Philosophical Ethics

Categorical feature (strong evaluation)

(unconditional feature) which has to do with the way in which strong goods are goods we ought to desire or show concern for (e.g., respecting human rights) such that if we do not then we show ourselves up as blameworthy (this relates to what Pojman identifies as the first trait of moral principles, 'prescriptivity').

Kant on the "good will":

* "There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will (p. 7)." *Commentary: Kant apparently means morally good or having moral worth, since he does affirm human dignity as another intrinsic value. And non-Kantian might affirm other intrinsic values as well. * A will is good not because it produces some good consequence or because of its fitness to attain some proposed end (e.g., happiness), but simply through its willing; that is, when it wills from duty (p. 7). *Commentary: Note the difference with utilitarianism/consequentialism here. Kant's remarks on the good will express a deontological perspective because of the emphasis on the important of motives/intentions and the idea that actions (willing) can be inherently right or wrong, good or bad (indeed, we will see that Kant accepts a form of moral absolutism with his account of "perfect duties"). For Kant, the ends do not justify the means; the means are all important. * The main purpose of reason is not to help us attain happiness, but to produce a will good in itself by informing it of its duty (which reason gives through the "Categorical Imperative"). The goal is to be worthy of happiness, and for this to be the case, we must have a good will (pp. 7-9).

Mill on the "Religion of Humanity":

*"If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one who can realize this conception will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness morality" (p. 33). *Mill borrows the idea of a "Religion of Humanity" from his contemporary, Auguste Comte, who he says "has superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even without the aid of belief in a Providence, both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion, making it take hold of human life, and color all thought, feeling, and action in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste" (p. 33). Questions for discussion: 1.Do you think it is possible to establish a "Religion of Humanity"? Do you agree with Mill that such a religion is better able to contribute to the betterment of humanity than traditional theism, which affirms a transcendent God and a transcendent eternal purpose for human life? Recall here Pojman and Cottingham's arguments for thinking that it is theistic religion that can be the most enhancing for our moral life. 2.Does Mill's emphasis on fellow-feeling, which enables shared forms of happiness, mean that we cannot be entirely "impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator," as the impartiality requirement specifies? This seems to connect more with our own happiness.

Mill's Account of Virtue in Chapter IV:

*According to Mill, virtue is originally only valued as a means to the end of promoting the greatest happiness principle. However, as a psychological fact, it comes to be associated with our own happiness and then we come to desire it for its own sake. *This also happens with other things like money, power, and fame; but virtue makes us loveable to other people, while money, power, and fame might make us obnoxious to others. *What kind of character traits do you think Mill would consider virtuous? *Benevolence/beneficence above all; but also justice, honesty, etc., insofar as each of these contribute to the general happiness. *Critiques from an Aristotelian virtue ethic perspective: (1) Whether we act virtuously should not depend on whether a virtuous action in a given circumstance happens to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. We cannot have the virtues of justice, honesty, courage, and so forth, and only exercise these virtues (i.e., perform virtuous actions) on occasions when they happen to promote the utilitarian standard. We must perform them with the integrity and constancy of character. (2) A virtuous agent should perform virtuous actions for their own sake as being inherently/intrinsically noble and worthwhile activities that are constitutive of the agent's own happiness, understood as an intrinsically noble, worthwhile, meaningful life.

How perfect and imperfects duties are derived from CI #1 ("The Universal Law Formula"):

*Conceptual consistency requirement for perfect duties: a perfect duty is one the violation of which could not be coherently thought as universal law. *Example: we couldn't even coherently think (i.e., without contradiction in thought) of a universal law in which everyone should break their promises. *Volitional consistency requirement for imperfect duties: an imperfect duty is one the violation of which can be thought but it cannot be consistently willed as a universal law. *Example: we might be able to think of a world in which people did not perform good deeds for each other, but we could not consistently will that this should be the case. Note: We violate our duty when we want to make ourselves an exception to the universal law, and thus we act in a rationally inconsistent manner. (Remember the ideal for Kant is that through acting rationally, i.e., acting from duty as given by reason, we can become free/autonomous/self-determining, rather than being determined by our inclinations, which is what happens we want to make ourselves an exception to the universal moral law).

Kant's Division of Duties: Perfect and Imperfect

*For Kant, our duties can be derived from the CI are divided into perfect duties (to oneself and to others) and imperfect duties (to oneself and to other). *Perfect duties are "irremissible," i.e., it is a duty that "permits no exception in the interest of inclination" (p. 30, fn. 12). In other words, these are duties that can be clearly defined and are strictly required and should be enforced through law. *Imperfect duties are "meritorious," i.e., they go beyond the call of strict duty and when done voluntarily for their own sake they are most deserving of praise. They cannot be clearly defined and should not be enforced, but are to be encouraged. Perfect Duty to Self: E.g., do not commit suicide. Perfect Duty to Others: E.g., do not lie, do not make false promises, do not kill, do not steal, do not merely use or objectify someone in any way (e.g., sexual use/objectification), etc. Imperfect Duty to Self: E.g., cultivate one's talents. Imperfect Duty to Others: E.g., do good deeds for others. Discussion activity: Is it ever right to lie? For instance, would it be right to lie to protect the life of a friend from an "enquiring would-be murderer"? How could the duty here be derived from the formulations of the categorical imperative? Consider also the other examples mentioned above.

What are some good things about the Hobbesian view?

*It does highlight the darker side of human nature (but does he overlook the brighter sider?). Any adequate account of ethics needs to come to terms with this. See Lord of the Flies and the looting after Hurricane Katrina for support for Hobbes's view. *It is straightforward in that it identifies morality with law/the social contract. *It gives a clear account of moral motivation (fear of death & desire for a contented life, and then when in society, fear of punishment).

