GOV 20 Final

District magnitude

# of legislative reps that are elected from a particular district

Four major problems w/ consociationalism

(1) Non-democratic mutual veto, for example, limits democracy by limit power of vote certain issues off the table b/c of segmental autonomy and mutual veto "ethnocracies" = ruled by ethnic group rather than by people (2) Inefficient; prone to immobilism opposing groups into grand coalition has to please everyone to make something happen pragmatic, deeply divided solution... greater evil = civil war (3) Overly rigid; often unable to adapt to changes in society institutionalize ethnic map of country when happens over time, when people stop caring about ethnic differences relative size of 2 groups... the bigger group may feel like getting short end of stick change rules to get larger share of pie... yet institutionalize this is hard b/c people in power have stake in pre-existing rules so they will resist rule changes (4) Reinforces ethnic identities (constructivist critique) socially constructed / malleable it institutionalized and exacerbate ethnic differences if power and resources are distributed along ethnic lines, people will continue to organize along ethnic lines... chances to overcome differences stopped rather should create incentives to get people to drop ethnic identity prevent differences from leading to violence ethnicity is fluid the appropriateness of consociationalism varies by context where ethnic differences have already descended into violent conflict, might have to take ethnic differences as given... CD might be helpful BUT where ethnic differences are not politicized... could harden/exacerbate those differences

Under what conditions does consociationalism succeed?

(1) Tradition of elite accommodation -- societal tradition of elite negotiation and compromise (2) Groups well organized and subject to elite control (3) All groups are minorities and physically separate from each other -- no majority group

Semi-Presidentialism

(France, Portugal, Poland) 1. Directly elected president; prime minister elected by parliament 2. Possibility of "cohabitation"

Parliamentarism

(Most of Europe, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Israel, India) 1. Executive and legislature fused: prime minister elected/removed by Parliament. 2. No fixed terms: prime minister can be removed any time by no confidence vote

Presidentialism

(U.S., all of Latin America, much of Africa, South Korea, Taiwan) 1. Separation of powers: president and legislature each directly elected and elected separately 2. Fixed presidential terms in office

Types of parties by Degree of Institutionalization (Scott Mainwaring)

1. Institutionalized party systems (Germany, U.S., Taiwan) - parties are stable and deeply rooted in society 2. Inchoate party systems (Philippines, Russia, Peru) - weakly institutionalized! parties lack strong organizations and lack strong societal base

Institutionalized versus inchoate party systems

1. Institutionalized party systems (Germany, U.S., Taiwan) parties are stable and deeply rooted in society... relative fixtures in society; strong party identities >> good showing of society >> identify with party A, B, C for generations; stable electoral bases; stable election results 2. Inchoate party systems (Philippines, Russia, Peru) weakly institutionalized! parties lack strong organizations and lack strong societal base

Types of Parties by Numbers

1. One party dominant systems (South Africa, Japan) One party wins all the time, single party has special legitimacy or responsible for major policy successes 2. Two (or two and a half) party systems (U.S., Britain, Costa Rica) Two pretty evenly matched parties dominate politics and nobody else has a chance at winning even if they are more parties, only two have serious chance of winning 3. Moderate multiparty systems (Sweden, Germany, Chile, Mexico) 3-6 major parties 4. Fragmented, or extreme multiparty, systems (Israel, Brazil) very large number of small parties

Plurality versus proportional representation systems

1. Plurality (or "first past the post") system (U.S., Britain, India) only the big parties make it into the party must have large # of the vote avoids extreme cabinet instability makes governing easier allow voters to hold representatives more accountable disadvantages: for new democracies, exclude minority parties (bad for democracy w/ deep ethnic, religious, ideological cleavages >> creation of losers is dangerous) 2. Proportional representation (PR) systems (Argentina, Israel, Sweden) can get little # of votes >> still have seat in congress don't need to join a big party, can elected w/ smaller party or even create a own party likely to make it into parliament encourages the formation of parties PR systems w/ big district magnitudes >> highly fragmented party systems

Populism

1. Populism as an ideology (Case Muddle) dominant ideology that treats society as divided into two antagonistic groups: the pure people vs. the corrupted elite, and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people 2. Populism as a strategy a way of mobilizing people in pursuit of power a phenomenon in which political outsiders mobilize subaltern groups against the entire political elites, usually via a Manichean appeal to the "people" against an irredeemably corrupt and exclusionary establishment

Three key characteristics of populism

1. Usually led by political outsiders 2. Anti-establishment (they attack the establishment) 3. Appeal to subaltern (low status) sectors of society

Linz' 3 big problems w/ presidentialism

1. Zero sum game those who win presidency win the big prize and everyone else left in cold; "winner take all" system 2. Minority presidents and executive-legislative deadlock each body, claiming to be legitimate representative of people, can try to destroy the others president closes congress = presidential coup congress tries to oust president Yeltsin bombed Russia's parliament into submission 3. Fixed terms and lame duck syndrome when president loses support of nation weak president at the end of term (2nd or 3rd year in office out of 5 year term) not just a few months... lame duck effect for 3-4 years... "sitting duck" major source of political instability 4. Illustrative Cases a) Chile in 1973: minority president, polarization, and breakdown b) Postwar Italy: cabinet instability, regime stability

Dual legitimacy

2 competing powers president & congress president & PM

Cohabitation

2 executives (PM & President) when party controls presidential office and the other party controls parliament/PM

Why do parties matter? (4 reasons)

A. Help voters choose among politicians and hold them accountable B. Lengthen politicians' time horizons and facilitate collective action C. Represent powerful social groups D. Elite recruitment and democratic socialization; avoid outsider politics

Approaches to Explaining the Origins of Civil Society

A. Modernization Theory: civil society as a product of capitalist development B. Cultural Approaches: civil society as rooted in liberalism C. Institutionalist Approaches: the role of states and laws

