Module 2 Cases (just ruling)

Macariola v. Judge Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1992 (114 SCRA 77);

#####Issues##### Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.). #####Ruling###### WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]). In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition. The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation. It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows: I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents: Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: " With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

Formaran v. Ong, G.R. No. 186264, July 8, 2013 (700 SCRA 758);

According to plaintiff (Petitioner)'s complaint, she owns the afore-described parcel of land which was donated to her intervivos by her uncle and aunt, spouses Melquiades Barraca and Praxedes Casidsid on June 25, 1967; that on August 12, 1967 upon the proddings and representation of defendant (Respondent) Glenda, that she badly needed a collateral for a loan which she was applying from a bank to equip her dental clinic, plaintiff made it appear that she sold one-half of the afore-described parcel of land to the defendant Glenda; that the sale was totally without any consideration and fictitious; that contrary to plaintiff's agreement with defendant Glenda for the latter to return the land, defendant Glenda filed a case for unlawful detainer against the plaintiff who consequently suffered anxiety, sleepless nights and besmirched reputation; and that to protect plaintiff's rights and interest over the land in question, she was constrained to file the instant case, binding herself to pay ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. In an answer filed on December 22, 1997, defendant Glenda insisted on her ownership over the land in question on account of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the plaintiff in her favor; and that plaintiff's claim of ownership therefore was virtually rejected by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ibaja-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, when it decided in her favor the unlawful detainer case she filed against the plaintiff, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 183. Defendants are also claiming moral damages and attorney's fees in view of the filing of the present case against them. #####Ruling##### The petition sufficiently shows with convincing arguments that the decision of the CA is based on a misappreciation of facts. The Court believes and so holds that the subject Deed of Sale is indeed simulated, as it is: (1) totally devoid of consideration; (2) it was executed on August 12, 1967, less than two months from the time the subject land was donated to petitioner on June 25, 1967 by no less than the parents of respondent Glenda Ong; (3) on May 18, 1978, petitioner mortgaged the land to the Aklan Development Bank for a ₱23,000.00 loan; (4) from the time of the alleged sale, petitioner has been in actual possession of the subject land; (5) the alleged sale was registered on May 25, 1991 or about twenty four (24) years after execution; (6) respondent Glenda Ong never introduced any improvement on the subject land; and (7) petitioner's house stood on a part of the subject land. These are facts and circumstances which may be considered badges of bad faith that tip the balance in favor of petitioner. The Court is in accord with the observation and findings of the (RTC,3 Kalibo, Aklan) thus: "The amplitude of foregoing undisputed facts and circumstances clearly shows that the sale of the land in question was purely simulated. It is void from the very beginning (Article 1346, New Civil Code). If the sale was legitimate, defendant Glenda should have immediately taken possession of the land, declared in her name for taxation purposes, registered the sale, paid realty taxes, introduced improvements therein and should not have allowed plaintiff to mortgage the land. These omissions properly militated against defendant Glenda's submission that the sale was legitimate and the consideration was paid. While the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized, it cannot justify the conclusion that the sale is a true conveyance to which the parties are irrevocably and undeniably bound. Although the notarization of Deed of Absolute Sale, vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it does not validate nor make binding an instrument never intended, in the first place, to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto (Suntay vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995; cited in Ruperto Viloria vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119974, June 30, 1999)."

Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748, Sept. 14, 2011 (657 SCRA 551);

Alfonso Ureta was financially well-off and owned several properties. He begot fourteen children, including herein petitioners and Policronio, father of respondents. For taxation purposes, Alfonso sold, without monetary consideration, several parcels of land to four of his children, including Policronio. Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. Upon his death, Liberato acted as the administrator. The Fernandez Family rented the portion transferred to Policronio. But even after the fact, the tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of this heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate. When Policronio died, except for a portion of one of the parcels of land, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands. Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,8 which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso's estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. The Heirs of Policronio averred that the extra-judicial partition is void because Conrado signed the same without written authority form his siblings. #####Issues##### WON Conrado Ureta's lack of capacity to give his co-heirs' consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition rendered the same voidable. #####Ruling digest##### No. Article 1390 is not applicable in this case. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract. What is involved in the case at bench though is not Conrado's incapacity to give consent to the contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to the circumstances prevailing in this case. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party's consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. Therefore, Conrado's failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado's co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority. #####Ruling##### a. Validity of the deed of sale Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced As will be discussed below, the evidence overcomes these two presumptions. First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction because it was absolutely simulated. The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence17 that the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes. xxx The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all bearing the same date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was expressly stipulated: ""The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all bearing the same date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was expressly stipulated:"" As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deeds of Sale. It was undisputed that Alfonso remained in possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their produce until his death. No credence can be given to the contention of the Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject lands or enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice. Had this been true, Policronio should have taken possession of the subject lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they were sold to him, and even after the death of both Alfonso and Policronio. It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the subject lands never turned over the produce of the properties to Policronio or his heirs but only to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate. Neither was there a demand for their delivery to Policronio or his heirs. Neither did Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on the properties, the only payment on record being those made by his heirs in 1996 and 1997 ten years after his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands. The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronio's failure to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children. This, coupled with Policronio's failure to exercise any rights pertaining to an owner of the subject lands, leads to the conclusion that he was aware that the transfer was only made for taxation purposes and never intended to bind the parties thereto. As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of Policronio, the factual findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, remain binding and conclusive upon this Court It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such, the Deed of Sale produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being absolutely simulated pursuant to Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which provides: Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the Deed of Sale. In their Answer,23 the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration, and even granting that there was consideration, such was inadequate. The Heirs of Policronio counter that the defenses of absence or inadequacy of consideration are not grounds to render a contract void. On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso. For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the ₱2,000.00 purchase price on the date of the signing of the contract Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable consideration, the RTC found that there was no money involved in the sale.27 This finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling that the sale is void for being absolutely simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason to deviate from such factual findings, they are binding on this Court. Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue on the inadequacy of consideration. Prior Action Unnecessary The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed an action to declare the sale void prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken. A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null and void; in such case, no independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for all purposes.39 A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.40 Therefore, it was not necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. #####Case too damn long i gave up after request to nullify deed of sale first before extra-judicial parittion####

Dinayug v. Ugaddan, G.R. No. 181623, Dec. 5, 2012 (687 SCRA260);

At the crux of this controversy are two parcels of land located in Barangay Libag, Tuguegarao, Cagayan (subject properties) covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-311 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan in the name of Gerardo Ugaddan (Gerardo), husband of respondent Basilia Lacambra (Basilia) and father of the other respondents Eugenio, Norberto, Pedro, Angelina, Tereso, Dominga, and Geronima, all bearing the surname Ugaddan Gerardo acquired title over the subject properties through the grant of Homestead Patent No. V-6269 in his favor on January 12, 1951. Said patent was registered and OCT No. P-311 was issued in Gerardo's name on March 5, 1951 Upon Gerardo's death, respondents discovered that OCT No. P-311 had been cancelled. The records of the Registry of Deeds show that Gerardo, with the consent of his wife Basilia, sold the subject properties on July 10, 1951 to Juan Binayug (Juan) for the sum of P3,000.00.6 As a result of the sale, OCT No. P-311 in Gerardo's name was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-106394 in Juan's name was issued. Juan was the father of petitioner Alejandro Binayug (Alejandro) and the subject properties passed on to him and his wife Ana Ugaddan Binayug (Ana) upon Juan's death After conducting their own investigation, respondents filed on October 22, 1998 a complaint "for declaration of nullity of title, annulment of instrument, [and] declaration of ownership with damages" against petitioners. Respondents averred that the purported sale between Gerardo and Juan was prohibited under Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended; and that the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951 between Gerardo (with Basilia's consent) and Juan was forged The RTC then declared the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951 as null and void for the following reasons: First, as proven by the testimonies of [respondents'] witnesses, the marital consent was not obtained by Gerardo. Second, Section 118 of the Public Land Law, amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456, reads as follows:xxx On the basis of the afore-quoted section, a homestead patent cannot be alienated or encumbered within five (5) years from the approval of application except in favor of the government or any of its branches or institutions. Where a homestead was sold during the prohibited period, even if the sale is approved by the Director of Lands subsequently after five (5) years, the approval will not give it any valid curative effect. Such sale is illegal, inexistent, and null and void ab initio. #####Issues##### Petitioners raise and argue only one issue in their Petition: whether or not Section 118 of the Public Land Act is applicable to their case. They no longer challenge the appreciation of evidence and factual conclusions of the RTC. Consequently, petitioners resort directly to this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is in accordance with procedural rules. #####Ruling##### Nonetheless, the Court finds no merit in the Petition and denies the same. The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here De Los Santos desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve". We are, therefore, constrained to hold that De Los Santos can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law. As regards the contention that because the immediate effect of the nullification of the sale is the reversion of the property to the State, De Los Santos is not the proper party to institute it but the State itself, that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose, to decide. That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the homestead, or his heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the Church, et al.. Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of De Los Santos and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of De Los Santos during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State In Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 the Court adjudged that in cases where the homestead has been the subject of void conveyances, the law still regards the original owner as the rightful owner subject to escheat proceedings by the State. Still in Arsenal, the Court referred to Menil v. Court of Appeals28 and Manzano v. Ocampo,29 wherein the land was awarded back to the original owner notwithstanding the fact that he was equally guilty with the vendee in circumventing the law. Jurisprudence, therefore, supports the return of the subject properties to respondents as Gerardo's heirs following the declaration that the Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1951 between Gerardo and Juan is void for being in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended. That the subject properties should revert to the State under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is a non-issue, the State not even being a party herein.

Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. L- 35702, May 29, 1973 (51 SCRA 120);

On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under Psu-99791 located in Barrio General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot on two occasions — in 1945 and in 1959. Plaintiff prayed also for damages and attorneys fees. (pp. 1-7, Record on Appeal). In his answer with counter-claim defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question and for the alleged malicious institution of the complaint he claims he has suffered moral damages in the amount of P 2,000.00, as well as the sum of P500.00 for attorney's fees. On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads:xxx On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court practically agreed with defendant's contention that the contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante was null and void. In due season plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 50-56 Record on Appeal) which was denied by the lower court on January 14, 1966 (p. 57, Record on Appeal). #####Ruling###### No error was therefore committed by the lower court in dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon defendant's motion after the pre-trial. ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in all instances against plaintiff-appellant. So ordered. 1. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof for P2,000.00 made in 1956 by his father-in- law, Francisco Militante, in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the dismissal of Militante's application for registration, the lack of any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land was conclusively and decisively judicially determined. Hence, there was no right or title to the land that could be transferred or sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in favor of plaintiff. Manifestly, then plaintiff's complaint against defendant, to be declared absolute owner of the land and to be restored to possession thereof with damages was bereft of any factual or legal basis. 2. No error could be attributed either to the lower court's holding that the purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced supra;6 and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." The reason thus given by Manresa in considering such prohibited acquisitions under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code as merely voidable at the instance and option of the vendor and not void — "that the Code does not recognize such nullity de pleno derecho" — is no longer true and applicable to our own Philippine Civil Code which does recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning." As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendant-appellant. The principles governing the nullity of such prohibited contracts and judicial declaration of their nullity have been well restated by Tolentino in his treatise on our Civil Code, as follows:

Ching v. Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879

On December 30, 1947, Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz (Epifania) were married.1 Out of the union were born respondents Joseph, Jr., Evelyn, Jerry, Imelda, Julius, Mary Ellen and Jess, all surnamed Goyanko. Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square meter property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu City but that as they (the parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia). On May 1, 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale2 over the property in favor of respondents' father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of sale3 over the property in favor of his common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 138405 was thus issued in petitioner's name. After Goyanko's death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that ownership of the property had already been transferred in the name of petitioner. Respondents thereupon had the purported signature of their father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory which found the same to be a forgery.4 Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against petitioner, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of TCT No. 138405 and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko. #####Issues##### APPLYING THE STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THE SAME BEING FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO, AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF PETITIONER, AND THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER PART OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' MOTHER EPIFANIA GOYANKO AND PETITIONER'S COMMON LAW HUSBAND, JOSEPH GOYANKO, SR., NOR THE EXCLUSIVE OR CAPITAL PROPERTY OF THE LATTER AT ANYTIME BEFORE THE SAME WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER. NOT FINDING THAT A JURIDICAL RELATION OF TRUST AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLES 1448 AND 1450 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE CAN VALIDLY EXIST BETWEEN COMMON LAW SPOUSES. #####Ruling##### The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al. Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.1âwphi1 Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife-herein petitioner, it was null and void. ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him. ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him. does not persuade. For petitioner's testimony that it was she who provided the purchase price is uncorroborated. That she may have been considered the breadwinner of the family and that there was proof that she earned a living do not conclusively clinch her claim.

Intac v. CA, G.R. No. 173211, Oct. 11, 2012 (684 SCRA 88);

From the records, it appears that Ireneo Mendoza (Ireneo), married to Salvacion Fermin (Salvacion), was the owner of the subject property, presently covered by TCT No. 242655 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and situated at No. 36, Road 8, Bagong Pag-asa, Quezon City, which he purchased in 1954. Ireneo had two children: respondents Josefina and Martina (respondents), Salvacion being their stepmother. When he was still alive, Ireneo, also took care of his niece, Angelina, since she was three years old until she got married. The property was then covered by TCT No. 106530 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. On October 25, 1977, Ireneo, with the consent of Salvacion, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of Angelina and her husband, Mario (Spouses Intac). Despite the sale, Ireneo and his family, including the respondents, continued staying in the premises and paying the realty taxes. After Ireneo died intestate in 1982, his widow and the respondents remained in the premises.3 After Salvacion died, respondents still maintained their residence there. Up to the present, they are in the premises, paying the real estate taxes thereon, leasing out portions of the property, and collecting the rentals.4 The Dispute The controversy arose when respondents sought the cancellation of TCT No. 242655, claiming that the sale was only simulated and, therefore, void. Spouses Intac resisted, claiming that it was a valid sale for a consideration. ###Issues### Basically, the Court is being asked to resolve the issue of whether the Deed of Absolute Sale,11 dated October 25, 1977, executed by and between Ireneo Mendoza and Salvacion Fermin, as vendors, and Mario Intac and Angelina Intac, as vendees, involving the subject real property in Pagasa, Quezon City, was a simulated contract or a valid agreement. ###Ruling### The Court finds no merit in the petition. In this case, the CA ruled that the deed of sale executed by Ireneo and Salvacion was absolutely simulated for lack of consideration and cause and, therefore, void. Articles 1345 and 1346 of the Civil Code provide: If the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is only relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest. In the case at bench, the Court is one with the courts below that no valid sale of the subject property actually took place between the alleged vendors, Ireneo and Salvacion; and the alleged vendees, Spouses Intac. There was simply no consideration and no intent to sell it. Critical is the testimony of Marietto, a witness to the execution of the subject absolute deed of sale. He testified that Ireneo personally told him that he was going to execute a document of sale because Spouses Intac needed to borrow the title to the property and use it as collateral for their loan application. Ireneo and Salvacion never intended to sell or permanently transfer the full ownership of the subject property to Spouses Intac. Marietto was characterized by the RTC as a credible witness. Aside from their plain denial, petitioners failed to present any concrete evidence to disprove Marietto's testimony. They claimed that they actually paid P150,000.00 for the subject property. They, however, failed to adduce proof, even by circumstantial evidence, that they did, in fact, pay it. Even for the consideration of P60,000.00 as stated in the contract, petitioners could not show any tangible evidence of any payment therefor. Their failure to prove their payment only strengthened Marietto's story that there was no payment made because Ireneo had no intention to sell the subject property. Angelina's story, except on the consideration, was consistent with that of Marietto. Angelina testified that she and her husband mortgaged the subject property sometime in July 1978 to finance the construction of a small hospital in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Angelina claimed that Ireneo offered the property as he was in deep financial need. Granting that Ireneo was in financial straits, it does not prove that he intended to sell the property to Angelina. Petitioners could not adduce any proof that they lent money to Ireneo or that he shared in the proceeds of the loan they had obtained. And, if their intention was to build a hospital, could they still afford to lend money to Ireneo? And if Ireneo needed money, why would he lend the title to Spouses Intac when he himself could use it to borrow money for his needs? If Spouses Intac took care of him when he was terminally ill, it was not surprising for Angelina to reciprocate as he took care of her since she was three (3) years old until she got married. Their caring acts for him, while they are deemed services of value, cannot be considered as consideration for the subject property for lack of quantification and the Filipino culture of taking care of their elders. Thus, the Court agrees with the courts below that the questioned contract of sale was only for the purpose of lending the title of the property to Spouses Intac to enable them to secure a loan. Their arrangement was only temporary and could not give rise to a valid sale. Where there is no consideration, the sale is null and void ab initio There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element of consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that "if the price is simulated, the sale is void," also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made. More importantly, Ireneo and his family continued to be in physical possession of the subject property after the sale in 1977 and up to the present. They even went as far as leasing the same and collecting rentals. If Spouses Intac really purchased the subject property and claimed to be its true owners, why did they not assert their ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did they have to assert their ownership of it only after the death of Ireneo and Salvacion? One of the most striking badges of absolute simulation is the complete absence of any attempt on the part of a vendee to assert his right of dominion over the property