The minimalist account of morality: The Hobbesian View - Morality as a Social Contract.

*Morality as a social contract for conflict resolution between self-interested individuals. 2 conditions of human life 1. State of nature (no society) -There is no justice because there are no laws. -We seek power to ensure the objects of our desires. -Force and fraud are the 'cardinal virtues'. 2. Life in society under a common power and common laws. -There is justice because there is a power to enforce it. Justice for Hobbes is understood as a "social contract" in the form of laws agreed upon and then enforced by a common power.

The Virtue of Selfishness?

*Rand argues that selfishness is a virtue and altruism is a vice, a totally destructive idea that leads to the undermining of individual worth. Ethical egoism (contrast with psychological egoism). Very Nietzschean (master vs. slave, Ubermensch) and Darwinian (survival of the fittest). Rand accepts a strict dichotomy between egoism and altruism. She does allow for some mutual benefit (a sort of Hobbesian in this way). On Pojman's view she has libertarian constraints as well (but her heroes do exploit others). She is primarily against positive duties to benefit. *Pojman: Rand is guilty of the fallacy of a false dilemma: She simplistically assumes that absolute altruism and absolute egoism are the only alternative. Selfishness and self-interest are different concepts (Rand conflates them). Pojman thinks sometimes we have duty to act for the good of others where no personal payoff is likely (e.g., Saving a drowning child in a foreign country. Working for a healthy global environment.) Pojman contrasts our love of self and love of others, but the latter will also involve happiness for us. This suggests a constitutive view (see also p. 34). *Perhaps consider the case of Phil Connors in Groundhog Day [all the rules are off, he can do whatever he wants, but ultimately he driven to despair; learn to find happiness in doing good for the right reasons], which leads into...

What are some objections to the Hobbesian view?

*Reduces morality to law/contract/social control/self-interest (in the weak evaluative sense), but it seems like we should be able to critique the law and particular conceptions of self-interest according to objective moral standards. *The social contract view does not recognize the claims of objective values, such as human dignity, virtue, the beauty of the environment, the intrinsic value of all life, etc. Many people see morality as being about properly recognizing objective values (a matter of strong evaluation). *The social contract view seems to allow for a tyranny of the majority. *The social contract view does not account for those outside of the contrast, but it should. For example, immigrants. If you're not in the moral contract, then you are not in the moral sphere of concern. *The free rider problem: If someone can get away with break the law, while at the same time benefiting from it, it seems that the social contract view can say there is nothing wrong with this as long as the person does not get caught. See the story of "The Ring of Gyges" in Plato's Republic. *Is Hobbes' egoistic view of human nature right? Hobbes seems to miss out on the nobler and more fulfilling aspects of genuine human friendship and care for others.

Religion and Ethics: What is the relationship, if any? 1. The Irrelevant View: Religion is Irrelevant for Ethics

*Religion is replaced by science and technology (or so it is claimed). Do you think this is true? *The Nietzsche position: we must create our own morality. Is morality something that can be created or must it be discovered? *The moderate objectivist position based on common human needs can also be seen as affirming the irrelevant of religion for ethics. *Religious morality is infantile (Nowell-Smith) and undermines autonomy and thus human dignity (Rachels). Thus it is not only irrelevant but also harmful if one attempts to make it relevant. *Is this a fair charge? It depends on how we understand autonomy. Two senses of autonomy: (1) Freedom from restraint to choose however we want (negative freedom); and (2) freedom to act from reason to be the fullest self (positive freedom). Religious morality may be incompatible with the first sense, but not the second sense (the second sense could be connected to a more mature faith where one does have reasons for his or her faith, and so it is not childish). Also, it seems that the first sense is incompatible with acknowledging other objective values beyond autonomy itself. Moreover, the idea that only autonomy has objective value seems self-undermining as autonomy/choice seems to have value when we think the ends (or objects) of choice of objective importance. Consider the case of the conscientious objector.

Kant on happiness:

*Subjective conception of happiness: Kant puts forward a desire-satisfaction model of happiness where it is the "sum of satisfactions of all inclinations" (p. 12), where this differs from person to person. This contrasts with objective, strong evaluative conception found in Aristotle, Aquinas, and others, where happiness is normatively higher, noble, worthwhile life, where virtue is constitutive of happiness and where this involves fulfilling our human potential. Thus, for Aristotle and Aquinas, happiness provides an objective standard of morality, whereas for Kant, because he understands it as subjective, it cannot serve as the standard for morality. * Kant vs. Aquinas on natural inclinations: for Kant, there are no universally shared basic natural inclinations that direct us towards a shared human good/happiness, whereas Aquinas does believe that this is the case, though he thinks as human beings we grasp this good through reason (recall Pojman's discussion of Aquinas in relation to natural law ethics). * Problem of conflict: given his subjective view of happiness, Kant sees our pursuit of happiness as a source of potential conflict with the good of others, whereas as Aristotle and Aquinas believe that our happiness, properly understood, leads us to promote the good of others and is thus in harmony with the happiness of others. *Duty over happiness: Kant resolves this problem of conflict by giving moral duties priority over happiness. Commentary: But this raises the 'why be moral?' question. I think ultimately Kant does put forward an objective conception of happiness/fulfillment, where it involves realizing one's human dignity through actualizing one's potential to be a rational, self-determining being through following the moral law that we give to ourselves through reason (rather than merely following our inclinations, which is what non-rational creatures do). *Note: Kant does believes we have an indirect duty to secure our happiness so that we won't be tempted to violate our duty, e.g., by committing suicide or other acts that would violate our duty (see p. 12).

