MIDTERM 2 Civil Rights

Lassiter v Board of Elections

FACTS: A North Carolina statute, applicable to members of all races, requires that a prospective voter be able to read and write any section of the constitution in North Carolina in the English language. Plaintiff-appellant, who was African American, having been denied registration as a voter because of her refusal to submit to the literacy test required by the statute, appealed to the County Board of Elections. At a de novo hearing, she again refused the literacy test and was again denied registration. She appealed to the Superior Court, Northampton County, North Carolina, which sustained the Board as against the claim that the requirement of the literacy test violated the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Plaintiff sought review of the decision from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which upheld the N.C. Const. art. VI, § 4 requirement that all persons pass a literacy test before being able to register to vote. She then filed suit against appellee county board of elections for violating U.S. Const. amends. XIV, XV and XVII. N.C. Const. art VI, § 4 prescribed a literacy test as a prerequisite to voter registration. Where the original wording of N.C. Const. art VI, § 4 included a grandfather clause which permitted certain persons to vote without meeting the literacy requirements the Court agreed with the lower court's finding that a later statutory amendment voided the grandfather clause. QUESTION: Was a North Carolina 1957 statute requiring a prospective voter to be able to read and write constitutionally valid? CONCLUSION: Yes. While noting that the right to vote was established and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the states had broad powers to establish non-discriminatory standards for the exercise of that right. Because the Court found that the ability to read and write had some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent voting, the Court held that the literacy requirements were constitutional on their face where the literacy requirements were neutral on race, creed, color and sex. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court affirming the application of the literacy requirements for voter registration. NOTES: In 1965 Congress said that literacy test are a violation of the law if you can provide EFFECT.

Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)

FACTS: An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived. QUESTION: Did the redrawing of Tuskegee's electoral district boundaries violate the Fifteenth Amendment? CONCLUSION: A state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of denying equal representation to African Americans. The unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power.

Harper v. Board of Elections

FACTS: Annie Harper, a Virginia citizen and a person of limited means, attempted to register to vote and was asked to pay a poll tax as a condition of registering. She filed a suit against the Virginia Board of Elections in federal district court alleging that her 14th Amendment right of equal protection was being violated by requiring her to pay a tax to vote. A three-judge panel dismissed her case, citing Supreme Court precedence. Harper appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. QUESTION: Does a poll tax on voter registration violate the equal protection rights of a class of citizens? CONCLUSION: Yes, the Court reversed the order dismissing the state residents' action. The poll tax was an invidious discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reversed and overruled the prior case to the extent that it sanctioned the tax. It held that a state violated the Equal Protection Clause whenever it made the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications had no relation to wealth or to paying or not paying this or any other tax. The Equal Protection Clause prohibited the states from fixing voter qualifications that invidiously discriminated. To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications was to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination was irrelevant. As a condition of obtaining a ballot, the requirement of fee paying caused an "invidious" discrimination that ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. NOTES:

City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980)

FACTS: Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the city commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Bolden. Their reasons were as follows: 1) found it significant that no black people had been elected to the Mobile city commission 2) history of discrimination in Alabama 3) white people who were on the city commission discriminated against black people in municipal employment and public services 4) proof that votes of black people were being cancelled out (naturally disadvantage minorities) from an at large electoral scheme represents purposeful discrimination against black voters. QUESTION: Did the at-large system violate the 14th and 15th amendments? CONCLUSION: No. The 15th amendment did not entail "the right to have Negro candidates elected," and that any purposefully discriminatory denials of the freedom to vote on the basis of race demanded constitutional remedies. The Court also found that multi member legislative districts were not unconstitutional per se; such legislative apportionment only violated the 14th amendment if they were "conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination". In short, the Court held that facially neutral actions were unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes. Moreover, the evidence proposed by the District Court and Court of Appeals fell short to prove that Mobile operated a voting system with the intent to racially discriminate. DISSENT: Marshall dissents; the right to vote is a fundamental right; interest is not "suspect classification" (Washington v Davis - facially neutral test) Under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary to impose strict scrutiny on facially neutral classifications having a racially discriminatory impact. Perhaps because the plaintiffs in the present cases are Negro, the plurality assumes that their vote-dilution claims are premised on the suspect-classification branch of our equal protection cases, and that, under Washington v. Davis, supra, they are required to prove discriminatory intent. That assumption fails to recognize that our vote-dilution decisions are rooted in a different strand of equal protection jurisprudence. NOTES: IMPACT is indicative of a constitutional wrong not purpose. "Totality of circumstances" voting rights act section ; not a constitutional violation.

