PHIL 110 - Module 3 Quiz

object

A thing or an entity. If we were to make a list of everything in reality, the things we put on that list are these.

abstract object

An object that does not exist in space (and maybe time) and does not casually interact with objects in the physical world.

Maddy begins her argument with the claim that the only evidence we have for the existence of numbers are arithmetic facts and practices. That is, we only think numbers exist because of what we know about arithmetic and how we use it to do things. So, if we could explain these arithmetic facts and practices without the existence of numbers, then we don't have any other reason to think numbers exist. Maddy then claims that number properties can do all the explaining. That is, arithmetic facts and practices can be accounted for by using number properties instead of numbers. So, Maddy concludes we have no reason to think numbers exist.

Explain Maddy's argument that numbers do not exist.

Unger uses the sorites of accumulation to argue that there are no ordinary objects. The series starts with empty space and the claim that empty space is not a stone. The next claim is that adding a single atom to a non-stone does not make that thing a stone. Repeated applications of this will get us to an arrangement of atoms that are not a stone, but are structurally identical to things we know are stones. Unger argues that we should reject the claim that there is an arrangement of atoms that makes something a stone. And because this argument generalizes to all ordinary objects, he thinks we should reject the claim that ordinary objects exist.

Explain how Unger uses the Sorites of Accumulation to argue that there are no ordinary objects?

Unger uses the sorites of cutting and separating to argue there are no ordinary objects. The series starts by claiming there is a table. It then says that taking a table apart does not turn it into a non-table. The table just has its parts scattered. But if we continue taking the table apart, we will be left with scattered atoms. Our claim that taking apart a table does not turn it into a non-table means this collection of scattered atoms is a table. But it is clearly not a table. So Unger thinks we should reject the claim that there is a table. And since this argument could apply to any ordinary object, he thinks we should deny that ordinary objects exist.

Explain how Unger uses the Sorites of Cutting & Separating to argue that there are no ordinary objects?

Unger uses the sorites series that begins with a stone and says that removing an atom from a stone does not make it a non-stone to argue that there are no ordinary objects. That is because if we take the series far enough we are left saying that no atoms make a stone. This is clearly false. So Unger argues we should say there are no stones instead. Because the series works for objects other than stones, he generalizes and says the argument applies to all ordinary objects.

Explain how Unger uses the Sorites of Decomposition to argue that there are no ordinary objects?

Potential infinity is simply the ability to always add a new object to a series. It is not that the series has an actual infinite number of things, but for anything in the series, we could always add another. An actual infinity is a series with an actual infinite amount of objects. Someone might say Maddy's view cannot account for arithmetic facts like "the integers are infinite in size". But Maddy understands such claims in terms of potential infinity and so can rely on number properties to explain such facts.

Explain the difference between potential and actual infinity and the role the distinction plays in Maddy's view of numbers.

A type is a single, universal kind that can have many instances or instantiations of it. For example, the number three is a type and there is only one of it. But there are lots of instances of the number three, like the one written on this screen or on a piece of paper somewhere. Those instances are tokens of the type.

Explain the difference between types and tokens.

The principle of simplicity says that if two theories equally explain the data we should prefer the theory that is simpler.

Explain the role that simplicity plays in choosing between theories.

Roughly, for Maddy arithmetic claims can always be translated to claims about number properties. For example, 2+3=5 is not a claim about how the numbers 2, 3, and 5 are related. For her, it is a claim about how the properties "being two", "being three", and "being five" are related. Or when we say "there are twelve things on the floor" what we actually are talking about is that the things on the floor have the property "being twelve".

How does Maddy think number properties explain arithmetic facts?

They can reply that their theory is simpler. Their theory says that there is only one kind of object in the world: physical objects. Rosen thinks there are at least two kinds of objects: physical and abstract. So the Physicalist has a simpler theory. Rosen can reply that while his theory is more complicated than Physicalism, that his theory accounts for all the data better than Physicalism. Namely, Rosen thinks his view accounts for knowledge of arithmetic facts.

How might a physicalist reply to Rosen's argument that Physicalism is false?

Leibniz's Law (Indiscernibility of Identicals)

If object A and object B are identical, then they have the same properties

The pluralist miscounts through overcounting. That is, they claim there are more objects than there actually are.

If the monist is right, then how does the pluralist miscount?

The monist miscounts through undercounting. That is, they claim there are fewer objects than there actually are.

If the pluralist is right, then how does the monist miscount?

actual infinity view

Interpreting claims about infinity as claiming there are actually infinitely many things.

potential infinity view

Interpreting claims about infinity as claims that we can, in principle, always add another object to the series

(numerical) identity

Objects are numerically identical when they are the same object.

One-thinger/monist

Someone who thinks that an object and what that object is made of are identical.

Two-thinger/pluralist

Someone who thinks that an object and what that object is made of are not identical (distinct)

eliminativist

Someone who thinks that ordinary objects don't actually exist. Someone can be an eliminativist about other things too, but we're just talking about ordinary objects in our class.

ordinary objects

The kinds of objects we encounter in ordinary life. It is used to rule out talking about really small objects like atoms, really big objects like the universe, or abstract objects like numbers.

physicalism

The view that the only objects that there are are physical objects. You can also be a physicalist about just minds, for example. But were focused on all objects in this class.

- Cop and Pen look similar. - We have the intuition that there is only one object in the box. - We cannot separate Cop and Pen. - We cannot sell Cop and then turn around and sell Pen. - Cop and Pen have the same mass.

Thinking of the Cop and Pen case, what is some evidence for monism?

Having argued that there are numbers, Rosen then claims that numbers are not physical. This is because he thinks that numbers are types and not their token instances. That is, there is a single number 3 and it is not identical to all the instances of the number three written or represented in some way. If numbers are types, then they are not physical. If there are numbers and numbers are not physical, this is enough to show that physicalism, the claim that everything that exists is a physical object, is false.

What is Rosen's argument that Physicalism is false?

Rosen argues from an arithmetic fact like there are two odd numbers between 6 and 10 to the claim that there are two odd numbers. And from that claim to the claim that there are two numbers. And then from that claim to the claim that there are numbers.

What is Rosen's argument that there are numbers?

Because scientists think some objects, like events, exist even though they never show up in their textbooks and publications.

Why does Yablo think we should not necessarily trust science to tell us what objects there are?

property

a feature, characteristic, or quality an object can have that helps explain how it is similar to and different from other objects

theory

a set of claims that, in some sense, explains the data

simplicity

if two theories explain the data equally well, we should prefer the simpler theory

distinct

objects that are not identical

undercounting

the counting error of stating there are fewer objects than there actually are

overcounting

the counting error of stating there are more objects than there actually are

tokens

the particular instances/occurrences of a single, universal type

type

the single, universal kind of which there might be many instances called tokens