International Politics Midterm
What are the hypotheses of Constructivism? (2)
1. Instrumental short-term changes in behavior lead to long-term changes in preferences and actions 2. Confronted with international pressure to abide by the norm of conduct to which they give rhetorical support, leaders change their behavior and respect the norm of conduct to which they agreed
What are the assumptions of Realism/Neorealism? (4)
1. International politics is anarchic 2. States are rational, unitary actors - key to international politics 3. States try to maximize their security above all else, and consider other factors only after security is assured 4. States try to increase their power so long as doing so does not place their security at risk
5 rules leaders follow in Selectorate Theory
1. Keep your coalition of essential supporters (W) as small as possible 2. Keep the coalition's replacement pool (S) as large as possible 3. Control the flow of revenue: Tax as much as you can 4. Pay key supporters just enough to keep them loyal 5. Don't take supporter money to make the people's lives better!
what are the assumptions of the median voter theorem? (3)
1. Unidimensional policy space 2. Single-peaked preference 3. Majority-voting rule
Five conditions to pursue fairness in Arrow's theorem
1. Universal Domain: all preferences are admissible 2. Monotonicity: if more people come to prefer A, then A should not become less likely to occur (Pareto Efficiency) - Pareto Efficiency cannot be achieved if social preferences are intransitive 3. Unanimity Principle: If A is preferred to B for everyone, then A is chosen rather than B - If A is chosen, no one is made worse off 4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If A > B, the introduction of C does not make B > A 5. No dictator: no individual should be decisive over every pair of alternatives
What is Arrow's question in Arrow's Theorem? What is the answer?
Can we find other methods of aggregating individual tastes which imply rational behavior on the part of the community and which will be satisfactory in other ways? The answer is no.
Instability
Changes in composition of international system; formerly key states no longer key
Calculating Majority rule
n/2 + 1 if n is even (n + 1)/2 if odd
What does Fearon say about the fundamental puzzle of war?
"The central puzzle about war, and also the main reason we study it, is that wars are costly but nonetheless wars recur... war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war"
Population
N number of people
What is the national interest within constructivism?
National interest is said to exist but changes as a function of norms/social interactions
Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium
Outcome of backward induction - best response at each node, given the strategies of other players
Bare-bones rationality
People have preferences and they pursue them subject to constraints
Budget Constraint
R, revenue determined strategically R ≥ pg + Wx p = price of a unit of... g = public goods; and W = coalition size is the implicit price of... x = private goods
What does the budget constraint in Selectorate Theory tell us about W size and regimes?
Rearranged equation is: (R - pg)/W ≥ x As government becomes more democratic, W increases, and less is spent on private goods (corruption) As government becomes more dictatorial, W decreases, and more is spent on private goods (corruption)
Coalition welfare
Suppose that we simply maximize coalition welfare subject to a truncated budget constraint (i.e., the leader knows they keep some amount, leaving only some R to allocate their coalition) Winning coalition utility is given by: ln(W/p) + (R - W)/W - Coalition utility in solid, leader resources in dashed Get nike swoop for coalition welfare as a function of W whereas leader welfare is strictly decreasing
What are the assumptions of Liberalism? (3)
1. States are rational, unitary actors 3. International politics are hierarchical, not anarchic 3. Cooperation is the natural state of affairs between states
What are the hypotheses of Liberalism? (4)
1. States pursue wealth and security 2. Cooperation is improved when there is a dominant state (hegemonic stability) 3. Alliances reflect shared interests and so are long-lived 4. Strong norms promote cooperation even when states are called on to act against their short-term interests
Bipolar system
2 major power blocs of states roughly the same size/strength, each focused on a great power
Pareto Improvement
A condition where you can make someone better off without making someone worse off
Pareto Optimal/Efficient
A condition where you can't make anybody better off without making someone worse off (no Pareto Improvements)
Pure Strategy Nash
A pure strategy equilibrium is one in which players actions are chosen for sure; that is, with probability = 1 and neither player has any incentive to unilaterally change its choice of strategy (actions)
Nash Equilibrium
A state of affairs in which everyone is best responding to everyone else; when no player benefits by unilaterally changing its strategy if the strategies of others remain the same
Pareto Inferior
An outcome is Pareto Inferior to another outcome if the outcome is a Pareto Improvement (makes someone better off without making someone worse off) over it
Pareto Superior
An outcome is Pareto Superior to another outcome if it Pareto improves (makes someone better off without making someone worse off) over that outcome
Power Transition theory
Claims that approximate power parity promotes conflict International orders are generally hierarchical rather than anarchic, with a dominant nation at the top The further down the pyramid one goes, the less satisfied with the system one becomes - Would be problematic for those at the top but those at the top possess the majority of power while those further down possess little if any resources required to exert their will on the international stage
Calculating Condorcet
Compare a candidate/policy one-to-one with every other candidate/policy, the one who wins all comparisons wins
Power weighted median voter; how do we determine the "power median"?