Evolution and Ethics

*Suckers, cheaters, and grudgers *Is this an adequate account? Again, why not say that the key to the moral life is what we find happiness in and how widely we extend our sense of self?

Religion and Ethics: What is the relationship, if any? 2. The Necessary View: Religion is Necessary for Ethics

*The Euthyphro dilemma: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is (intrinsically) good? There appears to be a dilemma here because if we take the former option, then this seems to make morality arbitrary, but if we take the latter option, then it seems to make God irrelevant to morality. Can the dilemma be solved? *Divine Command Theory (DCT): Morality not only originates with God, but also moral rightness simply means "willed by God" and moral wrongness means "being against the will of God." That is, an act is right in virtue of being in accordance with the will of God, and act is wrong in virtue of being against the will of God. This view takes the first option in the Euthyphro dilemma. *The opposing viewpoint: the autonomy thesis: (1) Morality does not originate with God (although the way God created us may affect the specific nature of morality). (2) Rightness and wrongness are not based simply on God's will. (3) Essentially, there are reasons for acting one way or the other, which may be known independently of God's will. God is subject to the same standards that we are. *Pro DCT: (1) Makes knowing what is right and wrong straightforward if we believe in some form of divine revelation; (2) Seems to do justice to God's omnipotence and sovereignty (though God's freedom here is understood in the negative freedom sense; but should it rather be primarily understood in the positive freedom sense?); (3) Gives a clear motive to morality (divine punishment and reward as the key motivators). *Con DCT: (1) Makes morality into something arbitrary (reduces morality to the right of the powerful: might makes right); (2) Seems to make attributing "goodness" to God redundant and thus undermines a sense of God being worthy of worship; (3) It does give the right reasons for what is moral and for acting morally; (4) Seems incompatible with the Scriptural view of God as loving. (5) There are disagreements over divine revelation. *One could argue that the option either DCT or the autonomy thesis is a false dilemma. The other major strand of theistic ethics is theistic natural law ethics (NLE) and according to this view God is the source of the moral law in that it is perfectly embodied in God's character: the moral law is an aspect of his eternal character that is immutable; i.e., it cannot be changed. God also perfectly grasps what is good and perfectly wills it and creates the world in light of this understanding of the good such that everything in the world ordered/purposively directed to the good. In the case of human beings, we were created with reason and a moral conscience that enables us to grasp the intrinsic goods to which we are directed by our natural inclinations (see the discussion of NLE in the previous discussion of strong ethical objectivism). We do not need to be religious to understand the moral law because it is "written on our hearts" *A religious view of the world provides a sense of purpose that can shape our understanding of morality. Religion may be necessary for a certain conception of morality (e.g., strong ethical objectivism), and apart from it we may have a reduced form of morality (e.g., moderate or weak ethical objectivism). Also, religion (especially theistic religion) might explain and make sense of the view that there is an objective moral order in the universe, but we might not need to believe in God in order to grasp this moral order (given NLE maintain that we all have the moral law 'written on our hearts'; i.e., we all have a moral conscience); though a lack of belief in God can perhaps cause one to be skeptical about the idea of an objective moral order. This all can be seen as a response to the irrelevant charge in taking the second option in the Euthyphro dilemma. We will see that the Enhancement view also can be seen as a response to this charge, and it can be connected to the NLE view.

Why should we go from the state of nature to life in society?

1. In the state of nature, we are all equally vulnerable to suffering harm done to us by others seeking their own advantage. 2. There is a war of all against all, because human beings have a "perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceases only in death." 3. The result of this war is that life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 4. We are therefore motivated to seek peace in society from "fear of death" and "desire of such things as are necessary to commodious [i.e., contented] living". 5. The articles of peace suggested to us by reason constitute the precepts of the natural law. Hobbes believes there are 2 main precepts* of the natural law: 1. To seek peace and follow it. 2. To be willing, when others are also, to lay down our "right to all things" and be content with equal liberty. *These precepts of the natural law form the basis of a "social contract." 6. In order to enforce the social contract, we establish a common power and common laws. We are motivated to obey these laws out of fear of punishment. How does this express a weak ought (conditional imperative)? *Answer: If you want to avoid the war of all against all and the fear of death that comes with it and if you desire a contented life, then you ought to agree to the social contract and abide by it. Weak ought because you are only agreeing because it is in your best interests.

What is the relationship between morality and happiness (or 'self-interest'): Why be moral? Is the good, good for you?

