Global Justice and Citizenship

Natural Resource argument (Beitz)

" parties to the international original position would know that resources are unevenly distributed with respect to population' 'adequate access to resources is a prerequisite for successful operation of (domestic) cooperative schemes' 'resource supplies are scarce' meaning '[t]he appropriation of valuable resources by some will leave others comparatively, and perhaps fatally, disadvantaged' (ibid). 'Resource distribution is morally arbitrary - no one has a natural prima facie claim to the resources that happen to be under his feet. meaning any appropriation of scarce resources by some requires a justification against the competing claims of others and the needs of future generations' Not knowing the resource endowments of their own societies, the parties would agree on a resource redistribution principle which would give each national society a fair chance to develop just political institutions and an economy capable of. 'human cooperative activity' is a matter of social justice as people do have claims over it and it may not be unevenly distributed and it would also interfere with personal liberty. This objection would not apply to the redistribution of natural resources because natural resources do not play so significant a role in the development of personal identity as natural talents

Hayward on Pogge 2005

Effects of GRD are unpredictable - Tax could hit poor societies badly rather than rich rather than an ecological footprint taxThen, maybe, the objection Hayward raises against Pogge can be raised against Hayward as well. The eco-footprint tax scheme 'forgets that [the tax burden] will be passed right back to poorer nations, in the form of higher prices for manufactured goods'(2005b: 320; quoting Heath 2005: 215-6). may achieve little of its secondary aim These are due to 'inadequate conception of natural resources.' should look at NR as 'ecological space' Using this conception, redistributive principles follow with a more definite logic from Pogge's own supporting moral argument. The proposed alternative approach also promises a more direct contribution to Pogge's secondary aim of resource conservation and environmental protection. Pogge has a powerful moral argument but GRD is wrong conclusion

What is Rawlsian Justice?

Greatest Equal Liberty Principle - each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others Difference Principle - equalities are justified when everyone in society is better off than when that inequality is not in place, the maximin theory where you want to make the worst off better off. These two principles are informed from the idea of the original position / veil of ignorance argument. Rawls argues that these principles are the ones which would be agreed upon by society under this framework.

Haywards idea of ecological space

Relates to the use of all resources, not just a small selection] Relates to the use of resources at each stage of their use, rather than just at the stage of extraction Ecological space tax = less arbitrary in its incidence than GRD Ecological footprint accounts factor in all environmental effects of resource utilisation rather than the partial and marginal environmental effects of the GRD- Adding imports - exports from domestic production. Pattern of distribution that has correlations with the distribtuion of economic wealth. Better explain 'the better-off enjoy significant advantages...' An ecological space tax tracks the use of natural resources even as they are valorised in the economic process, falls proportionately on the rich rather than the poor

Global Difference Principle

Same theory as Rawl's difference principle but applied globally without concern for borders However he also writes 'a wealthy nation may retain more than its share under a global difference principle, provided that some compensation for the benefits of global social cooperation is paid to less fortunate nations, and that the amount retained by the producing nation is used to promote domestic justice, for example, by increasing the prospects of the nation's own least favored group' (380)

Pogge's addition to Nagel's radical inequality

THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS (6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off... - created by the better off, not by chance, has empirical evidence as well as being a normative claim. These institutions maintain systems of inequality. (7) ... and there is a feasible alternative. (8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors. - states aren't more well off by chance UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES (9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated. - similar to Bietz but different conclusion. THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY (10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs. (creates a negative duty) - India and China pre-colonialism had more wealth than Europe post-colonialism significantly less. Pogge continues that by violating any of these 3 subsections you have violated negative duties

How do CTs spread sunstein

The appeal of some conspiracy theories, then, lies in the attribution of otherwise inexplicable events to intentional action,There is a pervasive human tendency to think that effects are caused by intentional action, especially by those who stand to benefit (the "cui bono?" maxim), human "minds protest against chaos," and people seek to extract a meaning from a bewildering event or situation. Note, however, that the domain of Popper's explanation is quite limited. Many conspiracy theories, including those involving political assassinations and the attacks of 9/11, point to events that are indeed the result of intentional action, and the conspiracy theorists go wrong not by positing intentional actors, but by misidentifying them. Mental illness? Perhaps conspiracy theories are a product of mental illness, such as paranoia or narcissism, or of similar conditions. And surely some people who accept conspiracy theories are mentally ill and subject to delusions Crippled Epistemologies - we have seen that in many communities and even nations, such theories are widely held. the most useful way to understand the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories is to examine how people acquire their beliefs. In some domains, people suffer from a "crippled epistemology," in the sense that they know very few things, and what they know is wrong. Many extremists fall in this category; their extremism stems not from irrationality, but from the fact that they have little (relevant) information, and their extremist views are supported by what little they know. Conspiracy theorizing often has the same feature. Rumours and Speculation -appearing roughly simultaneously in many different social networks; others are initiated and spread, quite intentionally, by conspiracy entrepreneurs who profit directly or indirectly from propagating their theories. Why do some theories hold whilst others don't Conspiracy theories, like rumors, may simultaneously relieve "a primary emotional urge" and offer an explanation, to those who accept the theory, of why they feel as they do; the theory "rationalizes while it relieves" antecedent beliefs are a key to the success or failure of conspiracy theories. - can further entrench prejudices etc. Conspiracy cascades - the more people that believe a conspiracy the more probable it become, even if initial root is speculation.n a standard pattern, the conspiracy theory is initially accepted by people with low thresholds for its acceptance etc. the informational pressure builds, to the point where many people, with somewhat higher thresholds, begin to accept the theory too The Role of reputation - Conspiracy theories do not take hold only because of information. Sometimes people profess belief in a conspiracy theory, or at least suppress their doubts, because they seek to curry favour. In a reputational cascade, people think that they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order to maintain the good opinion of others. Role of availability - a distinctive kind of cascade arises when such an event is highly salient or cognitively "available." Role of emotions -It is clear that affective factors, and not mere information are important in terms of the spread of CT Group polarization - members of a deliberating group typically end up in a more extreme position in line with their tendencies before deliberation began. Positional jockeying; if, for example, several members of a group want to be the second-most-extreme supporter of the view held in common by the group, the distribution of views within the group can shift to become more extreme overall.group polarization is particularly likely, and particularly pronounced, when people have a shared sense of identity and are connected by bonds of solidarity. Selection effects -self-selection of members into and out of groups with extreme views. As group's median view begins to move in a certain direction, doubters and halfway-believers will tend to depart while intense believers remain Members of informationally and socially isolated groups become increasingly distrustful or suspicious of the motives of others or of the larger society, falling into a "sinister attribution error.

Growth first principle

This principle allows rapid growth to be prioritised over some personal liberties, on the condition that the consequent benefits and sacrifices should be fairly shared, and that the bases of self-respect should not be undermined. The prospects of the least advantaged in the globe would be better advanced by following this principle, than by prioritising liberty over economic growth. If threshold of material well being has not been reached

Why are conspiracy theories dangerous sunstein

"crippled epistemology," There is a close connection, we suggest, between our claim on this count and the empirical association between terrorist behavior and an absence of civil rights and civil liberties An especially useful account suggests that what makes unjustified conspiracy theories unjustified is that those who accept them must also accept a kind of spreading distrust of all knowledge-producing institutions, in a way that makes it difficult to believe anything at all. Conspiracy theories often display the characteristic features of a "degenerating research program" in which contrary evidence is explained away by adding epicycles and resisting falsification of key tenets. But in the racial context, a belief in conspiracies has often played a significant role in producing violence; conspiracy theories have had large effects on behaviour. widespread public skepticism about the government's assertions, or by dampening public mobilization and participation in government-led efforts, or both. self-insulating quality. The very statements and facts that might dissolve conspiracy cascades can be taken as further evidence on their behal

What is Rawl's view of international justice (1999)

'1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. 6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political or social regime' Wealth is not an end in itself, but its relevance is to assure the conditions of political autonomy. As Long as a society is 'well-ordered' - its government liberal or decent, its people free and responsible - its level of wealth above the requisite minimum is irrelevant, and if one such society develops more than another there is no reason for requiring distributive transfers from it. There is no need and hence no duty of assistance.

Waldron 1993

'To embody a right in an entrenched constitutional document is to adopt a certain attitude towards one's fellow citizens. self-assurance and mistrust: 'The reasons which make me think of the human individual as a bearer of rights are the very reasons that allow me to trust her as the bearer of political responsibilities. It is precisely because I see each person as a potential moral agent, endowed with dignity and autonomy, that I am willing to entrust the people en masse with the burden of self-government.' against constitutionalizing rights for democracy proceduralist gambit

Nagel's idea of radical inequality

(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute terms - all rock bottom absolute basics are insufficient (2) They are also very badly off in relative terms - it is also unequal, it needn't be like that (3) The inequality is impervious - nothing that the very poor can do about it, not a case of them being lazy a case of absolute lack of opportunity. Cant 'get on their bikes' when they don't have bikes. (4) The inequality is pervasive - not in one dimension of life, but all aspects of well-being no off-setting reason which makes life likeable. (5) The inequality is avoidable - Makes it radical. What could solve this condition could be described and through positive actions and stopping actions which feed into it the situation could conceivably be solved. (these create a positive duty toward the poor)

Pogge 2001

Affluent countries are not only ailing their positive duties to the poor but furthermore their negative duties not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit from the unjust impoverishment of other GRD is feasible therefore it should be done Moral convictions can have real effects even in international politics you can ashift the normative baseline

Criticism for Rawlsian Justice

-Relative Welfare is arguable what is relevant - elastic band analogy -Oppenheimer (1990) tested Rawls's hypothesis and found that typically everyone agreed on a unanimity principle but not maximin, instead they set a floor below which no one was allowed to fall. ist alternative to Rawls -Incentivize laziness, typical argument against unemployment benefit -Harasnyi (1975) it is not rational to maximin principle unless you are risk averse, instead people should maximize their expected value One obvious objection to the above list is that illiberal and unjust regimes would not agree with the listed principles. But this objection is irrelevant because principles of international justice that concern Rawls are the ones that apply to the community of liberal societies and decent hierarchical societies.For Rawls, illiberal and indecent societies are not full members of international community; so, they are not parties to the international original position in the first place.

