International Relations 130

Game Theory 1: Stag Hunt (Jean Jacque Rousseau)

-An analogy to arms racing: All cooperate to get stag is best option/outcome. 1) all disarm 2) arm yourself while others disarm 3) all arm 4) disarm while others arm

Defensive Realism

-Balance of power between two states: provides a wold with fewer players to engage in conflict and almost a stalemate that offers little opportunity for powerful states to go to war with weaker states -Main motivation is survival, security

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and China

-China won't have incentive to fight the U.S. because China benefits from U.S.-led international institutions, like the WTO,World Bank, and free trade regime. --China joined WTO in 2001. -China is one fo the greatest beneficiaries of global institutions and the liberal order. --Ikenberry: China will not want to overturn the liberal order.

Offensive Realism

Hegemony: Works to remove opportunities for states to engage in war by providing one powerful state that can block ambitions of weaker states but feels no need to gain more power through war -Because of the anarchical structure of the international system (no coercive power), states seek survival by thinking and acting offensively to seek hegemony.

Sober Analysis

-China's rise should be put in perspective when comparing with the U.S., even if China keeps rising. -U.S. GDP/per capita is $62,000; China is only $9,000 -China is still a developing country and will be likely be one even when it surpasses the U.S. economy in size: --World's first superpower developing country? -U.S. military spending is much larger than China's: --U.S. spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined. --Thus, the U.S. will maintain unipolar role for a long time...

Liberalism, China's Rise, and War

-Historically, some hegemonic power transitions have been peaceful. -e.g. U.K.-> U.S. -Aaron Friedberg (Professor at Princeton) points out a scenario in which the U.S. may not want to fight China. -If China becomes a democracy -Historically, western democracies have not fought a war with each other. Other liberalists arguments: -Trade with China will reduce probability of war: Capitalist Peace -Trade frictions will increase chances of war. (e.g. U.S.-China trade war).

Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

- This theorem builds onto the H-O Model and explains who will benefit from free trade. - SS Theorem: Free trade will benefit owners of the abundantly endowed factor. Ex: -If the U.S. exports steels b/c steels uses a ton of capital, the capital owners (factory owners) will benefit from free trade. -But laborers will lose from free trade. If the H-O model and the S-S models of economics are correct, what would be the political ramifications? Ronald Rogowski: -The owners of the abundantly endowed factor will benefit from free trade so they will support free trade policies. -The owners of the scarce factor will be hurt from free trade so they will support protectionist policies. Ex: If the U.S. exports steel, capital owners should support free trade while laborers (workers) should oppose free trade.

Margaret Mead, "Warfare is Only an Invention - Not a Biological Necessity"

-If anarchy is what states make of it, what abt. war? -Was is nearly an invention some cultures never experienced war. a. Take for examples, eskimos, they have weapons but don't engage in war. -Wars are only on an intl. level, not so much on a domestic level besides wild west and mobs. -Believes that war is an invention (compares war to cooking, writing, marriage) -Regardless of temple, all people will go to war when put on the defensive. ***just a construct which allow men to accumulate prestige, defend honor, find wives, bring glory to the gods -We should use propaganda to defend against war.

Constructivism

-A movement in IR theory that examines how changing international norms and actors' identities help shape the content of state interests. 1) Anarchy = can be redefined in multiple ways, changeable ideas, not natural facts/laws of nature 2) Emphasis on idea ≠ material approach 3) World around us isn't socially constructed 4) International Relations only acquires meaning via social interaction -Ontology: emphasize non-materials things. -Unit of analysis: constructivists view the role of transnational of NGOs as important. -More interested in constitutive than casual relationships. -More optimistic abt. change in intl. politics and focus on what should be than what it. -But they disagree abt. whether non-material factors are more important than material factors. -Also, some constructivists focus on structure (Wendt) while others on agents.

Absolute vs. Relative Gains

-Absolute gains refers to the gains from cooperation, such as trade. -Realists worry if one country fails more money/trade for military power. -Realist: intl. coop. would be difficult because concerns over relative gains lead to concerns abt. power -Absolute gains looks at the total effect of the decision while relative gains only looks at the individual gains in respect to others. Absolute gains will engage in comparative advantage and expand the overall economy while relative gains is a zero-sum game where one state can only get richer by gaining from others.

G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Liberal Order?"

-If intl. institutions can affect the behavior or strong powers, realists and other might take neo-liberal instutionalism more seriously? -Global order is (neo) liberal instutinalist?! -What if China rises? Will it change this global order? -Is this new liberal order an order for all or is it a western order? -Is it the best for the U.S.? Intl. Institutions + Economic Development -Does it benefit all countries? What abt. poorer/weaker countries? -the counterfactual, would these countries be better off w/o these institutions, what if these countries have done better w/ bilateralism? -it's captured by powerful developed countries, captured by private firms, + investors: liberalist change?, internal dysfunction + lack of accountability -position of the US in the global system is changing, but the liberal international order is A okay because the countries like Brazil, China, and India have succeeded so well in it. -"The hierarchical aspects of the world order are fading while the liberal aspects persist." -Continuation of the liberal world order: yes.