3.. Paragas v. Heirs of Balacano,G.R. No. 168220, Aug. 31, 2005 (468 SCRA 717);

Gregorio Balacano, married to Lorenza Sumigcay, was the registered owner of Lot 1175-E and Lot 1175-F of the Subd. Plan Psd-38042 [located at Baluarte, Santiago City, Isabela] covered by TCT No. T-103297 and TCT No. T-103298 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Isabela. Gregorio and Lorenza had three children, namely: Domingo, Catalino and Alfredo, all surnamed Balacano. Lorenza died on December 11, 1991. Gregorio, on the other hand, died on July 28, 1996. Prior to his death, Gregorio was admitted at the Veterans General Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and stayed there until July 19, 1996. He was transferred in the afternoon of July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where he was confined until his death. Gregorio purportedly sold on July 22, 1996, or barely a week prior to his death, a portion of Lot 1175-E (specifically consisting of 15,925 square meters from its total area of 22,341 square meters) and the whole Lot 1175-F to the Spouses Rudy ("Rudy") and Corazon Paragas (collectively, "the Spouses Paragas") for the total consideration of ₱500,000.00. This sale appeared in a deed of absolute sale notarized by Atty. Alexander V. de Guzman, Notary Public for Santiago City, on the same date - July 22, 1996 - and witnessed by Antonio Agcaoili ("Antonio") and Julia Garabiles ("Julia"). Gregorio's certificates of title over Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were consequently cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in favor of the Spouses Paragas. The Spouses Paragas then sold on October 17, 1996 a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for the total consideration of ₱60,000.00. Domingo's children (Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette and Cyric, all surnamed Balacano;...) filed on October 22, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale and partition against Catalino and the Spouses Paragas ####Issues##### At bottom is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the nullity of the Deed of Sale purportedly executed between petitioners and the late Gregorio Balacano. #####Ruling###### petition denied The foregoing tenets in the case at bar apply with greater force to the petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are in full agreement with that of the trial court Specifically, the Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court, found that there was no prior and perfected contract of sale that remained to be fully consummated. We do not consider Atty. de Guzman's testimony sufficient evidence to establish the fact that there was a prior agreement between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F. This testimony does not conclusively establish the meeting of the minds between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on the price or consideration for the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F - Atty. de Guzman merely declared that he was asked by Gregorio to prepare a deed; he did not clearly narrate the details of this agreement. We cannot assume that Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas agreed to a ₱500,000.00 consideration based on Atty. de Guzman's bare assertion that Gregorio asked him to prepare a deed, as Atty. de Guzman was not personally aware of the agreed consideration in the sale of the lots, not being privy to the parties' agreement. To us, Rudy could have been a competent witness to testify on the perfection of this prior contract; unfortunately, the defendants-appellants did not present Rudy as their witness. We seriously doubt too the credibility of Atty. de Guzman as a witness. We cannot rely on his testimony because of his tendency to commit falsity. He admitted in open court that while Gregorio signed the deed on July 18, 1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, he nevertheless did not reflect these matters when he notarized the deed; instead he entered Santiago City and July 22, 1996, as place and date of execution, respectively. To us, Atty. de Guzman's propensity to distort facts in the performance of his public functions as a notary public, in utter disregard of the significance of the act of notarization, seriously affects his credibility as a witness in the present case. In fact, Atty. de Guzman's act in falsifying the entries in his acknowledgment of the deed of sale could be the subject of administrative and disciplinary action, a matter that we however do not here decide. Similarly, there is no conclusive proof of the partial execution of the contract because the only evidence the plaintiffs-appellants presented to prove this claim was Atty. de Guzman's testimony, which is hearsay and thus, has no probative value. Atty. de Guzman merely stated that Rudy told him that Rudy already gave ₱50,000.00 to Gregorio as partial payment of the purchase price; Atty. de Guzman did not personally see the payment being made But, did Gregorio give an intelligent consent to the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F when he signed the deed of sale? The trial court as well as the appellate court found in the negative. In the Court of Appeals' rationale- It is not disputed that when Gregorio signed the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, as he in fact died a week after the deed's signing. Gregorio died of complications caused by cirrhosis of the liver. Gregorio's death was neither sudden nor immediate; he fought at least a month-long battle against the disease until he succumbed to death on July 22, 1996. Given that Gregorio purportedly executed a deed during the last stages of his battle against his disease, we seriously doubt whether Gregorio could have read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of the consequences of his act. Additionally, the irregular and invalid notarization of the deed is a falsity that raises doubts on the regularity of the transaction itself. While the deed was indeed signed on July 18, 1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the deed states otherwise, as it shows that the deed was executed on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City. Why such falsity was committed, and the circumstances under which this falsity was committed, speaks volume about the regularity and the validity of the sale. We cannot but consider the commission of this falsity, with the indispensable aid of Atty. de Guzman, an orchestrated attempt to legitimize a transaction that Gregorio did not intend to be binding upon him nor on his bounty. Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection Based on the foregoing, the court of Appeals concluded that Gregorio's consent to the sale of the lots was absent, making the contract null and void. Consequently, the spouses Paragas could not have made a subsequent transfer of the property to Catalino Balacano. Indeed, nemo dat quod non habet. Nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him We likewise find to be in accord with the evidence on record the ruling of the Court of Appeals declaring the properties in controversy as paraphernal properties of Gregorio in the absence of competent evidence on the exact date of Gregorio's acquisition of ownership of these lots. On the credibility of witnesses, it is in rhyme with reason to believe the testimonies of the witnesses for the complainants vis-à-vis those of the defendants. In the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, we are guided by the following well-entrenched rules: (1) that evidence to be believed must not only spring from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible, and (2) findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witness are matters best left to the trial court who had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the witnesses' demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying In the case at bar, we agree in the trial court's conclusion that petitioners' star witness, Atty. De Guzman is far from being a credible witness. Unlike this Court, the trial court had the unique opportunity of observing the demeanor of said witness. Thus, we affirm the trial court and the Court of Appeals' uniform decision based on the whole evidence in record holding the Deed of Sale in question to be null and void. In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by Gregorio on his death bed in the hospital. Gregorio was an octogenarian at the time of the alleged execution of the contract and suffering from liver cirrhosis at that - circumstances which raise grave doubts on his physical and mental capacity to freely consent to the contract. Adding to the dubiety of the purported sale and further bolstering respondents' claim that their uncle Catalino, one of the children of the decedent, had a hand in the execution of the deed is the fact that on 17 October 1996, petitioners sold a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for ₱60,000.00.22 One need not stretch his imagination to surmise that Catalino was in cahoots with petitioners in maneuvering the alleged sale.

Villaceran v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 169055, Feb. 22, 2012 (666 SCRA 454);

Josephine De Guzman filed a Complaint4 with the RTC of Echague, Isabela against the spouses Jose and Milagros Villaceran and Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), Santiago City Branch, for declaration of nullity of sale, reconveyance, redemption of mortgage and damages with preliminary injunction. The complaint was later amended to include annulment of foreclosure and Sheriff's Certificate of Sale. In her Amended Complaint,5 De Guzman alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-236168,6 located in Echague, Isabela, having an area of 971 square meters and described as Lot 8412-B of the Subdivision Plan Psd-93948. On April 17, 1995, she mortgaged the lot to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of Santiago City to secure a loan of ₱600,000. In order to secure a bigger loan to finance a business venture, De Guzman asked Milagros Villaceran to obtain an additional loan on her behalf. She executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Milagros. Considering De Guzman's unsatisfactory loan record with the PNB, Milagros suggested that the title of the property be transferred to her and Jose Villaceran and they would obtain a bigger loan as they have a credit line of up to ₱5,000,000 with the bank. #####Issues##### Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in ruling that the Deed of Sale dated June 19, 1996 is a simulated contract and not a true sale of the subject property. Petitioners contend that the previous loans they extended to De Guzman in the amounts of ₱300,000, ₱600,000 and ₱200,000 should have been considered by the CA. When added to the ₱721,891.67 used to settle the PNB loan, De Guzman's total loan obtained from them would amount to ₱1,821,891.67. Thus, it would clearly show that the Deed of Sale dated June 19, 1996, being supported by a valuable consideration, is not a simulated contract. #####Ruling##### We do not agree. The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.22 In the case at bar, there is a relative simulation of contract as the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 19, 1996 executed by De Guzman in favor of petitioners did not reflect the true intention of the parties. It is worthy to note that both the RTC and the CA found that the evidence established that the aforesaid document of sale was executed only to enable petitioners to use the property as collateral for a bigger loan, by way of accommodating De Guzman. Thus, the parties have agreed to transfer title over the property in the name of petitioners who had a good credit line with the bank. The CA found it inconceivable for De Guzman to sell the property for ₱75,000 as stated in the June 19, 1996 Deed of Sale when petitioners were able to mortgage the property with FEBTC for ₱1,485,000. Another indication of the lack of intention to sell the property is when a few months later, on September 6, 1996, the same property, this time already registered in the name of petitioners, was reconveyed to De Guzman allegedly for ₱350,000. As regards petitioners' assertion that De Guzman's previous loans should have been considered to prove that there was an actual sale, the Court finds the same to be without merit. Petitioners failed to present any evidence to prove that they indeed extended loans to De Guzman in the amounts of ₱300,000, ₱600,000 and ₱200,000. We note that petitioners tried to explain that on account of their close friendship and trust, they did not ask for any promissory note, receipts or documents to evidence the loan. But in view of the substantial amounts of the loans, they should have been duly covered by receipts or any document evidencing the transaction. Consequently, no error was committed by the CA in holding that the June 19, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale was a simulated contract. The issue of the genuineness of a deed of sale is essentially a question of fact.1âwphi1 It is settled that this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is especially true where the trial court's factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the CA as in the present case. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.