Alegere 2004

-Right to freedom from severe deprivation is grounded in the basic character of the interests it protects and the slight effort it requires Denial of this is irrational flows from the principle of humanityy but is not a charity or benevolence but a core element of justice should be constitutionally entrenched even in narrow conceptions of justice against rawlisan argument about democratic disagreement

Kavanagh 2003

Implicit in much of the preceding discussion is the fact that there are many supportive connections between constitutional rights and popular participation First, an important consequence of entrenching rights in a judicially enforced Bill of Rights, is that it empowers individuals to initiate litigation in order to assert and enforce their rights before an independent court constitutional rights into sources of power for individuals can empower them to effect change in legislators may have otherwise been reluctant Regardless of whether they win or lose, litigants can succeed in raising the profile of an otherwise marginal issue and bringing it into the limelight for public debate. In these ways, judicial review involves a distribution of political power in society, such that those who might otherwise be effectively disenfranchised in the political system can press their claim in the public life of their country. It can provide an added channel of participation, which can benefit those who might have difficulty getting their voice heard through the channels of normal politics So, rather than disempowering ordinary citizens on matters of moral and political importance, as Waldron suggests, judicial review can be a way of empowering citizens to assert, publicise and mately enforce their rights in the public forum. No institutional set-up will succeed in allowing every single worthwhile claim to be heard. The point is simply some of those who may have little or no chance of achieving level of support or recognition, may have greater chances bringing a case to the Supreme Court. Of crucial importance is fact that in the latter, success is not dependent on mobilising spread political support among the populace at large, or power groups within that populace. Of course, the force of this point may be resisted by those who believe that the courts are above or outside politics. They argue constitutional judicial review provides a legal remedy for violation of a right. As such, it is an alternative to participation in the political process, rather than an instance of it. (waldron's argument that judiciary can be biased) This view rests on an unduly narrow conception of politics well as a narrow conception of participation Having the ability to legally enforce rights means that, at the very least, one's government may have to justify their policy decisions, and defend them publicly in court. If legislation is found to be wanting, it may to change to accommodate rights-claims. This gives individuals immense political power to instigate legislative change in an a which affects them directly. Moreover, success in the constitutional court can have considerable impact on the allocation of power and resources in society, and this has obvious political implications. This leads to the second point of supportive connection between participation and judicial review. While constitutional judicial review may indeed restrict the ambit of democratic decision-making to some degree, it does so for reasons which are congruent with the reasons why we value participation the point of having participatory rights was to ensure that people could get their voice heard in the public forum. It was intrinsically valuable because it gave people a sense of belonging and inclusion, as well as a feeling of being respected as a full member in their community. whatever restriction of democratic decision-making procedures results from judicial review, it does not reflect, or emanate from a disregard or disrespect for any section of the community, or denial of any person's membership. On the contrary, it is justifies on the basis that the enhanced protection of rights it aims to achieve is a way of respecting individuals, because it protects and respects their interests. It justifies a shortfall in participation in order to secure optimal protection for people's interests more generally. This connects with Waldron's claim that respect for people's autonomy requires a political decision-making mechanism that allows people to have a say in the decision: there is dignity in inclusion, and insult in exclusion. It should be clear by now that my response follows from the priority of the instrumental condition of good government. Individuals have an interest in personal autonomy, which gives rise to a duty in others to respect that interest. We respect people by having due regard for their interests, and we disrespect them by failing to do so. In the account presented here is one element amongst many which must be balanced in a that will provide optimal overall protection of people's interest including their interest in autonomy. The dignity of inclusion should be understood to incorporate this broader perspective, rather than being viewed entirely in procedural terms.

Habernas 2001

According to the classical conception, the laws of a republic express the unrestricted will of the united citizens. Regardless of how the laws reflect the existing ethos of the shared political life, this ethos presents no limitation insofar as it achieves its validity only through the citizens' own process of will-formation. The principle of the constitutional exercise of power, on the other hand, appears to set limits on the people's sovereign self-determination. The one side insists that in basic rights, the private autonomy of citizens assumes a form that—"unchangeable" in its essential content—guarantees the anonymous rule of law. According to the other side, the political autonomy of citizens is embodied in the self-organization of a community that freely makes its own laws. If the normative justification of constitutional democracy is to be consistent, then it seems one must rank the two principles, human rights and popular sovereignty. . On the first alternative, the democratic lawgiver may decide in a sovereign manner only within the boundaries of human rights; on the second alternative, the democratic lawgiver can set up any constitution it wants and, as the case may be, violate its own basic law, thus impairing the idea of the constitutional state. These alternatives contradict a strong intuition.The idea of human rights that is spelled out in basic rights may neither be imposed on the sovereign lawgiver as a limitation nor be merely instrumentalized as a functional requisite for legislative purposes. In a certain way, we consider both principles as equally original. One is not possible without the other, but neither sets limits on the other. The intuition of "co-originality" can also be expressed thus: private and public autonomy require each other. The two concepts are interdependent; they are related to each other by material implication. Citizens can make an appropriate use of their public autonomy, as guaranteed by political rights, only if they are sufficiently independent in virtue of an equally protected private autonomy in their life conduct. members of society actually enjoy their equal private autonomy to an equal extent—that is, equally distributed individual liberties have "equal value" for them—only if as citizens they make an appropriate use of their political autonomy .Rousseau and Kant both formulated this intuition in the concept of autonomy.3 The idea that the addressees of the law must also be able to understand themselves as its authors does not give the united citizens of a democratic polity a voluntaristic, carte blanche permission to make whatever decisions they like argue that the allegedly paradoxical relation between democracy and the rule of law resolves itself in the dimension of historical time, provided one conceives the constitution as a project that makes the founding act into an ongoing process of constitution making that continues across generations.

Pogges argument that Affluent countries are not only ailing their positive duties to the poor but furthermore their negative duties

Added criteria to Nagel's radical inequality

Beitz 1975

Agrees with the framework of Rawlsian Justice Believes that the affluent have a duty to the poor due not only to humanitarian principles but also due to justice principles (which conceivably reach a more drastic conclusion) Disagrees with Rawls that the nation state is the foundation of contractarian principles and argues instead that Rawlsian Justice should be applied globally. From this he argues; ' parties to the original position cannot be assumed to know that they are members of a particular national society, choosing principles of justice primarily for that society. The veil of ignorance must extend to all matters of national citizenship. [...] Assuming that the arguments for the two principles are successful as set out in Rawls' book, there is no reason to think that the content of the principles would change as a result of enlarging the scope of the original position so that the principles would apply to the world as a whole.' However he also contests that even without the premise of cooperation the obligations would be identical. He also rejects the idea that social justice has primacy over global justice The globalization of the two principles (or of the general conception, if appropriate) has the consequence that principles of justice for national societies can no longer be viewed as ultimate. The basic structure of national societies continues to be governed by the two principles (or by the general conception), but their application is derivative and hence their requirements are not absolute' (377) 'national policies which maximize the welfare of the least-advantaged group within the society cannot be justified if other policies would be more optimal from the point of view of the lesser advantaged elsewhere' (377-8) societies should not start to devote extra resources to the realisation of Rawls's two principles until all societies have reached the threshold level of material well-being. 'no society could justify the additional costs involved in moving from the general to the special conception [...] until every society had, at least, attained a level of well-being sufficient to sustain the general conception' Until the threshold level of material well being has been reached the growth first principle would apply Natural Resource Argument

Pigden 2016

Are conspiracy theorists epistemically vicious? That is the conventional wisdom a trait is an epistemic virtue if leads to the discovery of salient truths and the avoidance of pernicious falsehoods, and an epistemic vice the contrary. As such epistemic virtues and vices are role-relative, context-relative and end-relative. I argue that that it is not necessarily or even usually vicious to be a conspiracy theorist, even if we restrict the conspiracies in question to conspiracies on the part of Western government agencies, the reason being that many such theories are now known to be true. Finally I contend that the policy suggested by some polemicists of systematic skepticism towards conspiracy theories would be intellectually suicidal and hence vicious.

Caney 2005

Argues against Barry who saysThe global cooperative scheme is not a scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation, and therefore Rawls's principles do not apply within the global sphere. by arguing that Beitz escapes Barry's critique because his claim is that principles of distributive justice apply to groups of people who are interconnected in some way, even if that interconnection is not mutually beneficial or cooperative. As he writes in Political Theory and International Relations: 'the requirements of justice apply to institutions and practices (whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take place' (1999c: 131). Institutionalists such as Beitz argue that all or at least some principles of justice apply only within a scheme of cooperation, or an institutional framework, or a system of interdependence. But, if we consider the matter of distributive justice as a matter of entitlements and correlative duties, then the presence or absence of interdependence loses moral significance Argues that institutions have importance because of their impact but if this is true (impact argument) then agents external to an institutional system may also have moral significance and responsibility if they are able to have an effect on people's interests. The impact argument then cannot vindicate institutionalism; rather it entails ascribing duties to all who can make a difference. Beitz's resource redistribution principle has no significant role to play in Beitz's theory. Once nations agree upon the resource redistribution principle, nations start to contact each other in the form of resource redistribution. They now have impact upon each other. Then, this is now a case for Beitz's second argument based on global interdependence and the global original position, i.e. a case for the global difference principle. Beitz's resource redistribution principle is no longer relevant. Beitz does not explain why there should be the original position only if there is a scheme of cooperation, or interdependence. [Actually, he does seem to explain why in his 1975 article, following Rawls. Principles of justice are to guide and evaluate the outcomes of a scheme of cooperation (e.g. distributive outcomes). If there is no such scheme for justice to regulate, then there is no point discussing justice in the first place. So, if there is no such scheme, people do not enter the original position in the first place.] Caney thinks that there may be a global original position even if there is no global scheme of cooperation.