Security Dilemma

-In an anarchic international system one with no common central power, when one state seeks to improve its security it creates insecurity in other states. -It is dangerous because boiling arms and more weapons leads to war. -If your security is better and if you are building more arms, there is potential for arms races. -Wanting to feel secure w/o attacking another country, perfect examples is Cold War and Chine-U.S. relations. -It is very difficult for one state to make itself feel safe without making others feel less safe -Hussein tries to arm himself cos he is surrounded by enemies, he scares the USA, the USA attacks. What exacerbates the security dilemma? Offensive Advantage-Defensive Advantage Balance >< Offensive-Defensive Weapons Distringuishability -Examples: Dick's 1% rule -- even if you are 99% sure they won't use the nukes, there is 1% chance they could. Even defense can be threatening cause then you can strike and not get hurt back

The "China Threat"

-In recent years, there has been much talk about a "China Threat" -Where does the "China Threat" debate from from? China Before The "Rise" - Napoleon Bonaparte: "China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world." -Europe recognized, even back then, the power of China. -14th Century: 30% of the world's economy (Macquarie) was by China. -Opium Wars 1839-1860 and "century of humiliation" -China's global economic share dropped to less than 4% -1949: Mao Zedong, communist People's Republic of China China "Rises" -After Zedong dies in '76, China begins a policy of "open and reform" under Deng Xiaoping in '79. -Economic policy: more market-orientated measures -China's political system remains communist today. -Deng: "Black cat, white cat, what does it matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice" -Meaning: Black cat and white cat is capitalism and communist, who cares as long as it lets the people to be free and wealthy. -From '79-'13, China's economy grew at double digit growth rates on average (one calculator: 10.85%) -In comparison, U.S. GDP growth rate over same period is less than 4%. Taking Stock of China's Rise -China's economy is second largest in the world today. -Historically, is this the "rise" of China or "return" of China? China's Trajectory - Alarmists -Broadly, there are 3 views on China's Trajectory" - (1) Alarmists, (2) Pessimists, (3) "Soberists"

Immanuel Kant, "From Perpetual Peace"

-In this article Kant defines perpetual peace and how to obtain it in IR. -He seems to believe that we are in a constant state of war in the state of nature. -Has a very pessimistic view of human nature. -He believes that a the civil constitution of every nation should be republican and that all rights of nations shall be based on a federation of free states. -He defines treaty of peace and league of peace and prefers the latter. -He is pro institutions since a league of peace is basically a worldwide institution. -Claims the best hope for perpetual peace is a republican (elected groups that represents everyone) constitution because it puts the burden of deciding to go to war on those who have the most to lose. -"If the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all of its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game (Among these are doing the fighting themselves, paying the costs of war from their own resources, having to repair at great sacrifice the war's devastation)" (24). -Because a leader is not a citizen, it is easy for him to declare war b/c it doesn't affect him. -In the name of perpetual peace Kant calls for the prohibition of the system of national debts. -There should be a "league of peace", a band of countries who are charged with maintaining peace.

Geoffrey Blainey, "Power, Culprits, and Arms"

-It is not the BoP per se that effects prospects for War and Peace, but elites' perception of how power is distributed. -Therefore war is a dispute about the measurement of the bargaining power each side believes they have to tilt the BoP in their favor. -Conflicting aims of rival nations are the conflicts of power. It is not just conflicting aims though - the ability to make one's aim a reality (their relative arms) matters too. -Bipolarity is more stable that multipolarity -Countries only fight wars they think they can win. -War ends when nations agree on relative strength EX: Hitler rearmed Germany bc he thought that he could get away with it and it was actually effective bc it reinvigorated many ppl in Europe at the time.

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"

-Leaders are irrational -Leaders enjoy the benefits of war but do not experience the costs, which are suffered by soldiers and citizens -One can argue that even rational leaders who consider the risks + costs of war may end ip fighting nonetheless -Even rational leaders who consider the pros and cons fight anyway - under broad conditions that the fact that fighting is costly and risky implies that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally led states would prefer to war - combination of private information about resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent - states inability to commit to uphold deal -Fearon wants to provide clear rationalist explanation of why states engage in war: Therefore, 3 Reasons why states Fight States see war as a bargaining space 1) Bluffing (private information) State knows what it is capable of, may forge the truth to obtain more during bargaining. 2) Commitment Problems: States can temporarily agree to work together, but promises cant be made due to changes in the future, such as leadership. 3) Indivisibility (some disagreements cant be involved in compromise, cant divide a baby in half). The Five Rationalist arguments that are accepted as cause of war: 1. Anarchy 2. Expected benefits greater than expected costs 3. Rational preventative war 4. Rational miscalculation due to lack of information 5. Rational miscalculation or disagreement of relative power -Domestic politics are also relevant to explain war. Anarchy nor the misrepresentation of information can explain why states fail to reach a deal in one instance but not another

Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence"

-Observes that force can be used to hurt and destroy. -To wield the threat of such pain and destruction is to exercise a vicious diplomacy. The diplomacy of force is most effective when, rather than practicing actual violence on the enemy, it uses the mere prospect of such violence to bend the enemy to its will. -**Coercion requires the real possibility of violence as well as a credible reassurance that such violence can be avoided by capitulation. Furthermore, coercion is distinguished from brute force by the presence of at least some mutual interest. In its absence, the opposed parties have no choice but to hurt each other. Argument: the power to hurt is bargaining power; to exploit it is diplomacy, vicious diplomacy, but still diplomacy Conclusion:War no longer looks like just a contest of strength; Military strategy can no longer be thought of as the science of military victory; it is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence; Instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive; Military strategy has become the diplomacy of violence

Eric Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace"

-Peace not through democracy but economic integration (liberal political economy). -Free markets, economic development and similar interstate interests lessen risk of conflict. Economy is a new venue for competition. -Trade builds empathy and understanding. Regime type irrelevant (China and USA). -Conflict is too costly to be pursued. -Capitalism is a better explanation for the democratic peace because capitalism decreases the benefits and increases the costs of war -Some liberalists also believe that open trade will foster peace.

