2:3: There are no such things as 'laissez-faire' economics 3. Formal rules/insts. need to match informal norms and enforcement characteristics e.g. Formal rules that worked in the U.S. failed to work when implemented in L.A.

Doner et al. (2005) "Systematic Vulnerability & The Origins of the Developmental States"

1. North Eastern developmental states emerged from the challenges of maintaining peace in severely restricted political space. Southeast Asian states never faced this, thus they did not become developmental 2. Developmental states will only emerge when its political leaders face (1) threat of deteriorating living standards that can produce mass unrest (2) scarce resources endowments (3) hard budget constraints. To solve these problems developed countries turn to export promotion and industry deepening. 3. Whenever social conflict is perceived by political elites as intense and imminent in the early stages of state formation coalitions broadened if such conditions absent coalitions remain narrow 4. "It is [when] political leaders faced a fateful choice between expanding manufacturing exports through cutting wages versus raising productivity that marked the maturation of the developmental"

Governmentality

1. Originally termed by Foucault: Has a three part definition (1) The first part of the definition states that 'governmentality' is a government with specific ends, means to these ends, and particular practices that should lead to these ends (2) the second part presents 'governmentality' as the long, slow development of Western governments which eventually took over from forms of governance like sovereignty and discipline into bureaucracies and the typical methods by which they operate today (3) the third part says that the state employs strategies and tactics to maintain a content and thus stable society, or in other words to "render a society governable"

Homer (1999) "Environment, scarcity and violence"

1. Outlines three main positions relating to population growth, scarcity and violence (Neo-malthusians, the economic optimists and the distributionists)

Brett (2003) "Participation and accountability in development management"

1. Participation will only be successful in producing good organizational performance when it is operationalized through institutional arrangements which maximize the accountability of agencies to users 2. The search for participatory solutions began with the leading NGOs but has now been taken on by the major donors and many national governments 3. Participatory processes can improve performance, but that the poorest people have fewest of the necessary skills, so success is directly correlated with the level of development

Chambers (1994) "The origins and practice of participatory rural appraisal"

1. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) describes a growing family of approaches and methods to enable local people to share, enhance and analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act 2. In the mid-1980s, the words "participation" and "participatory" entered the RRA vocabulary. Much of the spread of PRA was South-South, through sharing field experiences and training 3. "For participatory approaches and methods to take off, a stage had also to be reached when different conditions could come together: recognition of past error and inadequacy, as has occurred with much agricultural research for resource-poor farmers; greater confidence and professionalism in rural NGOs; the invention of approaches such as agro-ecosystem analysis which simply did not exist before the 1980s; and the emergence of an international community of communication"

Lin (2012) "Demystifying the Chinese Economy"

1. Planned economies of socialist countries can be described as the "Economics of Shortage" (the shortage is caused by distorted prices) 2. China developed the trinity system to facilitate an agrarian economy short of capital to prioritize capital-intensive heavy industries: monopoly over purchasing and marketing; collectivization of agriculture and; and the urban-rural dichotomy in household registration (and the regional grain self-sufficiency)

Hall (1993) "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and The State"

1. Policy should not be seen as pressures on a state which then goes in direction of strongest press 2. First and Second order change can be seen as "normal policy-making." Only Third Order is paradigm change, marked by radical changes in policy discourse (e.g. Thatcher) 3. The process by whereby one policy paradigm offsets another likely to be more sociological than scientific - politics does not always agree with academia but almost always "wins" 4. Issues of authority play central role in process of paradigm shift. A paradigm will end only when the supporters of a new paradigm secure portions of authority over policy-making and are able to rearrange organizations and SOPs of the policy process so as to institutionalise the new paradigm

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) "Why Nations Fail"

