PHIL 25A - Aristotle Study Questions, PHILOS 25A Final

What is the relation between a just person and just actions? Is one defined in terms of the other? What makes an action just, in Plato's view?

A just person is one whose soul is arranged in a certain way, with the rational part ruling, the spirited part preserving stable, true beliefs about what to fear, and the appetitive part deferring to the rational part. Just actions are defined in terms of a just person or a just soul, insofar as they are actions that help preserve the just state of the soul.

Aristotle agrees with Socrates that "every vicious person is ignorant," but he doesn't think it follows that all wrongdoing is involuntary. Why not?

Aristotle agrees that every vicious person is ignorant of the actions he must do or avoid, and this sort of error makes people unjust. However, wrongdoing is still voluntary since there are actions one could have taken to increase the chances of arriving at virtuous states of character that would have prevented the wrongdoing.

Describe Aristotle's method in his examination of incontinence.

Aristotle begins with endoxa, or reputable beliefs, including the views of the many and the views of the wise. Aristotle then sets out to prove those reputable beliefs and resolve the puzzles that arise by making conceptual distinctions between the beliefs.

How does dialectic differ from mathematics? What is the goal of dialectic?

Dialectic differs from mathematics insofar as it treats hypotheses as stepping stones to find truth. The goal is to reach a conclusion, using only forms and not images, to reach the true form of the Good. Mathematics is the preparation and dialectic the ultimate form of study. Dialectic leaves behind sense perceptions and uses only pure abstract reasoning to find the Good itself. Dialectic eventually does away with hypotheses and proceeds to the first principle, which illuminates all knowledge. Dialectic finds true explanations of why things are the way they are and why that way is best, where mathematics only explains why something is the way it is.

What is Socrates' justification for requiring that each person in the city do the one job for which he or she is most naturally suited, and not dabble in others?

Each person has different capabilities and natural inclinations, and should do what they are most suited for. This is most efficient for the city and leads to the production of more plentiful and better-quality goods, both because the people best at each craft are the ones performing it and because their time is freed from trying other things.

Give an example of a deduction with true premises that are explanatory of the conclusion, and an example of a deduction with true premises that are not explanatory of the conclusion.

Explanatory: all vines are broad-leaved plants broad-leaved plants are deciduous ________ all vines are deciduous the middle term, "broad-leaved," explains why vines are deciduous Not Explanatory: all vines are deciduous all deciduous plants are broad-leaved ________ all vines are broad-leaved the middle term, "deciduous," does not explain why vines are broad-leaved

Glaucon argues that no one practices justice willingly. Explain.

Glaucon's argument that no one practices justice willingly is based on the claim that anyone, whether considered just or unjust, would perform injustice given the opportunity to do so without being caught. For example, when Gyges found an invisibility ring, he killed the king's wife and took over the kingdom. Anyone, when given this ring, would do injustice if it would benefit them.

Why does Aristotle think that the happiest life cannot be a life devoted to pleasant amusements?

Happiness is not found in amusement; for it would be absurd if our lifelong efforts and sufferings aimed at amusing ourselves. Rather, amusement would seem to be relaxation, and it is because we cannot toil continuously that we require relaxation. Relation, then is not the end, since we pursue it to prepare for further activity. Moreover, a slave is capable of amusement, but one would not say that the life of a slave, even if It included amusements, would be self-sufficient or choiceworthy. Further, the happy life seems to be a life expressing virtue, which is a life involving serious actions, and not consisting in amusement.

Materialist philosophers take the nature of a thing to be the matter of which it is composed (e.g., the elements air, earth, fire, and water). How does Aristotle argue that a thing's form is also the nature, and in fact "is the nature more than the matter is"?

If something were only potentially a bed and still lacked the form of a bed, we would not yet speak of a product in accordance with a craft or that it's constituted naturally. For what is only potentially flesh or bone does not have its nature, and is not naturally flesh or bone, until it acquires the form in accordance with the account by which we define flesh or bone

What is incontinence (a.k.a akrasia, weakness of will, or being overcome by pleasure)?

Incontinence is when one knows what is best, and is able to do that thing, but is pulled by pleasure to do something else, even if they do not think it is best.

Why does Aristotle think that one cannot have full virtue unless one is intelligent? Why does he think that one cannot be intelligent unless one has full virtue?

Living well requires standing firm in the right circumstances, but you do not know what the right circumstances are absent intelligence.

How do Stoics and Epicureans differ about the good, or the highest end of human life?

Stoics claim that living virtuously is the highest good that one can experience, and we should treat pleasure and pain indifferently. According to the Stoics, the virtues are good, and their opposites are bad. Epicureans claim that pleasure is the ultimate good. Instead of giving an account of right or virtuous action, Epicureans claim that all virtues devolve to pleasure.

How do Hippias' answers illustrate the "compresence of opposites" in sensible things and properties? Give some examples.

The "compresence of opposites" is the phenomenon where, with respect to any incomplete property F, every sensible thing that is F is in some sense also not F. Hippias' answers are illustrative of this phenomenon insofar as every fine thing he describes is proven not to be fine in some other context. For example, a pretty girl is beautiful compared to a pot, but not compared to a goddess. A cow is large compared to a calf, but small compared to a bull.

Do the Pyrrhonian Sceptics have distinctive positions that set them apart from Epicureans and Stoics? If not, what is distinctive about them?

The Pyrrhonian Sceptics make no claims about truth at all, whereas the Stoics and the Epicureans both claim to have found truth about what the highest good is (for the Stoics, being virtuous, and for the Epicureans, pleasure). The Sceptics, however, make the claim that, by suspending our judgement and doubting everything, we can attain tranquility and happiness.

What's wrong with democracy (and the democratic soul), according to Plato?

The appetitive part of the soul rules the democratic soul, and all of the people rule a democratic state. This means that the soul acts at the whim of desires, even unnecessary ones, and similarly, a democratic state takes action at the whim of the people, and what they think is best even if it is not actually what is best. Further, democratic souls and states are unstable due to a lack of checks. In the pursuit of freedom, democracies throw away every piece of law and external order, and democratic souls subordinate rationality to desire.

Glaucon urges Socrates to examine the completely just man and the completely unjust man. Describe each of these. Why does he think it is important to focus on these?

The completely just man is someone who always behaves justly, but has a reputation for being unjust. The completely unjust man is someone who always behaves unjustly, but has a reputation for being just. It is important to focus on these extremes because it allows us to see whether there are benefits to being just even if you are perceived as unjust or disadvantages to being unjust even if you are perceived as just. Glaucon describes this in terms of which one of these men lives a happier life.

What is the goal of skepticism, according to Sextus Empiricus, and how does it achieve this goal?

