Highlights from Principles of Psychology
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20%:
But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares
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Closely akin to the function of comparison is that of judging, predicating, or subsuming. In fact, these elementary intellectual functions run into each other so, that it is often only a question of practical convenience whether we shall call a given mental operation by the name of one or of the other
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
A God, who is supposed to drive the whole universe abreast, may also be supposed, without detriment to his activity, to see all parts of it at once and without emphasis. But were our human attention so to disperse itself we should simply stare vacantly at things at large and forfeit our opportunity of doing any particular act
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.1%:
But it seems more likely, from the facts, that the actions of modesty are suggested to us in a roundabout way; and that, even more than those of cleanliness, they arise from the application in the second instance to ourselves of judgments primarily passed upon our mates
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By the pre-evolutionary naturalists, whose generation has hardly passed away, classifications were supposed to be ultimate insights into God's mind, filling us with adoration of his ways. The fact that Nature lets us make them was a proof of the presence of his Thought in her bosom
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.5%:
All admit it to be our continued exposure to the thing, with its power to impress our senses
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.2%:
If we call Z the brain-tract of general interest, then, if the object abc turns up, and b has more associations with Z than have either a or c, b will become the object's interesting, pivotal portion, and will call up its own associates exclusively. For
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.1%:
If we compare the outward symptoms of perversity together, they fall into two groups, in one of which normal actions are impossible, and in the other abnormal ones are irrepressible. Briefly, we may call them respectively the obstructed and the explosive will
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.6%:
If we could only forget our scruples, our doubts, our fears, what exultant energy we should for a while display
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.5%:
If we find ourselves, in contemplating it, unable to banish the impression that it is a realm of final purposes, that it exists for the sake of something, we place intelligence at tile heart of it and have a religion. If, on the contrary, in surveying its irremediable flux, we can think of the present only as so much mere mechanical sprouting from the past, occurring with no reference to the future, we are atheists and materialists
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61%:
If we pass from one point of our cutaneous surface to another, we find a perfectly gradual and continuous alteration in our feeling, notwithstanding the objective nature of the contact has remained the same
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.4%:
If we ask how one thing can know another we are led into the heart of Erkenntnisstheorie and metaphysics Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17%:
If we then consider the cognitive function of different [p. 259] states of mind, we may feel assured that the difference between those that are mere 'acquaintance,' and those that are 'knowledges-about' (see p. 221) is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence of psychic fringes or overtones. Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations. Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare impression which it makes
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.3%:
In the practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as important a function as recollecting
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.3%:
Irritability' is one manifestation of this. Many persons have so small a stock of reserve brain-power - that most valuable of all brain-qualities - that it is soon used up, and you see at once that they lose their power of self-control very soon. They are angels or demons just as they are fresh or tired
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.9%:
It contains analysis and abstraction . Whereas the merely empirical thinker stares at a fact in its entirety, and remains helpless, or gets 'stuck,' if it suggests no concomitant or similar, the reasoner breaks it up and notices some one of its separate attributes. This attribute he takes to be the essential part of the whole fact before him. This attribute has properties or consequences which the fact until then was not known to have, but which, now that it is noticed to contain the attribute, it must have.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.5%:
It may be taken for a general rule that things which are produced by custom may be undone or changed by disuse or by contrary custom. On the other hand, it is a strong argument that an effect is not owning to custom, but to the constitution of nature, when a contrary custom is found neither nor to weaken it."
Chapter: MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES, 3.7%:
It may be, however, that the phenomena were due to the fact that in these animals the cortical 'centres' for vision reach outside of the occipital zone, and that destruction of the latter fails to remove them as completely as in man
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.9%:
It may perhaps be well to notice now that our senses only give us acquaintance with facts of body, and that of the mental states of other persons we only have conceptual knowledge Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 12.1%:
It may seem strange to suppose that anyone should mistake criticism of a certain theory about a fact for doubt of the fact itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.1%:
It might be that to reflection such a narrow teleology would justify itself, that pleasures and pains might seem the only comprehensible and reasonable motives for action, the only motives on which we ought to act. That is an ethical proposition, in favor of which a good deal may be said. But it is not a psychological proposition; and nothing follows from it as to the motives upon which as a matter of fact we do act
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 4%:
It must never be forgotten that a current that runs in has got to run out somewhere; and if it only once succeeds by accident in striking into its old place of exit again, the thrill of satisfaction which the consciousness connected with the whole residual brain then receives will reinforce and fix the paths of that moment and make them more likely to be struck into again
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.9%:
Its own body, then, first of all, its friends next, and finally its spiritual dispositions, MUST be the supremely interesting OBJECTS for each human mind. Each mind, to begin with, must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.8%:
Its reactions are the arrest of whatever we are saying or doing when such strangers draw nigh, coupled often with the pretense that we were not saying or doing that thing, but possibly something different. Often there is added to this a disposition to mendacity when asked to give an account of ourselves
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
Its roots, however, do not lie in psychology, but in physiology; as the chapter on Volition will abundantly make plain. Will and belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL phenomenon
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.3%:
Its simplest expression is, that when we pass from one sensation to a stronger one of the same kind, the sensations increase proportionally to the logarithms of their exciting causes
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
Its state of mind is practically one of unbounded confidence; but, as yet, it does not understand what confidence means.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.9%:
Having firmly and tenaciously grasped these two notions, of the absolute separateness of mind and matter, and of the invariable concomitance of a mental change with a bodily change, the student will enter on the study of psychology with half his difficulties surmounted."[4] Half his difficulties ignored, I should prefer to say. For this 'concomitance' in the midst of 'absolute separateness' is an utterly irrational notion. It is to my mind quite inconceivable that consciousness should have nothing to do with a business which it so faithfully attends
Chapter: THE FROG'S NERVE-CENTRES., 1.2%:
His conduct has become incalculable. We
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.9%:
Everywhere then the function of the effort is the same: to keep affirming and adopting a thought which, if left to itself, would slip away
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.3%:
Selection is the very keel on which our mental ship is built. And in this case of memory its utility is obvious
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.8%:
Speaking generally, the more a conceived object excites us, the more reality it has. The same object excites us differently at different times
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.9%:
Meanwhile Attention may be divided into kinds in various ways. It is either to Objects of sense (sensorial attention); or to b) Ideal or represented objects (intellectual attention). It is either Immediate; or d) Derived: immediate, when the topic or stimulus is interesting in itself, without relation to anything else; derived, when it owes its interest to association with some other immediately interesting thing. What
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.5%:
Much of the polemic writing against it is by men who have as yet failed to take it into their imaginations.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.1%:
No amount of repetition spent on nonsense-verses over a certain length enabled Dr. Ebbinghaus to retain them without error for 24 hours
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.9%:
No class of them have better sentiments or feel more constantly the difference between the higher and the lower path in life than the hopeless failures, the sentimentalists, the drunkards, the schemers, the 'dead-beats,' whose life is one long contradiction between knowledge and action, and who, with full command of theory, never get to holding their limp characters erect
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
If a movement feels agreeable, we repeat and repeat it as long as the pleasure lasts
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.4%:
If each 'idea' stand for some special nascent nerve-process, then the aggregate of these nascent processes might have for its conscious correlate a psychic 'fringe,'which should be just that universal meaning, or intention that the name or mental picture employed should mean all the possible individuals of the class
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.7%:
If each retinal image, whichever it be, can suggest automatically a motion in the right direction, what need for us to know whether it be in the right eye or the left
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.9%:
If feeling is an inert accompaniment, then of course the brain-cell can be played upon only by other brain-cells, and the attention which we give at any time to any subject, whether in the form of sensory adaptation or of 'preperception,' is the fatally predetermined effect of exclusively material laws. If, on the other hand, the feeling which coexists with the brain-cells' activity reacts dynamically upon that activity, furthering or checking it, then the attention is in part, at least, a cause.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.3%:
If it be really indeterminate, our future acts are ambiguous or unpredestinate: in common parlance, our wills are free.
Chapter: CONCLUSION., 4.5%:
If it has no other advantage, it at any rate makes us realize how enormous are the gaps in our knowledge, the moment we try to cover the facts by any one formula of a general kind.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.4%:
If neural action is as complicated as mind; and if in the sympathetic system and lower spinal cord we see what, so far as we know, is unconscious neural action executing deeds that to all outward intent may be called intelligent; what is there to hinder us from supposing that even where we know consciousness to be there, the still more complicated neural action which we believe to be its inseparable companion is alone and of itself the real agent of whatever intelligent deeds may appear? "As actions of a certain degree of complexity are brought about by mere mechanism, why may not actions of a still greater degree of complexity be the result of a more refined mechanism?" The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.5%:
If one must have a single name for the condition upon which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects depends, one had better call it their interest. 'The interest- [p. 559] ing' is a title which covers not only the pleasant and the painful, but also the morbidly fascinating, the tediously haunting, and even the simply habitual, inasmuch as the attention usually travels on habitual lines
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 34.1%:
The representation, as such, of the universal object is as particular as that of an object about which we know so little that the interjection 'Ha!' is all it can evoke from us in the way of speech.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.9%:
The result is various confused and scattered mysteries and unsatisfied intellectual desires.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94.1%:
The same subject was able to discriminate with the naked eye details in a microscopic preparation
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.5%:
The scheme of relationship and the conclusion being the essential things in thinking, that kind of mind-stuff which is handiest will be the best for the purpose
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.1%:
In America the phosphorus-delusion has twined itself round a saying quoted (rightly or wrongly) from Professor L. Agassiz, to the effect that fishermen are more intelligent than farmers because they eat so much fish, which contains so much phosphorus
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.4%:
In a word, a, muscular contraction gave me a sensation whereof I was unable during forty years to interpret a motor meaning, of which two glances of the eye made me permanently the master. To my mind no further proof is needed of the fact that muscular contraction, merely as such, need not be perceived directly as so much motion through space
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.7%:
The separateness is in the brain-world, on this theory, and the unity in the soul-world; and the only trouble that remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort of world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all
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The separation of attribute from subject in all judgments (which violates the way in which nature exists) may be similarly explained by the piecemeal order in which our perceptions come to us, a, vague nucleus growing gradually more detailed as we attend to it more and more
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.8%:
The tangible qualities are the least fluctuating. When we get them at all we get them the same
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.4%:
The subjective syn- [p. 332] thesis is involved in thought's mere existence. Even a really disconnected world could only be known to be such by having its parts temporarily united in the Object of some pulse of consciousness.[
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.3%:
In depressing emotions it is the other way. Outer things, whether living or inorganic, suddenly grow cold and foreign to us, and even our favorite objects of interest feel as if they belonged to us no more
COMPARED., 57.6%:
In logic a concept is unalterable; but what are popularly called our 'conceptions of things' alter by being used Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.4%:
In no revival of a past experience are all the items of our thought equally operative in determining what the next thought shall be. Always some ingredient is prepotent over the rest. Its special suggestions or [p. 572] associations in this case will often be different from those which it has in common with the whole group of items
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.8%:
In other words, canperipheral sense-organs be excited from above, or only from without? Are they excited in imagination? Professor Bain's instances are almost silent as to this point. All
96%:
In other words, though nature's materials lend themselves slowly and discouragingly to our translation of them into ethical forms, but more readily into æsthetic forms; to translation into scientific forms they lend themselves with relative ease and completeness
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.4%:
THUS, THERE ARE TWO GREAT POINTS IN REASONING First, an extracted character is taken as equivalent to the entire document from which it comes; and , Second, the character thus taken suggests a certain consequence more obviously than it was suggested by the total datum as it originally came
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.1%:
That theory will be most generally believed which, besides bring us objects able to account satisfactorily for our sensible experience, also offers those which are most interesting, those which apiaeal most urgently to our æsthetic, emotional, and active needs
99.4%:
That there is more order in the world than appears at first sight is not discovered till the order is looked for. The first impulse to look for it proceeds from practical needs
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.8%:
The chief of these purposes is predication , a theoretic function which, though it always leads eventually to some kind of action, yet tends as often as not to inhibit the immediate motor response to which the simple inferences of which we have been speaking give rise. In reasoning, I may suggest B; but B, instead of being an idea which is simply obeyed by us, is an idea which suggests the distinct additional idea C.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
The concrete dilem- [p. 532] mas do not come to us with labels gummed upon their backs. We may name them by many names. The wise man is he who succeeds in finding the name which suits the needs of the particular occasion best
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.3%:
In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.1%:
In short, voluntary and involuntary attention may be essentially the same
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
The consequences of one instinctive reaction often prove to be the inciters of an opposite reaction, and being suggested on later occasions by the original object, may then suppress the first reaction altogether, just as in the case of the child and the flame
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.8%:
In the next two types of decision, the final fiat occurs before the evidence is all 'in.'
COMPARED., 55.9%:
In these ambiguous cases it is interesting to note that perception is rarely abortive; some perception takes place Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41%:
The direction of its course and the form of its transitions, whether redintegrative, associative, or similar, are due to unknown regulative or determinative conditions which accomplish their effect by opening this switch and closing that, setting the engine sometimes at half-speed, and coupling or uncoupling cars
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.4%:
Induct him therefore in such a way as to knit each new thing on to some acquisition already there; and if possible awaken curiosity, so that the new thing shall seem to come as an answer, or part of an answer, to a question pre-existing in his mind
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.6%:
It appears, I say, as if this principle inoculated all it touched with its own intimate quality of worth; as if, previous to the touching, everything might be matter of indifference, and nothing interesting in its own right; as if my regard for my own body even were an interest not simply in this body, but in this body only so far as it is mine
98%:
It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant application of any one of our ideal systems of rational relations to the real world justifies our hope that other systems may be found also applicable. Metaphysics should take heart from the example of physics, simply confessing that hers is the longer task
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.9%:
It has no mental status except as either the vivid feeling of the manifestations, or the idea of them; and the latter thus constitute its entire material, and sum and substance Note: Que es para ti la felicidad?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.2%:
It is far too little recognized how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests
97.2%:
It is therefore not a purely formal law of thinking, but flows from the nature of the matters thought about
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.1%:
How pleasant is the day when we give up striving to be young, - or slender! Thank God! we say, those illusions are gone. Everything added to the Self is a burden as well as a pride
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78%:
Man has a far greater variety of impulses than any lower animal; and any one of these impulses, taken in itself, is as 'blind' as the lowest instinct can be; but, owing to man's memory, power of reflection, and power of inference, they come each one to be felt by him, after he has once yielded to them and experienced their results, in connection with a foresight of those results
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.5%:
Many instincts ripen at a certain age and then fade away
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
Memory is the association of a present image with others known to belong to the past. Expectation the same, with future substituted for past. Fancy, the association of images without temporal order.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.2%:
The education of our space-perception consists largely of two processes -- reducing the various sense-feelings to a [p. 269] common measure, and adding them together into the single allincluding space of the real world.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.8%:
The education of the will may be taken in a broader or a narrower sense. In the broader sense, it means the whole of one's training to moral and prudential conduct, and of one's learning to adapt means to ends, involving the 'association of ideas,' in all its varieties and complications, to- [p. 580] gether with the power of inhibiting impulses irrelevant to the ends desired, and of initiating movements contributory thereto
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.8%:
The effect of noise in heightening any terror we may feel in adult years is very marked. The howling of the storm, whether on sea or land, is a principal cause of our anxiety when exposed to it. The writer has been interested in noticing in his own person, while lying in bed, and kept awake by the wind outside, how invariably each loud gust of it arrested momentarily his heart.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.7%:
I know I hire a worthy, clean, agreeable, and conscientious male or female hypocrite at so many guineas a year to do so and so for me. Were he other than hypocrite, I would send him about his business
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.5%:
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
The fight is still under way. Our minds are yet chaotic; and at best we make a mixture and [p. 317] a compromise, as we yield to the claim of this interest or that, and follow first one and then another principle in turn
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.4%:
No more do musical sounds combine per se into concords or discords. Concord and discord are names for their combined effects on that external medium, the ear.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.6%:
No more' and 'not yet' are the proper time-feelings, and we are aware of time in no other way than through these feelings," says Volkmann (
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.4%:
These theories remind us of the 'theosophic' doctrines of the present day, and carry us back to times when the soul as vehicle of consciousness was not discriminated , as it now is, from the vital principle presiding over the formation of the body Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.7%:
This may come from the accidental fact that the English writings of the school have been more polemic than constructive, and that a reader may often take for a positive profession a statement ad hominem meant as part of a reduction to the absurd, or mistake the analysis of a bit of knowledge into elements for a dramatic myth about its creation
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.8%:
Thought is in fact a kind of Algebra, as Berkeley long ago said, "in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right, it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for."
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.6%:
Thus I have a conception of equidistant lines. Suddenly, I know not whence, there pops into my head the conception of their meeting. Suddenly again I think of the meeting and the equidistance both together, and perceive them incompatible. "Those lines will never meet," I say. Suddenly again the word 'parallel' pops into my head. 'They are parallels,' I continue; and so on
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94%:
Thus a lover of Nature in America finds himself able to overlook and ignore entirely the board- and rail-fences and general roadside raggedness, and revel in the beauty and picturesqueness of the other elements of the landscape, whilst to a newly- [p. 609] arrived European the fences are so aggressively present as to spoil enjoyment
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44%:
Tædium, ennui, Langweile, boredom, are words for which, probably, every language known to man has its equivalent. It comes about whenever, from the relative emptiness of content of a tract of time, we grow attentive to the passage of the time itself. Expecting, and being ready for, a new impression to succeed; when it fails to come, we get an empty time instead of it; and such experiences, ceaselessly renewed, make us most formidably aware of the extent of the mere time itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
Usually the learning is more apt to be ready than the sagacity, the ability to seize fresh aspects in concrete things, being rarer than the ability to learn old rules; so that, in most actual cases of reasoning, the minor premise, or the way of conceiving the subject, is the one that makes the novel step in thought
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78%:
if in addition to impulses he have memories, associations, inferences, and expectations, on any considerable scale
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.7%:
that (if we count out æsthetic and moral relations between things) the only important relations of which the mere inspection of conceptions makes us aware are relations of comparison, that is, of difference and no-difference, between them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
that he gives nothing but results where the vulgarian is profuse of reasons; that he does not explain or apologize; that he uses one sentence instead of twenty; and that, in a word, there is an amount of interstitial thinking
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83%:
that his main effort during the attacks is to get control of his inspirations and to slow his heart Note: Aka panic attack
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.4%:
the changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle that the entire organism may be called a sounding-board, which every change of consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
the difficult object erelong begins to call up its own congerers and associates and ends by changing the disposition of the man's consciousness altogether
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.5%:
the tendency to detect likeness in the midst of disparity and disguise
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.7%:
the more we sharpen our introspection, the more localized all our qualities of feeling become (see above, Vol. I. p. 300) and the more difficult the discrimination consequently grows
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.1%:
this tendency will be especially strong in the nervous apparatus, in virtue of that incessant regeneration which is the very condition of its functional activity
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.9%:
When the times exceed hours or days, the conception is absolutely symbolic. We think of the amount we mean either solely as a name, or by running over a few salient dates therein, with no pretence of imagining the full durations that lie between them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.5%:
Quite correct: but whence comes this curiosity, this irresistible desire to open everything and see what is inside? What makes the boy take the eggs from the nest and destroy them when he never thinks of eating them? These are effects of an hereditary instinct, so strong that warnings and punishments are unable to counteract it." (Schneider
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.6%:
Reading exemplifies this kind of cohesion even more beautifully. It is an uninterrupted and protracted recall of sounds by sights which have always been coupled with them in the past.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.3%:
Reasoning is always for a subjective interest, to attain some particular conclusion, or to gratify some special curiosity. It not only breaks up the datum placed before it and conceives it abstractly; it must conceive it rightly too; and conceiving it rightly means conceiving it by that one particular abstract character which leads to the one [p. 339] sort of conclusion which it is the reasoner's temporary interest to attain
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.9%:
Schopenhauer, who enforces his determinism by the argument that with a given fixed character only one reaction is possible under given circumstances, forgets that, in these critical ethical moments, what consciously seems to be in question is the complexion of the character itself. The problem with the man is less what act he shall now choose to do, than what being he shall now resolve to become
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.8%:
Secretiveness
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.8%:
See that very remarkable little work, 'The Anæthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy,'by Benj. P. Blood (Amsterdam
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.9%:
Similarity, in compounds, is partial identity
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.7%:
WE HAVE NO SENSE FOR EMPTY TIME
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
We can make more or less as we please, and if we make enough we can convert the greatest mental resistance into the least
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.7%:
We can trace the development of a nervous system and correlate with it the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with undoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection between them . . . There is no fusion possible between the two classes of facts - no motor energy in the intellect of man to carry it without logical rupture from the one to the other
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.7%:
We grow unconscious of every feeling which is useless as a sign to lead us to our ends, and where one sign will suffice others drop out, and that one remains, to work alone. We observe this in the whole history of sense-perception, and in the acquisition of every art. We ignore which eye we see with, because a fixed mechanical association has been formed between our motions and each retinal image
COMPARED., 58.5%:
We have seen (p. 75) that the free discharge of into each other through associative paths is a likely reason why the maximum intensity of function is not reached when the cells are excited by their neighbors in the cortex. At the end of Chapter XXV we shall return to this conception, and whilst making it still more precise, use it for explaining certain phenomena connected with the will. The idea is that the leakage forward along these paths is too rapid for the inner tension in any centre to accumulate the maximal explosion-point, unless the exciting currents are greater than those which the various portions of cortex supply to each other Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.3%:
We may say, then, that a man's native tenacity will fluctuate somewhat with his hygiene, and that whatever is good for his tone of health will also be good for his memory
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.1%:
When confronted with the present sensation and with the latent swarm of indistinct images which repeat our recent life, the figure first recoiled suddenly to an indeterminate distance. Then, completed by precise details, and confronted with all the shortened images by which we sum up the proceedings of a day or a week, it again receded beyond the present day, beyond yesterday, the day before, the week, still farther, beyond the ill-defined mass constituted by our recent recollections. Then something said by the painter was recalled, and it at once receded again beyond an almost precise limit, which is marked by the image of the green leaves and denoted by the word spring. A moment afterwards, thanks to a new detail, the recollection of the branches, it has shifted again, but forward this time, not backward; and, by a reference to the calendar, is situated at a precise point, a week further back than Easter, and five weeks nearer than the carnival, by the double effect of the contrary impulsions, pushing it, one forward and the other backward, and which are, at a particular moment, annulled by one another
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.3%:
When we brought in the Soul at the end of the Chapter VI, as an entity which the various brainprocesses were supposed to affect simultaneously, and which responded to their combined influence by single pulses of its thought, it was to escape integrated mind-stuff on the one hand, and an improbable cerebral monad on the other. But when (as now, after all we have been through since that earlier passage) we take the two formulations, first of a brain to whose processes pulses of thought simply correspond, and second, of one to whose processes pulses of thought in a Soul correspond, and compare them together, we see that at bottom the second formulation is only a more roundabout way than the first, of expressing the same bald fact
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.9%:
When we wake from the spell, however, we find a still more real world, which reduces Ivanhoe, and all things connected with him, to the fictive status, and relegates them to one of the sub-universes grouped under No. 5
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.2%:
When, now, we pass from deliberation to decision, that total object undergoes a change. We either dismiss A altogether and its relations to B, and think of B exclusively; or after thinking of both as possi- [p. 570] bilities, we next think that A is impossible, and that B is or forthwith shall be real. In Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.6%:
When, therefore, we ask: 'What is the physical link between the ingoing message from chilled skin and the outgoing message which moves the leg?'and the answer is, 'A man's will,' we have as much right to be amused as if we had asked our friend with the picture what pigment was used in painting the cannon in the foreground, and received the answer, 'Wrought iron.'
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.4%:
Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head
96.7%:
Whenever such a thing is met with by us now, our sagacity notes it to be of a certain kind; our learning immediately recalls that kind's kind, and then that kind's kind, and so on; so that a moment's thinking may make us aware that the thing is of a kind so remote that we could never have directly perceived the connection Note: Wisdom and learning again brought into play
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.1%:
Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject it, forget it, so far it is unreal for us and disbelieved Hume's account of the matter was then essentially correct, when he said that belief in anything was simply the having the idea of it in a lively and active manner: "I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever able to attain. ... It consists not in the peculiar nature or order of the ideas, but in the manner of their conception and in their feeling to the mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. ... Its true and proper name ... is belief
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.7%:
Where thoughts prevail without effort, we have sufficiently studied in the several chapters on sensation, association, and attention, the laws of their advent before consciousness and of their stay. We will not go over that ground again, for we know that interest and association are the words, let their worth be what it may, on which our explanations must perforce rely
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 36.2%:
Where, on the other hand, a distinction has no practical interest, where we gain nothing by analyzing a feature from out of the compound total of which it forms a [p. 516] part, we contract a habit of leaving it unnoticed, and at last grow callous to its presence
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.3%:
Whereas the beauty of all truly scientific work [p. 449] is to get to ever deeper levels
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.7%:
With the child, life is all play and fairy-tales and learning the external properties of 'things;' with the youth, it is bodily exercises of a more systematic sort, novels of the real world, boon-fellowship and song, friendship and love, nature, travel and adventure, science and philosophy; with the man, ambition-and policy, acquisitiveness, responsibility to others, and the selfish zest of the battle of life. If
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.2%:
and if the most prosaic of human beings could be transported into his dog's mind, he would be appalled at the utter absence of fancy which reigns there
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.5%:
and only what we cannot unlearn is instinctive.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.3%:
any total impression made on the mind must be unanalyzable, whose elements are never experienced apart. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.3%:
but I should as lief read verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm as toil through them again. They give one nowhere a central point of view, or a deductive or generative principle. They distinguish and refine and specify in infinitum without ever getting on to another logical level
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.3%:
clouts
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.4%:
dazu hast du noch eine lange Frist
94.9%:
even here such few facts as we can get point to the conclusion that automatic psychical connections result from the registration of experiences continued for numberless generations.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.5%:
he would do this because the ideas which we have above supposed him to possess would mediate in his mind between the phenomena he starts with and the conclusions he draws
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.7%:
it follows that the principles of interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the resulting construction is primarily only an expression of the mind's own nature Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.9%:
it has led a German author to say that we learn to swim during the winter and to skate during the summer. Dr. Carpenter writes:[7]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
it is a desolate and acrid sort of act, an excursion into a lonesome moral wilderness.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.1%:
it is thus that we have come to distinguish those diverse aspects of intelligence which are called judgment, reasoning, abstraction, perception, etc
98.4%:
it must be ascribed to accumulated experiences, and each experience must be held to have a share in producing it. We must conclude that in each bird that escapes with injuries inflicted by man, or is alarmed by the outcries of other members of the flock, . . . there is established an association of ideas between the human aspect and the pains, direct and indirect, suffered from human agency
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.1%:
it was found that the number of seconds saved in the study on the second day was proportional to the number of readings on the first
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.3%:
it will be safe to lay down the general law that no mental modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.5%:
it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that [p. 302] name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.9%:
it. I here confine myself to this brief statement, but it may suffice to show that Reasoning is but another form of the selective activity of the mind.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.4%:
l'amour de la vie qui s'indigne de tant de discours
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.8%:
Portions of the image common to the successive experiences will awaken, as it were, a stronger echo in the nervous apparatus than other portions. Hence it results that reproduction is usually elective: the more strongly reverberating parts of the picture yield stronger feelings than the rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 34.1%:
men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions: whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or different
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.1%:
most of our sensations are affected by errors for which a constant allowance must be made
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9%:
one has no right to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject only, as the automatists do, and to say that that causation is unintelligible, whilst in the same breath one dogmatizes about material causation as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One must be impartially naif or impartially critical. If the latter, the reconstruction must be thorough-going or 'metaphysical,' and will probably preserve the common-sense view that ideas are forces, in some translated form
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 26.8%:
only I think we ought not to talk of the doubling of the self as if it consisted in the failure to combine on the part of certain systems of ideas which usually do so. It is better to talk of objects usually combined, and which are now divided between the two 'selves,' in the hysteric and automatic cases in question
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.1%:
our own frailties and misdemeanors, how ready we are to acquit ourselves for them, when we notice them at all, on the ground of 'extenuating circumstances'! How much more really comic are our own jokes than those of others, which, unlike ours, will not bear being repeated ten or twelve times over! How
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.2%:
our own reality, that sense of our own, life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.4%:
parti pris
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.2%:
subjective interest may, by laying its weighty index-finger on particular items of experience, so accent them as to give to the least frequent associations far more power to shape our thought than the most frequent ones possess
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.2%:
there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason. Reason, per se , can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may, however, make an inference which will excite the imagination so as to set loose the impulse the other way; and thus, though the animal richest in reason might be also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he would never seem the fatal automaton which a, merely instinctive animal would be
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
we are more convinced by ten unbroken than by fifty for and one against
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.2%:
we give reality to whatever objects we think of, for they are really phenomena, or objects of our pausing thought, if nothing more. But, as thinkers with emotional reaction, to give what seems to be a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.4%:
we must project upon one of the alternative views the attribute of reality for us; we must so fill our mind with the idea of it that it becomes our settled creed
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.5%:
we shall see how inveterate is our habit of not attending to sensations as subjective facts, but of simply using them as stepping-stones to pass over to the recognition of the realities whose presence they reveal.
98.3%:
we should be greatly aided by knowing what always are the pre-existing emotions
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.1%:
Sometimes the bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes an additional conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express consent, has to intervene and precede the movement
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.7%:
Space means but the aggregate of all our possible sensations
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.7%:
Strangers neither know nor care anything about our conduct or character, but they may, and often do, criticise our appearance
Chapter: THE SUMMATION OF STIMULI, 5.2%:
Street-hawkers well know the efficacy of summation, for they arrange themselves in a line upon the sidewalk, and the passer often buys from the last one of them, through the effect of the reiterated solicitation, what he refused to buy from the first in the row.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
Such vague terms as 'grass,''mould,' and 'meat' do not exist for the botanist or the anatomist. They know too much about grasses, moulds, and muscles
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.6%:
THE SUBTLER EMOTIONS. These are the moral, intellectual, and æsthetic feelings
COMPARED., 55.8%:
Take the already-quoted catch, Pas de lieu Rhone que nous: one may read this over and over again without recognizing the sounds to be identical with those of the words paddle your own canoe Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.9%:
The current demonstrably does flow backward [p. 71] down the optic nerve in Meyer's and Féré's negative afterimage. Therefore it can flow backward; therefore it may flow backward in some, however slight, degree, in all imagination.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.2%:
The deeper grounds for this discrimination may possibly be hard to find; but superficial grounds are plenty and near at hand
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.9%:
The expression of the former state is 'hemming and hawing,' or else such phrases as 'et cetera,' or 'and so forth.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.1%:
The first care of diplomatists and monarchs and all who wish to rule or influence is, accordingly, to find out their victim's strongest principle of self-regard, so as to make that the [p. 312] fulcrum of all appeals
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62%:
The first thing that seems evident is that we have no immediate power of comparing together with any accuracy the extents revealed by different sensations
96.7%:
The flight to this last kind over the heads of the intermediaries is the essential feature of the intellectual operation here. Evidently it is a pure outcome of our sense for apprehending serial increase
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.1%:
The fons et origo of all reality, whether from [p. 297] the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves
96.6%:
The ground of there being any logic at all is our power to grasp any series as a whole, and the more terms it holds the better
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53%:
The imagination is called 'reproductive' when the copies are literal; productive' when elements from different originals are recombined so as to make new wholes
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.4%:
The mutual inconsistencies and agreements, reinforcements and obstructions, which obtain amonst these objective matters reverberate backwards and produce what seem to be incessant reactions of my spontaneity upon them, welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or against, saying yes or no.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The popular mind conceives of all these sub-worlds more or less discontentedly; and when dealing with one of them, forgets for the time being its relations to the rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76%:
The reason lies imbedded, but not yet laid bare, in all the countless previous cases dimly suggested by the actual one, all calling up the same conclusion, [p. 366] which the adept thus finds himself swept on to, he knows not how or why.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.7%:
The same objects do not recall the same associates when we are cheerful as when we are melancholy. Nothing, in fact, is more striking than our utter inability to keep up trains of joyous imagery when we are depressed in spirits
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.5%:
The specious present has, in addition, a vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe; but its nucleus is probably the dozen seconds or less that have just elapsed.
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10%:
There may be a single primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness may be produced by the compounding of this element with itself and the recompounding of its compounds with one another in higher and higher degrees
Chapter: THE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION., 1.8%:
These correlations between mind and body are, however, so frequent that the 'characters' given by phrenologists are often remarkable for knowingness and insight. Phrenology hardly does more than restate the problem
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.6%:
This notion that a higher faculty than the mere having of a conscious content is needed to make us know anything real by its means has pervaded psychology from the earliest times, and is the tradition of Scholasticism, Kantism, and Common-sense
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.9%:
This passage seems to me characteristic of the reigning half-way modes of thought. It puts the difficulties in the wrong places
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.8%:
in 1884, a tiger, whose cage had broken open, is said to have emerged, but presently crept back again, as if too much bewildered by his new responsibilities, so that he was without difficulty secured
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62%:
in the blind, whose skin is exceptionally discriminative, it seems to have become so through the inveterate habit which most of them possess of twitching and moving it under whatever object may touch them, so as to become better acquainted with the con- formation of the same
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 69.9%:
longo intervallo, America
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.6%:
the conditions which make ideas prevail in the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.6%:
the connection of the movements themselves with the continued effort of attention is certainly a genuine and curious fact
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
the machinist, the antiquary, and the bookworm perhaps hardly notice the whole at all, so eager are they to pounce upon the details. Familiarity has in them bred discrimination
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84%:
the oftener we meet an object, the more definitely we think and behave about it; and the less is the organic perturbation to which it gives rise.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.9%:
the only a priori couplings are of ideas with movements
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.8%:
the reason for the difference can only lie in the fact that wherever a preparation of the attention is impossible, the time of both perception and volition is prolonged
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.9%:
the sensation is the measuring-tape, the perception the dividing-engine which stamps its length
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.9%:
the subjective difference between imagined and felt objects is less absolute than has been claimed, and that the cortical processes which underlie imagination andsensation are notquite as discrete as one at first is tempted to suppose
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
the superstructure absorbs contributions from so many other factors of the emotional life that the original root may be hard to find
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.7%:
until often the morbid state chronically substitutes itself for the sound one
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.1%:
vis a tergo
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.1%:
volition is primarily a relation, not between our Self and [p. 568] extramental matter(as many philosophers still maintain), but between our Self and our own states of mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.5%:
. He had acquired a better method of noting and recording his experiences, but his physiological retentiveness was probably not a bit improved.[24]
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
A 'character,' as J.S. Mill says, 'is a completely fashioned will'; and a will, in the sense in which he means it, is an aggregate of tendencies to act in a firm and prompt and definite way upon all the principal emergencies of life. A tendency to act only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur, and the brain 'grows' to their use
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60%:
A cube of transparent green glass gives us a spatial sensation; an opaque cube painted green, on the contrary, only sensations of surface
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.4%:
A diagram will exhibit more emphatically what the assumptions of Psychology must be: 1 The Psychologist 2 The Thought Studied 3 The Thought's Object 4 The Psychologist's Reality
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.6%:
A man whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red Sea and the Desert and Jerusalem and Galilee can never doubt of any miraculous events which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.7%:
A scar anywhere is a locus minoris resistentioe, more liable to be abraded, inflamed, to suffer pain and cold, than are the neighboring parts
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61.7%:
A sensitive surface which has to be excited in all its parts at once can yield nothing but a sense of undivided largeness. This appears to be the case with the olfactory, and to all intents and purposes with the gustatory, surfaces
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.3%:
A spinal cord without . . . memory would simply be an idiotic spinal cord . . . It is impossible for an individual to realize how much he owes to its automatic agency until disease has impaired its functions."
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.9%:
A thing inferred by reasoning need neither have been an habitual associate of the datum from which we infer it, nor need it be similar to it. It
99.8%:
A thing is important if any one think it important. The process of history consists in certain folks becoming possessed of the mania that certain special things are important infinitely, whilst other folks cannot agree in the belief
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.1%:
A variety of the proprietary instinct is the impulse to form collections of the same sort of thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.4%:
After the emotional and active needs come the intellectual and æsthetic ones
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.8%:
All continuous sensations are named in beats
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.8%:
All currents tend to run forward in the brain and discharge into the muscular system; and the idea of a movement tends to do this with peculiar facility
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.6%:
All improvement of memory consists, then, in the improvement of one's habitual methods of recording facts. [p. 668] In the traditional terminology methods are divided into the mechanical, the ingenious, and the judicious. The mechanical methods consist in the intensification, prolongation, and repetition of the impression to be remembered
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.2%:
All narrow people intrench their Me, they retract it, - from the region of what they cannot securely possess
COMPARED., 55.8%:
All of us are conscious of the strong inflections of voice and explosives and gutturals of German speech in a way in which no German can be conscious of them. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.6%:
All our knowledge at first is vague. When we say that a thing is vague, we mean that it has no subdivisions ab intra , nor precise limitations ab extra ; but still all the forms of thought may apply to it
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.1%:
All our sensations are positively and inexplicably extensive wholes. The sensations contributing to space-perception seem exclusively to be the surface of skin, retina, and joints
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 5.9%:
All parts of the cortex, when electrically excited, produce alterations both of respiration and circulation
99.6%:
All philosophic interest vanishes from the question, the moment one ceases to ascribe to any a priori truths (whether analytic or synthetic) that "legislative character for all possible experience" which Kant believed in
95.5%:
All these mental affections are ways of knowing objects
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 65.7%:
Although it might seem that nothing should be easier than to be conscious of one's own sensations, experience nevertheless shows that often enough either a special talent like that showed in eminent degree by Purkinje, or accident or theoretic speculation, are necessary conditions for the discovery of subjective phenomena. Thus, for example, the blind spot on the retina was discovered by Mariotte by the theoretic way ; similarly by me the existence of 'summation'-tones in acoustics
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.1%:
Altogether this chapter of Brentano's on the Unity of Consciousness is as good as anything with which I am acquainted
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
An advanced thinker sees the relations of his topics in such masses and so instantaneously that when he comes to explain to younger minds it is often hard to say which grows the more perplexed, he or the pupil
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 86%:
An anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial consequences of a movement, plus (on certain occasions) the fiat that these consequences shall become actual, is the only psychic state which introspection lets us discern as the forerunner of our voluntary acts.
Chapter: CHAPTER III. On Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity., 5%:
An enormous number of the cellular bodies in the hemispheres are fibreless
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 86.3%:
An idea of the amount of muscular exertion requisite to perform a certain movement can consequently be nothing other than an anticipatory image of the movement's sensible effects.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.7%:
And if we ascend to the nervous system, we find how many so-called functional diseases seem to keep themselves going simply because they happen to have once begun
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
And the art of the reasoner will consist of two stages: [p. 331] First, sagacity , [7] or the ability to discover what part, M, lies embedded in the whole S which is before him; Second, learning , or the ability to recall promptly M's consequences, concomitants, or implications. [8]
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.4%:
And the faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will.
95.9%:
And the random irradiations and resettlements of our ideas, which supervene upon experience, and constitute our free mental play, are due entirely to these secondary internal processes, which vary enormously from brain to brain, even though the brains be exposed to exactly the same 'outer relations
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.9%:
And yet their moral knowledge, always there grumbling and rumbling in the background, - discerning, commenting, protesting, longing, half resolving, - never wholly resolves, never gets its voice out of the minor into the major key, or its speech out of the subjunctive into the imperative mood, never breaks the spell, never takes the helm into its hands
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
Another constant component of the web of motivation is the impulse to persist in a decision once made.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.9%:
Any natural subject will do, if the artist has wit enough to pounce upon some one feature of it as characteristic, and suppress all merely accidental items which do not harmonize with this.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.9%:
Any strong sensation whatever produces accommodation of the organs which perceive it, and absolute oblivion, for the time being, of the task in hand. This reflex and passive character of the attention which, as a French writer says, makes the child seem to belong less to himself than to every object which happens to catch his notice, is the first thing which the teacher must overcome
96.8%:
Arithmetic and its fundamental principles are thus independent of our experiences or of the order of the world Note: Because we regard it as such?
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.1%:
As Carlyle says: "Make thy claim of wages a zero, then hast thou the world under thy feet. Well did the wisest of our time write, it is only with renunciation that life, properly speaking, can be said to begin
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9%:
As in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical criticism all causes are obscure. But
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.1%:
As well might one say that because the world consists of all its parts, there- [p. 282] fore we can only apprehend it at all by having unconsciously summed these up in our head
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.4%:
Association, so far as the word stands for an effect, is between THINGS THOUGHT OF -- it is THINGS, not ideas, which are associated in the mind. We ought to talk of the association of objects, not of the association of ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.2%:
At bottom its only positive determination is Being, and this is something whose meaning we all realize even though we find it hard to explain.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.3%:
At the basis of our knowledge of our selves there lies only "the simple and utterly empty idea: I; of which we cannot even say we have a notion, but only a consciousness which accompanies all notions
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.7%:
Bastian saw Indian women in Peru who had lost an infant carrying about on their backs a wooden doll to represent it
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
Belief in anything not present to sense is the very lively, [p. 599] strong, and steadfast association of the image of that thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
Bowditch, who translated and annotated Laplace's Mécanique Céleste, said that whenever his author prefaced a proposition by the words 'it is evident,' he knew that many hours of hard study lay before him
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.8%:
But Shakespeare, whose mind supplied these means, could probably not have told why they were so effective
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.1%:
But a worse defect than vacuousness comes from the dependence of psychology on common speech. Naming our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume that as the objects are, so the thought must be
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 49.1%:
But as all conceptual knowledge stands for intuitive knowledge, and terminates therein
COMPARED., 55.8%:
But at that moment one may often surprise a change in the very feel of the word. Our own language would sound very different to us if we heard it without understanding, as we hear a foreign tongue Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
But in all this very little is said of the reason why we do pray, which is simply that we cannot help praying
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.6%:
But in certain nauseated states the idea of vomiting will make us vomit; and a kind of sequence which is in this case realized only exceptionally might be the rule with the so-called voluntary muscles. It all depends on the nervous connections between the centres of ideation and the discharging paths
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.9%:
But in default of dukes and envious salutations almost anything will do for some of us; and there is a whole race of beings to-day whose passion is to keep their names in the newspapers, no matter under what heading, 'arrivals and departures,' 'personal paragraphs,' 'interviews,' - gossip, even scandal, will suit them if nothing better is to be had. Guiteau
Chapter: MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES, 3.6%:
But is the consciousness which accompanies the activity of the cortex the only consciousness that man has? or are his lower centres conscious as well? This
98.1%:
But little by little there dawns in one the judgment "nothing can be right for me which would not be right for another similarly placed;" or the fulfilment of my desires is intrinsically no more imperative than that of anyone else's;" or "what it is reasonable that another should do for me, it is also reasonable that I should do for him;"[33] and forthwith the whole mass of the habitual gets overturned. It gets seriously overturned only in a few fanatical heads. But its overturning is due to a back-door and not to a front-door process
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.6%:
But now reverse the hypothesis and suppose a being to get only one 1000th part of the sensations that we get in a given time, and consequently to live 1000 times as long. Winters and summers will be to him like quarters of an hour
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73%:
But one who has actually seen such a phenomenon, under what seems to him sufficiently 'test-conditions,' will hold to his sensible experience through thick and thin, even though the whole fabric of 'science' should be rent in twain
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.9%:
But psychology is passing into a less simple phase
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.9%:
But put a reasoner amongst a set of concrete objects which he has neither seen nor heard of before, and with a little time, if he is a good reasoner, he will make such inferences from them as will quite atone for his ignorance
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.2%:
But sensations have no seat in this sense. They [p. 43] become seats for each other, as fast as experience associates them together; but that violates no primitive seat possessed by any one of them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
But some day we wake with the sense that we see the thing rightly, that no new light will be thrown on the subject by farther delay, and that the matter had better be settled now
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61.2%:
But such a machinery is already familiar to us. It is neither more nor less than the law of habit in the nervous system
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.5%:
But the malcontents will hardly try to refute our reasonings by direct attack. It is more probable that, turning their back upon them altogether, they will devote themselves to sapping and mining the region roundabout until it is a bog of logical liquefaction, into the midst of which all definite conclusions of any sort may be trusted ere long to sink and disappear. Our
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.6%:
But the supposition that a sensation primitively feels either itself or its object to be in the same place with the brain is absolutely groundless, and neither a priori probability nor facts from experience can be adduced to show that such a deliverance forms any part of the original cognitive function of our sensibility
COMPARED., 55.6%:
But the visible signs and the tangible significates are by long custom so "closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together, and the prejudice is so confirmed and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of language, and want of reflection," [3] that we think we see the whole object, tangible and visible alike, in one simple indivisible act Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.6%:
But this condition of the experience is not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not immediately known. It is only known in subsequent reflection. Instead, then, of the stream of thought being one of con-sciousness, "thinking its own existence along with whatever else it thinks," (as Ferrier says) it might be better called a stream of Sciousness pure and simple, thinking objects of some of which it makes what it calls a 'Me,' and only aware of its 'pure' Self in an abstract, hypothetic or conceptual way
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.3%:
But this representation is not the general and abstract idea. It is but its accompaniment, and, if I may say so, the ore from which it is extracted
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.5%:
But this represents the animal as obeying abstractions which not once in a million cases is it possible it can have framed
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.3%:
But this self, whose consciousness Kant thus established deductively as a conditio sine quâ non of experience, is in the same breath denied by him to have any positive attributes
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.8%:
But though this is true, and though it would be absurd in an absolute way to say that a given analytic mind was superior to any intuitional one, yet it is none the less true that the former represents the higher stage
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.7%:
But to the end of time certain places of the world remain defined for him as the places where those sensations were; and his only possible answer to the question where anything is will be to say 'there,' and to name some sensation or other like those first ones, which shall identify the spot
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.4%:
But we must not forget that the process has a psychical side, nor close our eyes to the possibility that the sort of feeling aroused by incipient currents may be the reason why certain of them are instantly inhibited and others helped to flow
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.2%:
But we need not do so; and nothing more is really required for a comparative judgment of the amount of a 'distance' than three or four impressions belonging to a common kind.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
But we shall presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason that we believe something else which contradicts the rest thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
But what determines which element we shall attend to first? There are two immediate and obvious answers : first, our practical or instinctive interests; and, second, our æsthetic interests. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.1%:
But what is lost for thought is converted into feeling, in this case into the peculiar feeling of effort, difficulty, or strain. The
96.5%:
But what is our purpose in predicating? Ultimately, it may be anything we please; but proximately and immediately, it is always the gratification of a certain curi- [p. 649] osity as to whether the object in hand is or is not of a kind connected with that ultimate purpose
99.2%:
But, as we have the elaborate volitional constitution we do have, the remodelling must be effected, there is no escape
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.9%:
Can 'suggestions of experience' reproduce elements which no particular experience originally contained? This is the point by which Helmholtz's 'empiristic' theory, as a theory, must he judged. No theory is worthy of the name which leaves such a point obscure. Well, Helmholtz does so leave it Note: Language
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.6%:
Certain postulatesare given in our nature; and whatever satisfies those postulates is treated as if real
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.9%:
Certain vicissitudes in the me demand our notice. In the first place, although its changes are gradual, they become in time great. The central part of the me is the feeling of the body and of the adjustments in the head; and in the feeling of the body should be included that of the general emotional tones and tendencies, for at bottom these are but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities run
COMPARED., 56.7%:
Children, whose ideas are not yet ready enough to perceive words at a glance, read them wrong if they are printed wrong, that is, right according to the way of printing Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.7%:
Classification and description are the lowest stage of science. They sink into the background the moment questions of genesis are formulated, and remain important only so far as they facilitate our answering these
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.4%:
Clothes, weapons, tools, habitations, and works of art are the result of the discoveries to which the plastic instinct leads, each individual starting where his forerunners left off, and tradition preserving all that once is gained
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11%:
Comment on this seems hardly called for. It is, as I said, pure mythology. None of these facts, then, appealed to so confidently in proof of the existence of ideas in an unconscious state, prove anything of the sort. They prove either that conscious ideas were present which the next instant were forgotten; or they prove that certain results, similar to results of reasoning, may be wrought out by rapid brain-processes to which no ideation seems attached
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.5%:
Complete social unselfishness, in other words, can hardly exist; complete social suicide hardly occur to a man's mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
Congruity with certain favorite forms of contemplation -- unity, simplicity, permanence, and the like;
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.3%:
Conversely, if words do belong to the same vocabulary, and if the grammatical structure is correct, sentences with absolutely no meaning may be uttered in good faith and pass unchallenged. Discourses at prayer-meetings, re-shuffling the same collection of cant phrases, and the whole genus of penny-a-line-isms and newspaper-reporter's flourishes give illustrations of this
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
Curiosity and fear form a couple of antagonistic emotions liable to be awakened by the same outward thing,
COMPARED., 58.5%:
Currents from the periphery are (as it seems) the only currents whose energy can vanquish the supra-ideational resistance (so to call it) of the cells, and cause the peculiarly intense sort of disintegration with which the sensational quality is linked Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.5%:
Decisions with effort merge so gradually into those without it that it is not easy to say where the limit lies. Decisions without effort merge again into ideo-motor, and these into reflex acts; so that the temptation is almost irresistible to throw the formula which covers so many cases over absolutely all.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.4%:
Delay for a minute, however, and the echo itself of the clock or the question is mute; present sensations have banished it beyond recall. With the feeling of the present thing there must at all times mingle the fading echo of all those other things which the previous few seconds have supplied
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.5%:
Did they not possess some such advantage as this, it would hardly be the case that the older men are and the more effective as thinkers, the more, as a rule, they have lost their visualizing power and depend on words.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.5%:
Different impressions on the same sense-organ do interfere with each other's perception, and cannot well be attended to at once. Hence we do not locate them in each other's spaces, but arrange them in a serial order of exteriority, each alongside of the rest, in a space larger than that which any one sensation brings. This larger space, however, is an object of conception rather than of direct intuition, and bears all the marks of being constructed piecemeal by the mind. The blind man forms it out of tactile, locomotor, and auditory experiences, the seeing men out of visual ones almost exclusively Note: Important - how seeing constructs space
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.2%:
Dr. Carpenter, who first used, I believe, the name of ideo-motor action, placed it, if I mistake not, among the curiosities of our mental life. The truth is that it is no curiosity, but simply the normal process stripped of disguise
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.4%:
EMOTION FOLLOWS UPON THE BODILY EXPRESSION IN THE COARSER EMOTIONS AT LEAST.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.7%:
Each 'section' of the stream would then be a bit of sciousness or knowledge of this sort, including and contemplating its 'me' and its 'not-me' as objects which work out their drama together, but not yet including or contemplating its own subjective being
95.1%:
Each of the constant connections among the fibres of the cerebral masses answers to some constant connection of phenomena in the experiences of the race
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
Each thinker, however, has dominant habits of attention; and these practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.8%:
Each thought decides, by its own authority, which, out of all the conceptive functions open to it, it shall now renew; with which other thought it shall identify itself as a conceiver, and just how far. "The same A which I once meant," it says, "I shall now mean again, and mean it with C as its predicate (or what not) instead of B, as before." In all this, therefore, there is absolutely no changing, but only uncoupling and re-coupling of conceptions
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.1%:
Effort is felt only where there is a conflict of interests in the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.7%:
Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will Note: Important
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 3.9%:
Either of these inabilities may come from a local ablation; and 'restitution' can then only mean that, in spite of a temporary block, an inrunning current has at last become enabled to flow out by its old path again-
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.1%:
Empiricist writers are very fond of emphasizing one great set of delusions which language inflicts on the mind. Whenever we have made a word, they say, to denote a certain group of phenomena, we are prone to suppose a substantive entity existing beyond the phenomena, of which the word shall be the name. But the lack of a word quite as often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be there ; and so we come to overlook phenomena whose existence would be patent to us all, had we only grown up to hear it familiarly recognized in speech
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.6%:
Even in poetry and the arts, some one has to come and tell us what aspects we may single out, and what effects we may admire, before our æsthetic nature can 'dilate' to its full extent and never 'with the wrong emotion
Chapter: CONCLUSION., 4.4%:
Even the spinal cord may possibly have some little power of will in this sense, and of effort towards modified behavior in consequence of new experiences of sensibility.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62%:
Even to-day the main function of the peripheral regions of our retina is that of sentinels, which, when beams of light move over them, cry 'Who goes there ?' and call the fovea to the spot. Most parts of the skin do but perform the same of office for the finger-tips
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.2%:
Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains [p. 404] of thought
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.2%:
Every one who has a wound or hurt anywhere, a sore tooth, e.g., will ever and anon press it just to bring out the pain. If we are near a new sort of stink, we must sniff it again just to verify once more how bad it is.