1. Political institutions → economic institutions → economic incentives (incentives to become educated, to save, to invest, to innovate, to adapt new technologies, etc.) 2. Inclusive political institutions tend to lead to inclusive economic institutions (virtuous circles) and centralized/pluralistic political institutions are the key to maintaining inclusive economic institutions 3. Extractive political institutions tend to lead to extractive economic institutions (vicious circles) and while a degree of economic growth is possible, it will not be sustained under extractive economic institutions (e.g. Roman empire, Mayan empire, China) 4. Small institutional differences and institutional drift interact with critical junctures and historical contingency to produce a change in the path of a nation (break from the circle)

Putzel & Di John (2012) "Seeing the State as a Political Settlement"

1. Political settlements determine impact of institutional reforms 2. Because institutions reflect power relations, institutions out of step with dominant political settlement will at best be ineffective and at worst provoke violent conflict 3. For an elite bargain to hold, state must be strong/legitimate enough to ensure: (1) Rents allocated and property rights assigned can be protected and enforce (2) Those who leave elite bargain (through violence) will lose (it will be very costly for them) (3) Elite bargain is inclusive (4) The state doesn't need to use violence against citizens to gain compliance

Chandler (2006) "Empire in denial: the politics of state-building"

1. Post-CW emphasis shifted from rights of states to rights of individuals: throughout CW numerous judgements of ICJ upheld rights to self governance and denied the existence of any legitimate grounds for external intervention, even on 'humanitarian' or 'human-rights' justifications 2. ICISS report (2001) Responsibility to Protect: proposed shift in language away from 'human-centered' framework of 'right to intervene' to 'state-centered' framework of 'responsibility to protect' 3. In new 'state-building' discourse, the sovereign state form is held but sovereignty is redefined (redefinition of sovereignty as a variable capacity rather than an indivisible right and as duty/responsibility rather than a freedom) 4. Defines 'phantom states' as those with international legal sovereignty but who cede policy making control to international institutions ("After ten years of state-building in Bosnia there is now a complete separation between power and accountability")

Chambers (1995) "Poverty and livelihoods: whose reality counts?"

1. Poverty is most often defined as low income, or often as low consumption, which is easier to measure 2. Income distribution is perhaps a better indicator of poverty levels that (the commonly used) GDP 3. For institutional changes to occur the institutions--namely who comprises them--must change first (less economists (typically male, northern, white and more social anthropologists/sociologists and people from the areas where the policies are to take effect)

Krugman (2015) "International Economics: Theory and Policy: The Political Economy of Trade Policy AND Trade Policy in Developing Countries"

1. Protected markets limit gains from external economies of scale by inhibiting the concentration of industries 2. By providing entrepreneurs with an incentive to seek new ways to export or compete with imports, free trade offers more opportunities for learning and innovation 3. When imports are restricted by a quota rather than a tariff, the cost is sometimes magnified by rent seeking: businesses have to waste some of their productive resources in efforts to gain import licenses 4. General equilibrium analysis: a tariff that reduces imports also necessarily reduces exports (e.g. Mexico after NAFTA)

Hirschman (1968) "The Political-Economy of Import Substitution Industrialization in Latin America"

1. Reversal of opinions on ISI (from 50s/60s to 79s) suggests it has flaws and benefits 2. ISI is highly sequential -smoother, less disruptive, less learning required that other indust. 3. Product convergence of industrialization some of needed inputs for ISI likely to be the same. May actually lead to greater imports of intermediary goods (rather than final demand goods). Product convergence can help negotiate steeper slopes of bottle-neck industry 4. Argument that ISI will not be able to break into export markets is false: Acceptance of manufactured commodity at home considered prerequisite for successful exporting (e.g. protection of US and German industry did not prevent success in exports) 5. LA. difficulties in exporting were political (Not ISI): LA industrialists lacked political power because they were not exporting, and vice versa, creating a vicious circle.

