Kant and Moral Duty

contingent truth

-a sentence s is contigently true iff (i) s is true and (ii) there is at least one possible world where s is false -ex: apples are red

necessary truth

-a sentence s is necessarily true iff (i) s is true and (ii) there is no possible world where s is false -ex: water is H20

analytic

-a statement s is analytically true only if (i) s is true and either (ii) s is true in virtue of the form of s or (iii) s is true in virtue of the predicate concept of being "contained in" the subject concept of s -ex: bachelors are unmarried

synthetic

-a statement s is synthetically true only if (i) s is true and (ii) s is true in virtue of the predicate concept of s "extending" the subject concept of s -ex: whales are mammals

respect for the moral law

-according to Kant, actions that are done from duty (out of respect for the moral law) derive their moral worth from the maxim that leads a person to try to perform them. we'll say shortly what exactly makes a maxim a right maxim. for now, the point is that our at ions have moral worth if the maxim satisfies the relevant criteria for being a right maxim; they do derive their worth from (a) successful completion of the action or (b) from obtaining any desired end

counterfactualism

-according to this reading of Kant, a person S's action A has moral worth iff (i) S recognizes that A is her duty and (ii) either S has no inclination to do A or S does have an inclination to do A, but (iii) S would have performed A even if she had no such inclination

actualism

-according to this reading of Kant, a person S's action A has morel work iff (i) S recognizes that A is her duty and (ii) S does A in the absence of any inclination to do A (and perhaps in the presence of an inclination not to do A)

linguistic distinctions

-analytic statements are made true by linguistic facts, synthetic statements are made true by non-linguistic facts

inquiry distinction

-formal inquiry: an inquiry of the form of the laws that govern some entities e. (pattern of reasoning) -material inquiry: an inquiry of the entities- the values of the variable"e"- that are governed by the laws -Kant argues that any inquiry is material in nature and based on impure reason can at most teach us practical anthropology -yet, before we can know how to apply the moral laws to some species, we must first know what the moral laws are and only a formal inquiry, which is based on pure reason alone, is capable of providing that knowledge

reason distinction

-pure reason: reason totally devoid of any a posteriori content -impure reason: reason that involves some a posteriori content

Kant's Goal in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

-seeks to demonstrate that there are moral laws that govern our conduct in virtue of there being a foundational or first principle of morality -has a commitment to ethical foundationalism -focus is to show that the supreme principle of morality is a necessary, synthetic, a priori principle (categorical imperative CI) -he contends that since CI is a moral principle that legitimately binds all rational creatures, any inquiry into CI is really an investigation into the metaphysics of morals

the good will

-the only thing that is unconditionally good according to Kant is the good will

What makes a good will just that, good?

-the shopkeeper example -on two kinds of actions: actions done in conformity with duty vs. actions done from duty -on two possible ways to read Kant's theory of appropriate motives: actualism vs. counterfactualism

What is the will?

-the will is an autonomous (self-legislating) faculty of volition only had by rational creatures, that is, the faculty that makes plans and decisions to do (or refrain from doing) certain acts, ad it is upon those plans and decisions that rational creatures act

argument for a priori city of moral duties

1. in order for a law of morality to specify an actual/genuine moral obligation, it must be absolutely true in all cases 2. if a law of morality is to be absolutely true in all cases, we cannot discover it by observing either the way human beings behave, or the kind of situations we find ourselves 3. an actual law of morality cannot be sought a posteriori (via empirical facts) via impure reason 4. anything not sought a posteriori must be sought a priori 5. we must seek an actual law of morality a priori 6. given (5), an actual law of morality is sought via pure reason 7. since all inquiries via pure reason are formal inquiries, ethics is a formal inquiry 8. since ethics is a formal inquiry, it is an investigation into the metaphysics of morals

Why aren't there other things that are good without limitation (The Bad Use Argument)

1. x is an unconditional good iff x can neither be immorally acquired nor used for bad 2. happiness can be immorally acquired 3. the virtues (knowledge, courage, etc) can be used for bad thus 4. neither happiness nor the virtues are unconditional goods 5. the good will can neither be immorally acquired nor used for bad therefore 6. the good will is an unconditional good 7. there are no other candidates for unconditional goods hence 8. the good will is the only unconditional good

basic nature of Kant's deontological theory

A. an action A is morally only if A was done from a good will B. an action A was done from a good will only if A was done from duty C. an action A was done from duty only if A was done from a respect for the moral law (i.e. for no other reason than it was the morally right thing to do) D. an action A was done from a respect for the moral law only if A is permitted by the Categorical Imperative therefore E. an action A is morally right only if A is permitted by the Categorical Imperative

a posteriori justification

a person S is epistemically justified a posteriori in believing that a proposition p is true only if (i) S has some justifier j for believing that p is true and (ii) S's having j does require that S be able to appeal to a particular sensory experience e -ex: there are more than two people in the room, that water is H20

a priori justification

a person S is epistemically justified a priori in believing that a proposition p is true only if (i) S has some justifier j for believing that p is true and (ii) S's having j does not require that S be able to appeal to a particular sensory experience e -ex: all apples are red