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.4%:
Every one," says he, "who makes reaction-time experiments for the first time is surprised to dind how little he is master of his own movements, so soon as it becomes a question of executing them with a maximum of speed. Not only does their energy lie, as it were, outside the field of choice, but even the time in which the movement occurs depends only partly upon ourselves.
94.8%:
Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to impress us, whether spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and acts. Impressions, as we well know, affect certain orders of sequence and coexistence, and the mind's habits copy the habits of the impressions, so that our images of things assume a time- and space-arrangement which resembles the time- and space-arrangements outside
95.3%:
Experience' does not mean every natural, as opposed to every supernatural, cause. It means a particular sort of natural agency, alongside of which other more recondite natural agencies may perfectly well exist
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.7%:
Fear has bodily expressions of an extremely energetic kind, and stands, beside lust and anger, as one of the three most exciting emotions of which our nature is susceptible
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
Five Types of Decision
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.7%:
For all the two thousand years during which metaphysicians have thus cultivated psychology, they are not agreed about one intelligible and established proposition. 'Internal observation' gives almost as many divergent results as there are individuals who think they practise it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.2%:
For him, better the actual evil than the fear of it; and so it is with the common lot of misers. Better to live poor now, with the power of living rich, than to live rich at the risk of losing the power
94.7%:
For in the first place, if a feeling do not mirror the reality which wakens it and to which we say it corresponds, if it mirror no reality whatever outside of the mind, it of course is a purely mental product
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.3%:
For my own part I confess that the moment I become metaphysical and try to define the more, I find the notion of some sort of an anima mundi thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis, in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls. Note: Well how the **** about that
98.7%:
For neurotic degeneration is unquestionably a disease whose original causes are unknown; and like other 'accidental variations' it is hereditary
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.4%:
For so Anaxigoras in Aristotle very fairly expresses the nature of knowledge and intellection under the notion of Conquering. Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind understands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.3%:
Fortunately for us: for since we cannot handle things as wholes, but only by conceiving them through some general character which for the time we call their essence, it would be a great pity if the matter ended there, and if the general character, once picked out and in our possession, helped us to no farther advance
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.5%:
Freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself.
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 34%:
From the cognitive point of view, all mental facts are intellections. From the subjective point of view all are feelings
COMPARED., 57.7%:
Genius, in truth, means little more than the faculty of perceiving in an unhabitual way Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.7%:
Habit, recency, vividness, and emotional congruity are, then, all reasons why one representation rather than another should be awakened by the interesting portion of a departing thought
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.3%:
Having the goose which lays the golden eggs, the description of each egg already laid is a minor matter
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.6%:
He gets up, blinded, spitting a mass of blood, not knowing exactly what the situation is. He thinks only of one thing, that he shall probably die of his wounds, but that before dying he must take vengeance on the panther
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.6%:
He is not entitled to frame a theory from one class of phenomena, extend it to another class which it does not fit, and excuse himself by saying that if we cannot make it fit, it is because ultimate facts are inexplicable
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.2%:
He is unusually sui compos who does not every week of his life fall into some such blundering act as this. Such instances of voluntas invita show not only that our acts cannot all be conceived as effects of represented pleasure, but that they cannot even be classed as cases of represented good
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
Hence the states of [p. 284] consent and belief, characterized by repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately connected with subsequent practical activity. This
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.8%:
Here, as in so many other cases, it is only the premier pas qui coûte
98.8%:
I proceeded at that time to draw a tentative conclusion to the effect that the origin of most of our instincts must certainly be deemed fruits of the back-door method of genesis, and not of ancestral experience in the proper meaning of the term
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.1%:
I think I emphasize it enough when I call it one of the ultimate foundation-pillars of the intellectual life, the others being Discrimination, Retentiveness, and Association
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.8%:
IN REASONING, WE PICK OUT ESSENTIAL QUALITIES.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.4%:
INDIVIDUALS DIFFER IN IMAGINATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.8%:
In the second type of case our feeling is to a certain extent that of letting ourselves drift with a certain indifferent acquiescence in a direction accidentally determined from without, with the conviction that, after all, we might as well stand by this course as by the other, and that things are in any event sure to turn out sufficiently right.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.4%:
No memory is involved in the mere fact of recurrence
97.2%:
Nor, to become more concrete, does the lover of a woman generally love her beloved, or the contradictor of a contradictor contradict whomever he contradicts
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.3%:
Of our numerous experiences there remain on the following day four or five more or less distinct recollections, which, obliterated themselves, leaves behind in us a simple colorless, vague representation, into which enter as components various reviving sensations, in an utterly feeble, incomplete, and abortive state
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.5%:
On the other hand, a deaf and dumb man can weave his tactile and visual images into a system of thought quite as effective and rational as that of a word-user.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.2%:
One can ask, then, with what particular muscular contraction the sense of strained attention in the effort to recall something is associated? On this question my own feeling gives me a decided answer; it comes to me distinctly not as a sensation of tension in the inside of the head, but as a feeling of strain and contraction in the scalp, with a pressure from outwards in over the whole cranium, undoubtedly caused by a contraction of the muscles of the scalp.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.8%:
One is surprised at one's success in this the moment one gives up one's habitually analytic state of mind.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
Other objects whisper doubt or disbelief; but the object of passion makes us deaf to all but itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.8%:
Our whole optical education indeed is largely taken up with assigning their proper distances to the objects of our retinal sensations
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.9%:
Pity she should not [p. 565] have been more generous, nor made a world whose other parts were as immediately subject to our will!
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33%:
Practically it amounts to saying that an idea must be a duplicate edition of what it knows[10] - in other words, that it can only know itself - or, more shortly still, that knowledge in any strict sense of the word, as a self-transcendent function, is impossible
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
Probably, when the subject is thoroughly examined, conviction will be found to be one of the intensest of human emotions, and one most closely connected with the bodily state
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.8%:
Professor de Morgan, thinking, it [p. 509] is true, rather of conceptual than of perceptive discrimination, wrote, wittily enough: "The great bulk of the illogical part of the educated community -- whether majority or minority I know not; perhaps six of one and half a dozen of the other -- have not power to make a distinction, and of course cannot be made to take a distinction, and of course never attempt to shake a distinction. With them all such things are evasions, subterfuges, come-offs, loop-holes, etc. They would hang a man for horse-stealing under a statute against sheep-stealing; and would laugh at you if you quibbled about the distinction between a horse and a sheep.
99.8%:
Pure rationalism, complete immunity from prejudice, consists in refusing to see that the case before one is absolutely unique
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.2%:
Reflex, instinctive, and emotional movements are all primary performances.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.9%:
Since the time of Hume it has been a commonplace in psychology that we are only conversant with the outward results of our volition, and not with the hidden inner machinery of nerves and muscles which are what it primarily sets at work.[11] The
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 59.8%:
Skin and retina are, however, the organs in which the space-element plays the most active part
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.4%:
So that we might say, by a sort of bad pun, "only a connected world can be known as disconnected." I say bad pun, because the point of view shifts between the connectedness and the disconnectedness. The disconnectedness is of the realities known; the connectedness is of the knowledge of them
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.7%:
Speculations like this traverse common-sense; and not only do they traverse common sense (which in philosophy is no insuperable objection) but they contradict the fundamental assumption of every philosophic school. Spiritualists, transcendentalists, and empiricists alike admit in [p. 305] us a continual direct perception of the thinking activity in the concrete. However they may otherwise disagree, they vie with each other in the cordiality of their recognition of our thoughts as the one sort of existent which skepticism cannot touch
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses, the more instinctive the better
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
Strange mutual dependence this, in which the appearance needs the reality in order to exist, but the reality needs the appearance in order to be known!
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.2%:
Sunsets will not suggest heroes' deaths, but supper-time. This is why man is the only metaphysical animal
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
The World-soul sends me just those phenomena in order that I may react upon them; and among the reactions is the intellectual one of spinning these conceptions
96.6%:
The abstract scheme of successive predications, extended indefinitely, with all the possibilities of substitution which it involves, is thus an immutable system of truth which flows from the very structure and form of our thinking Note: Important
97.2%:
The axiom of skipped intermediaries applies, however, only to certain particular series, and among them to those [p. 660] which we have considered, in which the recurring relation is either of difference, of likeness, of kind, of numerical addition, or of prolongation in the same linear or plane direction
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.1%:
The beginnings of acquisitiveness are seen in the impulse which very young children display, to snatch at, or beg for, any object which pleases their attention
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.4%:
The blood mounts to the eyes, and sympathy's chance is gone
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.9%:
The bow is a secondary correction of the primary feint that we do not see the other person. Probably
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.6%:
The brute, no doubt, has plenty of instances of error and disappointment in his life, but the similar shock is in him most likely always swallowed up in the accidents of the actual case
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.7%:
The certainty that we are well dressed," a charming woman has said, "gives us a peace of heart compared to which that yielded by the consolations of religion is as nothing
95.2%:
The corollary here drawn from the general argument is that the human brain is an organized register of infinitely-numerous experiences received during the evolution of life, or rather during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.6%:
The distinction is that between the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state. It is the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might become a science into a tumbling-ground for whimsies
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.1%:
The effort to attend is therefore only a part of what the word 'will' covers; it covers also the effort to consent to something to which our attention is not quite complete
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.5%:
The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us, but theoretically they are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest assumptions in this science without realizing, until challenged, what internal difficulties they involve
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.4%:
The geometer's sagacity lies in the invention of the new lines.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.8%:
The mind chooses to suit itself, and decides what particular sensation shall be held more real and valid than all the rest.
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.5%:
The mind-stuff theory, in short, is unintelligible. Atoms of feeling cannot compose higher feelings, any more than atoms of matter can compose physical things! The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
The molecules and ether-waves of the scientific world, for example, simply kick the object's warmth and color out, they refuse to have any relations with them. But the world of 'idols of the tribe' stands ready to take them in. Just so the world of classic myth takes up the winged horse; the world of individual hallucination, the vision of the candle; the world of abstract truth, the proposition that justice is kingly, though no actual king be just
97.6%:
The most promising of these ideal systems at first were of course the richer ones, the sentimental ones. The baldest and least promising were the mathematical ones; but the history of the latter's application is a history of steadily advancing successes, whilst that of the sentimentally richer [p. 666] systems is one of relative sterility and failure.[
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
The most sobering possible agents are objects of grief and fear. When one of these affects us, all 'light fantastic'notions lose their motive power, all solemn ones find theirs multiplied many-fold. The consequence is an instant abandonment of the more trivial projects with which we had been dallying, and an instant practical acceptance of the more grim and earnest alternative which till then could not extort our mind's consent
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.6%:
The normal provocatives of the impulse are all living beasts, great and small, toward which a contrary habit has not been formed -- all human beings in whom we perceive a certain intent towards us, and a large number of human beings who offend us peremptorily, either by their look, or gait, or by some circumstance in their lives which we dislike
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.1%:
The odiousness of the whole experience comes from its insipidity; for stimulation is the indispensable requisite for pleasure in an experience, and the feeling of bare time is the least stimulating experience we can have.[38] The sensation of tædium is a protest, says Volkmann, against the entire present.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.6%:
The older writings on instinct are ineffectual wastes of words, because their authors never came down to this defi- [p. 385] nite and simple point of view, but smothered everything in vague wonder at the clairvoyant and prophetic power of the animals -- so superior to anything in man -- and at the beneficence of God in endowing them with such a gift. But
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23%:
The only point that is obscure is the act of appropriation itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
The peculiar form of excitement called by Professor Bain the emotion of pursuit, the pleasure of a crescendo, is the soul of many common games. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.2%:
The random afferent impressions fell out, those that felt right were selected and grew together in the chain
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.1%:
The reader must judge of our own success in carrying the analysis farther
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.8%:
The retention of n, it will be observed, is no mysterious storing up of an 'idea' in an unconscious state. It is not a fact of the mental order at all. It is a purely physical phenomenon, a morphological feature, the presence of these 'paths,' namely, in the finest recesses of the brain's tissue
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.9%:
The revivability in memory of the emotions, like that of all the feelings of the lower senses, is very small. We
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.1%:
The stream of thought flows on; but most of its segments fall into the bottomless abyss of oblivion
95.6%:
The time- and space-relations between things do stamp copies of themselves within. Things juxtaposed in space impress us, and continue to be thought, in the relation in which they exist there
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.2%:
The total bigness of a cutaneous or retinal feeling soon becomes subdivided by discriminative attention.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
The true opposite of belief, psychologically considered, are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The various supernatural worlds
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with these worlds of faith -- the world of the Iliad, that of King Lear, of the Pickwick Pacers
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
The vividness of the first conception," he writes," diffuses itself along the relations and is conveyed, as by so many pipes or channels, to every idea that has any communication with the primary one. ...
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts -- first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard. Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
The whole drama is a mental drama. The whole difficulty is a mental difficulty, a difficulty with an object of our thought.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.2%:
There are all kinds of misers. The common sort, the excessively niggardly man, simply exhibits the psychological law that the potential has often a far greater influence over our mind than the actual
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90%:
There are at all times some ideas from which we shy away like frightened horses the moment we get a glimpse of their forbidding profile upon the threshold of our thought. The only resistance which our will can possibly experience is the resistance which such an idea offers to being attended to at all. To attend to it is the volitional act, and the only inward volitional act which we ever perform
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
There is a happy moment for fixing skill in drawing, for making boys collectors in natural history, and presently dissectors and botanists; then for initiating them into the harmonies of mechanics and the wonders of physical and chemical law
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.7%:
There is found a self-brand, just as there is found a herd-brand
Chapter: Hearing., 3.2%:
There is no 'centre of Speech' in the brain any more than there is a faculty of Speech in the mind. The entire brain, more or less, is at work in a man who uses language
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.6%:
There is no cell or group of cells in the brain of such anatomical or functional pre-eminence as to appear to be the keystone or centre of gravity of the whole system
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.7%:
There is no duplicate space known aliunde, or created by an 'epoch-making achievement
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
There is no more remarkable difference in human character than that between resolute and irresolute natures
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.2%:
There is no one whose intelligence does not embrace simultaneously many ideas, more or less distinct, more or less confused. Now, when we have many ideas at once, a peculiar feeling arises in us: we feel, among these ideas, resemblances, differences, relations. Let us call this mode of feeling, common to us all, the feeling of relation, or relation-feeling (sentiment-rapport)
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.5%:
There is no seeing them before they are offered; there is no summoning them before they are seen. The other circumstance is, that every kind of reasoning is nothing, in its simplest form, but attention
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.5%:
This is really no argument for simple determinism. There runs throughout it the sense of a force which might make things otherwise from one moment to another, if it were only strong enough to breast the tide
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.7%:
To crouch from cold is a sensation-impulse; to turn and follow, if we see people running one way, is a perception-impulse; to cast about for cover, if it begins to blow and rain, is an imagination-impulse. A single complex instinctive action may involve successively the awakening of impulses of all three classes
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.3%:
To say that phenomena inhere in a Substance is at bottom only to record one's protest against the notion that the bare existence of the phenomena is the total truth. A phenomenon would not itself be, we insist, unless there were something more than the phenomenon. To the more we give the provisional name of Substance.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.4%:
Turn now to the case of finding the unknown means to a distinctly conceived end
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.1%:
Unhealthiness of will may thus come about in many ways. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.3%:
Volition is the association of ideas of muscular motion with the ideas of those pleasures which the motion produces
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.9%:
We all of us have this permanent consciousness of whither our thought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling [p. 256] of what thoughts are next to arise, before they have arisen
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.9%:
We are crazy to get a visiting-list which shall be large, to be able to say when any one is mentioned, "Oh! I know him well," and to be bowed to in the street by half the people we meet. Of
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.6%:
We are exactly in his predicament, however, for spaces which exceed our visual range. We
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.6%:
We have never seen a human face except in relief -- hence the case with which the present sensation is overpowered
99.2%:
We have no organ or faculty to appreciate the simply given order
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61.5%:
We have shown that, within the range of [p. 165] every sense, experience takes ab initio the spatial form. We have also shown that in the cases of the retina and skin [p. 166] every sensible total may be subdivided by discriminative attention into sensible parts, which are also spaces, and into relations between the parts, these being sensible spaces too
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.2%:
We learn all our possibilities by the way of experience
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
What difference does it make what the means are? "Qu'importe le flacon, pourvu qu'on ait l'ivresse?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94.5%:
What explains everything explains nothing
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.3%:
What is taste in the arts, in intellectual productions? What but the feeling of those relations among the parts which constitutes their merit?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
What science means by 'verification' is no more than this, that no object of conception shall be believed which sooner or later has not some permanent and vivid object of sensation for its term.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.5%:
Whatever can be overcome by suggestions of experience must be regarded as itself a product of experience and custom.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19%:
When I say that we all call the two halves by the same names, and that those names are 'me' and 'not-me' respectively, it will at once be seen what I mean
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.3%:
Woe to the man who uses up his surplus stock of braininhibition too near the bitter end, or too often!
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.2%:
a high brain may do many things, and may do each of them at a very slight hint. But its hair-trigger organization makes of it a happy-go-lucky, hit-or-miss affair. It is as likely to do the crazy as the sane thing at any given moment.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.1%:
a premature philosophy has decided that these are our only spurs to action, and that wherever they seem to be absent
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80%:
and a vertiginous baffling of the expectation. This
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.3%:
ausgelöste Empfindungscomplex
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.2%:
but his case seems to me to be one of desperate infatuation with a hobby
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.6%:
etc. If habitual contiguities dominate, we have a prosaic mind; if rare contiguities, similarities, have free play, we call the person fanciful, poetic, or witty. But the thought as a rule is of matters taken in their entirety. Having been thinking of one, we later that we are thinking of another, to which we have I lifted along, we hardly know how
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 59.9%:
glass. By day the so-called empty space between us and objects seen appears very different from what it is by night
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.8%:
All arguments from continuity work in two ways, you can either level up or level down by their means; and it is clear that such arguments as these can eat each other up to all eternity.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.7%:
An often-quoted writer has said that Shakespeare possessed more intellectual power than any one else that ever lived. If by this he meant the power to pass from given premises to right or congruous conclusions, it is no doubt true. The abrupt transitions in Shakespeare's thought astonish the reader by their unexpectedness no less than they delight him by their fitness
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.7%:
And hereby he becomes one of the masters and the lords of life. He must be counted with henceforth; he forms a part of human destiny. Neither in the theoretic nor in the practical sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those who have no head for risks, or sense for living on the perilous edge
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
And if a brief definition of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit the appearances than this: It is action in the line of the greatest resistance.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.8%:
. A man's empirical thought depends on the things he has experienced, but what these shall be is to a large extent determined by his habits of attention. A thing may be present to him a thousand times, but if he persistently fails to notice it, it cannot be said to enter into his experience. We are all seeing flies, moths, and beetles by the thousand, but to whom, save an entomologist, do they say anything distinct? On the other hand, a thing met only once in a lifetime may leave an indelible experience in the memory
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94.6%:
10] I must repeat, however, that we are here on the verge of possibly unknown forces and modes of communication
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.9%:
A certain amount of timidity obviously adapts us to the world we live in, but the fear-paroxysm is surely altogether harmful to him who is its prey.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23%:
A thing cannot appropriate itself; it is itself; and still less can it disown itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.3%:
A habit, once grafted on an instinctive tendency, restricts the range of the tendency itself, and keeps us from reacting on any but the habitual object, although other objects might just as well have been chosen had they been the first-comers.
COMPARED., 56%:
A horse's head, a coil of rope, an anchor, are, for example, ideas which have come to me unsolicited whilst I have been writing these latter lines. They can often be explained by subtle links of association, often not at all Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94.4%:
A subject who knows himself to be ultra-susceptible should never allow himself to be entranced by an operator in whose moral delicacy he lacks complete confidence; and he can use a trusted operator's suggestions to protect himself against liberties which others, knowing his weakness, might tempted to take with him
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.4%:
Altogether, the Soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson, is: "Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else."
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.8%:
Among all sensations, the most belief-compelling are those productive of pleasure or of pain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.3%:
Among tastes, sweet has the lowest value, next comes salt, then bitter, and finally sour, though, as M. Féré remarks, such a sour as acetic excites the nerves of pain and smell as well as of taste
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.9%:
An act has no ethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several all equally possible
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.4%:
An education which should improve this faculty would be the education par excellence. But it is easier to define this ideal than to give practical directions for bringing it about
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.5%:
An element common to all these ceremonial games, as they may be called, is the excitement of concerted action as one of an organized crowd. The
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.9%:
An invisible law, as strong as gravitation, keeps him within his orbit, arrayed this year as he was the last; and how his better-bred acquaintances contrive to get the things they wear will be for him a mystery till his dying day.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.3%:
And John Min says that "the idea of space is, at bottom, one of time."[125] Space, then, is not to be found in any elementary sensation, but, in Bain's words, "as a quality, it has no other origin and no other meaning then the association of these different [nonspatial] [126] motor and sensitive effects." [127]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.7%:
And every unity, every identity, every classification is rightly called fanciful unless it serves some other end than the mere satisfaction, emotion, or inspiration caught by momentarily believing in it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.3%:
And what things stand in these relations immediately, and what others are so closely connected with the former that (in Hume's language) we 'carry our disposition' also on to them? In a simple and direct way these questions cannot be answered at all. The whole history of human thought is but an unfinished attempt to answer them. For what have men been trying to find out, since men were men, but just those things: "Where do our true interests lie -- which relations shall we call the intimate and real ones -- which things shall we call living realities and which not ?" A
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.4%:
Attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations force attention from us
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
Belief, the sense of reality, feels like itself -- that is about as much as we can say
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.8%:
But it is probably frequent in persons of strong emotional endowment and unstable or vacillating character. And in men of the world-shaking type, the Napoleons, Luthers, etc., in whom tenacious passion combines with ebullient activity, when by any chance the passion's outlet has been dammed by scruples or apprehensions, the resolution is probably often of this catastrophic kind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.1%:
But adding reality does not enrich the picture in any such inward way; it leaves it inwardly as it finds it, and only fixes it and stamps it in to us
97.2%:
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SERIES IS THE BASIS OF RATIONALITY. Classification
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61.7%:
Capacity for partial stimulation is thus the second condition favoring discrimination
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the way of exciting pleasure or pain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.9%:
Existence is thus no substantive quality when we predicate it of any object; it is a relation, ultimately terminating in ourselves, and tit the moment when it terminates, becoming a practical relation
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.7%:
Few things indeed are more striking than the changeable distance which the objects of many of our sensations may be made to assume
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.8%:
For common-sense insists that the unity of all the selves is not a mere appearance of similarity or continuity, ascertained after the fact. She is sure that it involves a real belonging to a real Owner, to a pure spiritual entity of some kind
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
For the important thing about a train of thought is its conclusion. That is the meaning, or, as we say, the topic of the thought. That is what abides when all its other members have faded from memory
96.6%:
Formal logic is the name of the Science which traces in skeleton form all the remote relations of terms connected by successive is's with each other, and enumerates their possibilities of mutual substitution
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.9%:
Geniuses are, by common consent, considered to differ from ordinary minds by an unusual development of association by similarity
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.3%:
He who says, 'Life is real, life is earnest,' however much he may speak of the fundamental mysteriousness of things, gives a distinct definition to that mysteriousness by ascribing to it the right to claim from us the particular mood called seriousness, which means the unwillingness to live with energy, though energy bring pain.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.8%:
Here, again, a birth of voluntary attention, grafted this time on a sympathetic instead of a selfish sentiment like that of the first example
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.6%:
Hobbes's phrase, sentire semper idem et non sentire ad idem recidunt, is generally treated as the original statement of the relativity doctrine
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
Hoec tibi erit janua leti
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53%:
Hume was the hero of the atomistic theory. Not
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.6%:
In every proposition, then, so far as it is believed, questioned, or disbelieved, four elements are to be distinguished, the subject, the predicate, and their relation(of whatever sort it be) -- these form the object of belief -- and finally the psychic attitude in which our mind stands towards the proposition taken as a whole-and this is the belief itself. Note: Important - definition of proposition
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
In its inner nature, belief or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than anything else
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.5%:
In the first place, following the great intellectual law of economy, we simplify, unify, and identify as much as we possibly can. Whatever
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.6%:
In the last chapter we already invoked association to account for the effect of use in improving discrimination
COMPARED., 56.8%:
In this wise one may make a person taste or smell what one will, if one only makes sure that he shall conceive it beforehand as we wish, by saying to him: 'Doesn't that taste just like, etc.?' or 'Doesn't it smell just like, etc Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 3.7%:
Inhibition is a vera causa, of that there can be no doubt.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91%:
Inhibition is therefore not an occasional accident; it is an essential and unremitting element of our cerebral life
Chapter: THE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION., 1.8%:
Instead of one soul, phrenology gives us forty, each alone as enigmatic as the full aggregate psychic life can be
96.6%:
Instead, however, of correcting the principle by these cases, we correct the cases by the principle. We say that if the thing we named an M has not M's properties, then we were either mistaken in calling it an M, or mistaken about M's properties; or else that it is no longer M, but has changed. But we never say that it is an M without M's properties
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.4%:
It is a case of better remembering by better thinking.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.7%:
It is a general principle in Psychology that consciousness deserts all processes where it can no longer be of use. The tendency of consciousness to a minimum of complication is in fact a dominating law. The law of parsimony in logic is only its best known case
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.7%:
It is no more true to say that he locates that pain in his body, than to say that he locates his body in that pain
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.2%:
It is surely subjectivity and inferiority which are the notions latest acquired by the human mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80%:
It produces a strange emotional 'curdle' in our blood to see a process with which we are familiar deliberately taking an unwonted course. Anyone's heart would stop beating if he perceived his chair sliding unassisted across the floor.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84%:
It seems as if it were essentially meant to be a provisional arrangement, on the basis of which precise and determinate reactions might arise Note: Emotions were meant to be temporary
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
Judgment is 'transferring the idea of truth by association from one proposition to another that resembles it.'[38]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.4%:
Just as an artificially imitated sneeze lacks something of the reality, so the attempt to imitate an emotion in the absence of its normal instigating cause is apt to be rather 'hollow
95.1%:
Just as the organized arrangement subsisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and the motor nerves of the respiratory muscles not only makes possible a sneeze, but also, in the newly-born infant, implies sneezings to be hereafter performed
98.1%:
Life is one long struggle between conclusions based on abstract ways of conceiving cases, and opposite conclusions prompted by our instinctive perception of them as individual facts
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.5%:
Like most psychologists, however, he makes of his personal peculiarities a rule, and says that verbal thinking is normally and universally an exclusively motor representation
99.8%:
Look at the Jews and the Scots, with their miserable factions and sectarian disputes, their loyalties and patriotisms and exclusions, -- their annals now become a classic heritage, because men of genius took part and sang in them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.5%:
Lots of actions are done with heaviness all through, and not till they are completed does pleasure emerge, in the joy of being done with them. Like Hamlet we say of each such successive task, "A cursed spite, That ever I was born to set it right!"and then we often add to the original impulse that set us on, this additional one, that "we shall feel so glad when [p. 558] well through with it,
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.3%:
Man is known again as 'the talking animal'; and lan- [p. 356] guage is assuredly a capital distinction between man and brute. But it may readily be shown how this distinction merely shows from those we have pointed out, easy dissociation of a representation into its ingredients, and association by similarity.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.8%:
Meanwhile, if it be true, it is certainly also true that no two 'ideas'are ever exactly the same, which is the proposition we started to prove. The proposition is more important theoretically than it at first sight seems. For it makes it [p. 236] already impossible for us to follow obediently in the footprints of either the Lockian or the Herbartian school, schools which have had almost unlimited influence in Germany and among
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.1%:
Measured in this way, full half of the forgetting seems to occur within the first half-hour, whilst only four fifths is forgotten at the end of a month
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.1%:
Memory being thus altogether conditioned on brain-paths, its excellence in a given individual will depend partly on the number and partly on the persistence of these paths.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.1%:
Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.8%:
Moral and religious truths come 'home' to us far more on some occasions than on others. As Emerson says, "There is a difference between one and another hour of life in their authority and subsequent effect. Our faith comes in moments, ... yet there is a depth in those brief moments which constrains us to ascribe more reality to them than to all other experiences." The Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.4%:
No. 1, the psychologist, believes Nos. 2, 3, and 4, which together form his total object, to be realities, and reports them and their mutual relations as truly as he can without troubling himself with the puzzle of how he can report them at all
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 26.5%:
No; the easiest and most natural solution to me is to admit the claim made, i.e., that it is a decarnated intelligence who writes. But who? that is the question. The names of scholars and thinkers who once lived are affixed to the most ungrammatical and weakest of bosh. . .
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 49.2%:
Not that mere native tenacity will make a man great. It must be coupled with great passions and great intellect besides
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.1%:
Now the study of the phenomena of consciousness which we shall make throughout the rest of this book will show us that consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency.[5] Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of intellection, we find it always doing one thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible all the rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.2%:
On the other hand, the man of auditory type, like the visual, is exposed to serious dangers; for if he lose his auditory images, he is without resource and breaks down completely. "It is possible that persons with hallucinations of hearing, and in- [p. 61] dividuals afflicted with the mania that they are victims of persecution, may all belong to the auditory type; and that the predominance of a certain kind of imagination may predispose to a certain order of hallucinations, and perhaps of delirium.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.9%:
That peripheral sensory processes are ordinarily involved in imagination seems improbable; that they may sometimes be aroused from the cortex downwards cannot, however, be dogmatically denied
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
Reasoning is the perception that "whatever has any mark has that which it is a mark of"; in the concrete case the mark or middle term being always associated with each of the other terms and so serving as a link by which they are themselves indirectly associated together
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
Practically it amounts to simply referring the inquirer to the relations between facts or things, and to telling him that his thinking follows them. But as a matter of fact, his thinking only sometimes follows them, and these so-called 'transitions of reason' are far from being all alike reasonable
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76%:
Saturated with experience of a particular class of materials, an expert intuitively feels whether a newlyreported fact is probable or not, whether a proposed hypothesis is worthless or the reverse. He instinctively knows that, in a novel case, this and not that mill be the promising course of action
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
She cannot change the stars or the winds; but she does change our bodies to suit our thinking, and through their instrumentality changes much besides; so the great practical distinction between objects which we may will or unwill, and objects which we can merely believe or disbelieve, grows up, and is of course one of the most important distinctions in the world
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.6%:
So of Conceptions. No one of them develops into any other. But if two of them are thought at once, their relation may come to consciousness, and form matter for a third conception. Take 'thirteen' for example, which is said to develop into 'prime.' What really happens is that we compare the utterly changeless conception of thirteen with various other conceptions, those of the different multiples of two, three, four, five, and six, and ascertain that it differs from them all
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
Subjectively and phenomenally, the feeling of effort, absent from the former decisions, accompanies these
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21%:
Such different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list carefully, and pick out the one on which to stake his salvation. All other selves thereupon become unreal, but the fortunes of this self are real. Its failures are real failures, its triumphs real triumphs, carrying shame and gladness with them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.9%:
That instinctive acts should be easiest recognized in childhood would be a very natural effect of our principles of transitoriness, and
97.2%:
The essential condition for the formation of all these sciences is that we should have grown capable of apprehending series as such, and of distinguishing them as homogeneous or heterogeneous, and as possessing definite directions of what I have called 'increase
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.9%:
The first produces the original reflex interactional sign; the second (as Bleek has well shown) fixes it, stamps it, attends by multiplying the number of determinate specific signs which are requisite preliminary
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.9%:
The former constitute the so-called horopter, and their discovery has been attended with great mathematical difficulty
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.8%:
The great source of terror to infancy is solitude
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
The immense majority of human decisions are decisions without effort
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
The impulse to pray is a necessary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a Self of the social sort, it yet can find its only adequate Socius in an ideal world
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.1%:
The inference that two things differ because their concomitants, effects, names, kinds, or -- to put it generally -- their signs, differ, is of course susceptible of unlimited complication
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.9%:
The innervation which exists during the effort of attention is therefore probably a different one for each sense-organ
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.6%:
The reader will please observe its very radical import
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.8%:
The literature of the Self is large, but all its [p. 371] authors may be classed as radical or mitigated representatives of the three schools we have named, substantialism, associationism, or transcendentalism
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19%:
The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone. In a sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there were a thousand different ones beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this one from the rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
The pathological state opposed to this solidity and deepening has been called the questioning mania (Grübelsucht by the Germans). It is sometimes found as a substantive affection, paroxysmal or chronic, and consists in the inability to rest in any conception, and the need of having it confirmed and explained 'Why do I stand here where I stand ?' 'Why is a glass a glass, a chair a chair' 'How is it that men are only of the size they are? Why not as big as houses,' etc., etc. [4] [p. 285]
Chapter: THE SUMMATION OF STIMULI, 5.2%:
The sight of a dead prey will often not stimulate a beast to pursuit, but if the sight of movement be added to that of form, pursuit occurs. "Brücke noted that his brainless hen, which made no attempt to peck at the grain under her very eyes, began pecking if the grain were thrown on the ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound."
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.7%:
The soul would be thus a medium upon which (to use our earlier phraseology) the manifold brain-processes combine their effects
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.3%:
The truth must be admitted that thought works under conditions imposed ab extra
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.6%:
The whole body of the associationist psychology remains standing after you have translated 'ideas' into 'objects,' on the one hand, and 'brain-processes' on the other
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.5%:
Them we shall imagine with the animal warmth upon them, to them may possibly cling the aroma, the echo of the thinking taken in the act
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.4%:
There is not properly an Art of Observing. There may be rules for observing But these, like rules for inventing, are properly instructions for the preparation of one's own mind; for putting it into the state in which it will be most fitted to observe, or most likely to invent
96.4%:
These truths of comparison result in Classifications.
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.2%:
These words are meant to impeach the entire English psychology derived from Locke and Hume, and the entire German psychology derived from Herbart, so far as they both treat 'ideas' as separate subjective entities that come and go
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.1%:
These writers are bent on showing how the higher faculties of the mind are pure products of 'experience;' and experience is supposed to be of something simply given. Attention, implying a degree of reactive spontaneity, would seem to break through the circle of pure receptivity which constitutes 'experience,' and hence must not be spoken of under penalty of interfering with the smoothness of the tale.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.5%:
They are an art of strengthening the limbs, not an art of using them
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.2%:
They are momentary arrests, coupled with a peculiar feeling, or portions of the stream. But the arresting force, instead of being this peculiar feeling itself, may be nothing but the processes by which the collision is produced. The feeling of effort may be 'an accompaniment,' as Mr. Bradley says,' more or less superfluous,' and no more contribute to the result than the pain in a man's finger, when a hammer falls on it, contributes to the hammer's weight
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
This element, howsoever we define it, constitutes belief, and is the difference between Memory and Imagination
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
This phenomenon clearly proves that a present impression, with a relation of causation, may enliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or assent, according to the precedent definition of it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 70.2%:
This shrinkage and expansion of the absolute space-value of the optical sensation remains to my mind the most obscure part of the whole subject
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
Thus, the vital circumstance in belief is never to be contradicted -- never to lose prestige
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.6%:
To have a self that I can care for, nature must first present me with some object interesting enough to make me instinctively wish to appropriate it for its own sake, and out of it to manufacture one of those material, social, or spiritual selves
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.9%:
To state these conclusions is to refute their premise. Probably no defender of the doctrine of free-will could be induced to accept them, even to save the theorem with which they are inseparably wrapped up. Yet the dilemma cannot be avoided. Volitions are either caused or they are not. If they are not caused, an inexorable logic brings us to the absurdities just mentioned. If they are caused, the free-will doctrine is annihilated
COMPARED., 59.7%:
Under ordinary circumstances, the entire brain probably plays a part in draining any centre which may be ideationally active. When the drainage is reduced in any way it probably makes the active process more intense. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.3%:
Usually the vague perception that all the words we hear belong to the same language and to the same special vocabulary in that language, and that the grammatical sequence is familiar, is practically equivalent to an admission that what we hear is sense. But if an unusual foreign word be introduced, if the grammar trip, or if a term from an incongruous vocabulary suddenly appear, such as 'rat-trap' or 'plumber's bill' in a philosophical discourse, the sentence detonates, as it were, we receive a shock from the incongruity, and the drowsy assent is gone
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.6%:
When one knows that he has no power, one's desire of a thing is called a wish and not a will. The sense of impotence inhibits the volition. Only by abstracting from the thought of the impossibility am I able energetically to imagine strongly the table sliding over the floor
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
We mutilate the fulness of S's reality. Every reality has an infinity of aspects or properties
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.7%:
We saw in effect in the appropriate chapter, how in the last resort belief means only a peculiar sort of occupancy of the mind, and relation to the self felt in the thing believed; and we know in the case of many beliefs how constant an effort of the attention is required to keep them in this situation and protect them from displacement by contradictory ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.4%:
Well, Kant's way of describing the facts is mythological
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.9%:
Well, from infancy to old age, this assemblage of feelings, most constant of all, is yet a prey to slow mutation
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.5%:
When conscious of our head we tend to grow unconscious of our feet, and there enters thus an element of time-succession into our perception of ourselves which transforms the latter from an act of intuition to one of construction
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.3%:
When we are learning to walk, to ride, to swim, skate, fence, write, play, or sing, we interrupt ourselves at every step by unnecessary movements and false notes. When we are proficients, on the contrary, the results not only follow with the very minimum of muscular action requisite to bring them forth, they also follow from a single instantaneous 'cue.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.7%:
Where, on the other hand, the prevalence of the thought is accompanied by the phenomenon of effort, the case is much less clear
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.2%:
Whistling to keep up courage is no mere figure of speech
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.4%:
Why not say that just as the spinal cord is a machine with few reflexes, so the hemispheres are a machine with many, and that that is all the difference
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.5%:
Why, from Plato and Aristotle downwards, philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular, and in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the more adorable things, and that the things of worth are all concretes and singulars
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.7%:
Words serve this purpose, gestures serve it, stones, straws, chalk-marks, anything will do. As soon as anyone of these things stands for the idea, the latter seems to be more real
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.8%:
Yes! in every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of certain relations being right or not, and there is the emotional flush and thrill consequent thereupon. And these are two things, not one. In the former of them it is that experts and masters are at home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions that they may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in their fulness by crétins and philistines in whom the critical judgment is at its lowest ebb
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.5%:
certain routine methods. In striving to recall a thought, for example, we may of set purpose run through the successive classes of circumstances with which it may [p. 590] possibly have been connected, trusting that when the right member of the class has turned up it will help the thought's revival
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
connected with him by a shorter train of consequences than any of those from which we learn the reality of his [p. 303] existence
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.1%:
deepest paths are formed from the most drainable to the most draining cells
96.5%:
in other words, that whatever has an attribute has all the attributes of that attribute; or more briefly still, that whatever is of a kind is of that kind's kind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.2%:
in our movements, such as that of speech, for example, in some of us it is the tactile, in others the acoustic, Effectsbild, or memory-image, which seems most concerned in starting the articulation
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.4%:
instinctive. A boy can no more help running after another boy who runs provokingly near him, than a kitten can help running after a rolling ball.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.9%:
so the sense of the whither, the fore-taste of the terminus, must be due to the waxing excitement of tracts or processes which, a moment hence, will be the cerebral correlatives of some thing which a moment hence will be vividly present to the thought
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.7%:
so, in thought, we must admit that those portions of the brain that have just been maximally excited retain a kind of soreness which is a condition of our present consciousness, a codeterminant of how and what we now shall feel
95.1%:
the gradually-increasing intelligence displayed throughout childhood and youth is more attributable to the completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual experiences -- a truth proved by the fact that in adult life there is sometimes displayed a high endowment of some faculty which, during education, was never brought into play.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.7%:
the moral and intellectual cognitions hardly ever do exist thus unaccompanied. The bodily sounding-board is at work, as careful introspection will show, far more than we usually suppose
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.2%:
though Berkeley's view appears to be largely applicable to such general ideas as are formed after language has been acquired, and to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that general ideas of sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and may exist independently of language
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
whereas here both alternatives are steadily held in view, and in the very act of murdering the vanquished possibility the chooser realizes how much in that instant he is making himself lose. It is deliberately driving a thorn into one's flesh; and the sense of inward effort with which the act is accompanied is an element which sets the fourth type of decision in strong contrast with the previous three varieties, and makes of it an altogether peculiar sort of mental phenomenon
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.9%:
whilst the slowness of his utterance shows how difficult, under such conditions, the labor of thinking must be
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20%:
yet in every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. We are all at once assimilated to the tramps and poor devils whom we so despise, and at the same time removed farther than ever away from the happy sons of earth who lord it over land and sea and men in the full-blown lustihood that wealth and power can give, and before whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish first principles, we cannot escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.2%:
Charlemagne, a Luther, a Leibnitz, a Walter Scott, any example, in short, of your quarto or folio editions of mankind, must needs have amazing retentiveness of the purely physiological sort. Men without this retentiveness may excel in the quality of their work at this point or at that, but will never do such mighty sums of it, or be influential contemporaneously on such a scale
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 93.1%:
Children under three or four, and insane persons, especially idiots, are unusually hard to hypnotize. This seems due to the impossibility of getting them to focus their attention continuously on the idea of the coming trance
97.2%:
Classification, logic, and mathematics all result, then, from the mere play of the mind comparing its conceptions, no matter whence the latter may have come
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.1%:
Close your eyes and simply wait to hear somebody tell you that a minute has elapsed. The full length of your leisure with it seems incredible. You engulf yourself into its bowels as into those of that interminable first week of an ocean voyage, and find yourself wondering that history can have overcome many such periods in its course. All because you attend so closely to the mere feeling of the time per se, and because your attention to that is susceptible of such fine-grained successive subdivision
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.4%:
Clothing, where not necessitated by cold, is nothing but a sort of attempt to re-model the human body itself -- an attempt still better shown in the various tattooings, tooth-filings, scarrings, and other mutilations that are practised by savage tribes.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.9%:
Coleridge: "The true practical general law of association is this: that whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more vivid or distinct than the rest will determine the mind to recall these, in preference to others equally linked together by the common condition of contemporaeity or of contiguity. But the will itself, by confining and intensifying the attention, may arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object whatsoever."
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.9%:
Collective secrecy, mystery, enters into the emotional interest of many games, and is one of the elements of the importance men attach to freemasonries of various sorts, being delightful apart from any end
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.7%:
Colors, sounds, smells, are just as much entangled with other matter as are more formal elements of experience, such as extension, intensity, effort, pleasure, difference, likeness, harmony, badness, strength, and even consciousness itself. All are embedded in one world. But by the fluctuations and permutations of which we have spoken, we come to form a pretty good notion of the direction in which each element differs from the rest, and so we frame the notion of it as a terminus, and continue to mean it as an individual thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.3%:
Common-sense and common psychology express this by saying that the mental state is composed of distinct fractional parts, one of which Is sensation, the other conception. We, however, who believe every mental state to be an integral thing (p. 276) cannot talk thus, but must speak of the degree of sensational or intellectual character, or function, of the mental state
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.1%:
Comparative observations, to be definite, must usually be made to test some pre-existing hypothesis ; and the only thing then is to use as much sagacity as you possess, and to be as candid as you can.