Kuhn (1962) "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"

1. Revolutions are non-cumulative dev episodes when old paradigm is replaced in part or in whole by a new, incompatible one 2. Paradigms can either incorporate conflicting info by the expanding of theories or be upset/overturned if it cannot incorporate new information (paradigm maintenance versus paradigm shift) 3. Paradigm shifts nearly always occur when old paradigm in crisis

Krueger (2004) "Meant Well, Tried Little, Failed Much"

1. SAPs failed, not because of the policies it strived for, but because of a 'failure to follow through': reluctance of policy makers to tackle awkward structural problems. 2. E.g. Argentina (1991) Convertibility to deliver high growth and low inflation. Fiscal control of currency board failed because of off budget spending: control board too weak to prevent increasing reliance on private capital flows. Argues that impact of crisis would have been mitigated if original reform more ambitious 3. E.g. Turkey (1980s) after failure of IMF standby arrangements of 1978/9. Reform was at first successful but government ultimately failed to control inflation. Once inflation grew (1987), the real exchange rate was allowed to appreciate

Cousins & Scoones (2010): "Contested paradigms of 'viability' in redistributive land reform: perspectives from southern Africa"

1. Settler colonialism in Africa involved large-scale land dispossession, the confinement of the indigenous rural population to densely-settled 'native reserves', massive state support for the development of a white settler farming class, and discrimination against small-scale black farmers in the reserves 2. Colonial prescriptions on agriculture match up well to those of today 3. The continued dominance of an agricultural modernization narrative is also evident in the design and priorities of recent initiatives 4. Persistence of agrarian dualism (South Africa and Namibia), and the revitalization of colonial-era modernization narratives that see 'viable' small-scale farms as scaled-down versions of large-scale commercial farms

Mawdsley (2012) "The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from gift theory"

1. Suggests that South-South development cooperation is constructed and performatively embodied around four key claims: shared identity as 'developing' nations, a specific expertise in appropriate development approaches and technologies (because of shared identity as 'developing'), explicit rejection of hierarchical relations, insistence on win-win outcomes of South- South development cooperation 2. Assertions of 'win-win' outcomes are founded on a simplistic construction of 'national interest'

Babb (2013) "The Washington Consensus as a Transnational Policy Paradigm"

1. The Washington Consensus was a transnational paradigm, shaped by both scholarly and political forces. Embedded in 2 types of bureaucratic organisations: gov & int. financial institutions (WB, IMF, etc.) 2. In transnational spread of paradigms, normative and coercive pressures play a role (1) Normative: e.g. Americanization of economic higher end even in developing countries (2) 'Coercive isomorphism': the adoption of structures and policies because more powerful organisations are rewarding adoption/punishing non-adoption (e.g. selective channelling of resources) 3. BRICS countries do not conform to IFI conditions, but still pursue (second order changes) policies not far from W.C. prescriptions- thus does not count as paradigm shift but paradigm maintenance 4. Augmentation of W.C. to include governance reforms and pro-poor policies also not a paradigm shift since they worked on an assumption that W.C. was essentially correct

Krueger (1997) "Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn"

1. The accepted tenets of developed countries (primary commodity produces orientation, export pessimism, agrarian nature and necessity of capital accumulation for growth) were a mixture of "touristic impressions, half truths and misapplied policy references" 2. The adoption of these 'tenets' framed the cause for ISI (also hangover of infant industries) 3. East Asia succeeded because its policies were diametrically opposed to those under ISI 4. Supporters of ISI sought out find reasons for why an exception should be made for neo-liberliasm.

Chang (2002) "Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalism Political Economics Alternative to the Neoliberal Theory of the Market and the State"

1. The central argument of the neo-liberal view regarding state intervention is that it cannot be assumes that the state is impartial or an omnipotent social guardian, as it was assumed in the golden age economics 2. The neoliberal discourse on the role of the state that revolves around whether state intervention can improve upon the workings of the free market should not be seen as inherently unproblematic (e.g. child labour and slavery)) 3. The neoliberal idea of an ideal market (perfect competition, etc) is just one of many ideas on what a market should be, thus what constitutes a market failure is up for debate 4. The assumption that "in the beginning there were markets' In this view, the state, as well as other non-market institutions, is seen as a man-made substitute which emerged after market failures became unbearable

Gore (2000) "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries"