How to tackle conspiracy theories sunstein

Assuming; "pluralistic ignorance," in which citizens are unsure what other citizens believe. because efforts to rebut conspiracy theories also legitimate them. minimize this effect by rebutting more rather than fewer theories enlisting independent groups to supply rebuttals, and by cognitive infiltration designed to break up the crippled epistemology of conspiracy-minded groups and informationally isolated social networks. Dilemma one; ignore or rebute ignore = omission, rebute . = draws attention In a typical pattern, government plays a wait-and-see strategy: ignore the conspiracy theory until it reaches some ill-defined threshold level of widespread popularity, and then rebut. legitimating effect arises at least in part because of a contrast between the foreground and the background: Dilemma two; to what audience If CTs are biased assimilators Government can partially circumvent these problems if it enlists credible independent experts in the effort to rebut the theories. There is a tradeoff between credibility and control, however. The price of credibility is that government cannot be seen to control the independent experts. (1)Government might ban "conspiracy theories", somehow defined. (2) Government might impose some kind of tax, financial or otherwise, on those who disseminate such theories . (3) Government might itself engage in counterspeech, marshaling arguments to discredit conspiracy theories. (4) Government might formally hire credible private parties to engage in counterspeech. (5) Government might engage in informal communication with such parties, encouraging them to help. cognitive infiltration of the groups that produce conspiracy theories, which involves a mix of (3), (4), and (5) The first-line response to conspiracy theories is to maintain an open society, in which those who might be tempted to subscribe to such theories are unlikely to distrust all knowledge-creating institutions, The Internet itself has ambiguous effects; it is no panacea, even if it is entirely free First, responding to more rather than fewer conspiracy theories has a kind of synergy benefit: it reduces the legitimating effect of responding to any one of them, because it dilutes the contrast with unrebutted theories

Common tropes of Conspiraracy theories

Conspiracy theories have distinctive features, above all because of their self-sealing quality; account for their plausibility, make it more difficult for outsiders to rebut or even to question them. Conspiracy theories often attribute extraordinary powers to certain agents. Those who believe that those agents have such powers are especially unlikely to give respectful attention to debunkers Likewise, individuals embedded in isolated groups or small, self-enclosed networks who are exposed only to skewed information will more often hold conspiracy theories that are justified, relative to their limited informational environment

Benjamin 2017

At the heart of contemporary international law lies a paradox: the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 have justified 16 years of international war, yet the official international community, embodied principally in the United Nations, has failed to question or even scrutinise the US government's account of those attacks. Despite the emergence of an impressive and serious body of literature that impugns the official account and even suggests that 9/11 may have been a classic (if unprecedentedly monstrous) false-flag attack, international statesmen, following the lead of scholars, have been reluctant to wade into what appears to be a very real controversy. African nations are no strangers to the concept of the false flag tactic, and to its use historically in the pursuit of illegitimate geopolitical aims and interests. This article draws on recent African history in this regard, as well as on deeper twentieth-century European and American history, to lay a foundation for entertaining the possibility of 9/11-as-false-flag. This article then argues that the United Nations should seek to fulfil its core and incontrovertible 'jury' function of determining the existence of inter-state aggression in order to exercise a long-overdue oversight of the official 9/11 narrative.

Bellamy

Bellamy distinguishes between 'political constitutionalism and legal constitutionalism' legalistic conception hinders the ability of a people to "continuously reconstitute themselves and democracy through normal politics Political = "a procedure for resolving disagreements about the nature and implications of democratic values" in light of principles of equal concern, respect, and non-domination Due to conflicts over goods that democratic society must achieve, need to avoid institutions of democratic decision making in order to realise the values of equal concern, respect and non-domination

Definitions of Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracism - untested hypothesis Critical method? Karl Popper famously argued that conspiracy theories overlook the pervasive unintended consequences of political and social action; they assume that all consequences must have been intended by someone. Sunstein narrowing our focus to conspiracy theories that are demonstrably false, harmful, and unjustified (in the epistemological sense), 'an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until their aims are accomplished)' (this is not exhaustive but best fits their purpose) Pigden Slanted Definition Feldman - [A] conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of events, contrary to an officially sanctioned alternative, involving the causal agency of a group of agents working together in secret, often or usually for a sinister purpose. (p. 106) Pipes = CT = theory which posits the existence of a conspiracy which does not in fact exist (they are mistaken) Raikka and Mandik - a theory that cites the existence of collective action that is kept perfectly secret from the public

Denith 2016

Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases, belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a 'conspiracy' and a 'conspiracy theory', and such arguments rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that it is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim that such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events needs to be reevaluated.

Pigden

Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. I defend epistemic 'oughts' that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. the policy of systematically doubting or disbelieving conspiracy theories would be both a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation, since it leads to the conclusion that history is bunk and the nightly news unbelievable. if you are not a 'conspiracy theorist' in my anodyne sense of the word then you are an 'idiot' in the Greek sense of the word, that is, someone so politically purblind as to have no opinions about either history or public affairs. (Either you believe the news and are a CT or you don't and are a CT) The conventional wisdom can only be saved (if at all) if 'conspiracy theory' is given a slanted definition. I discuss some slanted definitions apparently presupposed by proponents of the conventional wisdom (including, amongst others, Tony Blair) and conclude that even with these definitions the conventional wisdom comes out as deeply unwise.

Hayward

Constitutionalising a right makes it immune to the possibility of (routine) democratic revision. So, constitutional rights that set certain substantive values beyond the reach of routine political revision have the effect of pre-empting decisions that might otherwise be arrived at through democratic procedures. Environmental rights are subject to the criticism of being undemocratic Certain procedural rights, however, are necessary for the very functioning of democracy as such. Can procedural environmental rights be justified on this ground? And what about the substantive right to an adequate environment? Argues that both kinds of environmental rights, in common with some existing and far less controversial rights, can in fact be justified on the very grounds that democracy itself is justified. Environmental rights can assume a variety of forms within a constitution, including the three broad types discussed in this chapter: procedural rights, positive rights, and negative rights; each type, I have suggested, can in principle be claimed to have democratic legitimacy comparable to that of more established rights of these types Therefore if any constitutional rights at all can be considered to have democratic legitimacy, then a wide range of constitutional environmental rights can. Reasons have also be given for thinking that any normatively elaborated conception of constitutional democracy actually requires full recognition of these rights. I have argued that universal human rights imply two different demands on which we act on behalf of humanity;The first is the obligation to respond to the fundamental injustice of those who have become rightless; The second is the political obligation to constitute the human political community democratically so as to realize justice. The role of humanity in both senses provides a democratic minimum to the extent that all persons have the status and thus the normative power to initiate and bring their perspective to bear upon deliberation With its aim of greater institutionalization of human rights at various levels, such a public of humanity would constitute itself as a global civil rights movement, in which citizens use their universal political rights against the many forms of domination inherent in the socially destructive features of currently uneven globalization. This will require opening up the justification of human rights to a variety of perspectives . Although not advocating a cosmopolis, my argument is cosmopolitan in the sense that it suggests that just political order is best realized in a differentiated and democratically structured community of humanity. We cannot say that a well-ordered democracy with imperfect but fair procedures would always reflect the demands of justice; but we can say that it might achieve the democratic minimum that makes it possible for democracy to be a means to justice and in doing so realize the normative status of membership in the human political community. Democratic justification is continually enriched through adopting new perspectives. An enlarged mentality demands of deliberators that they not only think from the standpoint of all, but also, as Kant put it in a more distributive fashion, "from the standpoint of everyone else." If everyone else has universal political rights, then democracy can become more just by making manifest the perspective of humanity as a requirement of democratic justification. It can do this only if humanity becomes a novel political subject, a political community in which the status of humanity is realized.

Harambam Aupers 2016

Despite their popularity and normalization, the public image of conspiracy theory remains morally tainted. Academics contribute by conceiving of conspiracy theorists as a coherent collective: internal variety is sacrificed for a clear external demarcation. variation in the conspiracy milieu through people's own self-understanding More particularly, we study how these people identify with and distinguish themselves from others. The analysis shows that they actively resist their stigmatization as 'conspiracy theorists' by distinguishing themselves from the mainstream as 'critical freethinkers'. The trope 'I am not a conspiracy theorist' is used to reclaim rationality by labelling others within the conspiracy milieu the 'real' conspiracy theorists. Secondly, their ideas of self and other make three groups apparent: 'activists', 'retreaters' and 'mediators'. Conspiracy culture, we conclude, is not one monolithic whole, but rather a network of different groups of people, identifying with different worldviews, beliefs, and practices. Summary;scientific experts are power elite classify CT as bad science, irrational, extremeists CT contest authority of science and objectivity of . true

Tim Hayward 2006 (Beitz)

Distribution of natural resources is not morally arbitrary; natural resources that have been already appropriated as the outcome of a social phenomenon, redistribution of transferable, appropriated natural resources is morally neutral, and permissible, only if there is no one who has a pre-existing entitlement that opposes such redistribution. Otherwise, it infringes upon that someone's entitlement. For example, we could think of a nation's sovereign right to its territorial resources as such an opposing entitlement. Or we could draw on the Lockean theory of labour, and argue that someone who has appropriated a bundle of resources by mixing labour would have an entitlement to that bundle. He argues instead that instead you should attempt to distribute command over natural resources parties would not agree upon Beitz's resource redistribution principle, but something else [e.g. an access redistribution principle?]. A more satisfactory account can be developed from the perspective of ecological economics as inspired by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. From this perspective, global inequalities in the command of natural resources can be viewed with the clarity that a normative theory of their justice requires. If natural resources are re-conceptualised in terms of 'ecological space', Beitz's argument can be recast and vindicated. The re-conceptualisation is necessary to overcome the problems with the original version, as is shown by reference to the existing alternative formulations of Hillel Steiner and Thomas Pogge.