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.6%:
Compare the form in which facts appear in a text-book of physics, as logically subordinated laws, with that in which we naturally make their acquaintance. The conceptual scheme is a sort of sieve in which we try to gather up the world's contents. Most facts and relations fall through its meshes, being either too subtle or insignificant to be fixed in any conception
COMPARED., 59.4%:
Compare the historical reviews by K. Lange: Ueber Apperception (Plauen, 1879 Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.3%:
Compare this statement also: "The first question to a peasant seldom proves more than a flapper to rouse the torpid adjustments of his ears. The invariable answer of a Scottish peasant is, 'What's your wull?'-that of the English, a vacant stare. A second and even a third question may be required to elicit an answer.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.6%:
Consciousness, as we saw in an earlier chapter (p. 214) cannot properly be said to inhabit any place. It has dynamic relations with the brain, and cognitive relations with everything and anything
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.3%:
Consciousness, for example, is only intense when nerve-processes are hesitant
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.8%:
Consciousness, however small, is an illegitimate birth in any philosophy that starts without it, and yet professes to explain all facts by continuous evolution. If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very origin of things
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.5%:
Consider the enormous annual sale of revolvers to persons, not one in a thousands of whom has any serious intention of using them, but of whom each one has his carnivorous selfconsciousness agreeably tickled by the notion, as he clutches the handle of his weapon, that he will be rather a dangerous customer to meet. See
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.7%:
Experience is remoulding us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.6%:
Fear is a reaction aroused by the same objects that arouse ferocity. The antagonism of the two is an interesting study in instinctive dynamics. We both fear, and wish to kill, anything that may kill us; and the question which of the two impulses we shall follow is usually decided by some one of those collateral circumstances of the particular case
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
Fear is a transfer of the bodily hurt associated by experience with the thing feared, to the thought of the thing, with the precise features of the hurt left out. Thus we fear a dog without distinctly imagining his bite.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.3%:
Fechner himself indeed was a German Gelehrter of the ideal type, at once simple and shrewd, a mystic and an experimentalist, homely and daring, and as loyal to facts as to his theories. But it would be terrible if even such a dear old man as this could saddle our Science forever with his patient whimsies, and, in a world so full of more nutritious objects of attention, compel all future students to plough through the difficulties, not only of his own works, but of the still drier ones written in his refutation. Those
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.2%:
Few writers have admitted that we cognize relations through feeling
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67%:
For analogous reasons the upper and lower halves of the letter S, or of the figure 8, hardly seem to differ. But when turned upside down, as [upside-down "S" and "8"] the upper half looks much the larger. [115] [p. 265]
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.9%:
For how would it be if the Thought, the present judging Thought, instead of being in any way substantially or transcendentally identical with the former owner of the past self, merely inherited his 'title,' and thus stood as his legal representative now?
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
For the only summary description of these infinite possibilities of transition, is that they are all acts of reason, and that the mind proceeds from one object to another by some rational path of connection
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.6%:
For the sake of the pleasure, the parent discovers the necessity of nourishing the subject of it, and comes to regard the ministering function as a part or condition of the delight
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
For there are various categories both of illusion and of reality, and alongside of the world of absolute error (i.e., error confined to single individuals) but still within the world of absolute reality (i.e., reality believed by the complete philosopher) there is the world of collective error, there are the worlds of abstract reality, of relative or practical reality, of ideal relations, and there is the supernatural world.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.5%:
For these obscure matters consult C. Du Prel: The Philosophy of Mysticism, chap. III. § 1. [35] Ideale Fragen (1878). p. 219 (Essay, 'Zeit und Weile'). [36] Revue Philosophique, vol. III. p. 496.
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
For this education the hemispheres do not need [p.77] to be tabuloe rasoe at first, as the Meynert scheme would have them; and so far from their being educated by the lower centres exclusively, they educate themselves
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.9%:
For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.6%:
For us it is an unpardonable logical sin, when talking of a thought's knowledge (either of an object or of itself), to change the terms without warning, and, substituting the psychologist's knowledge therefor, [sic] still make as if we were continuing to talk of the same thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.9%:
Furnishing parallel cases is the necessary first step towards abstracting the reason imbedded in them all
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.9%:
Furthermore, Attention may be either Passive, reflex, non-voluntary, effortless; or f) Active and voluntary. Voluntary attention is always derived; we never make an effort to attend to an object except for the sake of some remote interest which the effort will serve. But both sensorial and intellectual attention may be either passive or voluntary.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.6%:
Galton, using a very simple apparatus, found that the sight of an unforeseen word would awaken an associated 'idea' in about 5/6 of a second
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.9%:
General concepts, therefore, we have, properly speaking, none; we have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts of the concrete idea: and by that exclusive attention we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts as subsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, exactly as if we were able to conceive them separately from the rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.6%:
Genius, then , as has been already said, is identical with the possession of similar association to an extreme degree . Professor Bain says: "This I count the leading fact of genius. I consider it quite impossible to afford any explanation of intellectual originality except on the supposition of unusual energy on this point." Alike in the arts, in literature, in practical affairs, and in science, association by similarity is the prime condition of success
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.4%:
Geniuses are commonly believed to excel other men in their power of sustained attention.[23] In most of them, it is to be feared, the so-called 'power' is of the passive sort. Their ideas coruscate, every subject branches infinitely before their fertile minds, and so for hours they may be rapt. But it is their genius making them attentive, not their attention making geniuses of them. And, when we come down to the root of the matter, we see that they differ from ordinary men less in the character of their attention than in the nature of the objects upon which it is successively bestowed. In the genius, these form a concatenated series, suggesting [p. 424] each other mutually by some rational law. Therefore we call the attention 'sustained' and the topic of meditation for hours 'the same.' In the common man the series is for the most part incoherent, the objects have no rational bond, and we call the attention wandering and unfixed.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8%:
Goethe says to a man who consulted him about an enterprise but mistrusted his own powers: "Ach! you need only blow on your hands!" And the remark illustrates the effect on Goethe's spirits of his own habitually successful career. Prof
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.9%:
Great thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of schemes of relation between terms, which hardly even as verbal images enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process
95.1%:
Doubtless, experiences received by the individual furnish the concrete materials for all thought. Doubtless, the organized and semiorganized arrangements existing among the cerebral nerves can give no knowledge until there has been a presentation of the external relations to which they correspond. And doubtless the child's daily observations and reasonings aid the formation of those involved nervous connections that are in process of spontaneous evolution
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.2%:
Dr. Ebbinghaus has found that syllables originally separated by as many as seven intermediaries still reveal, by the increased rapidity with which they are learned in order, the strength of the tie that the original learning established between them, over the heads, so to speak, of all the rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.6%:
Admitting, then, that this attitude is a state of consciousness sui generis, about which nothing more can be said in the way of internal analysis
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.6%:
Again, if anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. Such an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. The only [p.132] thing which influences matter is the position of surrounding matter or the motion of surrounding matter
COMPARED., 58.6%:
Again, whenever the associative processes are reduced and impeded by the approach of unconsciousness, as in falling asleep, or growing faint, or becoming narcotized, we find a concomitant increase in the intensity of whatever partial consciousness may survive Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.3%:
Against this it is to be said that many actors who perfectly mimic the outward appearances of emotion in face, gait, and voice declare that they feel no emotion at all
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.8%:
Algebra cannot exist without values, nor Thought without Feelings. The operations are so many blank forms till the values are assigned. Words are vacant sounds, ideas are blank forms, unless they symbolize images and sensations which are their values.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
All Goods are disguised by the vulgarity of their concomitants, in this work-a-day world; but woe to him who can only recognize them when he thinks them in their pure and abstract form! The habit of excessive novel-reading and theatre-going will produce true monsters in this line.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.9%:
All cells are motor; we simply call those of the Rolandic region, those nearest the mouth of the funnel, the motor cells par excellence.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.3%:
EVERYONE knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended by the mind, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus the mental state or function of cognizing reality
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
Each of these persons singles out the particular side of the entire man which has a bearing on his concerns, and not till this side is distinctly and separately conceived can the proper practical conclusions for that reasoner be drawn ; and when they are drawn the man's other attributes may be ignored
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.6%:
Each of us when he awakens says, Here's the same old self again, just as he says, Here's the same old bed, the same old room, the same old world.
COMPARED., 57.5%:
Each wished to know what question the others had received; and behold, he had given the same question to each. It ran thus: "What being destroys what it has itself brought forth? "To this the naturalist had answered, 'natural force'; the soldier, 'war'; the philologist, 'Kronos'; the publicist, 'revolution'; the farmer, 'a boar'. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
COMPARED., 57.2%:
All consciousness seems to depend on a certain slowness of the process in the cortical cells. The rapider currents are, the less feeling they seem to awaken. If a region A, then, be so connected with another region B that every current which enters A immediately drains off into B, we shall not be very strongly conscious of the sort of object that A can make us feel. If B, on the contrary, has no such copious channel of discharge, the excitement will linger there longer ere it diffuses itself elsewhere, and our consciousness of the sort of object that B makes us feel will be strong Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
97.4%:
All general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our abstract ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them, there we have general knowledge; and by putting the names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronounce general truths. . . . What
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.3%:
All languages whatever, even the most barbarous, as far as hath yet appeared, are of a regular and analogical make. The consequence is that similar relations in things will be expressed similarly; that is, by similar inflections, derivations, compositions, arrangement of words, or juxtaposition of particles, according to the genius or grammatical form of the particular tongue
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
All objects are well-springs of properties, which are only little by little developed to our knowledge, and it is truly said that to know one thing thoroughly would be to know the whole universe
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.8%:
All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body, and clothe more or less distant objects, furniture, walls, houses, trees, the sky, and the rest. This is why, when we afterwards reflect on them, we cease to attribute them to ourselves; they are alienated and detached from us, so far as to appear different from us. Projected from the nervous surface in which we localize the majority of the others, the tie which connected them to the others and to ourselves is undone. . . . Thus, all our sensations are wrongly situated, and the red color is no more extended on the arm-chair than the sensation of tingling is situated at my fingers' ends. They are all situated in the sensory centres of the encephalon
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
All our thoughts are determined, in great measure, by this law of least effort, as it is found exemplified in our activity of attention
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
All progress in the social Self is the substitution of higher tribunals for lower; this ideal tribunal is the highest; and most men, either continually or occasionally, carry a reference to it in their breast
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.3%:
All recollected times undergo, accordingly, what M. Ribot calls foreshortening; and this foreshortening is due to the omission of an enormous number of the facts which filled them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.4%:
All simple active games are attempts to gain the excitement yielded by certain primitive instincts, through feigning that the occasions for their exercise are there. They involve imitation, hunting, fighting, rivalry, acquisitiveness, and construction, combined in various ways; their special rules are habits, discovered by accident, selected by intelligence, and propagated by tradition; but unless they were founded in automatic impulses, games would lose most of their zest. The Note: Important
97.2%:
All skipping of intermediaries and transfer of relations occurs within homogeneous series. But not all homogeneous series allow of intermediaries being skipped and relations transferred
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33%:
All that a state of mind need do, in order to take cognizance of a reality, intend it, or be 'about' it, is to lead to a remoter state of mind which either acts upon the reality or resembles it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
All that the mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and consents to its existence, espouses it, says 'it shall be my reality.' It turns to it, in short, in the interested active emotional way. The rest is done by nature, which in some cases makes the objects real which we think of in this [p. 321] manner, and in other cases does not
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.3%:
All that the will does is to emphasize and linger over those which seem pertinent, and ignore the rest. Through this hovering of the attention in the neighborhood of the desired object, the accumulation of associates becomes so great that the combined tensions of their neural processes break through the bar, and the nervous wave pours into the tract which has so long been awaiting its advent
Chapter: CONCLUSION., 4.4%:
All the centres, in all animals, whilst they are in one aspect mechanisms, probably are, or at least once were, organs of consciousness in another, although the consciousness is doubtless much more developed in the hemispheres than it is anywhere else
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.7%:
All the rest, 'substantive' and separately intelligible as it may potentially be, actually serves only as so much transitive material. It is internodal consciousness, giving us the sense of continuity, but having no significance apart from its mere gap-filling function. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.6%:
All the while, however, as we look at them, we hold fast to the perception of their 'real' shape, by mentally combining the pictures momentarily received with the notion of peculiar positions in space. It is not the cross and ring pure and simple which we perceive, but the cross so held, the ring so held
COMPARED., 59.7%:
All the works on Insanity treat of them. Dr. W. W. Ireland's works, 'The Blot upon the Brain' (1886); 'Through the Ivory Gate' (1890) have much information on the subject. Gurney Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
All these lesser motives are appealed to, and the one ultimate motive is neglected. The ultimate motive with the man of every-day life is the will to have an external world. Whatever consciousness contains, reason will persist in spontaneously adding the thought: 'But there shall be something beyond this
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.5%:
All these pathological facts are showing us that the sphere of possible recollection may be wider than we think, and that in certain matters apparent oblivion is no proof against possible recall under other conditions Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.3%:
All things, then, so far as they are intelligible at all, are so through combination with pure consciousness of Self
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.9%:
All this comes from Mr. Fiske's not distinguishing between the possibles which really tempt a man and those which tempt him not at all. Free-will, like psychology, deals with the former possibles exclusively
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
All this suppression of the secondary leaves the field clear , -- for higher heights, should they choose to come. But even if they never came, what thoughts there were would still manifest the aristocratic type and wear the well-bred form
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
All ways of conceiving a concrete fact, if they are true ways at all, are equally true ways. There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing . The
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.6%:
Already in Chapter VI (see pp. 163 ff.) we discussed whether certain states of mind were 'unconscious,' or whether they were not rather states to which no attention had been paid, and of whose passage recollection could afterwards find no vestiges
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.4%:
An idea neither is what it knows, nor knows what it is; nor will swarms of copies of the same 'idea,' recurring in stereotyped form, or 'by the irresistible laws of association formed into one idea,' ever be the same thing as a thought of 'all the possible members' of a class. We must mean that by an altogether special bit of consciousness ad hoc
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.4%:
An ingenious friend of mine was long puzzled to know why each day of the week had such a characteristic physiognomy to him. That of Sunday was soon noticed to be due to the cessation of the city's rumbling, and the sound of people's feet shuffling on the sidewalk; of Monday, to come from the clothes drying in the yard and casting a white reflection on the ceiling; of Tuesday, to a cause which I forget; and I think my friend did not get beyond Wednesday. Probably each hour in the day has for most of us some outer or inner sign associated with it as closely as these signs with the days of the week. It
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.1%:
An organ swayed by slight impressions is an organ whose natural state is one of unstable equilibrium
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.4%:
And everybody praised the duke Who this great fight did win.''But what good came of it at last?'Quoth little Peterkin. Why, that I cannot tell, said he, 'But 'twas a famous victory!'"
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.8%:
And few of us have not on some occasion got up to repeat the performance, less because they believed in the reality of its omission than because only so could they banish the worrying doubt and get to sleep
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.2%:
And if we wish to feel that idiosyncrasy we must reproduce the thought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the [p. 276] whole sentence bathed in that original halo of obscure relations, which, like an horizon, then spread about its meaning. Our psychological duty is to cling as closely as possible to the actual constitution of the thought we are studying
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
And it has furthermore challenged the race of philosophers to banish something of the mystery by formulating the process in simpler terms
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.3%:
And now we can see why it is that what is called sustained attention is the easier, the richer in acquisitions and the fresher and more original the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.4%:
And that particular way of lodging it will be the better, which, in addition to describing the facts naturally, makes the 'mystery of synthesis' least hard to understand.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.7%:
And the dryness of it, the paleness, the absence of all glow, as it may exist in a thoroughly expert critic's mind, not only shows us what an altogether different thing it is from the 'coarser' emotions we considered first, but makes us suspect that almost the entire difference lies in the fact that the bodily sounding-board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 49.9%:
And the miracle must have an Agent. And the Agent must be a Subject or Ego 'out of time,' --
99%:
And the more sincerely one seeks to trace the actual course of psychogenesis, the steps by which as a race we may have come by the peculiar mental attributes which we possess, the more clearly one perceives "the slowly gathering twilight close in utter night."
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.6%:
And this idea of my having formerly had those ideas is a very complicated idea; including the idea of myself of the present moment remembering, and that of myself of the past moment conceiving; and the whole series of the states of consciousness, which intervened between myself remembering, and myself conceiving."[12]
Chapter: GENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES., 1.4%:
And those fishes which, like our cunners and sculpins, are no sooner thrown back from the hook into the water, than they automatically seize the hook again, would soon expiate the degradation of their intelligence by the extinction of their type, did not their exaggerated fecundity atone for their imprudence
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 34.6%:
And when the omitted things are discovered and the unnoticed differences laid bare, it is not that the old thoughts split up, but that new thoughts supersede them, which make new judgments about the same objective world
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.5%:
And, now, to prove the second point: Why are the couplings, consequences, and implications of extracts more [p. 342] evident and obvious than those of entire phenomena? For two reasons. First, the extracted characters are more general than the concretes, and the connections they may have are, therefore, more familiar to us, having been more often met in our experience
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.5%:
Another of the great capacities in which man has been said to differ fundamentally from the animal is that of pos- [p. 359] sessing self-consciousness or reflective knowledge of himself as a thinker. But this capacity also flows from our criterion, for (without going into the matter very deeply) we may say that the brute never reflects on himself as a thinker, because he has never clearly dissociated, in the full concrete act of thought, the element of the thing thought of and the operation by which he thinks it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to possess consciousness:
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.2%:
Any philosophy which annihilates the validity of the reference by explaining away its objects or translating them into terms of no emotional pertinency leaves the mind with little to care or act for. This is the opposite condition from that of nightmare, but when acutely brought home to consciousness it produces a kindred horror. In nightmare we have motives to act, hut no power: here we have powers, but no motives
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.2%:
Any state of mind which is shut up to its own moment and fails to become an object for succeeding states of mind, is as if it belonged to another stream of thought. Or rather, it belongs only physically, not intellectually, to its own stream, forming a bridge from one segment of it to another, but not being appropriated inwardly by later segments or appearing as part of the empirical self,
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.2%:
As I do not breathe for the pleasure of the breathing, but simply find that I am breathing, so I do not write for the pleasure of the writing, but simply because I have once begun, and being in a state of intellectual excitement which keeps venting itself in that way, find that I am writing still
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.9%:
As Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not only motion but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up into its consciousness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls had held, and realized it as its own
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.5%:
As Rochefoucauld says, there is something in the misfortunes of our very friends that does not altogether displease us; and an apostle of peace will feel a certain vicious thrill run through him, and enjoy a vicarious brutality, as he turns to the column in his newspaper at the top of which 'Shocking Atrocity' stands printed in large capitals
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.2%:
As a final practical maxim, relative to these habits of the will, we may, then, offer something like this: Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every day. That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do every day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. Asceticism
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.3%:
As a rule we believe as much as we can. We would believe everything if we only could
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.9%:
As a rule, associationist writers keep talking about 'the mind' and about what 'we' do; and so, smuggling in surreptitiously what they ought avowedly to have postulated in the form of a present 'judging Thought,' they either trade upon their reader's lack of discernment or are undiscerning themselves.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.3%:
As a rule, no sensible qualities are discriminated without a motive. [101] And those that later we learn to discriminate were originally felt confused. As well pretend that a voice, or an odor, which we have learned to pick out, is no sensation now
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.2%:
As a rule, things only benefit or harm us by coming into direct contact with our skin: sight is only a sort of anticipatory touch; the letter is, in Mr.Spencer's phrase, the 'mother-tongue of thought,' and the handmaid's idiom must be translated into the language of the mistress before it can speak clearly to the mind Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
As a, rule, the success with which a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is proportional to several qualities which it must possess
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.3%:
As emotions are described in novels, they interest us, for we are made to share them. We have grown acquainted with the concrete objects and emergencies which call them forth, and any knowing touch of introspection which may grace the page meets with a quick and feeling response. Confessedly literary works of aphoristic philosophy also flash lights into our emotional life, and give us a fitful delight
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 3.9%:
As far as the cortex itself goes, since one of the purposes for which it actually exists is the production of new paths,[80] the only question before us is: Is the formation of these particular 'vicarious' paths too much to expect of its plastic powers
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
As far as we ourselves go, the atoms are worth more for purposes of deduction, the consciousness for purposes of inspiration. We may fairly write the Universe in either way, thus: ATOMSproducing- consciousness; or CONSCIOUSNESS-produced-by-atoms.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
Against this impulse we have the dread of the irrevocable, which often engenders a type of character incapable of prompt and vigorous resolve, except perhaps when surprised into sudden activity
97.4%:
All that these sciences make us sure of is, that if these things are anywhere to be found, the eternal verities will obtain of them
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.2%:
All the intellectual value for us of a state of mind depends on our after-memory of it
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61.7%:
And it can feel at once white and black, whilst the ear can in nowise so feel sound and silence
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68%:
And so difficult is the subject, and so magically do catch-words work on the popular-scientist ear, that most likely, had he written 'physiological' instead of 'nativistic,' and 'spiritualistic' instead of 'empiristic' (which synonyms Hering suggests), numbers of his present empirical evolutionary followers would fail to find in his teaching anything worthy of praise. But since he wrote otherwise, they hurrah for him as a sort of second Locke, dealing another death-blow at the old bugaboo of 'innate ideas.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.4%:
And so it is with the objects with which our thinking is concerned. With some persons each note of a melody, heard but once, will accurately revive in its proper sequence
98.9%:
As a matter of fact, it quickly reaches a maximum, and then we hear no more of it, which is what happens always when an idiosyncrasy is exposed to the effects of miscellaneous intermarriage
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.4%:
As a mere subjective phenomenon the judgment presents no difficulty or mystery peculiar to itself. It belongs to the great class of judgments of sameness; and there is nothing more remarkable in making a judgment of sameness in the first person than in the second or the third. The intellectual operations seem essentially alike, whether I say 'I am the same,' or whether I say 'the pen is the same, as yesterday.
99.7%:
As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language: so in perusing the volume of nature methinks it is beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator Note: Opposition to scientific laws from Berkeley
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.1%:
As the Germans say, we nachdenken, or think towards a certain end
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.2%:
Both point to an object as the cause of the present feeling
97.9%:
But all around these incipient successes (as all around the molecular world, so soon as we add to it as its 'effects' those illusory 'things' of common-sense which we had to butcher for its sake), there still spreads a vast field of irrationalized fact whose items simply are together, and from one to another of which we can pass by no ideally 'rational' way
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.4%:
But how can the similarity strike him? Not without the juxtaposition of the similars (in virtue of the law we have laid down (p. 506), that in order to be segregated an experience must be repeated with varying concomitants) -- not unless the 'yelp' of the dog at the moment it occurs recalls to him his 'beg,' by the delicate bond of their subtle similarity of use -- not till then can this thought hash through his mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.3%:
But humor has often been defined as the recognition of identities in things different. When the man in Coriolanus says of that hero that "there is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger," both the invention of the phrase and its enjoyment by the hearer depend on a peculiarly perplexing power to associate ideas by similarity
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.9%:
But it operates of itself in highlygifted minds without any deliberation, spontaneously collecting analogous instances, uniting in a moment whet in nature the whole breadth of space and time keeps separate, and so permitting a, perception of identical points in the midst of different circumstances, which minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity could never begin to attain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.8%:
But just as our courage is so often a reflex of another's courage, so our faith is apt to be, as Mas Müller somewhere says, a faith in some one else's faith. We draw new life from the heroic example
95.1%:
But saying this is quite a different thing from saying that its intelligence is wholly produced by its experiences. That is an utterly inadmissible doctrine -- a doctrine which makes the presence of a brain meaningless -- a doctrine which makes idiotcy [sic] unaccountable.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.4%:
But such a revival is obviously not a memory, whatever else it may be; it is simply a duplicate, a second event, having absolutely no connection with the first event except that it happens to resemble it
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.5%:
But such conditions of suicidal frenzy are pathological in their nature and run dead against everything that is regular in the life of the Self in man.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.6%:
But suppose meat instead of a, glove, earth instead of a carpet, hunger-pangs instead of a fresh supper a few hours later, and it is easy to see how this dog might have got into a habit of burying superfluous food, which might have lasted all his life
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41%:
But the modus operandi of this active part is the same, be it large or be it small. The items constituting the coming object waken in every instance because their nerve-tracts once were excited continuously with those of the going object or its operative part. This ultimate physiological law of habit among the neural elements is what runs the train
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.6%:
But the more philosophic student, whose business it is to discover difficulties quite as much as to get rid of them, will reflect that it is conceivable that the partial factors might fuse into a larger space, and yet not each be located within it any more than a voice is located in a chorus
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.6%:
But the most notorious and important case of the mental combination of auditory with optical impressions originally experienced together is furnished by language. The child is offered a new and delicious fruit and is at the same time told that it is called a 'fig
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.4%:
But the whole historic doctrine of psychological association is tainted with one huge error -- that of the construction of our thoughts out of the compounding of themselves together of immutable and incessantly recurring 'simple ideas.
95.2%:
But these predetermined internal relations, though independent of the experiences of the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they have been determined by the experiences of preceding organisms Note: Is this where he's going to have a problem
96%:
But this agreeableness of the merely habitual is felt to be a mere ape and counterfeit of real inward fitness; and one sign of intelligence is never to mistake the one for the other
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 50.1%:
Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations would be like bridges without piers. Systems about fact must plunge themselves into sensation as bridges plunge their piers into the rock
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.6%:
Concords of sounds, of colors, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself, and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from the parts below the brain
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6%:
Dr. Lombard's explanation is that "in internal recitation an additional portion of energy, which in recitation aloud, was converted into nervous and muscular force, now appears as heat."[33] I should suggest rather, if we must have a theory, that the surplus of heat in recitation to one's self is due to inhibitory processes which are absent when we recite aloud. In the chapter on the Will we shall see that the simple central process is to speak when we think; to think silently involves a check in addition
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.9%:
Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it 'warm,' in the way we have described, greets it, saying: "Thou art mine, and part of the same self with me."
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.5%:
Each sign is drowned in its import, and never awakens other signs and other imports in juxtaposition. The rat-hunt idea is too absorbingly interesting in itself to be interrupted by anything so uncontiguous to it as the idea of the 'beg for food,' or of 'the door-open yelp,' nor in their turn do these awaken the rat-hunt idea
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.5%:
Empty time is most strongly perceived when it comes as a pause in music or in speech. Suppose a preacher in the pulpit, a professor at his desk, to stick still in the midst of his discourse; or let a composer (as is sometimes purposely done) make all his instruments stop at once; we await every instant the resumption of the performance, and, in this awaiting, perceive, more than in any other possible way, the empty time
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.3%:
Even should we admit that we cognize triangles in space because of our immediate cognition of the triangular shape of our excited group of nerve-tips, the matter would hardly be more transparent, for the mystery would still remain, why are we so much better cognizant of triangles on our finger-tips than on the nerve-tips of our back, on our eye than on our ear, and on any of these parts than in our brain? Thos
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.5%:
Even such texts as Job's, "Though He slay me yet will I trust Him," or Marcus Aurelius's, "If gods hate me and my children, there is a reason for it," can least of all be cited to prove the contrary. For beyond all doubt Job revelled in the thought of Jehovah's recognition of the worship after the slaying should have been done; and the Roman emperor felt sure the Absolute Reason would not be all indifferent to his acquiescence in the gods' dislike
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.7%:
Every particular activity of the organ makes it more suited to a repetition of the same; ever slighter touches are required to make the repetition occur.
COMPARED., 57.5%:
Every question is a hole-drilling experiment, and the answer is an opening through which one sees into our interiors.'Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
95.8%:
Every scientific conception is in the first instance a 'spontaneous variation' in some one's brain.[8] For one that proves useful and applicable there are a thousand that perish through their worthlessness. Their genesis is strictly akin to that of the flashes of poetry and sallies of wit to which the instable brain-paths equally give rise. But whereas the poetry and wit (like the science of the ancients) are their 'own excuse for being,' and have to run the gauntlet of no farther test, the 'scientific' conceptions must prove their worth by being 'verified
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.7%:
Everybody probably has isolated glimpses of certain hours of his nursery life, the position in which he stood or sat, the light of the room, what his father or mother said, etc. These moments so oddly selected for immunity from the tooth of time probably owe their good fortune to historical peculiarities which it is now impossible to trace
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.1%:
Everyone knows how difficult a thing it is not to covet whatever pleasing thing we see, and how the sweetness of the thing often is as gall to us so long as it is another's
96.8%:
As regards the mathematical judgments, they are all 'rational propositions' in the sense defined on p. 644, for they express results of comparison and nothing more.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.1%:
As such I ascribe a reality to the Ego - to my own mind - different from that real existence as a Permanent Possibility, which is the only reality I acknowledge in Matter
96.9%:
For all things, whatever other sensations they may give us, give us at any rate numbersensations
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 3.9%:
For, in the first place, the brain is essentially a place of currents, which run in organized paths. Loss of function can only mean one of two things, either that a current can no longer run in, or that if it runs in, it can no longer run out, by its old path
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.6%:
From the day of our birth we have sought every hour of our lives to correct the apparent form of things, and trans- [p. 260] it into the real form by keeping note of the way they are placed or held. In no other class of sensations does this incessant correction occur. What wonder, then, that the notion 'so placed' should invincibly exert its habitual corrective effect, even when the object with which it combines is only an after-image, and make us perceive the latter under a changed but more 'real' form? The
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.7%:
As the Creator is supposed to have made Adam with a navel -- sign of a birth which never occurred -- so He might instantaneously make a man with a brain in which were processes just like the 'fading' ones of an ordinary brain. The first real stimulus after creation would set up a process additional to these. The processes would overlap; and the new-created man would unquestionably have the feeling, at the very primal instant of his life, of having been in existence already some little space of time
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
As the art of reading (after a certain stage in one's education) is the art of skipping, so the art of being wise is the art of knowing what to overlook. The first effect on the mind of growing cultivated is that processes once multiple get to be performed by a single act. Lazarus
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.8%:
As they say the Self is nothing but Unity, unity abstract and absolute, so Hume says it is nothing but Diversity, diversity abstract and absolute; whereas in truth it is that mixture of unity and diversity which we ourselves have already found so easy to pick apart
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.3%:
As we decide between one man and another, - which is worthier, . . . so we decide between self and all other men; being, however, in this decision under the bias of our own desires.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.5%:
As we rightly perceive and name the same color under various lights, the same sound at various distances; so we seem to make an analogous sort of allowance for the varying amounts of attention with which objects are viewed; and whatever changes of feeling the attention may bring we charge, as it were, to the attention's account, and still perceive and conceive the object as the same.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.2%:
As we take, in fact, a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is this different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life, it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admiration, desire
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.4%:
He found that "the most favorable condition for the doubling of the mind was its sinultaneous [sic] application to two easy and heterogeneous operations
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20%:
He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.4%:
Here is the distinguishing feature of the good player: the good player, confident in his training and his practice, in the critical game trusts entirely to his impulse, and does not think out every move. The poor player, unable to trust his impulsive actions, is compelled to think carefully all the time. He thus not only loses the opportunities through his slowness in comprehending the whole situation, but, being compelled to think rapidly all the time, at critical points becomes confused; while the first-rate player, not trying to reason, but acting as impulse directs, is continually distinguishing himself and plays the better under the greater pressure."
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.6%:
Here, then, is the difficulty: How are characters extracted, and why does it require the advent of a genius in many cases before the fitting character is brought to light? Why cannot anybody reason as well as anybody else? Why does it need a Newton to notice tile law of the squares, a Darwin to notice the survival of the fittest?
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.4%:
Here, what we are aware of in advance seems to be its relations with the items we already know. It must bear a causal relation, or it must be an effect, or it must contain an attribute common to two items, or it must be a uniform concomitant, or what not. We know, in short, a lot about it, whilst as yet we have no knowledge of acquaintance with it (see p. 221), or in Mr. Hodgson's language, "we know what we want to find beforehand, in a certain sense, in its second intention, and do not know it, in another sense, in its first intention
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76%:
His thought obeys a nexus , but cannot name it. And so it is with all those judgments of experts , which even though unnoticed are so valuable. Saturated
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.2%:
How now is such an orderly concatenation of movements originally learned? or in other words, how are paths formed for the first time between one motor centre and another, so that the discharge of the first centre makes the others discharge in due order all along the line?
99%:
I must therefore end this chapter on the genesis of our mental structure by reaffirming my conviction that the so-called Experience-philosophy has failed to prove its point
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.6%:
I seem to perceive objects through the skin of my face, and to have the impressions immediately transmitted to the brain. The only part of my body possessing this power is my face; this I have ascertained by suitable experiments
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.4%:
I will now proceed to a detailed study of the more im- [p. 382] portant classes of movement consequent upon cerebromental change. They may be enumerated as -- 1) Instinctive or Impulsive Performances; Expressions of Emotion; and 3) Voluntary Deeds; and each shall have a chapter to itself. Footnotes
95.4%:
I will then, with the reader's permission, restrict the word 'experience' to processes which influence the mind by the front-door-way of simple habits and association
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 86%:
If I will to write "Peter" rather than "Paul," it is the thought of certain digital sensations, of certain alphabetic sounds, of certain appearances on the paper, and of no others, which immediately precedes the motion of my pen.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.6%:
If an abstract [p. 326] quality figures in the procession, it arrests our attention but for a moment, and fades into something else; and is never very abstract. Thus, in thinking of the sun-myths, we may have a gleam of admiration at the gracefulness of the primitive human mind, or a moment of disgust at the narrowness of modern interpreters. But, in the main, we think less of qualities than of whole things, real or possible, just as we may experience them.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.1%:
If one thus never forgets that the diverse faculties are only the unknown causes of known phenomena, that they are simply a convenient means of classifying the facts and speaking of them, if one does not fall into the common fault of making out of them substantial entities, creations which now agree, now disagree, so forming in the intelligence a little republic; then, we can see nothing reprehensible in this distribution into faculties, conformable as it is to the rules of a sound method and of a good natural classification
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.3%:
Imitation shades into Emulation or Rivalry , a very intense instinct, especially rife with young children, or at least especially undisguised. Everyone knows it. Nine-tenth of the work of the world is done by it. We know that if we do not do the task some-one else will do it and get the credit, so we do it.
Chapter: MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES, 3.7%:
In lower animals this may not be so much the case
COMPARED., 57.2%:
Enough has now been said to prove the general law of perception, which is this, that whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us (and it may be the larger part) always comes (in Lazarus's phrase) out of our own head. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 25.7%:
In such cases as the preceding, in which the secondary character is superior to the first, there seems reason to think that the first one is the morbid one.
96.3%:
Its most general expression would be "the Same operated on in the same way gives the Same." In
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.3%:
Even now the space inside our mouth, which is so intimately known and accurately measured by its inhabitant the tongue, can hardly be said to have its internal directions and dimensions known in any exact relation to those of the larger world outside. It forms almost a little world by itself.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.8%:
Let n be a past event; o its 'setting' (concomitants, date, self present, warmth and intimacy, etc., etc., as already set forth); and m some present thought or fact which may appropriately become the occasion of its recall
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.3%:
As with all gregarious animals, 'two souls,' as Faust says, 'dwell with-in his breast,' the one of sociability and helpfulness, the other of jealousy and antagonism to his mates. Though in a general way he cannot live without them, yet, as regards certain individuals, it often falls out that he cannot live with them either. Constrained to be a member of a tribe, he still has a right to decide, as far as in him lies, of which other members the tribe shall consist. Killing off a few [p. 410] obnoxious ones may often better the chances of those that remain. And killing off a neighboring tribe from whom no good thing comes, but only competition, may materially better the lot of the whole tribe. Hence the gory cradle, the bellum onnium contra omnes , in which our race was reared; hence the fickleness of human ties, the ease with which the foe of yesterday becomes the ally of to-day, the friend of to-day the enemy of to-morrow; hence the fact that we, the lineal representatives of the successful enactors of one scene of slaughter after another, must, whatever more pacific virtues we may also possess, still carry about with us, ready at any moment to burst into flame, the smouldering and sinister traits of character by means of which they lived through so many massacres, harming others, but themselves unharmed. Sympathy
98.4%:
As, in the course of generations, the young birds of this race begin to display a fear of man before they have been injured by him, it is an unavoidable inference that the nervous system of the race has been organically modified by these experiences
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.1%:
Nevertheless no ancient author understood it, for one cannot seriously maintain that a few scattered lines in Aristotle and the Stoics constitute a theory and clear view of the subject. It is to Hobbes, Hume, and Hartley that we must attribute the origin of these studies on the connection of our ideas
94.8%:
Now the first thing to make sure of is that when we talk of 'experience,' we attach a definite meaning to the word. Experience
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.9%:
Our consciousness is naively supposed to inhabit the picture and to feel the picture's position as related to other objects of space. But the truth is that the picture is non-existent either as a habitat or as anything else, for immediate consciousness
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.3%:
Our decks are consequently cleared for the struggle with that pure principle of personal identity which has met us all along our preliminary exposition, but which we have always shied from and treated as a difficulty to be postponed
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.6%:
Even when awake, it is more difficult to ascend to the meaning of a word than to pass from one word to another; or to put it otherwise, it is harder to be a thinker than to be a rhetorician, and on the whole nothing is commoner than trains of words not understood
COMPARED., 57.2%:
At bottom this is only one case (and that the simples case) of the general fact that our nervecentres are an organ for reacting on sense-impressions, and that our hemisphere in particular, are given us in order that records of our private past experience may co-operate in the reaction Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.7%:
At first sight it might seem that the analytic mind represented simply a higher intellectual stage, and that the intuitive mind represented an arrested stage of intellectual development; but the difference is not so simple as this
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.6%:
At first this view astounds us by the enormous number of special adjustments it supposes animals to possess ready-made in anticipation of the outer things among which they are to dwell. Can mutual dependence be so intricate and go so far? Is each thing born fitted to particular other things, and to them exclusively, as locks are fitted to their keys?
Chapter: THE LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE HEMISPHERES., 2.1%:
Even when the entire motor zone of a dog is removed, there is no permanent paralysis of any part, but only this curious sort of relative inertia when the two sides of the body are compared; and this itself becomes hardly noticeable after a number of weeks have elapsed
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.8%:
At most, I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come. All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either not be known at all, or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge-about Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.6%:
At the outset, we merely have the topic; then we operate on it; and finally we have it again in a richer and truer way. A compound conception has been substituted for the simple one, but with full consciousness that both are of the Same.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
Attention and effort are, as we shall see later, but two names for the same psychic fact. To what brain-processes they correspond we do not know. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31%:
Attention creates no idea; an idea must already be there before we can attend to it. Attention only fixes and retains what the ordinary laws of association bring 'before the footlights' of consciousness
95.4%:
Such a result is unquestionably the susceptibility to music, which some individuals possess at the present day. It has no zoological utility; it corresponds to no object in the natural environment
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.3%:
Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all. Its powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends, discerning which facts further them and which do not
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
Every conceivable connection may be thought of -- of coexistence, succession, resemblance, contrast, contradiction, cause and effect, means and end, genus and species, part and whole, substance and property, early and late, large and small, landlord and tenant, master and servant, -- Heaven knows what, for the list is literally inexhaustible
COMPARED., 57.5%:
Every man has one group of ideas which relate to his own person and interests, and another which is connected with society Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 81.8%:
Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well. Emotions, however, fall short of instincts, in that the emotional reaction usually terminates in the subject's own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go farther and enter into practical relations with the exciting object
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.6%:
Every one admits the entire incommensurability of feeling as such with material motion as such. "A motion became a feeling!" - no phrase that our lips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
The character abruptly rises to another 'level,' and deliberation comes to an immediate end.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.7%:
The comparing, sifting, and combining is here done, as it were, for the conscious agent, not by him. Recepts are received ; it is only concepts that require to be conceived
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.1%:
The course of our ideas is then called voluntary.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.9%:
The effort by which he succeeds in keeping the right name unwaveringly present to his mind proves to be his saving moral act.[
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84.2%:
Every one can testify that the psychical state called fear consists of mental representations of certain painful results; and that the one called anger consists of mental representations of the actions and impressions which would occur while inflicting some kind of pain."[
95.9%:
The higher thought-processes owe their being to causes which correspond far more to the sourings and fermentations of dough, the setting of mortar, or the subsidence of sediments in mixtures, than to the manipulations by which these physical aggregates came to be compounded
99.1%:
The love of drunkenness is a purely accidental susceptibility of a brain, evolved for entirely different uses, and its causes are to be sought in the molecular realm, rather than in any possible order of 'outer relations.'
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 65.5%:
The matter of size has been already touched upon, so that no more need be said of it here. As regards shape, almost all the retinal shapes that objects throw are perspective 'distortions.' Square
95.9%:
The only clear thing about the peculiarity seems to be its interstitial character, and the certainty that no mere appeal to man's 'experience' suffices to explain it. When
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.5%:
The other reason why the relations of the extracted characters are so evident is that their properties are so few , compared with the properties of the whole, from which we derived them
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.4%:
The primordial largenesses which the sensations yield must be measured and subdivided by consciousness, and added together, before they can form by their synthesis what we know as the real Space of the objective world
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.3%:
The question of fact in the free-will controversy is thus extremely simple. It relates solely to the amount of effort of attention or consent which we can at any time put forth
97.7%:
The ultimate goal of theoretic physics is to find the last unchanging causes [p. 668] of the processes in Nature
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84%:
This free and powerful flow means that brain-paths of association and memory have more and more organized themselves in him, and that through them the stimulus is drafted off into nerves which lead merely to the writing finger or the speaking tongue
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.3%:
This is the intellectual reason why habits of continuous application should be enforced in educational establishments
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.8%:
Thus perception involves a twofold choice. Out of all present sensations, we notice mainly such as are significant of absent ones; and out of all the absent associates which these suggest, we again pick out a very few to stand for the objective reality par excellence
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.1%:
To remember a thing as past, it is necessary that the notion of 'past' should be one of our 'ideas.' We shall see in the chapter on Memory that many things come to be thought by us as past, not because of any intrinsic quality of their own, but rather because they are associated with other things which for us signify pastness
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.5%:
We do not then exactly think of the object of our preoccupation; we do not represent it in a clear manner; and yet our mind is not as it would be without this preoccupation
COMPARED., 57.7%:
What they have meant is that perception is a mediate inference, end that the middle term is unconscious Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.4%:
Whatever things are plastic to his hands, those things he must remodel into shapes of his own, and the result of the remodeling, however useless it may be, gives him more pleasure than the original thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.5%:
Who in cold blood wants the fox for its own sake, or cares whether the ball be at this goal or that? We know, however, by experience, that if we can once rouse a certain impulsive excitement in ourselves, whether to overtake the fox, or to get the ball to one particular goal, the successful venting of it over the counteracting checks will fill us with exceeding joy
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.1%:
Wider and completer observations show us both that the lower centres are more spontaneous, and that the hemispheres are more automatic, than the Meynert scheme allows
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68%:
Because it can only occur in a definite direction the impossibility of perceiving it without perceiving its direction has been decreed -- a decree which the simplest experiment overthrows. [148] It is a case of what I have called the 'psychologist's fallacy': mere acquaintance with space is treated as tantamount to every sort of knowledge about it, the conditions of the latter are demanded of the former state of mind, and all sorts of mythological processes are brought in to help. [149
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.5%:
Before the connection of thought and brain can be explained, it must at least be stated in an elementary form; and there are great difficulties about so stating it
95%:
Being the constant and infinitely-repeated elements of thought, they must become the automatic elements of thought -- the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of -- the 'forms of intuition.'"Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists; neither of which is tenable by itself
COMPARED., 55.6%:
Berkeley compared our visual sensations to the words of a language, which are but signs or occasions for our intellects to pass to what the speaker means. As the sounds called words have no inward affinity with the ideas they signify, so neither have our visual sensations, according to Berkeley, any inward affinity with the things of whose presence they make us aware Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.3%:
Berkeley had already said:[16] "A word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of many several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind. An idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.1%:
Beyond its borders extends the immense region of conceived time, past and future, into one direction or another of which we mentally project all the events which we think of as real, and form a systematic order of them by giving to each a date
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.6%:
but rather in a preliminary phenomenon, the urgency, namely, with which it is able to compel attention and dominate in consciousness
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.6%:
but scarcely has the process begun, when the original law of interest begins to operate on this new formation, seizes on the interesting parts and impresses them on the attention to the exclusion of the rest, and the whole process is repeated again with endless variety
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
but the moralist always speaks of his as a victory over his propensities
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.3%:
certain steps forward in this process seem prima facie to be passive, and other steps (as where an object comes with effort) seem prima facie to be active in a supreme degree
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
flatus vocis
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.9%:
formed? All paths are paths of discharge, and the discharge always takes place in the direction of least resistance, whether the cell which discharges be 'motor' or 'sensory.' The
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
if we often flinch from making an effort, before we know it the effort-making capacity will be gone; and that, if we suffer the wandering of our attention, presently it will wander all the time
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 43.1%:
ignoratio elenchi in the
95.1%:
imply that such combinations will hereafter be made -- imply that there are answering combinations in the outer world -- imply a preparedness to cognize these combinations -- imply faculties of comprehending them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.2%:
in the first experiments which he made in Italy, was the extreme unrest of the blood-vessels of the hand, which at every smallest emotion, whether during waking or sleep, changed their volume in surprising fashion
Chapter: Hearing., 3.1%:
is, it must be that our ideas do not innervate our motor centres directly, but only after first arousing the mental sound of the words.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.1%:
it seems to us as if the frequent renewal of the effort were the very cause by which they are held fast,
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
most instincts are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits, and that, this purpose once accomplished, the instincts themselves, as such, have no raison d'être in the psychical economy, and consequently fade away
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 50.3%:
mouches volantes
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.6%:
Every one of them has a way, if the mind is left alone with it, of suggesting other parts of the continuum from which it was torn, for conception to work upon in a similar way. This 'suggestion' is often no more than what we shall later know as the association of ideas. Often, however, it is a sort of invitation to the mind to play, add lines, break number-groups, etc. Whatever it is, it brings new conceptions into consciousness, which latter thereupon may or may not expressly attend to the relation in which the new stands to the old
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.6%:
Everything arouses them; for objects which have no other effects will for a moment contract the brow and make the glottis close. It is as if all that visited the mind had to stand an entrance-examination, and just show its face so as to be either approved or sent back. These primary reactions are like the opening or the closing of the door. In
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.1%:
Exactly parallel variations occur in our consciousness of space. A road we walk back over, hoping to find at each step an object we have dropped, seems to us longer than when we walked over it the other way. A space we measure by pacing appears longer than one we traverse with no thought of its length. And in general an amount of space attended to in itself leaves with us more impression of spaciousness than one of which we only note the content
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
Both instincts and emotions are reactions upon special sorts of objects of perception; they depend on the hemispheres; and they are in the first instance reflex, that is, they take place the first time the exciting object is met, are accompanied by no forethought or deliberation, and are irresistible. But they are modifiable to a certain extent by experience, and on later occasions of meeting the exciting object, the instincts expecially have less of the blind impulsive character which they had at first
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.7%:
Both of us make flying leaps over large portions of the sentences uttered and we give attention only to substantive starting points, turning points, and conclusions here and there
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.3%:
But (apart from the difficulty of seeing how changing the sensations should relate them better) is it not manifest that the relations are part of the 'content' of consciousness, part of the 'object,' just as much as the sensations are
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.7%:
But [p.134] between conception and belief, proof ought to lie. And when we ask, 'What proves that all this is more than a mere conception of the possible?' it is not easy to get a sufficient reply. If
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.8%:
But a movement is a change, a process; so we see that in the time-world and the space-world alike the first known things are not elements, but combinations, not separate units, but wholes already formed. The condition of being of the wholes may be the elements; but the condition of our knowing the elements is our having already felt the wholes as wholes.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.1%:
But a second and worse defect in a philosophy than that of contradicting our active propensities is to give them no Object whatever [p. 313] to press against. A philosophy whose principle is so incommensurate with our most intimate powers as to deny them all relevancy in universal affairs, as to annihilate their motives at one blow, will be even more unpopular than pessimism. Better face the enemy than the eternal Void! This is why materialism will always fail of universal adoption, however well it may fuse things into an atomistic unity, however clearly it may prophesy the future eternity
97.9%:
But alongside of these ideal relations between terms which the world verifies, there are other ideal relations not as yet so verified. I refer to those propositions (no longer expressing mere results of comparison) which are formulated in such metaphysical and æsthetic axioms as "The Principle of things is one;" "The quantity of existence is unchanged;" "Nature is simple and invariable;" "Nature acts by
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.6%:
But as, according to our view, there are two stages in reasoned thought, one where similarity merely operates to call up cognate thoughts, and another farther stage, where the bond of identity between the cognate thoughts is noticed; so minds of genius may be divided into two main sorts, those who notice the bond and those who merely obey it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
But certain motives are more or less constantly in play. One of these is impatience of the deliberative state; or to express it otherwise, proneness to act or to decide merely because action and [p. 530] decision are, as such, agreeable, and relieve the tension of doubt and hesitancy
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.5%:
But each and all agree in this, that they bear a more evident relation to the conclusion than did the immediate data in their full totality. The difficulty is, in each case, to extract front the immediate data that particular ingredient which shall have this very evident relation to the conclusion
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.8%:
But even this is only an approximation; and in literal mathematical strictness all our abstracts must be confessed to be but imperfectly imaginable things
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.8%:
But even though there be a mental spontaneity, it can certainly not create ideas or summon them ex abrupto. Its power is limited to selecting amongst those which the associative machinery has already introduced or tends to introduce. If it can emphasize, reinforce, or protract for a second either one of these, it can do all that the most eager advocate of free will need demand; for it then decides the direction of the next associations by making them hinge upon the emphasized term; and determining in this wise the course of the man's thinking, it also determines his acts.