Countries like the US and UK are significantly more powerful than NK or Iran, and as such they should have greater influence on the norms of international society We count up the cumulative power along the dimension until we hit the 50% mark - here being at the UKs position (notice how the "power well" of the US pulls the policy in their direction!)
We see mutually agreeable negotiated should exist, so why do we see costly and risky conflicts in reality? (Fearon)
One of our assumptions underlying the model must therefore be wrong: 1. Preferences are rational (complete and transitive, also cardinal) 2. Actors are risk-neutral or risk-averse 3. Actors have complete information 4. Actors may sign binding commitments 5. Issue in question is completely divisible Violations of the last three conditions constitutes what Fearon calls "rationalist explanations for war"
Leaders Budget Constraint
R >_ pg + Wx
What is the national interest within realism?
Revolves around the survival of the state and thus involves security and power
What is the national interest within liberalism?
Seen as an aggregation of the preferences of domestic political groups
Normal form/Simultaneous move game (i.e., Prisoners' Dilemma)
Solve by finding best responses: if we hold the behavior of all but one player constant, what action is best for that last player? Whether P1 Defects or Cooperates, P2's best response is to Defect, and vice versa The Nash Equilibrium for this game is (Defect, Defect)! - But, both players seeking what is best for themselves leads to an outcome which is worse for both players than some other potential state of affairs! Both players Defecting (-3, -3) is worse (Pareto Inferior) to the state of affairs in which both cooperate (-1, -2)
What is the national interest within the strategic perspective? Why?
Strategic rejects any notion of a coherent national interest, largely by attacking the liberal notion of the concept, because of.. 1. Arrow's Theorem; and 2. Different methods of aggregation can lead to different outcomes
Median voter theorem
The people who are most moderate determine the election, so parties will try to cater to the moderate (centrist) view
Neorealism calculation
p > U(SQ) − U(Lose)/ U(Win) − U(Lose)
Stability
Sovereignty of key states preserved
What are some aspects of Liberalism? (4)
- Grounded in Wilsonian optimism - International politics concerns the international political economy (trade, organizations) rather than focusing only on problems related to security - International organizations and institutions, as well as domestic political forces, play a larger role in the theoretical approach - Focused on cooperation rather than conflict
What are some aspects of the Strategic Perspective? (4)
- Grounded in game theory/strategic interaction - Focused on the interplay between domestic and international interactions - Questions the concept of a coherent national interest (unlike realism), shifting the focus to the interests of critical decision makers and institutional constraints they face - Largely shuns focusing on the normative side of foreign policy (unlike liberalism) in favor of a positivistic (logic and evidence) approach closer in orientation to certain forms of realism - if you want to change the world you first have to understand it
What are some aspects of Realism/Neorealism? (4)
- Grounded in the failure of The League of Nations - Reflective of a strong unitary state as in absolute monarchy or tyranny - Focused on conflict rather than cooperation - Power is the central concept
What are some aspects of Constructivism? (2)
- Recognizes that the identities and interests of actors are socially constructed and can change over time - calls into question the idea that states or leaders have fixed interests - Power is the ability to change the social relations between actors and their identities rather than the ability to coerce (as in realism) or incentivize (as in liberalism)
What are some aspects of incumbent survival in Selectorate Theory? (4)
- To survive, L "pays" coalition enough so members prefer L to rivals - Challengers make the best offer they can but they can't credibly commit to keeping transition supporters in their winning coalition if they come to power - Leader is more committed to members of W than Challenger because leader gradually identifies & purges less loyal types - The longer L is in office the higher the probability that those still in W will remain in W