Rome v United States (1980)

FACTS: In 1966 the General Assembly of Georgia changed the electoral process of the city of Rome. In order for the changes to take effect, the Attorney General was required to preclear the changes in accordance with the voting rights act, which he refused to do based on his feeling that it would eliminate the power of the black electorate. Attorney General found no forbidden "purpose" so they had to rely on EFFECT. The city of Rome did not prove that annexations would not dilute the black vote. The city then took their case to a 3 judge court, where they rejected the challenges made by the city in regards to the disapproved changes and annexations, may not have been adopted for a discriminatory purpose, but did have a discriminatory effect. QUESTION: Whether the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress to impose the rigors of the Voting Rights Act upon the covered jurisdictions?Whether Congress has the authority to regulate state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights Act? CONCLUSION: Yes. The Act's ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if Section: 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of the Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not, pursuant to Section: 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect. Furthermore, The Court finds that there is no reason to disturb Congress' considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing states from undoing or defeating the rights recently won by African-Americans.Principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments by appropriate legislation. These amendments were designed to expand federal power and intrusion on state sovereignty. Therefore Congress has the authority to regulate state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power, and the act is an appropriate means for carrying out Congress' constitutional responsibilities. NOTES: This case stands for the principle that the federal government, through the Fifteenth Amendment, has the power to regulate what are entirely local issues, if it believes that the local decisions made with adversely impact the guarantees the Fifteenth Amendment provides to its citizens. It is also within Congress control to preemptory halt practices that it finds could potentially lead to discrimination, even if there is no evidence of past discrimination. This case shows the breadth of Congress' power to regulate when it comes to civil rights issues. This case and Mobile were decided on the same day. Mobile was held as a constitutional case where as Rome was held as a VRA case.

Crawford v. Marion County Election Board

FACTS: In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law's requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates. QUESTION: Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens' right to vote? CONCLUSION: By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory." Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent. NOTES:

Shelby County v. Holder

FACTS: The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time. Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination. QUESTION: Does the renewal of Section 5 of the Voter Rights Act under the constraints of Section 4(b) exceed Congress' authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and therefore violate the Tenth Amendment and Article Four of the Constitution? CONCLUSION: Yes, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining whether changes to a state's voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the voting turnout gap in the states in question. DISSENT: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments encompasses legislative action such as the Voting Rights Act. The legislative history and text of the Amendments as well as previous judicial precedent support Congress' authority to enact legislation that specifically targets potential state abuses. However, Congress does not have unlimited authority but must show that the means taken rationally advance a legitimate objective, as is the case with the Voting Rights Act. The evidence Congress gathered to determine whether to renew the Voting Rights Act sufficiently proved that there was still a current need to justify the burdens placed on the states in question. She also argued that, by holding Section 4 unconstitutional, the majority's opinion makes it impossible to effectively enforce Section 5. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. NOTES:

South Carolina v Katzenbach

FACTS: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, federal examiners were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities. QUESTION: Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections? CONCLUSION: The Court found that Congress was justified in limiting the operation of the Act through the use of a formula to only a handful of states because the record indicated that actual voter discrimination occurred in these states. The Court found that the temporary suspension of voter qualifications, such as literacy tests, were not unconstitutional because the record indicated that such tests were traditionally used to disenfranchise minorities and their suspension was a legitimate response to the problem. The Court found that the suspension of new voter qualifications pending review was constitutional because the record indicated that states often enacted new laws to perpetuate discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.

Reynolds v. Sims

FACTS: Voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government. QUESTION: Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances? CONCLUSION: In an 8-to-1 decision authored by Justice Earl Warren, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable. NOTES: Justice Stewart concurred, agreeing with Warren that the Court could intervene to address egregious situations of misapportionment, Stewart sought to limit the application of this decision to clear violations of equal protection. He felt wary of imposing specific guidelines on states for how to redraw the district lines or setting a certain range of ratios that would be acceptable.

Wesberry v. Sanders 1964

FACTS: Wesberry, a voter of the 5th District of Georgia, filed suit on the basis that his Congressional district had a population 2-3 times larger than other districts in the State, thereby debasing his vote. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent any further elections until the legislature had passed new redistricting laws to bring the districts in line with population distribution. The case was dismissed at the district level, but reached the Supreme Court on appeal. QUESTION: Did Georgia's congressional districts violate the Fourteenth Amendment or deprive citizens of the full benefit of their right to vote? CONCLUSION: The Court found that, as in Baker, the malapportionment of districts gave plaintiffs standing and presented a justiciable issue. The Court further found that Section 2, Article 1 of the Constitution requires that, to the extent possible, one person's vote should be equal to any others when electing Representatives of Congress. Specifically, Justice Black's majority opinion determined that the clause "by the People of the several States" "means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The differences between Georgia's districts thus represented a violation of this principle. The case was reversed and remanded, with the Supreme Court explicitly electing not to address "the arguments that the Georgia statute violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." NOTES: Wesberry was a significant step in the evolution of redistricting law that followed Baker, further establishing the idea that districts were to be as equal as possible and setting the stage for the later refinement of the one-man one-vote principle. In response to the case, districts across the country had to be redrawn to provide more equitable representation, a process which in some instances had significant political ramifications. The case also served as a predecessor to the series of cases known collectively as the "Reapportionment Cases," which would go beyond Federal elections to dramatically change the landscape of State legislative elections as well.