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13%:
But facts are facts, and if we only get enough of them they are sure to combine
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.3%:
But for inarticulate thoughts there is not even this resource, and introspection must confess that the task exceeds her powers. The mass of our thinking vanishes for ever, beyond hope of recovery, and psychology only gathers up a few of the crumbs that fall from the feast
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
But for us finite creatures, " 'tis to consider too curiously to consider [p. 295] so." The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.8%:
But gradually our will can lead us to same results by I very simple method: we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real. It
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.4%:
But if tears or anger are simply suppressed, whilst the object of grief or rage remains unchanged before the mind, the current which would have invaded the normal channels turns into others, for it must find some outlet of escape. It may then work different and worse effects later on. Thus vengeful brooding may replace a burst of indignation; a dry heat may consume the frame of one who fain would weep, or he may, as Dante says, turn to stone within; and then tears or a storming fit may bring a grateful relief
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.7%:
But if the brand is the ratio cognoscendi of the belonging, the belonging, in the case of the herd, is in turn the ratio existendi of the brand
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.7%:
But if with this horse I make an inroad into the world otherwise known, and say, for example, 'That is my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall,' the whole case is altered; for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known, and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.4%:
But in every one of us there are moments when this complete reproduction of all the items of a past experience occurs. What are those moments? They are moments of emotional recall of the past as something which once was, but is gone for ever -- moments, the interest of which consists in the feeling that our self was once other than it now is. When this is the case, any detail, however minute, which will make the past picture more complete, will also have its effect in swelling that total contrast between now and then which forms the central interest of our contemplation.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.5%:
But in general a few parts are strongly emphasized to consciousness and the rest sink out of notice; and it is then remarkable how vague and ambiguous our perception of their relative order of location is. Obviously
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.2%:
But in the matter of spatial feeling, where the retinal patch that produces a triangle in the mind is itself a, triangle, etc., it looks at first sight as if the sensation might be a direct cognition of its own neural condition
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
But in the psychological sense it is less a condensation than a loss, a genuine dropping out and throwing overboard of conscious content. Steps really sink from sight. An
94.7%:
But in the second place, even if it do mirror the reality exactly, still it is not that reality itself, it is a duplication of it, the result of a mental reaction
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
But in the very midst of our indignation with the gentleman, we have a consciousness that his preposterous inertia and neg- [p. 371] ativeness in the actual emergency is, somehow or other, allied with his general superiority to ourselves
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
But it cannot be denied that in the resolute type of character the accident that one of them has once been made does afterwards enter as a motive additional to the more genuine reasons why it should not be revoked, or if provisionally revoked, why it should be made again
95.6%:
But it is a very different matter to account for the categories themselves
Chapter: THE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION., 1.8%:
But it is plain that the faculty of spoken language alone is so complicated as to call into play almost all the elementary powers which the mind possesses, memory, imagination, association, judgment, and volition. A portion of the brain competent to be the adequate seat of such a faculty would needs be an entire brain in miniature,-just as the faculty itself is really a specification of the entire man, a sort of homunculus
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.3%:
But it never occurred to these writers that a process which could go the length of actually producing some ideas and sequences in the mind might safely be trusted to produce others too; and that those habitual associations which further thought may also come from the same mechanical source as those which hinder it
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.7%:
But just as, in the field of quantity, the relation between two numbers is another number, so in the field of space the relations are facts of the same order with the facts they relate. If
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.8%:
But little by little they succeeded in dropping all this supernumerary consciousness, and they became secure in their movements exactly in proportion as they did so
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 49.5%:
But memory seems to me the most physical of intellectual powers. Bodily ease and freshness have much to do with it. Then there is a great difference of facility in method
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.3%:
But my abstract idea corresponds to the whole class; it differs, then from the representation of in individual. -- Moreover, my abstract idea [p. 49] is perfectly clear and determinate; now that I possess it, I never fall to recognize an araucaria among the various plants which may be shown me
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.4%:
But my procedure is a mere association of two totals, diseased object and remedy. One learned in pneumatics could have named the cause of the disease, and thence inferred the remedy immediately
COMPARED., 57.4%:
But neither in anæsthesia nor in amputation can there be any contradictory sensation in the foot to correct us; so imagination has all the force of fact Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.6%:
But no single one of the mind's conceptions is fertile of itself, as the opinion which I criticise pretends. When the several notes of a chord are sounded together, we get a new feeling from their combination. This feeling is due to the mind reacting upon that
Chapter: THE FROG'S NERVE-CENTRES., 1.1%:
But now if to the lower centres we add the cerebral hemispheres, or if, in other words, we make an intact animal the subject of our observations, all this is changed. In addition to the previous responses to present incitements of sense, our frog now goes through long and complex acts of locomotion spontaneously, or as if moved by what in our-[p.18] selves we should call an idea. His reactions to outward stimuli vary their form, too. Instead of making simple defensive movements with his hind legs like a headless frog if touched, or of giving one or two leaps and then sitting still like a hemisphereless one, he makes persistent and varied efforts at escape, as if, not the mere contact of the physiologist's hand, but the notion of danger suggested by it were now his spur
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.2%:
But quâ thoughts, quâ sensations understood, the words have contracted by long association fringes of mutual repugnance or affinity with each other and with the conclusion, which run exactly parallel with like fringes in the visual, tactile and other ideas. The most important element of these fringes is, I repeat, the mere feeling of harmony or discord, of a right or wrong direction in the thought
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.2%:
But the Object of your thought is really its entire content or deliverance, neither more nor less. It is a vicious use of speech to take out a substantive kernel from its content and call that its object; and it is an equally vicious use of speech to add a substantive kernel not articulately included in its content, and to call that its object. Yet either one of these two sins we commit, whenever we content ourselves with saying that a given thought is simply 'about' a certain topic, or that that topic is its 'object.' The
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23%:
But the Thought never is an object in its own hands, it never appropriates or disowns itself. It appropriates to itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.7%:
But the effort seems to belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we are, and those were but externals which we carry. If the 'searching of our heart and reins' be the purpose of this human drama, then what is sought seems to be what effort we can make. He who can make none is but a shadow; he who can make much is a hero
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.2%:
But the judicious fellow all the while may have all these possibilities and more besides, ready to break out in the same or even a more violent way, if only the brakes were taken off. It is the absence of scruples, of consequences, of considerations, the extraordinary simplification of each moment's mental outlook, that gives to the explosive individual such motor energy and ease
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.4%:
But the knowledge he theorizes about is not the bare function of knowledge which Kant criticises - he does not inquire into the possibility of knowledge überhaupt. He assumes it to be possible, he does not doubt its presence in himself at the moment he speaks. The knowledge he criticises is the knowledge of particular men about the particular things that surround them. This he may, upon occasion, in the light of his own unquestioned knowledge, pronounce true or false, and trace the reasons by which it has become one or the other.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.4%:
But the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.4%:
But the principle of selection is so important that no illustrations seem redundant which may help to show how great is its scope
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.8%:
But the question remains: Do currents run backward, so that if the optical centres (for example) are excited by 'association' and a visual object is imagined, a current runs down to the retina also, and excites that sympathetically with the higher tracts
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.1%:
But the spirit that animates him is that on which ultimately the very life and health of Science rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
But this absence of prompt tendency in his brain to set into particular modes is the very condition which insures that it shall ultimately become so much more efficient than the woman's. The very lack of preappointed trains of thought is the ground on which general principles and heads of classification grow up; and the masculine brain deals with new end complex matter indirectly by means of these, in a manner which the feminine method of direct intuition, admirably and rapidly as it performs within its limits, can vainly hope to core with
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.3%:
But we can set ourselves new questions about the object, so that a new interest in it arises, and then the attention will remain riveted. The relation of attention to will is, then, less one of immediate than of mediate control
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.7%:
But we get them, and, presto! there the movements are! They are knocked out of us, they surprise us. It is just cause for wonder, as our chapter on Instinct has shown us, that such bodily consequences should follow such mental antecedents
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.6%:
But we have seen that Kant deemed it of next to no importance at all. It was reserved for his Fichtean and Hegelian successors to call it the first Principle of Philosophy, to spell its name in capitals and pronounce it with adoration, to act, in short, as if they were going up in a balloon, whenever the notion of it crossed their mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
But we must insist that, so soon as the object of a thought becomes the object of an assenting or rejecting judgment, our consciousness steps into an entirely new relation towards it. It is then twice present in consciousness, as thought of, and as held for real or denied ; just
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.4%:
But what on this view could be the function of the consciousness itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.2%:
But what the ordinary psychologies call 'ideas' are nothing but parts of the total object of representation
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84%:
But what they gain for practice by this law, they lose, it must be confessed, for feeling. For the world-worn and experienced man, the sense of pleasure which he gets from the free and powerful flow of thoughts, overcoming obstacles as they arise, is the only compensation for that freshness of the heart which he once enjoyed
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.1%:
But when all is said and done about the conditions which favor our perception of resemblance and our abstraction of its ground, the crude fact remains, that some [p. 530] people are far more sensitive to resemblances, and far more ready to point out wherein they consist, than others are. They are the wits, the poets, the inventors, the scientific men, the practical geniuses. A native talent for perceiving analogies is reckoned by Prof. Bain, and by others before and after him, as the leading fact in genius of every order. But
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.8%:
But when the penultimate terms of all the trains, however differing inter se, finally shoot into the same conclusion, we say and rightly say, that all the thinkers have had substantially the same thought. It would probably astound each of them beyond [p. 270] measure to be let into his neighbor's mind and to find how different the scenery there was from that in his own
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.4%:
But when we come to man we find a great difference. He has a deliberate intention to apply a sign to everything . The linguistic impulse is with him generalized and systematic. For things hitherto unnoticed or unfelt, he desires a sign before he has one
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.2%:
But when we come to monkeys and man the scheme well-nigh breaks down altogether; for we find that the hemispheres do not simply repeat voluntarily actions which the lower centres perform as machines. There are many functions which the lower centres cannot by themselves perform at all
97.6%:
But when you give things mathematical and mechanical names and call them just so many solids in just such positions, describing just such paths with just such velocities, all is changed. Your sagacity finds its reward in the verification by nature of all the deductions which you may next proceed to make Note: The verification of science
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.3%:
But whereas we simple begged the vehicle of this connected knowledge in the shape of what we call the present Thought, or section of the Stream of Consciousness (which we declared to be the ultimate fact for psychology), Kant denies this to be an ultimate fact and insists on analyzing it into a large number of distinct, [p. 361] though equally essential, elements
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.6%:
But wherever a movement is difficult and precise, we become, as a matter of fact, acutely aware in advance of the amount and direction of energy which it is to involve Note: Speaking too
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.2%:
But whether we take it abstractly or concretely, our considering the spiritual self at all is a reflective process, is the result of our abandoning the outward-looking point of view, and of our having become able to think of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as thinkers.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.3%:
But while the asso- [p. 278] ciationists think that a 'manifold' can form a single knowledge, the egoists deny this, and say that the knowledge comes only when the manifold is subjected to the synthetizing activity of an ego
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23%:
. It may feel its own immediate existence - we have all along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspection to ascertain the fact - but nothing can be known about it till it be dead and gone
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.4%:
But who does not see that for this sort of pleasure to be possible, the impulse must be there already as an independent fact? The pleasure of successful performance is the result of the impulse, not its cause
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.1%:
1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness. 2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing. 3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous. 4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself. 5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects - chooses from among them, in a word - all the while
94.7%:
1) That, taking the word experience as it is universally understood, the experience of the race can no more account [p. 618] for our necessary or a priori judgments than the experience of the individual can;
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.6%:
But with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new nature seems to slip in, something whereof the potency was not given in the mere outward atoms of the original chaos
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.1%:
But with the power of exploring one part of the surface by another we get a direct perception of cutaneous equivalencies
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.3%:
But with the ripening of reflection this tie is loosened, the warmth of our interest cools, things look differently to us, and we act more as foreigners to the outer world, even though we know it a great deal better
97.5%:
But yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain even of real things existing; because real things are no farther concerned nor intended to be meant by any such propositions
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.3%:
But, either because they were intoxicated with the principle of association, or because in the number of details they lost their general bearings, they have forgotten, as a rule, to state under what sensible form the primitive spatial experiences are found which later became associated with so many other sensible signs
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.5%:
But, if it is useful, it must be so through its causal efficaciousness, and the automaton-theory must succumb to the theory of commonsense
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.9%:
But, if language must thus influence us, the agglutinative languages, and even Greek and Latin with their declensions, would be the better guides. Names did not appear in them inalterable, but changed their shape to suit the context in which they lay.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.6%:
But, if we are lucky enough to single out the proper character, we take in, as it were, by a single glance all its possible consequences
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
But, inasmuch as they may also possibly be harmful, it is better that he should not be quite indifferent to them either, but on the whole remaining on the survive, ascertain as much about them, and what they may be likely to bring forth, as he can, before settling down to rest in their presence
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.9%:
But, since the rest of this volume will be little more than a collection of illustrations of the difficulty of discovering by direct introspection exactly what our feelings and their relations are, we need not anticipate our own future details, but just state our general conclusion that introspection is difficult and fallible
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
2) The world of science
94.7%:
3) That the features of our organic mental structure cannot be explained at all by our conscious intercourse with the outer environment, but must rather be understood as congenital variations, 'accidental'[1] in the first instance, but then transmitted as fixed features of the race. On
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.2%:
A French writer, speaking of our ideas, says somewhere in a fit of antispiritualistic excitement that, misled by certain peculiaritities which they display, we 'end by personifying' the procession which they make, - such personification being regarded by him as a great philosophic blunder on our part. It could only be a blunder if the notion of personality meant something essentially different [p. 227] from anything to be found in the mental procession
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.7%:
A certain richness of the æsthetic nature may, therefore, easily keep one in the intuitive stage. All the poets are examples of this
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.5%:
A consequence of this law is that if, during the time of such an instinct's vivacity, objects adequate to arouse it are met with, a habit of acting on them is formed, which remains when the original instinct has passed away; but that if no such objects are met with, then no habit will be formed
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.8%:
A dagger hurts us only when in contact with our skin, a poison only when we take it into our mouths, and we can only use an object for our advantage when we have it in our muscular control. It is as tangibles, then, that things concern us most; and the other senses, so far as their practical use goes, do but warn us of what tangible things to expect. They are but organs of anticipatory touch, as Berkeley has with perfect clearness explained. [28] Note: Consequences for writing here
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.5%:
A farther condition is required before the present image can be held to stand for a past original. That condition is that the fact imaged be expressly referred to the past, thought as in the past. But how can we think a thing as in the past, except by thinking of the past together with the thing, and of the relation of the two?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78%:
A fruitless discussion might be waged on this point by two theorizers who were careful not to define their terms
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
A girl in a country parsonage will be sure that Paris never can be taken, or that Bismarck is a wretch" -- all because they have either conceived these things at some moment with passion, or associated them with other things which they have conceived with passion.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 55%:
A man blind of his eyes merely, sees darkness. A man blind of his visual brain-centres can no more see darkness out of the parts of his retina which are connected with the brain-lesion than lie can see it out of the skin of his back. He cannot see at all in that part of the field; and he cannot think of the light which he ought to be feeling there, for the very notion of the existence of that particular 'there' is cut out of his mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.1%:
A philosophy may be unimpeachable in other respects, but either of two defects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, its ultimate principle must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints our dearest desires and most cherished powers. A pessimistic principle like Schopenhauer's incurably vicious Will-substance, or Hartmann's wicked jack-at-all-trades, the Unconscious, will perpetually call forth essays at other philosophies
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.4%:
A process set up anywhere in the centres reverberates everywhere, and in some way or other affects the organism throughout, making its activities either greater or less
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.7%:
A sentimental layman would feel, and ought to feel, horrified, on being admitted into such a, critic's mind, to see how cold, how thin, how void of human significance, are the motives for favor or disfavor that there prevail. The capacity to make a nice spot on the wall will outweigh a picture's whole content; a foolish trick of words will preserve a poem; an utterly meaningless fitness of sequence in one musical composition set at naught any amount of 'expressiveness' in another.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.3%:
A successful piece of mimicry gives to both bystanders and mimic a peculiar kind of aesthetic pleasure. The dramatic impulse, the tendency to pretend one is someone else, contains this pleasure of mimicry as one of its elements. Another element seems to be a peculiar sense of power in stretching one's own personality so as to include that of a strange person
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8%:
A third maxim may be added to the preceding pair: Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain. It is not in the moment of their forming, but in the moment of their producing motor effects, that resolves and aspirations communicate the new 'set'to the brain
97%:
By such elaborate inventions, and at such a cost to the imagination, do men succeed in making for themselves a world in which real things shall be coerced per fas aut nefas under arithmetical law.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.2%:
By what means, then, through what fiction [!] can we turn round and play them off upon self? Or how comes it that we obtain any satisfaction by putting self in the place of the other party? Perhaps the simplest form of the reflected act is that expressed by Selfworth and Self-estimation, based and begun upon observation of the ways and conduct of our fellow
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.8%:
C knows quite as well as B that 7 + 5 = 12, yet he needs 1/10 of a second longer to call it to mind; B knows quite as well as C that Dante was a poet, but needs 1/20 of a second longer to think of it. Such experiments lay bare the mental life in a way that is startling and not always gratifying
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.9%:
Call the fact or concrete datum S; the essential attribute M; the attribute's property P. Then the reasoned inference of P from S cannot be made without M's intermediation. The 'essence' M is thus that third or middle term in the reasoning which a moment ago was pronounced essential
97.6%:
Call the things of nature as much as you like by sentimental, moral, and æsthetic names, no natural consequences follow from the naming. They may be of the kinds you allege, but they are not of 'the kind's kind; and the last great system-maker of this sort, Hegel, was obliged explicitly to repudiate logic in order to make any inferences at all from the names he called things by. Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.6%:
Can we determine, now, when a certain portion of the going thought has, by dint of its interest, become so prepotent as to make its own exclusive associates the dominant features of the coming thought -- can we, I say, determine which of its own associates shall be evoked? For
99.2%:
Can we realize for an instant what a cross-section of all existence at a definite point of time would be? While I talk and the flies buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in France. What does that mean? Does the contemporaneity of these events with each other and with a million more as disjointed as they form a rational bond between them, and unite them into anything that means for us a world? Yet
COMPARED., 59.2%:
Cf. Th. Reid's Intellectual Powers, essay ii. chap. xxii, and A. Binet. in Mind, Ix. 206. M. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
Chapters ix and x of Prof. Royce's work are on the whole the dearest account of the psychology of belief with which I am acquainted.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.8%:
Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his logcabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveller, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the 'shop,' in a word, from which the man can byand- by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On
99.1%:
Half of both the poetry and the tragedy of human life would vanish if alcohol were taken away. As it is, the thirst for it is such that in the United States the cash-value of its sales amounts to that of the sales of meat and of bread put together. And yet what ancestral 'outer relation' is responsible for this peculiar reaction of ours? The only 'outer relation' could be the alcohol itself, which, comparatively speaking, came into the environment but yesterday, and which, so far from creating, is tending to eradicate, the love of itself from our mental structure, by letting only those families of men survive in whom it is not strong
COMPARED., 57.6%:
Hardly any one of us can make new heads easily when fresh experiences come. Most of us grow more and more enslaved to the stock conceptions with which we have once become familiar, and less and less capable of assimilating impressions in any but the old ways Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.2%:
He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the case
99.6%:
He insisted on thought- forms with which experience largely agrees, forgetting that the only forms which could not by any possibility be the results of experience would be such as experience violated. The first thing a Kantian ought to do is to discover forms of judgment to which no order in 'things' runs parallel. These would indeed be features native to the mind. I
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.2%:
He will be king of his company, sing all the songs and make all the speeches, lead the parties, carry out the practical jokes, kiss all the girls, fight the men, and, if need be, lead the forlorn hopes and enterprises, so that an onlooker would think he has more life in his little finger than can exist in the whole body of a correct judicious fellow
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.8%:
Hering and Helmholtz express this by saying that we judge of the direction of objects as they would appear to an imaginary cyclopean eye, situated between our two real eyes
Chapter: THE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION., 1.9%:
Herr Pastor, sure there be a horse inside,'called out the peasants to X after their spiritual shepherd had spent hours in explaining to them the construction of the locomotive. With a horse inside truly everything becomes clear, even though it be a queer enough sort of horse-the horse itself calls for no explanation
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.1%:
His experiments conclusively show that an idea is not only 'associated' directly with the one that follows it, and with the rest through that, but that it is directly associated with all that are near it, though in unequal degrees
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84%:
His mother's death, which in former times would have wrung his heart, left him quite cold; largely, as he himself suggests, because he could form no definite visual image of the event, and of the effect of the loss on the rest of the family at home.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.7%:
How comes it about that a man reading something aloud for the first time is able immediately to emphasize all his words [p. 254] aright, unless from the very first he have a sense of at least the form of the sentence yet to come, which sense is fused with his consciousness of the present word, and modifies its emphasis in his mind so as to make him give it the proper accent as he utters it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.3%:
How often the battles of psychology have to be fought over again, each time with heavier armies and bigger trains, though not always with such able generals! [36 Note: Interesting
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29%:
How rapid is progress in a science when its first principles have been so well impressed upon us that we reproduce them mentally with perfect distinctness and ease! How slow and uncertain, on the other hand, is our learning of the principles themselves, when familiarity with the still more elementary percepts connected with the subject has not given us an adequate predisposition! - Apperceptive
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
How this power of analysis was brought about we saw in our chapters on Discrimination and Attention
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.8%:
However closely psychical changes may conform to law, it is safe to say that individual histories and biographies will never be written in advance no matter how 'evolved'psychology may become.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.1%:
Human nature is sufficiently homo- [p. 437] geneous for us to be sure that everywhere reserve must inspire some respect, and that persons who suffer every liberty are persons whom others disregard
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.8%:
Hume says nothing of the judging Thought; and he denies this thread of resemblance, this core of sameness running through the ingredients of the Self, to exist even as a phenomenal thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.1%:
Hume surely had images of his own works without seeing distinctly every word and letter upon the pages which floated before his mind's eye. His dictum is therefore an exquisite example of the way in which a man will be blinded by a priori theories to the most flagrant facts
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 36.6%:
I believe that this is one of the principal reasons why the analysis of the notes of the human voice in singing is relatively so [p. 520] difficult. Such fusions of many sensations into what, to conscious perception, seems a simple whole, abound in all our senses.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.6%:
I call this view mythological, because I am conscious of no such Kantian machine-shop in my mind, and feel no call to disparage the powers of poor sensation in this merciless way
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.8%:
I can keep my wandering mind a great deal more closely upon a conversation or a lecture if I actively re-echo to myself the words than if I simply hear them; and I find a number of my students who report benefit from voluntarily adopting a similar course
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
I cannot help thinking, therefore, that there is in the remembrance of a real fact, as distinguished from that of a thought, an element which does not consist ... in a difference between the mere ideas which are present to the mind in the two cases
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.7%:
I confess, therefore, that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we yet have attained.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.4%:
I did my best in these respects, without forgetting the most important part of all-namely, to tempt my correspondents to write freely in fuller explanation of their replies, and on cognate topics as well
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.3%:
I do not fully understand how we come to our unshakable belief that thinking exists as a special kind of [p. 571] immaterial process alongside of the material processes of the world. It
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 39%:
I have noticed a curious enlargement of certain 'distances' of difference under the influence of chloroform. The jingling of the bells on the horses of a horse-car passing the door, for example, and the rumbling of the vehicle itself, which to our ordinary hearing merge together very readily into a quasi-continuous body of sound, have seemed so far apart as to require a sort of mental facing in opposite directions to get from one to the other, as if they belonged in different worlds. I am inclined to suspect, from certain data, that the ultimate philosophy of difference and likeness will have to be built upon experiences of intoxication, especially by nitrous oxide gas, which lets us into intuitions the subtlety whereof is denied to the waking state
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.1%:
I have spoken all along as if they also might determine that they shall be. This, no doubt, has disconcerted many readers, for it certainly seems as if a special fiat, or consent to the movement were required in addition to the mere conception of it, in many cases of volition; and this fiat I have altogether left out of my account
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
I may not hope for its realization during my lifetime
99.8%:
I must quit society. I would rather undergo twice the danger from beasts and ten times the danger from rocks. It is not pain, it is not death, that I dread, -- it is the hatred of a man; there is something in it so shocking that I would rather submit to any injury than incur or increase the hatred of a man by revenging it. . . . Another sufficient reason for suicide is that I was this morning out of temper with Mrs. Douglas (for no fault of hers). I did not betray myself in the least, but I reflected that to be exposed to the possibility of such an event once a year, was evil enough to render life intolerable. The disgrace of using an impatient word is to me overpowering
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6%:
I need hardly say that the activity of the nervous matter is the primary phenomenon, and the afflux of blood its secondary consequence. Many popular writers talk as if it were the other way about, and as if mental activity were due to the afflux of blood. But, as Professor H.N. Martin has well said, "that
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.8%:
I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endowed with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain in which the idea is placed, these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that which the mind desired at first to survey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy to show, if there was occasion
COMPARED., 59%:
I should further say that there is no relationship between rapidity of perception as thus tested and intellectual activity as tested by the general results of intellectual work; for I have tried the experiment with [p. 133] server highly distinguished men in science and literature, most whom I found to be slow readers."Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.6%:
I think that a delight in self-dissection must be a strong ingredient in the pleasure that many are said to take in confessing themselves to priests
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.1%:
I trust that I have now made clear what that 'idea of a movement' is which must precede it in order that it be voluntary. It is not the thought of the innervation which the movement requires. It is the anticipation of the movement's sensible effects, resident, or remote, and sometimes very remote indeed. Such
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63%:
I will answer these questions by asking another: Why do we move our joists at all? Surely to gain something more valuable than the insipid joint-feelings themselves
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87%:
I write, I have no anticipation, as a thing distinct from my sensation, of either the look or the digital feel of the letters which flow from my pen. The words chime on my mental ear, as it were, before I write them, but not on my mental eye or hand. This comes from the rapidity with which often-repeated movements follow on their mental cue
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.5%:
INSTINCT is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such away as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.9%:
Ideas are substitutions which require a secondary process when what is symbolized by them is translated into the images and experiences it replaces; and this secondary process is frequently not performed at all, generally only performed to a very small extent
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.3%:
If I now inquire what this, experience has left in me, I find, first, the sensible representation of an araucaria; in fact, I have been able to describe almost exactly the form and color of the plant. But there is a difference between this representation and the former sensations, of which it is the present echo. The internal semblance, from which I have just made my description, is vague, and my past sensations were precise. For, assuredly, each of the araucarias I saw then excited in me a distinct visual sensation; there are no two absolutely similar plants in nature; I observed perhaps twenty or thirty araucarias; without a doubt each one of them differed from the others in size, in girth, by the more or less obtuse angles of its branches, by the more or less abrupt jutting out of its scales, by the style of its texture; consequently, my twenty or thirty visual sensations were different
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60%:
If I wish, for example, to recall a place or person, it will arise before me with vividness, not according as I strain my attention forwards, but rather in proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards." [8]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.7%:
If a boy grows up alone at the age of games and sports, and learns neither to play ball, nor row, nor sail, nor ride, nor skate, nor shoot, probably he will be sedentary to the end of his days; and, though the best of opportunities be afforded him for learning these things later, it is a hundred to one but he will pass them by and shrink back from the effort of taking those necessary first steps the prospect of which, at an earlier age, would have filled him with eager delight
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.7%:
If a boy has seen nothing all his life but sloops and schooners, he will probably never distinctly have singled out in his notion of 'sail' the character of being hung lengthwise. When for the first time he sees a square-rigged ship, the opportunity of extracting the lengthwise mode of hanging as a special accident, and of dissociating it from the general notion of sail, is offered. But there are twenty chances to one that that will not be the form of the boy's consciousness. What he notices will be the new and exceptional character of being hung crosswise. He will go home and speak of that, and perhaps never consciously formulate what the more familiar peculiarity consists in.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78%:
If a boy sees a fat hopping-toad, he probably has incontinently an impulse (especially if with other boys) to smash the creature with a stone, which impulse we may suppose him blindly to obey. But something in the expression of the dying toad's clasped hands suggests the meanness of the act, or reminds him of sayings he has heard about the sufferings of animals being like his own; so that, when next he is tempted by a toad, an idea arises which, far from spurring him again to the torment, prompts kindly actions, and may even make him the toad's champion against less reflecting boys
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.1%:
If a common person is asked how he is enabled to see things as they are, he will simply reply, by opening his eyes and looking. This innocent answer has, however, long since been impossible for science. There are various paradoxes and irregularities about what we appear to perceive under seemingly identical optical conditions, which immediately raise questions. To say nothing now of the time-honored conundrums of why we see upright with an inverted retinal picture, and why we do not see double; and to leave aside the whole field of color-contrasts and ambiguities, as not directly relevant to the space-problem, -- it is certain that the same retinal image makes us see quite differently-sized and differently-shaped objects at different times, and it is equally certain that the same ocular movement varies in its perceptive import
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.4%:
If a fourth thing interests him for which no sign happens already to have been learned, he remains tranquilly without it and goes no further. But the man postulates it, its absence irritates him, and he ends by inventing it. This GENERAL PURPOSE constitutes, I take it, the peculiarity of human speech, and explains its prodigious development.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.3%:
If an act require for its execution a chain, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, etc., of successive nervous events, then in the first performances of the action the conscious will must choose each of these events from a number of wrong alternatives that tend to present themselves; but habit soon brings it about that each event calls up its own appropriate successor without any alternative offering itself, and without any reference to the conscious will, until at last the whole chain, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, rattles itself off as soon as A occurs,
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.6%:
If asked how he perceived them, he will answer he cannot tell, he simply knew it. and so strongly and so distinctly that it is impossible to shake the opinion as to the exact details of the man's appearance
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
If belief consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man on an object, how can we believe at will? We cannot control our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will abruptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently, produces instantaneous conversions for us. She suddenly puts us in an active connection with objects of which she had till then left us cold. " I realize for the first time," we then say, "what that means!" This happens often with moral propositions. We have often heard them; but now they shoot into our lives; they move us; we feel their living force
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9%:
If feelings are causes, of course their effects must be furtherances and checkings of internal cerebral motions, of which in themselves we are entirely without knowledge.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.4%:
If heat were a function of position above the earth's surface, so that the higher a thing was the hotter it became, one word would serve for hot and high. We
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
If pure thought runs all our trains, why should she run some so fast and some so slow, some through dull flats and some through [p. 552] gorgeous scenery, some to mountain-heights and jewelled mines, others through dismal swamps and darkness? -- and run some off the track altogether, and into the wilderness of lunacy? Why
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 55.1%:
If sight is lost after the seventh year, visual imagination seems to survive through life Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.1%:
If such an account were true, a race of dogs bred for generations, say in the Vatican, with characters of visual shape, sculptured in marble, presented to their eyes, in every variety of form and combination, ought to discriminate before long the finest shades of these peculiar characters. In a word, they ought to become, if time were given, accomplished connoisseurs of sculpture
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10%:
If the different sensations known as sounds are built out of a common unit, is it not to be rationally inferred that so likewise are the different sensations known as tastes, and the different sensations known as odors, and the different sensations known as colors? Nay
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.2%:
If the history of popular speculation on these topics could be written, how much of cowardice and shuffling would be found in the behavior of the natural mind before the question, 'How dost thou know of an external reality. Note: Writing
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.4%:
If the reader has never paid attention to this matter, he will be both interested and astonished to learn how many different local bodily feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods.
COMPARED., 59.4%:
If the teacher is to explain the distance of the sun from the earth, let him ask ... 'If anyone there in the sun fired off a cannon straight at you, what should you do?' 'Get out of the way' should be the answer. 'No need of that,' the teacher might reply. 'You may quietly go to sleep in your room, and get up again, you may wait till your confirmation-day, you may learn a trade, and grow as old as I am, -- then only will the cannon-ball be getting near, then you may jump to one side! See, so great as that is the sun's distance Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.3%:
If there be any truth at all in this view, it follows that however vaguely a philosopher may define the ultimate universal datum, he cannot be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest degree pretends that our emotional or active attitude towards it should be of one sort rather than another
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84.1%:
If there be such a thing as a purely spiritual emotion, I should be inclined to restrict it to this cerebral sense of abundance and ease, this feeling, as Sir W. Hamilton would call it, of unimpeded and not overstrained activity of thought. Under ordinary conditions, it is a fine and serene but not an excited state of consciousness. In certain intoxications it becomes exciting, and it may be intensely exciting. I can hardly imagine a more frenzied excitement than that which goes with the consciousness of seeing absolute truth, which characterizes the coming to from nitrous-oxide drunkenness. Chloroform Note: Sounds like Flow or Hoffer's keyed up mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
If there is anything intolerable (especially to the heart of a woman), it is to do nothing when a [p. 311] loved one is sick or in pain. To do anything is a relief. Accordingly, whatever remedy may be suggested is a spark on inflammable soil
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.2%:
If this kind of simplicity and substantiality were all that is predicated of the Soul, then it might appear that we had been talking of the soul all along, without knowing it, when we treated the present Thought as an agent, an owner, and the like. But the Thought is a perishing and not an immortal or incorruptible thing. Its successors may continuously succeed to it, resemble it, and appropriate it, but they are not it, whereas the Soul- Substance is supposed to be a fixed unchanging thing
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.8%:
If volitions arise without cause, it necessarily follows that we cannot infer from them the character of the antecedent states of feeling. If, therefore, a murder has been committed, we have a priori no better reason for suspecting the worst enemy than the best friend of the murdered man.
Chapter: THE SUMMATION OF STIMULI, 5.2%:
If we are striving to remember a lost name or fact, we think of as many 'cues' as possible, so that by their joint action they may recall what no one of them can recall alone
Chapter: CHAPTER III. On Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity., 5%:
If we make a symbolic diagram on a blackboard, of the laws of association between ideas, we are inevitably led to draw circles, or closed figures of some kind, and to connect them by lines. When we hear that the nerve-centres contain cells which send off fibres, we say that Nature has realized our diagram for us, and that the mechanical substratum of thought is plain
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37%:
If we start to deal with the things as simply the same or alike, we are liable to be surprised by the difference. If we start to [p. 529] treat them as merely different, we are apt to discover how much they are alike. Difference, commonly so called, is thus between species of a genus.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.3%:
If we survey the held of history and ask what feature all great periods of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, we shall find, I think, simply this: that each and all of them have said to the human being, 'The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to powers which you possess
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.9%:
If we think of the space behind us, we, as a rule, have to [p. 208] turn round mentally, and in doing so the front space vanishes. But in this, as in the other things of which we have been talking, individuals differ widely.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.1%:
If with the desire there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply wish; but if we believe that the end is in our power, we will that the desired feeling, having, or doing shall be real; and real it presently becomes, either immediately upon the willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled
Chapter: CONCLUSION., 4.4%:
If, moreover, it can identify in memory any motor discharges which may have led to such ends, and associate the latter with them, then these motor discharges themselves may in turn become desired as means. This is the development of will; and its realization must of course be proportional to the possible complication of the consciousness
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.3%:
If, with the Spiritualists, one contend for a substantial soul, or transcendental principle of unity, one can give no positive account of what that may be. And if, with the Humians, one deny such a principle and say that the stream of passing thoughts is all, one runs against the entire common-sense of mankind, of which the belief in a distinct principle of selfhood seems an integral part
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
If, without believing in a God, I still continue to talk of what the world 'essentially is,' I am just as much entitled to define it as a place in which my nose itches, or as a place where at a certain corner I can get a mess of oysters for twenty cents, as to call it an evolving nebula differentiating and integrating itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.9%:
Imagine two steel knife-blades with their keen edges crossing each other at right angles, and moving to and fro. Our whole nervous organization is 'on-edge ' at the thought; and yet what emotion can be there except the unpleasant nervous feeling itself, or the dread that more of it may come? The entire fund and capital of the emotion here is the senseless bodily effect which the blades immediately arouse
COMPARED., 56.7%:
In a foreign language, although it may Be printed with the same letters, we read by so much the more slowly as we do not understand, or are unable promptly to perceive the words. But we notice misprints all the more readily Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.5%:
In a scientific research we get perhaps as rich an example as can be found.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.8%:
In a word, feeling constitutes [p.135] the 'unscientific' half of existence, and any one who enjoys calling himself a 'scientist'will be too happy to purchase an untrammelled homogeneity of terms in the studies of his predilection, at the slight cost of admitting a dualism which, in the same breath that it allows to mind an independent status of being, banishes it to a limbo of causal inertness, from whence no intrusion or interruption on its part need ever be feared.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.5%:
In a word, our love pleasures begin and end in sensual contact
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
In action as in reasoning, then, the great thing is the quest of the right conception Note: Important
Chapter: GENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES., 1.5%:
In all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by reference to the most distant ends has been held to possess the highest intelligence. The tramp who lives from hour to hour; the bohemian whose engagements are from day to day; the bachelor who builds but for a single life; the father who acts for another generation ; the patriot who thinks of a whole community and many generations; and finally, the philosopher and saint whose cares are for humanity and for eternity,-these range themselves in an unbroken hierarchy, wherein each successive grade results from an increased manifestation of the special form of action by which the cerebral centres are distinguished from all below them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
In all pedagogy the great thing is to strike the iron while hot, and to seize the wave of the pupil's interest in each successive subject before its ebb has come, so that knowledge may be got and a habit of skill acquired -- a headway of interest, in short, secured, on which afterward the individual may float
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.8%:
In all primitive literature, in all savage oratory, we find persuasion carried on exclusively by parables and similes, and travellers in savage countries readily adopt the native custom
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.2%:
In all this the determining condition of the unhesitating and resistless sequence of the act seems to be the absence of any conflicting notion in the mind. Either there is nothing else at all in the mind, or what is there does not conflict. The hypnotic subject realizes the former condition.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
In all this the everlasting partiality of our nature shows itself, our inveterate propensity to choice
99.3%:
In an article entitled 'Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment,' published in the Atlantic Monthly for October 1880
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.9%:
In both existential and attributive judgments a synthesis is represented. The syllable ex in the word Existence, da in the word Dasein, express it. 'The candle exists' is equivalent to 'The candle is over there.' and the 'over there' means real space, space related to other reals. The proposition amounts to saying: 'The candle is in the same space with other reals.'
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
In both these states the content of our mind is in unrest, and the emotion engendered thereby is, like the emotion of belief itself, perfectly distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.9%:
In cases of morbid terror the subjects often confess that what possesses them seems, more than anything, to be fear of the fear itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.5%:
In cases where the difference is slight, we may need, as previously remarked, to get the dying phase of n as well as of m before n-different-from-m is distinctly felt
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.8%:
In demanding a more 'real' connection than this obvious and verifiable likeness and continuity, Hume seeks 'the world behind the looking-glass,' and gives a striking example of that Absolutism which is the great disease of philosophic Thought.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
In each of us a saturation-point is soon reached in all these things; the impetus of our purely intellectual zeal expires, and unless the topic be one associated with some urgent personal need that keeps our wits constantly whetted about it, we [p. 402] settle into an equilibrium, and live on what we learned when our interest was fresh and instinctive, without adding to the store
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.9%:
In ethical, psychological, and æsthetic matters, to give a clear reason for one's judgment is universally recognized as a mark of rare genius. The helplessness of uneducated people to account for their likes and dislikes is often ludicrous
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.9%:
In fact, in answering the question what things it is that a man loves in his selflove, we have implicitly answered the farther question, of why he loves them. Unless his consciousness were something more than cognitive, unless it experienced a partiality for certain of the objects, which, in succession, occupy its ken, it could not long maintain itself in existence; for, by an inscrutable necessity, each human mind's appearance on this earth is conditioned upon the integrity of the body with which it belongs
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.1%:
In fact, the joint-feeling can frequently serve as a map on a reduced scale, of a reality which the imagination can identify at its pleasure with this or that sensible extension simultaneously known in some other way. When the joint-feeling in itself acquires an emotional interest, -- which happens whenever the joint is inflamed and painful, -- the secondary suggestions fail to arise, and the movement is felt where it is, and in its intrinsic scale of magnitude
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.9%:
In fact, to those born blind, time serves instead of space. Vicinity and distance mean in their mouths nothing more than the shorter or longer time ... necessary to attain from some one feeling to some other."
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.9%:
In general, a time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems short in passing, but long as we look back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences seems long in passing, but in retrospect short
COMPARED., 59.7%:
In general, the narrower a train of 'ideas' is, the wider the consciousness is of each. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.1%:
In its essential character, belief is a phase of our active nature -- otherwise called the Will."
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.6%:
In kindergarten instruction one of the exercises is to make the children see how many features they can point out in such an object as a flower or [p. 444] a stuffed bird. They readily name the features they know already, such as leaves, tail, bill, feet. But they may look for hours without distinguishing nostrils, claws, scales, etc., until their attention is called to these details; thereafter, however, they see them every time
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 59.9%:
In like manner extensity, being an entirely peculiar kind of feeling indescribable except in terms of itself, and inseparable in actual experience from some sensational quality which it must accompany, can itself receive no other name than that of sensational element
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
In looking back over the subject of reasoning, one feel show intimately connected it is with conception; and one realizes more than ever the deep reach of that principle of selection on which so much stress was laid towards the close of Chapter IX.
COMPARED., 58.8%:
In many of these cases if has been distinctly proved that a morbid irritation in the internal ear, or an opacity in the humors of the eye, was the starting point of the current which the patient's diseased acoustic or optical centres clothed with their peculiar products in the way of ideas Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
98.1%:
In many respects we do class ourselves with other men, and call them and ourselves by a common name. They agree with us in having the same Heavenly Father, in not being consulted about their birth, [p. 674] in not being themselves to thank or blame for their natural gifts, in having the same desires and pains and pleasures, in short in a host of fundamental relations. Hence, if these things be our essence, we should be substitutable for other men, and they for us, in any proposition in which either of us is involved Note: The basis of the golden rule
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.2%:
In mental terms, the more other facts a fact is associated with in the mind, the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of its associates becomes a hook to which it hangs, a means to fish it up by when sunk beneath the surface.
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.8%:
In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyze a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more our familiarity with it is of the acquaintance-type Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.3%:
In other words, a blurred picture is just as much a single mental fact as a sharp picture is
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.4%:
In other words, however numerous and delicately differentiated the train of ideas may be, the train of brain-events that runs alongside of it must in both respects be exactly its match, and we must postulate a neural machinery that offers a living counterpart for every shading, however fine, of the history of its owner's mind
COMPARED., 57.3%:
In other words, just in proportion as associations are habitual, mill the qualities of the suggested thing tend to substitute themselves in consciousness for those of the thing immediately there; or, more briefly, just in proportion as an experience is probable will it tend to be directly felt Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.3%:
In other words, muscular contraction is only indirectly instrumental, in giving us spaceperceptions, by its effects on surfaces. In skin and retina it produces a motion of the stimulus upon the surface; in joints it produces a motion of the surfaces upon each other -- such motion being by far the [p. 198] most delicate manner of exciting the surfaces in question
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.3%:
In other words, no possible number of entities (call them as you like, whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can sum themselves together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only for a bystander who happens to overlook the units and to [p.159] apprehend the sum as such
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.5%:
In persons whose auditory imagination is weak, the articulatory image seems to constitute the whole material for verbal thought
COMPARED., 57.6%:
In principle, however, we must maintain that, although either factor is both active and passive, the a priori factor is almost always the more active of the two." [35] Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.6%:
In scientific research this accumulation of associates has been methodized by Mill under the title of 'The Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry.' By the 'method of agreement,' by that of 'difference,' by those of 'residues'and 'concomitant variations' (which cannot here be more nearly defined), we make certain lists of cases; and by ruminating these lists in our minds the cause we seek will be more likely to emerge
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.9%:
In sentimental natures the thought of 'yearning' will produce real 'yearning.' And
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.2%:
In short, the absence of an item is a determinant of our representations quite as positive as its presence can ever be. The gap becomes no mere void, but what is called an aching void
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
In short, the essence of plebeianism, that which separates vulgarity from aristocracy, is perhaps less a defect than an excess, the constant need to animadvert upon matters which for the aristocratic temperament do not exist
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.7%:
In short, the only things which we commonly see are those which we preperceive, and the only things which we preperceive are those which have been labelled for us, and the labels stamped into our mind. If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the midst of the world
Chapter: CHAPTER III. On Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity., 5%:
In some way, it is true, our diagram must be realized in the brain; but surely in no such visible and palpable way as we at first suppose
COMPARED., 58.6%:
In somnolescence, sensations being extinct, the mind, it is said, then having no stronger things to compare its ideas with ascribes to these the fulness of reality. At ordinary times the objects of our imagination are reduced to the status subjective facts by the ever-present contrast of our sensations with them. Eliminate the sensations, however, this view supposes, and the 'images' are forthwith 'projected' into the outer world and appear as realities, Thus Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.9%:
In the fifth and final type of decision, the feeling that the evidence is all in, and that reason has balanced the books, may be either present or absent. But in either case we feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful act inclined the beam; in the former case by adding our living effort to the weight of the logical reason which, taken alone, seems powerless to make the act discharge; in the latter by a kind of creative contribution of something instead of a reason which does a reason's work
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.4%:
In the first place, the acts of attending, assenting, negating, making an effort, are felt as movements of something in the head. In many cases it is possible to describe these movements quite exactly
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.2%:
In the majority of emotions this test is inapplicable; for many of the manifestations are in organs over which we have no voluntary control. Few people in pretending to cry can shed real tears, for example. But
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.8%:
In the most critical moments of my life, when I ought to have been so engrossed as to leave no room for any secondary thoughts, I have been oppressed by the inability to be at peace, and in the most ordinary circumstances it is all the same Note: Clouston personal mental habits
95.3%:
In the one case the natural agents produce perceptions which take cognizance of the agents themselves; in the other case, they produce perceptions which take cognizance of something else
COMPARED., 59.3%:
In the ordinary hearing of speech half the words we seem to hear are supplied out of our head. A language with which we are perfectly familiar is understood Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.1%:
In the practical as in the theoretic life, the man whose acquisitions stick is the man who is always achieving and advancing, whilst his neighbors, spending most of their time in relearning what they once knew but have forgotten, simply hold their own
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 59.8%:
In the sensations of smell and taste this element of varying vastness seems less prominent but not altogether absent
COMPARED., 56.8%:
In the sense of feeling this phenomenon is less prominent, because we get so close to the object that our sensation of it is never incomplete Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.8%:
In the third type the determination seems equally accidental, but it comes from within, and not from without
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.1%:
In these latter instances we must suppose that there is an identical portion in the similar objects, and that its brain-tract is energetically operative, without, however, being sufficiently isolable in its activity as to stand out per se, and form the condition of a distinctly discriminated 'abstract idea.'Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78%:
In this condition an impulse acted out may be said to be acted out, in pert at least, for the sake of its results
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
In this, the partiality of one moment is partly atoned for by the different sort of partiality of the next. To me now, writing these words, emphasis and selection seem to be the essence of the human mind. In other chapters other qualities have seemed, and will again seem, more important parts of psychology
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30%:
In turning his attention, therefore, from the outset towards the answer, those brain-processes in him which were connected with this entire 'sphere' were kept sub-excited, and the question could then discharge with a minimum amount of lost time that particular answer out of the 'sphere' which belonged especially to it. When
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.1%:
In what then is Mr. Bain's procedure superior to the method of the faculties? It is that the latter is simply a classification while his is an explanation. Between the psychology which traces intellectual facts back to certain faculties, and that which reduces them to the single law of association, there is, according to our way of thinking, the same difference that we find in Physics between those who attribute its phenomena to five or six causes, and those who derive gravity caloric, light, etc., from motion
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.2%:
In women it is called coyness, and has to be positively overcome by a process of wooing before the sexual instinct inhibits it and takes its place
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
Independence of other causes, and its own causal importance
98.3%:
Instincts must have been either 1) Each specially created in complete form, or Gradually evolved. As
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.1%:
Is it not the simplest explanation for all these phenomena, so consistent among themselves, to suppose that the Ego, the self, which forms the origin and centre of our thinking life, is at the same time the original and central object of our life of feeling, and the ground both of whatever special ideas and of whatever special feelings ensue?