1. The Religious Answer: The good is good for you because God or the spiritual laws of the universe (e.g., Karma) determine that people ultimately get what they really deserve. There is ultimate moral accountability. However, it is difficult to show that any religion is true; it is a matter of faith, even if there is some reason as well. [Does this idea of 'ultimate moral accountability' adequately represent the religious answer? For instance, is this why Mother Theresa did what she did? It doesn't seem like it. She acted from religious motives, but they were motives like care for others because of their intrinsic and profound dignity as 'made in the image of God'. Will come back to discuss the relationship between religion and morality in a couple of classes.] You have to believe in the religious perspective for this to apply. 2. The Socratic Answer: The good is good for you in the same way that health is good for you and disease is bad for you. The goal is an objective state of spiritual health and inner harmony that do not depend on our subjective feelings. [Does it already presuppose a commitment to morality? That we all have a moral conscience? Would it apply to Nietzsche? Socrates would reply that sooner or later the immoralist will succumb to their disease. Is harmony really possible? Discuss Freud's critique.] It doesn't apply to people who do not possess a conscience to help guide them or to people who aren't bothered by doing the wrong thing. 3. The Existentialist Answer: Whether morality contributes to happiness depends on whether morality is something you are "into" or not (i.e., whether morality is one of your projects). Morality cannot be rationally justified. Each person must make an ultimate choice about how he or she will live. [Discuss Paul Gauguin case.] This view makes the choice of morality entirely arbitrary and weak evaluative, like the preference between two flavors of ice cream. 4. The Rational Split-Level Answer: This is Pojman's own view. Morality and self-interest are closely, but not necessarily, allied. Morality is a "best bet" (a rational gamble) for happiness on the whole. When we ask ourselves what kind of life is most likely to bring us happiness in the "long run," reason will guide us to the moral life, but once we have accepted the moral life, we may sometimes have to act in ways that do not benefit our immediate desires or short-term satisfactions [But couldn't there always be exceptions made then, which would undermine the integrity of the moral life? See the case of the quasi-moralist. Does Pojman provide an adequate response?] This is the rational split-level answer because there are two separate levels of reasoning: (1) a higher-order reflective, general level in which I ask, "Which way of life is likely to maximize my overall personal happiness?" and (2) a lower, more particular level in which I ask, "Which act in this particular situations accords best with the way of life chose at the higher level?" Given that we, as social beings, want to live in a harmonious community, having family and friends, the moral point of view makes good sense. [Pojman never really defines what happiness/self-interest/success/prospering consists in, but takes it to be something largely separate from morality, though morality is instrumentally conducive to it. Should morality be instrumentalized in this way? This misses the idea of acting morally for its own sake, which is constitutive of happiness. See next answer...] Critiques include someone can say morality is not the best bet for me who is moral sometimes and cuts corners other times. Morality isn't the priority all the time, a quasi-moralist. Doesn't give the right answer for being moral. 5. [I add to Pojman's list:] The Aristotelian Answer: The good is good for you because acting for the sake of what is good or virtuous is directly constitutive of our happiness (we can also call this "The Constitutive View"). In other words, we see acting virtuously or morally as part of a higher, nobler, more fulfilling, more worthwhile mode of life. Virtue is its own reward. This would probably be accepted by many religious people as well as by Socrates. This view is informed by strong evaluation: the conception of happiness is already moralized. It maintains that there is such a thing as true happiness and false happiness. This is controversial, though many people speak this way.

*The Purposes of Morality (according to Pojman)

1. To keep society from falling apart [Pojman makes morality out to be primarily other directed in society. Is this right? Later he says morality is an antidote to greed, selfishness, and the hate that would destroy our civilization. But later he says: The goal of morality is to create happy and virtuous people, the kind that create flourishing communities.] 2. To ameliorate human suffering 3. To promote human flourishing [For who? For oneself? For others? Both?] 4. To resolve conflicts of interest in just and orderly ways 5. To assign praise and blame, reward and punishment, and guilt 6. [We can add a sixth purpose to Pojman's list: To properly recognize objective values and thereby to live a normatively higher, more fulfilling, more meaningful mode of life. These objective values (e.g., human dignity) can stand behind our concern to alleviate suffering and promote human flourishing.]

Kant's 3 propositions about the nature of morality:

1."An action must be done from duty in order to have any moral worth" (i.e., to make one have a good will) (pp. 10-12). *Acting from duty vs. merely in accordance with duty: Only the former has true moral worth. *Examples of duties: (1) Not overcharging an inexperienced purchaser; (2) Preserving one's life; (3) Doing good deeds for others. *Discussion question #1: In what circumstance does Kant say someone is acting from duty and when are they acting merely in accordance with duty? *Discussion question #2: Do you think Kant overlooks the moral importance of feelings with his remarks on the "unsympathetic philanthropist" who has full moral worth so long as he or she acts from duty? [For Aristotle, moral worth is tied to virtue, which requires right intention (acting for the sake of the noble) as well as right feeling. Full virtue requires that want to do what is virtuous and we have a sense of fulfillment in doing what is virtuous. For Aristotle, what Kant admires is not full virtue but rather 'continence', which is where we have the willpower to overcome temptation in order to do the right thing.] Also, do you agree with Kant when he says that "love as an inclination [i.e., a feeling/desire] cannot be commanded," but rather, only as a doing a good deed, irrespective of particular loving or unloving feelings, can be commanded as a duty (p. 12)? 2. "An action from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim [i.e., the principle of willing/action] according to which the action is determined (pp. 12-13)." * In other words, the action is good for its own sake when done from duty, as specified by the "categorical imperative." * First initial statement of the "categorical imperative", from which we derive our moral duties: "I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (p. 14). 3. An action from duty must be done from a feeling of respect for the dignity of the moral law/duty, which we give to ourselves as self-determining rational beings (p. 13). *'Respect' for the moral law, rather than seeking to attain happiness, is the source of moral motivation for Kant: Acting from duty means that our actions must be done from a respect for the dignity of the moral law, precisely because it is an expression of our reason, which makes us truly free/autonomous by legislating a law for ourselves that would apply to all rational beings irrespective of circumstances (see pp. 13-14, 22-23). To simply follow inclinations, according to Kant, would not be free/autonomous because he believes our inclinations are determined by the causal forces at work in the circumstances of our lives (see pp. 38-41). *Note that Kant does have someplace for feeling in the moral life here, but this is where it is tied to his conception of reason and the moral law that we derive from our reason.