The goal of skepticism is to attain tranquility and happiness. Skepticism is the best way to achieve this goal because it avoids claims of truth. If I claim I know something is true, I open the door for opposition/debate, or create internal turmoil as I reflect on alternatives. If I suspend my judgement, however, none of this happens, resulting in tranquility and happiness.

What does the second stage in the allegory of the cave (i.e., looking at the fire and the figurines that cast shadows on the wall) represent?

The second stage represents the recognition of the difference between what something appears to be and what it is. In the allegory, this occurs when the prisoners recognize that the puppets are making the shadows, and the shadows themselves are not entities.

Socrates says that justice "isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him..." Explain.

This means that instead of being concerned with taking just action, people should be concerned with ensuring that the parts of their soul are in harmony and doing their correct jobs. Justice is concerned with achieving a certain state of the soul. Then and only then should someone be considering action - once one's soul is arranged correctly, it will lead them to take actions that help preserve the state of their soul.

How does Aristotle argue that we are responsible for our own states of character?

We are responsible for our own states of character because we willingly take actions that are responsible for shaping our states of character -- if we choose to live carelessly and be unjust by cheating or be intemperate by drinking, then we have chosen to produce the corresponding states of character

Give an example of... a. Something that is SAID OF a subject and IN a (different) subject. b. Something that is SAID OF a subject but not IN any subject. c. Something that is IN a subject but not SAID OF any subject. d. Something that is neither SAID OF nor IN any subject.

a. whiteness; said-of many primary substances but is only accidental to them b. man; a secondary substance said of a primary substance but is not accidental to it c. Socrates' paleness; accidental particulars d. Socrates; primary substance

What is the primary (unmoved) mover like? Why does Aristotle say, "Its way of life has the same character as our own way of life at its best has for a short time" (Metaphysics XII.7)?

insofar as primary unmoved mover exists necessarily, its being is fine, and insofar as its being is fine, it is an object of love. For what is necessary is spoken of in a number of ways -- as what is forced because it is contrary to the subject's impulse, as that without which the good cannot be, and as what cannot be otherwise but is necessary without qualification Aristotle says that because the primary mover is always in a state of complete actuality, whereas we cannot always be in it; for its actuality is also pleasure

Explain the distinction between intelligence and craft knowledge. (How is Aristotle departing from the Socrates of the Protagoras here?)

intelligence involves appropriate emotional responses, while craft knowledge only requires intellectual conditions.

What is the difference between being SAID OF and being IN (as a subject)?

something that is SAID OF a subject is an essential quality, whereas something that is IN subject is an accidental quality beings that are said-of others are universals, while those that are not said-of others are particulars. Beings that are present-in others are accidental, while those that are not present-in others are non-accidental

What does Aristotle mean by a "coincidental cause"? Give an example.

suppose Polycleitus is a sculptor and Polycleitus sculpts a statue. Polycleitus is a coincidental cause of the statue, while the sculptor is the efficient cause of the sculptor -- Polycleitus is not, by virtue of being Polycleitus, the cause of the statue; it easily could have been a different sculptor

What is a "first mover" (Physics VIII.5)? Why does Aristotle think there must be at least one eternal first mover?

the first mover is the initiator of motion everything that is in motion is moved by something. If motion was not everlasting, it would not be able to restart. Since motion must be everlasting, there must be some eternal first mover.

What does Aristotle think is wrong with the Platonists' approach to natural science (those who say there are Ideas)?

they separate natural objects -- can't separate flesh, bone, and human -- Aristotle thinks we must study form and matter

Is chance a cause, in Aristotle's view? Explain.

yes -- a particular event results from chance if it has an external cause and the actual result is not what it is for i.e. the horse came by chance, since it was saved because it came but did not come in order to be saved **we say that an event results from luck if it results from chance and is an event of the sort that is decided on by an agent who is capable of decision **we assume that an event is pointless if it is naturally for something else, but does not succeed in being for what it is naturally for -- an event happens by chance whenever it is pointless

Contrast Epicurean views on (a) the value of justice and (b) the nature of pleasure with Plato's views in the Republic.

(a) Epicureans see justice as an instrumental value, which is only important insofar as it helps people reach pleasure (by giving them peace of mind and putting in place a social contract which prevents others from harming them). They go so far as to say that injustice is not an evil, and we should only refrain from breaking the law because doing so would cause pain in the form of fear of being caught or punishment. Plato, however, argues that justice is the correct state of the soul, where each part does its correct job. Justice is not concerned with its external results/actions, but rather with the internal state of the soul. (b) Epicureans view pleasure as the absence of pain, whereas Plato views the absence of pain as neutrality, and pleasure as a separate phenomenon.

Give an example of how a skeptic might use one of the modes to induce suspension of belief.

A skeptic may use the first mode (based upon the differences in animals) to induce suspension of belief as follows. First, by noting that a dog perceives a ball as yellow. Second, by noting that a cow perceives the same ball as red. Because the dog's perception does not have any more authority than the cow's, and vice versa, we must suspend belief about whether the ball is yellow or red.

What justification does Plato give for believing in the Forms? Is it a reasonable one?

Absolute ideas like beauty, justice, etc. are acknowledged universally as real, and it is possible to know what they mean. However, none of these ideas can be perceived by the senses or experienced in their pure form (e.g. someone may seem beautiful, but not compared to someone even more beautiful). However, we can see when things are participating in the Forms (e.g. a beautiful flower is participating in the Form of Beauty). If we have the ability to determine whether something is beautiful, we must have prior knowledge of what it is to be beautiful. It follows that we must have acquired this knowledge before birth, because we start having sensory experiences at birth and make these judgements about whether things are beautiful as soon as we are coherent.

How does Socrates explain apparent cases of incontinence, e.g., smoking a cigarette though you know it's bad for you?

According to Socrates, apparent cases of incontinence like this are actually instances of ignorance. When we have incorrect opinions about what causes the most pleasure, we act in a way that is confused with incontinence. People who smoke cigarettes, though they know the consequences, incorrectly believe that the pleasure provided by cigarettes outweighs the pain of lung cancer.

Why does Thrasymachus call justice a vice, injustice a virtue?

Acting unjustly is only bad for you if it has negative consequences for you. Otherwise, it may lead to riches, success, and fame. Justice is only good insofar as it has good consequences, but if those could be reached by being unjust without anyone knowing you were unjust, there would be no incentive to be just.

What is an end? What is it for one end to be "higher" than another, that is, for the second to be "subordinate" to the first? Give some examples. What is meant by "the highest end"?