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.6%:
It appears as if all our concrete manifestations of selfishness might be the conclusions of as many syllogisms, each with this principle as the subject of its major premiss, thus: Whatever is me is precious; this is me; therefore this is precious; whatever is mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore this must not fail, etc
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
It explains all intellectual facts, certainly not after the manner of Metaphysics which demands the ultimate and absolute reason of things; but after the manner of Physics which seeks only their secondary and immediate cause."[37]
94.6%:
It is a familiar truth that some propositions are necessary. We must attach the predicate 'equal' to the subject 'opposite sides of a parallelogram' if we think those terms together at all, whereas we need not in any such way attach the predicate 'rainy,' for example, to the subject 'tomorrow.'The dubious sort of coupling of terms is universally admitted to be due to 'experience'; the certain sort is ascribed to the 'organic structure' of the mind.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.9%:
It is a matter of universal experience that every kind of training for special aptitudes is both far more effective, and leaves a more permanent impress, when exerted on the growing organism than when brought to bear on the adult
99.2%:
It is a transformer of the world of our impressions into a totally different world, the world of our conception; and the transformation is effected in the interests of our volitional nature, and for no other purpose whatsoever
96.7%:
It is a very peculiar world, and plays right into logic's hands. Some of the things, at least, which it contains are of the same kind as other things; some of them remain always of the kind of which they once were; and some of the properties of them cohere indissolubly and are always found together
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.2%:
It is as when one 'cuts' an acquaintance, 'ignores' a claim, or 'refuses to be influenced' by a consideration. But the perceptive activity which works to this result is disconnected from the consciousness which is personal, so to speak, to the subject, and makes of the object concerning which the suggestion is made, its own private possession and prey Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15%:
It is astonishing what havoc is wrought in psychology by admitting at the outset apparently innocent suppositions, that nevertheless contain a flaw. The bad consequences develop themselves later on, and are irremediable, being woven through the whole texture of the work
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.4%:
It is better not to be pedantic, but to let the science be as vague as its subject, and include such phenomena as these if by so doing we can throw any light on the main business in hand
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.5%:
It is enough that certain philosophers have thought they could see under the dissolving-view-appearance of the mind elementary facts of any sort that remained unchanged amid the flow
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.6%:
It is for this reason that men have no eyes but for those aspects of things which they have already been taught to discern. Any one of us can notice a phenomenon after it has once been pointed out, which not one in ten thousand could ever have discovered for himself.
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.1%:
It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in the descriptive parts of most psychologies.
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.4%:
It is highly important that this natural-science point of view should be understood at the outset. Otherwise more may be demanded of the psychologist than he ought to be expected to perform
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.8%:
It is in short, the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.5%:
It is just because human bloodthirstiness is such a primitive part of us that it is so hard to eradicate, especially where a fight or a hunt is promised as part of the fun
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.4%:
It is likely that the different degrees in which different men are able to make them sharp and complete has had something to do with keeping up such philosophic disputes as that of Berkeley with Locke over abstract ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.2%:
It is more probable that with them the instinct of physical aver- [p. 439] sion toward a, certain class of objects was inhibited early in life by habits, formed under the influence of example; and that then a kind of sexual appetite, of which very likely most men possess the germinal possibility, developed itself in an unrestricted way. That Note: Taking about the unnatural sexual habits of the Greeks
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.9%:
It is necessary, above all things, in such a situation, never to lose a battle. Every gain on the wrong side undoes the effect of many conquests on the right. The essential precaution, therefore, is so to regulate the two opposing powers that the one may have a series of uninterrupted successes, until repetition has fortified it to such a degree as to enable it to cope with the opposition, under any circumstances. This is the theoretically best career of mental progress."
97.9%:
It is not that these more metaphysical postulates of rationality are absolutely barren -- though barren enough they were when used, as the scholastics used them, as immediate propositions of fact
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.1%:
It is obvious that the advance of our knowledge must consist of both operations; for objects at first appearing as wholes are analyzed into parts, and objects appearing separately are brought together and appear as new compound wholes to the mind. Analysis and synthesis are thus the incessantly alternating mental activities, a stroke of the one preparing the way for a stroke of the other, much as, in walking, a man's two legs are alternately brought into use, both being indispensable for any orderly advance. The manner in which trains of imagery and consideration follow each other through our thinking, the restless flight of one idea before the next, the transitions our minds make between things wide as the poles asunder, transitions which at first sight startle us by their abruptness, but which, when scrutinized closely, often reveal intermediating links of perfect naturalness and propriety -- all this magical, imponderable streaming has from time immemorial excited the admiration of all whose attention happened to be caught by its omnipresent mystery
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.6%:
It is of course conceivable (though far from clearly so) that in the last metaphysical resort all these streams of thought may be thought by one universal All-thinker. But in this metaphysical notion there is no profit for psychology; for grant that one Thinker does think in all of us, still what He thinks in me and what in you can never be deduced from the bare idea of Him
96%:
It is often a deadly fight; and many a man of science can say, like Johannes Müller, after an investigation, 'Es klebt Blut an der Arbeit.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.3%:
It is one of the strangest laws of our nature that many things which we are well satisfied with in ourselves disgust us when seen in others. With
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.4%:
It is only as we are conscious of the action of these energies that we are conscious of the existence of mind. It is only by the exertion of its own powers that the mind becomes cognizant of their existence. The cognizance of its powers, however, gives us no knowledge of that essence of which they are predicated. In
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.9%:
It is only in some such way as this, again, that I can imagine that state which is sometimes described as the beginning of our whole education, a state which in itself is supposed to be simple, and to be afterwards divided into different sensations by an activity of separation. No activity of separation in the world could establish differences where no real diversity existed; for it would have nothing to guide it to the places where it was to establish them, or to indicate the width it was to give them
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.4%:
It is probable that genius tends actually to prevent a man from acquiring habits of voluntary attention, and that moderate intellectual endowments are the soil in which we may best expect, here as elsewhere, the virtues of the will, strictly so called, to thrive. But
Chapter: Touch., 3.5%:
It is probable that we have about reached the limits of what can be learned about brain-functions from vivisecting inferior animals, and that we must hereafter look more exclusively to human pathology for light. The existence of separate speech and writing centres in the left hemisphere in man; the fact that palsy from cortical injury is so much more complete and enduring in man and the monkey than in dogs; and the farther fact that it seems more difficult to get complete sensorial blindness from cortical ablations in the lower animals than in man, all show that functions get more specially localized as evolution goes on
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
It is probable, also, that man's superior association by similarity has much to do with those discriminations of character on which his higher flights of reasoning are based
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
It is safe to say that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated, mankind will drop all other systems and cling to that one alone as reel. Meanwhile
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.2%:
It is simply unintelligible and fantastical to say, because they point to the same outer reality, that they must therefore be so many editions of the same 'idea,' now in conscious and now in an 'unconscious' phase. There is only one 'phase' in which an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condition
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8%:
It is surprising how soon a desire will die of inanition if it be never fed
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.1%:
It is the old idea of our actual knowledge being drawn out from a pre-existent potentiality, an idea which, whatever worth it may metaphysically possess, does no good in psychology Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.3%:
It is the one essential spontaneity of the Understanding which, under these different names, brings unity into the manifold of sense. "The Understanding is, in fact, nothing more than the faculty of binding together a priori, and of bringing the Manifold of given ideas under the unity of Apperception, which consequently is the supreme principle of all human knowledge"
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.3%:
It is true that a presiding arbiter seems to sit aloft in the mind, and emphasize the better suggestions into permanence, while it ends by droopping out and leaving unrecorded the confusion. But this is all the difference. The mode of genesis of the worthy and the worthless seems the same. The laws of our actual thinking, of the cogitatum, must account alike for the bad and the good materials on which the arbiter has to decide, for wisdom and for folly. The laws of the arbiter, of the cogitandum, of what we ought to think, are to the former as the [p. 553] laws of ethics are to those of history. Who but an hegelian historian ever pretended that reason in action was per se a sufficient explanation of the political changes in Europe?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.4%:
It is true that sympathy is peculiarly liable to inhibition from other instincts which its stimulus may call forth. The traveller whom the good Samaritan rescued may well have prompted such instinctive fear or disgust in the priest and Levite who passed him by, that their sympathy could not come to the front.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88%:
It is where the normally less efficacious motive becomes more efficacious and the normally more efficacious one less so that actions ordinarily effortless, or abstinences ordinarily easy, either become impossible or are effected, if at all, by the expenditure of effort
96.4%:
It is, for some unknown reason, a, great æsthetic delight for the mind to break the order of experience, and class its materials in serial orders, proceeding from step to step of difference, and to contemplate untiringly the crossings and inosculations of the [p. 647] series among themselves
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.2%:
It is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed to philosophic meditation. Reflection leads us to the conclusion [p. 609] that it must exist, but that it does exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience. The only fact of our immediate experience is what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called 'the specious present.' His
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.6%:
It may be a constitutional infirmity, but I can take no comfort in such devices for making a luxury of intellectual defeat. They are but spiritual chloroform. Better live on the ragged edge, better gnaw the file forever!
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
It may be said in general that a great part of every deliberation consists in the turning over of all the possible modes of conceiving the doing or not doing of the act in point. The moment we hit upon a conception which lets us apply some principle of action which is a fixed and stable part of our Ego, our state of doubt is at an end
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 26.4%:
It seems exactly as if one author composed more than half of the trance-messages, no matter by whom they are uttered. Whether all sub-conscious selves are peculiarly susceptible to a certain stratum of the Zeitgeist, and get their inspiration from it, I know not
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.1%:
It seems more probable, therefore, that this wood-cutter's dog had also been accustomed to carry the axe, and now, excited by the vain hunt for the wedge, had discharged his carrying powers upon the former instrument in a sort of confusion -- just as a man may pick up a sieve to carry water in, in the excitement of putting out a fire.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.1%:
It seems to me, as I said in the previous place, that the illusion is in all these cases due to the inveterate association of ideas. Normally our will to move has always been followed by the sensation that we have moved, except when the simultaneous sensation of an external resistance was there. The result is that where we feel no external resistance, and the muscles and tendons tighten, the invariably associated idea is intense enough to be hallucinatory
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
It settles into our belief as a common-sense object, a scientific object, an abstract object, a mythological object, an object of some one's mistaken conception, or a madman's object; and it reaches this state sometimes immediately, but often only after being hustled and bandied about amongst other objects until it finds some which will tolerate its presence and stand in relations to it which nothing contradicts
99.8%:
It shows the world in a clear frosty light from which all fuliginous mists of affection, all swamp-lights of sentimentality, are absent. Straight and immediate action becomes easy then -- witness a Napoleon's or a Frederick's career. But the question always remains, "Are not the mists and vapors worth retaining?" The illogical refusal to treat certain concretes by the mere law of their genus has made the drama of human history. The obstinate insisting that tweedledum is not tweedledee is the bone and marrow of life
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.8%:
It takes, in short, what Berkeley calls a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for the why of any instinctive human act. To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so upside-down? The
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.5%:
It will be least obeyed by those minds which have the smallest variety and intensity of interests -- those who, by the general flatness and poverty of their æsthetic nature, are kept for ever rotating among the literal sequences of their local an personal history. Most of us, however, are better organized than this, and [p. 573] our musings pursue and erratic course, swerving continually into some new direction traced by the shifting play of interest as it ever falls on some partial item in each complex representation that is evoked
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 36.2%:
It will be remembered that on page 509 personal interest was named as a sharpener of discrimination alongside of practice. But personal interest probably acts through attention and not in any immediate or specific way
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.3%:
It will have been noticed in the account given that when two sensorial sense-impressions, believed to come from the same object, differ, then THE ONE MOST INTERESTING, practically or æsthetically, Is JUDGED TO BE THE TRUE ONE
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11%:
It would be natural to feel towards him as the sailor in the story felt towards the horse who got his foot into the stirrup, - "If you're going to get on, I must get off."
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.1%:
It would be one of the most important of physiological discoveries could we assign the mechanical or chemical difference which makes the thoughts of one brain cling close to impartial redintegration, while those of another shoot about in all the lawless revelry of [p. 583] similarity. Why, in these latter brains, action should tend to focalize itself in small spots, while in the others it fills patiently its broad bed, it seems impossible to guess. Whatever the difference may be, it is what separates the man of genius from the prosaic creature of habit and routine thinking
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.9%:
It would be rash to say definitely just how many seconds long this specious present must needs be, for processes fade 'asymptotically,' and the distinctly intuited present merges into a penumbra of mere dim recency before it turns into the past which is simply reproduced and conceived
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87%:
It would seem indeed that we fail of accuracy and certainty in our attainment of the end whenever we are preoccupied with much ideal consciousness of the means
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.7%:
It would seem that in such a case the neural process corresponding to the imagination must be the entire tract concerned in the actual sensation, even down as far as the retina. This
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
It would seem, then, that in these higher creatures the lower centres must be less adequate than they are farther down in the zoological scale; and that even for certain elementary [p.76] combinations of movement and impression the co-operation of the hemispheres is necessary from the start
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.3%:
Its content is in a constant flux, events dawning into its forward end as fast as they fade out of its rearward one, and each of them changing its time-coefficient from 'not yet,' or 'not quite yet,' to 'just gone' or 'gone,' as it passes by. Meanwhile, the specious present, the intuited duration, stands permanent, like the rainbow on the waterfall, with its own quality unchanged by the events that stream through it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.9%:
James Mill, to be sure, chimes in heroically in the chapter on Classification of his 'Analysis'; but in his son John the nominalistic voice has grown so weak that, although 'abstract ideas' are repudiated as a matter of traditional form, the opinions uttered are really nothing but a conceptualism ashamed to call itself by its own legitimate name.[
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24%:
John Mill, annotating this account, says: "The phenomenon of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same fact, or two different modes of viewing the same fact
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.5%:
Knowledge becomes for him an ultimate relation that must be admitted, whether it be explained or not, just like difference or resemblance, which no one seeks to explain Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
97.4%:
Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds, producing there certain general propositions
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.4%:
Language is a system of signs , different from the things signified, but able to suggest them
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.2%:
Language is the sole channel through which [p. 262] we communicate our knowledge and discoveries to others, and through which the knowledge and discoveries of others are communicated to us. By reiterated recourse to this medium, if necessarily happens that when things are related to each other, the words signifying those things are more commonly brought together in discourse. Hence the words and names by themselves, by customary vicinity, contract in the fancy a relation additional to that which they derive purely from being the symbols of related things
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.1%:
Language was originally made by men who were not psychologists, and most men to-day employ almost exclusively the vocabulary of outward things
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.3%:
Later we must ourselves discuss them all, and sufficient to that day will be the evil thereof
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
Later, introspective psychology and the metaphysical and religious mysteries take their turn; and, last of all, the drama of human affairs and worldly wisdom in the widest sense of the term
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.8%:
Learning does but make one the more sensible of its inward unintelligibility
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.3%:
Let a man early in life set himself the task of verifying such a theory as that of evolution, and facts will soon cluster and cling to him like grapes to their stem. Their relations to the theory will hold them fast; and the more of these the mind is able to discern, the greater the erudition will become. Meanwhile the theorist may have little, if any, desultory memory. Unutilizable facts may be unnoted by him and forgotten as soon as heard. An ignorance [p. 663] almost as encyclopædic as his erudition may coexist with the latter, and hide, as it were, in the interstices of its web
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.9%:
Let anyone closely examine what has passed in his mind when he has constructed a chain of reasoning, and he will be surprised at the fewness and faintness of the images which have accompanied the ideas
97.3%:
Let it not be said that it is a mere matter of verbal association, due to the fact that language sometimes permits us to transfer the name of a relation over skipped intermediaries, and sometimes does not; as where we call men 'progenitors' of their remote as well as of their immediate posterity, but refuse to call them 'fathers' thereof
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.8%:
Let me sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious of a certain duration -- the specious present -- varying in length from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and that this duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and the other part later) is the original intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by adding, shorter ones by dividing, portions of this vaguely bounded unit, and are habitually thought by us symbolically.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.4%:
Let no one be surprised at this notion of a space without order. There may be a space without order just as there may be an order without space
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.2%:
Let no youth have any anxiety about the upshot of his education, whatever the line of it may be. If he keep faithfully busy each hour of the workingday, he may safely leave the final result to itself. He can with perfect certainty count on waking up some fine morning, to find himself one of the competent ones of his generation, in whatever pursuit he may have singled out. Silently, between all the details of his business, the power of judging in all that class of matter will have built itself up within him as a possession that will never pass away. Young people should know this truth in advance. The ignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement and faint-heartedness in youths embarking on arduous careers than all other causes put together.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.2%:
Let them despise this little person of mine, and treat me like a dog, I shall not negate them so long as I have a soul in my body. They are realities as much as I am
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 86.9%:
Let there be no such consciousness; let all our thoughts of movements be of sensational constitution; still in the emphasizing, choosing, and espousing of one of them rather than another, in the saying to it, 'be thou the reality for me,' there is ample scope for our inward initiative to be shown
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.9%:
Let us make this ability to deal with NOVEL data the technical differentia of reasoning .
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.4%:
Let us then admit distance to be at least as genuinely optical a content of consciousness as either height or breadth
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.6%:
Let us then confess that Thought alone can unlock the riddle of space, and that Thought is an adorable but unfathomable mystery.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.4%:
Like ourselves he believes in a Reality outside the mind of which he writes, but the critic who vouches for that reality does so on grounds of faith, for it is not a verifiable phenomenal thing
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9%:
Like physics, she must be naïve; and if she finds that in her very peculiar field of study ideas seem to be causes, she had better continue to talk of them as such
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.2%:
Loading its dice would mean bringing a more or less constant pressure to bear in favor of those of its performances which make for the most permanent interests of the brain's owner; it would mean a constant inhibition of the tendencies to stray aside. Well, just such pressure and such inhibition are what consciousness seems to be exerting all the while. And
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 50.2%:
Locke's pupils seek to do the impossible with sensations, and against them we must once again insist that sensations 'clustered together' cannot build up our more intellectual states of mind. Plato's earlier pupils used to admit Sensation's existence, grudgingly, but they trampled it in the dust as something corporeal, non-cognitive, and vile. [11] His latest followers [p. 10] seem to seek to crowd it out of existence altogether. The only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers appear to be relations, relations without terms, or whose terms are speciously such and really consist in knots, or gnarls relations finer still in infinitum
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
Love is the association of the agreeableness of certain sensible experiences with the idea of the object capable of affording them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.4%:
Man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not given him
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
Man, by his immensely varied instincts, practical wants, and aesthetic feelings, to which every sense contributes, would, by dint of these alone, be sure to dissociate vastly more characters than any other animal; and accordingly we had that the lowest savages reason incomparably better than the highest brutes. The diverse interests lead, too, to a diversification of experiences, whose accumulation becomes a condition for the play of that law of dissociation by varying concomitants of which I treated in a former chapter
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.9%:
Many cut all the leaves of a book of which they may be reading a single chapter, so that no one shall know which one they have singled out, and all this with no definite notion of harm
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.9%:
Many objects, events, changes, many subdivisions, immediately widen the view as we look back. Emptiness, monotony, familiarity, make it shrivel up
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.8%:
Many of the stanchest believers in the soul admit that we know it only as an inference from experiencing its states.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.7%:
Many of us need an attack of mental disease to teach us the meaning of the word. Hence the possibility of so much blindly optimistic philosophy and religion. The atrocities of life become 'like a tale of little meaning though the words are strong;' we doubt if anything like us ever really was within the tiger's jaws, and conclude that the horrors we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry for the chambers in which we lie so comfortably at peace with ourselves and with the world.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.7%:
Many persons never blush at the idea of their blunders, but only when the actual blunder is committed; others blush at the idea; and some do not blush at all
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
Meanwhile we can say that the multiplicity of emotional and instincitive reactions in man, together with his extensive associative power, permit of extensive recouplings of the original sensory and motor partners
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.5%:
Memory aims at filling the gap with an image which has at some particular time filled it before, reasoning with one which bears certain time-and space-relations to the images before and after" -- or, to use perhaps clearer language, one which stands in determinate logical relations to those data round about the gap which filled our mind at the start
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.6%:
Memory is then the feeling of belief in a peculiar complex object; but all the elements of this object may be known to other states of belief
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
Men are so ingrained partial that, for common-sense and scholasticism (which is only commonsense grown articulate), the notion that there is no one quality genuinely, absolutely, and exclusively essential to anything is almost unthinkable
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.8%:
Men, taken historically, reason by analogy long before they have learned to reason by abstract characters
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.8%:
Mental and physical events are, on all hands, admitted to present the strongest contrast in the entire field of being
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.5%:
Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
Millions,' says Hartmann, 'stare at the phenomenon before a genialer Kompf pounces on the concept
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.1%:
Monkeys these people seem to us, whilst we seem to them reptilian
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.5%:
Moreover, 'feeling' has acquired in the hearts of platonizing thinkers a very opprobrious set of implications ; and since one of the greatest obstacles to mutual understanding in philosophy is the use of words eulogistically and disparagingly, impartial terms ought always, if possible, to be preferred
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.2%:
Moreover, this author goes on to show that our own things are fuller for us than those of others because of the memories they awaken and the practical hopes and expectations they arouse. This alone would emphasize them, apart from any value derived from their belonging to ourselves
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 5.9%:
Mosso, using his ingenious 'plethysmo-[p.98] graph' as an indicator, discovered that the blood-supply to the arms diminished during intellectual activity, and found furthermore that the arterial tension (as shown by the sphygmograph) was increased in these members (see Fig.23).
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.2%:
Most of the performances of other animals are automatic. But in him the number of them is so enormous, that most of them must be the fruit of painful study. If practice did not make perfect, nor habit economize the expense of nervous and muscular energy, he would therefore be in a sorry plight. As Dr. Maudsley says: [10] :If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the careful direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or two deeds - that no progress could take place in development
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.8%:
Most people have the potentiality of this disease
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.2%:
Most people probably fall several times a day into a fit of something like this: The eyes are fixed on vacancy, the sounds of the world melt into confused unity, the attention is dispersed so that the whole body is felt, as it were, at once, and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if by anything, by a sort of solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of time
95.5%:
Most psychologists nowadays believe that the objects first, in some natural way, engendered a brain from out of their midst, and then imprinted these various cognitive affections upon it. But how? The ordinary evolutionist answer to this question is exceedingly simple-minded
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.4%:
Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling may be
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.5%:
Mozart describes thus his manner of composing: First bits and crumbs of the piece come and gradually join together in his mind; then the soul getting warmed to the work, the thing grows more and more, "and I spread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my head, even when it is a long piece, so that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were a beautiful painting or a handsome human being; in which way I do not hear it in my imagination at all as a succession - the way it must come later - but all at once, as it were. It is a rare feast! All the inventing and making goes on in me as in a beautiful strong dream. But the best of all is the hearing of it all at once."
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
Mr. Bagehot distinctly calls it the 'emotion' of conviction. I just now spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles more than anything what in the psychology of volition we know as consent
99.1%:
Mr. Grant Allen, in a brilliant article entitled Idiosyncrasy (Mind, VIII. 493), seeks to show that accidental morphological changes in the brain cannot possibly be imagined to result in any mental change of a sort which would fit the animal to its environment
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.1%:
Mr. Mill's habitual method of philosophizing was to affirm boldly some general doctrine derived from his father, and then make so many concessions of detail to its enemies as practically to abandon it altogether
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.8%:
Mr. Ruskin somewhere makes the (for him terrible) admission that religious people as a rule care little for pictures, and that when they do care for them they generally prefer the worst ones to the best
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
Mr. Warner, in his Adirondack story, shot a beer by aiming, not at his eye or heart, but 'at him gen- [p. 334] erally.' But we cannot aim 'generally' at the universe; or if we do, we miss our game. Our scope is narrow, and we must attack things piecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness in which the elements of Nature exist, and stringing one after another of them together in a serial way, to suit our little interests as they change from hour to hour. In
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.6%:
Much of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by another, of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems likely enough that the higher brutes should be capable
Chapter: Touch., 3.3%:
Munk calls the motor zone the Fühlsphäre of the animal's limbs, etc., and makes it coördinate with the Sehsphäre, the Hörsphäre, etc., the entire cortex being, according to him, nothing but a projection-surface for sensations, with no exclusively or essentially motor part. Such a view would be important if true, through its bearings on the psychology of volition
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.3%:
Music comes from the time-order of the notes upsetting their quality-order
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.1%:
My conclusion is that to urge the automaton-theory upon us, as it is now urged, on purely a priori and quasi-metaphysical grounds, is an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state of psychology.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
My excuse is necessity -- the necessity which my finite and practical nature lays upon me.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.4%:
My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds. After a certain amount of effort of attention has been given to an idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether either more or less of it might have been given or not
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22%:
My own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the primitive object, instinctively determined, of my egoistic interests. Other
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.4%:
My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.8%:
NO SPECIAL BRAIN-CENTRES FOR EMOTION
95.3%:
Nature has many methods of producing the same effect. She may make a 'born' draughtsman or singer by tipping in a certain direction at an opportune moment the molecules of some human ovum; or she may bring forth a child ungifted and make him spend laborious but successful years at school. She
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.2%:
Nature rises at such suggestions, and excludes them from the view: - How long, O healthy reader, can you now continue thinking of your tomb? - In milder instances the difficulty is as great, especially when the brain is fagged. One snatches at any and every passing pretext, no matter how trivial or external, to escape from the odiousness of the matter in hand. I
COMPARED., 55.7%:
Nature, as Reid says, is frugal in her operations, and will not be at the expense of a particular instinct to give us that knowledge which experience and habit will soon produce Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.6%:
Nevertheless, it is by no means easy to decide just what is meant by reason, or how the peculiar thinking process called reasoning differs from other thought-sequences which may lead to similar results
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.8%:
New conceptions come from new sensations, new movements, new emotions, new associations, new acts of attention, and new comparisons of old conceptions, and not in other ways,
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.2%:
Nil humani a me alienum puto' is the motto of each individual of the species; and makes him, whenever another individual shows a power or superiority of any kind, restless until he can exhibit it himself
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.8%:
No doubt it is often convenient to formulate the mental facts in an atomistic sort of way, aud to treat the higher states of consciousness as if they were all built out of unchanging simple ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.6%:
No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in himself be, and be so, as he apprehends it. Whoever should doubt this would have reached that finished doubt which destroys itself in destroying every fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowledge
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.2%:
No psychology, at any rate, can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.4%:
Nonsense in grammatical form sounds half rational; sense with grammatical sequence upset sounds nonsensical; e.g., "Elba the Napoleon English faith had banished broken to he Saint because Helena at." Finally, there is about each word the psychic 'overtone' of feeling that it brings us nearer to a forefelt conclusion
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
Nor is this intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest in those points in which men differ most from each other
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.6%:
Not new sensations, as in the em- [p. 465] pirical instance, but new conceptions, are the indispensable conditions of advance.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.8%:
Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more. If you ask him why he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at you for a fool
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21%:
Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the bon-vivant and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same [p. 310] tenement of clay
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.8%:
Not that the sensations melt into one another, but simply that the act of distinguishing them is absent; and this again certainly not so far that the fact of the difference remains entirely unperceived, but only so far as to prevent us from determining the amount of the difference, and from apprehending other relations between the different impressions
COMPARED., 56%:
Note that in every illusion what is false is what is inferred, not what is immediately given. The 'this,' if it were felt by itself alone, would be all right, it only becomes misleading by what it suggests Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.9%:
Note that the permanent interests are themselves grounded in certain objects and relations in which our interest is immediate and instinctive
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.4%:
Nothing could be more absurd than to hope for the definitive triumph of any philosophy which should refuse to legitimate, and to legitimate in an emphatic manner, the more powerful of our emotional and practical tendencies. Fatalism, whose solving word in all crises of behavior is 'All striving is vain,' will never reign supreme, for the impulse to take life strivingly is indestructible in the race
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.1%:
Nothing is requisite to make any man whatever he is, but a sentient principle with this single law. . . . Not only all our intellectual pleasures and pains but all the phenomena of memory, imagination, volition, reasoning and every other mental affection and operation, are but different modes or cases of the association of ideas."[35]
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
Now any thought the quality of whose fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all right,' is an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever kind of thought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it to have a place in the scheme of relations in which the in- [p. 260] teresting topic also lies, that is quite sufficient to make of it a relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.3%:
Now how do we ever get up under such circumstances? If I may generalize from my own experience, we more often than not get up without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly find that we have got up
98.5%:
Now if habit could thus bear fruit outside the individual life, and if the modifications so painfully acquired by the parents' nervous systems could be found ready-made at birth in those of the young, it would be hard [p. 681] to overestimate the importance, both practical and theoretical, of such an extension of its sway
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
Now into every one's deliberations the representation of one alternative will often enter with such sudden force as to carry the imagination with itself exclusively, and to produce an apparently settled decision in its own favor. These premature and spurious decisions are of course known to everyone. They often seem ridiculous in the light of the considerations that succeed them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
Now it is obvious that any mind in which association by similarity is highly developed is a mind which will spontaneously form lists of instances like this
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.8%:
Now let no modest reader think that if this sounds obscure to him it is because he does not know the full context; and that if a, wise professor like Wundt can talk so fluently and plausibly about 'combination' and 'psychic synthesis,' it must surely be because those words convey a so much greater fulness of positive meaning to the scholarly than to the unlearned mind. Really it is quite the reverse; all the virtue of the phrase lies in its mere sound and skin
95.5%:
Now we may postulate at the outset that all these forms of thought have a natural origin, if we could only get at it. That assumption must be made at the outset of every scientific investigation, or there is no temptation to proceed
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.5%:
Now words, uttered or unexpressed, are the handiest mental elements we have. Not only are they very rapidly revivable, but they are revivable as actual sensations more easily than any other items of our experience.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.7%:
Now, how comes it that one thing thought of can be contradicted by another? It cannot unless it begins the quarrel by saying something inadmissible about that other
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.5%:
Now, the dissociation of these two elements probably occurs first in the child's mind on the occasion of some error or false expectation which would make him experience the shock of difference between merely imagining a thing and getting it. The thought experienced once with the concomitant reality, and then without it or with opposite concomitants, reminds the child of other cases in which the same provoking phenomenon occurred
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.3%:
Now, what is this self of all the other selves? Probably all men would describe it in much the same way up to a certain point. They would call it the active element in all consciousness; saying that whatever qualities a man's feelings may possess, or whatever content his thought may include, there is a spiritual something in him which seems to go out to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in to be received by it. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its [p. 298] assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest, - not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak. It
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81%:
Now, what may the impulsive root be? I believe that, for one thing, it is shyness
95.8%:
Nowhere does the account of inner relations produced by outer ones in proportion to the frequency with which the latter have been met, more egregiously break down than in the case of scientific conceptions. The order of scientific thought is quite incongruent either with the way in which reality exists or with the way in which it comes before us
96.8%:
Number seems to signify primarily the strokes of our attention in discriminating things. These strokes remain in the memory in groups, large or small, and the groups can be compared.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
Objects and thoughts of objects start our action, but the pleasures and pains which action brings modify its course and regulate it; and later the thoughts of the pleasures and the pains acquire themselves impulsive and in- [p. 550] hibitive power
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
Objects of belief, on the contrary, are those which do not change according as we think regarding them
COMPARED., 57.4%:
Of all possible experiences, it is hard to imagine any pair more uniformly and incessantly coupled than the volition to move, on the one hand, and the feeling of the changed position of the parts, on the other Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
Of all these wider, more potential selves, the potential social self is the most interesting, by reason of certain apparent paradoxes to which it leads in conduct, and by reason of its connection with our moral and religious life
97.7%:
Of course it is a world with a very minimum of rational stuff. The sentimental facts and relations are butchered at a blow. But the rationality yielded is so superbly complete in form that to many minds this atones for the loss, and reconciles the thinker to the notion of a purposeless universe, in which all the things and qualities men love, dulcissima mundi nomina, are but illusions of our fancy attached to accidental clouds of dust which the eternal cosmic weather will dissipate as carelessly as it has formed them. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.9%:
Of course the eye-man has a right to fall back on the skin-man for help at a pinch. But doesn't this means that he is a mere eye-man and not a complete psychologist ? In Note: Language
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.6%:
Of ingenious methods, many have been invented, under the name of technical memories
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.9%:
Of our own past states of mind we take cognizance in a peculiar way. They are 'objects of memory,' and appear to us endowed with a sort of warmth and intimacy that makes the perception of them seem more like a process of sensation than like a thought. Footnotes [1] Messrs. Payton-Spence
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.7%:
Often the insistent idea is of a trivial sort, but it may wear the patient's life out. His hands feel dirty, they must be washed. He knows they are not dirty; yet to get rid of the teasing idea he washes them
COMPARED., 57.6%:
Oldfogyism, in short, is the inevitable terminus to which life sweeps us on. Objects which violate our established habits of 'apperception' are simply not taken account of at all; or, if on some occasion we are forced by dint of argument to admit their existence, twenty-four hours later the admission is as if it were not, and every trace of the unassimilable truth has vanished from our thought Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.7%:
On the other hand, in those cases in which conduct, and not personal appearance, is concerned, we are much more apt to be shy in the presence of acquaintances whose judgment we in some degree value than in that of strangers
COMPARED., 57.7%:
On the other hand, nothing is more congenial, from babyhood to the end of life, than to be able to assimilate the new to the old, to meet each threatening violator or burster of our well-known series of concepts, as it comes in, see through its unwontedness, and ticket it off as an old friend in disguise Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.2%:
On the other hand, sit all day in a moping posture, sigh, and reply to everything with a dismal voice, and your melancholy lingers. There
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
On the other hand, the excessive explicitness and short-windedness of an ordinary man are as wonderful as they are tedious to the man of genius
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81%:
On the other hand, the modest impulse, if it do exist, must be admitted to have a singularly ill-defined sphere of influence, both as regards the presences that call it forth, and as regards the acts to which it leads
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94.2%:
On the other hand, the reddenings and bleedings of the skin along certain lines, suggested by tracing lines or pressing objects thereupon, put the accounts handed down to us of the stigmata of the cross appearing oil the hands, feet, sides, and forehead of certain Catholic mystics in a new light. As so often happens, a fact is denied until a welcome interpretation comes with it. Then it is admitted readily enough; and evidence judged quite insufficient to back a claim, so long as the church had an interest in making it, proves to [p. 613] be quite sufficient for modern scientific enlightenment
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
On the vivid objects we [p. 302] pin, as the saying is, our faith in all the rest; and our belief returns instinctively even to those of them from which reflection has led it away
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.8%:
On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again. If the period between twenty and thirty is the critical one in the formation of intellectual and professional habits, [p.122] the period below twenty is more important still for the fixing of personal habits, properly so called, such as vocalization and pronunciation, gesture, motion, and address
95.5%:
On this view, if the outer order suddenly were to change its elements and modes, we should have no faculties to cognize the new order by. At most we should feel a sort of frustration and confusion
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 26.4%:
One curious thing about trance-utterances is their generic similarity in different individuals. The 'control' here in America is either a grotesque, slangy, and flippant personage ('Indian' controls, calling the ladies 'squaws,' the men 'braves,' the house a 'wigwam,' etc., etc., are excessively common); or, if he ventures on higher intellectual flights, he abounds in a curiously vague optimistic philosophy-and-water, in which phrases about spirit, harmony, beauty, law, progression, development, etc., keep recurring
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
One of the charms of drunkenness unquestionably lies in the deepening of the sense of reality and truth which is gained therein. In whatever light things may then appear to us, they seem more utterly what they are, more 'utterly utter' than when we are sober.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 94%:
One of the most extraordinary examples of visual hyperæsthesia is that reported by Bergson, in which a subject who seemed to be reading through the back of a book held and looked at by the operator, was really proved to be reading the image of the page reflected on the latter's cornea
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.4%:
One person, from inattention, or attending only in the wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees; another sets down much more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what be infers; another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each vague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but makes such an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass which require to be separated, and separating others which might more conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same, sometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.3%:
One sensation measures the 'thing' present, and the 'thing' then measures the other sensations
97.5%:
Only hypothetically can we affirm intuitive truths of real things -- by supposing, namely, that real things exist which correspond exactly with the ideal subjects of the intuitive propositions.
COMPARED., 57.7%:
Only what we partly know already inspires us with a desire to know more Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
98.2%:
Other natural lines are the moral and æsthetic relations. Philosophy is still seeking to conceive things so that these relations also may seem to obtain between them. As long as things have not successfully been so conceived, the moral and æsthetic relations obtain only between entia rationis, terms in the mind; and the moral and æsthetic principles remain but postulates, not propositions, with regard to the real world outside. There is thus a large body of a priori or intuitively necessary truths. As a rule, these are truths of comparison only, and in the first instance they express relations between merely mental terms.
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.5%:
Others would rejoice that the finite and separatist view of things with which we started had at last developed its contradictions, and was [p.179] about to lead us dialectically upwards to some 'higher synthesis' in which inconsistencies cease from troubling and logic is at rest
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 34.6%:
Our first unanalyzed sensation was really composed of these elementary sensations, our first rapid conclusion was really based on these intermediate inferences, all the while, only we failed to note the fact." But this is nothing but the fatal 'psychologists fallacy' (p. 196) of treating an inferior state of mind as if it must somehow know implicitly all that is explicitly known [p. 489] about the same topic by superior states of mind
95.4%:
Our higher æsthetic, moral, and intellectual life seems made up of affections of this collateral and incidental sort, which have entered the mind by the back stairs, as it were, or rather have not entered the mind at all, but got surreptitiously born in the house
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.2%:
Our mental states have always an essential unity, such that each state of apprehension, however variously compounded, is a single whole, of which every component is, therefore, strictly apprehended (so far as it is apprehended) as a part.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.7%:
Our mind will be like a polyhedron, whose facets are the attitudes of perception in which it can most easily rest. These are worn upon it by habitual objects, and from one of these it can pass only by tumbling over into another
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.5%:
Our only command over it is by the effort we make to keep the painful unfilled gap in consciousness.[
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.6%:
Our own attempt to formulate it more definitely, and to escape the usual confusion between causal agencies and relations merely known, must not blind us to the immense services of those by whom the confusion was unfelt
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.9%:
Our own visual explorations go on by means of innumerable stoppings and startings of the eyeballs. Yet these are all effaced from the final space-sphere of our visual imagination. They have neutralized each other
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.6%:
Our perception seems wedded to certain total ways of seeing certain objects
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.7%:
Our strength and our intelligence, our wealth and even our good luck, are things which warm our heart and make us feel ourselves a match for life. But deeper than all such things, and able to suffice unto itself without them, is the sense of the amount of effort which we can put forth.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.7%:
Our thought is rational, and leads to a rational act, but it can hardly be called reasoning in a strict sense of the term
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.2%:
Our usual purpose with it, our commonest title for it, and the properties which this title suggests, have in reality nothing sacramental. They characterize us more than they characterize the thing. But we are so stuck in our prejudices, so petrified intellectually, that to our vulgarest names, with their suggestions, we ascribe an eternal and exclusive worth
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.5%:
Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense of personality that every one of us unfailingly carries with him.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 65.5%:
Out of the flux, however, one phase always stands prominent. It is the form the object has when we see it easiest and best: and that is when our eyes and the object both are in what may be called the normal position
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.7%:
Out of the infinite chaos of movements, of which physics teaches us that the outer world consists, each sense-organ picks out those which fall within certain limits of velocity. To these it responds, but ignores the rest as completely as if they did not exist. It thus accentuates particular movements in a manner for which objectively there seems no valid ground
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.9%:
Over immense departments of our thought we are still, all of us, in the savage state. Similarity operates in us, but abstraction has not taken place. We
COMPARED., 55.7%:
Perception may then be defined, in Mr. Sully's words, as that process by which the mind "supplements a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived sensations being solidified or 'integrated' into the form of a percept, that is, an apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an object now present in a particular locality or region of space Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 49.8%:
Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about [2] a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.6%:
Perhaps nothing in after-life more closely resembles the effect of a doll upon a child than the effect of the illustrations of a tale upon a grown reader
99.7%:
Perhaps the most influential of all these postulates is that the nature of the world must be such that sweeping statements may be made about it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 59.9%:
Persons born blind are reported surprised at the largeness with which objects appear to them when their sight is restored
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
Persons of authority, who have to make many decisions in the day, carry with them a set of heads of classification, each bearing its motor consequence, and under these they seek as far as possible to range each new emergency as it occurs. It is where the emergency belongs to a species without precedent, to which consequently no cut-and-dried maxim will apply, that we feel most at a loss, and are distressed at the indeterminateness of our task As soon, however, as we see our way to a familiar classification, we are at ease again
Chapter: GENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES., 1.5%:
Physiologically interpreted, chastity means nothing more than the fact that present solicitations of sense are overpowered by suggestions of aesthetic and moral fitness which the circumstances awaken in the cerebrum ; and that upon the inhibitory or permissive influence of these alone action directly depends
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.6%:
Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.3%:
Playing with the brain,' says Miss Alma Murray, 'is far less fatiguing than playing with the heart. An adventuress taxes the physique far less than a sympathetic heroine. Muscular exertion has comparatively little to do with it.' . . . 'Emotion
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.3%:
Please note again, however, how the pure Ego appears merely as the vehicle in which the estimation is carried on, the objects estimated being all of them facts of an empirical sort
COMPARED., 56.7%:
Practised novel -- or newspaper-readers could not possibly get on so fast if they had to see accurately every single letter of every word in order to perceive the words. More than half of the words come out of their mind, and hardly half from the printed page. Were this not so, did we perceive each letter by itself, typographic errors in well-known words would never be overlooked Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.2%:
Prepositional and conjunctival states of mind are not remembered as independent facts -- we cannot recall [p. 644] just how we felt when we said 'how' or 'notwithstanding.' Our consciousness of these transitive states is shut up to their own moment -- hence one difficulty in introspective psychologizing.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.2%:
Problems come much harder to reflective and inhibitive minds. They can, it is true, solve much vaster problems; and they can avoid many a mistake to which the men of impulse are exposed. But when [p. 539] the latter do not make mistakes, or when they are always able to retrieve them, theirs is one of the most engaging and indispensable of human types.[42] Note: You gave advice about habit and memory. Where's the advice here?
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.7%:
Professor Robertson in his clear and instructive article 'Axioms' in the Encyclopedia Britannica (9th edition) suggests that it may only be where movements enter into the constitution of the ideal object (as they do in geometrical figures) that we can "make the ultimate relations to be what for us they must be in all circumstances.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
Propositions concerning the different worlds are made from 'different points of view'; and in this more or less chaotic state the consciousness of most thinkers remains to the end
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.3%:
Psychologically, as a rule, P overshadows the process from the start. We are seeking P, or something like P. But the bare totality of S does not yield it to our gaze; and casting about for some point in S to take hold of, which will lead us to P, we hit, if we are sagacious, upon M, because M happens to be just the character which is knit up with P.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.6%:
Psychology will be Psychology,[72] and Science Science, as much as ever (as much and no more) in this world, whether free-will be true in it or not. Science, however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on which she has no claims at all. Note: Scientism
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.7%:
Rarely are both sorts of intellect, the splendid and the analytic, found in conjunction
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.4%:
Really there are but three possible kinds of theory concerning space. Either (1) there is no spatial quality of sensation at all, and [p. 272] space is a mere symbol of succession; or (2) there is an extensive quality given immediately in certain particular sensations ; or, finally, (3) there is a quality produced out of the inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensations which, as given originally, are not spatial, but which, on being cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This last is the Kantian view. Stumpf admirably designates it as the 'psychic stimulus' theory, the crude sensations being considered as goads to the mind to put forth its slumbering power. Brown, the Mills, and Bain, amid these possibilities, seem to have gone astray like lost sheep. With
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.3%:
Red is thus the most exciting color
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.2%:
Refuse to express a passion, and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger, and its occasion seems ridiculous
95.3%:
Regrettable as is the loss of readers capable of such wholesale discipleship, I feel that a definite meaning for the word experience is even more important than their company
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.9%:
Remember that nothing is said yet of the origin of instincts, but only of the constitution of those that exist fully formed
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16%:
Remembrance is like direct feeling; its object is suffused with a warmth and intimacy to which no object of mere conception ever attains
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
Renouvier calls this belief of a thing for no other reason than that we conceive it with passion, by the name of mental vertigo
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 32.2%:
Repetition of this sort does not confer intelligence of what is said, it only keeps the mind from wandering into other channels
COMPARED., 55.7%:
Reproduced sights and contacts tied together with the present sensation in the unity of a thing with a name, these are the complex objective stuff out of which my actually perceived table is made. Infants must go through a long education of the eye and ear before they can perceive the realities which adults perceive. Every perception is an acquired perception Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.7%:
Resemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings (especially bodily feelings) experienced along with things widely different in all other regards, thus constitutes the real and verifiable 'personal identity' which we feel
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.9%:
Respice finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.8%:
Ribot says: "A child refuses to read; he is incapable of keeping his mind fixed on the letters, which have no attraction for him; but he looks with avidity upon the pictures contained in a book. 'What do they mean?' he asks. The father replies: 'When you can read, the book will tell you.' After several colloquies like this, the child resigns himself and falls to work, first slackly, then the habit grows, and finally he shows an ardor which has to be restrained. This is a case of the genesis of voluntary attention. An artificial and indirect desire has to be grafted on a natural and direct one. Reading has no immediate attractiveness, but is has a borrowed one, and that is enough. The child is caught in the wheelwork, the first step is made."I take another example, from M. B. Perez:[
98%:
Rightness is not mere usualness, wrongness not mere oddity
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.5%:
Rooms, landscapes, buildings, pictures, or persons with whose look we are very familiar, surge up before the mind's eye with all the details of their appearance complete, so soon as we think of any one of their component parts
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.6%:
Sagacity ; or the Perception of the Essence. To reason, then, we must be able to extract characters, -- not any characters, but the right characters for our conclusion. If we extract the wrong character, it will not lead to that conclusion.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.4%:
Schopenhauer expresses the Kantian view with more vigor and clearness than anyone else
97.6%:
Science thinks she has discovered the objective realities in question. Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses and velocities expressible by numbers, and paths expressible by analytic formulas, these at last are things over which the mathematico-logical network may be flung
95.8%:
Scientific thought goes by selection and emphasis exclusively. We break the solid plenitude of fact into separate essences, conceive generally what only exists particularly, and by our classifications leave nothing in its natural neighborhood, but separate the contiguous, and join what the poles divorce
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.9%:
Second, a teacher who wishes to engage the attention of his class must knit his novelties on to things of which they already have preperceptions. The old and familiar is readily attended to by the mind and helps to hold in turn the new, forming, in Herbartian phraseology
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92%:
Second, our unstriped muscles yield no feelings in contracting, nor can they be contracted at will, differing thus in two peculiarities from the voluntary muscles
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.5%:
See, for some excellent pedagogic remarks about doing yourself when you want to get your pupils to do, and not simply telling them to do it, Baumann, Handbuch der Moral (1879), p. 32 ff.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.8%:
Self-Feeling. These are primarily self-complacency and self-dissatisfaction
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 49.8%:
Sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic point of [p. 2] view, differs from Perception only in the extreme simplicity of its object or content
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53%:
Sensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism, so that copies of them arise again in the mind after the original outward stimulus is gone. No mental copy, however, can arise in the mind, of any kind of sensation which has never been directly excited from without
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 50%:
Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and then are replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether other ways
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.5%:
Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the tests of our realities
97%:
Sensibly, however, things are constantly changing their numbers, just as they are changing their kinds. They are forever breaking apart and fusing
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.9%:
Sensitiveness to immediately exciting sensorial stimuli characterizes the attention of childhood and youth. In mature age we have generally selected those stimuli which are connected with one or more so-called permanent interests, and our attention has grown irresponsive to the rest.[17] But childhood is characterized by great active energy, and has few organized interests by which to meet new impressions and decide whether they are worthy of notice or not, and the consequence is that extreme mobility of the attention with which we are all familiar in children, and which makes their first lessons such rough affairs
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.9%:
Shall I commit this crime? choose that profession? accept that office, or marry this fortune? - his choice really lies between one of several equally possible future Characters
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.8%:
Shall we add the propensity to walk along a curbstone, or any other narrow path. to the list of instincts? Shall we subtract secretiveness, as due to shyness or to fear? Who knows? Meanwhile
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.9%:
Shame, love, and anger are particularly liable to be thus revived by ideas of their object
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.7%:
Shyness ... is closely related to fear; yet it is distinct from fear in the ordinary sense. A shy man dreads the notice of strangers, but can hardly be said to be afraid of them
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.8%:
Since confusion is mistaking the wrong part of the phenomenon for the whole, whilst reasoning is, according to our definition, based on the substitution of the right part for the whole, it might be said that confusion and reasoning are generically the same process. I believe that they are so, and that the only difference between a muddle-head and a, genius is that between extracting wrong characters and right ones
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.5%:
Since indubitably such states do exist, they must exist as single new facts, effects, possibly, as the spiritualists say, on the Soul (we will not decide that [p.162] point here), but at any rate independent and integral, and not compounded of psychic atoms
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.1%:
So complete is the inhibition is this latter case that it is almost impossible for a man to cut or mutilate himself slowly and deliberately - his hand invincibly refusing to bring on the pain
96.4%:
So far as the facts of experience can not be serially classified, therefore, so far experience fails to be rational in one of the ways, at least, which we crave.