Two Versions of Utilitarianism:

1.Act-Utilitarianism: evaluates each individual action with regard to how it conduces to the greatest happiness principle. *Critique: Makes morality too circumstantial and seems to fly in the face of fundamental intuitions (see Brandt's cases about whether to pay the boy who mows the lawn, whether to support family or give to those in need, and whether to euthanize one's father). *We need 'rules of thumb' and ways of coordinating our actions with others... 2.Rule-Utilitarianism: evaluates a whole system of conduct with regard to how it conduces to the greatest happiness principle. *Critique: Still seems to allow for exceptions to the rule (consider the case of lying, p. 117), otherwise it is not utilitarianism, but 'rule worship' or deontology. *Pojman: One way of resolving the difference between the two is to use rules of thumb, then, when rules come into conflict (e.g., keep promises vs. help those in need) we can appeal to conflict resolving-rules (helping others in need, when it is no great cost to self or others, takes precedence over keeping promises), and then, at the top, we can appeal, when no other rule applies (say deciding what to do with $50 that you don't really need), to the remainder rule, which is act utilitarianism (117) *Mill appears to allow for both kinds of utilitarian evaluation. Rule-utilitarianism is especially seen in his account of justice in chapter 5. Through it he also attempts to mitigate what seems to be the overly demanding nature of act-utilitarianism to always actively seek to benefit the general happiness and also the problem with rights.

Strong evaluation

By contrast, in strong evaluation something is judged to be good—a 'strong good'—according to qualitative distinctions of value (e.g., good and bad, higher and lower, noble and base, admirable and contemptible, sacred and profane, etc.) that are seen as normative for our desires rather than merely contingent upon them (e.g., we ought to respect the intrinsic dignity of other human beings, live a life of virtue, and so on).

The Quasi Moralist

Consider the case of the mobster. Is Pojman's response sufficient? How might the other the religious, Socratic, or Aristotelian answers to the 'Why be moral?' question respond?

Weak evaluation

In weak evaluation something is seen as good—a 'weak good'—simply in virtue of being desired (e.g., a particular flavor of ice cream).

Two Kinds of Ethical Relativism (2) Conventional Ethical Relativism (Conventionalism):

It improves upon subjective ethical relativism by recognizing the social nature of morality. It also seems more "liberal" or "tolerant" by avoiding "ethnocentricity." *Key arguments in support of conventionalism: (1) The diversity thesis: uses the descriptive thesis of cultural relativism (moral diversity) in support of conventionalism. Given that there is such moral diversity this seems to count as evidence against the idea that there are objective moral standards. (2) The dependency thesis: we depend upon others (esp. our parents, but also the wider culture) to learn about morality. Whether it is right for an individual to act in a certain way depends on or is relative to the society to which he or she belongs (this is odds with a strong evaluative view of morality). We imbibe our morality from the mores, rituals, and folkways of our community, which we internalize. They are not taught to us as rationally defended norms but as part of the atmosphere we breathe. We are culturally determined beings (so this thesis claims). Morality is just the set of common rules, habits, and customs that have won social approval over time so that they seem part of the nature of things, like facts. There is nothing mysterious or transcendent about these codes of behavior. They are the outcomes of our social history. (3) The weirdness objection to ethical objectivism: the idea that there are intrinsic values (or 'moral facts') is just too weird to be true. *Critiques: (1) Although there is moral diversity, there is also a lot of moral commonality that seems to count as evidence in favor of ethical objectivism. Also, just because there is moral diversity does not mean that there are not views that are superior to others (e.g., that the views of Mother Theresa are superior to those of Hitler). (2) Although we depend upon others to first learn about morality, this does not mean that this moral education is not truth-revealing (just as a scientific education can be truth-revealing). We can come to evaluate what is good and bad in the moral education we received, but we cannot do this without first receiving such an education. (3) It is regarded as being more tolerant, but it cannot really support tolerance as a value. (4) Conventionalism does not allow criticism of other cultures or one's own, even though we may think they have immoral practices. "If conventional ethical relativism is accepted, then racism, genocide of unpopular minorities, oppression of women and the poor, slavery, and even the advocacy of war for its own sake are as moral as their opposites" (56). It entails that moral reformers are always wrong; neither law nor civil disobedience have a firm foundation; consider the examples of Wilberforce, MLK, Ghandi, and Jesus. (5) Which culture should we follow and why? We are often part of many, and so it seems we could be wrong and not wrong at the same time. Why should we follow any particular culture at all? There is no reason to recognize a culture's authority unless that culture recognizes the authority of something that legitimizes the culture. Conventionalism seems to become subjectivism, which also seems to become nihilism.

Kant on Moral Duties

Moral duties are derived from reason alone (a priori), rather than from experience (a posteriori) (pp. 19-23). *Question: Do you think this is right? Can moral duty be derived from reason alone? *Note a few contrasts with Aristotle here: Kant is concerned with the way "self-love" would undermine the moral worth of our actions. He does not seem to allow for the kind of "proper self-love" that was foundational for Aristotle's understanding of ethics, and this again raises the "why be moral?" question (though recall that I said in the previous lecture that I think Kant does actually have an objective conception of happiness tied to account of morality, where it involves realizing our dignity as rational, self-determining moral agents). Also, he does not allow a role for "moral exemplars" in the way that Aristotle does.

Ethical nihilism:

There are no moral truths at all. Nothing really matters. Morality is an illusion, and so "might makes right." Conventional ethical relativism ultimately seems to reduce to subjective ethical relativism, which seems to reduce to ethical nihilism.

Ethical objectivism:

There are universal objective moral standards that everyone should recognize, whether or not they do.