An end is the good that an action attempts to achieve. An end, say (a), is subordinate to another end, say (b), if the choice worthiness of (a) is so in part because it is a means of achieving (b). If this is the case, (b) is a higher end than (a). For example, one's decision to study for this final may be motivated by the end of receiving a good grade. But acquiring a good grade is really just a means to pursue the end of, say, getting into law school, which is again simply a means to pursue the end of being successful and living a comfortable life. The intermediary ends — good grades, high GPA, acceptance into a competitive law school — are all subsidiary since they are done for the sake of the higher end of living a good life. The highest end is the end that we desire only for itself and that serves as the basis for our desiring of other things

How does Aristotle argue that happiness is the highest end of human actions? What does he mean when he says that happiness is "complete" and "self-sufficient"?

Aristotle argues that happiness is the highest end since it is the end for which every action is pursued. Happiness is complete since it is always choiceworthy and also choiceworthy for itself, not because of something else -- happiness is consistently regarded as a good reason for action, despite the fact that happiness is not instrumentally valuable for anything Happiness is self-sufficient since a person who leads a happy life is not seen as lacking in any other regard. Similarly, the addition of other goods does not increase the overall value of happiness since all other goods are only valuable to the extent that they produce happiness

How does Aristotle argue that the arrangement of teeth in the mouth (sharp ones in front, flat ones in the back) is "for an end"? Are his premises plausible? How might a philosopher like Empedocles reply?

Aristotle argues that the view that the arrangement of teeth in the mouth is coincidental is impossible since teeth and all natural things come to be as they do either always or usually, whereas no result of luck or chance comes to be either always or usually. Thus, if natural things seem either to be coincidental results or for something, and they cannot be coincidental or chance results, they are for something. Empedocles could respond that the initial arrangement of the teeth was by chance and the fact that subsequent animals had that arrangement of teeth was not by chance but because their constitution made them suitable for survival

How does Aristotle argue that the human good is the good performance of the human function? What is the human function? How does Aristotle get to the conclusion that the human good is "the soul's activity that expresses virtue"?

Aristotle argues that we shall find the human good if we first find the function of a human being. For just as the good of a sculptor depends on its function, the same is true for a human. One wouldn't judge the good of the sculptor on the sculptor's ability to bake a cake since that is not the sculptor's function. The human's function must be unique to humans, ruling out the possibility of living or perceiving, which is shared by other animals. The distinguishing feature of humans is rationality. Thus, the human function is the activity of the soul expressing reason. Just as the function of a harpist is to play the harp and the function of a good harpist is to play it well, if the function of a human is activity of the soul expressing reason, then the function of an excellent human is to do this well. Because each function is completed well when its completion expresses the proper virtue, the human good is the soul's activity that expresses virtue.

Aristotle agrees with Socrates that incontinence is a kind of ignorance. He also agrees with ordinary people that an incontinent person knows (or believes) what is best but does something else. How can he have it both ways? In what way does the incontinent person have knowledge, and in what way does she lack knowledge? Pay careful attention to Aristotle's distinctions.

Aristotle distinguishes between active and passive knowledge, with the former being knowledge that one has and uses and the latter being knowledge that one has but does not use. Furthermore, Aristotle distinguishes between universal knowledge, i.e. unhealthy things should be avoided, and particular knowledge, this is candy is unhealthy. For the incontinent person, the knowledge that candy is unhealthy and should, thus, be avoided is passive, while the knowledge that candy is sweet and, thus, pleasant to eat is active. In this way, Aristotle agrees with Socrates that incontinence is a kind of ignorance — ignorance of the active knowledge that candy is unhealthy and should, thus, be avoided — but also agrees that one can possess the knowledge of what is best but do something else — i.e. passively possess the knowledge that candy should be avoided, but do something else by acting on the activated knowledge that candy is sweet and will bring about pleasure.

Why does Aristotle say that adequate students of ethics must have been brought up well, with good habits? Does he think that his book alone can make someone good?

Aristotle does not believe this book alone can make someone good. Students of ethics must have been brought up well with good habits since one cannot make progress towards understanding what makes virtuous action worthwhile unless one begins with the assumption that virtuous activity is worthwhile. Just as one who has never made astronomical observations is not equipped to engage in the science of astronomy, one who has not come to enjoy virtuous activity through a fine upbringing is not equipped to engage in ethical inquiry.

What does Aristotle mean when he says that the virtues (of character) are states? What is a state? How does Aristotle argue that the virtues are not feelings or capacities?

By calling the virtues of character a state, Aristotle means that it is neither a feeling nor a capacity nor a mere tendency to behave in specific ways. Virtues of character are states in that they are settled conditions we are in when we are well off in relation to feelings and actions. We are well off in relation to our feelings and actions when we are in a mean or intermediate state in regard to them. Virtues are not feelings or capacities since we have those by nature and one is not praised or blamed for having feelings, while virtues are acquired and they are praiseworthy.

Why does Aristotle think that the happiest human activity is study (or contemplation)? What makes study superior to exercises of the "civic virtues" like courage and justice?

Contemplation is the happiest human activity since it is the most continuous activity since we are more capable of continuous study than any continuous action. Study is also liked because of itself alone since it has no result beyond having studied. Contemplation is also self-sufficient since the wise person is able to study by himself, but the just person needs recipients of his just actions and the courageous person needs scenarios in which he can demonstrate his courage.

True or false? For Aristotle, being virtuous is a matter of being strong enough to overcome your emotions and feelings when they tempt you to do something inappropriate. Explain.

False. For Aristotle, being virtuous is partly a matter of not having inappropriate feelings that tempt you to do something wrong. A person who has these feelings and has to overcome them is continent, not virtuous.

Oedipus killed an old man at a crossroads. The old man turned out to be his father-though he did not know this, and had no way of knowing. Would Aristotle say that Oedipus killed his father voluntarily? Explain. Would Aristotle says that Oedipus killed the old man voluntarily?

If Oedipus had no way of knowing that the old man was his father, then the decision to kill his father would be involuntary. This is because this decision was made out of ignorance of the particulars, namely, who the action would affect. So long as Oedipus feels pain and regret for his action, the decision to kill the father would be involuntary. However, the decision to kill the old man would be voluntary since it is not done out of ignorance of the particulars.

Why is it important for Aristotle that virtue and vice be in our power?

If it is not, we must dispute the conclusion reached, that a human being originates and fathers his own actions as he fathers his children. If our conclusion appears true, and we cannot refer actions back to other principles beyond those in ourselves, then it follows that whatever has its principle in is us is itself up to us and voluntary

What are Socrates reasons (at the beginning of Protagoras) for doubting that virtue can be taught?

If virtue could be taught, there would be experts, and only they could speak on state politics in the assembly. However, in reality, everyone is allowed to opine on politics in the assembly. Socrates clarifies this argument with an analogy to shipbuilders. Shipbuilding is an art that can be taught, and when ships are needed, shipbuilders are called. Virtue, however, cannot be taught, and thus when deliberating on city management, anyone can stand and speak. Further, if virtue could be taught, the sons of virtuous men would be virtuous. However, in reality, there are many cases in which the children of virtuous men are the opposite of virtuous. For example, Pericles' is virtuous, but sends his sons to virtue school.