Beitz's argument withouth the scheme of cooperation (Kantian Argument) 1983

Even if there is no cooperative scheme at the international level, parties to the international original position would be interested in the redistribution of natural resources. (Natural resource argument) Parties would therefore agree upon what Beitz calls a 'resource redistribution principle'. In the absence of equitable resource redistribution, nations 'might resort to war as a means of securing the resources necessary to establish domestic justice'Therefore, the resource redistribution principle would serve the peaceful coexistence of nations. it is not clear why national psychological ties are so morally important as to override the consideration of international economic ties. the modern state is so large that co-nationals do not share psychological attachments to each other. And third, if we accept the moral importance of national loyalty, then a certain portion of a nation's gross product would be exempt from the application of the global difference principle. But this does not affect the fact that there exists the obligation based on the global difference principle. Beitz accepts Barry's point of criticism re his scheme of cooperation and develops a third argument why the scope of the original position should be global: c) all persons should be represented in a global original position because while the nation one happens be born into is morally arbitrary, relevant characteristics human share (i.e. sense of justice and capacity to form a conception of the good) are morally significant: even if a global scheme of justice does not presently exist, it is nonetheless feasible, and fulfilling the feasibility condition suffices to make the case (since the alternative would be arbitrary favoring of status quo).

Isiksel 2014

Even if we think constitutional rights can be democratic, a constitution might still be undemocratic, as is illustrated in the case of EU Constitutionalism has long been a byword for legitimate government. Recently, however, legal scholars and political theorists have begun attending to the ways in which constitutional rule can fail to realize (or actively hinder) the lofty ideals with which it is traditionally associated. legal system can be configured on a constitutional footing, and still thwart democratic rule to a far more systematic extent than the occasional "counter‐majoritarian difficulty." I analyze the European Union as an example of non-democratic constitutionalism, other international regimes share similar features. EU's constitutional authority = functionalist, justified with regard to technocratic competence but it's unstable and inadequate conditioning the ordinary exercise of public power in accordance with a change-resistant legal framework Constrains the ability of democratic publics to collectively govern themselves Disables elected institutions from making decisions that contradict the terms of the constitution Habermas = constitutional rule is supported by a compelling democratic rationale, fixed nature of constitutional norms facilitates the exercise of collective self-legislation Democracy is inconceivable without a framework of rules and procedures by which citizens collectively govern themselves, and it is the constitution's task to supply these norms as well as the terms of their revision. The latter faculty is particularly important: constitutionalism is compatible with democracy insofar as it makes all laws, including itself, subject to revision in accordance with popular will. BUT not just popular will, just as likely to lock in hegemonic structures as they are to protect freedoms Fixity (entrenchment) and reflexivity (democratic revisability(possibility of constitutional amendment through democratic mobilisation, ensures entrenched norms e.g. individual rights accord with what a particular society at a particular time considers to be fundamental )) > tracing constitution's authority to the will of popular sovereign helps to justify the procedural and substantive constraints placed by constitutional norms on ordinary politics Non-democratic constitutionalism = political regime with features of constitutional rule BUT whose normative priorities do not include democratic self-rule .. EU = liberal but non-democratic constitution DISABLES democratic control over certain areas of policy making Saps domestic democratic autonomy from its member states European . integration has "de-parliamentarized" decision-making by removing policy . competences from national legislatures and transferring them to non-elected executive institutions such as the Council and the Commission Parliament can sack the commission but not the council, cannot make laws unlike domestic legislative assembly, limited share in decision making, EU's current constitutional system ensures that there is no electoral route to alternation of power Trade-off between democratic legitimacy and policy effectiveness is endemic to the EU's design AND TO DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT EU's legitimacy rests on its claim to have superior 'problem-solving' or technocratic capacity - Fritz Scharpf's formulation as 'output legitimacy' Geared to policy outcomes such as economic productivity, employment, consumer welfare, and environmental protection Sum; Needs to be reflexive - traceable to popular will EU non-democratic; parliaments have limited rights Output legitimacy can just as easily entrench hedgemoinc power structure

JS MIll

Freedom of speech the only justification for ignoring freedom of speech is if its inciting harm, anything else should be triumphed over with reason in discourse.

Ecological perspective on Pogge

From the perspective of ecological economists, damage to an adequate environment is another cause of material poverty. Societies accumulate wealth through the interaction with the environment. Production is possible by inhaling productive potential from the environment, and exhaling waste into the environment. The less productive or assimilative the environment becomes, the less material wealth a society can produce, and the more difficult it will become for societies to ensure subsistence for the poor. So, in the long run, we cannot solve poverty without solving environmental degradation. A short-term solution to poverty may cause ecological problems, and ecological problems may reproduce material disadvantages of the poor. So, we should take material poverty and ecological degradation as a dual problem, rather than as separate problems.

Fabre 2000

Furthermore, will you vote when you're starving. Necessary in any society that has the luxury of democracy? Which is the luxury? Fabre questions this, since rights to health and welfare are important for reasons that have nothing to do with political participation. Although they are useful for democracy they are important in their own right. Fabre's question goes to how we balance various political values, including democracy. We want these things regardless of the political system. I reject the claim that bills of social rights are undemocratic and therefore unacceptable. I argue that they are indeed undemocratic in some cases, but that this is not a good reason for rejecting them I distinguish between democratic rights, namely, those rights the respect of which is necessary for a regime to count and function as a democracy, and undemocratic rights, namely, those rights the respect of which is not necessary for a regime to count and function as a democracy. I also argued that the constitutionalization of social rights to basic resources and of the right to adequate education is democratic, while the constitutionalization of social rights to adequate minimum income, health care, and housing is undemocratic, except in those cases where, if these rights are not respected, democracy cannot survive and function as such. I also look at different ways in which the judiciary could protect constitutional social rights; I claim that the constitutional court should tell the government when it has breached a right and should set a deadline for the provision of remedies, but should not tell the government which remedies to provide, and how it should provide them. I thus delineate the scope for democratic decision‐making when constitutional social rights are at issue. I have argued that democracy should be conceived of as a procedure for making decisions: it should not be conceived of in terms of outcomes yielded by the procedure and independent of it. I have also claimed that on each of these readings of the word 'undemocratic', the objection against bills of rights on grounds of their being undemocratic is not convincing I have thereby consolidated my claim that it is legitimate to entrench individual rights in the constitution of a democratic state.

Pogge 2004

Gross injustices are happening and a feasible alternative is insight The entire system is an infringement of negative duty not to harm Take the unconditional international resource privilege for example. It is beneficial to the affluent countries by giving us access to a larger, cheaper and more reliable supply of foreign resources, because we can acquire ownership of them from anyone who happens to exercise effective power without regard to whether the country's population either approves the sale or benefits from the proceeds. Unconditional international resource and borrowing privileges are also highly advantageous to many a putschist or tyrant in the poor countries, for whom they secure the funds needed to maintain himself in power even against the will of a large majority of his compatriots. Such privileges are, however, an unmitigated disaster for the global poor who are being dispossessed through loan and resource agreements over which they have no say and from which they do not benefit that this injustice does not consist in too little "aid" being dispensed to the poor. There is still so much severe poverty, and so much need for aid, only because the poor are systematically impoverished by present institutional rules and have been so impoverished for a long time during which our advantage and their disadvantage have been compounded. Of course, substantial aid is needed to eradicate severe poverty at a morally acceptable speed But such aid is not generous charity. All that is needed is compensation for the harms produced by the long-term imposition of an unjust global order, an imposition that the affluent countries effected and still greatly benefit from The continuing imposition of this global order, essentially unmodified, constitutes a massive violation of the human right to basic necessities — a violation for which the governments and electorates of the more powerful countries bear primary responsibility. This charge cannot be defeated through appeal to baseline comparisons, by appeal to the consent of the global poor themselves, or by appeal to other causal factors that the present global order may merely do too little to counteract.

Difference between positive and negative duties

Hayward 2008 an be interpreted in two ways, either Positive Duty = An Act, Negative Duty = An omission , however Shue argued a negative duty was an avoidance of doing harm, so act as to avoid harm, duty to avoid harm may require an act Pogge falls on the not harm side of the argument Negative duty with positive obligations (to protect and reform) = Pogge Derivative obligation on Alternative Duty Compensation is due for harm done- Confused to say can avoid harming by compensating do instead collaborate in upholdinga just order."- Implies a positive duty to uphold one

Is benefiting from and contributing to injustice the same?

Hayward's answer. In some cases, benefiting is also depriving. For example, we are benefiting from the single finite natural resource base. What we are doing is not simply benefiting from someone else's unjust conduct. What we are actually doing is benefiting by depriving - by depriving the poor of their secure access to finite resources. Dan Butt's answer. We are moral agents. We are committed to certain principles of justice. And it can be assumed that moral agents want justice to prevail over injustice. This means that we shouldn't only wish to avoid causing injustice ourselves, but we should also have a genuine aversion to injustice caused by someone else. So, it is morally inconsistent to say we regret that injustice has taken place but say the benefits we received from that injustice are not morally wrong.