1. The demise of the Washington Consensus is inevitable because methodology and ideology are contradictory 2. Two main shifts that have occurred in development discourse (1) Partial globalisation of development policy analysis (2) Shift to ahistorical assessment (judgement solely on performance) 3. Post-Washington-Consensus still based on principles of open trade regimes, competitive markets and open societies. Gore argues that paradigm shift inevitable but his own account of PWCC suggests paradigm mount

Fine (2009) "Development As Zombienomics In The Age of Neoliberalism"

1. The development field has become 'Americanized': policy oriented rather than critical-approach oriented 2. The hyper-economic focus claims to address politics, history, etc. (but doesn't) 3. Zombieconomics: the unchanging (overall rejection of new ideas) and parasitic nature of economics 4. Neoliberalism has entered a second phase: more state friendly and humanist but still heavily market oriented: policy now for states to support rather than concede to the private sector 5. Development studies has split from the 'political economy of development' and has shifted towards now being policy oriented rather than critical-approach oriented 6. Domination of development studies by the World Bank means that they now control the main thoughts on development as well as control how those thoughts are critiqued

Hayek (1945) "The Use of Knowledge In Society"

1. The difference between a 'planned' and 'competitive' market is who does the planning. This is the problem of rational economic organization 2. Competitive markets are preferable because only it can make the day-to-day adjustment necessary: People must be allowed to react to market changes 3. The over-reliance on statistical aggregates leads economists to overlook or underestimate the importance of these day-to-day adjustments 4. "We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function-a-function which, of course, it fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid"

Razavi & Miller (1995) "From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shifts in the Women and Development Discourse"

1. The emergence of women in development (WID) in the early 1970s: argued for more attention paid to women's productive labour (but not to social welfare and reproductive concerns). WID's demands for the allocation of development resources to women hinge on economic efficiency arguments about what women can contribute to the development process 2. Eventually the discourse shifted to 'gender and development' (GAD) after critical analyses of WID which argued that WID tended to isolate women as a separate and often homogeneous category, and was predominantly descriptive, as well as being equivocal in its identification and analysis of women's subordination (Pearson, et al., 1981)

Krugman (1994) "The Myth of Asia's Miracle"

1. The growth pattern of Singapore specifically, East Asian 'tigers' generally mirrors that of USSR 2. In USSR and East Asian tigers the rapid economic growth fully explained by equally rapid growth in inputs (labour, education, physical capital) rather than productivity (output per unit of input) 3. The NICs of East Asia have achieved growth through their ability to mobilize resources: most of these are one-time changes not reproducible and the eventually the growth will slow down. 4. Japans growth in the 1950s unlike Singapore's growth in the 1920s-80s : Japans growth due both to increased inputs and high rates of efficiency growth. Thus Japans growth has slowed, but not halted (like that of USSR)

Arnstein (1969) "A ladder of citizen participation"

1. The idea of citizen participation becomes less popular when the have-nots define participation as redistribution of power 2. Levels of participation: Informing (emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information with no channel provided for feedback/negotiation) → Consultation → Placation (citizens begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism is still apparent) → Partnership ( power is in fact redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power-holders) → Delegated Power (citizens with dominant decision-making role) → Citizen Control

Beall, Goodfellow, Putzel (2006) "On the discourse of terrorism, security and development"

1. The incorporation of security concerns in development thinking is not new and dates back at least to the Cold War era 2. Countries central to the security interests of DAC countries are benefiting in all sectors, not just those relating to the military or connected with security (e.g. aid to Pakistan has increased dramatically) 3. Frances Stewart argues that 'conflict has heavy development costs, so that promoting security is instrumental for development' 4. Not only does the security-development nexus endanger the poverty reduction focus of aid, but also ignores some of the most effective means by which development can be harnessed to make societies more secure

Doornbus (2001) "Good Governance"

1. The label good government is a political tool to rationalize choices that may otherwise be arbitrary 2. Two main streams of good government have emerged: Academic (concerned with developing a better understanding of ways power relations - structured (state-civil relations)) and policy oriented (focuses on state-market relations - structures relating to property rights, accountability rule fo law etc) 3. "To create development assistance programs without attaching conditionalities would chill for reversal of roles which would largely put the responsibility of development on the receiving country, rather than the supplying."