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
So far from being unorganized at birth, they must have native tendencies to reaction of a determinate sort
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.5%:
So far is it from being true that our first way of feeling things is the feeling of them as subjective or mental, that the exact opposite seems rather to be the truth. Our earliest, most instinctive, least developed kind of consciousness is the objective kind;
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.6%:
So far the action has a teleological character;[p.9] but such mere outward teleology as this might still be the blind result of vis a tergo
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.1%:
So our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator our success: thus, Self-esteem = Success / Pretensions
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.7%:
So strong a postulate is continuity! Now this book will tend to show that mental postulates are on the whole to be respected. The demand for continuity has, over large tracts of science, proved itself to possess true prophetic power
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.1%:
So that all that was said of the dependence of analysis upon a preliminary separate acquaintance with the character to be abstracted, and upon its having varied concomitants, finds a place in the psychology of resemblance as well as in that of difference.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21%:
So that is comes about that persons for whose opinion we care nothing are nevertheless persons whose notice we woo; and that many a man truly great, many a woman truly fastidious in most respects, will take a deal of trouble to dazzle some insignificant cad whose whole personality they heartily despise.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.8%:
So that it seems as if our description of the belonging-together of the various selves, as a belonging-together which is merely represented, in a later pulse of thought, had knocked the bottom out of the matter, and omitted the most characteristic one of all the features found in the herd - a feature which common-sense finds in the phenomenon of personal identity as well, and for our omission of which she will hold us to a strict account
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.3%:
So that on the whole the quarrel between Descartes and Locke as to whether the mind ever sleeps is less near to solution than ever Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.2%:
So that the EFFECTIVE consciousness we have of our states is the after-consciousness; and the more of this there is, the more influence does the original state have, and the more permanent a factor is it of our world
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.1%:
So we have the paradox of a man shamed to death because he is only the second pugilist or the second oarsman in the world. That he is able to beat the whole population of the globe minus one is nothing; he has 'pitted' himself to beat that one; and as long as he doesn't do that nothing else counts. He is to his own regard as if he were not, indeed he is not.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.2%:
So with the man who has [p.127] daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the blast.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.3%:
So, in the present instance, we ought certainly to admit that there is more than the bare fact of coexistence of a passing thought with a passing brain-state. But we do not answer the question 'What is that more?' when we say that it is a 'Soul' which the brainstate affects. This
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
So, the country boy dissociates the blackberry, the chestnut, and the wintergreen, from the vague mass of other shrubs and trees, for their practical uses, and the savage is delighted with the beads, the bits of looking-glass, brought by an exploring vessel, and gives no heed to the features of the vessel itself, which is too much beyond his sphere
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.9%:
Some few persons see mentally in print every word that is uttered; they attend to the visual equivalent and not to the sound of the words, and they read them off usually as from a long imaginary strip of paper, such as is unwound from telegraphic instruments
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.1%:
Some minds are like wax [p. 660] under a seal -- no impression, however disconnected with others, is wiped out. Others, like a jelly, vibrate to every touch, but under usual conditions retain no permanent mark. These
98.1%:
Some minds are preternaturally sensitive to logical consistency and inconsistency. When they have ranked a thing under a kind, they must treat it as of that kind's kind, or feel all out of tune
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.7%:
Some of the tests we meet by actions that are easy, and some of the questions we answer in articulately formulated words. But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening of our heartstrings as we say, "Yes, I will even have it so!" When a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up its dark abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their hold on the situation altogether, and either escape from its difficulties by averting their attention, or if they cannot do that, collapse into yielding masses of plaintiveness and fear. The effort required for facing and consenting to such objects is beyond their power to make
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.7%:
Some persons, the present writer among the number, can hardly lecture without a black-board: the abstract conceptions must be symbolized by letters, squares or circles, and the relations between them by lines
99.6%:
Some readers may expect me to plunge into the old debate as to whether the a priori truths are 'analytic' or 'synthetic.' It seems to me that the distinction is one of Kant's most unhappy legacies, for the reason that it is impossible to make it sharp. No
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.4%:
Stand for,' not know; 'becomes general,' not becomes aware of something general; 'particular ideas,' not particular things - everywhere the same timidity about begging the fact of knowing, and the pitifully impotent attempt to foist it in the shape of a mode of being of 'ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.6%:
Stumpf adds: "All wrong perceptions that depend on peculiarities in the organs are more or less perfectly corrected by the influence of imagination following the guidance of experience."
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.4%:
Subjectively, any collocation of words may make sense - even the wildest words in a dream - if one only does not doubt their belonging together. Take the obscurer passages in Hegel: it is a fair question whether the rationality included in them be anything more than the fact that the words all belong to a common vocabulary, and are strung together on a scheme of predication and relation
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.6%:
Such elaborately artificial constructions are, it seems to me, only a burden and a hindrance, not a help, to our science.[47]
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.6%:
Such expressions as the abysmal vault of heaven, the endless expanse of ocean, etc., summarize [p. 204] many computations to the imagination, and give the sense of an enormous horizon
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.9%:
Such filling of the mind by an idea, with its congruous associates, is consent to the idea and to the fact which the idea represents
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
Such genial play with such massive materials, such an easy hashing of light over far perspectives, such careless indifference to the dust and apparatus that ordinarily surround the subject and seem to pertain to its essence, make these conversations seem true feasts forgoes to a listener who is educated enough to follow them at all. His mental lungs breathe more deeply, in an atmosphere more broad and vast than is their wont.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.4%:
Such incoherency is pitiful. The fact is that, at bottom, all these authors are really 'psychical stimulists,' or Kantists. The space they speak of is a super-sensational mental product. This position appears to me thoroughly mythological
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
Such is the inevitable effect of reasonable ideas over others - if they can once get a quiet hearing; and passion's cue accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent their still small voice from being heard at all. "Let me not think of that! Don't speak to me of that!" This is the sudden cry of all those who in a passion perceive some sobering considerations about to check them in mid-career
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.2%:
Such persons can feel a sort of delicate rapture in thinking that, however sick, ill-favored, mean-conditioned, and generally forsaken they may be, they yet are integral parts of the whole of this brave world, have a fellow's share in the strength of the dray-horses, the happiness of the young people, the wisdom of the wise ones, and are not altogether without part or lot in the good fortunes of the Vanderbilts and the Hohenzollerns themselves
98.1%:
Such postulates are exemplified by the ethical propositions that the individual and universal good are one, and that happiness and goodness are bound to coalesce in the same subject
97.9%:
Such principles as these, which might be multiplied to satiety,[29] are properly to be called postulates of rationality, not propositions of fact
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.4%:
Such thoughts as these, says M. Janet, "are known by no one, for disaggregated sensations reduced to a state of mental dust are not synthetized in any personality."
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.4%:
Suffice it meanwhile that each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit
98.1%:
Suffice it that these judgments express inner harmonies and discords between objects of thought; and that whilst outer cohesions frequently repeated will often seem harmonious, all harmonies are not thus engendered, but our feeling of many of them is a secondary and incidental function of the mind.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.6%:
Suppose we were able, within the length of a second, to note 10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely 10, as now; if our life were then destined to hold the same number of impressions, it might be 1000 times as short
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.9%:
Suppose you inform me that 'the blood rushed violently from the man's heart, quickening his pulse at the sight of his enemy.' Of the many latent images in this phrase, how many were salient in your mind and in mine? Probably two - the man and his enemy - and these images were faint. Images of blood, heart, violent rushing, pulse, quickening, and sight, were either not revived at all, or were passing shadows. Had any such images arisen, they would have hampered thought, retarding the logical process of judgment by irrelevant connections
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.5%:
Surely if form and length were originally retinal sensations, retinal rectangles ought not to become acute or obtuse, and lines ought not to alter their relative lengths as they do
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.4%:
Sympathy is an emotion as to whose instinctiveness psychologists have held hot debate, some of them contending that it is no primitive endowment, but, originally at least, the result of a rapid calculation of the good consequences to ourselves of the sympathetic act
95.5%:
THE GENESIS OF THE ELEMENTARY MENTAL CATEGORIES. We find: 1. Elementary sorts of sensation, and feelings of personal activity; 2. Emotions; desires; instincts; ideas of worth; æsthetic ideas; 3. Ideas of time and space and number; Ideas of difference and resemblance, and of their degrees. 5. Ideas of causal dependence among events; of end and means; of subject and attribute. 6. Judgments affirming, denying, doubting, supposing any of the above ideas. 7. Judgments that the former judgments logically involve, exclude, or are indifferent to, each other.
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 43.2%:
THE SENSIBLE PRESENT HAS DURATION. Let any one try, I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend to, the present moment of time. One of the most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming. As a poet, quoted by Mr. Hodgson, says, "Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,"and it is only as entering into the living and moving organization of a much wider tract of time that the strict present is apprehended at all.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 49.9%:
Take the pain called toothache for example. Again and again we feel it and greet it as the same real item in the universe. We must therefore, it is supposed, have a distinct pocket for it in our mind into which it and nothing else will fit
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.5%:
Tastes and smells form no very habitual series in our experience. But even if they did, it is doubtful whether habit would fix the order of their reproduction quite so well as it does that of other sensations. In vision, however, we have a sense in which the order of reproduced things is very nearly as much influenced by habit as is the order of remembered sounds
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.4%:
Tell a person to think intently of a certain name, and saying that you will then force her to write it, let her hold a pencil, and do you yourself hold her hand. She will then probably trace the name involuntarily, believing that you are forcing her to do it.
COMPARED., 56.7%:
Testimony to personal identity is proverbially fallacious for similar reasons. A man has witnessed a rapid crime or accident, and carries away his mental image. Later he is fronted by a prisoner whom he forthwith perceives in light of that image, and recognizes or 'identifies' as participant, although he may never have been near that spot Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.3%:
That bald fact is that when the brain acts, a thought occurs. The spiritualistic formulation says that the brain-processes knock the thought, so to speak, out of a Soul which stands there to receive their influence. The simpler formulation says that the thought simply comes. But what positive meaning has the Soul, when scrutinized, but the ground of possibility of the thought? And what is the 'knocking' but the determining of the possibility to actuality? And what is this after all but giving a sort of concreted form to one's belief that the coming of the thought, when the brainprocesses [p. 346] occur, has some sort of ground in the nature of things?
96.9%:
That confident tone is due to the fact that they deal with abstract and ideal numbers exclusively. What we mean by one plus one is two; we make two out of it; and it would mean two still even in a world where physically (according to a conceit of Mill's) a third thing was engendered every time one thing came together with another
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
That does the reader do when he wishes to see in what the precise likeness or difference of two objects lies? He [p. 346] transfers his attention as rapidly as possible, backwards and forwards, from one to the other. The rapid alteration in consciousness shakes out, as it were, the points of difference or agreement, which would have slumbered forever unnoticed if the consciousness of the objects compared had occurred at widely distant periods of time
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.8%:
That is should so often do so is quite sufficient to account for the tendency of these characters to a fatalistic mood of mind. And
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.8%:
That is, the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in compari- [p. 222] son with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.9%:
That is, we can produce, not remembrances of the old grief or rapture, but new griefs and raptures, by summoning up a lively thought of their exciting cause
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
That may be metaphysical reality, reality for God; but what we need is practical reality, reality for ourselves; and, to have that, an object must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting and important
94.7%:
That there is no good evidence for the belief that our instinctive reactions are fruits of our ancestors' education in the midst of the same environment, transmitted to us at birth
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.1%:
That they do so is proved by the cases in which particular nerves, when specially irritable, share in the emotion and determine its quality. When one is suffering from an open wound, any grievous or horrid spectacle will cause pain in the [p. 462] wound
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.1%:
That we cannot explain why they should is no presumption that they do not, for we never can explain why any sense-organ should awaken the sensation it does
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81%:
That we dislike in others things which we tolerate in ourselves is a law of our æsthetic nature about which there can be no doubt
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.4%:
That we have cogitations of some sort is the inconcussum in a world most of whose other facts have at some time tottered in the breath of philosophic doubt
COMPARED., 55.9%:
That we more commonly get is first one object in its completeness, and then the other in its completeness. In other words, all brain-processes are such as give rise to what we may call FIGURED consciousness Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
The 'depth' is partly, no doubt, the insight into wider systems of unified relation, but far more often than that it is the emotional thrill
95.2%:
The 'experience-philosophy' has from time immemorial been the opponent of theological modes of thought. The word experience has a halo of anti-super-naturalism about it
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.1%:
The 'ideational prepararation,' the 'preperception' of A keeps going on of its own accord, whilst that of Z need incessant pulses of voluntary reinforcement - that is, we have the feeling of voluntary reinforcement (or effort) at each successive moment in which the thought of Z flares brightly up in our mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.8%:
The 'marvels' of Science, about which so much edifying popular literature is written, are apt to be 'caviare' to the men in the laboratories. And even divine Philosophy itself, which common mortals consider so 'sublime' an occupation, on account of the vastness of its data and outlook, is too apt to the practical philosopher himself to he but a sharpening and tightening business, a matter of 'points,' of screwing down things, of splitting hairs, and of the 'intent' rather than the 'extent' of conceptions
95.9%:
The 'scientific' truths have to harmonize with these truths, or be given up as useless; but they arise in the mind in no such passive associative way as that in which the simpler truths arise. Even those experiences which are used to prove a scientific truth are for the most part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after the truth itself has been conjectured
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.2%:
The 'secret of a good memory' is thus the secret of forming diverse and multiple associations with every fact we care to retain. But this forming of associations with a fact, what is it but thinking about the fact as much as possible? Briefly, then, of two men with the same outward experiences and the same amount of mere native tenacity, the one who THINKS over his experiences most, and weaves them into systematic relations with each other, will be the one with the best memory
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
The Caliph Omar burnt the Alexandrian Library, saying: 'All books which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous. All which contain what is in it are useless! ' Probably no one ever had an intenser belief in anything than Omar had in this. Yet it is impossible to imagine it preceded by an argument. His belief in Mahomet, in the Koran, and in the sufficiency of the Koran, probably came to him in spontaneous rushes of emotion; there may have been little vestiges of argument donating here and there, but they did not justify the strength of the emotion
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.9%:
The English writers on psychology, and the school of Herbart in Germany, have in the main contented themselves with such results as the immediate introspection of single individuals gave, and shown what a body of doctrine they may make. The works of Locke, Hume, Reid, Hartley, Stewart Brown, the Mills, will always be classics in this line ; and in Professor Brain's Treatises we have probably the last word of what this method taken mainly by itself can do
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88%:
The Feeling of Effort
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.2%:
The Psychologist's Fallacy.' The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the 'psychologist's fallacy' par excellence
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.5%:
The Pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment, are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon.
99.8%:
The Shah of Persia refused to be taken to the Derby Day, saying "It is already known to me that one horse can run faster than another." He made the question "which horse?" immaterial. Any question can be made immaterial by subsuming all its answers under a common head. Imagine what college ball-games and races would be if the teams were to forget the absolute distinctness of Harvard from Yale and think of both as One in the higher genus College.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.4%:
The Spiritualists do not deduce any of the properties of the mental life from otherwise known properties of the soul. They simply find various characters ready-made in the mental life, and these they clap into the Soul, saying, "Lo! behold the source from whence they flow!" The merely verbal character of this 'explanation' is obvious
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.2%:
The Stoic receipt for contentment was to dispossess yourself in advance of all that was out of your own power, - then fortune's shocks might rain down unfelt. Epictetus exhorts us, by thus narrowing and at the same time solidifying our Self to make it invulnerable: "I must die; well, but must I die groaning too? I
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.8%:
The Thought does not capture them, but as soon as it comes into existence it finds them already its own. How is this possible unless the Thought have a substantial identity with a former owner, - not a mere continuity or a resemblance, as in our account, but a real unity?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.1%:
The action may follow the stimulus or idea too rapidly, leaving no time for the arousal of restraining associates - we then have a precipitate will. Or, although the associates may come, the ratio which the impulsive and inhibitive forces normally bear to each other may be distorted, and we then have a will which is perverse
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8%:
The actual presence of the practical opportunity alone furnishes the fulcrum upon which the lever can rest, by means of which the moral will may multiply its strength, and raise itself aloft. He who has no solid ground to press against will never get beyond the stage of empty gesturemaking."[p.125] No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one's sentiments may be, if one have not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act, one's character may remain entirely unaffected for the better
COMPARED., 57.6%:
The aim of 'Science' is to attain conceptions so adequate and exact that we shall never need to change them Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
98.3%:
The aim of both science and philosophy is to make the identifiable terms more numerous. So far it has proved easier to identify nature's things with mental terms of the mechanical than with mental terms of the sentimental order.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
The aim of the whole process seems to be to reach as complete and united a conception of reality as possible, a conception wherein the greatest fulness of data shall be combined with the greatest simplicity of conception. The effort of consciousness seems to be to combine the greatest richness of content with the greatest definiteness of organization
its TIME-RELATIONS., 13.9%:
The anaesthesias, paralyses, contractions and other irregularities from which hysterics suffer seem then to be due to the fact that their secondary personage has enriched itself by robbing the primary one of a function which the latter ought to have retained Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.9%:
The ascription of height and depth to certain notes seems due, not to any localization of the sounds, but to the fact that a feeling of vibration in the chest and tension in the gullet accompanies the singing of a bass note, whilst, when we sing high, the palatine mucous membrane is drawn upon by the muscles which move the larynx, and awakens a feeling in the roof of the mouth.
99.4%:
The aspiration to be 'scientific' is such an idol of the tribe to the present generation, is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided subjective interest which it is. But as a matter of fact, few even of the cultivated members of the race have shared it; it was invented but a generation or two ago
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.7%:
The attention which we lend to an experience is proportional to its vivid or interesting character; and it is a notorious fact that what interests us most vividly at the time is, other things equal, what we remember best
96.4%:
The attributes again may be compared, forming genera of higher orders, and their characters singled out; so that we have a new sort of series, that of predication, or of kind including kind. Thus horses are quadrupeds, quadrupeds animals, animals machines, machines liable to wear out, etc
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.2%:
The auditory type," says M. A. Binet, [13] "appears to be rarer than the visual
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.2%:
The bare existence of a past fact is no ground for our remembering it. Unless we have seen it, or somehow undergone it, we shall never know of its having been. The experiences of the body are thus one of the conditions of the faculty of memory being what it is
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 25%:
The basis of our personality, as M. Ribot says, is that feeling of our vitality which, because it is so perpetually present, remains in the background of our consciousness. "It is the basis because, always present, always acting, without peace or rest, it knows neither sleep nor fainting
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
The belief, as Brentano says, presupposes the mere thought: "Every object comes into consciousness in a twofold way, as simply thought of [vorgestellt] [6] and as admitted [anerkaant] [7] or denied. The relation is analogous to that which is assumed by most philosophers(by Kant no less than by Aristotle) to obtain between mere thought and desire. Nothing is ever desired without being thought of; but the desiring is nevertheless a second quite new and peculiar form of relation to the object, a second quite new way of receiving it into consciousness
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.5%:
The best grammatical subject for the verb know would, if possible, be one from whose other properties the knowing could be deduced. And if there be no such subject, the best one would be that with the fewest ambiguities and the least pretentious name
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.3%:
The blindness must have been an 'Ausfallserscheinung,' due to the loss of vision's essential organ
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 5.9%:
The brain itself is an excessively vascular organ, a sponge full of blood, in fact; and another of Mosso's inventions showed that when less blood went to the arms, more went to the head.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.2%:
The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature. Everyone will recognize this to be true, so long as the existence of something corresponding to the term 'personal mind' is all that is insisted on, without any particular view of its nature being implied.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
The candle exists as an outer reality' is an existential, 'My Maggie has got a pair of wings' is an attributive, proposition; [14] and it follows from what was first said that all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by alarming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.2%:
The chapter is entitled "What is the cause that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and by the reader?" The author, in answering this question, makes (inter alia) the following remarks:[21] "That connection [he says] or relation which comes gradually to subsist among the different words of a language, in the minds of those who speak it, ... is merely consequent on this, that those words are employed as signs of connected or related things. It is an axiom in geometry that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. It may, in like manner, be admitted as an axiom in psychology that ideas associated by the same idea will associate one another. Hence it will happen that if, from experiencing the connection of two things, there results, as infallibly there will result, an association between the ideas or notions annexed to them, as each idea will moreover be associated by its sign, there will likewise be an association between the ideas of the signs. Hence the sounds considered as signs will be conceived to have a connection analogous to that which subsisteth among the things signified; I say, the sounds considered as signs; for this way of considering them constantly attends us in speaking, writing, hearing, and reading. When we purposely abstract from it, and regard them merely as sounds, we are instantly sensible that they are quite unconnected, and have no other relation than what ariseth from similitude of tone or accent. But to consider them in this manner commonly results from previous design, and requires a kind of effort which is not exerted in the ordinary use of speech. In ordinary use they are regarded solely as signs, or, rather, they are confounded with the things they signify; the consequence of which is that, in the manner just now explained, we come insensibly to conceive a connection among them of a very different sort from that of which sounds are naturally susceptible.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.2%:
The child's first words are in part vocables of his own invention, which his parents adopt, and which, as far as they go, form a new human tongue upon the earth; and in part they are his more or less successful imitations of words he beers the parents use
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 81.9%:
The class of emotional, is thus rather larger than that of instinctive, impulses, commonly so called. Its stimuli are more numerous, and its expressions are more internal and delicate, and often less practical. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.6%:
The classic taste brands these effects as coarse and tawdry, and prefers the naked beauty of the optical and auditory sensations, unadorned with frippery or foliage. To the romantic mind, on the contrary, the immediate beauty of these sensations seems dry and thin
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92.5%:
The combined power of soft contact and warmth amounts to a considerable pitch of massive pleasure; while there may be subtle influences not reducible to these two heads, such as we term, from not knowing anything about them, magnetic or electric
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
The commonplace doctrine of 'judgment' is that it consists in the combination of 'ideas' by a 'copula' into a 'proposition,' which may be of various sorts, as a formative, negative, hypothetical, etc. But who does not see that in a disbelieved or doubted or interrogative or conditional proposition, the ideas are combined in the same identical way in which they are in a proposition which is solidly believed? The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The complete philosopher is he who seeks not only to assign to every given object of his thought its right place in one or other of these sub-worlds, but he also seeks to determine the relation of each sub-world to the others in the total world which is. Note: Important - the task of philosophy
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.3%:
The conception of consciousness as a purely cognitive form of being, which is the pet way of regarding it in many idealistic-modern as well as ancient schools, is thoroughly anti-psychological
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29.3%:
The conditio sine quâ non of sustained attention to a given topic of thought is that we should roll it over and over incessantly and consider different aspects and relations of it in turn. Only
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
The conflict of these motives so far as they alone affect the matter of decision is a conflict as to when it shall occur. One says 'now,' the other says 'not yet.'
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.8%:
The connection of the reality of things with their effectiveness as motives is a tale that has never yet been fully told. The moral tragedy of human life comes almost wholly from the fact that the link is ruptured which normally should hold between vision of the truth and action, and that this pungent sense of effective reality will not attach to certain ideas Note: Important
Chapter: CONCLUSION., 4.4%:
The consciousness must everywhere prefer some of the sensations which it gets to others; and if it can remember these in their absence, however dimly, they must be its ends of desire
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.6%:
The continuity and permanency of the topic is of the essence of our intellection. We recognize the old problem, and the old solutions; and we go on to alter and improve and substitute one predicate for another without ever letting the subject change. This is what is meant when it is said that thinking consists in making judgments. A succession of judgments may all be about the same thing. The general practical postulate which encourages us to keep thinking at all is that by going on to do so we shall judge better of the same things than if we do not
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.2%:
The continuous flow of the mental stream is sacrificed, and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is preached, for the existence of which no good introspective grounds can be brought forward, and out of which presently grow all sorts of paradoxes and contradictions, the heritage of woe of students of the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 34%:
The contrast is not, then, as the Platonists would have it, between certain subjective facts called images and sensations, and others called acts of relating intelligence; the former being blind perishing things, knowing not even their own existence as such, whilst the latter combine the poles in the mysterious synthesis of their cognitive sweep. The contrast is really between two aspects, in which all mental facts without exception may be taken; their structural aspect, as being subjective, and their functional aspect, as being cognitions
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
The cooling advice which we get from others when the fever-fit is on us is the most jarring and exasperating thing in life. Reply we cannot, so we get angry; for by a sort of self-preserving instinct which our passion has, it feels that these chill objects, if they once but gain a lodgment, will work and work until they have frozen the very vital spark from out of all our mood and brought our airy castles in ruin to the ground. Such
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.1%:
The crater of a, newly-extracted tooth, and the movements of a loose tooth in its socket, feel quite monstrous
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 55.1%:
The current from the periphery is the new order of force required; and what happens after the resistance is overcome is the sensational process. We may suppose that the latter consists in some new and more violent sort of disintegration of the neural matter, which now explodes at a deeper level than at other times
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.8%:
The currents, once in, must find a way out. In getting out they leave their traces in the paths which they take. The only thing they can do, in short, is to deepen old paths or to make new ones; and the whole plasticity of the brain sums itself up in two words when we call it an organ in which currents pouring in from the sense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do not easily disappear
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.9%:
The defect of all these attempts is that the conclusion pretended to follow from certain premises is by no means rationally involved in the premises. A feeling of any kind, if it simply returns, ought to be nothing else than what it was at first. If
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.6%:
The definitively closed nature of our personal consciousness is probably an average statistical resultant of many conditions, but not an elementary force or fact; so that, if one wishes to preserve the Soul, the less he draws his arguments from that quarter the better. So
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
The deliberation may last for weeks or months, occupying at intervals the mind. The motives which yesterday seemed full of urgency and blood and life to-day feel strangely weak and pale and dead. But as little to-day as to-morrow is the question finally resolved. Something tells us that all this is provisional; that the weakened reasons will wax strong again, and the stronger weaken; that equilibrium is unreached; that testing our reasons, not obeying them, is still the order of the day, and that we must wait awhile, patient or impatiently, until our mind is made up 'for good and all.' This Note: Important - on decision making
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.5%:
The demand for immortality is nowadays essentially teleological. We believe ourselves immortal because we believe ourselves fit for immortality. A 'substance, ought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy to survive, and an insubstantial 'stream' to prolong itself, provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organized [p. 349] in the rational way in which we trust it is.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.8%:
The desire on the part of men educated in laboratories not to have their physical reasonings mixed up with such incommensurable factors as feelings is certainly very strong. I have heard a most intelligent biologist say: "It is high time for scientific men to protest against the recognition of any such thing as consciousness in a scientific investigation.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
The difficulty lies in the gaining possession of that field. Though the spontaneous drift of thought is all the other way, the attention must be kept strained on that one object until at last it grows, so as to maintain itself before the mind with ease. This strain of the attention is the fundamental act of will. And the will's work is in most cases practically ended when the bare presence to our thought of the naturally unwelcome object has been secured
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.2%:
The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, 'I won't count this time!' Well! he may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the less. Down among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 59.8%:
The ear gives a greater vastness than the skin, but is considerably less able to subdivide it
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.9%:
The effect of such training is shown in the tendency of the organ to 'grow to' the mode in which it is habitually exercised
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.2%:
The effects of stimuli may thus be superposed upon each other many stages deep, the total result in consciousness being an increase in the feeling's intensity, and in all probability, as we saw in the last chapter, an elementary sense of the lapse of time (see p. 635). [p. 646] Exner writes:
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.3%:
The ego, the man, the will, may be non-existent for the time
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.5%:
The entire history of Sensation is a commentary on our inability to tell whether two sensations received apart are exactly alike. What appeals to our [p. 232] attention far more than the absolute quality or quantity of a given sensation is its ratio to whatever other sensations we may have at the same time
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.3%:
The entire superstructure which Fechner rears upon the [p. 548] facts is thus not only seen to be arbitrary and subjective, but in the highest degree improbable as well. The departures from Weber's law in regions where it does not obtain, he explains by the compounding with it of other unknown laws which mask its effects. As if any law could not be found in any set of phenomena, provided one have the wit to invent enough other coexisting laws to overlap and neutralize it! The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.2%:
The essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest. Amongst those other things which have this important property I class it, after this property I name it, as a thing endowed with this property I conceive it; and whilst so classing, naming, and conceiving it, all other truth about it becomes to me as naught
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.9%:
The extreme degree of subtlety in analogy is [p. 365] reached in such cases as when we say certain English art critics' writing reminds us of a close room in which pastilles have been burning, or that the mind of certain Frenchmen is like old Roquefort cheese. Here language utterly fails to hit upon the basis of resemblance.
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 9.8%:
The fact is that discontinuity comes in if a new nature comes in at all.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.9%:
The fact is that the whole question of interaction and influence between things is a metaphysical question, and cannot be discussed at all by those who are unwilling to go into matters thoroughly
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.5%:
The fact that the same real topic of discourse is at one time conceived as a mere 'that' or 'that which, etc.,' and is at another time conceived with additional specifications, has been treated by many authors as a proof that conceptions themselves are fertile and self-developing
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.6%:
The fading object must be due to a brain-process some of whose elements awaken through habit [p. 591] some of the elements of the brain-process of the object which comes to view. This
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.3%:
The feeling of rationality in these cases seems rather a negative than a [p. 263] positive thing, being the mere absence of shock, or sense of discord, between the terms of thought
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.5%:
The feeling," he says, "of the words makes ten or twenty times more noise in our consciousness than the sense of the phrase, which for consciousness is a very slight matter
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.5%:
The figure never produced the least sound nor came within a number of feet of his person, yet he knew that it was a man, that it moved, and in what direction, even that it wore a full beard, which, like the thick curly heir, was partially gray
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.5%:
The figure we viewed as a polygon appears to us now as a sum of juxtaposed triangles; the number hitherto conceived as thirteen is at last noticed to be six plus seven, or prime; the man thought honest is believed a rogue. Such changes of our opinion are viewed by these thinkers as evolutions of our conception, from within.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.9%:
The first abstract qualities thus formed are, no doubt, qualities of one and the same sense found indifferent objects --as big, sweet; next analogies between different senses, as 'sharp' of taste, 'high' of sound, etc.; then analogies of motor combinations, or form of relation, as simple, confused, difficult, reciprocal, relative, spontaneous, etc
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.9%:
The first adjectives will therefore probably be total nouns embodying the striking character. The primeval man will say, not 'the bread is hard,' but 'the bread is stone'; not 'the face is round,' but 'the face is moon'; not 'the fruit is sweet,' but 'the fruit is sugar-cane.' The
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.6%:
The first and most important, but also the most difficult, task at the outset of an education is to overcome gradually the inattentive dispersion of mind which shows itself wherever the organic life preponderates over the intellectual. The training of animals . . . must be in the first instance based on the awakening of attention
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.6%:
The first are the abstract reasoners, properly so called, the men of science, and philosophers -- the analysts, in a word; the latter are the poets, the critics -- the artists, in a word, the men of intuitions. These judge rightly, classify cases, characterize them by the most striking analogic epithets, but go no further
95.4%:
The first mode is called by Mr. Spencer direct, the second indirect, equilibration. Both equilibrations must of course be natural and physical processes, but they belong to entirely different physical spheres. The direct influences are obvious and accessible things. The causes of variation in the young are, on the other hand, molecular and hidden
94.7%:
The first thing I have to say is that all schools (however they otherwise differ) must allow that the elementary qualities of cold, heat, pleasure, pain, red, blue, sound, silence, etc., are original, innate, or a priori properties of our subjective nature, even though they should require the touch of experience to waken them into actual consciousness, and should slumber, to all eternity, without it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.5%:
The first thing is to have seen that every possible case of reasoning involves the extraction of a particular partial aspect of the phenomena thought about, and that whilst Empirical Thought simply associates phenomena in their entirety, Reasoned Thought couples them by the conscious use of this extract
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 61.5%:
The fovea acts thus as the origin of a system of polar co-ordinates, in relation to which each and every retinal point has through an incessantly-repeated process of association its distance and direction determined
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
The free-will question arises as regards belief. If our wills are indeterminate, so must our beliefs be, etc. The first act of free-will, in short, would naturally be to believe in freewill, etc Note: What?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
The genius is simply he to whom, when he opens his eyes upon the world, the 'right 'characters are the prominent ones. The fool is he who, with the same purposes as the genius, infallibly gets his attention tangled amid the accidents
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.2%:
The germinal question concerning [p. 314] things brought for the first time before consciousness is not the theoretic 'What is that?' but the practical 'Who goes there?' or rather, as Horwicz has admirably put it, 'What is to be done?' -- 'Was fang' ich an?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.5%:
The girl, on the contrary, plays with her doll, washes and dresses it, strokes it, clasps and kisses it, puts it to bed and tucks it in, sings it a cradle-song, or speaks with it as if it were a living being
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.8%:
The grammatical sentence expresses this. Its 'subject' stands for an object of acquaintance which, by the addition of the predicate, is to get something known about it. We may already know a good deal, when we hear the subject named - its name may have rich connotations. But, know we much or little then, we know more still when the sentence is done Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.9%:
The great difference, in fact, between that simpler kind of rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of past experience merely suggesting each other, and reasoning distinctively so called, is this, that [p. 330] whilst the empirical thinking is only reproductive, reasoning is productive
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.3%:
The great law of habit itself -- that twenty experiences make us recall a thing better than one, that long indulgence in error makes right thinking almost impossible -- seems to have no essential foundation in reason. The business of thought is with truth -- the number of experiences ought to have nothing to do with her hold of it; and she ought by right to be able to hug it all the closer, after years wasted out of its presence. The
COMPARED., 59.4%:
The great maxim in pedagogy is to knit every new piece of knowledge on to a pre-existing curiosity -- i.e., to assimilate its matter in some way to what is already known. Hence the advantage of 'comparing all that is far off and foreign to something that is near home, of making the unknown plain by the example of the known, slid of connecting all the instruction with the personal experience of the pupil Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.9%:
The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the fund
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting idea. To give this power is the highest result of education
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.2%:
The hardest part of the training of a young draughtsman is his learning to feel directly the retinal (i.e. primitively sensible) magnitudes which the different objects in the held of view subtend. To do this he must recover what Ruskin calls the 'innocence of the eye' -- that is, a sort of childish perception of stains of color merely as such, without consciousness of what they mean
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.2%:
The hell to be endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.8%:
The herd's unity is only potential, its centre ideal, like the 'centre of gravity' in physics, until the herdsman or owner comes. He furnishes a real centre of accretion to which the beasts are driven and by which they are held
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.1%:
The higher poets all use abrupt epithets, which are alike intimate and remote, and, as Emerson says, sweetly torment us with invitations to their inaccessible homes.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
The history of science is strewn with wrecks and ruins of theory -- essences and principles, fluids and forces -- once fondly clung to, But found to hang together with no facts of sense
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19%:
The human race as a whole largely agrees as to what it shall notice and name, and what not. And among the noticed parts we select in much the same way for accentuation and preference or subordination and dislike
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.4%:
The hunting and pugnacious instincts, when aroused, also inhibit our sympathy absolutely. This accounts for the cruelty of collections of men hounding each other on to bait or torture a victim
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.5%:
The hunting and the fighting in- [p. 412] stinct combine in many manifestations. They both support the emotion of anger; they combine in the fascination which stories of atrocity have for most minds; and the utterly blind excitement of giving the rein to our fury when our blood is up (an excitement whose intensity is greater than that of any other human passion save one) is only explicable as an impulse aboriginal in character, and having more to do with immediate and overwhelming tendencies to muscular discharge than to any possible reminiscences of effects of experience, or association of ideas
95.7%:
The idea of one term will then engender a fixed, a wavering, or a negative expectation of another, giving affirmative, the hypothetical, disjunctive, interrogative, and negative judgments, and judgments of actuality and possibility about certain things
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87%:
The idea of the end, then, tends more and more to make itself all-sufficient
97.7%:
The ideal which this philosophy strives after is a mathematical world-formula, by which, if all the collocations and motions at a given moment were known, it would be possible to reckon those of any wished-for future moment Note: The grand unified theory
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.3%:
The ideal working of the law of compound association, were it unmodified by any extraneous influence, would be such as to keep the mind in a perpetual treadmill of concrete reminiscences from which no detail could be omitted
Chapter: CHAPTER I - The Scope of Psychology, 0.3%:
The ideas and feelings, e.g., which these present printed characters excite in the reader's mind not only occasion movements of his eyes and nascent movements of articulation in him, but will some day make him speak, or take sides in a discussion, or give advice, or choose a book to read, differently from what would have been the case had they never impressed his retina
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.1%:
The instinct about O is there; only by the complication of the associative machinery it has come into conflict with another instinct about P.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88%:
The intensity of some feelings is practically apt to be below the discharging point, whilst that of others is apt to be above it
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 28.2%:
The interest itself, though its genesis is doubtless perfectly natural, makes experience more than it is made by it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.2%:
The internal shadings of emotional feeling, moreover, merge endlessly into each other. Language has discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, animosity, dislike, aversion, malice, spite, vengefulness, abhorrence, etc., etc.; but in the dictionaries of synonyms we find these feelings distinguished more by their severally appropriate objective stimuli than by their conscious or subjective tone
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.1%:
The judgment seems to result from the combination of retinal, muscular and intellectual factors with each other; and any one of them may occasionally overpower the rest in a way which seems to leave the matter subject to no simple law
98.2%:
The judgments of subsumption are themselves subsumed under the laws of logic. Those of comparison are expressed in classifications, and in the sciences of arithmetic and geometry.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.2%:
The later mental state says 'this is the same flavor (or fluid) which that earlier state perceived as simple, but that does not make the two states themselves identical. It is nothing but a case of learning more and more about the same topics of discourse or things
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.6%:
The links between the terms are either 'contiguity' or 'similarity,' and with a mixture of both these things we can hardly be very incoherent. As a rule, in this sort of irresponsible thinking, the terms which fall to be coupled together are empirical concretes, not abstractions. A sunset may call up the vessel's deck from which I saw one last summer, the companions of my voyage, my arrival into port, etc.; or, it may make me think of solar myths, of Hercules' and Hector's funeral pyres, of Homer and whether he could write, of the Greek alphabet, etc
98.1%:
The logical stickler for justice always seems pedantic and mechanical to the man who goes by tact and the particular instance, and who usually makes a poor show at argument. Sometimes the abstract conceiver's way is better, sometimes that of the man of instinct. But just as in our study of reasoning we found it impossible to lay down any mark whereby to distinguish right conception of a concrete case from confusion (see pp. 336, 350), so here we can give no general rule for deciding when it is morally useful to treat a concrete case as sui generis, and when to lump it with others in an abstract class.[35] Note: Et tu John Reed
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67%:
The lower half of the retina, which habitually sees the farther half of things spread out on the ground, ought to have acquired a habit of enlarging its pictures by imagination, so as to make them more than equal to those which fall on the upper retinal surface; and this habit ought to be hard to escape from, even when both halves of the object are equidistant from the eye, as in a, vertical line on paper
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.9%:
The man of genius is he who will always stick in his bill at the right point, and bring it out with the right element - 'reason' if the emergency be theoretical, 'means' if it be practical - transfixed upon it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.8%:
The man, however, by seeking to make some one impression characteristic and essential, prevents the rest from having their effect. So that, if the (for him) essential feature be forgotten or changed, he is too apt to be thrown off altogether, and then the brute or the trance-subject may seem to outstrip him in sagacity
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.4%:
The mania of young children for breaking and pulling apart whatever is given them is more often the expression of a rudimentary constructive impulse than of a, destructive one. 'Blocks' are the playthings of which they are least apt to tire
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.8%:
The marksman ends by thinking only of the exact position of the goal, the singer only of the perfect sound, the balancer only of the point of the pole whose oscillations he must counteract
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.3%:
The material connected must be given by lower faculties to the Understanding, for the latter is not an intuitive faculty, but by nature 'empty.' And the bringing of this material 'under the unity of Apperception' is explained by Kant to mean the thinking it always so that, whatever its other determinations be, it may be known as thought by me.[31] Though this consciousness, that I think it, need not be at every moment explicitly realized, it is always capable of being realized
96.9%:
The matter of arithmetic is mental matter; its principles flow from the fact that the matter forms a series, which can be cut into by us wherever we like without the matter changing
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.2%:
The measuring of our space-feelings against each other mainly comes about through the successive arousal of different ones by the same thing, by our selection of certain ones as feelings of its real size and shape, and by the degradation of others to the status of being merely signs of these.
95.6%:
The mere existence of things to be known is even now not, as a rule, sufficient to bring about a knowledge of them. Our abstract and general discoveries usually come to us as lucky fancies; and it is only après [p. 631] coup that we find that they correspond to some reality. What immediately produced them were previous thoughts, with which, and with the brain-processes of which, that reality had naught to do. Why
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.6%:
The mere stream of consciousness, with its lapses of memory, cannot possibly be as 'responsible' as a soul which is at the judgment day all that it ever was. To modern readers, however, who are less insatiate for retribution than their grandfathers, this argument will hardly be as convincing as it seems once to have been.
98.2%:
The mind has a native structure in this sense, that certain of its objects, if considered together in certain ways, give definite results; and that no other ways of considering, and no other results, are possible if the same objects be taken. The results are 'relations' which are all expressed by judgments of subsumption and of comparison.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.7%:
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.4%:
The mind's relations to other objects than the brain are cognitive and emotional relations exclusively, so far as we know. It knows them, and it inwardly welcomes or rejects them, but it has no other dealings with them. When it seems to act upon them, it only does so through the intermediary of its own body, so that not it but the body is what acts on them, and the brain must first act upon the body Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.5%:
The mind-stuff of which this 'knowing' is made seems to be verbal images exclusively. But if the words 'coffee,' 'bacon,' 'muffins,' and 'eggs' lead a man to speak to his cook, to pay his bills, and to take measures for the morrow's meal exactly as visual and gustatory memories would, why are they not, [p. 266] for all practical intents and purposes, as good a kind of material in which to think? In fact, we may suspect them to be for most purposes better than terms with a richer imaginative coloring.
97%:
The modern theories of atoms, of heat, and of gases are, in fact, only intensely artificial devices for gaining that constancy in the numbers of things which sensible experience will not show. "Sensible things are not the things for me," says Science, "because in their changes they will not keep their numbers the same. Sensible qualities are not the qualities for me, because they can with difficulty be numbered at all. These hypothetic atoms, however, are the things, these hypothetic masses and velocities are the qualities for me; they will stay numbered all the time."
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.6%:
The moment one tries to define what habit is, one is led to the fundamental properties of matter. The laws of Nature are nothing but the immutable habits which the different elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.3%:
The moment, however, they came to closer quarters with it, trying to define more accurately its precise nature, we should find opinions beginning to diverge. Some would say that it is a simple active substance, the soul, of which they are thus conscious; others, that it is nothing but a fiction, the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun I; and between these extremes of opinion all sorts of intermediaries would be found.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.6%:
The more classic one's taste is, however, the less relatively important are the secondary pleasures felt to be in comparison with those of the primary sensation as it [p. 469] comes in.[22] Classicism and romanticism have their battles over this point
98%:
The most characteristically and peculiarly moral judgments that a man is ever called on to make are in unprecedented cases and lonely emergencies, where no popular rhetorical maxims can avail, and the hidden oracle alone can speak; and it speaks often in favor of conduct quite unusual, and suicidal as far as gaining popular approbation goes Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.8%:
The most complex habits, as we shall presently see more fully, are, from the same point of view, nothing but concatenated discharges in the nerve-centres, due to the presence there of systems of reflex paths, so organized as to wake each other up successively - the impression produced by one muscular contraction serving as a stimulus to provoke the next, until a final impression inhibits the process and closes the chain
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.2%:
The most fictitious puzzles have been introduced into our science by this means. The so-called question of presentative or representative perception, of whether an [p.197] object is present to the thought that thinks it by a counterfeit image of itself, or directly and without any intervening image at all ; the question of nominalism and conceptualism, of the shape in which things are present when only a general notion of them is before the mind ; are comparatively easy questions when once the psychologist's fallacy is eliminated from their treatment
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 3.7%:
The most general and striking fact connected with cortical injury is that of the restoration of function. Functions lost at first are after a few days or weeks restored
COMPARED., 59.7%:
The most important thing on the subject from the point of view of theory is t article by Mr. Myers on the Demon of Socrates in the Proceedings of t society for Psychical Research for 1889, p. 522.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.1%:
The most peculiar social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of the person one is in love with
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.2%:
The motor type remains -- perhaps the most interesting of all, and certainly the one of which least is known
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.6%:
The mystery is solved when we note the class to which all these experiences belong. They are 'perceptions' of definite 'things,' definitely situated in tridimensional space. The mind uniformly uses its sensations to identify things by. The sensation is invariably apperceived by the idea, name, or 'normal' aspect (p. 238) of the thing. The peculiarity of the optical signs of things is their extraordinary mutability. A 'thing' which we follow with the eye, never doubting of its physical identity, will change its retinal image incessantly. A
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 36%:
The names differ far more than the flavors, and help to stretch these latter farther apart.
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.5%:
The natural possibility or impossibility of the thing does not touch the question of its conceivability in this problematic way. 'Round square,' 'black-white-thing,' are absolutely definite conceptions; it is a mere accident, as far as conception goes, that they happen to stand for things which nature lets us sensibly perceive
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.4%:
The negative conditions, at least, of an atmosphere and a free outlook are present in the former
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
The only a priori advice that can be given to a man embarking on life with a certain purpose is the somewhat barren counsel: Be sure that in the circumstances that meet you, you attend to the right ones for your purpose. To pick out the right ones is the measure of the man
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.1%:
The only case, says Helmholtz, in which such copying occurs, and in which [p. 628] "our perceptions can truly correspond with outer reality, is that of the time-succession of phenomena
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33%:
The only class of thoughts which can with any show of plausibility be said to resemble their objects are sensations. The stuff of which all our other thoughts are composed is symbolic, and a thought attests its pertinency to a topic by simply terminating, sooner or later, in a sensation which resembles the latter
95.9%:
The only cohesions which experience in the literal sense of the word produces in our mind are, as we contended some time back, the proximate laws of nature, and habitudes of concrete things, that heat melts ice, that salt preserves meat, that fish die out of water, and the like.[9] Such 'empirical truths' as these we [p. 638] admitted to form an enormous part of human wisdom. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 70%:
The only exception seems to be when we expressly wish to abstract from particulars, and to judge of the general 'effect.' Witness ladies trying on new dresses with their heads inclined and their eyes askance; or painters in the same attitude judging of the 'values' in their pictures
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47%:
The only hypothesis, in short, to which the facts of inward experience give countenance is that the brain-tracts excited by the event proper, and those excited in its recall, are in part different from each other
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.8%:
The only images intrinsically important are the halting-places, the substantive conclusions, provisional or final, of the thought. Throughout all the rest of the stream, the feelings of relation are everything, and the terms related almost naught
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.8%:
The only impressions that can be made upon them are through the blood, on the one hand, and through the sensory nerve-roots, on the other; and it is to the infinitely attenuated currents that pour in through these latter channels that the hemispherical cortex shows itself to be so peculiarly susceptible
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
The only simplification which could possibly be aimed at would be the reduction of the relations to a smaller number of types, like those which such authors as Kant and Renouvier call the 'categories' of the understanding
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.5%:
The only value of universal characters is that they help us, by reasoning, [p. 480] to know new truths about individual things. The restriction of one's meaning, moreover, to an individual thing, probably requires even more complicated brainprocesses than its extension to all the instances of a kind; and the mere mystery, as such, of the knowledge, is equally great, whether generals or singulars be the things known. In sum, therefore, the traditional universal-worship can only be called a bit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophic 'idol of the cave.'