What is the difference between doing a virtuous action and doing a virtuously action virtuously?

If you do the kind of action a virtuous person would do (in those circumstances), you would have done a virtuous action. But in order to have performed the virtuous action virtuously, you must also (i) know that it is virtuous, (ii) decide on the action for itself (and not some ulterior motive), and (iii) the decision must stem from a stable underlying state and not just be a momentary quirk of your behavior

How does Socrates reply to Adeimantus' objection that the guardians in his ideal city won't be very happy?

In establishing the city, Socrates is not looking to make one group particularly happy. Rather, his focus is on making the whole city as happy as possible. The guardians will be happy because the whole city will be generally happy. However, individual happiness is not a concern when establishing the city.

Why aren't the guardians allowed to have private property?

In order to effectively guard the city, the guardians' top priority needs to be guarding the city, not being shepherds of their own property. If the guardians had private property, their top concern would be keeping their property safe and acquiring more property.

Describe the tyrannical soul and explain how it is analogous to a tyrannical state.

In the tyrannical soul, the appetitive part, specifically the desire for lawlessness, rules. The tyrannical soul is not pursuing what is best for itself, but what is best for the tiny ruling part of itself. Its desires will never be fulfilled. Similarly, in a tyranny, erosion of social conventions and rule of law allow a democratic leader to become a tyrant. The tyrant pursues only what is best for themself, not for the rest of society. The tyrant can never be happy or do what he wants because he always has to fear for his like because he is so hated.

What is injustice in the soul? In the city? In what sense is injustice "contrary to nature"?

Injustice in the soul occurs when each part is not doing its job (e.g., the appetitive part is ruling and the rational part is taking orders from the appetitive part). Similarly, injustice in the city occurs when each part is not doing its job (i.e. the auxiliary is taking orders from the producers, or the producers are attempting to overthrow the rulers). Injustice is contrary to nature in the sense that it involves the parts of the soul/city doing something other than what they are naturally inclined to do.

What does Thrasymachus mean when he says that justice is "nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (388c)?

Justice is a term used to legitimate the ruling institution. For example, in a democracy, freedom of speech is considered just, but in a tyranny, it is not. If you are a ruler, justice is to your advantage because it provides you and your government legitimacy, but if you are not, justice is largely the good of another. If you are truly just, for example, you will give away all your possessions and become poor.

What are natural virtue and cleverness, and how do they relate to full virtue and intelligence?

Natural virtue exists through habituation and natural disposition -- in order to attain full virtue, one must acquire intelligence, which arises through experience. Cleverness is the capacity to figure out what promotes an end, regardless of whether the end is good or bad. However if one lacks virtue and, thus, lacks the correct conception of what the end should be, then cleverness might lead them astray.

What is the difference between necessary and non-necessary appetites or desires? Explain what Plato means when he says that the rational part of the oligarchic man's soul is enslaved to his necessary desires.

Necessary appetites/desires are ones that cannot be denied (i.e., to eat). Non-necessary appetites/desires are desires that we can train ourselves to overcome, and that Plato argues we should train ourselves to overcome (i.e., to eat sugar). The rational part of the oligarchic man's soul is enslaved to his necessary desires because in an oligarchic soul, the necessary desires are in charge, and make the rational part do their bidding (e.g. by calculating how to make money).

Would Plato say that a businessman who rationally organizes all of his desires so that he can make money most efficiently has a soul ruled by the rational part? Why or why not? What kind of a soul would Plato say such a man has?

No, plato would not say that a businessman who organizes his desires so he can make money has a soul ruled by the rational part. Instead of refraining from indulgence because it is wrong or irrational, he refrains because it would prevent him from making more money. Thus, this man has a soul ruled by the appetitive part, because his desire for money dictates all of his other actions. His soul is oligarchic because he engages only in necessary appetites, and uses instrumental rationality.

How does Plato characterize democracy and the democratic soul? What features of the democratic soul correspond to the freedom and equality of the democratic state?

Plato characterizes democracy and the democratic soul as the natural result of evolution of oligarchy and the oligarchic soul. There are no laws in an oligarchic society preventing people from doing what they want. Rulers want bad desires to arise in their citizens so people will buy their goods and they can make more money. The parallel of this in the soul is that bad desires arise. Poverty in the state leads to the people revolting and taking over. In the soul the bad desires of the appetitive part take over. Because all of these desires have been suppressed, initially these (unnecessary) desires rule, but eventually, equal weight is given to necessary desires. Just as every person is equal in a democratic state, every desire is equally important to a democratic soul. In a democracy, citizens are free to do as they please without restriction. In the democratic soul, the appetitive part rules and the soul follows whatever desires it pleases.

What kinds of phenomena does Plato take to show the soul has different parts?

Plato shows that the soul has different parts using the phenomena of simultaneously being in opposite states. He invokes specifically the phenomena of being thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink. This proves that the soul can simultaneously be in opposite states, proving it must have distinct parts.

In what way does Plato think the senses are unreliable as sources of knowledge?

Plato thinks that no objects about which we can have knowledge can be perceived with the senses. We can only have knowledge about the forms (the beautiful itself, the just itself, etc.), which are ideas we cannot grasp with the senses. Sensible things are in a constant state of flux, so any knowledge we garner from our senses is not stable. (By "state of flux" Plato means that our perceptions are changing, not that nature is literally shapeshifting).

What is Plato's justification for giving all the political and military power to the guardians and depriving the producing class of any political participation? What is the guardians' main goal in governing?

Plato's justification for depriving the producing class of political participation is based on the idea that each person should only do what they are best suited for. Producers do not know anything about ruling, and so should not have a say in how the city is ruled. The guardians of the city are philosopher kings, who blend philosophy and political power.

Explain Plato's proposals for state regulation of reproduction and child rearing. Why does Plato think the nuclear family should be abolished?

Plato's proposal for state regulation of reproduction and child rearing is that the state should breed the best people together using rigged lotteries with the prize of sex. If other people have children, they will be killed. No mother will know her child because it will be cared for by nurses and taken at birth. Plato argues that the traditional nuclear family should be abolished because concern for one's family distracts from concern for the public good. If the nuclear family is abolished, everyone will put the city first because they will consider every other citizen equally relevant because they are all unrelated. Further, the nuclear family prevents women from doing the jobs most in their nature, and deprives state of control over breeding.

What does Aristotle mean by "primary substance" and "secondary substance"? In which of the above four categories are primary substances? In which of them are secondary substances?

Primary substances are substances which are not said-of or in any subject -- They are essential unities and not predicable at all. Aristotle thinks that all other entities bear some relation to primary substances. Example: Socrates Secondary substances are universals — They are essential characteristics of primary substances. Secondary substances are the kinds to which primary substances belong. Example: man

How does Protagoras reply to Socrates' arguments that virtue cannot be taught?