Moyo (2009) "Dead Aid"

1. The long term effect of 'aid injection' has been to decimate local economies and make the local economies dependent on foreign aid (unlike the Marshall plan) 2. Aid both encourages corruption and 'is one of the greatest aids to corruption (e.g. about 25% of the WB is misused; in Uganda in the 1990s it is estimated that only 20% of government spending on education made it to the schools) 3. Corruption leads to worse development projects: contracts → co-colluders → bad projects → poor development projects 4. Aid undermines social capital

Riddell (2009) "Is aid working? Is this the right question to be asking?"

1. The most fundamental problem with aid is that there is a gap between what it is achieving and what it could achieve is enormous and it can be narrowed significantly 2. Official aid is given voluntarily by individual donor governments, each of which chooses how much aid to give and to whom that aid will be given 3. The choices about recipients and volumes of aid are informed and shaped not only by the development/poverty needs of the recipients but also by the short-term political and commercial interests of the donor country

Livi-Bacci (2001) "The populations of poor countries"

1. The reason for the higher fertility rates (6.2) in the pre transition developing countries, than pre transition Europe (generally below 5) was the Malthusian check on marriage in Europe which is rarely seen in today's developing countries 2. The complexity of reasons for infant mortality means that it is more difficult for developing countries to pass from "medium" mortality (after first interventions have been made and were successful) to "low" mortality 3. "The fact that certain Islamic countries still have high levels of mortality in spite of considerable economic development has been explained by the subordinate status of women and the limited instruction they receive" 4. Demeny's 4 inputs of how many children parents want to have: cost, opportunity cost, contribution of child's labour to family income, contribution of children to parent's old age economic security

Barrientos & Hulme (2009) "Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest in Developing Countries: Reflections on a Quiet Revolution: Commentary"

1. There are large long-term economic and human development losses associated with not having adequate social protection, and consequently large gains to be captured by establishing strong social protection institutions 2. Two main areas of concern for researchers and policymakers: mechanisms to scale-up social protection coverage in low-income countries effectively, and, identifying approaches to extend social protection into fragile states and difficult environments 3. The World Bank conceptualizes social protection as social risk management and moves beyond what it sees as "traditional" social protection by adding the goals of macroeconomic stability and financial market development

Bloom et al. (2003) "The Demographic Dividend"

1. This demographic transition produces a "boom" generation (a generation that is larger than those immediately before and after it) that is gradually working its way through each nation's age structure 2. Because people's economic behavior and needs vary at different stages of life, changes in a country's age structure can have significant effects on its economic performance 3. If most of a nation's population falls within the working ages, the added productivity of this group can produce a "demographic dividend" 4. The demographic dividend is delivered through a number of mechanisms. The most important are labor supply, savings, and human capital 5. Critical policy areas to reap benefits of dividend include: public health, family planning, education and economic policies that promote labor-market flexibility, openness to trade, and savings

Ferguson (1994) "The Anti-Politics Machine)

1. Through a case-study of Lesotho, the author author shows how the technical and 'anti-political' approach of development practitioners leads to failure 2. These failures produce many effects, including the expansion of bureaucratic state power and the coding of political problems as 'technical' ones 3. The reason for this is that the development industry is invested in 'the development apparatus' and therefore can only understand (and give solutions for) problems of development: The fantasy of the 'development apparatus' assumes people in developing countries are isolated and agrarian, and that the government is benevolent (e.g. Canada's development project in Lesotho failed to understand social thought behind keeping cattle rather than selling, and assumed 'that they just didn't know better')

Ayers & Dodman (2010) "Climate Change Adaptation and Development: the state of the debate"