What are the hypotheses of Realism/Neorealism? (3)
1. Bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity 2. War is avoided by balancing power 3. Alliances are a way to balance power/protect security
Rational actor preferences
1. Completeness: Compare alternatives x > y: x is preferred to y y > x: y is preferred to x x ∼ y: indifferent between x and y 2. Transitivity: if x > y > z, then x > z
Under what conditions does an incumbent lose power in Selectorate Theory (2)
1. A rival gets the support of a group of size W 2. The leader's coalition drops below W
Conditions for Arrow's Theorem (3)
1. At least 2 people/choosers/voters 2. At least 3 alternatives 3. Choosers each have a ranked preference ordering on the options
Rationalist explanations for war (3)
1. Incomplete information: uncertainty about relative power, motivation, costs, patience can make it difficult to find agreement 2. Commitment problems: self-interest may dictate violating an agreement even though cooperation leaves all better off than fighting (e.g., Prisoners' Dilemma) 3. Indivisibility: cannot be adequately divided
What are the assumptions of Selectorate Theory? (4)
1. Once in office leaders wish to remain there 2. While in office, leaders wish to either profit as much as possible by their position or have as large of a discretionary budget as possible to pursue their own policy interest 3. Leaders buy the support of their winning coalition with offers of public and private goods 4. The political challengers of leaders attempt to break the incumbent's winning coalition by offering public and private goods, although they face a credible commitment problem: potential defectors only believe that they will be included in office with the probability W/S
What are the assumptions of the Fundamental Puzzle of War?
1. Preferences are rational (complete and transitive, also cardinal) 2. Actors are risk-neutral or risk-averse 3. Actors have complete information 4. Actors may sign binding commitments 5. Issue in question is completely divisible If all the above hold true, a mutually agreeable negotiated settlement exists
Spatial Model and Decision Making Rules
Majority rule: Anything can happen by manipulating the status quo Consensus rule: fixed points appear in a triangle
Bargaining Model of War (Selectorate Theory)
A leader (L) and the political challenger (C) compete for the loyalty of the critical selector (k) (the least happy member of the leader's coalition, without whom their coalition fails) by making offers of public goods (g) and private goods (x), the critical selector determining the winner Critical concept: The challenger is unable to credibly commit to the critical selector that they will remain in the winning coalition should they defect; selector is kept in coalition with the probability W/S and ejected otherwise Game solved via backward induction: k prefers L over C if... - ln(gL) + xL ≥ ln(gC) + (W/S)xC C is disadvantaged in their offer - they will always lose in equilibrium The Challenger's best credible offer is to maximize coalition utility by spending the entire budget... - Max{gC, xC}ln(gC) + (W/S)xC ⇒ R - pgC - WxC = 0 Holding all else constant, as W increases relative to S... 1. Public goods provision increases 2. Private goods provision decreases The residual resources retained by the leader, with respect to W, is negative under reasonable circumstances. Thus... 1. Leaders spend more of the budget on public/private goods as W increases 2. Leaders have less opportunities for kleptocracy as W increases 3. Leaders should have shorter tenure as W increases
Backward induction
A method for solving an extensive form game, starting at the end of the game and working backwards through time to figure out each Players' best responses
What do multiple methods of aggregation tell us about the national interest?
Even though the underlying preferences of society remained exactly the same, the result of voting depends on the method Even if there was a national interest, there is no reliable way for us to find it and so it cannot be acted upon in the international arena - we need to focus on the strategic incentives individual leaders face
What is W relative to S in Selectorate Theory within a dictatorship and a democracy?