Chapter IV: Mill's Proof for the Principle of Utility

Premise 1: "The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it." Premise 2: "No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness." [Mill assumes here that desirable = good] Conclusion: "This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." Two Critical Questions: 1.Does the fact that we desire something necessarily make it desirable or good? The philosopher G.E. Moore charged this with the "Is-Ought" Fallacy: just because something is the case doesn't mean that it ought to be the case. Recall strong evaluation. 2.Has Mill successfully demonstrated the link between the fact that we desire our own happiness as something good/desirable and the claim that we should desire the general happiness of all sentient beings as something good/desirable? Can this link be made without an appeal to the goodness of fellow-feeling in which we identify our own happiness with the happiness of others? Or does it require a belief in human dignity, which utilitarianism does not seem to allow for (given it accept hedonism, a monistic view of value where only pleasure has intrinsic value)?

Pros and Cons of Utilitarianism

Pros: (1) Utilitarianism is straight-forward; can seem commonsensical and even scientific; it has a single principle with a potential answer for every situation (in short, it seems to have a clear decision procedure). (2) It provides a secular account of morality (this is a pro for those who want an account of morality detached from religion, especially theistic religion). (3) We thinking morality should, to some extent, be concerned with promoting happiness, both for ourselves and for others; benevolence is a virtue. (4) Consequences matter. (5) The impartiality requirement acknowledges a kind of fundamental moral equality; we think morality should, to some extent, be impartial. Cons: (1) No-Rest/Too Demanding Objection; the utilitarian standard is too demanding and thus impractical (it raises the 'why be moral?' problem; we need a link with individual happiness); it doesn't allow a place for the supererogatory (what Kant calls an imperfect duty: a duty that is not strictly required but encouraged as being especially morally praiseworthy). (2) The objection against value monism (hedonism): There is a plurality of things that have value, not just one thing (pleasure). For instance: human dignity, virtue, beauty, knowledge, friendship, etc. (3) The objection to pig philosophy (or The Aristotelian objection): There is a tension between Mill's utilitarianism and his qualitative hedonism. He does not adequately account for the role of virtue. Virtue is its reward. Pojman: 'Is Mill assuming some nonhedonic notion of intrinsic value to make this distinction [between higher and lower pleasures]—that is, that knowledge, intelligence, freedom, friendship, love, health, and so forth are good things in their own right? Or is Mill simply saying that the lives of humans are generally such that they will be happier with more developed, refined, spiritual values?' (115). (4) The Integrity/Self-Alienation Objection: utilitarianism violates our integrity and is self-alienating by always requiring us to act for the greatest happiness for the greatest number. (5) The Justice Objection (consider Pojman's example of framing someone to maintain racial harmony); utilitarianism does not seem to adequately account of individual rights. The rule-utilitarian account doesn't give the right reason for individual rights (they are granted because they promote the utilitarian standard on the whole rather than because of human dignity) and seems like it must always allow for exceptions. (6) The Publicity Objection (some utilitarians think it would be more beneficial if people acted like deontologists, so it would be better not to publicize the utilitarian standard - but this is lying/deceptive). (7) Partiality should also have a place in the moral life (e.g., concern for friends and family and our own self-development). (8) The 'One Thought Too Many' Objection (to utilitarian defenses of partiality and justice - they don't give us the right reasons) (9) Motives/intentions also seem to matter. (10) The problem of knowing future consequences; (11) The formulation problem: should we emphasize the greatest happiness or greatest number? Should we be concerned with spreading the happiness around or is it ok if the greatest happiness includes makes some really happy, while others not so happy? Should we be concerned with the total happiness or the highest average? Also, how should we measure happiness and make comparisons? (Mill attempts to solve this with his qualitative hedonism.) (12) The Absurd-Implications Objection (Two acts that cause 100 hedons, but one involves lying, would have to be considered to have the same moral value). (13) Mill's 'proof' for utilitarianism is problematic (see Lecture Notes from the previous class).

*The Nature of Moral Principles: 5 traits:

Purpose of morality is to be responsive to these values, an objective view. 1. Prescriptivity (or Normativity) - the realm of the 'ought' [recall the discussion of the strong and weak sense of 'ought' above]; 2. Universalizability [this goes against relativism]; Example: fairness and respect. 3. Overridingness [Is this always the case? What gets included in the sphere of the 'moral'? Pojman says morality overrides aesthetic, prudential, and legal considerations. Consider the case of Paul Gauguin. Consider also the case of partial attachments vs. impartial moral demands. Should partiality be included in morality?]; Overrides weak evaluations. Strong goods we identify always override weak goods that we desire. Example a weak evaluation is a preference for ice cream, while a strong evaluation is that we ought to respect human dignity. 4. Publicity; 5. Practicability - we have to be able to practically act on moral principles [can there be moral ideals that no one can fully live up to? Such as saintliness? We should be able to at least live up to them to some degree, even if not perfectly.]. We can make progress towards moral values even though we may never attain it.

Egoism vs. altruism:

Self-regarding vs. other-regarding. Seems like a bad way to frame the issue. The question should be more about how we understand our happiness (is it constituted by objective values, including the good of others?) and how widely do we extend our sense of self: do we identify with the happiness of others? Do we have "we-self" or sense of "communion" in friendship? But how to account for feeling of real sacrifice? Strong vs. weak goods. Strong goods vs. strong goods. Pojman makes it a matter of short-term vs. long-term self-interest, but it is really a matter of different goods in play.