Protagoras replies to the argument that everyone can speak on state politics by claiming that justice only works if everyone is just; justice has to be taught to everyone for it to work, unlike shipbuilding. Further, Athenians do think justice is teachable, which is proven by the fact that the city imposes punishments on criminals in an attempt to teach them better behavior. Protagoras answers Socrates second argument by claiming that we all take part in instilling virtue in other people's children (in the same way we all teach other people's babies English just by speaking it around them). If you are a child of a non-virtuous person, you still have a chance to be taught virtue and vice versa.

What does Protagoras' speech tell us about (a) how he thinks virtue is taught and (b) what virtue is?

Protagoras' speech tells us that he thinks the way we instill/teach virtue is through habituation. It is not an intellectual process, but a process of repetition, much like learning handwriting or how to ride a bicycle. Specifically, Protagoras says virtue is taught in school through the reading of Homer, which shows examples of virtue, and through musical education, which helps us develop more harmonious souls. After school, our education on virtue continues via law, which forces us to act in certain ways until it becomes natural. Protagoras' speech reveals he has a fairly conventional view of morality. He views virtue as a sort of skill, which all citizens have, but some are better at it than others. In the same way as flute players are all capable when compared to non-flue players, all citizens are virtuous compared to people who have never been exposed to virtue.

What sorts of sense perceptions does Plato call "summoners" (523b ff.)? What effect do summoners have on the soul? How do they draw us towards knowledge of the forms?

Sense perceptions that reveal opposite characteristics at the same time are summoners (e.g. when you look at your hand and see that your ring finger is large compared to your pinky, but small compared to your middle finger). Summoners move the soul to realize that it is perceiving a contradiction, and to ask questions about the contradiction (e.g. what makes something large/small, what is largeness/smallness). When the soul is moved to ask these questions, it creates an awareness that things like largeness and smallness exist apart from sensible things which are large or small. This leads the soul to turn its attention away from sensory perception and towards the intelligible realm.

Why does Plato think that no sensible property could explain why beautiful things are beautiful, or why large things are large? What does he think can explain why beautiful things are beautiful?

Sensible properties are relative (e.g., a cow is large compared to a calf, but is small compared to a bull). These properties can remind us of the Form, but cannot perfectly be the form (e.g., the cow is in some respect large, but cannot explain to us what it is to be large, because it is also small in some respect). Plato thinks that the Theory of Forms is the best explanation for why large things are large, beautiful things are beautiful, etc. This says that beautiful things are beautiful because they participate in the Form of Beauty.

Explain how Socrates uses hedonism to show that incontinence is impossible.

Socrates argues that we always do what is best if we know what is best. The phenomenon we call incontinence is actually ignorance. If the good is pleasure, and we always do what produces the most pleasure, we can never be incontinent. (It makes sense to say "I believe it is better to F than G, but I G anyway because Ging provides more pleasure," but it is logically incoherent to say "I believe it is more pleasant to F than G, but I G anyway because Ging provides more pleasure"). Sometimes, we have incorrect opinions about what will result in the most pleasure, and do what is not actually best. This results in the phenomenon others confuse for incontinence.

What "small" question does Socrates have after Protagoras' speech? Why does he ask it? How does Protagoras answer Socrates' question? Why does he answer it the way he does? (That is, why is this a reasonable way for him to answer, given what he has said in his "Great Speech"?)

Socrates asks Protagoras: is virtue a single thing, or are justice, piety, temperance, courage, and wisdom all parts of a whole? Protagoras claims that these are all various parts of a whole. Virtue is a single thing, with justice, temperance, etc. as its parts. Protagoras answers this way because it is consistent with his view that virtue is teachable. When people learn how to be just, temperate, and pious, they become virtuous.

Why does Socrates start an investigation into the just man by acquiring about the just city?

Socrates begins his investigation into the just man by examining the just city because he claims that examining a larger thing that is similar to a smaller thing will help us better understand the smaller thing. The larger thing, he claims, is easier to examine.

Explain how Socrates argues (on behalf of "the many") for hedonism, the view that "pleasure and the good are the same" (351e).

Socrates claims that if someone has lived pleasantly, they have lived well. Pleasure/pleasantness is a good thing insofar as it is pleasant, even if it results in nothing but pleasure. When Protagoras hesitates to agree to this, Socrates explains that most people are unwilling to do what is best, even if they know it is best and are able to do it. The reason is that they are overcome by pleasure or pain, and are being ruled by one of those. Because Socrates believes we always do what is best, if we also always do what produces pleasure or avoids pain, pleasure must be what is best.

How does Socrates define fear (358d)? Why does his account of incontinence, together with this definition of fear, imply that courage is neither standing up to what you fear nor not having fear? What does he think courage is?

Socrates defines fear as the expectation of something bad. What follows from Socrates' denial of incontinence is that no one willingly goes towards the bad. If fear is the expectation of something bad, no one goes towards what they fear. This disproves the common definition of courage, which is that it is going towards one's fears. Courage is also not having no fear, because bad things definitely exist and everyone fears things in the sense they expect them to be bad. According to Socrates, being courageous is knowing what to fear. This is rooted in (correct) knowledge about what is good and bad. Thus, courage is a form of wisdom.

How would Aristotle distinguish between the relation between subject and predicate in "Socrates is pale" and the relation between subject and predicate in "Socrates is human"? How would Plato understand these two sentences?

Socrates is pale - paleness is an accidental predicate of the subject Socrates since paleness is describes a quality in Socrates not said of Socrates -- describes what Socrates is like Socrates is human - human is an essential predicate of the subject since human is said of Socrates -- describes what Socrates is

At 74b, Socrates asks: "do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal?" Explain.

Socrates is pointing out the relative nature of perception. We may see sticks and stones as equal in one sense and unequal in another. Or, we may see them as equal from one point of view but not another. However, we would never call Equality itself unequal. Therefore, the sticks and stones that are equal cannot be the same thing as Equality (because they can be/seem unequal and Equality cannot). If equal things call Equality to our minds, they must remind us of the Form of Equality. We must have this form known to us if we are able to recognize inequality in the sensible world.

Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics all consider themselves advocates of the true Socratic philosophy. Explain how their views relate to themes from the Socratic dialogues.

The Epicureans' view that pleasure is the ultimate good is similar to Socrates' argument in favor of ethical hedonism, which says that the good is pleasure. The Stoics' view that death is not something to be feared is similar to Socrates' view that he should not fear death in the Apology. The Skeptics' view that they know no truths is similar to Socrates' claims in the Apology that he knows nothing and the general theme of elenchus, which usually begins with the premise that Socrates knows nothing. The largest difference is that Socrates is searching for truth, while the Skeptics are not.