Heirs of San Andres v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 135634, May 31, 2000

Juan San Andres was the registered owner of Lot No. 1914-B-2 situated in Liboton, Naga City. On September 28, 1964, he sold a portion thereof, consisting of 345 square meters, to respondent Vicente S. Rodriguez for P2,415.00. The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Sale. 2 Upon the death of Juan San Andres on May 5, 1965, Ramon San Andres was appointed judicial administrator of the decedent's estate in Special Proceedings No. R-21, RTC, Branch 19, Naga City. Ramon San Andres engaged the services of a geodetic engineer, Jose Peñero, to prepare a consolidated plan (Exh. A) of the estate. Engineer Peñero also prepared a sketch plan of the 345-square meter lot sold to respondent. From the result of the survey, it was found that respondent had enlarged the area which he purchased from the late Juan San Andres by 509 square meters. 3 Accordingly, the judicial administrator sent a letter, 4 dated July 27, 1987, to respondent demanding that the latter vacate the portion allegedly encroached by him. However, respondent refused to do so, claiming he had purchased the same from the late Juan San Andres. Thereafter, on November 24, 1987, the judicial administrator brought an action, in behalf of the estate of Juan San Andres, for recovery of possession of the 509-square meter lot. #####Ruling##### The petition has no merit. As shown in the receipt, dated September 29, 1964, the late Juan San Andres received P500.00 from respondent as "advance payment for the residential lot adjoining his previously paid lot on three sides excepting on the frontage; the agreed purchase price was P15.00 per square meter; and the full amount of the purchase price was to be based on the results of a survey and would be due and payable in five (5) years from the execution of a deed of sale. Petitioner contends, however, that the "property subject of the sale was not described with sufficient certainty such that there is a necessity of another agreement between the parties to finally ascertain the identity; size and purchase price of the property which is the object of the alleged sale." 1 He argues that the "quantity of the object is not determinate as in fact a survey is needed to determine its exact size and the full purchase price therefor" Petitioner's contention is without merit. There is no dispute that respondent purchased a portion of Lot 1914-B-2 consisting of 345 square meters. This portion is located in the middle of Lot 1914-B-2, which has a total area of 854 square meters, and is clearly what was referred to in the receipt as the "previously paid lot." Since the lot subsequently sold to respondent is said to adjoin the "previously paid lot" on three sides thereof, the subject lot is capable of being determined without the need of any new contract. The fact that the exact area of these adjoining residential lots is subject to the result of a survey does not detract from the fact that they are determinate or determinable. Thus, all of the essential elements of a contract of sale are present, i.e., that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties, by virtue of which the late Juan San Andres undertook to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing for a price certain in money. As Art. 1475 of the Civil Code provides: That the contract of sale is perfected was confirmed by the former administrator of the estates, Ramon San Andres, who wrote a letter to respondent on March 30, 1966 asking for P300.00 as partial payment for the subject lot. Applying these principles to this case, it cannot be gainsaid that the contract of sale between the parties is absolute, not conditional. There is no reservation of ownership nor a stipulation providing for a unilateral rescission by either party. In fact, the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to respondent. 20 Thus, Art. 1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. The stipulation that the "payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in five (5) years from the execution of a formal deed of sale" is not a condition which affects the efficacy of the contract of sale. It merely provides the manner by which the full consideration is to be computed and the time within which the same is to be paid. But it does not affect in any manner the effectivity of the contract. Consequently, the contention that the absence of a formal deed of sale stipulated in the receipt prevents the happening of a sale has no merit.

Rufloe v. Burgos, G.R. No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009 (577 SCRA 264);

Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Bagbagan, Muntinlupa, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 406851 which is the subject of the present controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of Sale dated September 8, 1978 to make it appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a title in her name, TCT No. S-74933. Thus, in November 1979, the Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes with the RTC of Pasay City alleging that the Deed of Sale was falsified as the signatures appearing thereon were forged because Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. M-7690.5 They also filed a notice of adverse claim on November 5, 1979. On December 4, 1984, during the pendency of Civil Case No. M-7690, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelito and Amy (Burgos siblings). A new title, TCT No. 135860, was then issued in their names. On December 12, 1985, the Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued in her name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued paying the real estate taxes thereon. On February 6, 1989, the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 108,6 rendered its decision in Civil Case No. M-7690 declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was falsified as the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had been forged. The trial court ruled that Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject property. Said decision had become final and executory. Such was the state of things when, on February 8, 1990, in the RTC of Muntinlupa, the Rufloes filed their complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles against respondents Leonarda and the Burgos siblings, and Delos Reyes. #####Issues##### In a gist, the issues to be resolved are (1) whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale by the siblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and (2) whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes. #####Ruling##### We find merit in the petition. The issue concerning the validity of the deed of sale between the Rufloes and Delos Reyes had already been resolved with finality in Civil Case No. M-7690 by the RTC of Pasay City which declared that the signatures of the alleged vendors, Angel and Adoracion Rufloe, had been forged.12 It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally.13 Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda. We now determine whether respondents Burgos siblings and Leonarda Burgos were purchasers in good faith. It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes The circumstances surrounding this case point to the absolute lack of good faith on the part of respondents. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be annotated on the title of Delos Reyes as early as November 5, 1979.18 The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or may have a better right than the registered owner thereof. Despite the notice of adverse claim, the Burgos siblings still purchased the property in question. Too, at the time the Burgos siblings bought the subject property on December 4, 1984, Civil Case No. M-7690,19 an action for damages, and Criminal Case No. 10914-P,20 for estafa, filed by the Rufloes against Delos Reyes, were both pending before the RTC of Pasay City. This circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to the validity of Delos Reyes' title and her authority and legal right to sell the property. Equally significant is the fact that Delos Reyes was not in possession of the subject property when she sold the same to the Burgos siblings. It was Amado Burgos who bought the property for his children, the Burgos siblings In the same vein, Leonarda cannot be categorized as a purchaser in good faith. Since it was the Rufloes who continued to have actual possession of the property, Leonarda should have investigated the nature of their possession. We cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not shown any diligence in protecting their rights. Respondents had knowledge of facts that should have led them to inquire and investigate in order to acquaint themselves with possible defects in the title of the seller of the property.1avvphi1.zw+ However, they failed to do so. Thus, Leonarda, as well as the Burgos siblings, cannot take cover under the protection the law accords to purchasers in good faith and for value. They cannot claim valid title to the property. We quote with approval the following findings of the trial court showing that the sale between the Burgos siblings and Leonarda is simulated:xxx These circumstances taken altogether would show that the sale, which occurred between Leonarda and the Burgos siblings, was simply a scheme designed to cleanse the title passed on to them by the forger Delos Reyes. Respondents had to resort to this strategy because they were fully aware that their title, having originated from the forged deed of sale of Delos Reyes, was not a clean and valid title.

Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 333(1989); Ong v. Ong, 139 SCRA 133(1985);

Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972. As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter who are living under the same roof, especially so when the father has no need of money as the properties supposedly sold were all income-producing. Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner questions not the extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his father to Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo). The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the considerations mentioned in the documents were merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the prices were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention of the parties were donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the estate of his parents. It further declared the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties subject matter of all the documents be registered in the name of herein petitioners and private respondents. #####Ruling##### According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the action for annulment must be brought within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had prescribed. If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the questioned documents, We would have sustained the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he further assailed the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they were without consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact merely simulated. According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a simulated price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is imprescriptible. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are without consideration. For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic. The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes more stringent where the documents themselves show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are without consideration. Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other source of income other than what she derives from helping in the management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and which was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974). On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and rice even before her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation. Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the market value and the purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332). Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father and his daughter is purely speculative which has no relevance to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly present. There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete. We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs- Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154). In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson. There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.