The Ultimate Sanction (i.e., Source of Motivation) of the Principle of Utility

The motivation question: Given the utilitarian standard, "why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why my I not give that the preference (p. 27)?" "Sanction" = Source of motivation. 2 kinds of sanctions: 1. External sanction: the hope of favor/praise and fear of displeasure/blame from our fellow human beings or from God and the hope for reward and fear of punishment from our fellow human beings or from God. 2. Internal sanction: Mill describes this in different ways as "the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures" (p. 27), "the conscientious feeling of mankind" (p. 29), and "the social feelings of mankind" (p. 32). When this is connected to the principle of utility it forms our "moral sentiment" or "moral sense," which involves both pain when our duty is violated and pleasure when our duty is fulfilled. Such fellow-feeling, for Mill, is the ultimate sanction (i.e., source of motivation) for our action on behalf of the principle of utility. Question: Mill believes there is a natural basis for our fellow-feeling; however, is this natural fellow-feeling sufficient to motivate us to life up to the high demand of the principle of utility and the impartiality requirement? Mill's answer: transformation towards a greater degree of fellow-feeling is needed. *In order to cultivate a greater degree of fellow-feeling Mill appeals to the need to establish good education, civilized public opinion, and good social institutions, especially those that foster relationships of mutual benefit in which we identify our interests with those of others (pp. 32-33). * Mill's faith and hope in human progress: he believes civilization will continue to "advance" and as it does our fellow-feeling will increase along with it (p. 32). * Mill's view here culminates in his advocacy of the "Religion of Humanity", which he believes gives us a higher object of attachment and devotion, namely, humanity itself, that can replace a more traditional religious perspective centered around love and devotion to God (p. 33).

Overridingness

Thus, strong goods 'override' weak goods (e.g., the life of virtue should override the life of pleasure-seeking; this relates to what Pojman identifies as the third trait of moral principles, 'overridingness').

*Kant's Enlightenment ideal:

To be free/autonomous/self-determining is to be rational, i.e., to act from moral duties which are given to us by reason. Our capacity for such freedom or self-determination through reason is what our realized dignity consists in as human beings (we will see that Kant thinks all human beings have intrinsic dignity insofar as they have the capacity for rationality; but when we actualize this capacity we achieve a realized form of dignity, one that involves being moral praiseworthy). *Discuss: Does Kant really get away from a happiness-based perspective in his account of moral motivation? Does he get away from basing morality on feeling?

Kant on "Imperatives" (p. 24): *Commands of reason that tell us what we ought to do.

Two kinds of imperatives (pp. 25-28): *Hypothetical imperative: *Commands something we ought to do as a means to something else we desire (i.e., it is "conditional"; good as a means to something else). *It may either be a skill that we should acquire as useful for any number of possible ends, or it may be a command of prudence, which counsels us regarding the best means to attain happiness. However, for Kant, happiness is something indeterminate, and thus it cannot provide the basis for morality (see pp. 27-28). This imperative is based on experience (a posteriori). Example: "If you want to have good health, then you ought to exercise and eat well." *Categorical imperative: *Commands something we ought to do, irrespective of other purposes (i.e., it is "unconditional"; good in itself). They also apply to all rational beings irrespective of circumstances. *For Kant, it is only imperatives that are categorical which make up the commands (laws) of morality. It is only with respect to the categorical imperative that we can act simply from duty. *Based on reason (a priori). *Example: "Don't lie!" (or, "You ought not to lie, regardless if by doing so you might bring about some beneficial consequence.") Two main formulations of the Categorical Imperative ("CI"): CI #1: The Universal Law Formula (p. 30): "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., principle of action] whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." *Akin to the Golden Rule; consider also John Rawls's idea of the 'veil of ignorance'. CI #2: The Humanity as an End in Itself Formula (p. 36): "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means."

The Paradox of Egoism:

We need to find things of objective value to be orientated towards. Could an egoist have friends? The paradox of egoism is that in order to reach the goal of egoism (viz., happiness) one must give up egoism and become (to some extent) an altruist. Cf. Aristotle's account of friendship. Pojman: Sometimes the way to personal survival and happiness is to forget about them and commit yourself to a worthy cause (again see the case of Phil Connors in Groundhog Day). In caring for others, we often indirectly care for ourselves [why not say directly if we identify with the other?]. This embodies P's rational split-level view. Consider the Aristotelian response: virtue is its own reward. Find our happiness most when we live for something beyond our happiness. Acting for the sake of virtue will provide us happiness. We're actually not going to be happy if we live selfishly.

Ethical relativism:

a normative or philosophical thesis, stating a theory about morality, viz., there is no universal objective moral standards binding on all people everywhere and at all times. Morality is either relative to the individual (subjective ethical relativism) or to the conventions of a particular culture (conventional ethical relativism).

Religion and Ethics: What is the relationship, if any? 3. The Enhancement View: Religion Can Enhance Morality

a. If God exists, then Good will win out over evil b. If God exists, then cosmic justice reigns in the universe c. If theism is true, then moral reasons always override nonmoral reasons (John Cottingham maintains that only a theistic teleological perspective can provide us with conclusive reasons to be moral; whereas apart from this ethics is radically contingent. In other words, although a moderate ethical objectivism based on common human needs may be possible without theism, a strong objectivism that appeals to intrinsic and absolute values is not). d. If theism is true, then God loves and cares for us - His love inspires us. e. If God created us in his image, then all persons are of equal worth. f. Religious faith has inspired some of the most altruistic behavior the world has ever seen (Father Maximillian Kolbe, Father Damien, Mother Teresa, Albert Schweitzer, Mohandas Gandhi, etc.) Can a secular ethic produce such high altruism?