Buchanan 2000

I have argued that Rawls's work on the law of peoples not only does not, but cannot, provide guidance for two of the most important topics a moral theory of international law must address: global distributive justice and intrastate conflict. Rawls is barred from making a contribution in these areas because his theory is founded on a denial of two basic features of the world for which a moral theory of international law is needed: the fact that there is a global basic structure and the fact that the populations of states are not ''peoples'' Adding the global basic structure assumption and dropping the assumption that states are politically homogeneous (that there is a one-to-one correlation of ''peoples'' and states) opens the door to a much richer conception of what international law is about. Rawls stresses that his Law of Peoples departs from the Westphalian paradigm by recognizing that sovereignty is limited by the need to respect basic human rights and the prohibition against aggressive war. He is correct to see this departure as progress. What he has failed to appreciate is how Westphalian his theory nonetheless is and, thereby, how debilitating the limitations of the Westphalian framework are Buchanan also supported Beitz's reply to arguments that his principle would incentivise wastefulness by arguing that the poor do not make the decisions involving use of resources and thus shouldn't have to pay the price

Hagen 2017

In the social science literature, conspiracy theories are commonly characterized as theories positing a vast network of evil and preternaturally effective conspirators, and they are often treated, either explicitly or implicitly, as dubious on this basis. This characterization is based on Richard Hofstadter's famous account of 'the paranoid style'. However, many significant conspiracy theories do not have any of the relevant qualities. Thus, the social science literature provides a distorted account of the general category 'conspiracy theory', conflating it with a subset of that category that encourages unfairly negative evaluations of conspiracy theories. Generally, when evaluating theories, one should focus on the most plausible versions; the merit of a theory is independent of the existence of less plausible versions of it. By ignoring this and glossing over important distinctions, many academics, especially in the social sciences, have misclassified many conspiracy theories and in doing so have contributed to an epistemically unfair depiction of them. Further, even theories that genuinely fit the description of 'the paranoid style' cannot be completely dismissed on that basis. All conspiracy theories ought to be judged on the totality of their individual merits.

Risse 2004

International institutions, including in particular international economic institutions, are currently under attack from both left and right . For the left and for many new social movements, such institutions are handmaidens to the destructive and inequitable forces of global capitalism. For the right, they are threats to the efficient working of global market economy and to the cohesion and autonomy of nation-states. Instead I wish to consider how international institutions might be morally important; how international institutions have changed; and what those changes imply for global economic justice. Institutions form a central element in what I term the normative structure of international society. My understanding of normative structure focuses on international legal rules and institutional practices, on international political norms (for example shared understandings of great power management, or concepts of humanitarian intervention, self-determination or sustainable development that have both a legal and political life), and on the dominant ideologies and social practices that animate them. My argument is that the normative structure of international society has evolved in ways which help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order, above all because of the extreme disparities of power that exist within both international and world society. Does imposition + feasible alternatives = implication It does only if omissions of support count as harming. Or it may be the case that, had the global order not been imposed, matters would be even worse than they are now, in which case it would make sense to say that the global order causes a harmful state of affairs, but it would not make sense to say that the global order harms developing countries we encounter four prima facie reasons against development assistance . The first is that assistance is ineffective: what it takes to improve the situation cannot be "imported." The second is a paternalism concern: it is inappropriate for outsiders to build and thus shape institutions. The third is that outsiders cannot be blamed if a society fails in creating something it can only create itself - and thus are not obligated to try. The fourth reason is that institutions might be corrupted if those whose participation maintains them rely on support from the outside This can be overruled if , in a particular case persistent poverty turns on, say, geographical factors Rawls holds that the content of the duty to the global poor is limited to transitory assistance in institution building, and thus implies that inequalities as such among peoples are not morally relevant. He takes this view because he endorses a strong version of the institutional view

Criticism of Pogge

Is benefiting from and contributing to injustice the same? Deny (6) that there is a shared institutional order shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worse-off. (Recall related criticisms of Beitz on this score but note that Pogge is not making Rawlsian argument here therefore institutions need not support Rawlsian justice.) Bietz - no institutional order to support system of justice, Pogge - no institutional order which is created by better off and imposed on poor, Deny (7) that there is a feasible institutional alternative under which such severe and extensive poverty would not persist. [This issue is discussed in Pogge's final section.] In what sense is it feasible? Deny (8) that radical inequality cannot be traced to extra-social factors - such as natural disasters doesn't fully account. Deny (9) that there is a causal relation of natural resource inequalities to radical inequalities (see e.g. Risse, 'What Do We Owe?') depends on definition of natural resource inequalities than their relation. Deny that (10) 'common violent history' makes present inequalities unjust. (e.g. David Miller against running counterfactual histories, you can't know if things would have been had history been different?) Is incidence of the taxation just? Would distribution of funds be effective? [Note Pogge's qualifications on who would receive it.] Note that moral argument and practical proposal could be assessed independently. Is the, secondary, environmental aim taken seriously enough? (reasoning behind it is that it would disincentives the overuse of resources. However this makes the problem of do you want a higher tax base - more money to distribute or less use of resources)

Criticism of Beitz

Is it a a sufficientarian principle? Does it have a target and a cutoff point? What about resource redistribution to those societies that are excluded from Rawls's picture of international community (i.e. illiberal unjust societies), would they be covered by Rawl's duty of assistance? How would this apply in reality, resources aren't easily transferred, e.g. would transferring of a land resource mean transferring food? 'In the absence of a broader agreement to regard international society as a unified scheme of social cooperation, formulation of an acceptable food redistribution rule might prove impossible' Who are the parties to the original position that Beitz is talking about here? Representatives of nations? Or all participants in the global cooperative scheme? Caney explains that it is the latter, but it is not clear from Beitz's discussion here. First, shouldn't different rates of national contribution to the global welfare be awarded proportionally?--- The global difference principle would allow for an incentive mechanism that rewards different rates of national contribution to the global welfare if inequalities resulting from this mechanism are to the greatest benefit of the world's least advantaged population. isn't the present wealth of an affluent society what its citizens deserve on the basis of their personal merits and efforts?--- In response to this, Beitz asks: Why do I enjoy the present level of well-being? His answer is this. It is because I was born in a developed society, and not so much because of my personal merits and efforts. The ground of this principle is that citizens of a nation owe a special obligation to the nation's less advantaged members, and that this special obligation may override their general obligation to improve the prospects of the worse-off elsewhere. because they share a close-knit national community. But, one may continue, people do not share a close-knit community at the international [or global?] level. Have the two thresholds really been reached? a) can everyone be provided for? b)is there a scheme of cooperation How does TNCs command of natural resources factor in? Are natural resources necessarily a good thing? Does it incentivise bad use of natural resources (Miller) Is determining that nations are morally arbitrary really emancipatory? Some states may need to be protected from infiltration

Sunstein Vermeule 2009

It is an open question whether most conspiracy theories are equally benign; we will suggest that some are not benign at all. We shall see that the mechanisms that account for conspiracy theories overlap with those that account for false and dangerous beliefs of all sorts, including those that fuel anger and hatred Conspiracy theories have distinctive features, above all because of their self-sealing quality; account for their plausibility, make it more difficult for outsiders to rebut or even to question them. Government dispelling of information does not work Throughout, we assume a well-motivated government that aims to eliminate conspiracy theories, or draw their poison, if and only if social welfare is improved by doing so.

Definition Rights

Moral rights Basic rights Subsistance rights - Shue constitutional rights

Risse, M. 'Do we live in an unjust world?' 2004

Ofcourse there are small injustices Many of the arguments for larger scale injustce are false If it is unjust the culprits will have duties in justice to rectify the situation, duties that could not simply be subordinated to domestic concerns due to globalization adopt a minimal conception of justice and ask whether the global order as such is unjust in that sense. I ask whether there is a straightforward sense in which the global order harms the poor. >>defining harm? Injustice is not obvious. In most ways things now are better than they have ever been. In terms of just about any standard indicator, the last 200 years have witnessed massive worldwide improvements Some countries have benefited more than others, but it is unclear that inequality and poverty are injustices, rather than great misfortunes crying for rectification on the basis of a positive duty to support the most downtrodden. Uncompensated Exclusion suggests that the global poor are harmed through violations of their common ownership rights in external resources, whereas Shared Institutions proposes that they are harmed because the global order makes them worse off than they would be according to a suitable standard of reference. Uncompensated exclusion only holds if; Egalitarian Ownership: The world's resource base belongs in some (possibly rather weak) sense to humankind in common. And Resource Significance: Resources are crucial for countries' wealth So let us see whether it is true that resources are crucial for a country's wealth. To this end, we consult the three current views on what determines a country's wealth: Geography, institutions, integration shared institutions; Imposition: The better-off impose a shared institutional order on the worse-off (that is, the order that we introduced in section 1 as the global and political order). Feasible Alternatives: There is a feasible alternative institutional order under which radical poverty would not persist . Implication: The existing institutional order is implicated in the persistence of radical inequality because there is such an alternative. Extra-Social Factors: Radical inequality cannot be traced to extra-social factors affecting different people differently. \ accept Imposition and Extra-Social Factors: the latter is consistent with the institutional view, the former is obvious. The other two claims must be qualified. Once they are, it does not follow that the global order is unjust in the sense that it harms the global poor.

Gould 2003

On the face of it, the question of the compatibility of democracy and human rights in the present would normally be answered with a resounding, "Of course they are." The first is that democratic participation is in fact one of the human rights Article 21 (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. ... (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures Article 25 Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without ... unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. ... If human rights become institutionalised in regional and global frameworks of law, then they can restrict the democratic decisions of communities Constitutional circle problem - conflicts over the scope, interpretation of human rights Ronald Dworkin 1996 argues against what he calls the "majoritarian premise" and in favor of a "constitutional conception of democracy," which takes the defining goal of democracy not to be arriving at collective decisions with majority support but rather "that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect." this approach, although requiring much of the same structure of government as majoritarian views do, including especially periodic election of officials, requires this out of a concern for the equal status of citizens and hence permits also nonmajoritarian procedures when they enhance this status. This conception justifies basic requirements and rights to preserve this equality and establishes a basis for declaring laws unconstitutional if they violate these conditions. He also insists that "political decisions that affect the distribution of wealth, benefits, and burdens, must be consistent with equal concern for all. : When is it legitimate to constrain democratic decision making in the interest of justice? If democracy is a central value in political and social life, what can justify limiting or overriding the decisions arrived at by the democratic process? Wouldn't any constraint undercut the very essence of democracy? On the other hand, justice is also a central value for politics, economics, and society. Can our commitment to democratic process allow for decisions or laws democratically arrived at that violate the requirements of justice? Where these two values conflict, what is the basis for judgment as to which will prevail? Even if we agree that in certain cases democracy should be constrained in the interest of justice, who has the right or the authority to determine this? Worse yet, if democracy is itself understood as that procedure that most fully realizes the principle of justice (by recognizing equal rights of participation in decision making), how can it in turn need to be constrained by the requirements of justice? In short, how can democracy as a just procedure itself violate justice?

Criticism of Waldron

Paradox of democracy; taking this argument to the extreme if you trust future (selves) completely then why does their need to be rules put in place at all would the majority not simply follow them anyway without being told, and the minority who wouldn't who are you to tell them not to follow those rules? Judiciary has a legitimate role in a democracy. - if they are doing their job well, they can be effective in looking after majority AND minority and stepping back from controversies To what extent is legislature really disabled? - legislature hasn't been prevented from making laws they're simply bound, if constitution is rational it is simply applying reasonable conditions. Exaggerated claim. Rights bind the executive (and secondary legislation) as well as legislature. - constitutional rights being hard to change can be an advantage, constitution may act to make things more challengeable if they're not already. Legislature and executive have short term view? - Parties my court votes by going for short-run strategies. There is incentive structure to be short term. Constitutions on the other hand must be long-term. in arguments against the short run and long run view democracy in theory will always chose the short-run present aim etc. Rights intended to give citizens access to judiciary? - constitutional rights give citizens access to the appeals process, particularly important for minority groups Do fundamental values really change as much as Waldron supposes? - If we assume that preferences in the present are similar to preferences in the future this is an easily defensible position. if you leave this to politicians they can trick people into voting for them and then not do what they promise / use their mandate to do other things. Need rights to guarantee democracy. How pluralistic is society with respect to fundamental values? - constitutions globally are very similar in many respects especially regarding rights. (disagreement around social and economic rights, Cranston and Shue) and are distinctive geographically, therefore why would you assume that these ideals would change overtime . Respecting valued freedoms does mean constraining some options. - you can't be free to be an axe murderer, freedom does not equal anarchy . All freedom involves respecting limits.

Duty of assistance principle under Rawls International Justice

Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political or social regime' Rawls accepts a 'duty of assistance ' to the poor, but not a principle that is supposed to apply without ed, 'without a target'. Rawls recognises a duty to assist burdened societyes to make a transition towards or liberal or decent basic institutions

Miller 2007

Peverse incentives - Affluencia and Ecologia People shouldn't be subject to redistributive justice due to preferences "nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples."Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. Ofcourse Miller's premise is based on his quantification of resources, wouldn't apply to the conception of ecological space

Mertens, T. (2003)

Pogge's moral arguments, the origins of which are to be found in the legal philosophies of Kant and Rawls. Contrary to these philosophers, however, Pogge does argue in favor of an institutionalized global order. That is, he argues, what justice demands. On this point, he sharply differs from his predecessors. Although Rawls criticizes Kant because of his adherence to a 'comprehensive', metaphysical viewpoint, he follows Kant in distinguishing between several layers of justice, especially between justice on the domestic, national level and justice on the international, global scale (adding local justice as a third layer). In comparison with both Kant's and Rawls's views, Pogge pleads for a revolutionary transformation of the 'law of peoples', in which the 'statist' approach is rejected altogether and a much more utopian stance is adopted . Here, I intend to bring the main arguments together: Kant's and Rawls's pleas for international justice on the one hand and Pogge's arguments for global justice on the other. By doing so, I hope to contribute to answering the question whether Pogge's views represent an unjustifiable 'moral doctrine', unfit for the highly complex international society of societies or an utopian view in need of being endorsed by many. if the requirement of global justice is true in theory, why is it so difficult to apply it in practice? Do these difficulties point at the nature of morality itself..

Why does Rawls argue that the nation state is the boundary for his conception of justice?

Principles must apply equally - (is this applicable globally?) Apply within the sphere where a scheme of social cooperation exists. If national boundaries demarcate boundaries of cooperative schemes, then Rawls's two principles only apply within national communities. Principles of international justice (justice that applies between nations) can be considered only after principles of social justice (justice that applies within a cooperative scheme) and principles for individuals ('natural duties') are identified. The boundaries of cooperative schemes map onto the boundaries of self-sufficient national communities (empirical assumption). This assumption is relaxed only after principles of social justice are identified, and when international justice is considered.

Who would get Pogge's GRD

Proceeds would go to relief of worst extremes of global poverty (how do you decide this) Aim of ensuring all humans can meet own basic needs with dignity Will not need to be a large amount - initial max of 1% of global aggregate income Matter of morality

J Raz

Rejection of view that individual liberty rests primarily on the existance of fundamental moral rights vs. insistence on the importance of civil rights and the rejection of moral individualism emerging view of morality is not one which denies rights a significant role. On the contrary, it is one in which rights play a central role as important ingredients in a mosaic of value‐relations whose significance and implications cannot be spelled out except by reference to rights. does not assign them a privileged status in the moral firmament Does it leave any room for the privileged position of civil rights in many constitutions? Or does it compel one to reject root and branch the doctrine of the constitutional protection of fundamental rights, and of their privileged position in international law? Every moral theory worthy of serious consideration allows for property and consensual rights, for rights of personal security and probably many more. These may well be fundamental rights in the sense that they are part of the deepest level of moral thought. It does not follow, of course, that they are either inalienable or of absolute or near absolute weight Every legal institution once it exists may be justifiably used on occasion for purposes which do not justify its creation or perpetuation. The practice of entrenching certain rights may sometimes be legitimately used to achieve incidental goals which do not belong the the justification of the practice itself.

which rights work with democracy.

Some rights seem to be constitutive for democracy: e.g. right to vote, to stand for election, to participate in other ways. Without these democracy would fundamentally change. How can you be assured you have a democracy without these? Also, exercise of such rights seems to require other rights, such as free expression and association; also information? [See e.g. Saward ch 5.] Proceduralist Gambit Why would you reject both proceduralist and substantive rights simply because it is hard to distinguish between the two. Here note the distinction between procedural and substantive rights. (Draw links to what was said previously re Cranston, and his contrast with Shue) Non-democratic rights and democracy? Substantive rights may not be inherently democratic (i.e. constitutive for a type of decision-making procedure), but some might be necessary for a regime in practice to function democratically: e.g.right to informtion a right to education might be a necessary condition for effective political participation? HOWEVER how do you have a right for education without indoctrination? What about other rights - for instance, to health and welfare (even including basic income, actually don't worry too many questions): could these be justified as necessary preconditions of democracy? Saward thinks so (and compare Daniels' egalitarian argument against Rawls re 'equal worth' of liberty). - begs the question 'what do you mean by democracy' Various rights might not be judged undemocratic if democracy seen not as a mere mechanism but a type of society, with other goods inherent to it? - How do you define democracy? democracy isn't simply a system of government but a kind of society? system of government is just one aspect should democracy be seen as inherently linked to majoritarian principle? With just democracry it would be simply majority rule the constitution is what forces the caveats which account for minority rights. Is Waldron's view sociologically adequately informed? What about realities of power inscribed in existing rights? - who designed the system? - is this also true for constitutional rights. Constitution evolved inherited but changeable? Why should democracy take precedence if it conflicts with rights anyway? Could it not be argued that the very point of democracy, its justification, is the protection it can afford to individual rights? Does Waldron's argument allow for the legitimacy of any constitution at all

Hagen 2010 CT

Sunstein and Vermeule state that their recommendation of infiltration is to apply only to demonstrably false (and potentially harmful) theories. Their chief example of demonstrably false theories is the set of theories that posit insider complicity in the events of 9/11 My challenge to Sunstein and Vermeule is this: Can you prove, in a fair forum, that the theories in question are false? ("Proof" in an unfair forum, of course, is no proof at all.) Why should we take such a totalitarian route Hagen thinks, we should not use the governmental instrument for cognitive infiltration. We should strive towards a more open society where robust public enquiry for knowledge can flourish There are two extreme kinds of society where conspiracy theorists cannot thrive. On the one extreme, there is a totalitarian regime where knowledge is completely controlled by the government. The government closes the minds of people through controlled education. On the other extreme, there is a fully open-democratic society. In such a society, false conspiracy theories cannot gain support from informed people. A real society is located somewhere between these two extremes. In which direction should we move the society? infiltration is Epistemically indefensible False official stories can be much more dangerous than false counter-narratives And in the case of 9/11 in particular there is much at stake indeed. Not only the war in Afghanistan, but also the war in Iraq, the global war on terror, domestic warrantless wire-tapping, secret prisons, torture, extraordinary rendition, and indefinite detention without a trial, have been, and many of these continue to be, justified on the basis of a particular interpretation of what happened on 9/11. holocaust would have been true - that a theory seems extreme and brutal doesn't mean its not true For peaceful groups or organizations to be infiltrated and undermined because the powerful do not agree with their account of history is fundamentally anti-democratic and epistemically perverse, since such actions subvert the dialectic of competitive inquiry. S + V - overestimate the competence//discretion of officials assumed to make sophisticated plans Brian Keeley - Religion is a conspiracy theory - self-sealing quality, able to maneuver to avoid detection, some religious extremists may be dangerous > BUT obviously shouldn't infiltrate religious groups and try to undermine their belief in God 'Introducing cognitive diversity' - want to see groups undermined, including deceit "Rather, we mean that government efforts might succeed in weakening or even breaking up the epistemological complexes that constitute these networks and groups." How do you prove a theory is demonstrably false