Carabeo v. Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011 (647 SCRA 200);

On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for ₱38,000. Respondents tendered their initial payment of ₱10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990. Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase price, petitioner requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going "squabble" over the land. Nevertheless, respondents gave petitioner small sums of money from time to time which totaled ₱9,100, on petitioner's request according to them; due to respondents' inability to pay the amount of the remaining balance in full, according to petitioner. By respondents' claim, despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted on petitioner's acceptance of the remaining balance of ₱18,900 but petitioner remained firm in his refusal, proffering as reason therefor that he would register the land first. Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that petitioner had caused its registration in his name on December 21, 1993 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered to pay the balance but petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan. #####Ruling##### The petition fails. x x x x Na ako ay may isang partial na lupa na matatagpuan sa Purok 111, Tugatog, Orani Bataan, na may sukat na 27 x 24 metro kuwadrado, ang nasabing lupa ay may sakop na dalawang punong santol at isang punong mangga, kaya't ako ay nakipagkasundo sa mag-asawang Norby Dingco at Susan Dingco na ipagbili sa kanila ang karapatan ng nasabing lupa sa halagang ₱38,000.00. x x x x (underscoring supplied) That the kasunduan did not specify the technical boundaries of the property did not render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.9 As the above-quoted portion of the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the object of the sale is determinate Clutching at straws, petitioner proffers lack of spousal consent. This was raised only on appeal, hence, will not be considered, in the present case, in the interest of fair play, justice and due process Respecting the argument that petitioner's death rendered respondents' complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla v. Barcena11 enlightens: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights,12 it survives.1avvphi1 It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner's death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner's legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority.14 Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner's counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court's decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.

Ong v. Ong, 139 SCRA 133(1985);

Records show that on February 25, 1976 Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of One (P1.00) Peso and other valuable considerations, executed in favor of private respondent Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim Deed whereby she transferred, released, assigned and forever quit-claimed to Sandra Maruzzo, her heirs and assigns, all her rights, title, interest and participation in the ONE-HALF (½) undivided portion of the parcel of land, particularly described On November 19, 1980, Imelda Ong revoked the aforesaid Deed of Quitclaim and, thereafter, on January 20, 1982 donated the whole property described above to her son, Rex Ong-Jimenez. On June 20, 1983, Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian (ad litem) Alfredo Ong, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila an action against petitioners, for the recovery of ownership/possession and nullification of the Deed of Donation over the portion belonging to her and for Accounting. In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that the Quitclaim Deed is null and void inasmuch as it is equivalent to a Deed of Donation, acceptance of which by the donee is necessary to give it validity. Further, it is averred that the donee, Sandra Maruzzo, being a minor, had no legal personality and therefore incapable of accepting the donation. On December 12, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Maruzzo and held that the Quitclaim Deed is equivalent to a Deed of Sale and, hence, there was a valid conveyance in favor of the latter. Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. They reiterated their argument below and, in addition, contended that the One (P1.00) Peso consideration is not a consideration at all to sustain the ruling that the Deed of Quitclaim is equivalent to a sale. On June 20, 1984, respondent Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the appealed judgment and held that the Quitclaim Deed is a conveyance of property with a valid cause or consideration; that the consideration is the One (P1.00) Peso which is clearly stated in the deed itself; that the apparent inadequacy is of no moment since it is the usual practice in deeds of conveyance to place a nominal amount although there is a more valuable consideration given ######Ruling##### On March 15, 1985, respondent Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an Omnibus Motion informing this Court that she has reached the age of majority as evidenced by her Birth Certificate and she prays that she be substituted as private respondent in place of her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong. On April 15, 1985, the Court issued a resolution granting the same. A careful perusal of the subject deed reveals that the conveyance of the one- half (½) undivided portion of the above-described property was for and in consideration of the One (P 1.00) Peso and the other valuable considerations (emphasis supplied) paid by private respondent Sandra Maruzzo through her representative, Alfredo Ong, to petitioner Imelda Ong. Stated differently, the cause or consideration is not the One (P1.00) Peso alone but also the other valuable considerations. The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden of proving such allegation. (Caballero, et al. vs. Caballero, et al., (CA), 45 O.G. 2536). Moreover, even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens (Article 726, Civil Code). The acceptance by a legal guardian of a simple or pure donation does not seem to be necessary (Perez vs. Calingo, CA-40 O.G. 53). Thus, Supreme Court ruled in Kapunan vs. Casilan and Court of Appeals, (109 Phil. 889) that the donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in question does not impose any condition. The above pronouncement of respondent Appellate Court finds support in the ruling of this Court in Morales Development Co., Inc. vs. CA, 27 SCRA 484, which states that "the major premise thereof is based upon the fact that the consideration stated in the deeds of sale in favor of Reyes and the Abellas is P1.00. It is not unusual, however, in deeds of conveyance adhering to the Anglo-Saxon practice of stating that the consideration given is the sum of P1.00, although the actual consideration may have been much more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration of P1.00 is suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justify the inference that Reyes and the Abellas were not purchasers in good faith and for value. Neither does this inference warrant the conclusion that the sales were null and void ab initio. Indeed, bad faith and inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render a conveyance inexistent, for the assignor's liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract (Article 1350, Civil Code), whereas fraud or bad faith may render either rescissible or voidable, although valid until annulled, a contract concerning an object certain entered into with a cause and with the consent of the contracting parties, as in the case at bar."

Montecillo v. Reynes, G.R. No. 138018, July 26, 2002 (385 SCRA 244);

Respondents Ignacia Reynes ("Reynes" for brevity) and Spouses Abucay ("Abucay Spouses" for brevity) filed on June 20, 1984 a complaint for Declaration of Nullity and Quieting of Title against petitioner Rido Montecillo ("Montecillo" for brevity). Reynes asserted that she is the owner of a lot situated in Mabolo, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74196 and containing an area of 448 square meters ("Mabolo Lot" for brevity). In 1981, Reynes sold 185 square meters of the Mabolo Lot to the Abucay Spouses who built a residential house on the lot they bought. Reynes alleged further that on March 1, 1984 she signed a Deed of Sale of the Mabolo Lot in favor of Montecillo ("Montecillo's Deed of Sale" for brevity). Reynes, being illiterate,6 signed by affixing her thumb-mark7 on the document. Montecillo promised to pay the agreed P47,000.00 purchase price within one month from the signing of the Deed of Sale. Reynes further alleged that Montecillo failed to pay the purchase price after the lapse of the one-month period, prompting Reynes to demand from Montecillo the return of the Deed of Sale. Since Montecillo refused to return the Deed of Sale,9 Reynes executed a document unilaterally revoking the sale and gave a copy of the document to Montecillo. Subsequently, on May 23, 1984 Reynes signed a Deed of Sale transferring to the Abucay Spouses the entire Mabolo Lot, at the same time confirming the previous sale in 1981 of a 185-square meter portion of the lot. Reynes and the Abucay Spouses alleged that on June 18, 1984 they received information that the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issued Certificate of Title No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo for the Mabolo Lot. Reynes and the Abucay Spouses argued that "for lack of consideration there (was) no meeting of the minds"11 between Reynes and Montecillo. Thus, the trial court should declare null and void ab initio Montecillo's Deed of Sale, and order the cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo. #####Ruling##### The petition is devoid of merit. First issue: manner of payment of the P47,000.00 purchase price. Montecillo's Deed of Sale does not state that the P47,000.00 purchase price should be paid by Montecillo to Cebu Ice Storage. Montecillo failed to adduce any evidence before the trial court showing that Reynes had agreed, verbally or in writing, that the P47,000.00 purchase price should be paid to Cebu Ice Storage. Absent any evidence showing that Reynes had agreed to the payment of the purchase price to any other party, the payment to be effective must be made to Reynes, the vendor in the sale Thus, Montecillo's payment to Cebu Ice Storage is not the payment that would extinguish 16 Montecillo's obligation to Reynes under the Deed of Sale. It militates against common sense for Reynes to sell her Mabolo Lot for P47,000.00 if this entire amount would only go to Cebu Ice Storage, leaving not a single centavo to her for giving up ownership of a valuable property. This incredible allegation of Montecillo becomes even more absurd when one considers that Reynes did not benefit, directly or indirectly, from the payment of the P47,000.00 to Cebu Ice Storage. The trial court found that Reynes had nothing to do with Jayag's mortgage debt with Cebu Ice Storage. Thus, Montecillo's payment to Jayag's creditor could not possibly redound to the benefit18 of Reynes. We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, as in the instant case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law.19 This Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. Second issue: whether the Deed of Sale is void ab initio or only rescissible. Montecillo argues that his Deed of Sale has all the requisites of a valid contract. Montecillo points out that he agreed to purchase, and Reynes agreed to sell, the Mabolo Lot at the price of P47,000.00. Thus, the three requisites for a valid contract concur: consent, object certain and consideration. Montecillo asserts there is no lack of consideration that would prevent the existence of a valid contract. Rather, there is only non-payment of the consideration within the period agreed upon for payment. Montecillo argues there is only a breach of his obligation to pay the full purchase price on time. Such breach merely gives Reynes a right to ask for specific performance, or for annulment of the obligation to sell the Mabolo Lot. Montecillo maintains that in reciprocal obligations, the injured party can choose between fulfillment and rescission, 20 or more properly cancellation, of the obligation under Article 1191 21 of the Civil Code. This Article also provides that the "court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of the period." Montecillo claims that because Reynes failed to make a demand for payment, and instead unilaterally revoked Montecillo's Deed of Sale, the court has a just cause to fix the period for payment of the balance of the purchase price. These arguments are not persuasive. Montecillo's Deed of Sale states that Montecillo paid, and Reynes received, the P47,000.00 purchase price on March 1, 1984, the date of signing of the Deed of Sale. This is clear from the following provision of the Deed of Sale:jxxx On its face, Montecillo's Deed of Absolute Sale 22 appears supported by a valuable consideration. However, based on the evidence presented by both Reynes and Montecillo, the trial court found that Montecillo never paid to Reynes, and Reynes never received from Montecillo, the P47,000.00 purchase price. There was indisputably a total absence of consideration contrary to what is stated in Montecillo's Deed of Sale. As pointed out by the trial court — Where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. This is not merely a case of failure to pay the purchase price, as Montecillo claims, which can only amount to a breach of obligation with rescission as the proper remedy. What we have here is a purported contract that lacks a cause — one of the three essential requisites of a valid contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract 26 while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract Reynes expected Montecillo to pay him directly the P47,000.00 purchase price within one month after the signing of the Deed of Sale. On the other hand, Montecillo thought that his agreement with Reynes required him to pay the P47,000.00 purchase price to Cebu Ice Storage to settle Jayag's mortgage debt. Montecillo also acknowledged a balance of P10,000.00 in favor of Reynes although this amount is not stated in Montecillo's Deed of Sale. Thus, there was no consent, or meeting of the minds, between Reynes and Montecillo on the manner of payment. This prevented the existence of a valid contract because of lack of consent. In summary, Montecillo's Deed of Sale is null and void ab initio not only for lack of consideration, but also for lack of consent. The cancellation of TCT No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo is in order as there was no valid contract transferring ownership of the Mabolo Lot from Reynes to Montecillo.

Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, Dec. 9, 2004 (445 SCRA 529);

Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseo's Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a case1 involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees.2 On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondent's office to inquire about the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made.3 Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period. On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for respondent's appearance fee. In the same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter within 30 days #####Ruling###### Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002. We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty.12 All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.

2 - The Roman Catholic Church v. Pante, G.R. No. 174118, April 11, 2012 (669 SCRA 234);

The Church, represented by the Archbishop of Caceres, owned a 32-square meter lot that measured 2x16 meters located in Barangay Dinaga, Canaman, Camarines Sur.5 On September 25, 1992, the Church contracted with respondent Regino Pante for the sale of the lot (thru a Contract to Sell and to Buy6 ) on the belief that the latter was an actual occupant of the lot. The contract between them fixed the purchase price at ₱11,200.00, with the initial ₱1,120.00 payable as down payment, and the remaining balance payable in three years or until September 25, 1995. On June 28, 1994, the Church sold in favor of the spouses Nestor and Fidela Rubi (spouses Rubi) a 215-square meter lot that included the lot previously sold to Pante. The spouses Rubi asserted their ownership by erecting a concrete fence over the lot sold to Pante, effectively blocking Pante and his family's access from their family home to the municipal road. As no settlement could be reached between the parties, Pante instituted with the RTC an action to annul the sale between the Church and the spouses Rubi, insofar as it included the lot previously sold to him.7 #####Issues##### It points out that, during trial, Pante already admitted knowing that the spouses Rubi have been residing on the lot. Despite this knowledge, Pante misrepresented himself as an occupant because he knew of the Church's policy to sell lands only to occupants or residents thereof. It thus claims that Pante's misrepresentation effectively vitiated its consent to the sale; hence, the contract should be nullified. For the Church, the presence of fraud and misrepresentation that would suffice to annul the sale is the primary issue that the tribunals below should have resolved. Instead, the CA opted to characterize the contract between the Church and Pante, considered it as a contract of sale, and, after such characterization, proceeded to resolve the case in Pante's favor. The Church objects to this approach, on the principal argument that there could not have been a contract at all considering that its consent had been vitiated. #####Ruling##### The Court resolves to deny the petition. No misrepresentation existed vitiating the seller's consent and invalidating the contract In the present case, the Church contends that its consent to sell the lot was given on the mistaken impression arising from Pante's fraudulent misrepresentation that he had been the actual occupant of the lot. Willful misrepresentation existed because of its policy to sell its lands only to their actual occupants or residents. Thus, it considers the buyer's actual occupancy or residence over the subject lot a qualification necessary to induce it to sell the lot. Contrary to the Church's contention, the actual occupancy or residency of a buyer over the land does not appear to be a necessary qualification that the Church requires before it could sell its land. Had this been indeed its policy, then neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi would qualify as buyers of the 32-square meter lot, as none of them actually occupied or resided on the lot. We note in this regard that the lot was only a 2x16-meter strip of rural land used as a passageway from Pante's house to the municipal road. We find well-taken Pante's argument that, given the size of the lot, it could serve no other purpose than as a mere passageway; it is unthinkable to consider that a 2x16-meter strip of land could be mistaken as anyone's residence. In fact, the spouses Rubi were in possession of the adjacent lot, but they never asserted possession over the 2x16-meter lot when the 1994 sale was made in their favor; it was only then that they constructed the concrete fence blocking the passageway. We find it unlikely that Pante could successfully misrepresent himself as the actual occupant of the lot; this was a fact that the Church (which has a parish chapel in the same barangay where the lot was located) could easily verify had it conducted an ocular inspection of its own property. The surrounding circumstances actually indicate that the Church was aware that Pante was using the lot merely as a passageway. The above view is supported by the sketch plan,18 attached to the contract executed by the Church and Pante, which clearly labeled the 2x16-meter lot as a "RIGHT OF WAY"; below these words was written the name of "Mr. Regino Pante." Asked during cross-examination where the sketch plan came from, Pante answered that it was from the Archbishop's Palace; neither the Church nor the spouses Rubi contradicted this statement The records further reveal that the sales of the Church's lots were made after a series of conferences with the occupants of the lots.20 The then parish priest of Canaman, Fr. Marcaida, was apparently aware that Pante was not an actual occupant, but nonetheless, he allowed the sale of the lot to Pante, subject to the approval of the Archdiocese's Oeconomous. Relying on Fr. Marcaida's recommendation and finding nothing objectionable, Fr. Ragay (the Archdiocese's Oeconomous) approved the sale to Pante. The above facts, in our view, establish that there could not have been a deliberate, willful, or fraudulent act committed by Pante that misled the Church into giving its consent to the sale of the subject lot in his favor. That Pante was not an actual occupant of the lot he purchased was a fact that the Church either ignored or waived as a requirement. In any case, the Church was by no means led to believe or do so by Pante's act; there had been no vitiation of the Church's consent to the sale of the lot to Pante. From another perspective, any finding of bad faith, if one is to be made, should be imputed to the Church. Without securing a court ruling on the validity of its contract with Pante, the Church sold the subject property to the spouses Rubi. Article 1390 of the Civil Code declares that voidable contracts are binding, unless annulled by a proper court action. From the time the sale to Pante was made and up until it sold the subject property to the spouses Rubi, the Church made no move to reject the contract with Pante; it did not even return the down payment he paid. The Church's bad faith in selling the lot to Rubi without annulling its contract with Pante negates its claim for damage The rule on double sales Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. As neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi registered the sale in their favor, the question now is who, between the two, was first in possession of the property in good faith.1âwphi1 Jurisprudence has interpreted possession in Article 1544 of the Civil Code to mean both actual physical delivery and constructive delivery.23 Under either mode of delivery, the facts show that Pante was the first to acquire possession of the lot. Delivery of a thing sold may also be made constructively. Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that:xxx Under this provision, the sale in favor of Pante would have to be upheld since the contract executed between the Church and Pante was duly notarized, converting the deed into a public instrument.27 In Navera v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court ruled that:

2.. Maharlika Publishing Corp. v. Tagle, G.R. No. L-65594, July 9, 1986 (142 SCRA 553);