Robert Gilpin, "The Nature of Political Economy, from U.S. Power and the Multilateral Corporation" (1) Robert Gilpin, "The New Global Economic Order" (2)

-Pioneer in IPE -Advocated Realist IPE -Main units: state -States pursue power in anarchy -States acquire power through wealth + tech -Pushed back against idea that the state was retreating in a globalized world a. "Borderless" communications + info. tech, powerful multinational corporations. -Other realist ideals: use trade dependency of other states as a form of power. -Albert Hirshman: Nazi Germany traded w/ small states to create "asymmetric dependence" (1) - "the conflict of our era is between ethnocentric nationalism and geocentric technology" -mentions Kari Levitt (canadian nationalist) + George Ball (former U.S. under-secretary of state) -International Society we are told is increasingly rent between its economic and its political organization. -liberalism -marxism -mercantilism Absolute v relative gains - basically hegemonic stability theory - there are three main conceptions of IPE: liberalism, marxism, and mercantilism - economics is based on absolute gains, whereas politics is relative - correct view is to use relative gains when analyzing economy as well, and strive for maximum relative economic gains (2) -state-centrican analytic view power is determine by wealth itself -political ambitions and rivalries of states create framework of political relations for economic forces to operate

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions"

-Realist critique of neo-liberalism institutionalism -It only pertains to "less important" topics, not war or security -Intl. institutions only reflect power relations; epiphenomenal -States worry abt. relative gains, not just absolute gains -Intl. institutions don't change/ resolve the conditions/ concerns of relative gains/anarchy -Neo-liberalism institutionalism is just an addendum to realism -- Post cold war politics- states wanted to move past power politics so they created IOs to mitigate conflict and maintain stability IOs create a formal set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other Realism and IOs: Security competition limits cooperation= states act in self interest and are concerned about security "My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world. " States fear each other and suspect that other states will cheat them- they aim to guarantee their own survival and maximize their relative gainsInstitutions reflect distributions of power (ex. The US has more say in the UN than a smaller nation) Liberalism and IOs States have mixed interest that facilitate cooperation, the threat of cheating is the biggest hindrance of cooperationIOs can increase interactions over time and link issues together to reduce transaction costs.Economic interdependence Liberal theory ignores relative gains and focuses exclusively on absolute gains Collective security Managing military power and settling disputes peacefully- equating interests with the broader community so that states trust each otherRealism exists but states should move beyond self help—requires the creation of pluralistic security where states behave according to norms (war is an unacceptable cost) Material factors are important, not just norms, The status quo is important but it is impossible to predict the future trajectory of relations

Realism Theory

-States seek survival + security -The state is the primary actor. -The theoretical approach that analyzes all international relations as the relation of states engaged in the pursuit of power. Realism cannot accommodate non-state actors within its analysis -War is inevitable • people are self-interested + competitive • Concepts: conflict + power • Military power is most important, states seek their own interests all the time • No need for overarching power to enforce global rules • Peace= balance of power • Main organization: state • Policy should be about expanding self-interest + power, not morality o Examples (when realist policy came into place): Cold War, George W. Bush

Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games"

-The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. - At the national level: -Domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies - Politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups - At the international level: -National governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressure, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments Say the U.S. is trying to negotiate a deal w/ China: -The U.S. must find a agreeable deal to show China -The U.S. also must show Congress, opp. party, etc. an acceptable deal -Only a deal that satisfies both "levels" is feasible

Game Theory 2: The Prisoner's Dilemma (Albert W. Tucker)

-The prisoner's dilemma is a game that concerns two players -- both suspects in a crime. They're arrested and brought to a police station. If both suspects protect each other by staying quiet (called cooperation in game theory terms), the police have only enough evidence to put each in jail for five years. -However, each suspect is offered a deal. If either one confesses (defection from a cooperative relationship), and the other suspect doesn't, the defector will be rewarded with freedom, while the tight-lipped suspect will get 20 years in jail. If both confess, both get 10 years in jail. -It seems both players benefit most by cooperating with each other. Receiving a 20-year jail term is an unacceptable outcome. Since there's an opportunity for one of them to go scot-free by defecting, both players know the other is thinking along these same lines, both must defect out of self-interest. In doing so, the suspects receive 10-year sentences. This isn't the best outcome, but it is the best strategy for the situation the players find themselves in.

Does China need to catch up?

-Thomas Christensen (Professor at Columbia U.) argues that China can "pose problems without catching up" (2001). -China doesn't need to become an equal to the U.S. in terms of military power to pose problems for the U.S. military. -China only needs to make it too costly for the U.S. to intervene near China, and China already has much capabilities (e.g. Taiwan, South China Sea.) -China has advantage of geography near waters. -U.S. military is tied up around the globe.