Glaucon says that justice is an intermediate between the best and the worst. What are the best and the worst?

The best is to do injustice without penalty. The worst is to suffer injustice without revenge.

What does Aristotle think is the proper way to think about the relation between the form of a wall (or an eye) and its matter? What does he mean by "hypothetical necessity"?

The best thing to say is that since being a human being is this this is why he has these parts, since it is impossible for him to be without these parts -- since this is the character of the product, it is necessary for the coming to be to have this character to happen in this way; that is why first this part comes to be, and then this part (form explains matter, matter does not explain form) Hypothetical necessity means that the matter must be of a certain kind in order to bring about the form. A form is hypothesized, so a matter is necessitated (since an axe is needed for splitting wood, it is necessary for it to be hard, and in that case, it is necessary for it to be made of iron)

What is the difference between incontinence and intemperance, and between continence and temperance?

The continent person has base appetites but because of reason does not follow them, whereas the temperate person does not have base appetites. The incontinent person has base appetites and in spite of reason is led by his appetites, whereas the intemperate person has incorrect conception of the good and has no internal conflict as to what course of action he should pursue, rather, easily pursues incorrect conception

What are the three parts of Plato's city? What is the job of each?

The first part of Plato's city is the rulers/guardians. They know what's best for the city and their job is to make decisions about what everyone else does. The second part is the auxiliaries, who act as the army and state police. They have stable, true beliefs about what is to be feared, and their job is to keep the producers in line and fight in wars if needed. The third part is the producers, who agree that the guardians should rule. Their job is to produce goods and services.

What are the four stages in the cave?

The first stage of the cave, which corresponds to imagination, is when the prisoners are looking at the shadows of objects on the cave wall. People at this stage do not make a distinction between what things look like and what the actually are (they think the shadows are the objects they are shadows are). The second stage, which corresponds to opinion, is when the prisoners turn around and see the objects themselves that are making the shadows. At this stage, they recognize a distinction between the appearance of things and what they actually are (e.g. they recognize the shadows are not actually objects). The third stage, which corresponds to thought, is when the prisoners exit the cave and are blinded by the sun so they can only look at shadows and reflections (in lakes), then at the real objects. At this stage, people are no longer just considering whether something is what it looks like, but what makes it what it looks like. The fourth stage, which corresponds to understanding, is when the prisoners' eyes have adjusted and they can look at the sun. At this stage, the prisoners know that the sun is the cause of everything around them (light, ability to see, etc).

*Plato says that the communal breeding arrangements he recommends lead to "the greatest good" for the city. What is this good?

The greatest good for the city is the public good. When no one sees some as being closer to them than others, they will care about everyone equally, and will care most about the good of the city as a whole.

Is the knowledge the guardians must have any different from the knowledge the completely just individual must have? Why or why not?

The knowledge the guardians must have is geared to teach their souls to turn away from sensible things, and eventually find the Form of the Good, so they can rule based on their knowledge of it. If it is true that the Good is analogous to the sun insofar as it makes it possible for us to know all the Forms, the completely just individual must also have this kind of knowledge. This is both in order to know the Form of Justice, and to possess wisdom and courage (the correct belief about what is to be feared), which are parts of the whole of justice.

Socrates' aim at the end of book 5 is to distinguish true philosophers from the "lovers of seeing and hearing." Who are the lovers of seeing and hearing? What distinguishes them from philosophers?

The lovers of seeing and hearing are aesthetes, dilettantes, and generally people who claim expertise in the particular subject of beauty. These people relate to things through their images; they confuse an image or an instance of a thing with the thing itself (i.e. a beautiful thing with beauty). In order to actually explain the Beautiful, however, one must be able to transcend the visible realm and recognize the Form of Beauty, which only philosophers can do. The lovers of sights and sounds claim to have knowledge of beauty, but because they only deal with sensible particulars (not Forms), they can only have opinions about what beauty is, never stable knowledge.

How does Socrates argue that the lovers of seeing and hearing are lovers of opinion, not knowledge?

The lovers of seeing and hearing claim to love beauty, but they do not truly know what beauty is, because they have no knowledge of the Forms. They love to see and hear things that they think are beautiful, and opine on what beauty is based on their sight and hearing, but they do not truly know what makes beautiful things beautiful (the Form of Beauty). Because their conceptions of beauty are based on sensible particulars, which are in flux, they cannot have stable, true knowledge of beauty.

Aristotle thinks that it may be nearly impossible for a vicious person to do virtuous actions. So how, on Aristotle's view, can we hold the vicious person responsible for her vicious actions?

The person who is now unjust was originally free not to acquire this character, so that he has it willingly. He is responsible for his states of character because he willingly took actions that shaped his states of character

Why does Plato think that the prisoners in the cave are "like us"? In what sense do we argue about mere shadows? - indeed, about shadows of artifacts, not real things.

The prisoners in the cave are initially unable to make a distinction between the shadows and the objects that are making shadows; they think the shadows are the objects. Similarly, people often are not able to make a distinction between whether an action is really just and whether it will be interpreted to be just (interpretation is a shadow of the action). We often argue about how things are interpreted, instead of how they really are. We are blinded by our sensory perceptions of things, and argue over those perceptions.

Why does Plato think that the prisoners in the cave would be reluctant to turn around and walk towards the light? Explain how this part of the allegory applies to us.

The prisoners in the cave, upon seeing light for the first time, would probably be pained and blinded to all of the objects the light reveals. Similarly, we are reluctant to turn our focus away from the sensible world because our desires are bound up in the sensible world, and we are reluctant to let go of our desires.

Why does Plato think that the successful tyrant is the most wretched and least free of all people?

The successful tyrant is one who performs great injustices at the expense of others for personal gain and suffers no external penalty. However, the tyrant is the least free of all people. Because of his actions, he is universally hated. This means he is always in fear for his life, and also places significant restrictions on him (i.e. can't go out for a stroll because the neighbors may try to kill him).

At 357b-357e, Glaucon distinguishes three classes of goods. What are they? In which class does he put justice? In which class does he think "most people" put justice?

The three classes of goods are: (1) things desirable just for their own sake, not for their consequences, (2) things desirable for their own sake and their consequences, and (3) things desirable for their consequences only. Glaucon puts justice in the second category, of things desirable for their own sake and their consequences. He says most people put justice in the third category, as something desirable only for its consequences.

What are the three parts of the soul, and how do they match up with the parts of the city? What is the natural role of each part?

The three parts of the soul are: rational, spirited, and appetitive. The rational part of the soul makes decisions about what is best for the person, and matches up with the rulers/guardians. The spirited part of the soul possesses willpower and drive, and in the courageous person has correct beliefs about what is to be feared. This part matches up with the auxiliary. The appetitive part of the soul is the source of desires like hunger and thirst, and matches up with the producers.