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was the registered owner of a parcel of land consisting of 1,373 square meters situated in the district of Paco and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5986 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. On June 4, 1963, the GSIS entered into a conditional contract to sell the parcel of land to petitioner Maharlika Publishing Corporation (Maharlika for short) together with the building thereon as well as the printing machinery and equipment therein. Among the conditions of the sale are that the petitioner shall pay to the GSIS monthly installments of P969.94 until the total purchase price shall have been fully paid and that upon the failure of petitioner to pay any monthly installment within ninety (90) days from due date, the contract shall be deemed automatically cancelled. After Maharlika failed to pay the installments for several months, the GSIS, on June 7, 1966, notified Maharlika in writing of its arrearages and warned Maharlika that the conditions of the contract would be enforced should Maharlika fail to settle its account within fifteen (15) days from notice. Because of Maharlika's failure to settle the unpaid accounts, the GSIS notified Maharlika in writing on June 26, 1967 that the conditional contract of sale was annulled and cancelled and required Maharlika to sign a lease contract. Maharlika refused to vacate the premises and to sign the lease contract. Sometime later, the GSIS published an invitation to bid several acquired properties, among which was the property in question, Meanwhile, on February 11, 1971, or one day before the scheduled public bidding, Maharlika represented by its president Adolfo Calica addressed to GSIS a letter-proposal to repurchase their foreclosed properties On February 12, 1971, however, the public bidding of this particular property was held as scheduled prompting Adolfo Calica to submit his bid to the Bidding Committee with a deposit of P11,000.00 represented by the same two checks submitted to General Manager Cruz, Jr., together with his letter-proposal. His bid proposal reads: "I bid to match the highest bidder." The bidding committee rejected Maharlika's bid as an imperfect bid and recommended acceptance of private respondent Luz Tagle's bid of P130,000.00 with a ten percent (10%) deposit of P13,000.00. On February 19, 1971, the GSIS addressed a letter to Adolfo Calica informing him of the non-acceptance of his bid and returning his two checks. After approval and confirmation of the sale of the subject property to Luz Tagle on April 20, 1971, the GSIS executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of the Tagles on June 8, 1971. Due to the refusal of petitioners to surrender the possession of the property in question, respondent spouses Luz R. Tagle and Edilberto Tagle filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila ######Issue##### whether the respondent spouses Luz and Edilberto Tagle can still enforce their claim as winning bidders considering the fact that they have so far made only two payments to the GSIS amounting to P32,500.00 in violation of the terms and conditions of the conditional sale executed in their favor and which provides for its automatic cancellation in such case, or whether the petitioners can still repurchase the property in question as original owners thereof. #####Ruling###### We find the petitioners' motion for reconsideration impressed with merit. We find the petitioners' motion for reconsideration impressed with merit. The certification secured by the petitioners from GSIS on April 28, 1983 shows that Edilberto Tagle was Chief, Retirement Division, GSIS, from 1970 to 1978. He worked for the GSIS since 1952. Strictly speaking, the evidence of Mr. Tagle's being a GSIS official when his wife bid for the disputed property is not newly discovered evidence. However, we cannot simply ignore the fact that on February 12, 1971 when Adolfo Calica was desperately trying to retrieve the property foreclosed against him, after receiving assurances from the highest GSIS officials that his letter- proposal would be accepted and after the sale at public auction of the property was, in fact, ordered to be stopped, the wife of a GSIS official would be allowed to bid for that property and would actually win in the bidding. As stated by the petitioners, this important factor implicit in good government, should have been considered in the interest of justice. It was incumbent under the law for GSIS to have rejected the bid of the wife of a GSIS official and to have refused to enter into the deed of conditional sale with the respondents Tagle. The petitioners bank on the allegation that the indirect participation of Edilberto Tagle in the public bidding creates a "conflict of interests situation" which invalidates the aforesaid transaction under the precept laid down in Article 1409 paragraph (1) of the Civil Code making his participation void for being contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. The Supreme Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when in the interest of justice and the promotion of public policy there is a need to make its own finding to support its conclusions. In this particular case, there is absolutely no doubt that Mr. Edilberto Tagle was a GSIS Division Chief when his wife bid for the property being sold by GSIS. The only issue is whether or not to consider this fact because it surfaced only after trial proper. A Division Chief of the GSIS is not an ordinary employee without influence or authority. The mere fact that he exercises ample authority with respect to a particular activity, i.e., retirement, shows that his influence cannot be lightly regarded. The point is that he is a public officer and his wife acts for and in his name in any transaction with the GSIS. If he is allowed to participate in the public bidding of properties foreclosed or confiscated by the GSIS, there will always be the suspicion among other bidders and the general public that the insider official had access to information and connections with his fellow GSIS officials as to allow him to eventually acquire the property. It is precisely the need to forestall such suspicions and to restore confidence in the public service that the Civil Code now declares such transactions to be void from the beginning and not merely voidable (Rubias vs. Batiller, 51 SCRA 120). The reasons are grounded on public order and public policy. We do not comment on the motives of the private respondents or the officers supervising the bidding when they entered into the contract of sale. Suffice it to say that it fags under the prohibited transactions under Article 1491 of the Civil Code and, therefore, void under Article 1409. There are other grounds which contain us to grant this petition. We now come to the issue whether or not there was a repurchase of the property in question from the GSIS effected by the petitioners the day before the public bidding. In Article 1475 of the Civil Code, we find that "the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the law governing the form of contracts. " It is undisputed that when the letter-proposal of petitioners was presented to GSIS General Manager Roman Cruz, Jr., he wrote on the face of such letter the words "Hold Bidding. Discuss with me." These instructions were addressed to one Mr. Ibañez who was in-charge of public bidding. Thereafter, a deposit of P11,000.00 in checks was accepted by the Secretary of Mr. Roman Cruz, Jr. In the light of these circumstances an inference may be made that General Manager Cruz, Jr. had already accepted the petitioners' offer of repurchase or at the very least had led them to understand that he had arrived at a decision to accept it. It should also be noted that there is no serious denial as to General Manager Cruz, Jr.'s capacity to enter into binding contractual obligations for GSIS without the prior approval of the Board of Trustees. On the other hand, the letter of endorsement made by the GSIS Board Vice-Chairman Leonilo Ocampo which states ...subject to your wise judgment, as usual leads one to conclude that it has been the practice of GSIS to permit the General Manager to do acts within the scope of his apparent authority. We note that the petitioners are not complete strangers entering into a contract with respondent GSIS for the first time. There was an earlier contract to sell the same properties to the petitioners. That contract was perfected and there had been partial compliance with its terms. The transaction now under question in this case merely referred to the curing of certain defects which led to the cancellation of the earlier contract by GSIS. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, therefore, the acceptance of the petitioners' letter-proposal by Mr. Roman Cruz, Jr., the person with authority to do so, and his order to his subordinates to stop the bidding so that they could first discuss the matter with him, created an agreement of binding nature with the petitioners.

Calimlim v. Fortun, G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984 (133 SCRA 615);

The background facts may be summarized as follows: Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19, 1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in question with an area of approximately 891 square meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land. In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27, 1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II, which judgment has become final. On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as "also inherited by me from my deceased parents." Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June 19, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale #####Issues##### The issues posed for resolution are (1) whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property; and (2) whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction. #####Ruling###### The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:xxx We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, 1 which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnershi The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads: It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 3 relied upon by respondent Judge, it was held that the land belonging to one of the spouses, upon which the spouses have built a house, becomes conjugal property only when the conjugal partnership is liquidated and indemnity paid to the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that enunciated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691 (1961), where the following was explained: As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be considered to have become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was, under the 1943 decision, subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code) ... The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale. 4 Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

Ordonio v. Eduarte, A.M. No. 3216, March 16, 1992 (207 SCRA 229);

The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case No. 391 was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. On June 13, 1987, while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari. On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received no consideration therefor). #####Ruling###### The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420 square meters as the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees. Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject property in favor of the respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the execution of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property, has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession." In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20 hectares of land allegedly conveyed to the respondent) was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers is of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harrased client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both." The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation. (Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still the subject of a pending case. For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, respondent has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting."