1. UN General Assembly (1998) discourse on climate change shied away from adaptation, on the basis that adaptation was 'local' and conflicted with the 'global good' of mitigation 2. Long term adaptation priorities may conflict with near-term development priorities 3. 'Stand-alone' interpretations adopted by the UNFCCC will not work in the wider context of LDCs

Polanyi-Levitt (2006) "Keynes & Polanyi: The 1920s and the 1940s"

1. We are living Keynes' nightmare of a 'casino economy' of speculators and rentier capitalists and Polanyi's false utopia of the self-regulating market: the mechanisms by which this predatory style of capitalism is capsizing viable economies, and impoverishing the human and environmental resources of the developing world are financial 2. Author suggests that future historians may consider the victory of the western powers in the cold war as a watershed event as important as 1914. It terminated the post-WWII economic and political order.

Fraser (2012) "Marketization, Social Protection and Emancipation"

1. What we today call "neoliberalism" is nothing but the second coming of the very same 19th century faith in the "self-regulating market" that unleashed the capitalist crisis Polanyi chronicled: now, as then, attempts to implement that creed are rending social bonds, destroying livelihoods, and despoiling nature 2. Focused single-mindedly on harms emanating from disembedded markets, Polanyi overlooks harms originating elsewhere, in the surrounding "society" 3. Central to both iterations of the great transformation, the one analyzed by Polanyi and the one we are living through now, struggles for emancipation constitute the missing third that mediates every conflict between marketization and social protection 4. While protection aims to shield society from the disintegrative effects of unregulated markets, emancipation aims to expose oppressive relations wherever they root, in society (from social protections that are premised on status hierarchies) as well as in economy

Reddy and Krangraven (2015) "Global Development Goals: If At All, Why, When & How?"

1. While goals purport to serve needs of the power this is questionable - whose definition of good goals: Northern NGO's favoured MDGs, Southern NGOs wanted rights-based norms & standards 2. MDGs focused on targets often linked to service delivery w/no direct attention to alleviating the structural constraints impeding development achievements - lack of durable & effective financing 3. MDGs reflect shift in dev thinking towards basic services which see people as patients, not agents 4. SDGs represent move away from basic-services model of the MDGs

McNay (2005) "The implications of the demographic transition for women, girls and gender equality: A review of developing country evidence"

1. While women of reproductive age may benefit from fertility decline, this may not always be the case for girls or older women 2. UNDP's Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) show that there is a clear negative relationship, suggesting that lower fertility is associated with increased women's empowerment in these areas 3. Research suggests that in countries with a preference for sons, girls with older female siblings are particularly vulnerable to parental discrimination in terms of survival-related resources, such as healthcare 4. Women increasingly confront a 'double burden' of work as the transition progresses

Rodrik (2006) "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion"

1. World Bank's (2005) 'Learning From Reform' documents how far we have drifted from WC and calls for development to away from "best practices." WC broad economic reform objectives did not in principle call for specific policy actions what is likely to have the largest payoff 2. Reform efforts should be focused on dismantling 'binding constraints' and on what is likely to have the largest payoff 3. Easterly and Levine (2003) show that policies do not effect long term economic performance once quality of institutions is held for. 4. Learning from reform suggests 'big-push' style and injections (Like those called for by sachs) are unlikely to do any lasting good.

Elson & Catagay (2000) "The Social Content of Macroeconomics Policies,"

Sen's argument of entitlement failures on a micro level can also be expanded up to the macro-level in three main ways 1. Deflationary Bias: policies aims at maintaining "credibility (i.e. high interest rates, tight monetary policy, and fiscal restraint" prevent governments from dealing effectively with recession which disproportionately negatively affect women 2. Male Bias: Assumes that the non-market sphere of social reproduction is articulated with the market economy of commodity production through a wage which is paid a male breadwinner and which largely provides for the cash needs of dependents 3. Commodification Bias: The privatization of entitlements (i.e. private pension funds, private healthcare, etc.) which has profound and disturbing implications for the organization of social reproduction, and for the majority of women who currently disproportionately provide the unpaid care upon which social reproduction rests