Constructivism, China's Rise, and War

-U.S.-China identities and culture are too different? Clash of Civilizations? -But identities and culture can change? -Alistair Iain Johnston (Harvard professor): China has become socialized into working in and with international institutions and global community. -China has not just benefited from intl. institutions (material incentives) but has become member of the global community and internalized new norms. -China came along way from its revolutionary days in the Communist Bloc! Robert Zoellick (Former U.S. Deputy secretary fo State and World Bank president): in 2005 famously called on China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in global affairs.

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War"

-Usually held that democracies do not go to war with other democracies. -But these authors contend it is not the case that simply a democratic regime necessitates stability. -They argue that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. -Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either mature autocracies or mature democracies. -It is such a cornerstone of common sense that the concepts finds itself embedded in foreign policy decisions and explanation. -While it is more than likely true that a world of stable and mature democracies is generally more peaceful for all, these authors contend, it is not the case that simply a democratic regime necessitates stability. -The authors argue that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. "In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states" (5). -Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either mature autocracies or mature democracies." -Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other" (9). -These authors use the same database and argue that there is statistical significance that democratizing states do go to war. The distinction between democratic and democratizing states is crucial. "We consider states to be democratizing if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are autocratizing if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy" (9). -"We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change" (12).

Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, "Why Leaders Fight"

-age, childhood, military experience gives us reasons why they make certain decisions -leader w/military but no combat experience most likely to start wars -JFK had combat experience -Older leaders more prone to start wars -Souther presidents tend to escalate military Leaders + Psychology -"self-monitoring": life of the party, cares a lot, appearances; more like to fight for U.S. reputation

Chaim Kauffman and Robert A. Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade"

-looked @ how slavery being abolished was a norm that was made despite high costs i.e., jobs, cheap labor -this condition--costly norm diffusion-- indicates that norms can be v. important: they even trump material factors -They even said it led to security concerns, but the spread of anti-slavery norms in the UK still succeeded But was its success due to constructivist factors like persuasion or cosmopolitan ideas alone? -Domestic politics played a crucial role

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change"

-norms evolve in a patterned life cycle, and different behavioral logics dominate different segments of the cycle 1. Norm emergency: a. Norm entrepreneurs promote new standards of appropriateness What motivates them? empathy, altruism, ideational commitment, institutionalization into organization rules, law, etc. 2. Norm Cascades a. Once tipping point is reached, rapid adoption of "norms", socialization 3. Internalization a. Norms acquire "taken-for-grantedness" -constructivism: better at explaining norms than change -rational choice: norms go along w/ it rather than oppose it -realism: fails to take morality + emotion into account Finnemore and Sikkink ask the following questions: How do we know a norm when we see one? How do we know norms make a difference in politics? Where do norms come from and how do they change? Finnemore and Sikkink are primarily interested in the role norms play in political change — "both the ways in which norms change and the ways in which they change other features of the political landscape" (888). The authors have three main arguments. The first is that The ideational "turn" of scholarship on norms and ideational phenomenon of recent years is actually a return of some traditional concerns of the discipline (of constructivism). The second is that Norms evolve in a "Life Cycle": norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization. The third argument is Norms cannot be ignored against rationality in explaining "strategic social construction" where actors configure preferences, identities, and social context because social bargaining and social construction are deeply intertwined. The authors first begin with their first argument and explain how norms and normative issues were central to political science for 2,000 years but shifted away once people began valuing measurement and methodical analysis. They then begin to talk about the definitions of a norm, the relationship between domestic and international norms, and whether norms affect stability or change.

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

-saw new World as fundamentally threatening -Identities were becoming broader so we were developing civilizational identities -Believes a civilization has common objective elements like language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and people have diff. identities "narrow identities", each level is accurate, he is not looking @ where we are from, but rather @ the broader identity that defines us. -when he wrote it, he believed next war will be fighting not abt. geology/security but rather opposing civilizations. -Predicted conflict between West + Islam (prior to 9/11)

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"

-the big frame is the stag hunt--we need to work together to get the stag instead of the rabbit. -the lack of an intl. sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but it makes it difficult for states that are satisfied w/ the status quo to arrive at their goals that they recognize as being in their common interests. -thus, all actors have the same preference order and there is a solution that gives each of his first choice. 1) cooperate and trap the stag 2) chase a rabbit while others remain at their posts 3) all chase rabbits 4) stay at the original position while another chases a rabbit (being disarmed while others are armed) -even when there is a solution that is everyone's 1st choice, the intl. case is characterized by 3 difficulties not present in the stag hunt: 1) to the incentives defect given above must be added to the potent fear that even if the other state now supports the status quo, it may become dissatisfied later 2) in order to protect their possessions, states often seek to control resources outside their own territory 3) security dilemma: many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security often inadvertently threatens others.

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics"

-written in 1992, commonly regarded as first major piece of constructivism. -Is considered a "structural constructivist", focus on anarchy as a social contract -states don't have to be anarchic -anarchy is created Agency - some actors have more ability to set agenda and act Actors: media, religious leaders, movements -"Anarchy is an empty vessel" -Anarchy is an outcome of how states interact -"Anarchy is what states make of it" -Depending on what identity you have, you have different interests -Nuclear weapons for U.S.-Israel, U.S.-N. Korea -Constructivism is a social theory which seeks to explain identities and interests Sociological social psychological form of systemic theory in which identities and interests are the dependent variable -States do not necessarily face a stag hunt or a security dilemma because that would attribute to states in the state of nature qualities that they can only possess in society -Identities & interests of people are given to them, not created by them- Processes & institutions impact behavior- Identities explain, in part, State behavior -We should not necessarily treat interests and identity as given. Although Wendt agrees with a statist view, he argues that an important field of research should treat state interests and identity as the dependent variable. -Wendt concedes that there are those who study how first- and second-image factors affect state identity and interests; he wants us to study how anarchy affects state identities and interests. -Realism's shortcoming is its failure to do this (although Wendt agrees that realist game theory is entirely appropriate in situations where we can assume that identities are constant, at least in the short term). -Neoliberalism's failure is that it has sought to explain cooperation by focusing on process, but it has not sufficiently accounted for systemic variables. -Constructivism's failure is that it gets too bogged down in epistemological debates without looking enough at how identities are formed in practice. -In short, we need a combination of neoliberalism and constructivism that will study how the system affects state identities and interests. -One example of this is when Wendt argues for a constructivist approach to the concept of self-help. He argues that international institutions (here the institution is self-help) can change state identities and interests.

Joshua D. Kertzer and Kathleen M. McGraw, "Folk Realism: Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens"

-young IR scholar @ Harvard who conducts surveys involving psychology + IR -People fight wars when they are threatened i.e., terrorist attacks -Realists fear the unknown -He has popularized the term, "micro-foundations" (psychological) in IR -Yet psychological approaches in IR have longe lineage. -States may misperceive threats from other side, not just b/c of anarchy -E.g. people tend to trust evidence that accords w/ their prior beliefs Prospect Theory -When people are in the domain of losses, they are risk-seeking. When are in the domain of gain, they are risk-averse -Applied to IR: if people perceive an intl. dispute as abt. to lose something, they are generally more willing to fight for it. -Realists and neo-liberal instutionalists assume actors are rational

China's Power in Perspective

1. Military Power: No comparison, U.S. is better 2. Economic power: Many countries want to trade w/ China, developing countries in Africa/Latin America want investment 3. "Soft Power": Power of culture; many students today learn mandarin Chinese -Comprehensive power: includes R&D, educations, number of patents per year, etc. This, China has a lot of catching up to do

Specific Factors Model

Basic idea: some factors are specific to the industry e.g. machines to stamp coins can't make cars -The model predicts that it will be the people who are employed in the industry which exports goods that benefit from free trade, not (just) the owners of the abundantly endowed factor. What does this mean for politic economy? Who will favor free trade? -Interests groups will form along industry lines. -H-O + S-S model has class struggles. Assume capital is either steel or cloth specific: Factories can't simply switch -If the U.S. exports steel, all those in the steel industry will support free trade, while those in the cloth industry will oppose free trade. Compare with H-O model: The capitals support whereas the laborers oppose.

Heckscher-Ohlin Model

Countries will have a comparative advantage in making goods that intensely use the factor they are abundantly endowed in so they will tend to export those goods. Ex: -Let's say the U.S. is abundant in capital (rather than land or labor) - Let's say that before free trade, it produces both 1) steel, which uses capital intensely and 2) cloth, which uses labor intensely - If the U.S. opens up to free trade, which good will it specialize in and export? Steel, since it has a comparative advantage. Steel uses the abundantly endowed factor--capital-- intensely.

Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions"

Discussed the factors that impede and promote cooperation (issue linkages, shadow of the future) ○ Cooperation is not same as harmony ○ Anarchy means lack of central government ○ Interactions may be structured to varying degrees ○ 3 factors that determine cooperation ■ Mutuality of interests ● Payoff structure for a game affects cooperation ○ Determined whether players have mutual or conflicting interest ○ Prisoners dilemma: greater conflict of interest and greater incentive to defect ○ Differences of game b/w stag and prisoners: ■ Different potential for cooperation and problems related to security dilemma ■ International cooperation is easier in some settings, payoff structures depend on events outside of actors control ○ Interests are determined both by objective and subjective factors and perceptions of these ■ Shadow of the future ● Long time horizons ● Regularity of stakes ● Reliability of info about others actions ● Quick feedback about changes in others behavior ● States are more concerned about future and that helps promote cooperation because they value long term payoffs more than short term payoffs ● Difference between military and economic payoffs ○ Military secrecy can affect ● Number of actors: the more actors, the harder it is to cooperate ■ Number of actors ○ Issue linkage: most issues are linked to other issues ■ Can be used to gain bargaining power ■ Difference between being a back scratcher and a blackmailer ■ Domestic politics may interfere ○ Tit-for-tat: ■ If players keep defecting, there are high payoffs for defecting

Thucydides. "The Melian Dialogue"

Father of realism ■ Conflict between athens and sparta, athens has sea sparta has land ■ "It was the rise in athens and the fear that this instilled in sparta that made war inevitable": Thucydides trap ■ Can china and US avoid this trap? ■ Melian: athens went to island of milos saying we want you to join our side, Milos wanted to remain neutral, great powers don't accept neutrality ● Result: "while the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must". Melos was defeated by athens

Rising Power & War

Graham Allison 2017 book: "Destined for War" -Thucydides Trap: -Rising power causes fear in the ruling power which leads to war. -Disagreements: will rising or ruling power initiate war? -Is war inevitable?

Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs"

Liberal Internationalism 3 sets of liberal rights 1. freedom of arbitrary authority (negative freedom-- speech, press, religion) 2. Freedom to control one's destiny in one's interest (positive freedom- social, economic, education, healthcare, employment rights) 3. Right to democratic participation, democratic legislation 3 sources of liberal peace 1. Constitutional- people only willing to fight for liberal purposes 2. International- mutual understanding and peace 3. Cosmopolitan- economic interdepedence -The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention. -When states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to trade with each other and create a web of mutual advantages that bolsters sentiments of respect. -These conventions of mutual respect have formed a foundation for relations among liberal democracies of a remarkable effective kind. Democratic Peace Theory - the observation that there are few, if any, clear cases of war between mature democratic states. • Liberal democracies don't go to war with each other because it destroys their credibility, there are many economic repercussions, the citizens don't want to go to war (maybe familial ties), and there are similar social values. Conflict remains a possibility, but there are ways that possibility can be greatly reduced.Impacts that Liberal Democracies have on foreign policy - pacifist possibility (people bear the brunt of war, and therefore do not want to get involved) and imperialist possibility (war is a unifying factor, "fruits of conquest," want glory). Liberal Institutionalism

Structural (Neo-realism)

MAIN PEOPLE: Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer, Jack Synder, Edward Mansfield, James Fearon -Believe the anarchic system is the key component to international relations -States behavior is based on the differences in their relative power -states are rational unitary actors -states don't seek power, but security and that it the preferences -system is ordered by the distribution of material capabilities (balance of power) Main ideas: -balance of power -bandwagoning: weaker states joining more powerful ones -relative gains matter -self-help: no other state can be relied upon to guarantee the state's survival -zero-sum game: a situation in which for one person to win, the other must lose

Neoliberalism Institutionalism

MAIN PEOPLE: Keohane -A reinterpretation of liberalism that says that even in an anarchic international system, states will cooperate because of their continuous interactions with each other and because it is in their self-interest to do so; institutions provide the framework for cooperative interactions -Believe intl. regimes make a big diff: they have an important independence influence on the world, not simply a reflection of inter-state power relations -Believe world is anarchic, like realists -States can be seen as a unitary rational actors, just like realists -Power makes a difference in the world, just like realists So what's the difference between this and realism, liberalism? -unlike realists: states can cooperate despite anarchy -intl. institutions importantly affect states -unlike liberalists: it doesn't look @ domestic level institutions or values to explain cooperation Intl. Institutions: Nato, Un, Intl. Criminal Court, EU, WTO, G20, World Bank, WHO, etc. -can be formal or informal, for instance, informal can be rules + norms, formal is organizations + offices -can provide legal liability, reduce transaction costs, create issue linkages, reduce uncertainty + provide information, institutionalized iteration (create shadow of future), norms converge (ex.: women driving), & if you jeopardize future cooperation, you will caught, punished, and shunned -these institutions come from a hegemonic state like the U.S. that is very motivated and these institutions can stay even after hegemonic state declines. How relevant is neo-liberalism institutions? -Mixing power, institutions, + liberal global order a. if intl. institute. can affect the behavior of strong powers, realists + others might take neo-liberalism instutionalism more seriously? b. intl. institutions can "bind" power states, such as U.S. c. the U.S. led the creation of such institutions to bind itself to certain "rules of the game" so weaker states can feel more comfortable to cooperate.

Classical Realism

MAIN PEOPLE: Morgenthau, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes -Places power + conflict at the center. Assumption that we lust after power. This motivates state behavior + causes competition + conflict

Liberalism

Main People: Robert D. Puntnam, Michael Doyle, Eric Gartzke, Immanuel Kant -The intl. system creates opportunities for cooperation and conflict & it's up to the states and other actors in the international political system to either take advantage of those or not. -Believes repetitive relationships establish institutions for resolving intl. conflict. -Domestic Politics matter, cooperation is in states' self-interest, trade & intl. organizations promote peace. • People can rationally cooperate to achieve mutual interests, goal is lasting peace • Concept: cooperation, interdependence • Trade leads to peace, interdependence, cooperation, need to abide by international law • Believe in the power in IGO's and states • Policy: cooperate to achieve mutual interests, military is not the only form of power Liberalism POV in war: Collective security, an attack on one state, is an attack on everyone. United Nations were an answer to this ideology. War can be avoidable.