Cabalu v. Tabu

The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 square meter lot situated in Mariwalo, Tarlac, which was a portion of a property registered in the name of the late Faustina Maslum (Faustina) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16776 with a total area of 140,211 square meters.2 On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, dated July 27, 1939, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not probated. One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana (Domingo), Benjamin Laxamana, who died in 1960. On March 5, 1975, Domingo allegedly executed a Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 square meter share of the land to Laureano Cabalu.3 On August 1, 1994, to give effect to the holographic will, the forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted 9,000 square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to Domingo. Thereafter, on December 14, 1995, Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters to his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. The document was captioned Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land. On May 7, 1996, the remaining 4,500 square meters of Domingo's share in the partition was registered under his name under TCT No. 281353.4 On August 4, 1996, Domingo passed away. On October 8, 1996, two months after his death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of respondent Renato Tabu (Tabu). The resultant transfer of title was registered as TCT No. 286484. Subsequently, Tabu and his wife, Dolores Laxamana (respondent spouses), subdivided the said lot into two which resulted into TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339.5 On January 15, 1999, respondent Dolores Laxamana-Tabu, together with Julieta Tubilan-Laxamana, Teresita Laxamana, Erlita Laxamana, and Gretel Laxamana, the heirs of Domingo, filed an unlawful detainer action, docketed as Civil Case No. 7106, against Meliton Cabalu, Patricio Abus, Roger Talavera, Jesus Villar, Marcos Perez, Arthur Dizon, and all persons claiming rights under them. The heirs claimed that the defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their late father, Domingo, but, when asked to vacate the property, they refused to do so. The case was ruled in favor of Domingo's heirs and a writ of execution was subsequently issued. On February 4, 2002, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela Cabalu and Rodolfo Talavera, and Patricio Abus (petitioners), filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale, Joint Affidavit of Nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 291338 and 291339, Quieting of Title, Reconveyance, Application for Restraining Order, Injunction and Damages (Civil Case No. 9290) against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City (RTC).7 In their complaint, petitioners claimed that they were the lawful owners of the subject property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 5, 1975. Hence, being the rightful owners by way of succession, they could not be ejected from the subject property. #####Issues##### The core issues to be resolved are 1) whether the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 square meter property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid; and 2) whether the Deed of Sale, dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter portion of the 9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void. #####Ruling##### WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. It is well to note that both the RTC and the CA found that the evidence established that the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu was a fictitious and simulated document. Nevertheless, since there are discrepancies in the signature of the notary public, his PTR and the document number on the lower-most portion of the document, as well as the said deed of sale being found only after the plaintiffs-appellants were ejected by the defendants-appellants; that they were allegedly not aware that the said property was bought by their father, and that they never questioned the other half of the property not occupied by them, it is apparent that the sale dated March 5, 1975 had the earmarks of a simulated deed written all over it. The lower court did not err in pronouncing that it be declared null and void Petitioners, in support of their claim of validity of the said document of deed, again invoke the legal presumption of regularity. To reiterate, the RTC and later the CA had ruled that the sale, dated March 5, 1975, had the earmarks of a simulated deed, hence, the presumption was already rebutted. Verily and as aptly noted by the respondent spouses, such presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the facts proven and already established in the records of this case. Even on the assumption that the March 5, 1975 deed was not simulated, still the sale cannot be deemed valid because, at that time, Domingo was not yet the owner of the property. There is no dispute that the original and registered owner of the subject property covered by TCT No. 16776, from which the subject 9,000 square meter lot came from, was Faustina, who during her lifetime had executed a will, dated July 27, 1939. In the said will, the name of Benjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs. Thus, and as correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980 In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustina's will was not yet probated; the object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein.1âwphi1 Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him. The CA, therefore, did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void. Domingo's status as an heir of Faustina by right of representation being undisputed, the RTC should have maintained the validity of TCT No. 266583 covering the 9,000 square meter subject property. As correctly concluded by the CA, this served as the inheritance of Domingo from Faustina. Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property executed in favor of Renato Tabu, it is evidently null and void. The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on August 4, 1996 more than two months after the death of Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted no rights whatsoever. Consequently, TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue of the October 8, 1996 Deed of Sale, as well as its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, both registered in the name of Rena to Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise void.

Ladanga v. CA, G.R. No. L-55999,

The spouses Salvacion Serrano and Doctor Agustin S. Ladanga appealed from the decision of the Court of Appeals (affirming the decision of the Manila Court of First Instance), declaring void the sale to Salvacion by her aunt, Clemencia A. Aseneta, of the 166-square-meter lot with a house located at 1238 Sison Street, Paco, Manila for non-payment of the price of P26,000. It ordered the register of deeds of Manila to issue a new title to Clemencia. The said spouses were further ordered to pay to Clemencia's estate P21,000 as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees and to render to Bernardo an accounting of the rentals of the property from April 6, 1974. The Appellate Court and Judge Jose C. Colayco found that Clemencia, a spinster who retired as division superintendent of public schools at 65 in 1961, had a nephew named Bernardo S. Aseneta, the child of her sister Gloria, and a niece named Salvacion, the daughter of her sister Flora. She legally adopted Bernardo in 1961 (Exh. B). On a single date, April 6, 1974 (when Clemencia was about 78 years old), she signed nine deeds of sale in favor of Salvacion for various real properties. One deed of sale concerned the said Paco property (administered by the Ladanga spouses) which purportedly was sold to Salvacion for P26,000 (Exh. C). The total price involved in the nine deeds of sale and in the tenth sale executed on November 8, 1974 was P92,200. On the witness stand, Clemencia denied having "received even one centavo" of the price of P26,000 (15, 16, 32 tsn August 16, 1976), much less the P92,000. She considered the allegation that she received the price as a he, exclaiming on the witness stand: "Susmaryosep! P92,000!" #####Issues##### The questions ventilated by the Ladangas in their briefs and in their comment of April 3, 1984 may be reduced to the issue of the validity of the sale which the vendor Clemencia herself assailed in her testimony on August 16 and December 3, 1976 when she was eighty years old. Her testimony and that of the notary leave no doubt that the price of P26,000 was never paid. #####Ruling##### A contract of sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor (Meneses Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque, L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88; Mapalo vs. Mapalo, 123 Phil. 979, 987; Syllabus, Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. Flores and Bas, 40 Phil. 921). Such a sale is inexistent and cannot be considered consummated (Borromeo' vs. Borromeo, 98 Phil. 432; Cruzado vs. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil. 17; Garanciang vs. Garanciang, L-22351, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 229). it was not shown that Clemencia intended to donate the Paco property to the Ladangas. Her testimony and the notary's testimony destroyed any presumption that the sale was fair and regular and for a true consideration. Judge Colayco concluded that the Ladangas abused Clemencia's confidence and defrauded her of properties with a market value of P393,559.25 when she was already 78 years old. The contention that Bernardo had no right to institute the instant action because he was not a compulsory heir of Clemencia cannot be sustained. Bernardo was Clemencia's adopted son. Moreover, Clemencia, by testifying in this case, tacitly approved the action brought in her behalf.

Valencia v. Atty. Arsenio Cabanting, A.C. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543, April 26, 1991(196 SCRA 302);

n 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership If the Valencias could now documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., pp. 21-22).On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.chanrobles lawlibra #####Issues##### I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents. III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170. On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel. #####Ruling###### In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco v. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension. The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to. It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen v. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos v. CA, Et Al., L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes v. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989). Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court

Godinez v. Fong Pak Luen,

n September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Sulu alleging among others that they are the heirs of Jose Godinez who was married to Martina Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910; that during the marriage of their parents the said parents acquired a parcel of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D - 155) in the name of Jose Godinez; that their mother died sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs; that on November 27, 1941, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said Jose Godinez, for valuable consideration sold the aforesaid parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen, which transaction is contrary to law and in violation of the Civil Code because the latter being an alien who is inhibited by law to purchase real property; that Transfer Certificate Title No. 884 was then issued by the Register of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and void ab initio since the transaction constituted a non-existent contract; that on January 11, 1963, said defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata, who is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property in this jurisdiction; that defendant Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as the purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non-existent, so much so that the alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said property and defendant Navata had not acquired anything from said grantor and as a consequence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322, which was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the latter is null and void ab initio; that since one-half of the said property is conjugal property inherited by the plaintiffs from their mother, Jose Godinez could not have legally conveyed the entire property; that notwithstanding repeated demands on said defendant to surrender to plaintiffs the said property she refused and still refuses to do so to the great damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that they were constrained to engage the services of counsel in the sum of P2,000.00. The plaintiffs thus pray that they be adjudged as the owners of the parcel of land in question and that Transfer Certificate of Title RT-90 (T-884) issued in the name of defendant Fong Pak Luen be declared null and void ab initio; and that the power of attorney issued in the name of Kwan Pun Ming, as well as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322 issued in the name of defendant Navata be likewise declared null and void, with costs against defendants. #####Issues##### The appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that their cause of action has prescribed. While the issue raised appears to be only the applicability of the law governing prescription, the real question before us is whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it. #####Ruling###### However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen - whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely prohibited. * It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the statute of limitations. Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits.From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (1 SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned. The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, in appropriate cases, to recover that which their predecessors sold to aliens.cralawnad In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the alien vendee later sold the property to a Filipino corporation, this Court, in affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of real property to the defendant Li Seng Giap on January 22, 1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands, Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (1 SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned. The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or successors-in-interest, in appropriate cases, to recover that which their predecessors sold to aliens.cralawnad Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had occasion to pass upon a factual situation substantially similar to the one in the instant case. We ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez v. Giap & Sons: (96 Phil. 447 [1955]) "Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property."cralaw virtua1aw library In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third assignments of errors without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner.