ECON 323 - HW7

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In a Cournot duopoly, we find that Firm 1's reaction function is Q1 = 50 - 0.5Q2, and Firm 2's reaction function is Q2 = 75 - 0.75Q1. What is the Cournot equilibrium outcome in this market? A) Q1 = 20 and Q2 = 60 B) Q1 = 20 and Q2 = 20 C) Q1 = 60 and Q2 = 60 D) Q1 = 60 and Q2 = 20

A

In the ________, each firm treats the output of its competitor as fixed and then decides how much to produce. A) Cournot model B) Bertrand model C) Stackelberg model D) none of the above

A

Suppose the market demand curve is P = 40 - 2Q and the constant marginal cost of production is MC = 20. Which of the following is a valid expression for the collusion curve? A) Q1+Q2 = 5 B) Q1 = 5 - Q2 C) Q1 = Q2 = 5 D) Q1 = 40 - Q2

A

Under a Cournot duopoly, the collusion curve represents: A) all possible allocations of the pure monopoly quantity among the two firms in the duopoly. B) all possible allocations of the pure monopoly quantity that would be possible if the two firms in the duopoly did not cooperate. C) all optimal price-quantity outcomes for a cartel rather than a Cournot duopoly. D) the potential profits to be earned by firms in a collusive cartel.

A

What is one difference between the Cournot and Stackelberg models? A) In Cournot, both firms make output decisions simultaneously, and in Stackelberg, one firm sets its output level first. B) In Stackelberg, both firms make output decisions simultaneously, and in Cournot, one firm sets its output level first. C) In Cournot, a firm has the opportunity to react to its rival. D) Profits are zero in Cournot and positive in Stackelberg.

A

Collusion can earn higher prices and higher profits under the Bertrand model, but why is this an unlikely outcome in practice? A) Firms prefer to remain independent of other firms so that their pricing plans can be more flexible over time. B) The collusive firms have an incentive to gain market share at the expense of the other firms by cutting prices. C) The federal antitrust authorities have an easier time catching firms that collude on price rather than quantity. D) none of the above

B

In the Stackelberg model, suppose the first-mover has MR = 15 - Q1, the second firm has reaction function Q2 = 15 - Q1/2, and production occurs at zero marginal cost. Why doesn't the first-mover announce that its production is Q1 = 30 in order to exclude the second firm from the market (i.e., Q2 = 0 in this case)? A) In this case, MR is negative and is less than MC, so the first-mover would be producing less than the optimal quantity. B) In this case, MR is negative and is less than MC, so the first-mover would be producing too much output. C) This is a possible outcome from the Stackelberg duopoly under these conditions. D) We do not have enough information to determine if this is an optimal outcome for this case.

B

In the Stackelberg model, there is an advantage: A) to waiting until your competitor has committed herself to a particular output level before deciding on your output level. B) to being the first competitor to commit to an output level. C) to the firm with a dominant strategy. D) to producing an output level which is identical to a monopolist's output level.

B

Suppose a stream is discovered whose water has remarkable healing powers. You decide to bottle the liquid and sell it. The market demand curve is linear and is given as follows: P = 30 - Q The marginal cost to produce this new drink is $3. What price would this new drink sell for if it sold in a competitive market? A) 0 B) $3 C) $13.50 D) $16.50 E) $27

B

Which of the following is true in the Stackelberg model? A) The first firm produces less than its rival. B) The first firm produces more than its rival. C) Both firms produce the same quantity. D) Both firms have a reaction curve.

B

Which oligopoly model(s) have the same results as the competitive model? A) Cournot B) Bertrand C) Stackelberg D) Both Cournot and Stackelberg

B

A ________ shows how much a firm will produce as a function of how much it thinks its competitors will produce. A) contract curve B) demand curve C) reaction curve D) expansion path

C

Relative to the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot model, the Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand model with homogeneous products A) results in the same output but a higher price. B) results in the same output but a lower price. C) results in a larger output at a lower price. D) results in a smaller output at a higher price.

C

Suppose a stream is discovered whose water has remarkable healing powers. You decide to bottle the liquid and sell it. The market demand curve is linear and is given as follows: P = 30 - Q The marginal cost to produce this new drink is $3. What will be the price of this new drink in the long run if the industry is a Cournot duopoly? A) $3 B) $9 C) $12 D) $13.50 E) none of the above

C

In comparing the Cournot equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium, A) both profit and output level are higher in Cournot. B) both profit and output level are higher in the competitive equilibrium. C) profit is higher, and output level is lower in the competitive equilibrium. D) profit is higher, and output level is lower in Cournot.

D

Is there a first-mover advantage in the Bertrand duopoly model with homogenous products? A) Yes, first-movers always hold the advantage over other firms. B) Yes, first-movers may have an advantage, but it depends on the model assumptions. C) No, first-movers cannot choose a profit maximizing quantity because the second-mover can always produce a bit less and earn higher profits. D) No, the second-mover would be able to set a slightly lower price and capture the full market share.

D

Suppose a stream is discovered whose water has remarkable healing powers. You decide to bottle the liquid and sell it. The market demand curve is linear and is given as follows: P = 30 - Q The marginal cost to produce this new drink is $3. What is the monopoly price of this new drink? A) 0 B) $3 C) $13.50 D) $16.50 E) $27

D

Suppose a stream is discovered whose water has remarkable healing powers. You decide to bottle the liquid and sell it. The market demand curve is linear and is given as follows: P = 30 - Q The marginal cost to produce this new drink is $3. What will be the price of this new drink in the long run if the industry is a Stackelberg duopoly? A) $3 B) $9 C) $12 D) $13.50 E) none of the above

E


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