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.7%:
The opinion so stoutly professed by many, that language is essential to thought, seems to have this much of truth in it, that all our inward images tend invincibly to attach themselves to something sensible, so as to gain in corporeity and life
94.8%:
The order of experience,' in this matter of the time- and spaceconjunctions of things, is thus an indisputably vera causa of our forms of thought. It is our educator, our sovereign helper and friend; and its name, standing for something with so real and definite a use, ought to be kept sacred and encumbered with no vaguer meaning
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.3%:
The original impulse which got us homes, wives, dietaries, and friends at all, seems to exhaust itself in its first achievements and to leave no surplus energy for reacting on new cases
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.5%:
The perception of them is the stimulus; and our reaction upon it is our tendency to join them and do what they are doing, and our unwillingness to be the first to leave off and go home alone.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
The perfect object of belief would be a God or 'Soul of the World,' represented both optimistically and moralistically (if such a combination could be), and withal so definitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal experiences should be sent to us by Him in just the very way in which they come
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.7%:
The phenomena of selective attention and of deliberative will are of course patent examples of this choosing activity. But few of us are aware how incessantly it is at work in operations not ordinarily called by these names. Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception we have. We
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.4%:
The phenomenon would seem to be due to a pure conception becoming saturated with the sort of stinging urgency which ordinarily only sensations bring Note: Ghosts
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.1%:
The philosophers in question simply substitute one particular object for all others, and call it the object par excellence. It is a case of the 'psychologist's fallacy' (see
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
The philosophic brain responds to an inconsistency or a gap in its knowledge, just as the musical brain responds to a discord in what it hears. At
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.2%:
The phosphorous-philosophers have often compared thought to a secretion. "The brain secretes thought, as the kidneys secrete urine, or as the liver secretes bile," are phrases which one sometimes hears. The lame analogy need hardly be pointed out
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.8%:
The piano, the German, awaken [p. 447] no spontaneous attention; but they arouse and maintain it by borrowing a force from elsewhere
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
The point I wish to notice here is simply that belief and disbelief are but two aspects of one psychic state.
97.7%:
The popular notion that 'Science' is forced on the mind ab extra, and that our interests have nothing to do with its constructions, is utterly absurd. The craving to believe that the things of the world belong to kinds which are related by inward rationality together, is the parent of Science as well as of sentimental philosophy; and the original investigator always preserves a healthy sense of how plastic the materials are in his hands
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.4%:
The popular notion that mere consciousness as such is not essentially a forerunner of activity, that the latter must result from some superadded 'will-force,' is a very natural inference from those special cases in which we think of an act for an indefinite length of time without the action taking place. These cases, however, are not the norm; they are cases of inhibition by antagonistic [p. 527] thoughts
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.8%:
The practical inferences are pedagogic. First, to strengthen attention in children who care nothing for the subject they are studying and let their wits go wool-gathering. The interest here must be 'derived' from something that the teacher associates with the task, a reward or a punishment if nothing less external comes to mind. Prof
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.8%:
The present conscious state, when I say 'I feel tired,' is not the direct state of tire ; when I say "I feel angry,' it is not the direct state of anger. It is the state of saying-I-feel-tired, of saying-I-feel-angry, - entirely different matters, so different that the fatigue and anger apparently included in them are considerable modifications of the fatigue and anger directly felt in the previous instant. The act of naming them has momentarily detracted from their force
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.4%:
The present writer does this for the alternative of freedom, but since the grounds of his opinion are ethical rather than psychological, he prefers to exclude them from the present book
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14%:
The primary self often has to invent an hallucination by which to mask and hide from its own view the deeds which the other self is enacting Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
The pristine assurance is soon met by checks; a disagreeable experience leading to new insight. To be thwarted and opposed is one of our earliest and most frequent pains
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.4%:
The private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind. This has always been the invincible contention of the spiritualists against the associationists in Psychology
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.2%:
The problem which the philosophers have set themselves is that of ascertaining principles of connection between the thoughts which thus appear to sprout one out [p. 551] of the other, whereby their peculiar succession or coexistence may be explained. But immediately an ambiguity arises: which sort of connection is meant? connection thought-of, or connection between thoughts? These are two entirely different things, and only in the case of one of them is there any hope of finding 'principles
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.5%:
The process of deliberation contains endless degrees of complication. At every moment of it our consciousness is of an extremely complex object, namely the existence of the whole set of motives and their conflict, as explained on p. 275 of Vol. I
COMPARED., 57.4%:
The process of the willing ought, then, to pour into the process of feeling the command effected, and ought to awaken that feeling in a maximal degree provided no other positively contradictory sensation come in at the same time. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.7%:
The progress from brute to man is characterized by nothing so much as by the decrease in frequency of proper occasions for fear. In civilized life, in particular, it has at last become possible for large numbers of people to pass from the cradle to the grave without ever having had a pang of genu- [p. 416] ine fear
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91%:
The psychic side of the phenomenon thus seems, somewhat like the applause or hissing at a spectacle, to be an encouraging or adverse comment on what the machinery brings forth
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 34.2%:
The psychologic unit is not fixed; that which is called one impression by Hartley is treated as half-a-dozen or more by Mill: and the tendency of the modern teachers on this point is to recede more and more from the better chosen track of their master
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.9%:
The psychological law of association of objects thought of through their previous contiguity in thought or experience would thus be an effect, within the mind, of the physical fact that nervecurrents propagate themselves easiest through those tracts of conduction which have been already most in use. Descartes and Locke hit upon this explanation, which modern science has not yet succeeded in improving. "Custom," says Locke, "settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which seem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.1%:
The psychological stock-in-trade of some authors is the belief that two thoughts about one thing are virtually the same thought, and that this same thought may in subsequent reflections become more and more conscious of what it really was all along from the first
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.4%:
The psychologist, looking on and playing the critic, might prove the thought wrong, and show there was no real identity, - there might have been no yesterday, or, at any rate, no self of yesterday; or, if there were, the sameness predicated might not obtain, or might be predicated on insufficient grounds. In either case the personal identity would not exist as a fact; but it would exist as a feeling all the same; the consciousness of it by the thought would be there, and the psychologist would still have to analyze that, and show where its illusoriness lay. Let
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30.9%:
The question is of course a purely speculative one, for we have no means of objectively ascertaining whether our feelings react on our nerveprocesses or not; and those who answer the question in either way do so in consequence of general analogies and presumptions drawn from other fields. As mere conceptions, the effecttheory and the cause-theory of attention are equally clear; and whoever affirms either conception to be true must do so on metaphysical or universal rather than on scientific or particular grounds
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.1%:
The question is this: Is the bare idea of a movement's sensible effects its sufficient mental cue (p. 497), or must there be an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or other synonymous phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement can follow?
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.4%:
The question is: How do this conception and this belief arise? How is the chaos smoothed and straightened out? Mainly by two operations: Some of the experiences are apprehended to exist out- and alongside of each other, and others are apprehended to interpenetrate each other, and to occupy the same room
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.5%:
The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
The reader will recognize in these two cases the two sorts of judgment called in the logic-books existential and [p. 290] attributive respectively
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.5%:
The real stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the fact, but in the fact itself. The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present; that a series of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a simple present conception, accompanied by a belief or reality
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
The real things are, in Mr. Taine's terminology, the reductives of the things judged unreal
95.8%:
The reality exists as a plenum. All its parts are contemporaneous, each is as real as any other, and each as essential for making the whole just what it is and nothing else
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.2%:
The reason is that he is constantly going over these things in his mind, and comparing and making series of them. They form for him not so many odd facts, but a concept-system -- so they stick
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily commotion which the exciting idea sets up. 'Nothing which I can feel like that can be false.' All our religious and supernatural beliefs are of this order. The surest warrant for immortality is the yearning of our bowels for our dear ones; for God, the sinking sense it gives us to imagine no such Providence or help.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.6%:
The reason why physics grows more deductive the more the fundamental properties it assumes are of a mathematical sort, such as molecular mass or wave-length, is that the immediate consequences of these notions are so few that we can survey them all at once, and promptly pick out those which concern us.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.3%:
The reason why that doctrine is not a self-evident truth is that we have so many ideas which do not result in action. But it will be seen that in every such case, without exception, that is because other ideas simultaneously present rob them of their impulsive power.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.4%:
The reason why this fact is so strangely garble in the books seems to be what on an earlier page (see p. 196 ff.) I called the psychologist's fallacy. We have the inveterate habit, whenever we try introspectively to describe one of our thoughts, of dropping the thought as it is in itself and talking of something else
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18%:
The reason why we all believe that the objects of our thoughts have a duplicate existence outside, is that there are many human thoughts, each with the same objects, as [p. 272] we cannot help supposing. The judgment that my thought has the same object as his thought is what makes the psychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer reality.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.8%:
The recall or recollection, on the other hand, is a psychophysical phenomenon, with both a bodily and a mental side. The bodily side is the functional excitement of the tracts and paths in question; the mental side is the conscious vision of the past occurrence, and the belief that we experienced it before.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.7%:
The records of Arctic or African travel perused in one mood awaken no thoughts but those of horror at the malignity of Nature; read at another time they suggest only enthusiastic reflections on the indomitable power and pluck of man
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.1%:
The relation of conceived to intuited time is just like that of the fictitious space pictured on the flat back-scene of a theatre to the actual space of the stage
97%:
The relation of numbers to experience is just like that of 'kinds' in logic. So long as an experience will keep its kind we can handle it by logic. So long as it will keep its number we can deal with it by arithmetic
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
The relative unimportance of the means appears from the fact that when the conclusion is there, we have always forgotten most of the steps preceding its attainment
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
The remedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a concert, without expressing it afterward in some active way.[19] Let the expression be the least thing in the world -speaking genially to one's aunt, or giving up one's seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic offers - but let it not fail to take place.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.6%:
The remembrance of those fields and rivers has the same influence as a new argument
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.3%:
The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.3%:
The result of all this flux is that the merely descriptive literature of the emotions is one of the most tedious parts of psychology. And not only is it tedious, but you feel that its subdivisions are to a great extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.5%:
The richness is got by including all the facts of sense in the scheme; the simplicity, by deducing them out of the smallest possible number of permanent and independent primordial entities: the definite organization, by assimilating these latter to ideal objects between which relations of an inwardly rational sort obtain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.3%:
The same is true of him who says that all is vanity. Indefinable as the predicate vanity may be in se, it is clearly enough something which permits anæsthesia, mere escape from suffering, to be our rule of life. There is no more ludicrous incongruity than for agnostics to proclaim with one breath that the substance of things is unknowable, and with the next that the thought of it should inspire us with admiration of its glory, reverence, and a willingness to add our cooperative push in the direction towards which its manifestations seem to be drifting. The unknowable may be unfathomed, but if it make such distinct demands upon our activity, we surely are not ignorant of its essential quality
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.8%:
The schematism we have used is, moreover, taken immediately from the analysis of objects into their elementary parts, and only extended by analogy to the brain. And yet it is only as incorporated in the brain that such a schematism can represent anything causal
Chapter: CHAPTER III. On Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity., 5%:
The scheme that suggests itself in the first instance to the mind, because it is so obvious, is certainly false: I mean the notion that each cell stands for an idea or part of an idea, and that the ideas are associated or 'bound into bundles' (to use a phrase of Locke's) by the fibres
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.7%:
The sciousness in question would be the Thinker, and the existence of this thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate than as that direct inner perception of spiritual activity which we naturally believe ourselves to have
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.4%:
The sense of personal identity is not, then, this mere synthetic form essential to all thought. It is the sense of a sameness perceived by thought and predicated of things thought-about. These things are a present self and a self of yesterday. The thought not only thinks them both, but thinks that they are identical
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.7%:
The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other [p. 289] thing of which we think. Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
The sensualist uses terms of inactivity, says he forgets his ideals, is deaf to [p. 549] duty, and so forth; which terms seem to imply that the ideal motives per se can be annulled without energy or effort, and that the strongest mere traction lies in the line of the propensities
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.5%:
The sentimentalist is so constructed that 'gushing' is his or her normal mode of expression. Putting a stopper on the 'gush' will only to a limited extent cause more 'real' activities to take its place; in the main it will simply produce listlessness
97.2%:
The series A is not B is not C is not D . . . does not permit the relation to be traced between remote terms. From two negations no inference can be drawn. Nor
98.7%:
The shrugging child and the begging pup, e.g., prove somewhat too much. They are examples so unique as to suggest spontaneous variation rather than inherited habit
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.9%:
The simple and open method of attack having done what it can, the method of patience, starving out, and harassing to death is tried ; the Mind [p.193] must submit to a regular siege, in which minute advantages gained night and day by the forces that hem her in must sum themselves up at last into her overthrow. There is little of the grand style about these new prism, pendulum, and chronographphilosophers. They mean business, not chivalry.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.2%:
The solution of problems is the most characteristic and peculiar sort of voluntary thinking. Where the end thought of is some outward deed or gain, the solution is largely composed of the actual motor processes, walking, speaking, writing, etc., which lead up to it. Where the end is in the first instance only ideal, as in laying out a place of operations, the steps are purely imaginary. In both of these cases the discovery of the means may form a new sort of end, of an entirely peculiar nature, an end, namely, which we intensely desire before we have attained it, but of the nature of which, even whilst most strongly craving it, we have no distinct imagination whatever. Such an end is a problem. Note: Important
99.9%:
The sovereign road to indifference, whether to evils or to goods, lies in the thought of the higher genus. "When we have meat before us," says Marcus Aurelius, seeking indifference to that kind of good, "we must receive the impression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again that this Falernian is only a little grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish. Such, then, are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, me ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.3%:
The space of the tooth-sensibility is thus really a little world by itself, which can only become congruent with the outer space- [p. 182] world by farther experiences which shall alter its bulk, identify its directions, fuse its margins, and finally embed it as a definite part within a definite whole
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 5.4%:
The stage marked 3 is the only one that interests us here. The other stages answer to purely physiological processes, but stage 3 is psycho-physical; that is, it is a higher-central process, and has probably some sort of consciousness accompanying it. What
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 93.4%:
The state in question has many affinities with ordinary sleep. It is probable, in fact, that we all pass through it transiently whenever we fall asleep; and one might most naturally describe the usual relation of operator and subject by saying that the former keeps the latter suspended between making and sleeping by talking to him enough to beep his slumber from growing profound, and yet not in such a way as to wake him up. A
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88%:
The states of mind which normally possess the most impulsive quality are either those which represent objects of passion, appetite, or emotion - objects of instinctive reaction, in short; or they are feelings or ideas of pleasure or of pain; or ideas which for any reason we have grown accustomed to obey so that the habit of reacting on them is ingrained; or finally, in comparison with ideas of remoter objects, they are ideas of objects present or near in space and time
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.3%:
The stimulating effects of tobacco-smoke, alcohol, beef-extract (which is innutritious), etc., etc., may be partly due to a dynamogenic action of this sort. -- Of odors, that of musk seems to have a peculiar dynamogenic power. Fig
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.5%:
The stream is made higher in the drawing at its end than at its beginning, because the final way of feeling the content is fuller and richer than the initial way. As Joubert says, "we only know just what we meant to say, after we have said it." And as M. V. Egger remarks, "before speaking, one barely knows what one intends to say, but afterwards one is filled with admiration and surprise at having said and thought it so well."
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.7%:
The subject does not know that he is reading the foreign language more slowly than his own; this explains why foreigners seem to talk so fast. This simple method of determining a person's familiarity with a language might be used in school examinations.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.1%:
The system which includes the most of them, and definitely explains or pretends to explain the rest of them, will, ceteris paribus, prevail. It is needless to say how far mankind still is from having excogitated such a system. But the various materialisms, idealisms, and hylozoisms show with what industry the attempt is forever made
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77.4%:
The tendency to contract is the source of all the self-protective impulses and reactions which are later developed, including that of flight. The tendency to expand splits up, on the contrary, into the impulses and instincts of an aggressive kind, feeding, fighting, sexual intercourse, etc Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
The total world of which the philosophers must take account is thus composed of the realities plus the fancies and illusions.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.9%:
The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect imagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.3%:
The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too much as absolutely individual things. So long as they are set down as so many eternal and sacred psychic entities, like the old immutable species in natural history, so long all that can be done with them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters, points, and effects. But if we regard them as products of more general causes (as 'species' are now regarded as products of heredity and variation), the mere distinguishing and cataloguing becomes of subsidiary importance
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.5%:
The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability, at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts; and in general, one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than another, because the whole of human language is accommodated to the one, and is so incongruous with the other that it cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.5%:
The two opposite instincts relative to the same object ripen in succession. If the first one engenders a habit, that habit will inhibit the application of the second instinct to that object
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.4%:
The ultimate of ultimate problems, of course, in the study of the relations of thought and brain, is to understand why and how such disparate things are connected at all
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.8%:
The unity of the parts of the stream is just as 'real' a connection as their diversity is a real separation
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.2%:
The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel.'[2
94.9%:
The universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so-called 'forms of thought,' as soon as it is supplemented by the law that habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative in generation after generation
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.1%:
The usual mode of lessening the shock of disappointment or disesteem is to contract, if possible, a low estimate of the persons that inflict it. This is our remedy for the unjust censures of party spirit, as well as of personal malignity." (
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.9%:
The verbal symbol 'horse,' which stands for all our experiences of horses, serves all the purposes of Thought, without recalling one of the images clustered in the perception of horses, just as the sight of a horse's form serves all the purposes of recognition without recalling the sound of its neighing or its tramp, its qualities as an animal of draught, and so forth
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.4%:
The visceral and organic part of the expression can be suppressed in some men, but not in others, and on this it is probable that the chief part of the felt emotion depends
94.7%:
The warfare of philosophers is exclusively relative to their FORMS OF COMBINATION. The empiricist maintains that these forms can only follow the order of combination in which the elements were originally awakened by the impressions of the external world; the apriorists insist, on the contrary, that some modes of combination, at any rate, follow from the natures of the elements themselves, and that no amount of experience can modify this result
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76%:
The well-known story of the old judge advising the new one never to give reasons for his decisions, "the decisions will probably be right, the reasons will surely be wrong," illustrates this. The
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
The whole history of witchcraft and early medicine is a commentary on the facility with which anything which chances to be conceived is believed the moment the belief chimes in with an emotional mood
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77%:
The whole neural organism, it will be remembered, is, physiologically considered, but a machine for converting stimuli into reactions; and the intellectual part of our life is knit up with but the middle or 'central' portion of the machine's operations
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.9%:
The whole notion of 'binding' is a mystery, the first step towards the solution of which is to clear scholastic rubbish out of the way. Popular science talks of 'forces,' 'attractions'or 'affinities' as binding the molecules; but clear science, though she may use such words to abbreviate discourse, has no use for the conceptions, and is satisfied when she can express in simple 'laws' the bare space-relations of the molecules as functions of each other and of time
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.3%:
The whole science of geometry may be said to owe its being to the exorbitant interest which the human mind takes in lines
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.1%:
The whole story of our dealings with the lower wild animals is the history of our taking advantage of the way in which they judge of everything by its mere label, as it were, so as to ensnare or kill them. Nature, in them, has left matters in this rough way, and made them act always in the manner which would be oftenest right.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.5%:
The whole surface of the body is always in a state of semi-conscious irritation which needs only the emphasis of attention, or of some accidental inward irritation, to become strong at any point.
98.3%:
The widest postulate of rationality is that the world is rationally intelligible throughout, after the pattern of some ideal system
97.9%:
The word 'cause' is, in short, an altar to an unknown god; an empty pedestal still marking the place of a hoped-for statue. Any really inward belonging-together of the sequent terms, if discovered, would be accepted as what the word cause was meant to stand for
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
The world contains consciousness as well as atoms -- and the one must he written down as just as essential as the other, in the absence of any declared purpose regarding them on the creator's part or in the absence of any creator
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The world of 'idols of the tribe
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The world of ideal relations
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The world of sense, or of physical 'things'
95.9%:
The world of æsthetics an d ethics is an ideal world, a Utopia, a world which the outer relations persist in contradicting, but which we as stubbornly persist in striving to make actual
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.7%:
The world thus finds in the heroic man its worthy match and mate; and the effort which he is able to put forth to hold himself erect and keep his heart unshaken is the direct measure of his worth [p. 579] and function in the game of human life. He can stand this Universe. He can meet it and keep up his faith in it in presence of those same features which lay his weaker brethren low
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.9%:
The worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also
98%:
The æsthetic principles are at bottom such axioms as that a note sounds good with its third and fifth, or that potatoes need salt, We are once for all so made that when certain impressions come before our mind, one of them will seem to call for or repel the others as its companions
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.4%:
Their nervous centres have become a sluice-way pathologically unlocked by every passing conception of a bottle and a glass
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.5%:
Their several extents seem one extent. The place at which each appears is held to be the same with the place [p. 184] at which the others appear. They become, in short, so many properties of ONE AND THE SAME REAL THING. This is the first and great commandment, the fundamental 'act' by which our world gets spatially arranged.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.2%:
Then the superior tenacity of the paths formed in childhood becomes manifest: the dotard will retrace the facts of his earlier years after he has lost all those of later date.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.6%:
Thenceforward, long as he may live, he will never see a fig, a piebald horse, or a letter of the alphabet without the name which he first heard in conjunction with each clinging to it in his mind; and inversely he will [p. 557] never hear the name without the faint arousal of the image of the object.[3]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.7%:
There are other shorter flights of thought, single couplings of terms which suggest one another by association, which approach more to what would commonly be classed as acts of reasoning proper. Those are where a present sign suggests an unseen, distant, or future reality
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83%:
There are outbreaks of rage so groundless and unbridled that all must admit them to be expressions of disease Note: Leon
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 50%:
There are realities and there are 'states of mind,' and the latter know the former; and it is just as wonderful for a state of mind to be a 'sensation' and know simple pain as for it to be a thought and know a system
97.3%:
There are relations which are intrinsically transferable, whilst others are not. The relation of condition, e.g., is intrinsically transferable. What conditions a condition conditions what it conditions -- "cause of cause is cause of effect." The relations of negation and frustration, on the other hand, are not transferable: what frustrates a frustration does not frustrate what it frustrates Note: Important
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.8%:
There are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable: we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.9%:
There are two other conditions of language in the human being
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.3%:
There are, as we know, two ways of studying every psychic state. First, the way of analysis: What does it consist in? What is its inner nature? Of what sort of mind-stuff is it composed? Second, the way of history: What are its conditions of production, and its connection with other facts?
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.3%:
There are, then, mechanical conditions on which thought depends, and which, to say the least, determine the order in which is presented the content or material for her comparisons, selections, and decisions.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88%:
There is a certain normal ratio in the impulsive power of different sorts of motive, which characterizes what may be called ordinary healthiness of will,
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48%:
There is a curious experience which everyone seems to have had -- the feeling that the present moment in its completeness has been experienced before -- we were saying just this thing, in just this place, to just these people, etc
COMPARED., 57.6%:
There is an everlasting struggle in every mind between the tendency to keep unchanged, and the tendency to renovate, its ideas. Our education is a cease-less compromise between the conservative and the progressive factors. Every new experience must be disposed [p.110] of under some old head. The great point is to find the head which has to be least altered to take it in Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.1%:
There is an excitement during the crying fit which is not without a certain pungent pleasure [p. 445] of its own; but it would take a genius for felicity to discover any dash of redeeming quality in the feeling of dry and shrunken sorrow.-
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.5%:
There is another sort of human play, into which higher aesthetic feelings enter.. I refer to that love of festivities, ceremonies, ordeals, etc., which seems to be universal in our species
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.4%:
There is hardly any more difficult task than that of framing questions which are not likely to be misunderstood, which admit of easy reply, and which cover the ground of inquiry
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.3%:
There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera. Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind.
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.9%:
There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of rising and going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are subjects of express volitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his consciousness at all.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.4%:
There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.6%:
There is not one moment of passive inextensive sensation, succeeded by another of active extensive perception, but the form I see is as immediately felt as the color which fins it out
99.6%:
There is something 'ampliative' in our greatest truisms, our state of mind is richer after than before we have uttered them. This
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.3%:
There is thus a sort of perspective projection of past objects upon present consciousness, similar to that of wide landscapes upon a camera-screen.
97.3%:
There is thus no denying the fact that the mind is filled with necessary and eternal relations which it finds between certain of its ideal conceptions, and which form a determinate system, independent of the order of frequency in which experience may have associated the conception's originals in time and space. Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24%:
There is, first, . . . the difference between a fact and the Thought of that fact: a distinction which we are able to cognize in the past, and which then constitutes Memory, and in the future, when it constitutes Expectation; but in neither case can we give any account of it except that it exists
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.7%:
There must be a penury in one's interest in the details of particular forms in order to permit the forces of the intellect to be concentrated on what is common to many forms
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.8%:
There remains a sort of philosophic faith, bred like most faiths from an aesthetic demand
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.2%:
There remains another feature of general brain-physiology, and indeed for psychological purposes the most important feature of all. I refer to the aptitude of the brain for acquiring habits. But I will treat of that in a chapter by itself.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.3%:
There the charm of conversation is in direct proportion to the possibility of abridgment and elision, and in inverse ratio to the need of explicit statement. With old friends a word stands for a whole story or set of opinions. With new-comers everything must be gone over in detail
COMPARED., 57.5%:
Therein consists the joke. Each one answers the first thing that occurs to him, [34] and that is whatever is most newly related to his pursuit in life. Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
These are the ultimate fixities from which, as we formerly observed, the whole chain of our beliefs depends, object hanging to object, as the bees, in swarming, hang to each other until, de proche en proche, the supporting branch, the Self, is reached and held.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.9%:
These are: first, the great natural loquacity; and, second, the great imitativeness of man.
Chapter: THE EDUCATION OF THE HEMISPHERES, 1.5%:
These assumptions (which after all are inevitable in any event) are: 1) The same cerebral process which, when aroused from without by a sense-organ, gives the perception of an object, will give an idea of the same object when aroused by other cerebral processes from within. 2) If processes 1, 2, 3, 4 have once been aroused together or in immediate succession, any subsequent arousal of any one of them (whether from without or within) will tend to arouse the others in the original order.[This is the so-called law of association.] 3) Every sensorial excitement propagated to a lower centre tends to spread upwards and arouse an idea. 4) Every idea tends ultimately either to produce a movement or to check one which otherwise would be produced
Chapter: THE LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE HEMISPHERES., 2.2%:
These differences between dogs and monkeys show the danger of drawing general conclusions from experiments done on any one sort of animal
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 36.7%:
These examples" [of synthetic perception,' perception in which [p. 521] each contributory sensation is felt in the whole, and is a co-determinant of what the whole shall be, but does not attract the attention to its separate self] "may suffice to show the vital part which the direction of attention and practice in observing play in sense-perception
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.8%:
These feelings of relation, these psychic overtones, halos, suffusions, or fringes about the terms, may be the same in very different systems of imagery
94.8%:
These habits of transition, from one thought to another, are features of mental structure which were lack- [p. 620] ing in us at birth; we can see their growth under experience's moulding finger, and we can see how often experience undoes her own work, and for an earlier order substitutes a new one
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.2%:
These last results ought to make us careful, when we speak of nervous 'paths,' to use the word in no restricted sense. They add one more fact to the set of facts which prove that association is subtler than consciousness, and that a nerve-process may, without producing consciousness, be effective in the same way in which consciousness would have seemed to be effective if it had been there
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 8.1%:
These latter cases make us aware that it is not simply particular lines of discharge, but also general forms of discharge, that seem to be grooved out by habit in the brain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
These remarks illustrate the earlier heads of the list on page 292
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
These æsthetic and practical interests, then, are the weightiest factors in making particular ingredients stand out in high relief. What
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.7%:
They 'see into the situation --that is, they analyze it -- with their first glance. It is full of delicately differenced ingredients which their education has little by little brought to their consciousness, but of which the novice gains no clear idea.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17%:
They are not separately heard by the ear; they blend with the fundamental note, and suffuse it, and alter it; and even so do the waxing and waning brain-processes at every moment blend with and suffuse and alter the psychic effect of the processes which are at their culminating point.
99.3%:
They are the ends of what we call science; and the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up by any philosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the remodelling.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.5%:
They are the functional correlatives of structure. With the presence of a certain organ goes, one may say, almost always a native aptitude for its use
Chapter: GENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES., 1.3%:
They are, in short, remote sensations; and the difference between the hemisphereless animal and the whole one may be concisely expressed by saying that the one obeys absent, the other only present, objects. The hemispheres would then seem to be the seat of memory. Vestiges of past experience must in some way be stored up in them, and must, when aroused by present stimuli, first appear as representations of distant goods and evils; and then must discharge into the appropriate motor channels for warding off the evil and securing the benefits of the good
97.9%:
They have a fertility as [p. 671] ideals, and keep us uneasy and striving always to recast the world of sense until its lines become more congruent with theirs. Take for example the principle that 'nothing can happen without a cause.' We have no definite idea of what we mean by cause, or of what causality consists in. But the principle expresses a demand for some deeper sort of inward connection between phenomena than their merely habitual time-sequence seems to us to be
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 93.8%:
They may laugh at themselves; and they always recognize the abnormality of their state when asked about it, and call it 'sleep.' One often notices a sort of mocking smile upon them, as if they mere playing a comedy, and they may even say on 'coming to' that they were sham- [p. 606] ming all the while
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.2%:
They reason, as well as remember, by ear.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91.7%:
They teach us how greatly the centres vary in their power to discharge through certain channels
96.3%:
This AXIOM OF SKIPPED INTERMEDIARIES or of TRANSFERRED RELATIONS occurs, as we soon shall see, in logic as the fundamental principle of inference, in arithmetic as the fundamental property of the number-series, in geometry as that of the straight line, the plane and the parallel. It seems to be on the whole the broadest and deepest law of man's thought
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.3%:
This amounts to taking one species of a genus, calling it alone by the generic name, and ordering the other co-ordinate species to find what names they may. At bottom this is only verbal play. How much more conducive to clearness and insight it is to take the genus 'springs of action' and treat it as a whole; and then to distinguish within it the species 'pleasure and pain' from whatever other species may be found!
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.6%:
This answers the question why Darwin and Newton had to be waited for so long. The flash of similarity between an apple and the moon, between the rivalry for food in nature and the rivalry for man's selection, was too recondite to have occurred to any but exceptional minds
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.2%:
This attention to thought as such, and the identification of ourselves with it rather than with any of the objects which it reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a rather mysterious operation, of which we need here only say that as a matter of fact it exists; and that in everyone, at an early age, the distinction between thought as such, [p. 297] and what it is 'of' or 'about,' has become familiar to the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.3%:
This case seems to me to contain in miniature form the data for an entire psychology of volition
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.3%:
This concentration of the attention is in the highest degree exhausting. After some experiments in which I was concerned to get results as uniform as possible, I was covered with perspiration and excessively fatigued although I had as quietly in my chair all the while.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 34.7%:
This consciousness of serial increase of differences is one of the fundamental facts of our intellectual life. More, more, MORE, of the same kind of difference, we say, as we advance from term to term, and realize that the farther on we get the larger grows the breach between the term we are at and the one from which we started. Between any two terms of such a series the difference is greater than that between any intermediate terms, or than that between an intermediate term and either of the extremes. The
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.8%:
This dynamic (I had almost written dynamitic) way of representing knowledge has the merit of not being tame. To turn from it to our own psychological formulation is like turning from the fireworks, trap-doors, and transformations of the pantomime into the insipidity of the midnight, where "ghastly through the drizzling rain, On the bald street breaks the blank day!"[38]
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.9%:
This field of view of consciousness varies very much in extent, depending largely on the degree of mental freshness or fatigue. When very fresh, our minds carry an immense horizon with them. The present image shoots its perspective far before it, irradiating in advance the regions in which lie the thoughts as yet unborn
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44%:
This formula roughly expresses the phenomena, it is true, but cannot possibly be an elementary psychic law; and it is certain that, in great part at least, the foreshortening of the years as we grow older is due to the monotony of memory's content, and the consequent simplification of the backward-glancing view
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.3%:
This immixture of the will appears most flagrantly in the fact that although external matter is doubted commonly enough, minds external to our own are never doubted. We need them too much, are too essentially social to dispense with them.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
This inclining first to one then to another future, both of which we represent as possible, resembles the oscillations to and fro of a material body within the limits of its elasticity. There is inward strain, but no outward rapture. And this condition, plainly enough, is susceptible of indefinite continuance, as well in the physical mass as in the mind. If the elasticity give way, however, if the dam ever do break, and the currents burst the crust, vacillation is over and decision is irrevocably there Note: That's me
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.1%:
This is a great mistake, however
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 34.2%:
This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore, so acceptable to all people because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labor of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.3%:
This is an act of will.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 84%:
This is perhaps a reason why it may be better that a man of thought should not have too strong a visualizing power. He is less likely to have his trains of meditation disturbed by emotional interruptions
COMPARED., 55.8%:
This is probably the reason why, if we look at an isolated printed word and repeat it long enough, it ends by assuming an entirely unnatural aspect. Let the reader try this with [p.81] any word on this page. He will soon begin to wonder if it can possibly be the word he has been using all his life with that meaning Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.5%:
This is the ordinary process of the association of ideas as it spontaneously goes on in average minds
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.8%:
This is the point at which an anti-mechanical psychology must, if anywhere, make it stand in dealing with association. Everything else is pretty certainly due to cerebral laws.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.8%:
This is the stage in which proverbial philosophy reigns supreme. " An empty sack can't stand straight" will stand for the reason why a man with debts may lose his honesty; and " a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" will serve to back up one's exhortations to prudence
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.3%:
This is, in fact, a, world in which general laws obtain, in which universal propositions are true, and in which reasoning is therefore possible
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the 'Great Companion
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.4%:
This law that our consciousness constantly tends to the minimum of complexity and to the maximum of definiteness, is of great importance for all our knowledge
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.2%:
This same kind of transfer of a sensible experience associated with another to a third also associated with that other, serves to explain emotional facts. When we are pleased or hurt we express it, and the expression associates itself with the feeling. Hearing the same expression from another revives the associated feeling, and we sympathize, i.e. grieve or are glad with him
96.6%:
This shows that the principle of mediate subsumption has nothing to do with the particular order of our experiences, or with the outer coexistences and sequences of terms. Were it a mere outgrowth of habit and association, we should be forced to regard it as having no universal validity; for every hour of the day we meet [p. 650] things which we consider to be of this kind or of that, but later learn that they have none of the kind's properties, that they do not belong to the kind's kind.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
This shows that the whole doctrine of essential characters is intimately bound up with a teleological view of the world. Materialism becomes self-contradictory when it denies teleology, and yet in the same breath calls atoms, etc., the essential facts. The
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22%:
This sort of interest is really the meaning of the word 'my.' Whatever has it is eo ipso a part of me. My child, my friend dies, and where he goes I feel that part of myself now is and evermore shall be:
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.8%:
This state of non-efficacious presence is the normal condition of some objects, in all of us. Great fatigue or exhaustion may make it the condition of almost all objects
94.7%:
This structure is in turn supposed by the so-called apriorists to be of transcendental origin, or at any rate not to be explicable by experience; whilst by evolutionary empiricists it is supposed to be also due to experience, only not to the experience of the individual, but to that of his ancestors as far back as one may please to go. Our
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.1%:
This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is that by which I distinguish my Self
96.6%:
This synthetic consciousness of an uniform direction of advance through a multiplicity of terms is, apparently, what the brutes and lower men cannot accomplish, and what gives to us our extraordinary power of ratiocinative thought
COMPARED., 57.7%:
This victorious assimilation of the new is in fact the type of all intellectual pleasure. The lust for it is curiosity. The relation of the new to the old, before the assimilation is performed, is wonder. We feel neither curiosity nor wonder concerning things so far beyond us that we have no concepts to refer them to or standards by which to measure them Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
This will immediately be recognized by those who have read Mill's Logic as the ground of Utility in his famous 'four methods of experimental inquiry,' the methods of agreement, of difference, of residues, and of concomitant variations
96.7%:
This world might be a world in which all things differed, and in which what properties there were were [p. 652] ultimate and had no farther predicates. In such a world there would be as many kinds as there were separate things. We could never subsume a new thing under an old kind; or if we could, no consequences would follow. Or, again, this might be a world in which innumerable things were of a kind, but in which no concrete thing remained of the same kind long, but all objects were in a flux. Here again, though we could subsume and infer, our logic would be of no practical use to us, for the subjects of our propositions would have changed whilst we were talking. In such worlds, logical relations would obtain, and be known (doubtless) as they are now, but they would form a merely theoretic scheme and be of no use for the conduct of life Note: Cases where logic would not hold
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.4%:
Those parts of the object, however, which possess an interest resist this tendency to gradual decay of the whole object. . . . This inequality in the object -- some parts, the uninteresting, submitting to decay; others, the interesting parts, resisting it -- when it has continued for a certain time, ends in becoming a new object."Only where the interest is diffused equally over all the parts (as in the emotional memory just referred to, where, as all past, they all interest us alike) is this law departed from
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.3%:
Those thoughts which lie farthest in that direction we call sensations, for practical convenience, just as we call conceptions those which lie nearer the opposite extreme
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.8%:
Those to whom God' and 'Duty' are now mere names can make them much more than that, if they make a little sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known in moral and religious education that I need say no more. [39]
95.1%:
Those who contend that knowledge results wholly from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do the mental evolution which accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous system, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all bodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency to assume the adult form
94.9%:
Though such infinity of experiences cannot be received by a single individual, yet it may be received by the succession of individuals forming a race
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 79.6%:
Though the female sex is often said to have less pugnacity than the male, the difference seems connected more with the extent of the motor consequences of the impulse than with its frequency
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.6%:
Thus comes to pass what Mr. Hodgson calls the translation of the perceptual into the conceptual order of the world.[20] In Chapter XXII we shall see how this translation always takes place for the sake of some subjective interest, and how the conception with which we handle a bit of sensible experience is really nothing but a teleological instrument
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.3%:
Thus either by negating or by embracing, the Ego may seek to establish itself in reality. He who, with Marcus Aurelius, can truly say, "O Universe, I wish all that thou wishest," has a self from which every trace of negativeness and obstructiveness has been removed - no wind can blow except to fill its sails.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 60.7%:
Thus it appears indubitable that all space-relations except those of magnitude are nothing more or less than pure sensational objects. But magnitude appears to outstep this narrow sphere. We
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.1%:
Thus it comes about that this strongest passion of all, so far from being the most 'irresistible,' may, on the contrary, be the hardest one to give rein to and that individuals in whom the inhibiting influences are potent may pass through life and never find an occasion to have it gratified
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.6%:
Thus it comes that we will often take any course whatever which happens to be most vividly before our minds, at the moment when this impulse to decisive action becomes extreme
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.6%:
Thus it is that blind men are never without the consciousness of their horizon
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.7%:
Thus it is that events lived through only once, and in youth, may come in after-years, by reason of their exciting quality or emotional intensity, to serve as types or instances used by our mind to illustrate any and every occurring topic whose interest is most remotely pertinent to theirs. If a man in his boyhood once talked with Napoleon, any mention of great men or historical events, battles or thrones, or the whirligig of fortune, or islands in the ocean, will be apt to draw to his lips the incidents of that one memorable interview
Chapter: CONCLUSION., 4.4%:
Thus it may happen that those functions which can safely grow uniform and fatal become least accompanied by mind, and that their organ, the spinal cord, becomes a more and more soulless machine; whilst on the contrary those functions which it benefits the animal to have adapted to delicate environing variations pass more and more to the hemispheres, whose anatomical structure and attendant consciousness grow more and more elaborate as zoological evolution proceeds
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.5%:
Thus it so often comes about that we find ourselves thinking at two nearly adjacent moments of things separated by the whole diameter of space and time. Not till we carefully recall each step of our cogitation do we see how naturally we came by Hodgson's law to pass from one to the other
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.8%:
Thus not only our morality but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate, depend on the effort which we can make. "Will you or won't you have it so?" is the most probing question we are ever asked
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.2%:
Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are generic, not specific
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.1%:
Thus the natural development of self-consciousness implicitly involves the most abstract forms in which this faculty has been described in philosophy; only philosophy is fond of placing the abstract ego at the outset, and so reversing the process of development
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31%:
Thus the whole process of involuntary derived attention is [p. 450] accounted for if we grant that there is something interesting enough to arouse and fix the thought of whatever may be connected with it. Note: So how does this relate to the "two selves" theory where the mother is listening to her children?
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.5%:
Thus we detect a strange or foreign ingredient or flavor in a familiar dish, or of tone in a familiar tune, and yet are wholly unable for a while to say what the intruder is like. Hence perhaps discrimination may be regarded as the earliest and most primordial mode of intellectual activity.
96.5%:
Thus, to fix our ideas by an example, we have a curiosity (our ultimate purpose being conquest over nature) as to how Sirius may move. It is not obvious whether Sirius is a kind of thing which moves in the line of sight or not. When, however, we find it to be a kind of thing in whose spectrum the hydrogen-line is shifted, and when we reflect that that kind of thing is a kind of thing which moves in the line of sight; we conclude that Sirius does so move. Whatever Sirius's attribute is, Sirius is; its adjective's adjective can supersede its own adjective in our thinking, and this with no loss to our knowledge, so long as we stick to the definite purpose in view. Now please note that this elimination of intermediary kinds and transfer of is's along the line, results from our insight into the very meaning of the word is, and into the constitution of any series of terms connected by that relation. It has naught to do with what any particular thing is or is not; but, whatever any given thing may be, we see that it also is whatever that is, indefinitely
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 54.9%:
To 2): The difference alleged is not absolute, and sensation and imagination are hard to discriminate where the sensation is so weak as to be just perceptible
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48%:
To ask a man whether he remembers that the sun shines, that fire burns, that iron is hard, would be a misuse of language. Even the almost fortuitous connections among our experiences cease to be classed as memories when they have become thoroughly familiar
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.6%:
To conceive it merely as 'God's work' would be a similar mutilation of it, so long as we said not what God, or what kind of work. The only real truth about the world, apart from particular purposes, is the total truth.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.9%:
To conceive with passion is ipso facto affirm
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.1%:
To conclude, then, thought may, but need not, in knowing, discriminate between its object and itself. We have been using the word Object. Something must now be said about the proper use of the term in Psychology.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
To detect the moment of the instinctive readiness for the subject is, then, the first duty of every educator
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
To fill it up is our thought's destiny. Some bring us nearer to that consummation. Some the gap negates as quite irrelevant. Each swims in a felt fringe of relations of which the aforesaid gap is the term. Or instead of a definite gap we may merely carry a mood of interest about with us
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.5%:
To my astonishment, I found that, the great majority of the men of science to whom I first applied protested that mental imagery way unknown to them, and they looked on me as fanciful and fantastic in supposing that the words 'mental imagery' really expressed what I believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had no more notion of its true nature than a color-blind man, who has not discerned his defect, has of the nature of color. They had a mental deficiency of which they were unaware, and naturally enough supposed that those who affirmed they possessed it were romancing.
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 55%:
To perceive that one is blind to the right half of the field of view one must have an idea of that part of the field's possible existence. But the defect in these patients has to be revealed to them by the doctor, they themselves only knowing that there is 'something wrong'with their eyes. What you have no idea of you cannot miss; and their not definitely missing this great region out of their sight seems due to the fact that their very idea and memory of it is lost along with the sensation
95%:
To rest with the unqualified assertion that, antecedent to experience, the mind is a blank, is to ignore the questions -- whence comes the power of organizing experiences? whence arise the different degrees of that power possessed by different races of organisms, and different individuals of the same race? If, at birth, there exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, why is not a horse as educable as a man? Should Note: Et tu Steven pinker?
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 52.1%:
To say that we feel a sensation's seat to be 'in the brain' or 'against the eye' or 'under the skin' is to say as much about it and to deal with it in as nonprimitive a way as to say that it is a mile off. These are all secondary perceptions, ways of defining the sensation's seat per aliud
98.3%:
To some the very fact that there is a world at all seems irrational. Nonentity would be a more natural thing than existence, for these minds
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 46.2%:
To suffer for only a hundredth of a second is not to suffer at all; and for my part I would readily agree to undergo a pain, however acute and intense it might be, provided it should last only a hundredth of a second, and leave after it neither reverberation nor recall
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.9%:
To sum up, then, we see no reason to suppose that self-love' is primarily, or secondarily, or ever, love for one's mere principle of conscious identity. It is always love for something which, as compared with that principle, is superficial, transient, liable to be taken up or dropped at will
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90%:
To sustain a representation, to think, is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and lunatics alike
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.9%:
To tell how this comes to pass would be to answer the problem of the education of the will in physiological terms. Evidently the problem is that of the formation of new paths; and the [p. 581] only thing to do is to make hypotheses, till we find some which seem to cover all the facts
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
To the genuinely philosophic mind, however, they still have existence, though not the same existence, as the real things. As objects of fancy, as errors, as occupants of dreamland, etc., they are in their way as indefeasible parts of life, as undeniable features of the Universe, as the realities are in their way
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9%:
To the more curiously inquiring mind, however, this simplified expression of the bare facts is not enough; there must [p.137] be a 'reason' for them, and something must 'determine' the laws. And when one seriously sits down to consider what sort of a thing one means when one asks for a 'reason,' one is led so far afield, so far away from popular science and its scholasticism, as to see that even such a fact as the existence or non-existence in the universe of 'the idea of a beefsteak'may not be wholly indifferent to other facts in the same universe, and in particular may have something to do with determining the distance at which two molecules in that universe shall lie apart
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.4%:
To the reader, the book quoted from seems pure nonsense from beginning to end. It is impossible to divine, in such a case, just what sort of feeling of rational relation between the words may have appeared to the author's mind. The border line between objective sense and nonsense is hard to draw; that between subjective sense and nonsense, impossible.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.8%:
To the usual empiricist explanation of personal consciousness this is a formidable reproof, because all the individual thoughts and feelings which have succeeded each other 'up to date' are represented by ordinary Associationism as in some inscrutable way 'integrating' or gumming themselves together on their own account, and thus fusing into a stream
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.7%:
To these most primitive abstract objects Dr. G. J. Romanes gives the name of recepts or generic ideas, to distinguish them from concepts and general ideas properly so called. [3] They are not analyzed or defined, but only imagined
94.8%:
To uniform outer coexistences and sequences correspond constant conjunctions of ideas, to fortuitous coexistences and sequences casual conjunctions of ideas. We are sure that fire will burn and water wet us, less sure that thunder will come after lightning, not at all sure whether a strange dog will bark at us or let us go by. In these ways experience moulds us every hour, and makes of our minds a mirror of the timeand space-connections between the things in the world
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 36%:
To which I reply that I believe that the difference is always concreted and made to seem more substantial by recognizing the terms
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 27.4%:
To which the reply is that we must take care not to be duped by words. The words I and me signify nothing mysterious and unexampled - they are at bottom only names of emphasis; and Thought is always emphasizing something
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 75.2%:
To wonder why the universe should be as it is presupposes the notion of its being different, and a brute, which never reduces the actual to fluidity by breaking up its literal sequences in his imagination, can never form such a notion. He takes the world simply for granted, and never wonders at it at all.