Authors

Morgenthau (Classical Realist, everyone wants power) Kenneth Waltz (NeoRealism, everyone just wants to survive) John J. Mearsheimer (NeoRealism, survival) Carl von Clausewitz Stephen M. Walt (NeoRealism, states either balance or bandwagon) Thomas C. Schelling (Game Theory) Geoffrey Blainey (Causes of War) James D. Fearon (Rationalist Explanation of War, leaders like war, but not costs) Immanuel Kant (Liberalist, we should live in a republic, people choose to go to war, not elected people) Woodrow Wilson (idealist, had foundations of NLI) Michael Doyle (Liberalist, Liberal Internationalist, more democracies=less wars b/c democracies don't go to war w/ other democracies) Edward D. Mansfield + Jack Snyder (Liberalists, democracies less likely to go to war, but transitional democracies more likely) Eric Gartzke (Liberal peace, free market is reason for peace among liberal states) Robert D. Putnam (Two-level game) Robert Jervis (stag hunt, challenges to intl. coop) Robert Axelrod + Robert O. Keohane (challenges to intl. coop.) Robert O. Keohane (Neo-liberal instutionalism) John Mearsheimer, "False Promise..." (realist critique of institutionalism) G. John Ikenberry (discusses new liberal order and impact of institutions, who benefits from it) Robert Gilpin (use trade as a form of power, trade w/ small states so they become dependent on you) Michael Hiscox (H-O Model, S-S Model, S-F, economics) Edward D. Mansfield + Helen V. Milner (PTAs) Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, Cali M. Ellis (why leaders fight; age, military) Joshua Kertzer + Kathleen M. McGraw (Prospect Theory, psychology) Alexander Wendt (structural constructivist, anarchy is what states make of it) Margaret Mead (war is an invention) Martha Finnemore + Katherine Sikkink (norms) Chaim Kauffman + Robert A. Pape (slavery in Britain, norms can be made despite high costs, norms can trump material factors) Samuel P. Huntington (Clash of Civilizations)

Realism, China's Rise, and War

Pessimism Intentions: China will want more power and former glory, so it will be expansionist. Power: Even if we don't know China's intentions, we must focus on its power. Threat = Intentions + Power Anarchy: Even if China is peaceful, there can still be a security dilemma.

Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements"

Preferential Trade Agreements are w/ select countries or deeper integration. e.g. NAFTA, EU, U.S.-S. Korea Countries do PTA to protect certain sectors while gaining benefits in trade in others. -Partly to become closer w/ Allies -They often affect trade in manufactures, agriculture, and services, as well as foreign investment, labor rights, and environmental practices. -Non-democratic countries tend to not join PTAs. -PTAs come sometimes lead to domestic turmoil -Debate whether PTAs are actually beneficial to economy -PTAs can induce greater foreign investment in developing and transition countries, perhaps accelerating their economic development -a country's domestic politics has an important influence on whether and when it elects to sign a trade agreement -they argue that political leaders focus on how trade agreements can reassure the public and domestic groups about their decision making, but that they also worry about the domestic costs involved in ratifying agreements PTAs + Global Econ. -There is consensus that the preferential arrangements forged during the nineteenth century tended to be trade creating and that those established between World War I and II tended to be trade diverting.

Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points"

President of the United States who proposed 14 Points as a treaty for WW I. 4 BIG POINTS: "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at", "Reduction of national armaments", "The self-determination of peoples", "A general association of nations (a.k.a. The League of Nations) -collective security -states agree to resolve differences peacefully and forego the use of force for aggression -use of force in self defense -states join together to enforce the rule of peace if a state acts aggressively -league of nations -united nations -difficult to get everybody to cooperate, leads to preemptive warfare, difficult to judge which actions are aggressive and which defensive, creates free-riders, how can we ensure its not abused by the powerful

Carl von Clausewitz, "War as an Instrument of Policy"

REALIST "War is only part of political intercourse" therefore by no means an independent thing in itself. -Changes in the practice of war are a result of changes in practice in policy. -War is an instrument of policy. -Realists argue that war is waged to advance state interests, liberals and constructionists argue that war is to advance democracy or values. argument: war is part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself; solution: if policy is grand and powerful, war will be too, may be carried to point at which war attains to its absolute form. Actual changes in art of war are consequence of alterations in policy, this gives very strong evidence of the intimacy of their connection

Kenneth Waltz, "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics"

REALIST -Believes in Neorealism -Power is still the key concept -Relations among states in the international arena. -States are still self-reliant and do not work to improve the entire system. -Human nature does not have as large a role in driving states. -Believe there is a real distinction between domestic and international politics because for domestic, people know how to take orders but in international, not the case. -Countries have to use their own power to get what they want and feel safest with similar govts.** -No international government could actually work because of the anarchy. -Causes can be looked at individual, domestic and international level. -Anarchic world system, security dilemma, primary concern is survival -Domestic politics is hierarchically ordered. Relationship between units is super- and subordination, implying differentiation among units. -Int'l politics is anarchically ordered. Relationship between units is coordination. All states perform same basic functions (making revenue, regulating itself, defending itself), but differ in their capabilities to perform those tasks. -Within national systems, units are highly interdependent therefore the use of force is uncommon. (EX: Kansas depends on Washington for regulation and protection while Washington depends on Kansas for beef and wheat.) -Cooperation in int'l systems is limited by 1) uncertainty of the other's actions, and 2) being too dependent on others leads to vulnerability/security concerns.