What are the two characteristic features of Thought (the third stage of the Divided Line, 510b-d)? How does Plato illustrate them by means of mathematics? What are some other examples of Thought (in addition to mathematics)

The two characteristic features of Thought are that it uses images to help reason about a concept or form, and that it relies on unsupported hypotheses/assumptions. Mathematics is an example of this because it does not appeal to the sensible world alone, but rather it uses the objects of our senses as images of something that is not visible (e.g. using triangles in nature as images of triangularity). It also relies on unproven hypotheses. Plato specifically uses the example of Euclid's Postulate 4, which tells us about triangularity generally, not only the two triangles (ABC and DEF) it uses. It relies on the mirror images of triangles ABC and DEF. Physics is another example of thought. We know the weight of an electron, but not why an electron weighs that much. To discover this, we form hypotheses and test them using images.

Materialists try to explain the features of things by appealing to features of their matter. How does Aristotle use the example of a wall to show that this is implausible? In what way is the example of a wall (an artifact) relevant to the kinds of cases Aristotle is really interested in (e.g. an eye)?

The wall did not come to exist because heavy things move downward. The wall comes about because the form of a wall is of this sort, whereas it is not true that a house is of this sort because this is how it comes to be. Empedocles was wrong to say that many things belong to animals because they came about coincidentally in the course of animals' coming to be. The backbone does not have vertebrae because of the coincidence that the foetus got twisted and the backbone was broken. For 1) the seed resulting in animal must already have the right potentiality and 2) the producer is prior in time as well as in account -- for a human being generates a human being, so that the character of the parent explains the way in which the offspring comes to be.

Explain Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. (How is Aristotle departing from Plato here?)

Theoretical wisdom is, "scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature." For Aristotle, theoretical wisdom involves knowledge of necessary, scientific, first principles and propositions that can be logically deduced from them. Practical wisdom is knowledge of contingent facts that are useful to living well. According to Aristotle, "Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general." Thus, for Aristotle, practical wisdom requires knowing, in general, how to live well. Different from Plato since Plato believed theoretical wisdom was required to live well.

Thrasymachus thinks that Socrates, Cephalus, and Polemarchus all share a mistaken assumption about justice. What is it?

Thrasymachus thinks that Socrates, Cephalus, and Polemarchus all assume justice is some objective good. However, Thrasymachus rejects this conventional view of morality and says that justice is subjective and based on the ruling institution.

Our word "Epicurean" is used for people who seek out fine wines and fancy meals. In what ways is this usage accurate (to the original Epicurean school), and in what ways is it misleading?

To a limited extent, this usage of Epicurean is accurate. Insofar as Epicureans believe that the highest good is pleasure, and fine wines and fancy meals may cause pleasure, this is accurate. However, overall, the usage of this word is largely misleading. This is because the Epicureans considered pleasure the absence of pain, and considered unnatural and unnecessary desires (e.g. fine wine) the worst kind of pain. This is because these desires are difficult to fulfill, which causes anxiety, and often beget more desire.

Glaucon tells a story about the origins of justice. what is it? What view of human nature underlies it?

To do injustice is naturally good, and to suffer injustice is bad. The badness of suffering it exceeds the goodness of doing it. Those who had both done and suffered injustice decided that it was profitable to come to an agreement with each other not to do injustice, thus preventing themselves from suffering it. As a result, they began to make laws and covenants, and what the laws commanded they called just. The human nature underlying this is that humans want what is best for themselves, but also want to avoid suffering. Justice is between the best outcome (doing something unjust with no punishment) and the worst (having something unjust done to you with no recourse). People love justice not because it is a good thing, but because they are too weak to allow justice without impunity.

Aristotle says that Plato departed from Socrates and "separated the Forms" because he accepted the Heraclitean doctrine that all sensible things are "in flux." How should we understand this doctrine, and what does it have to do with Plato's belief in non-sensible Forms?

To say that all sensible things are in flux indicates both that the things we can touch, smell, see, etc. are always changing (e.g. hair growing, skin shedding), and that our perception of sensible things changes (as we change, our environment changes, etc.). If knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some permanent entity, separate from that which is sensible. This is because there can be no stable, true knowledge of those things which are in a state of flux.

What kind of state of character is a virtue? What does Aristotle mean when he says that virtue is a state "consisting in a mean"? (Does this mean that our actions and feelings should always be "medium-strength"?) How is the mean determined?

Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it He doesn't mean we should always have a "medium-strength" emotional response. Rather, he means that we should have the kind of response that is appropriate to the circumstances: e.g. the right amount of anger, at the right time, toward the right person. There is no mathematical formula. The mean is determined "by reference to reason" -- the reason by which the intelligent person would define it

Aristotle says that "virtue makes the goal correct, intelligence what promotes the goal" (1144a10). Explain. What is the role of intelligence in deliberation?

Virtue is the end, and intelligence is what allows us to know how to achieve the end Because deliberation concerns the means by which we achieve the end, deliberation requires intelligence since intelligence is the knowledge of how to achieve ends.

How, according to Aristotle, do we become virtuous?

Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching, and hence needs experience and time. Virtue of character results from habit. Just as we become harpists by playing the harp, we become just be doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions, etc.. A state of character arises from the repetition of similar activities. Hence we must display the right activities, since differences in these imply corresponding differences in the states. It is very important to acquire the habit from our youth.

Give some examples of voluntary actions not done from decision. What is required for a voluntary action to be done from decision?

Voluntary actions may be motivated by appetite or emotion, while decisions are not. If I impulsively choose to eat a piece of cake I know contains ingredients I am allergic, I am taking a voluntary action not done from decision. In order for an action to be done from decision we must deliberate about the action and desire to do it -- for what we decide to do is what we have judged to be right as a result of deliberation. Deliberation concerns actions we can do and does not concern the ends of actions, but what promotes the ends.

*What account of virtue is suggested by Socrates' rejection of incontinence? What does Socrates think we need in order to avoid "being overcome by pleasure"?

What follows from Socrates' denial of incontinence is that virtue is teachable, because it is having correct knowledge of what is good, which can be taught.

What kind of answer is Socrates looking for when he asks Hippias "what is the fine?"

When Socrates asks Hippias what the fine is, he is not asking for a quality that all fine things share, or an example of a fine thing. Rather, he is asking for an explanatory definition of fineness; he is asking what makes fine things fine.

What is wisdom in the city? What is courage? Temperance? Justice?

Wisdom in the city is rulers knowing what is best for the city. Courage is auxiliaries having stable, true beliefs about what is to be feared (i.e. running away from enemies, allowing producers to run the city). Temperance is the agreement of all parts of the city, especially the producers, about who should rule (the guardians). Justice is everyone doing the job they are supposed to do.

What is wisdom in the soul? What is courage? Temperance? Justice?

Wisdom in the soul is the rational part knowing what is best for the whole soul. Courage is the spirited part's power to preserve true, stable beliefs about what is to be feared. Temperance is the appetitive part's agreement that the rational part should rule. Justice is each part doing its job.

How does Plato argue that the guardians should include women as well as men? How does he reply to the objection that since men and women have different natures, they should do different jobs?

Women will be birthed and raised in the same way as men, so if they are well-suited to be guardians, they ought to be. Plato responds to the objection that men and women have different natures is that not all differences in nature are relevant. Men and women have different natures in the same way bald men and long-haired men have different natures. Plato claims that the only respect in which men and women significantly differ is that women are able to bear children, but there is no reason that this interferes with their ability to be guardians. Further, Plato claims this objection mistakes the custom that women take care of children for nature, which in some women may be that they are well-suited to be guardians.

Suppose someone threatens to kill my family if I don't confess to a crime I didn't do, and I confess. Is this voluntary or not, according to Aristotle?

Yes, this action is voluntary since you do it willingly and have the ability to not take the action. Actions are only involuntary if you had no control over them or if you were ignorant of the particulars of the actions.

How does Aristotle define a "nature"? Explain what work is done by each part of the definition.

a nature is - a principle cause of motion and stability -- this means that when an entity moves or is at rest according to its nature reference to its nature may serve as an explanation of the event - internal to the substance that has it -- cause of motion and stability is not external to the object - belongs to it because it' the kind of substance it is, not accidentally -- when a doctor is sick and heals herself, the capacity to heal herself is not apart of her being human; belongs to her because she is a doctor, which is an accidental quality not essential

Give an example of a deduction with true premises that are explanatory of the conclusion but not primary and immediate. What kind of premises are primary and immediate?

a premise is immediate if no others are prior to it a premise is primary when no further explanation can be given this object is (a) or this object is not (a) this object is (b) _________ this object is not (a) not primary and immediate because the first premise relies on the law of the excluded middle

True or false? (Explain your choices.) a. When P is SAID OF S, P and S are in different categories. b. When P is IN S, P and S are in different categories. c. When P is SAID OF S and Q is SAID OF P, Q is SAID OF S. d. When P is IN S and Q is SAID OF P, Q is SAID OF S. e. When P is SAID OF S, the definition of P is SAID OF S. f. When P is IN S, the definition of P is SAID OF S.

a. false - if human is said of Socrates, then both are in the category substance; Socrates is a primary substance and human is a secondary substance b. true - if pale is in Socrates, then pale is in the category of quality and Socrates is in the category of substance. c. true - if human (p) is said of socrates (s) and animal (q) is said of human (p), then animal (q) is said of socrates (s) d. false - when pale (P) is IN socrates (S) and color (Q) is SAID OF pale (p), color (q) is SAID OF socrates (S). e. true - when human (P) is said of Socrates (S), the definition of human (P) is said of Socrates (S); if the definition of human is rational animal, rational animal is said of Socrates. f. false; when pale (P) is in Socrates (S), the definition of pale (P) is said of Socrates (S); P and S are different categories. P and its definition are the same category, so the definition of P cannot be said of S.

Explain the dilemma about knowledge Aristotle poses at the beginning of Posterior Analytics 1.3. How does he resolve the dilemma?

because knowledge through demonstration requires knowledge of the primary things either a) there is no knowledge since it is impossible to provide proofs of primary things or b) circular and reciprocal demonstration is possible the first belief is based on the assumption that because we can only know things through demonstration, and we cannot provide proofs of the primary things, then we cannot know the primary things without qualification and the things derived from them we can only know conditionally on the assumption that we know the primary things the second belief is based on the assumption that it is possible to demonstrate everything since circular and reciprocal demonstration is possible Aristotle replies that not all knowledge is demonstrative, and in fact, knowledge of the immediate premisses is indemonstrable -- we can know that certain primary principles are true through experience and perception.

Aristotle says that according to materialist philosophers like Empedocles, nature acts "not for something, but by necessity." What does he mean? How do these philosophers account for the features of organisms?

if a natural act, say rain, happens for a purpose, then rain falls in order to make grain grow. if rainfall happens by necessity then, on account of material processes, rain falls and coincidentally makes the grain grow. on this view, organisms have the features they do coincidentally. Whenever all the parts came about coincidentally as though they were for something, these animals survived since their constitution, though coming about by chance, made them suitable for survival. other animals, however, were differently constituted and so were destroyed.

How does Antiphon argue that the nature of a bed is not its shape, but the material (wood) from which the bed is made? What does Aristotle think of this argument?

if you were to bury a bed and the rotting residue were to sprout, the result would be wood, not a bed -- this is because the conventional arrangement i.e. the craft making the wood into a bed is a mere coincident of the wood, whereas the substance remains continuously while it is affected in these ways Aristotle disagrees with Antiphon and thinks that the form is the nature more than the matter is. If something were only potentially a bed and still lacked the form of a bed, we would not yet speak of a product in accordance with a craft or that it's constituted naturally. For what is only potentially flesh or bone does not have its nature, and is not naturally flesh or bone, until it acquires the form in accordance with the account by which we define flesh or bone

Aristotle says that four different things might be meant by "cause." What are they? What are the four causes of a door?

material: what a thing is made of --wood and metal formal: how it is defined; the object's essence -- tall structure that acts as a blockade efficient: what made the thing come into existence; who or what created it -- carpenter final: its purpose or function -- to blockade

Why does Aristotle say that in the case of living organisms, the formal, efficient, and final causes "amount to one" (198a25)?

the last three often amount to one for what something is and what it is for are one, and the first source of the motion is the same in species as these, since a man generates a man; and the same is true generally of things that initiate motion by being in motion formal cause of a human: something which lives a rationally-directed life efficient cause of a human: something which lives a rationally-directed life final cause of a human: living a rationally-directed life

It clearly makes sense to talk about the purpose or end of an artifact like a lectern or tea pot or door. But what does Aristotle mean when he talks of the purpose or end of a living creature-a tree, a dog, or a human being?

the living creature's function -- in the case of a human being, actions of the soul expressing reason

Aristotle says that among the natural things are "the simple bodies, such as earth, fire, air and water." What "principle of motion and stability" do these simple bodies have?

the nature of the elements is to seek their proper place -- center of the earth is the center of the universe, earth is then encapsulated by water, which is encapsulated by air, which is encapsulated by fire

How does Aristotle's unmoved mover move the sphere of the fixed stars? How can something that doesn't change cause change in something else?

the sphere of fixed stars wishes to emulate the unmoved mover. To do so, it engages in the only continuous motion -- circular motion in order for something that doesn't change to cause change in something else, it must change in a non-physical way, or by inspiring desire.