Anthony Downs and the median voter theorem

An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs; median voter at the center >> such that in a two-party system, they will converge in center and neither party will alienate voters >> broad and bland platforms

Electoral System Examples Presidential Democracies + PR

Argentina Brazil Costa Rica Peru

Electoral System Examples Presidential Democracies + Mixed Plurality/PR

Bolivia Mexico

Electoral System Examples Parliamentary Democracies + Plurality

Canada Great Britain India Jamaica

Potential Problems with Putnam's Social Capital Argument

Causal Misdirection? Role of the State in Social Capital Formation (Sidney Tarrow) difference between northern and southern italy is about difference in character of state north has effective state, southern doesn't (foreign occupation, north conquer, poor Roman governance, etc.) assumption that social capital is always a good thing BUT nazi germany (Berman reading) The Dark Side of Social Capital: Putting Social Capital to Violent Ends: The Case of Nazi Germany (Berman reading)

Some arguments for why civil society matters

Civil Society and Democracy 1. "Muscle" behind democracy movements 2. "Schools of Democracy" (Tocqueville) b. Civil Society and Ethnic Peace: Varshney's Study of India

Duverger's Law

Duverger's law holds that single-ballot plurality-rule elections structured within single-member districts tend to favor a two-party system. The simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system.

According to Ahmed, why did some Western countries adopt a proportional system while others chose a majoritarian one? Who were the major actors and what were their incentives?

GUIDING QUESTION

According to Drutman, what institutional changes would help the United States escape the "two-party doom loop"? Do you think Drutman's suggestions address the problems highlighted by Levitsky and Ziblatt? If so, how? If not, what additional changes would you recommend?

GUIDING QUESTION

According to Levitsky and Ziblatt, how do democracies die? Why are democratic norms important and why have they eroded in the US?

GUIDING QUESTION

According to Putnam, what is "social capital"? Where does social capital come from? How could social capital influence the performance of a government?

GUIDING QUESTION

Berman argues that strong civil society can be detrimental to democratic stability. What are the conditions under which civil society might undermine democracy?

GUIDING QUESTION

Do you think civil society and its characteristics are important in shaping political outcomes such as democratic stability and ethnic violence? Why?

GUIDING QUESTION

How can electoral institutions be leveraged to reduce ethnic conflict? What specific arrangements or rules do Reilly, Lijphart, and Howard recommend for this purpose? Are these recommendations context-dependent or are there general solutions?

GUIDING QUESTION

Parties play important roles in democratic governance but not all democracies have strong parties. Why have some new parties established themselves as enduring political organizations while the vast majority of them have failed?

GUIDING QUESTION

The welfare state is much larger in Europe than in the United States. According to Alesina and Glaeser, how have different social scientists attempted to explain this divergence? Which explanation(s) do Alesina and Glaeser favor? Does Thelen suggest an alternative explanation? Do you find some of these explanations more persuasive than others? Why?

GUIDING QUESTION

What are the benefits and drawbacks of proportional and plurality electoral systems? What evidence or cases do the authors present to support such claims?

GUIDING QUESTION

What are presidential and parliamentary systems? How do they differ in the governing process? What effects do these differences have on the quality of democracies?

GUIDING QUESTION *See table created for Paper #2

What are the differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism and majoritarian and proportional representation systems? How do they interact?

GUIDING QUESTION *See table created for Paper #2

Electoral System Examples Parliamentary Democracies + Mixed Plurality/PR

Germany Hungary New Zealand

Mixed plurality/PR

Germany, Japan, Mexico features a. Minimum threshold for PR b. Concurrent elections c. Majority runoff system for presidential elections

Electoral System Examples Presidential Democracies + Plurality

Ghana USA

Social democratic, conservative, and liberal welfare states

Gosta Esping-Andersen: Three Types of Welfare State **Social Democratic (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) Universalistic, with egalitarian distribution of benefits Generous Direct state provision of benefits Gender egalitarian **Conservative (or Christian Democratic) (Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, Italy) Universal coverage, with less egalitarian distribution of benefits Fairly generous, but less so than in social democratic model Often state insurance (and private provision), rather than state provision Less gender egalitarian **Liberal (USA, Britain, Canada, New Zealand) More limited range of public benefits (most people meet needs via market) Less generous Means-tested, rather than universal coverage

The Ethnocracy Trap, Howard, 2012 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

In what instances might ethnic politics become problematic and toxic? How might this toxicity manifest itself? Explains the reasons for the breakdown of consociationalism in other parts of the world and why conflict remains even in the face of institutions that should supposedly moderate ethnic parties. Ethnic politics, even if it begins as consociationalism, may decay into ethnocracy, in which the state is comprised of ethnic parties, governments are dictated by ethnic quotas, and territories and institutions are ethnically segmented. Here, the only cleavages are ethnic (no elite cooepration, no cross-cutting cleavages to institutionalize) -- this form of government is too rigid, closes of the likelihood of ethnic cooperation, and cannot ward against ethnic extremism. Cases of ethnocratic drift (e.g. Belgium) show that even ostensibly liberal democracies can verge on ethnic dysfunciton (having democratic structures does not ensure democracy) 1) In Lebanon, Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia, and Iraw, individuals are unable to express themselves and consociational measures prevent government from adapting to new ethnic conditions. 2) Also prevents the emergence of a secular state. 3/4)Because the state is solely predicated on ethnic divides, further, it creates discord, deadlock, and imminent violence, which then contributes to outside intervention that is virtually neo-colonialism. 5) Bad for business because only specific ethnic institutions can provide licenses so economics becomes monopolized by ethnicity (Bosnia has stagnated compared to its non-ethnocratic neighbors) 6) Harder to achieve liberal democracy than from other starting points. Based on Lijhphart's consociational model but tries to explain why consociational models can fail when they neglect to foment the cooperation and mutual productivity necessary for a functioning democracy. Also cites the possibility of outbidding (Chandra) to further produce ethnic conflict and extremism, which then contributes to protracted deadlock.

Democracy in Plural Societies, Lijhphart, 1977 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

In what ways can ethnic conflict be mitigated via political structure and institutions? Basis for a number of ethnic solutions that have both succeeded (Netherlands, kinda Austria) and failed (Lebanon, Ethiopia, kinda Belgium). Bosnia is currently consociationalist but its efficacy in the absence of UN peacekeepers is unknown. Consociationalism, by giving each ethnic group a sizable and meaningful stake in government, promotes ethnic cooperation and disincentivizes the instrumentalization of ethnicity. Consociationalism has four components 1) Grand Coalition 2) Mutual veto 2) Proportionality in Representation 4) Segmental Autonomy (federalism)The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and Austria have all used consociational approaches that have, to an extent, given them relative ethnic stability. 1) Grand coalition implies that all ethnic parties coalesce as one to govern 2) mutual veto implies that all parties have a right to strike down measures they feel have a negative impact on the livelihood of their constituents. 3) Proportionality requires PR to ensure that the government is demographically resemblant of the public (or at least that the government must include members of each ethnic group) 4) segmental autonomy ensures that, in their respective regions, ethnic groups are self-governing. Again, institutional approach to ethnicity by promoting but moderating ethnic politics (e.g. Chandra, who also thinks that ethnic parties aren't necessarily problematic as long as they are brought to the political center). When this goes awry, however, we run the risk of actualizing Howard's argument, in which ethnic divides are the only divides and ethnic politics becomes detrimental and toxic. NOTE: also predicated on elite cooperation, which harckens back to wilkinson's notion of elite involvement in politics

Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, Berman, 1997 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

In what ways might the presence of social captial and civil society contribute to democratic breakdown rather than democratic reinforcement? May explain why democracies are still vulnerable to authoritarian, bigoted, and jingoistic forces despite the presence of strong civil bonds and norms of trust and reciprocity. Civil society is not always conducive to democracy. In fact, in some cases it may undermine it because, especially when coupled with a weak and ineffectual state, civil society creates ripe, robust, and well established organizations through which authoritarian regimes can take hold. The Case of Weimar Germany: Although post WWI Germany was both a democracy and had a vibrant civil society, the weakness of the state was largely responsible for magnitude of civic activity. As the state continued to demonstrate its incapacity, people drew closer to their civil organizations which deepened social cleavages. Because social capital and civil organizatiosn were already so robust, the Nazis were able to capitalize off of preexisting social institutions and gain a ready avenue to power.Directly combats argument made by Putnam. Also potentially reinforces a theme from Varshney's work that stipualtes the importance of cross-cutting and multi-interest group bonds. In both cases, the strengthening of internal ties contributes to the breakdown of civility.

What is populism's double-edged relationship w/ liberal democracy?

Inclusionary Often leads to competitive authoritarianism A. Outsiders less committed to liberal democracy in contrast to career politicians who respect democratic institutions B. Mandate to assault the old elite leads to institutional crisis has to do w/ how they are elected/what elected to do/tell voters what they will do... platform/campaign to "drain the swamp", to crush the elite C. When populists prevail in institutional crises, they can concentrate enough power to tilt the playing field against opponents pack the court, rewrite constitution >> recipe for a show-down between popular president to sweep away "corrupt" institutions and elites who depend on those institutions >> competitive authoritarianism face weak and fragmented opposition populists win when established parties are in crises traditional parties then become badly discredited when populists wins rewrite electoral laws

Three Roots of Latin American Populism

Inequality serious crisis of political representation inequality helps to create gap !! socioeconomic inequality >> political inequality political elite has to be broadly representative of society systematic exclusion Party Collapse as established parties collapse, outsider politics become normal (combined w/ inequality) >> populism State Weakness citizens feel abandoned and mistreated by state >> public discontent discontent is not distributed equally >> hit poor harder than rich, rich can live w/ weak states (they have private security, schools, hospitals and network to evade bureaucracy) poor rely on indifferent, corrupt bureaucrats, police and courts working for someone w/ better connections and money law applied unevenly and unfairly

Electoral System Examples Parliamentary Democracies + PR

Israel Norway Spain Sweden

How is the US different? (statistical facts about US vs. Europe)

Less taxation/less spending More limited welfare state Higher levels of poverty and inequality Reduction of poverty and spending are positively correlated if the US had european-style spending, we would likely have european-style poverty rates welfare state = similar set of social/demographic and economic changes women entering workforce divorce rates higher fertility rates declining

Consociationalism

Lijphart A. Starting Point: Deeply divided society (ethnic difference taken as given) B. Why Majoritarianism is Problematic in Divided Societies: The case of Northern Ireland C. The Consociational Model a. Parliamentarism and Proportional representation b. Grand coalitions c. Proportionality d. Mutual Veto e. Segmental Autonomy

Party substitutes

Mass media If you can reach people through mass media/social media, why need a party? strong party organizations still exist but they are a legacy of the past when older parties collapse, politicians today lack an incentive to build them back

Viktor Orbán and Fidesz in Hungary

Once Orbán and Fidesz came into power, they subverted the system, having a majority in parliament and competitive authoritarianism ensued.

Civic community vs "amoral familism"

Putnam & the Case of Italy in North = civic community: respect for one another and participation in public life, enlightened sense of own self-interest found very little civic community in South amoral familism = interest in self and family only, too busy to engage in public life confident in others cooperation and playing by rules OR opposite

Coalitional presidentialism

Requires that presidents form multi-party coalitions b/c minority presidents can govern alone but its costly >> politicians learn from difficulties divide up cabinet among multiple parties a strong president sought to overcome fragmentation by providing incentives to coalition partners

"Bridging" versus "bonding" social capital

Societal free rider problems and the issue of interpersonal trust Civic associations and social capital as the key to overcoming free rider problems The roots of civic association and social capital: history *VARSHEY 2001 The difference between bonding and bridging social capital relates to the nature of the relationships or associations in the social group or community. Bonding social capital is within a group or community whereas bridging social capital is between social groups, social class, race, religion or other important sociodemographic or socioeconomic characteristics. The bonding/bridging distinction can be made in relation to a range of relationship and network characteristics. The table below summarises the main features of each. Robert Putman in his book Bowling Alone discussed bonding social capital is good for "getting by" and bridging is crucial for "getting ahead" [2]. Putnam credit these terms to Ross Gittell and Avis Vidal [3].

Dutch "pillars"

The Case of the Netherlands Pre-1917: a deeply divided society Religious cleavage: Catholic vs. Protestant vs. Secular Class cleavage: Bourgeoisie vs. working class Four "pillars" or blocs Catholic (Catholic People's Party) Protestant (Anti-Revolutionary Party and Christian Historical Union) Socialist (secular, working class) (Labor Party) Liberal (secular, middle class) (Liberal Party) The 1917 pact: full suffrage + proportionality in public/private school funding The Post-1917 "Politics of Accommodation"

Factors that Explain Populism in the Contemporary West

The Populist Base. Voters who are White, Christian, residents of small towns or rural areas, and non-college educated Competing Explanations Economic explanation: globalization and inequality trade w/ China flooded market w/ cheap goods manufacturing sectors couldn't complete w/ Chinese goods entire towns and regions devastated (US' Rust Belt) young uneducated men in these sectors left jobless income doubled for top 10%, everyone else's income didn't grow (entire generation of americans less well off than parents) drug addictions, mental health crises, suicide lack of social mobility Cultural explanation: response to immigration/ethnic diversity status, identity cultural changes trigger cultural backlash among populist base racial component, feminism/gay rights A political explanation: Convergence of mainstream center-left and center-right parties around globalization and immigration, leaving part of the electorate feeling unrepresented (and angry) mainstream political parties don't represent those opposed to globalization and immigration no major political parties listened to them/shared their concerns ***all of the above = demand-side explanations (voters) A "supply side" explanation: the weakening of political establishments much easier to be a populist today than in peron's day collection/set of individuals or resources that politicians need to get elected (a lot of pluralism/competition among these actors) political parties major interest groups/business association/labor unions major media dependance on establishment // failure of those who broke w/ establishment could afford to be popular and not pay a price easier to bypass establishment today than 50 years ago double-edged effect on democracy many of the populists go on to assault democratic institutions

What is the structuralist approach to party systems?

The Role of Conflict -- conflict creates strong parties A Structural Approach to Party Systems: The Role of Conflict A. Two Requirements for Durable Parties 1. Grassroots Organization 2. Strong Partisan Identities B. Why Conflict Gives Rise to Organization and Mass Partisan Loyalties C. The Case of Peronism D. The Role of Timing: Mass Media and Problems of Party-Building in the Contemporary Era

Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, Norris, 1997 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

Until recently electoral systems have usually proved remarkably resilient to radical reform. Yet in the last decade this pattern has been broken in a number of established democracies. The emergence of newer democracies has also generated a resurgence of interest in what criteria should be used in the choice of an electoral system. Given these develop- ments, the aim of this article is to outline the main variants in different types of electoral system; to consider the normative criteria underpinning debates about reform; and to evaluate the relevant standards for choosing an electoral system. The article compares legislative elections in 53 democracies, including countries at different level of economic and polit- ical development, in order to examine the effects of electoral systems under a wide variety of conditions.

Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Shugart and Carey, 1992 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What are the benefits and costs of a presidential system? What are the benefits and costs of a parliamentary system? Analyzes the potential rationale behind the persistence of presidential or parliamentary regimes in some regions and their breakdown in others. There are two dimension to democratic government: efficiency (the ability of elections (and thus government) to be more predicated on policy rather than exclusively local conerns like "pork") and representativeness. Parliamentary systems are efficient in that they require parties to differentiate themselves based on national policy, and are representative in that they tend to employ PR or regional majorities that usually ensure that representation is high and either ideological or regional. Presidential systems are efficient in that, because there is a truly national office, the election nor the President's job can be based on activities that exclude any area or locale, and is representative in that they normally also consist of a legislature.Similar in part to Linz's argument --- Presidential regimes are criticized because of their majoritarian tendencies, complications with dual legislative and executive legitimacy, and temporal rigidity. They may also be susceptible to authoritarian leaders.

The American Precariat: US Capitalism in Comparative Perspective, Thelen, 2019 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What are the implications of the rise of the "gig" economy and the destabilization of labor? Very current and brings a relevant and salient trend into the comparative perspective. Explores the way that stable employment has contributed to the development of American political and economic culture and explores why the welfare state is not ready to handle the change in employment style. Rich democracies have seen a rise in the "gig" economy (temporary contractual labor that has neither the long term protections nor stability of typical employment), but the immature nature of the American welfare state in comparison to the rest of the world has contributed to this phenomenon's exacerbation of labor insecurity, even as nominal unemployment levels decline. Rise of Uber and Lyft, food delivery services, short term contractual labor (e.g. contracted web developer, freelancing etc.) is assymetric and has a heavier impact on low wage workers than it does on those at the top. Further, the US has fewer employee protections, no sick or parental leave, and no universal health insurance which shows that its welfare state is underdeveloped comapred to other countries that may be better equipped to handle the economic drawbacks of a rising gig economy. Draws on a lot of the same trends in welfare as Alesina and Glaeser.

Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop, Drutman, 2020 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What are the potential solutions to rampant American partisanship and the breakdown of democracy under the current two-party single member plurality system? I woudln't say it's important, but it's interesting. The likelihood of any of these changes being made is slim to none (I mean, RCV literally got voted down in MASSACHUSETTS the most liberal state on the planet, so we know all of this is just intellectual gaming). Democratic dysfunction, as it stands right now, is the result of institutional inefficacies caused by the polarization wrought by two party system and the first-past-the-post voting system. To solve this, elections should move to proportional representation and ranked choice voting. RCV has worked to reduce polarization and moderate politics in other similar countries like Australia (where in the face of rising immigration, democracy has remained farily centrist and productive). PR systems and multi-member districts have also proven to be fruitful at the local level in the US and in parts of Europe.

Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference, Alesina and Glaeser, 2004 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What can explain the differences in welfare policy in the United States and Europe despite having similar economic capacities and governemtnal structures? Explains the historical significance of institutions and prejudice in the modern day development of the welfare state, analyzes potential pathways of welfare breakdown and welfare promulgation. The United States has not developed a welfar state while Europe has due to two primary mechanisms: 1) Institutions (e.g. separation of powers, majoritarian electoral system, etc.) 2) Racial FractalizationHistorical analysis of instituions shows that American institutions haave stifled the rise of a leftist party (majoritarian rule usually brings parties to the political center, prevents the development of strong or politically viable third parties, etc.) Separation of powers and federalism also create additional "veto players" that can inhibit implementation of welfare. Also the dependence of welfare on taxation, and the regional varaibility of taxes produces "competition" that undermines the maximization of tax revenue. Regarding racial fracturing, individuals tend to be less likely to want to financially support dissimilar others. Further, previous left leaning movements were split along racial lines, thus preventing the unification of an organizationally muscular liberal party that might make welfare more mainstream. Provides a lot of the context behind Thelen's argument (or use of the American "welfare" state as justification for the negative ramifications of atypical employment). Also related to the decommodification of labor mentioned in recommended reading.

How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziplatt, 2018 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What contributes to democratic breakdown in societies where democracy may have been well-engrained in their culture and institutions? First of all, it's just fabulous. Second of all, identifies the long standing trend towards disregard for preexisting norms of forebearance and toleration. Identifies fault on both sides of the aisle and notes that Donald Trump is not the ultimate problem, but a symptom of a persistent threat to American democracy. Democratic dysfunction in the United States has exacerbated itself on account of the breakdown of norms of forebearance and mutual toleration. Indeed, although American democratic institutions are robust, the Constitution itself is insufficient to protect democracy, so when the norms that have moderated government decline, democracy itself also suffers. Historical analysis of breakdown of democracy in countries that have firm constitutions and democratic traditions (e.g. Chile) and even the undermining of the most famous democracy in the world (US). Norms of mutual toleration and forebearance have been undercut by "anti-American" rhetoric, intentional gridlock along partisan lines, refusal to confirm court nominees form opposite parties, refusal to raise the debt ceiling, etc. all of which were previously commonplace and bipartisan

Electoral Systems for Divided Societies, Reilly, 2002 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What electoral models can contribute to the mitigation of ethnic conflict in pluralistic societies? Presents a practical (and already implemented in some countries) solution to ethnic political dead lock that promote political cooperation, guard against extremism, and can allow consociational models to work. Reilly suggests measures that promote power sharing rather than eliminating ethnic parties all together. Instead, by using reciprocal vote pooling,r anked choice voting, PR, and accommodation across group lines, ethnic conflict can be mitigated and centripetalism (movement towards the center rather than extremism) can be actualized. Five Cases in which RCV, PR, and the 5 step mechanism has been actualized and reduced conflict. 1) Northern Ireland (mitigated conflict between Catholics and Protestants) used preferential voting system (RCV) 2) Estonia, despite having limited electoral experience, was able to implment RCV, although it was short lived and reduced ethnic conflict 9although didn't combat personalistic politics). 3) Australia has famously implemented both single member and multi- member RCV that has prevented divisiveness in politics despite demographic diversity. (Labor Party was forced to moderate) 4) Fiji once had monoethnic politics but RCV, once implemented, modestly allowed for th einclusion of other ethnic groups in politics. 5) Papua New Guinea was once a plurality based RCV system, but abandoned it in the late 1900s, only to grow more dysfunctional. Leaders currently advocate for a return to RCVTries to find practical and institutional methods of making Lijhphart's consociational model practicable and feasible for the long term. Also tries to find institutional measures that can prevent outbidding (Chandra) and coins a term, "centripetalism", for the reverse outbidding Chandra describes for post-colonial India.

Making Democracy Work, Putnam, 1993 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What is the variable that contributes to the development of effective political and societal institutions? How is social capital involved in the creation of civil society, and how does civil society contribute to political efficacy? Draws conclusions about the importance of civil society and social capital for generating politically efficient and effective instituions. One can then draw conclusions about American society and other parts of the world using Putnam's framework. Institutional capacity and efficacy is stimualted by civil society. Civil society, that is the realm of civic organizations that function independently of the state, are produced by robust networks of social capital. Social capital is anything that promotes the development of united civil ties (e.g. norms of reciprocity, trust, empathy, etc.) that can either strengthen internal bonds or bridge interest groups. The Italian Case: Northern and Southern Italy have vastly different economic and political capacities (the North is more developed and its political institutions are more efficacious). This distinciton is mimicked by the presence of civil society in the North and its relative absence in the South. Further, when controlling for a number of variables, we find that when social capital is robust, it promotes citizens to have faith in their institutions, which further makes them more gracious when evaluating institutional performance, and contirbutes to institutional efficacy, thus making social capital and political capacity mutually reinforcing. The opposite is true where social capital is absent. Argumentative basis and foil for Berman's argument. States that civil society contributes to democracy while berman says that it can also contribute to democratic decadence. Also discusses vertical and horizontal integration of society, which is mildly reminiscent of some of the ethnicity readings (vertical indicates clear hierarchy of power that may breed resentment and subjugation, mostly present in the South) (horizontal implies egalitarian and equitable politico-social structure, which promotes norms of trust and reciprocity).

Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice, Ahmed, 2013 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What leads some countries to develop plurality voting systems, and what leads others to develop PR voting systems? Identifies the origins of electoral structures throughout the world (or at least in places where a wealthy conservative party exists), and analyzes the impact of "threats" and social dyanmics on the development of one electoral system over another. Electoral systems are selected by elite conservatives upon democratization so as to preserve their existence in the face of existential threats from below. In countries where radical lower/working class parties posed an existential threat to the right party, PR was adopted. In countries where no such threat existed (even if radical working class parties did), Single Member plurality was adopted. Mechanism: No threat = majorities are more easily reached by conservative party, or at least a politically viable minority opposition can be reached, so no need for PR. This is true in US, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand, and somewhat Frnace. Yes Threat = conservative party may dissolve without the ability to remain in government while lacking substantial support from the electorate. PR allows for candidates with little support to stay in power. This is true in Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and literally every other Western European country. Not necessarily relating to other texts but relates to lecture in which we talked about the presence of a strong conservative party that could protect the interests of wealthy elites in the face of universal suffrage was necessary for the development of democracy in the West. This theory explains why conservative parties remain durable, although a bit voluntarist (electoral system functions at the pleasure of the political elite, kind of like Aldrich).

Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society, Varshney, 2001 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

What variables can explain differences in the magnitude and detriment of ethnic conflict in regions with similar ethnic makeup and preexisting ethnic divides?Identifies a mitigating factor in the escalation of ethnic conflict, and could provide a long term solution for reducing the lethality of ethnic conflict worldwide through investment in civil society. Ethnic conflict is often mitigated in communities that have heightened bridging social capital because they create cross-cutting points of concurrency that not only depress the impacts of ethnic differences but create the social infrastructure for the creation of organizations to moderate conflict. Analyzed two cities in India with similar ethnic makeups and history of conflict. However, the only difference between the two was the presence of bridging social capital in one and bonding social capital in the other. In the city that had cross cutting social captial that created avenues of communication, understanding, and empathy across ethnic divides, ethnic violence was minimal and met with coalition organization intended to mitigated its effects. In the city where social capital existed only to reinforce preexisting ethnic identifications, ethnic conflict escalated and was not met with any mitigating human agency. Related directly to lectures and certainly draws on the social capital concepts identified in Putnam's work (underlying although not explicity allusions to norms of reciprocity, trust, and civil organizations -- although these are less separate from the state and may still have a role in governing or at elast facilitating governance. Related also to Varshney's other ethnic conflict readings, particularly on the rise of ethnic conflict as a function of government intent).

Reform, Representation, and Resistance: The Politics of Property Rights'Enforcement, Brule, 2020 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

When do quotas for women's political representation promote economic gender equality? Legislative reforms equal-izing economic rights are common globally, with mixed results. I consider the impact of quotas on women's rights in a crucial domain: property. I leverage exogenously set electoral quotas—reservations—for women as heads of local gov- ernment in India. Reservations enable clean identification of the impact of representation on enforcing gender-equalizingland inheritance reforms. I find that political representation enables women to secure property rights and ensures thatthey are upheld. However, backlash occurs when reservations guaranteeing female representation make enforcement ofreform credible. Women can reduce this backlash by using female representation to trade traditional monetary dowry forproperty inheritance and familial responsibilities. This, in turn, reduces the "cost"of reform to men. These findings con-firm the power of political representation to not only claim economic rights but broaden their acceptance by changingperceptions of parity.

The Perils of Presidentialism, Linz, 1990 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

Which democratic regime structure is best for states democratizing during the 3rd and 4th waves? Why is Parliamentarism preferred to Presidentialism?Identifies the drawbacks of both Parliamentarism and Presidentialism while also noting their respective strenghts. Suggests which regime type may be more successful in parts of the Global South. (Linz = Parliamentarism)Because Presidneitalism is "paradoxical" in that it promotes minimum majority and plurality politics, results in zero-sum elections, makes the regime highly personal, is not conducive to coalition building, and capitlizes off of detrimental polarization, new democracies should instead adopt Parliamentarism as their preferred model. The latter is neither less stable nor less inefficient than its former counterpart, allows for greater representation, cooperation, adaptability, etc. The Spanish Case: Presidentialism would not have worked due to lack of a majority within the electorate and the likelihood of divisiveness because coalitions are forced in presidential systems. Parliamentarism instead contributed to partisan moderation and cooperation between fromer Francosits, Christian Democrats, the Socialist and Communist Parties, etc.Shares a number of drawbacks and contributions of either parliamentarism and presidneitalism as Shugart and Carey (addresses stability, time, dual legitimacy). NOTE: Presidential cabinets are less comprised of independent members than parliamentary ones because the party is so personalized around the president. NOTE: Term limits etc. may force a good leader to leave office and a bad one to stay (whereas a parliamentary system allows for majority coalitions to choose leaders each time they win, and remove leaders with votes of no confidence).

PR and Democratic Statecraft, Quade, 1996 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

Which electoral system is best for democracy? (Out of PR and plurality/majoritarian elections)Outlines the potential benefits of a plurality/majoritarian system and rebuts arguments that claim otherwise. Plurality is better than PR because it is more responsive/accountable, allows people more of a choice, and representation exists to ensure that mob rule does not run rampant (e.g. the point of representation is to mitigate the effects of perfect representation). A defense of PR requires that you operationalize "fair" and "representative", which Lijhphart does not do despite citing these characteristics as the reason for PR's superiority. Instead, PR has a tendency to re-create divisions and proliferate parties, which may not always be a good thing and may instead allow for extremism to become canonized. Lijhphart also primarily uses only positive cases of PR, but a number of other cases have failed (France Republic IV, Weimar Germany, Pre-WWII Italy, etc.). Lijhphart also fails to identify a causal mechanism and does not conduct the analysis necessary to rule out confounding variables. PR, further, has four main drawbacks 1) extremism, state weakness/instability, political unrealism, and lack of electoral accountability. Direct response to Lijhphart's original assertion that PR is best for democracy. Has a lot of ties to the argument made by Shugart and Carey about the potential benefits of Presidentialism (which often coexists with first-past-the-post). Agreed! States that plurality voting encourages parties to adopt a more centrist attitude. They also form automatic coalitions via partisan majorities that are strong enough to yield productive government. Honestly, he addressed a lot of the concerns I had with Lijhphart's argument. Thought it was interesting that he thinks PR's benefits can be simulated by FPTP voitng systems (accommodation of differences, etc.) and I wonder what he thinks that mechanism is.

Constitutional Choices for New Democracies, Lijhphart, 1996 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

Which electoral system is best for democracy? (Out of PR and plurality/majoritarian elections)Outlines the potential benefits of a proportional representation system and rebuts arguments that claim otherwise. PR is better than pluarlity majoritarianism because it moderates societal divisions (e.g. consociationalism), allows for more consensual and stable governance, better representation, and economic growth. PR outperforms pluarlity in terms of representation (and representation yields the development of efficacious public policy that accounts for all citizens) also out perfrorms economic growth, inflation, and unemployment, although unclear why. Potential cases for presidential plurality 1) less legislative toggling ostensibly increases economic efficiency. 2) Stability and steadiness necessary for economic growth. 3) Rapid decision making is easier with one key figure. Direct response to Quade's response to himself. Also very much related other works regarding the benefits of PR for consociationalism and mitigation of ethnic conflict. Promotes parliamentarism coupled with PR like Linz. Also talks about the norms of representativeness, accountability, equality, and participation mentioned by Shugard and Carey.

Why Not Parties in Russia?, Hale, 2006 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

Why does Russia, despite being an overt "democracy" and holding elections, not have a party system? Why might parties not develop elsewhere? Gives partisan politics an economic lense and analyzes political mechanisms outside of parties. Assigns supply and demand for economic variables. Politicans need ideational and administrative capital to gain power, thus creating an electoral market that features supply and demand for parties. Parties are not the only sources of political capital, in that other organizational structures can outperform parties (like corporations and businesses). The Russian Negative Case: Oligarchs, wealthy businessmen, and large corporations sponsor and incentivize policy for Russian politicans and have the historical organization capacity to outperform parties. Although parties exist, they are largely on the fringes and cannot actualize any of their goals without the support of a non-partisan entity. Prussia: Lacked a strong conservative party because the military and regional kingdoms overshadowed partisan efficacy. Ziblatt's account of conservatism in Prussia may be similar in that Hale's argument explains why a strong conservative party may not have emerged. Could this potentially explain why Russia fell victim to competitive authoritarianism? Without parties that make politicans in some way beholden to constituents and citizens rather than external actors, it is more likely that elections will not be representative of public interests and instead are more dependent on money, economic power, etc. (which can serve to reduce the fairness of elections).

The Case of Lebanon Shia and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon Maronite Christians and the Phalange Party Hezbollah The Ta'if Accords Michael Aoun The Cedar Revolution Prime Ministers Rafic and Saad al-Hariri

a. Pre-1943: a divided society: Christians (mostly Maronite) vs Muslims (Sunni, Shia)b. The 1943 National Pacti. Grand coalition: Maronite President; Sunni Prime Minister; Shiite Speaker of Parliamentii. Proportionality1. Cabinet seats divided among religious groups 2. Parliamentary seats divided among religious groups, with Christians given 6 to 5 advantage 3. Public jobs divided among groups, but Maronites gain top posts iii. Mutual veto and segmental autonomyc. Challenges to Consociationalism in the 1960s and 1970si. Demographic change: Muslim population growth and demands for parityii. Lebanese elite loses control over rank-and-file groups a. Muslim camp: radicalization of Shia groupsb. Christian camp: rise of rightist Phalange Party militias iii. Regional challenges: Arab-Israeli wars (1967, 1973); influx of Palestiniansd. The failure to adapt and the collapse into civil war (1975-1990)e. The 1989 Ta'if Accordsi. 50-50 parity in Parliamentii. Weaker presidency, stronger parliament and prime Ministerf. An uneasy peace after 1990i. Syrian domination, 1990-2005ii. The 2005 Cedar Revolution and its Aftermath1. A new cleavage? Sunna vs Shia2. The rise of Hezbollah iii. The Syrian civil war and mounting dysfunction

The case of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina

a. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accordsb. Bosnia's Consociational Arrangementsi. Segmental Autonomy: Loose confederation with two semi-autonomous entities: Bosniac-Croat Federation and Serb Republicii. Tripartite Presidency (one elected from each ethnic group)iii. Proportionality: In Lower House (5 seats per ethnic group), cabinetiv. Mutual Veto1. Any President can veto laws that endanger group's "vital interests" 2. All legislation needs support of at least 1/3 of each entityv. The Tutelary Role of the Office of the High Representativevi. Why Bosnia is not a Full Democracy1. Veto power of ethnic groups limits power of the vote ("ethnocracy")2. Tutelary power of the OHRc. Evaluating Consociationalism's Performancei. Dysfunctionalii. Reinforced ethnic identitiesiii. But avoided civil war

Illiberalism

anti-classic liberalism

Programmatic party

appeal to votes through programs (public goods)

Cabinet instability vs. regime instability

cabinet instability = cabinet changing every couple of months regime instability = type of government changing can have regime stability but cabinet instability*

Salvador Allende/Popular Unity government in Chile

case against presidentialism one of the longest democratic traditions in LA fairly stable throughout 20th century polarized politics: national party (economic elites) vs. socialist/communist party (Unity) vs. christian democrats salvador allende wins the presidency w/ 36% of the vote peaceful transition to socialism several major banks/industries nationalized spending increased Within a year, christian Democrats coalition moved into opposition... majority in congress lost for allende Allende didn't remove from office chaos ensued... class conflict economy collapsed 1973 -- military overthrew Allende, ended chilean democracy, military coup and dictatorship for 16 years afterwards if parliamentary system, coup might've been avoided

Personalistic Party

created by and for a single candidate, get founding leader elective is sole purpose

Mutual veto

each group gets veto power that affects its vital interests (culture, education, etc.) need group's consent

Electoral Formula

electoral formula (how members of congress elected: plurality (# of votes, win or take all system, person w/ most votes wins and the rest gets nothing) and proportional representation (PR system) >> both can be in presidential and parliamentary systems)

Grand coalition

ensure that everyone has some share of the pie

Political establishment

existing government and/or regime

Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America, levitsky 2016 - What is the research question? (cause-effect, IV-DV) - Why is it important to read this? (concept, theory, debate, case) - What is the argument? (IV > mechanism > DV) - What is the evidence? (data, tables, graphs, etc.) - How does it all tie into other things you've read? (audience, who arguing against, disagree/agree, key takeaways for GOV 20, implication/purpose) - What do you think? (confused, convinced/not, logic+quality argument, assumptions, scope - internal/external validity)

explains variation in party-building outcomes in Latin Americawhy have some new parties established themselves as enduring political organizations while the vast majority of them have failed?stability/quality of democracywhere parties are weak, or where party systems decompose and are not rebuilt, democracies frequently sugger problems of governability, constitutional crisis, and even breakdownwhere parties remain strong, or where previously inchoate party systems become institutionalized, democracies tend to remain stable or consolidateconditions under which parties emerge in the first place?extraordinary conflict -- periods of intense polarization accompanied by large-scale popular mobilization and, in many cases, violence or repressionintense conflict such as social revolution, civil war, authoritarian repression, and susttained popular mobilization generate the kinds of partisan attachments, grassroots organizations/organization building, and internal cohesion that facilitate successful party-building- mobilizing activistsparty-building is more likely to success where party founders inherit a brand and/or organizational infrstructure or collective identities from social movements, guerilla movements, or previous dictatorships or nonelectoral orgslatin america as almost uniformly democratic/regular competitive elections/similar cultures and histories and social structures >> yet party-building outcomes vary wildly- democracy is more fertile for party building, yet many parties find their roots in periods of authoritarian rulesuccess AND failure casesare polarization and conflict endogenous to, rather than determinitive, to party strength? (critique of conflict-centered strength)conflict is not sufficient for successful party-buildingfollowing effects on party building (1) regime type (see above), (2) the state, (3) leadership, and (4) populismparty-building and the state is double-edged -- both the relationship of parties to the state and the character of the state itself nay affect oliticians' incentives and capcity to invest in party organization; state resources remain central to party-building even if economic liberalization and state reform ultimately limit Latin American politicians' ability to deploy patronage resources for partisan endsweak states = government performance suffers (limited tax capacity, ineffective judicial systems, etc.) -- shows that party-building is more likely to success where state capacity is highleadership >> win votes, source of party cohesion, populism >> if weaken PARTIES in short-run, will strengthen them in the long-run (paradox)

Social capital

features of social organization such as trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement, that can facilitate coordinated actions

Proportionality

guarantee share of spoils of state (cabinet votes, judicial appointments, gov jobs)

Electoral volatility

high degree of change from one election to the next

Majority Runoff System for presidential elections

if no presidential candidate gets 50% of vote in first round, top 2 compete in runoff (FRANCE) encourages marginal candidates to throw hat in ring >> increase # of candidates and parties strong parties/stable party systems = don't tell us the whole story >> structuralist approach

Segmented autonomy

in key areas, ethnic groups can govern themselves

"Closed shop" and "union shop"

laws/public policies help orgs overcome collective action problems gov can help unions overcome CAP >> distribute pensions, health insurance, social benefits >> makes joining union more attractive permit arrangement in which only unionized workers can get access to jobs (closed shop) In labor law, a union shop, also known as a post-entry closed shop, is a form of a union security clause. Under this, the employer agrees to either only hire labor union members or to require that any new employees who are not already union members become members within a certain amount of time. heavy state intervention could reduce civic society (PUTNAM)

Clientelistic Party

parties whose primary linkage to voters is the exchange of favors per vote

Juan Perón and Peronism

peronism = an Argentine political movement based on the ideas and legacy of Argentine ruler Juan Perón Justicialista Party in Argentina Juan peron = first politician to embrace working class, tell workers that they're not second class citizens two generations of peronists in 1950s and 1960s >> became peronists for life

Flash parties

personalistic, created by and for single candidate for single election, when leader dies >> party collapses electoral volatility = high degree of change from one election to the next parties are essentially created anew at each election coalitional instability, increase likelihood of severe and sustained conflict between president and conflict, more likely than traditional politicians to assault democratic institutions

Pluralism versus Corporatism

pluralism = groups organize themselves from below corporatism = groups are generally created/sustained from above state-sponsored orgs less friendly to civil society not really civil society

Can informal institutions help make presidentialism work?

presidential impeachment Coalitional presidentialism

Presidential coattails effect

presidential race weighs heavily on congressional elections >> parties of leading presidential candidates tend to do better when held separately, no co-tail effects >> smaller parties win

Hugo Chávez

prototypical populist The Case of Chavismo in Venezuela He came into power and then subverted the system

Civil society

realm of citizen organization that is independent of the state Wide-range: union, business associations, churches/church association, roaderies, girl scouts, NRA to the ACLU, bowling conservatives = no big state, people solving problems for themselves promoting change from below! (what democrats love: LGBTQ, BLM, etc.) social scientists = democratization, economic development, ethnic peace

Vote of No Confidence

veto PM out of office

Concurrent elections

voting for president and congress happens simultaneously

Lame duck effect

when president loses support of nation weak president at the end of term (2nd or 3rd year in office out of 5 year term) not just a few months... lame duck effect for 3-4 years... "sitting duck" major source of political instability