Dictatorship: W < S, relatively large S paired with a small W Democracy: ratio of W/S is large, a large portion of voters (between 25%-50%) are required to select a ruler
Expected Utility Calculation
EU= p(1-c1)+(1-p)(-c1)
Discretionary Budget
How many resources the leader has left after incumbency constraint R - m*
When do wars occur in Power Transition theory?
In periods around the power transition, war should be of a higher likelihood than in periods where power is particularly asymmetric Over the time the distribution of power can change - Lower power may increase its power relative to the dominating coalition and grow so strong as to throw off the existing international regime - Dominant nation tolerates some development insofar as they can extract resources from the lesser powers as they develop - the issue is if the growth is particularly rapid and drastic, unable to be contained by means other than war
What is the conclusion on balance of power theory, and what is a way to reach this conclusion?
Insofar as there is variation in the risk-propensity of leaders, there should be no systematic relationship between polarity, uncertainty, and stability Can reach this conclusion using expected utility theory: Suppose a leader believes that they will win with probability p and lose with probability 1 - p Suppose they will only attack if the expected utility of war exceeds the utility of the status quo We have the following condition in which war occurs (instability): p(U(W)) + (1 - p)(U(L)) > U(SQ) Solving for p, we find that a conflict occurs when: p > (U(SQ) - U(L))/(U(W) - U(L)) p can take virtually any number between 0 and 1 - this means that relative power says little about the impetus for war without reference to what is at stake in the conflict There need not be any direct association between the distribution of material capabilities and the occurrence of war!
What are the assumptions of Constructivism? (3)
Legitimization, Role Redefinition, Reflection: 1. Initial leader actions are strategic - seek legitimacy 2. Later, external pressure and socially-accepted norms alter self-perception (Role Redefinition) 3. Reflection alters one's sense of self-interest
Extensive form game/game trees
Method for solving this game is backward induction and yields subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium If P1 attacks, P2 will resist since the payoff is greater If P1 leaves, P2 will follow since the payoff is greater P1, knowing what P2 will do, will attack since the payoff, based on the strategy of P2, will be greater So, the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is (Attack; Resist, Follow)
Multipolar system
More than 2 major power blocs of roughly the same size/strength
The Disenfranchised
N - S, unable to participate in selection
Balance of power theory; what is the central problem of this theory?
Neorealist view: Bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems - War less likely to occur when there is a balance of power Central problem: scholars of this period failed to consider the risk-preferences of the agents involved - So, neither "bipolar" or "multipolar" system are particularly stable relative to each other
Conclusion for Arrow's Theorem
Only one aggregation rule satisfies the first four conditions - dictatorship - But it violates the notion of social fairness in the fifth condition!
Bargaining Model of War (Fearon)
P1 offers z amount of land to P2. P2 can either accept or reject it. If they reject, P1 and P2 go to war. - If P2 accepts, P1's utility is 1 - z and P2's is z - If P2 rejects, EU(P1) is p - c1 and EU(P2) is 1 - p - c2 So P2 accepts if: z ≤ p + c2, and indifferent when z = p + c2 P1 makes an offer to P2, and would rather than than go to war when: z ≥ p - c1 So a mutually agreeable negotiated settlement exists when: p + c2 ≥ p - c1, which comes out to c1 + c2 ≥ 0 Conclusion: because all wars are costly, there exists some peace settlement that would leave all participants better off than fighting
Balance of power
Power is distributed such that no dominating hegemonic power bloc may form
Best response
The strategy that will give a player the highest payoff, given the strategies that the other players select
Selectorate, S
Those people who have a say in who can be leader Key role is that they can be members of a winning coalition, W
Winning coalition, W
Those people whose support is necessary for the leader to stay in power
Key states
Those whose support could be needed to counter a threat from a rival bloc
When does a Condorcet paradox occur and what does it mean?
When the "social preference" followed by this method of aggregation follows the cycle: C > A, A > B, B > C... it is intransitive!! Thus, irrational!!