John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"

REALIST -Believes in Offensive Realism -places the principal emphasis on security competition among great powers within the anarchy of the international system, and not principally on the human nature of statesmen and diplomats Different to Waltz b/c: offensive neorealism maintains that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony for security because the anarchic makeup of the international system creates strong incentives for states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of competitors. -Conflict is result of anarchy, not human nature or the characteristics of states -Implications of Anarchy: States seek to maximize power. -System is anarchical -States are rational -States have survival as their primary goal -All states possess some offensive capability -Uncertainty Security through domination -Powers want more power; powers seek hegemony; security dilemma -great powers seek to maximize their share of world power -power is not a means to an end, but an end in itself -threatened states = not good and unstable alliance in the face of threat -ultimate goal is to be hegemon***

Hans Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Politics and Political Power" Hans Morgenthau, "The Balance of Power"

REALIST -States must adapt to the reality of inequality and the limited choices and constraints it imposed on decision-making. -Distinguishes the ethics of foresight, caution and prudence from that of private morality and the principle of justice. -Holds that political decisions have consequences for the group as whole -Politics is the struggle for power, human nature is flawed and unchanging, power is the immediate aim 6 Political Principles: 1) Politics governed by objective laws rooted in human nature 2) Interest defined in terms of power 3) Power is universal, but changes over time 4) Universal moral principles don't apply to states 5) Any state's moral aspirations are not universal 6) Politics is an autonomous realm This school of thought holds that nation-states are the main actors in international relations and that the main concern of the field is the study of power. Morgenthau emphasized the importance of "the national interest", and in Politics Among Nations he wrote that "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power".

Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning"

REALIST -What Walt is saying in this article is that states have two possible reactions when some other state becomes a danger. -They can form alliances either to: (A) balance the power of the "new" state or to (B) "bandwagon" -- that is, to become friendly with the new danger so that it will not threaten them. Walt says states will tend to balance against threats when • They themselves are relatively strong • When there are allies who might help them • During a war, especially, when the war is serious.He says that states will bandwagon when • They themselves are weak • There are few likely allies to help them against the new power. • In peacetime, at the start of a war, or if the side is close to victory. Walt also says that - balancing is more common than bandwagoning - the more unalterably aggressive a state is, the more likely states are to balance against it

Why are the H-O + S-F model's predictions different?

S-F model assumes that land, labor, capital are sector-specific: they can't simply be used in another sector. e.g. laborers trained to build car's can't simply operate machines to sew wool. H-O model assumes that land, labor, capital can be used seamlessly in other sectors.

Michael Hiscox, "The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies" Section 1, 2, 3

Section 1: Each government/country makes a different choice about how to manage its economy with respect to the global economy in terms of: - Position of national market towards international trade, sectors of International flows of investment - Migration of workers - Exchange rate and the national currency policies -According to the Stopler-Samuelson theorem, trade benefits those who own the factors of production with which the economy is relatively well endowed and trade hurts owners of scarce factors. -In the alternative 'specific factors' model, individuals employed or invested in export industries are the ones who benefit from trade while those who are attached to import-competing industries are disadvantaged. -In the specific factors model, the real incomes of different individuals are tied very closely to the fortunes of the particular industries in which they make their living. Individuals employed or invested in export industries benefit from trade according to this model, while those who are attached to import-competing industries are harmed Section 2: -Collective action is easier to organize in the relatively small groups that benefit from a particular trade restriction than in the much larger groups that are hurt by the restriction, so the strongest lobbying pressure tends to come from protectionist groups. -Proportional representation systems with strong political parties typically generate lower levels of trade protection and other restrictions than plurality rule systems in which particular local and regional interests have a greater influence. - Small electoral districts in plurality rule systems tend to increase the influence of sectoral or particularistic groups over elected representatives when compared to larger districts, and thus lead to higher levels of protection. Section 3: -Political institutions affect policy outcomes by defining who gets to vote, how political representatives are elected, and how policy making takes place in legislatures and is delegated to presidents and government agencies. -Policy preferences depend mainly on the types of assets people own, and how the income earned from those assets is affected by different policies. (Specific-factors model?)

Thomas Hobbes, "From Leviathan"

Social contract theory -Though on rational grounds a champion of absolutism for the sovereign, Hobbes also developed some of the fundamentals of European liberal thought: the right of the individual; the natural equality of all men; the artificial character of the political order (which led to the later distinction between civil society and the state); the view that all legitimate political power must be "representative" and based on the consent of the people; and a liberal interpretation of law which leaves people free to do whatever the law does not explicitly forbid.

Pessimists

They claim China's economy will slow down significantly. -China must reform its economy to keep growing. -Population issues, environmental issues. -Bubble bursting. Legitimacy: If slow growth, there might be revolt. -Ideology of communism has less appeal to Chinese citizens today to hold country together. -Since people are getting richer in China, they don't really care that they are living in a communist country. "Fragile superpower" (Susan Shirk): China has many internal issues to resolve.

Alarmists

Think China will surpass the U.S. soon and that China will become sole superpower soon.

Robert O. Keohane, "From After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy"

○ Post hegemonic cooperation is possible ○ Hegemony: preponderance of material resources ■ Keohane argues control over raw material, sources of capital, control over markets, some competitive advantage in prediction over highly valued goods ■ Cooperation because hegemon can supply enough resources. No other option but to cooperate, or you won't have what you need to survive ○ Hegemony: a situation in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and willing to do so ○ Before WWII, Britain was hegemon, after it was US ■ Britain highly dependent on foreign trade and investment ■ Britain was less productive than US after war ■ US is hegemon because could supply own resources, didn't rely on others ○ Bottom line: hegemony can greatly facilitate the creation of international orgs; cooperation can endure after hegemony is established, owing it to IOs