Where does Rawls disagree with Beitz (1999)

The availability of natural resources does not play a significant role in the creation of societal wealth. 'Historical examples seem to indicate that resource-poor countries may do very well (e.g., Japan), while resource-rich countries may have serious difficulties (e.g., Argentina). Peverse incentives ;Suppose there were two societies A and B. Society A decided to industrialise and accumulate societal wealth to the extent necessary for the operation of just social institutions. Society B decided to pursue a pastoral and leisurely society; so, it did not industrialise. Both A and B are either liberal or decent. A few decades later, A became wealthier than B. Does distributive justice require A to offset the inequality resulting from A's decision? Assumes autartik resources in resource distribution principle as each states resources can only be used in their own state and thus where there is unfair distribution there is inequality and this should be compensated. In the opposite state of no autarky the and there is a flow of trades and services between countries Beitz advocates for the global difference principle- Paradoxically Rawls argues in an original position people would not agree to Betiz's global difference principle but rather to a duty of assistance

Basham 2016

The critics of conspiracy theory advocate generalism, where conspiracy explanations are by nature extremely suspect. The generalist makes little distinction between any particular conspiracy theory and ignores the justificatory practices of conspiracy theorists, studiously avoiding their actual arguments

Barry 1989

The global cooperative scheme is not a scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation, and therefore Rawls's principles do not apply within the global sphere. Beitz's argument for extending the Rawlsian difference prin ciple is in essense that the network of international trade is sufficiently extensive to draw all countries together in a single cooperative scheme. But it seems to be that trade, however multilateral, does not constitute a cooperative scheme of the relevant kind. Trade, if freely undertaken, is (presumably) beneficial to the exchanging parties, but it is not, it seems to me, the kind of relationship that gives rise to duties of resditributive justice aid and transfers are not the same moreover, we should not expect the latter to develop since the conditions for reciprocity - that all parties stand to gain from the scheme - do not exist (i.e. why would USA pool resources with Bangladesh, as implied on Beitz's version, in first place?). For global principles of justice there would have to be a global society with a global state (which there is not), or else they must be derived from a different theory of justice than Rawls's.

Original position on a global scale

The international original position parties are prevented by the veil of ignorance from knowing their generation; they would be concerned to minimize the risk that, when the veil is lifted, they might find themselves living in a world where resource supplies have been largely depleted. Thus, part of the resource redistribution principle would set some standard for conservation against this possibility'

Why does Beitz believe that Rawlsian Justice applies on a global scale?

The nation state is not self-sufficient and thus a cooperative scheme exists at a global level. - capital movements, a division of labour, regulatory financial institutions, and unequal exchange of productive resources, at the international level 'Since [national] boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social cooperation, they do not mark the limits of social obligations'. This economic interdependence imposes burdens upon societies and confers benefits upon others It is coercive and non-voluntary, and its effects on people's welfare are pervasive. Beitz argues that there is a threshold level of interdependence beyond which the difference principle starts to apply, and that due to economic interdependence this has been reached. Therefore, how this system distributes rights and duties, starting positions, access to resources, etc., among its participants stands in need of justification If national communities are self-sufficient cooperative schemes, then there would be no international interaction to regulate with principles of justice. It would instead be centred around security and peaceful coexistence - E.g. Rawlsian international justice The world systems theory, developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, is an approach to world history and social change that suggests there is a world economic system in which some countries benefit while others are exploited.

Shaw 2010

The problem is that Pogge's approach ignores the diverse identities of the poor and treats them as equally situated and ignores differences among them, an approach that Pogge himself warns against (2008b, 49-50). Pogge assumption that modification in implementing a global tax on natural resources (GRD) = sufficient to eradicate severe poverty as institutional racism and gender injustice are left in place by maintaining the same overall global economic system Pogge proposes a panel of experts as the determining body for how funds are distributed either to poor countries, or in the case of bad governments, to Non-Governmental Organizations (Ibid, 212). This schema leaves several important questions unanswered. For instance, who counts as an expert? development has become inundated with "experts," or 'professionals," defined in such a way as to push out local knowledge and skills (Kothari 2005). This recreates the inequalities The GRD fails to challenge and so reinforces the notion that non-whites belong at the bottom, thus constructing the illusion that such a hierarchy is natural when in actuality it has been created by socio-political activities and decisions under the hand of neoliberalism.

Campbell, T. (2003)

The proposal that poverty ought to be regarded as a violation of human rights and therefore as a condition that ought to be abolished is presented as 'a new paradigm in the fight against poverty' that has the potential to galvanise an effective strategy for ending poverty through an international human rights framework. . I suggest that the basis for the proposal would be strengthened rather than weakened by including compassion or humanitarianism as part of its moral basis and that this can be done without diluting either the moral force or the radical implications of regarding poverty as a violation of human rights. I then argue the case for including a principle of humanity as one basis for such a proposal, bring out the possible distortions of over-emphasising justice as the moral basis for the obligation to relieve poverty and deal with some misunderstandings that get in the way of acknowledging and drawing on the thesis that, in the case of dealing with extreme poverty, it is usually the case that we should put 'humanity before justice'

Pogge and libertarian thinking

The whole idea of switching positive to a negative is consistent with libertarian ideals - typically negative duties are uncontroversial whilst positive duties it has been argued can intervene with people's right to liberty GRD doesn't interfere with the sovereignty of what is done with the resource GRD recognizes property rights of all people to finite resource base. Reformation is not radical but moderate Draws on John Locke - 'leaves enough and as good for the others' which is significant as it is such liberals who argue against global distribution significant is because it accepts all premises of those who normally argue against this kind of global redistribution. It doesn't involve transferring any other rights. non-coercion a country cannot be forced to pay GRD proposal is 'anchored in the dominant strands of western normative political thought'. All the different strands of thinking can deduce this from their frameworks. Doesn't require a massive upheaval of morals. (Locke's proviso) (This is part of the point of insisting on 'negative' character of our obligation.)

Waldron 1993 against constitutionalizing rights

Too much power to judiciary (Judges interpret as well as enforce rights) - he is aware that judges don't simply enforce but interpret Disables legislature from its normal functions... (Legislation can be struck down etc.) - parliament cannot function if constitution is against it and thus, also undermines citizens' democratic rights (Legislature elected, judiciary not.) Binds future legislatures and citizens to unchosen constraints - change is very difficult, (super-majority) which leads no room for future legislatures and citizens, robbing the future of its democratic rights. (e.g. Gun law US) These rules must have been made thinking that they know better than future generations. Once clear rationales may become controversial Rights proponents have unwarranted self-assurance ... the fact of saying some rights are removed above the democracy is saying your ideas are above those of the future population and a self-contradictory mistrust of democracy (e.g. if there should be a right of freedom, let people use it!) In this sense, constitutional provisions and constitutional rights are undemocratic. The constitutional immunity disables representative politics. And, ultimately, this means, citizens are disabled from exercising autonomy and self-government through representative politics. Waldron also touches upon the personality of those who want to constitutionalise a right. They are first 'self-assured'. They have the strong conviction that they are putting forward a truly valuable right even if others disagree. Also, they have a 'mistrust' towards other citizens. They think that other ill-minded people - contemporary or future - will not take the right in question as seriously as they do. That's why they want to put the right beyond revision. According to Waldron, these attitudes of the people in favour of constitutionalisation exhibit disrespect for the equal status of all citizens. Those in favour of constitutionalisation fail to respect the power of autonomy and self-government of other citizens. Waldron thinks that it is inappropriate to constitutionalise the right to political participation even if it is an important right. After all, 'rights' is a very controversial concept. Philosophers disagree aboutwhat rights are, and how to interpret each right, and so on. Citizens also disagree about those questions. So, philosophers and citizens may disagree about how participatory rights should be interpreted and how those rights should be balanced against other important values. Again, if we respect the self-government and collective autonomy of citizens, we should not disable their dialogue on those questions by constitutionalising participatory rights.

Tully 1995

Tully argues that constitutional entrenchment is justified only insofar as it is necessary to enable citizens to participate equally the exercise of public power democratic constitutionalism needs to keep constitutional norms 'open to deliberation and amendment en passant (Not all at once' Self-reflexivity = enables citizens to contest aspects of framework they feel to be unjust As soon as becomes foreclosing - hegemonized rather than liberates

Proceduralist Gambit

Waldron rejects this 'proceduralist gambit', as he calls it, because people disagree how participatory rights should be understood; so they should be left with elected legislature, not set above politics. Is showing this disagreement evidence enough for this conclusion? Surely this simply wastes time. - How convincing is Waldron's response to the 'procedural gambit'? He denies there is a clear distinction between procedural and substantive rights: but why reject both kinds rather than embrace both?

True Conspiracy theories

Watergate, project MKULTRA, Northwoods and Cuba, Nazi Regime/Final solution, that Santa Claus isn't real

Butterfeild 2016

Worry that bad organisations, Machiavellian intentions, get away with activity if using term 'conspiracy theorists' to discredit opponents/critics Will force us to dismiss the accurate proclamations of those who spot secretive, underhanded deal-making BUT pejorative definition acceptance = only apply to those who make irrational or ill-researched claims Shouldn't change definition of terms to ensure powerful and corrupt have fewer negative terms e.g. terrorist sympathiser used in the wrong way, may not be accurate, doesn't mean term shouldn't exist

Resource distribution Principle (Beitz)

[t]he underlying principle is that each person has an equal prima facie claim to a [sufficient?] share of the total available resources' And 'departures from this initial standard could be justified (analogously to the operation of the difference principle) if the resulting inequalities were to the greatest benefit of those least advantaged by the inequality' The resource redistribution principle would give each society a fair chance to realise domestic economic conditions 'sufficient to support just social institutions and to protect human rights guaranteed by the principles for individuals'

Why is democracy important? Waldron 1993

a) First, humans are political animals. So, participation in the public realm constitutes part of a flourishing human life. Political participation is, in this sense, a human essence. (b) Second, political participation is self-protection. This seems to overlap with Shue's argument forthe basic right to liberty. Political participation ensures that your voice and interests will be heard in politics. (c) Third, political participation is a corrective to human fallibility. One person may make mistakesand errors. By including many people with diverse opinions and perspectives, we can reach a better,more valid, conclusion than one person can reach alone. (d) Fourth, dignity, autonomy and self-government are important values. The right to politicalparticipation is grounded in those values. Political participation enables people to self-govern theirsocial, collective life. (e) Finally, political participation is a concession to the human reality: the fact that we do not live alone. This is the recognition of human plurality. Many people have many views about how to organise a human community, how to govern our social life, and so on. And those views are entitled to be respected, and entitled to count when we are making political decisions in the society we live in.

Heath 2002

distributive effects will be at best random, at worse regressive, disfavouring some of the poorest. Random as even if proceeds go to the poor, levied on the extraction of primary resources whose territorial distribution included both rich and poor nations. By taxing immediate products of primary extraction, falls heavily on nations dependent on such activities, not those capital-intensive production . In practice could fall on poorer rather than richer nations under the GRD 'the "value-added" by the wealthy nations would be almost entirely untaxed, because their production is more capital-intensive '[t]he underlying fallacy lies in thinking that wealthy nations are wealthy because they consume so many resources.' t it is profoundly arbitrary to relate global redistributive taxes to natural resources at all Also later criticizes Hayward 2005 Pogge rebuttal = the cost would be passed on to richer nations in the form of higher commodity prices. BUT Heath - Pogge 'forgets that it will be passed right back to poorer nations, in the form of higher prices for manufactured goods, which is what those commodities are exchanged for. Pogge only suggests mitigation of regressive effects, no certainty

Haubrich 2004

many economic variables - such as demand elasticity and 'rippling through' effects, involved in determining where the burden of such a tax would fall . Pogge does recognise that applying the GRD to certain kinds of resources would quite foreseeably harm the poor directly. He accordingly says that the GRD should apply not to the cultivation of basic commodities such as grain, beans or cotton, for instance, but rather, when it is land use at issue, to raising cattle or growing crops such as tobacco, coffee, cocoa or flowers. May compound not alleviate arbitrariness of proposal - poor under economic pressure to switch from producing food crops to cash crops > not relieved by reducing profit on cash crops Assesses the GRD's moral standing once it is institutionalized in the real world. It analyses the causal link between a country's resource endowments and its economic prosperity and identifies the beneficiaries of, and contributors to, the monetary transfers under two possible tax-shifting scenarios . The article concludes that in order to offset the morally questionable results that Pogge's scheme produces, some moral demands need to be relaxed and the GRD scheme be divided into separate stages that operate with distinct moral rationales.

Feasibility of GRD

modest amount of wealth comparatively Liberterian grounding The proposal is more robust than conventional aid measures, with their tendency to succumb to 'compassion fatigue' and the feeling that small contributions are essentially futile. It would not require continual renegotiation. People wouldn't feel it due to its modest.(proposal is not perpetual, or continuous but minimal but consistent.) Moral shift is possible e.g. slave trade Argument from prudence - i.e. it's in the the self-interest of the affluent - to stave off various threats from the poor and desperate (p.73). The prudential concern also has the moral dimension - to preserve not only our future security but also our moral values. (unlike what is often a moral dilemma between what is prudent(self-interest) vs what is moral but Pogge argues this satisfies both. Want to shape the world in accordance to the values you share.) e.g. remove threat of immigration. Unless you act with the moral values your society espouses then they will be under threat from other societies Needs institutional adoption > not adopted on the grounds of charity but justice Would need major countries to agree (EU, US etc) How would it be applied? at what incidence?when? how would you quantify

Risse, M. 'What We Owe the Global Poor' 2005

tends to be broadly in agreement with John Rawls's account in The Law of Peoples. Institutions (rich countries have better institutions) are crucial for prosperity vs. Geography's point is that natural parameters are crucial for wealth, and integration's point is that a society's dealings with others shape its prosperity The reasons behind rich countries wealth impact their 'duties' to the poor institutional stance illuminates and supports The Law of Peoples" view on duties among societies. The view of our duties to the global poor that has emerged is a complex one. On the one hand, we have argued that what is required is support in building institutions. On the other hand, we have also seen that, due to the nature of such institutions, there are some prima facie reasons that will constrain what outsiders can and or ought to do these considerations together offer a framework within which one can assess what is to be done in specific cases. would be wrong to think that my arguments against further-reaching redistributive duties show that Rawls only requires a minimal duty towards burdened societies.

Hayward 2008 on Pogge

there is insufficient clarity as to what the duty substantively consists in. Pogge's core idea, or so I shall maintain, is that the rich are in debt to the poor. To put it this way is to give the core duty a simple clarity The most appropriate way to conceive this debt, I shall argue, is as an ecological debt. Ecological debt, I argue, is not just a special issue or set of special issues, but is in fact the very essence of the question of global justice. It captures just the issues Pogge seeks to capture, as well as more besides, and allows the debate to be settled about whether the core duty Pogge describes is 'positive' or 'negative'. Ecological debt can in fact be construed to entail a negative duty - a simple and clear one. What pogge concieves more closely resembles a positive duty but

Pogge's proposal

using particularly around (9). - Constructive proposal on how to make good on the moral argument presented in part 1. Global Resources Dividend - GRD The better-off enjoy significant advantages in the use of a single natural resource base from whose benefits the worse-off are largely, and without compensation, excluded. Single natural resource base - similar to Hayward's conception of ecological space States shall not have full libertarian property rights in the natural resources in their territory; they must share a small part of the value of resources they 'use' or sell (normal example is oil being sold on the world market, essentially it is about exporting resources from their territory). This payment ('dividend') due because global poor own stake in all limited natural resources (this is agreed with under most libertarian property rights). No rights over decisions about natural resource use transferred (so respects sovereignty) - but right to share of economic value of resource if used.

Harambam Aupers 2015

we distinguish three critiques that are motivated by encounters with scientific experts in everyday life: the alleged dogmatism of modern science, the intimate relation of scientific knowledge production with vested interests, and the exclusion of lay knowledge by scientific experts forming a global "power elite." typically CT Dismissed as 'irrational narratives produced by extremists in margins of life', 'bad science' or 'religious belief' Cultural Sociological approach > persistent disqualification = form of 'boundary work', obscures rather than clarifies how and why CT challenge epistemic authority of science CT compete with scientists in complex battles for epistemic authority in broader field of knowledge contestation Those labelled 'conspiracy theorists' are dismissed by academics and excluded from public debate' = (Knight) Culture where authority of science = eroding, findings contested, alternative claims Bad science = not interested in falsification - selectively seek evidence to confirm their theories Piper (1997) - 'indiscriminately accept any argument that points to conspiracy' = Confirmation bias Sunstein = 'self-sealing quality: they are resistant and in extreme cases invulnerable to contrary evidence' Paradox of evidence, unfalsifiable Karl Popper (2013) = 'the secularisation of religious superstition', 'opposite of the true aim of the social sciences' Outdated world view More affinity with religious epistemologies not science (barkun, 2006) - Matter of faith not proof Pipes (1997) - chapter on their dangers muddying the waters between fact and fiction, so this distinction melts away (Barkun, 2006) and we 'degrade to relativism' (Aaronovitch) CT lack of respect for truth and evidence (Showalter, 1997) Subvert the foundations of truth and fiction which modern societies should be based on Claims of CT as bad science/religious believers = not simple empirical description since they are situated in social-cultural context and informed by moral consideration about a good society and real science (Latour, 1993) - exemplify a modern 'practice of purification' - efforts by scientists to erase the hybrids which disturb the boundaries between fact and value, truth and fantasy and science and belief' - reinforces a 'modern divide' and 'rational' science vs 'irrational counterparts' Fassin (2011) - a tendency to underscore the irrationality of such beliefs without examining its meaning cultural sociological perspective = disqualification of CT is a form of boundary work - fact vs CT Irrational CT = obscures not clarifies Why do CTs ignore authority of modern science; critical of it, freww spirit of inquiry, science is vulnerable to political influences and interstsWant to reveal the social, economic and political powers which colour science's findings we argue, the discourse of conspiracy theorists resonates with postmodern skepticism about "grand narratives," social constructivist accounts of knowledge production, neo-Marxist perspectives on the power of capital, and sociological assumptions about a (global) power elite "what's the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized version of social critique, inspired by, let's say, a sociologist as eminent as Pierre Bourdieu? elective affinity posits conspiracy theories not outside of science, but right in the middle of its most fierce battle: the science wars. These clashes between scientific "realists" and "constructivists" centered exactly around the objectivity of scientific knowledge and the "pollution of science" by external factors. But although the arguments of conspiracy theorists resonate with those in the social studies of science, it appears imperative in these science wars for the latter to disassociate themselves from conspiracy theories.

Alternatives to GRD

• Straightforward global income tax based on GDP (Brian Barry) Global wealth Tax(Thomas Picketty) • Tobin tax (receipts distributed to poor) • Land value tax (Hillel Steiner) • Ecological space/footprint tax