Chapter: CHAPTER III. On Some General Conditions of Brain-Activity., 5%:
Too much anatomy has been found to order for theoretic purposes, even by the anatomists
97.4%:
Truths belonging to essences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are [p. 663]eternal, and are to be found out only by the contemplation of those essences
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
Turning now to the form of the decision itself, we may distinguish four chief types. The first may be called the reasonable type. It is that of those cases in which the arguments for and against a given course seem gradually and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and to end by leaving a clear balance in favor of one alternative, which alternative we then adopt without effort or constraint
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.5%:
Two circumstances are important to notice: the first is, that volition has no power of calling up images, but only of rejecting and selecting from those offered by spontaneous redintegration
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.9%:
Two great maxims emerge from his treatment. The first [p.123] is that in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, we must take care to launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible. Accumulate all the possible circumstances which shall re-enforce the right motives; put yourself assiduously in conditions that encourage the new way; make engagements incompatible with the old; take a public pledge, if the case allows; in short, envelop your resolution with every aid you know. This will give your new beginning such a momentum that the temptation to break down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day during which a breakdown is postponed adds to the chances of its not occurring at all. The second maxim is: Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life. Each lapse is like the letting fall of a ball of string which one is carefully winding up; a single slip undoes more than a great many turns will wind again. Continuity of training is the great means of making the nervous system act infallibly right
Chapter: THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION., 3.8%:
Under these circumstances it seems as if error might more probably lie in cutailing its sphere too much than in stretching it too far as an explanation of the phenomena following cortical lesion.[74] On the other hand, if we admit no re-education of centres, we not only fly in the face of an a priori probability, but we find ourselves compelled by facts to suppose an almost incredible number of functions natively lodged in the centres below the thalami or even in those below the corpora quadrigemina
Chapter: REACTION-TIME., 6.1%:
Unfortunately we cannot do this directly, but can only gauge the amount of PO5 in the urine, which represents other organs as well as the brain, and this procedure, as Dr. Edes says, is like measuring the rise of water at the mouth of the Mississippi to tell where there has been a thunder-storm in Minnesota
97%:
Unless our arithmetic is to remain without application to life, we must somehow make more numerical continuity than we spontaneously find. Accordingly
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.5%:
Unquestionably this is the stronghold of the spiritualistic belief, - as indeed the popular touchstone for all philosophies is the question, "What is their bearing on a future life?"
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 53.4%:
Until very recent years it was supposed by all philosophers that there was a typical human mind which all individual minds were like, and that propositions of universal validity could be laid down about such faculties as 'the [p. 50] Imagination.' Lately, however, a mass of revelations have poured in, which make us see how false a view this is
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.8%:
Very little emotion here! -- except the effort of setting the attention fine, and the feeling of ease and relief (mainly in the breathing apparatus) when the inconsistencies are overcome and the thoughts run smoothly for a while. Emotion and cognition seem then parted even in this last retreat; and cerebral processes are almost feelingless, so far as we can judge, until they summon help from parts below.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.7%:
Vividness in an original experience may also have the same effect as habit or recency in bringing about likelihood of revival. If we have once witnessed an execution, any subsequent conversation or reading about capital punishment will almost certainly suggest images of that particular [p. 576] scene
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.6%:
Volkmann's mythological account of past representations striving to drive present ones out of the seat of consciousness, being driven back by them, etc., suffers from the same fallacy
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.5%:
Watt contained all the elements preparatory to a great stroke of similarity in such a case; -- a high susceptibility, both by nature and by education, to the mechanical properties of bodies; ample previous knowledge or familiarity; and indifference to the superficial and sensational effects of things
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.3%:
We all immediately recognize, however, that in some minds there is a much greater tendency than in others for the flow of thought to take this form. Those insufferably garrulous old women, those dry and fanciless beings who spare you no detail, however petty, of the facts they are recounting, and upon the thread of whose narrative all the irrelevant items cluster as pertinaciously as the essential ones, [p. 571] the slaves of literal fact, the stumblers over the smallest abrupt step in thought, are figures known to all of us
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.1%:
We are constantly busy comparing feelings with whose quality our imagination has no sort of acquaintance at the time -- pleasures, or pains, for example. It is notoriously hard to conjure up in imagination a lively image of either of these classes of feeling. The associationists may prate of an idea of pleasure being a pleasant idea, of an idea of pain being a painful one, but the unsophisticated sense of mankind is against them, agreeing with Homer that the memory of griefs when past may be a joy, and with Dante that there is no greater sorrow than, in misery, to recollect one's happier time.
96.9%:
We are masters of our meanings, and discriminate between the things we mean and our ways of taking them, between our strokes of numeration themselves, and our bundlings and separatings thereof Note: Important
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.7%:
We begin with complete trust in physics and the senses, and are forthwith led away from the object into a nervous labyrinth, where the object is entirely displaced by a set of nervous changes which are totally unlike anything but themselves. Finally, we land in the dark chamber of the skull Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41%:
We can form a series of examples. When Mr. Bagehot says that the mind of the savage, so far from being in a state of nature, is tattooed all over with monstrous superstitions, the case is very like the one we have just been considering. When Sir James Stephen compares our belief in the uniformity of nature, the congruity of the future with the past, to a man rowing one way and looking another, and steering his boat by keeping her stern in a line with an object behind him, the operative link becomes harder to dissect out. It is subtler still in Dr. Holmes's phrase, that stories in passing from mouth to mouth make a great deal of lee-way in proportion to their headway; or in Mr. Lowell's description of German sentences, that they have a way of yawing and going stern-foremost and not minding the helm for several minutes after it has been put down
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.9%:
We can relapse at will into a mere condition of acquaintance with an object by scattering our attention and staring at it in a vacuous trance-like way. We can ascend to knowledge about it by rallying our wits and proceeding to notice and analyze and think. What we are only acquainted with is only present to our minds; we have it, or the idea of it. But when we know about it, we do more than merely have it; we seem, as we think over its relations, to subject it to a sort of treatment and to operate upon it with our thought Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 55%:
We can see, in short, why the sensational process OUGHT TO be discontinuous with all normal ideational processes, however intense. For, as Dr. Münsterberg justly observes: "Were there not this peculiar arrangement we should not distinguish reality and fantasy, our conduct would not be accommodated to the facts about us, but would be inappropriate and senseless, and we could not keep ourselves alive
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.7%:
We cannot meet strangers without a certain tension, or talk to them exactly as to our familiars. This is particularly the case if the stranger be an important personage. It may then happen that we not only shrink from meeting his eye, but actually cannot collect our wits or do ourselves any sort of justice in his presence
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.2%:
We choose the pilot, the sailors, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. This matter belongs to the pilot. But the ship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do - submit to being drowned without fear, without clamor or accusing of God, but as one who knows that what is born must likewise die
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.2%:
We demand in it a character for which our emotions and active propensities shall be a match. Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the Cosmos impinges upon each one of us, each one desires to feel that his reaction at that point is congruous with the demands of the vast whole, that balances the latter, so to speak, and is able to do what it expects of him
99.3%:
We discover among its parts regulations that were never given to sense at all, --mathematical relations, tangents, squares, and roots and logarithmic functions, -- and out of an infinite number of these we call certain ones essential and lawgiving, and ignore the rest. Essential these relations are, but only for our purpose, the other relations being just as real and present as they; and our purpose is to conceive simply and to foresee
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.2%:
We do all these things because at the moment we cannot help it; our nervous systems are so shaped that they overflow in just that way; and for many of our idle or purely 'nervous' and fidgety performances we can assign absolutely no reason at all
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 51.5%:
We far more readily incline to explain the astonishing certainty with which they make use of their sensations (and which is an effect of adaptation and inheritance) as the result of an inborn intuition of the outer world
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37%:
We go through the world, carrying on the two functions abreast, discovering differences in the like, and likenesses in the different
COMPARED., 58.6%:
We have in fact a regular series of facts which can all be formulated under the single law that the substantive strength of a state of consciousness bears an inverse proportion to its suggestiveness. It is the halting-places of our thought which are occupied with distinct imagery. Most of the words we utter have no time to awaken images at all; they simply awaken the following words. But when the sentence stops, an image dwells for awhile before the mental eye (see Vol. I. p, 243 Note: Important , especially for writers Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.7%:
We have, however, a perfect sense of being free, in that we are devoid of any feeling of coercion. The conclusive reason for the decision in these cases usually is the discovery that we can refer the case to a class upon which we are accustomed to act unhesitatingly in a certain stereotyped way
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.6%:
We have, then, or some of us seem to have, genuinely cerebral forms of pleasure and displeasure, apparently not agreeing in their mode of production with the 'coarser ' emotions we have been analyzing. And
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.6%:
We hear from our parents various anecdotes about our infant years, but we do not appropriate them as we do our own memories. Those breaches of decorum awaken no blush, those bright sayings no self-complacency. That child is a foreign creature with which our present self is no more identified in feeling than it is with some stranger's living child to-day. Why? Partly because great time-gaps break up all these early years - we cannot ascend to them by continuous memories; and partly because no representation of how the child felt comes up with the stories
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.5%:
We know how little it matters to us whether some man, a man taken at large and in the abstract, prove a failure or succeed in life, - he may be hanged for aught we care, - but we know the utter momentousness and terribleness of the alternative when the man is the one whose name we ourselves bear. I must not be a failure, is the very loudest of the voices that clamor in each of our breasts: let fail who may, I at least must succeed
96.5%:
We learned in the chapter on Reasoning what our great motive is for abstracting attributes and predicating them. It is that our varying practical purposes require us to lay hold of different angles of the reality at different times. But for these we should be satisfied to 'see it whole,' and always alike. The purpose, however, makes one aspect essential; so, to avoid dispersion of the attention, we treat the reality as if for the time being it were nothing but that aspect, and we let its supernumerary determinations go. In short, we substitute the aspect for the whole real thing. For our purpose the aspect can be substituted for the whole, and the two treated as the same; and the word is (which couples the whole with its aspect or attribute in the categoric judgment) expresses (among other things) the identifying operation performed. Note: Reasoning
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.5%:
We may consequently set it down as certain that, whether or no there be anything else in the mind at the moment when we consciously will a certain act, a mental conception made up of memory-images of these sensations, defining which special act it is, must be there.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.2%:
We may construct one which will react infallibly and certainly, but it will then be capable of reacting to very few changes in the environment - it will fail to be adapted to all the rest. We may, on the other hand, construct a nervous system potentially adapted to respond to an infinite variety of minute features in the situation; but its fallibility will then be as great as its elaboration. We can never be sure that its equilibrium will be upset in the appropriate direction
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.8%:
We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, and objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter let us see the words ME and I for the empirical person and the judging Thought.
COMPARED., 57.6%:
We may then define Apperception as the movement of two masses of consciousness (Vorstellungsmassen) against each other so as to produce a cognition. "The a priori factor we called active, the a posteriori factor passive, but this is only relatively true Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 33.1%:
We must decide in favor of the conceptualists, and affirm that the power to think things, qualities, relations, or whatever other elements there may [p. 473] be, isolated and abstracted from the total experience in which they appear, is the most indisputable function of our thought
98.9%:
We must rather suppose that the divers varying parts brought the other parts into har- [p. 688] mony with themselves by exercising them ad hoc, and that the effects of the exercise remained and were passed on to the young
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.3%:
We never have an isolated sensation; . . . we are therefore never without the feeling of relation
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.9%:
We saw in the chapter on Discrimination that two compound things are similar when some one quality or group of qualities is shared alike by both, although as regards their other qualities they may have nothing in common. The moon is similar to a gas-jet, it is also similar to a football; but a gas-jet and a foot-ball are not similar to each other
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.2%:
We see in writing or piano-playing a great number of very complicated movements following quickly one upon the other, the instigative representations of which remained scarcely a second in consciousness, certainly not long enough to awaken any other volition than the general one of resigning one's self without reserve to the passing over of representation into action.
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 19.9%:
We see then that we are dealing with a fluctuating material. The same object being sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times as simply mine, and then again as if I had nothing to do with it at all
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.6%:
We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.6%:
We shall find that all the facts of rivalry and substitution that have so struck us, all the shiftings and expansions and contractions of the sphere of what shall be considered me and mine, are but results of the fact that certain things appeal to primitive and instinctive impulses of our nature, and that we follow their destinies with an excitement that owes nothing to a reflective source
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.5%:
We spoke a moment since of warmth and intimacy. This leads us to the answer sought. For, whatever the thought we are criticising may think about its present self, that self comes to its acquaintance, or is actually felt, with warmth and intimacy
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 20.2%:
We take a purer self-satisfaction when we think of our ability to argue and discriminate, of our moral sensibility and conscience, of our indomitable will, than when we survey any of our other possessions. Only when these are altered is a man said to be alienatus a se
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 73.2%:
We will not touch it. It is fetish. You must burn it
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.5%:
Well, if it be so, Transcendentalism is only Substantialism grown shame-faced, and the Ego only a 'cheap and nasty' edition of the soul
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 46.1%:
Were I awake, a would leave a fading process in my sensorium which would overlap the process of b when the latter came, and both would then appear in the same specious present, a belonging to its earlier end. But the sudden advent of the brain-change called sleep extinguishes a's fading process abruptly. When b then comes and wakes me, a comes back, it is true, but not as belonging to the specious present
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
What I myself have called (Vol. I, p.276) the 'object' of thought may be comparatively simple, like "Ha! what a pain," or "It-thunders"; or it may becomplex, like "Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492,'' or "There-exists-an-all-wise-Creator-of-the-world" In either case, however, the mere thought of the object may exist as something quite distinct from the belief in its reality
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.4%:
What characterizes both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation, though the advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory ideas.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
What does the scientific man do who searches for the reason or law embedded in a phenomenon? He deliberately accumulates all the instances he can and which have any analogy to that phenomenon; and by simultaneously filling his mind with them all, he frequently succeeds in detaching from the collection the peculiarity which he was unable to formulate in one alone; even though that one had been preceded in his former experience by all of those with which he now at once confronts it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIII. [*] THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT., 77%:
What happens patently when an explosion or a flash of lightning startles us, or when we are tickled, happens latently with every sensation which we receive. The only reason why we do not feel the startle or tickle in the case of insignificant sensations is partly its very small amount, partly our obtuseness. Professor Bain many years ago gave the name
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.6%:
What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind. One might call this the law of dissociation by varying concomitants.
95%:
What is the obvious inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate impressions and to perform the appropriate actions always implies the preexistence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way. What is the meaning of the human brain? It is that the many established relations among its parts stand for so many established relations among the psychical changes
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.4%:
What it has done for them is to improve their power of studying a part systematically. Their mind is now full of precedents in the way of intonation, emphasis, gesticulation; the new words awaken distinct suggestions and decisions; are caught up, in fact, into a pre-existing net-work, like the merchant's prices, or the athlete's store of 'records,' and are recollected easier, although the mere native tenacity is not a whit improved, and is usually, in fact, impaired by age.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 15.8%:
What makes it convenient to use the mythological formulas is the whole organization of speech, which, as was remarked a while ago, was not made by psychologists, but by men who were as a rule only interested in the facts their mental states revealed
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 92%:
What more natural than to suppose that the two peculiarities hang together, and that the reason why we cannot contract our intestines, for example, at will, is, that we have no memory-images of how their contraction feels?
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.5%:
What shall we do? Many would find relief at this point in celebrating the mystery of the Unknowable and the 'awe' which we should feel at having such a principle to take final charge of our perplexities
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 13.2%:
What the thought sees is only its own object ; what the psychologist sees is the thought's object, plus the thought itself, plus possibly all the rest of the world Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87%:
What we are interested in is what sticks in our consciousness; everything else we get rid of as quickly as we can. Our resident feelings of movement have no substantitve interest for us at all, as a rule. What interest us are the ends which the movement is to attain
95.8%:
What we experience, what comes before us, is a chaos of fragmentary impressions interrupting each other;[6] what we think is an abstract system of hypothetical data and laws.[7]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.3%:
What were Luther's mission and Wesley's but appeals to powers which even the meanest of men might carry with them, faith and self-despair, but which were personal, requiring no priestly intermediation, and which brought their owner face to face with God? What
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.8%:
What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the amount which we accord of it be the one strictly underived and original contribution which we make to the world!
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 12%:
What!" they say, "is not the taste of lemonade composed of that of lemon plus that of sugar?" This is taking the combining of objects for that of feelings
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71%:
Whatever [p. 294] positively contradicts them must get into another world or die.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.4%:
Whatever degree of complication the latter may reach, the complication of the machinery must be quite as extreme, otherwise we should have to admit that there may be mental events to which no brainevents correspond
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.2%:
Whatever things fail to establish this connection are things which are practically no better for me than if they existed not at all
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.7%:
Whatever variety of materials may exist within reach of my mind, I can become conscious of them only by recognizing them as mine. . . . Relation to the conscious self is thus the permanent and universal feature which every state of consciousness as such must exhibit
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.5%:
When I recognize a weight which I now lift as inferior to the one I just lifted; when, with my tooth now aching, I perceive the pain to be less intense than it was a minute ago; the two things in the mind which are compared would, by the authors I criticise, be admitted to be an actual sensation and an image in the memory. An image in the memory, by general consent of these same authors, is admitted to be a weaker thing than a sensation. Nevertheless it is in these instances judged stronger; that is, an object supposed to be known only in so far forth as this image represents it, is judged stronger. Ought not this to shake one's belief in the notion of separate representative 'ideas' weighing themselves, or being weighed by the Ego, against each other in the mind?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.7%:
When I think the savage with one fringe of relationship, I believe in him; when I think him without that fringe, or with another one (e.g., if I should class him with 'scientific vagaries' in general), I disbelieve him. The word 'real' itself is, in short, a fringe
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41.8%:
When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.1%:
When an idea stings us in a certain way, makes as it were a certain electric connection with out self, we believe that it is a reality. When it stings us in another way, makes another connection with [p. 569] our Self, we say, let it be a reality. To the word 'is' and to the words 'let it be' there correspond peculiar attitudes of consciousness which it is vain to seek to explain. The indicative and the imperative moods are as much ultimate categories of thinking as they are of grammar. The 'quality of reality' which these moods attach to things is not like other qualities. It is a relation to our life. It means our adoption of the things, our caring for them, our standing by them Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.4%:
When for motives of honor and conscience I brave the condemnation of my own family, club, and 'set'; when, as a protestant, I turn catholic; as a catholic, freethinker; as a 'regular practitioner,' homoeopath, or what not, I am always inwardly strengthened in my course and steeled against the loss of my actual social self by the thought of other and better possible social judges than those whose verdict goes against me now
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10.5%:
When grouped in a certain way, we name them this 'thing' or that; but the thing we name has no existence out of our mind. So of the states of mind which are supposed to be compound because they know many different things together
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.3%:
When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations of those lie had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his whole body, as nearly as he could, into the exact similitude of the person he intended to examine; and then carefully observed what turn of mind he seemed to acquire by the change. So that, says my author, he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as effectually as if he had been changed into the very men
Chapter: FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME., 4.1%:
When it comes to birds deprived of their hemispheres, the evidence that some of their acts have conscious purpose behind them is quite as persuasive
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.5%:
When me arrive at it, we seem to have reached, as it were, the central point of our intellectual nature, presupposed and built upon in every attempt we make to explain the more recondite phenomena of our mental being
COMPARED., 59.4%:
When not all M, but only some M, is A, when, in other words, M is 'undistributed' the conclusion is liable to error. Illusions would thus be logical fallacies, if true perceptions were valid syllogisms. They would draw false conclusions front undistributed middle terms. Note: Interesting logic Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.1%:
When roused by indignation or moral enthusiasm, how trenchant are our emotions, how smiting are our words! The whole network of petty scruples and by-considerations which, at ordinary languid times, surrounded the matter like a cob-web, holding back our thought, as Gulliver was pinned to the earth by the myriad Lilliputian threads, are dashed through at a blow, and the subject stands with its essential and vital lines revealed.
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
When the sense of furtherance is there, we are 'all right;' with the sense of hindrance we are dissatisfied and perplexed, and cast about us for other thoughts
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.7%:
When the use of a record is withdrawn, and attention withdrawn from it, and we think no more about it, we know that we experience a feeling of relief, and we may thus conclude that energy is in some way liberated
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.7%:
When two or more letters are always in view, not only do the processes of seeing and naming overlap, but while the subject is seeing one letter he begins to see the ones next following, and so can read them more quickly
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.6%:
When we do doubt, however, in what does the subsequent resolution of the doubt consist? It either consists in a purely verbal performance, the coupling of the adjectives 'real' or 'outwardly existing' (as predicates) to the thing originally conceived (as subject); or it consists in the perception in the given case of that for which these adjectives, abstracted from other similar concrete cases, stand. But what these adjectives stand for, we now know well. They stand for certain relations (immediate, or through intermediaries) to ourselves
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.1%:
When we have uttered a proposition, we are rarely able a moment afterwards to recall our exact words, though we can express it in different words easily enough. The practical upshot of a book we read remains with us, though we may not recall one of its sentences
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 6.5%:
When we look at living creatures from an outward point of view, one of the first things that strike us is that they are bundles of habits. In wild animals, the usual round of daily behavior seems a necessity implanted at birth; in animals domesticated, and especially in man, it seems, to a great extent, to be the result of education. The habits to which there is an innate tendency are called instincts; some of those due to education would by most persons be called acts of reason. It thus appears that habit covers a very large part of life, and that one engaged in studying the objective manifestations of mind is bound at the very outset to define clearly just what its limits are.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.5%:
When we teach children to repress their emotional talk and display, it is not that they may feel more -- quite the reverse. It is that they may think more; for, to a certain extent, whatever currents are diverted from the regions below, must swell the activity of the thought-tracts of the brain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.8%:
Whether these impulses could ever have been useful, and selected for usefulness, is a question which, it would seem, can only be answered in the negative. Apparently they are pure hindrances, like fainting at sight of blood or disease, sea-sickness, a dizzy head on high places, and certain squeamishnesses of æsthetic taste. They are incidental emotions, in spite of which we get along
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.1%:
Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily class it under, makes me unjust to the other aspects
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
Whichever represented objects give us sensations, especially interesting ones, or incite our motor impulses, or arouse our hate, desire, or fear, are real enough for us
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.5%:
While we are hurrying from one to the other, everything between them vanishes in the twilight of general consciousness
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 85.8%:
Whilst they were tyros, they thought of their means as well as their end: the marksman of the position of his gun or bow, or the weight of his stone; the pianist of the visible position of the note on the keyboard
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.4%:
Whilst we are attending to one, or at most to two or three objects, all the others lapse, and the most we feel of them is that they still linger on the outskirts and can be caught again by turning in a certain way
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68%:
Who calls a thing a first sensation admits he has no theory of its production. Helmholtz, though all the while without an articulate theory, makes the world thing he has one
Chapter: CHAPTER VII The Methods and Snares of Psychology, 12.8%:
Who can be sure of the exact order of his feelings when they are excessively rapid? Who can be sure, in his sensible perception of a chair, how much comes from the eye and how much is supplied out of the previous knowledge of the mind? Who can compare with precision the quantities of disparate feelings even where the feelings are very much alike. For instance, where an object is felt now against the back and now against the cheek, which feeling is most extensive? Who can be sure that two given feelings are or are not exactly the same? Who can tell which is briefer or longer than the other when both occupy but an instant of time? Who knows, of many actions, for what motive they were done, or if for any motive at all? Who can enumerate all the distinct ingredients of such a complicated feeling as anger? and who can tell offhand whether or no a perception of distance be a compound or a simple state of mind. The whole mind-stuff controversy would stop if we could decide conclusively by introspection that what seem to us elementary feelings are really elementary and not compound.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.6%:
Who does not 'realize' more the fact of a dead or distant friend's existence, at the moment when a portrait, letter, garment or other material reminder of him is found? The whole notion of him then grows pungent and speaks to us and shakes us, in a manner unknown at other times
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 21.2%:
Who will not be mine I will exclude from existence altogether; that is, as far as [p. 313] I can make it so, such people shall be as if they were not
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 41%:
Why a single portion of the passing thought should break out from its concert with the rest and act, as we say, on its own hook, why the other parts should become inert, are mysteries which we can ascertain but not explain. Possibly a minuter insight into the laws of neural action will [p. 581] some day clear the matter up; possibly neural laws will not suffice, and we shall need to invoke a dynamic reaction of the form of consciousness upon its content. But into this we cannot enter now.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 39.3%:
Why do we spend years straining after a certain scientific or practical problem, but all in vain -- thought refusing to evoke the solution we desire? And why, some day, walking in the street with our attention miles away from that quest, does the answer saunter into our minds as carelessly as if it had never been called for -- suggested, possibly, by the flowers on the bonnet of the lady in front of us, or possibly by nothing that we can discover? If reason can give us relief then, why did she not do so earlier?
95.9%:
Why do we thus invincibly crave to alter the given order of nature? Simply because other relations among things are far more interesting to us and more charming than the mere rates of frequency of their timeand space-conjunctions Note: Important
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 77.7%:
Why, in a, room, do they place themselves, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, with their faces towards its middle rather than to the wall ? Why do they prefer saddle of mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water? Why does the maiden interest the youth so that everything about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the world? Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that every creature likes its own ways, and takes to the following them as a, matter of course. Science may come and consider these ways, and find that most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following them we feel that that is the only appropriate and natural thing to do.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.6%:
Will is a Relation Between the Mind and its 'Ideas
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.1%:
With the manifestations of instinct and emotional expression, for example, they have absolutely nothing to do
95.3%:
With the scientific animus of antisupernaturalism we ought to agree, but we ought to free ourselves from its verbal idols and bugbears.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 35.2%:
With us, inevitably, by a mechanism which we as yet fail to understand, the shock of difference is felt between them, and the second object is not n pure, but n-as-different-fromm.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
With what [p. 430] is called a scientific curiosity, and with metaphysical wonder, the practical instinctive root has probably nothing to do. The stimuli here are not objects, but ways of conceiving objects; and the emotions and actions they give rise to are to be classed, with many other aesthetic manifestations, sensitive and motor, as incidental features of our mental life
99.3%:
Yes, indeed, Exception has a peculiar fascination; it is a subject of astonishment, a "thauma", and the credulity with which in this first stage of pure association we adopt our supposed rules is matched by the equal credulity with which we adopt the miracles that interfere with them
99.2%:
Yet just such a collateral contemporaneity, and nothing else, is the real order of the world. It is an order with which we have nothing to do but to get away from it as fast as possible. As I said, we break it: we break it into histories, and we break it into arts, and we break it into sciences; and then we begin to feel at home
its TIME-RELATIONS., 14.7%:
Yet there is no alternative but to affirm that to perceive the universe we must construct it in thought, and that our knowledge of the universe is but the unfolding of the mind's inner nature Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.4%:
Yet there seems no reason to doubt that the subjective feeling of the rationality of these sentences was strong in the writer as he penned them, or even that some readers by straining may have reproduced it in themselves
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40.7%:
] A fourth factor in tracing the course of reproduction is congruity in emotional tone between the reproduced idea and our mood
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 73.8%:
a cry of this kind, and in those circumstances, is so intimately associated in my mind with its [p. 328] purpose, that the idea which it arouses need not rise above the level of a recept
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.5%:
a feeling, ordinarily so called, is a portion of consciousness that admits imaginary division into like parts which are related to one another in sequence or coexistence. A feeling proper is either made up of like parts that occupy time, or it is made up of like parts that occupy space, or both. In any case, a feeling proper is an aggregate of related like parts, while a relational feeling is undecomposable
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 31.1%:
a real [p. 452] river could feel, it would feel these eddies and set-backs as places of effort. "I am here flowing," it would say, "in the direction of greatest resistance, instead of flowing, as usual, in the direction of least. My effort is what enables me to perform this feat." Really
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 47.5%:
although I know how foolish it often is to deny a fact on the strength of a theory
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.2%:
and added, 'Go ahead and do it,' thereby instantly quenching his desire. This director knew how to minister to a mind diseased
95.7%:
and form secondary combinations such as the forms of judgment, which, taken per se, are not congruent either with the forms in which reality exists or in those in which experiences befall us, but which may nevertheless be explained by the way in which experiences befall in a mind gifted with memory, expectation, and the possibility of feeling doubt, curiosity, belief, and denial
94.9%:
and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible that particular races of men become characterized by particular aptitudes, which are nothing else than partially-organized psychical connections
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83%:
and others of an equally unmotived apathy which persists in spite of the best of outward reasons why it should give way
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.6%:
and the more it seems to me that if I were to become corporeally anæsthetic, I should be ex - [p. 453] cluded from the life of the affections, harsh and tender alike, and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or intellectual form. Such an existence, although it seems to have been the ideal of ancient sages, is too apathetic to be keenly sought after by those born after the revival of the worship of sensibility, a few generations ago.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.2%:
and with this verdict we ought to remain contended, and not seek an illusory simplification at the cost of half the facts
Chapter: MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES, 3.6%:
and yet be proved by circumstantial evidence to exist all the while in a split-off condition, quite as 'ejective'[64] to the rest of the subject's mind as that mind is to the mind of the bystanders
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 45.1%:
as Exner remarks, our ear and brain must be wonderfully efficient organs to get distinct feelings from so slight an objective difference as this. See
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89%:
as Homer says, "griefs are often afterwards an entertainment
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 17.9%:
as the Algebrist, though the sequence of his terms is fixed by their relations rather than by their several values, must give a real value to the final one he reaches; so the thinker in words must let his concluding word or phrase be translated into its full sensibleimage- value, under penalty of the thought being left unrealized and pale.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9%:
common-sense, though the intimate nature of causality and of the connection of things in the universe lies beyond her pitifully bounded horizon, has the root and gist of the truth in her hands when she obstinately holds to it that feelings and ideas are causes. However inadequate our ideas of causal efficacy may be, we are less wide of the mark when we say that our ideas and feelings have it, than the Automatists are when they say they haven't it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.4%:
consciousness is in its very nature impulsive
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 23.8%:
de proche en proche
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44.5%:
duration is the immediate effect of such an overlapping of brain-pro- [p. 638] cesses of different phase -- wherever and from whatever cause it may occur
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.2%:
every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy of expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his neighbor, or reddening or growing pale where others do not. We should find a like variation in the objects which excite emotion in different persons. Jokes at which one explodes with laughter nauseate another, and seem blasphemous to a third; and occasions which overwhelm me with fear or bashfulness are just what give you the full sense of ease and power
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.4%:
exciting. Such is the sight of Saturn through a telescope; such are the occasional insights and illuminations which upset our habitual ways of thought.
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 42.6%:
few principles of analysis, in any science, have proved more fertile than this one, however vaguely formulated it often may have been
Chapter: THE LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE HEMISPHERES., 2.2%:
fibrous strand. It passes directly from the cortex to the motor arrangements in the cord, depending for its proper nutrition (as the facts of degeneration show) on the influence of the cortical cells, just as motor nerves depend for their nutrition on that of the cells of the spinal cord
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.8%:
for aesthetic reasons of my own In like manner, the real form of the circle is deemed to be the sensation it gives when the line of vision is perpendicu- [p. 286] lar to its centre
Chapter: CHAPTER XIV.[1] ASSOCIATION., 40%:
for in the vicissitudes of our outer experience we are constantly liable to meet the same thing in the midst of differing companions -- and a philosophy of association that should merely say that it will suggest one of these, or even of that one of them which it has oftenest accompanied, would go but a very short way into the rationale of the subject
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.8%:
fourth form of decision, which often ends deliberation as suddenly as the third form does. It comes when, in consequence of some outer experience or some inexplicable inward charge, we suddenly pass from the easy and careless to the sober and strenuous mood, or possibly the other way. The whole scale of values of our motives and impulses then undergoes a change like that which a change of the observer's level produces on a view
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.2%:
how do we recognize the magnitude of a difference at all? Prof. Stumpf discusses this question in an interesting way;[39] and comes to the conclusion that our feeling for the size of a difference, and our perception that the terms of two diverse pairs are equally or unequally distant from each other, can be explained by no simpler mental process, but, like the shock of difference itself, must be regarded as for the present an unanalyzable endowment [p. 532] of the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.2%:
however uncertain man's reactions upon his environment may some-times seem in comparison with those of lower creatures, the uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any principles of action which he lacks . On the contrary, man possesses all the impulses that they have, and a great many more besides
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.2%:
if a man's impulses are in the main orderly as well as prompt, if he has courage to accept their consequences, and intellect to lead them to a successful end, he is all the better for his hairtrigger organization, and for not being 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought
Chapter: MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES, 3.7%:
if our lower optical centres, the corpora quadrigemina, and thalami, do have any consciousness, it is at all events a consciousness which does not mix with that which accompanies the cortical activities, and which has nothing to do with our personal Self
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 32.5%:
if we know any of the relations of it at all, anything about it, that is enough to individualize and distinguish it from all the other things which we might mean. Many of our topics of discourse are thus problematical, or defined by their relations only. We think of a thing about which certain facts must obtain, but we do not yet know how the thing will look when it is realized. Thus we conceive of a perpetual-motion machine. It is a quoesitum of a perfectly definite kind, - we can always tell whether the actual machines offered us do or do not agree with what we mean by it
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.2%:
if we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-bloodedly, go through the outward movements of those contrary dispositions which we prefer to cultivate. The reward of persistency will infallibly come, in the fading out of the sullenness or depression, and the advent of real cheerfulness and kindliness in their stead. Smooth the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial compliment, and your heart must be frigid indeed if it do not gradually thaw!
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 64.4%:
if what seems to be a sensation varies whilst the process in the sense-organ remains unchanged, the reason is presumably that it is really not a sensation but a higher mental product
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.2%:
imagine the nervous system to represent a drainagesystem, inclining, on the whole, toward certain muscles, but with the escape thither somewhat clogged. Then streams of water will, on the whole, tend most to fill the drains that go towards these muscles and to wash out the escape. In case of a sudden 'flushing,' however, the whole system of channels will fill itself, and the water overflow everywhere before it escapes. But a moderate quantity of water invading the system will flow through the proper escape alone
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 49.9%:
in Condillac's phrase we are it rather rather than see it.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.8%:
in Reason, when she lays her corpse-like finger on our heart and says, "Halt! give up! leave off! go back! sit down!" that it is no wonder that to most men the steadying influence seems, for the time being, a very minister of death. Note: Interesting
98.4%:
in all cases where anything is secured or taken possession of, exist an ideal excitement of the feeling which that thing will gratify
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87.4%:
in all simple and ordinary cases, just as the bare presence of one idea prompts a movement, so the bare presence of another idea will prevent its taking place. Try to feel as if you were crooking your finger, whilst keeping it straight. In a minute it will fairly tingle with the imaginary change of position; yet it will not sensibly move, because its not really moving is also a part of what you have in mind
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 24.7%:
in spite of occasional glimpses of something more refined, still dwells habitually in that mythological stage of thought where phenomena are explained as results of [p. 369] dramas enacted by entities which but reduplicate the characters of the phenomena themselves. The self must not only know its object, - that is too bald and dead a relation to be written down and left in its static state. The knowing must be painted as a 'famous victory' in which the object's distinctness is in some way 'overcome.'
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.3%:
in the one-sided development of civilized life, it happens that the timely age goes by in a sort of starvation of objects, and the individual then grows up with gaps in his psychic constitution which future experiences can never fill. Compare the accomplished gentleman with the poor artisan or tradesman of a city: during the adolescence of the former, objects appropriate to his growing interests, bodily and mental, were offered as fast as the interests awoke, and, as a consequence, he is armed and equipped at every angle to meet the world. Sport came to the rescue and completed his education where real things were lacking. He has tasted of the essence of every side of human life, being sailor, hunter, athlete, scholar, fighter, talker, dandy, man of affairs, etc., all in one. Over the city poor boy's youth no such golden opportunities were hung, and in his man-hood no desires for most of them exist. Fortunate it is for him if gaps are the only anomalies his instinctive life presents; perversions are too often the fruit of his unnatural bringing up
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81.2%:
irregularity of behavior may come as well from the possession of too many instincts as from the lack of any at all.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.7%:
is as easy physically to avoid a fight as to begin one, to pocket one's money as to squander it on one's cupidities, to walk away from as towards a coquette's door. The difficulty is mental; it is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all. When any strong emotional state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no images but such as are congruous with it to come up
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 37.3%:
it follows that likeness überhaupt must not be conceived as a special complication of identity, but rather that identity must be conceived as a special degree of likeness, according to the proposition expressed at the outset of the paragraph that precedes.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.9%:
it is an idea to which our will applies itself, an idea which if we let it got would slip away, but which we will not let go. Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achievement. Its only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 77%:
it is probable that the consciousness of how one stands with other people occupies a relatively larger and larger part of the mind, the lower one goes in the scale of culture. Woman's intuitions, so fine in the sphere of personal relations, are seldom first-rate in the way of mechanics.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 80.6%:
it is probably only within a few centuries, since religious beliefs and economic applications of science have played a prominent part in the conflicts of one race with another, that they may have helped to 'select' for survival a particular type of brain
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 78.8%:
it would probably lead to a more earnest temper on the part of college students if they had less belief in their unlimited future intellectual potentialities, and could be brought to realize that whatever physics and political economy and philosophy they are now acquiring are, for better or worse, the physics and political economy and philosophy that will have to serve them to the end.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.3%:
joy makes us feel young again
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 19.5%:
just as a relation can have no existence apart from the feelings which form its terms, so a feeling can exist only by relations to other feelings which limit it in space or time or both
COMPARED., 56%:
link; how delicate yet how strong that connection among brain-paths which makes any number of them, once excited together, thereafter tend to vibrate as a systematic whole Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 26.6%:
names. I record my bare opinion here unsupported by the evidence, not, of course, in order to convert anyone to my view, but because I am persuaded that a serious study of these trance-phenomena is one of the greatest needs of psychology, and think that my personal confession may possibly draw a reader or two into a field which the soidisant 'scientist' usually refuses to explore.
99.9%:
natural objects that look as if they were artificial, or that mimic other objects, -- these form a class of things which human beings snatch at as magpies snatch rags. They simply fascinate us. What house does not contain some drawer or cupboard full of senseless odds and ends of this sort, with which nobody knows what to do, but which a blind instinct saves from the ash-barrel?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72.4%:
no system which should not be rich, simple, and harmonious would have a chance of being chosen for belief, if rich, simple, and harmonious systems were also there
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.2%:
notoriously bad lecturers. The reason is that they never spontaneously see the subject in the minute articulate way in which the student needs to have it offered to his slow [p. 370] reception. They grope for the links, but the links do not come.
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 34%:
once restore, I say, the vague to its psychological rights, and the matter presents no further difficulty.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 65.7%:
only where the subjective appearances are so intense that they interfere with the perception of objects are they noticed by all men alike
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.9%:
our chief help towards noticing those special characters of phenomena, which, when once possessed and named, are used as reasons, class names, essences, or middle terms, is this association by similarity . Without it, indeed, the deliberate procedure of the scientific man would be impossible: he could never collect his analogous instances
Chapter: CHAPTER XXIV. [1] INSTINCT, 81%:
ourselves. " Who taught you politeness? The impolite," is, I believe, a Chinese proverb
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 11.7%:
procedure I might perhaps force some of these materialistic minds to feel the more strongly the logical respectability of the spiritualistic position
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 30%:
reaction-time is shorter when one concentrates his attention on the expected movement than when one concentrates it on the expected signal.
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 66.7%:
real' form is also a sensation conjured up by memory; but it is one so probable, so habitually conjured up when we have just this combination of optical experiences, that it partakes of the invincible freshness of reality, and seems to break through that law which elsewhere condemns reproductive processes to being so much fainter than sensations
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.1%:
reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
reasoning may then be very well defined as the substitution of parts and their implications or consequences for wholes
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 89.4%:
round all our impulses, merely as such, there twine, as it were, secondary possibilities of pleasant and painful feeling, involved in the manner in which the act is allowed to occur
COMPARED., 57.3%:
semi-hallucinatory power of the suggested thing Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.2%:
sensibilities and reactive powers, nothing touches us intimately, rouses us, or wakens natural feeling. The consequence is the complaint so often heard from melancholic patients, that nothing is believed in by them as it used to be, and that all sense of reality is fled from life
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.1%:
so that we find ourselves automatically prompted to think, feel, or do what we have been before accustomed to think, feel, or do, under like circumstances, without any consciously formed purpose, or anticipation of results
98.4%:
the act of appropriating comes to be one constantly involving agreeable associations, and one which is therefore pleasurable, irrespective of the end subserved
Chapter: CHAPTER IV [1] Habit, 7.3%:
the conscious effort of the will soon produces exhaustion
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 88.9%:
the consciousness of inward hollowness that accrues from habitually seeing the better only to do the worse, is one of [p. 548] the saddest feelings one can bear with him through this vale of tears.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 91%:
the drainage currents and discharges of the brain are not purely physical facts. They are psycho-physical facts, and the [p. 584] spiritual quality of them seems a codeterminant of their mechanical effectiveness
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 70.8%:
the existence disregarded an existence into men's land, in the limbo 'where footless fancies dwell
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 72%:
the fact that to believe a certain object will cause that action to explode is a sufficient reason for that belief to come. The motor impulse sweeps it unresisting in its train.
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 8.6%:
the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata."
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22.7%:
the feelings that accompanied them are so lacking in the recall, or [p. 336] so different from those we now enjoy, that no judgment of identity can be decisively cast.
96.7%:
the fundamental law of thought, is thus only the result of the function of comparison in a mind which has come by some lucky variation to apprehend a series of more than two terms at once
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74.8%:
the mere general fact of having occurred at some time in one's experience, with varying concomitants, is not by itself a sufficient reason for a character to be dissociated now. We need something more; we need that the varying concomitants should in all their variety be brought into consciousness at once . Not
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 18.3%:
the mistake of supposing that the most complex states of mind are not truly, in their very essence, as much one and indivisible as those which we term simple - the complexity and seeming coexistence which they involve being relative to our feeling[34] only, not to their own absolute nature
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 87%:
the more practised we become in a movement, the more 'remote' do the ideas become which form its mental cue
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.4%:
the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.3%:
the only questions being, is the effort where it exists a fixed function of the object, which the latter imposes on the thought? or is it such an independent 'variable' that with a constant object more or less of it may be made?
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.1%:
the transition from merely considering an object as possible, to deciding or willing it to be real; the change from the fluctuating to the stable personal attitude concerning it; from the 'don't care' state of mind to that in which 'we mean business,' is one of the most familiar things in life
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 63.8%:
the use of imaginary maps on a reduced scale is less frequent with them than With the rest of us. Possibly the extraordinary changeableness of the visual magnitudes of things makes this habit natural to us, while the fixity of tactile magnitudes keeps them from falling into it
99.3%:
the world becomes divided for us into two provinces, one in which we are at home and anticipate with confidence always the same sequences; another filled with alternating, variable, accidental occurrences
Chapter: CHAPTER XV.[1] THE PERCEPTION OF TIME., 44%:
the years grow hollow and collapse.
98%:
there is a mental structure which expresses itself in AESTHETIC AND MORAL PRINCIPLES.
Chapter: CHAPTER XI. ATTENTION., 29%:
there is no clear line to be drawn between immediate and derived attention of an intellectual sort
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.6%:
there is no effort without counter-effort, . . . and effort and counter-effort signify only that causes are mutually robbing each other of effectiveness
Chapter: CHAPTER X. The Consciousness of Self., 22%:
there is no reason why any object whatever might not arouse passion and interest as primitively and instinctively as any other, whether connected or not with the interests of the me. The phenomenon of passion is in origin and essence the same, whatever be the target upon which it is discharged; and what the target actually happens to be is solely a question of fact
Chapter: Touch., 3.6%:
there remains little ground for keeping up that old controversy about the motor zone, as to whether it is in reality motor or sensitive. The whole cortex, inasmuch as currents run through it, is both
Chapter: CHAPTER XVI. MEMORY., 48.3%:
there seems to be a rhythm in the memory itself, which, after falling, recovers slightly, and then fades out again."[37]
Chapter: CHAPTER XXI. THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. [1] BELIEF., 71.6%:
they feel the good effect of external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervor, which otherwise would decay
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 67.4%:
they hold the third view, but again in other places imply the first
98.3%:
this feeling is absent in infancy; when we see that an infant in arms exhibits anger, fear, wonder, while yet it manifests no desire of permanent possession
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 85%:
this is because "the soul is inwardly grown larger without knowing it, and can no longer be filled by that first sensation. The man thinks that he has lost, but really he has gained. What he has lost in rapture, he has gained in inward growth
Chapter: MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES, 3.7%:
we can pretty confidently answer the question prefixed to this paragraph by saying that the cortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 68.2%:
we can see no possible inward reason why a certain brain-process should produce the feeling of redness and another of anger: the one process is no more red than the other is angry, and the coupling of process and feeling is, as far as other understanding goes, a juxtaposition pure and simple
Chapter: CHAPTER XX THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. [1], 62.6%:
we may get to regard them as synonymous, and say, "What is the meaning of the word extent, unless it be possible movement?" [46] We forget in this conclusion that (whatever intrinsic extensiveness the movements may appear endowed with), that seen spreadoutness which is the pattern of the abstract extensiveness which we imagine came to us originally from the retinal sensation
Chapter: CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION. THE SENSE OF SAMENESS., 34%:
we ought no longer to talk of mental states differing by having more or less of the cognitive quality; they only differ in knowing more or less, in having much fact or little fact for their object
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 74%:
we see that the second or minor premise, the 'subsumption' as it is sometimes called, is the one requiring the sagacity; the first or major the one requiring the fertility, or fullness of learning
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.2%:
we should but ring the changes on the elements which these three typical cases involve
Chapter: CHAPTER XXII. [1] "REASONING.", 76.1%:
we should confine ourselves exclusively to lower animals. In them fixed habit is the essential and [p. 368] characteristic law of nervous action. The brain grows to the exact modes in which it has been exercised, and the inheritance of these modes -- then called instincts -- would have in it nothing surprising. But in man the negation of all fixed modes is the essential characteristic. He owes his whole pre-eminence as a reasoner, his whole human quality of intellect, we may say, to the facility with which a given mode of thought in him may suddenly be broken up into elements, which recombine anew. Only
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.1%:
what discharge a given small impression will produce may be called accidental, in the sense in which we say it is a matter of accident whether a rain-drop falling on a mountain ridge descend the eastern or the western slope
98%:
what do all such principles express save our sense of how pleasantly our intellect would feel if it had a Nature of that sort to deal with?
COMPARED., 59.3%:
what gives trouble to most of us when abroad is not only that the natives speak so fast, but they speak so indistinctly and so low. The verbal objects for interpreting the sounds by lire not alert and ready made in our minds, Chapter: CHAPTER XIX. THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.' PERCEPTION AND SENSATION
Chapter: CHAPTER XIII. DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON., 38.7%:
what he calls the 'fusion of many sensations into one' is really the production of one sensation by the co-operation of many organic conditions; and that what perception fails to discriminate (when it is synthetic') is not sensations already existent but not singled out, but new objective facts, judged truer than the facts already synthetically perceived -- two views of the solid body, many harmonic tones, instead of one view and one tone, states of the eyeball-muscles thitherto unknown, and the like. These new facts, when first discovered, are known is states of consciousness never till that moment exactly realized before, states of consciousness which at the same time judge them to be determinations of the same matter of fact which was previously realized
Chapter: CHAPTER VI The Mind-Stuff Theory, 10%:
when the duration is greatly abridged, nothing more is known than that some mental change has occurred and ceased
Chapter: CHAPTER XVIII. IMAGINATION., 55.1%:
when the greatest ideational intensity has been reached, an order of resistance presents itself which only a new order of force can break through
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 82.9%:
where an ideal emotion seems to precede the bodily symptoms, it is often nothing but an anticipation of the symptoms themselves
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.2%:
where effort exists, it is where the change from the first object to the second one is hard
Chapter: CHAPTER XXVI.[1] Will., 90.2%:
where the thought is deliberative its object has always some such form as this
its TIME-RELATIONS., 13.4%:
whether it shall have one after the latter's decease, are questions to be decided by my general philosophy or theology rather than by what we call 'scientific facts' - I leave out the facts of so-called spiritualism, as being still in dispute Chapter: CHAPTER VIII. The Relations Of Minds To Other Things. Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to
Chapter: CHAPTER V The Automaton-Theory, 9.5%:
whilst the study a posteriori of the distribution of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself
Chapter: CHAPTER XVII. SENSATION., 50.1%:
would be better expressed by the bare interjection 'lo!' ), the infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the 'categories of the understanding' are contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality
Chapter: CHAPTER IX.[1] The Stream of Thought., 16.7%:
yet'? The truth is that large tracts of human speech are noth- [p. 253] ing but signs of direction in thought, of which direction we nevertheless have an acutely discriminate sense, though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever. Sensorial images are stable psychic
Chapter: CHAPTER XXV.[1] THE EMOTIONS., 83.6%:
æsthetic emotion, pure and simple, the pleasure given us by certain lines and masses, and combinations of colors and sounds, is an absolutely sensational experience, an optical or auricular feeling that is primary, and not due to the repercussion backwards of other sensations elsewhere consecutively aroused. To