Weak ought - conditional imperative

if you desire x, then you ought to do y. Based on a weak good: a good that is good simply in virtue of being desired.

Two Kinds of Ethical Objectivism (1) Strong Ethical Objectivism:

it affirms both intrinsic values/goods and moral absolutism, i.e., that there are some actions that we must always avoid and some that we must always do. Natural Law Ethics as example of Strong Ethical Objectivism (we will also see that Kantianism is another example): (a) This is exemplified in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, but Aristotle can also be seen within this perspective (see Pojman's discussion). See also Martin Luther King, Jr.: 'The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice'. (b) 'Written on the heart': We are naturally inclined (i.e., oriented) towards intrinsic values/goods that we apprehend through our reason/conscience and from we derive what we ought to do. By appropriately responding to these intrinsic goods we can achieve our happiness, understood as normatively higher, nobler, more worthwhile life. These intrinsic goods are constitutive of our happiness. (c) Intrinsic values/strong goods: goods that are good in and of themselves, which contrasts which instrumental goods, which are only good insofar as they serve some further purpose that is thought to be good. Intrinsic goods are strong goods (i.e., objects of strong evaluation): we ought to desire them even if we don't. They provide normative standards that we ought to be concerned with. According to Pojman: 'These values are not good because we desire them; rather, we desire them because they are good—they are absolutely necessary for human flourishing' (71). (d) Examples of intrinsic goods: life (where human life as a special dignity, viz., a 'sanctity'), knowledge, virtue, friendship, erotic love, beauty, religion, etc. (e) The weirdness of objection: the idea that there are intrinsic values (or 'moral facts') is just too weird to be true, perhaps especially in light of Darwinian evolution. (f) Reply to the weirdness objection and the argument from common moral experience: Intrinsic values are not weird; they only seem so if we adopt a scientistic perspective (i.e., a perspective that claims that only the natural sciences can give us knowledge about the world). We all experience intrinsic values and they are important to our self-understanding (we understand our lives in terms of our orientation towards these intrinsic values and we assess our selves in light of them). Darwinian evolution is not incompatible with an underlying teleology/purpose, as, e.g., theists believe (who are big proponents of natural law ethics). (g) Moral absolutism: natural law ethics affirms that there are some actions that we must always avoid and some that we must always do. For instance: we ought never to intentionally kill an innocent human being in virtue of the intrinsic value of human life (i.e., the 'sanctity of human life'). (h) Discussion: Are there moral absolutes? Or is absolutism too demanding? Is it better to suffer than to do evil? (Would you rather be MLK or Lee Harvey Oswald?) Consider the following examples with regard to whether they should be regarded as moral absolutes: a. Do not intentionally kill innocent human life. b. Do not engage in cannibalism. c. Do not engage in sexual violence. d. Do not commit adultery. e. Do not steal. f. Do not lie. g. Help those in dire need.

Two Kinds of Ethical Objectivism (2) Moderate Ethical Objectivism:

it rejects moral absolutism and affirms ethical situationalism (which differs from ethical relativism). It may accept intrinsic values or it may base ethics on common human needs (if the latter, then it is a much weaker version of ethical objectivism). According to Pojman: (a) Moderate Ethical Objectivism endorses prima facie principles: valid rules of action that one should generally adhere to but that, in cases of moral conflict, may be overridable by another moral principle. (b) If we can establish or show that it is reasonable to believe that there is, in some ideal sense, at least one objective moral principle that is binding on all people everywhere, then we will have shown that relativism is probably false and that limited objectivism is true. For example, It is morally wrong to torture people for the fun of it. If someone rejects this we would try to explain his/her rejection as perverse, ignorant, or irrational. (c) The core morality: rules that are necessary for survival and flourishing (Here Pojman adopts the weaker version of moderate ethical objectivism where it is based in common human needs - this fits with his Rational Split Level answer to the 'why be moral?' question). Pojman proposes the following rules: 1. Do not lie 2. Keep your promises 3. Do not murder 4. Respect other people's freedom 5. Do not steal or cheat 6. Help other people, especially when the cost to oneself is minimal 7. Act justly, treating people according to their merit 8. Do not cause unnecessary suffering 9. Reciprocate good for good, not evil for good 10. Obey just laws (d) Common human nature: The weaker moderate ethical objectivist bases his or her moral system on a common human nature with common needs and common desires (this way it does not have to respond to the weirdness objection to intrinsic values). An objectivist version of the dependency thesis: There is only one large human framework to which all humans belong and to which all principles are relative. The principle of humanity: there is more that unites all humans than divides us. (e) Ethical situationalism vs. Ethical relativism: Ethical situationalism states that objective moral principles are to be applied differently in different contexts (there is still a right answer here), whereas ethical relativism denies universal ethical principles altogether (there is no wrong answer). (f) Some challenges to moderate ethical objectivism from a strong ethical objectivist perspective: (1) Against both versions: There are - so it is argued - some absolute moral principles, such as that we ought never to intentionally kill an innocent human being. (2) Against the weak version: it is too weak evaluative; ethics should be seen as strong evaluative. It has difficulty dealing with the 'mixed bag' problem: i.e., the fact that we have both good and bad tendencies in our human nature.

Two Kinds of Ethical Relativism (1) Subjectivism (or Subjectivism Ethical Relativism):

morality is in the eye of the beholder; i.e., it is relative to what each individual thinks and feels. *Key arguments in support of subjectivism: (1) The diversity thesis: uses the descriptive thesis of cultural relativism (moral diversity) in support of subjectivism. Given that there is such moral diversity this seems to count as evidence against the idea that there are objective moral standards. a. Examples of moral diversity: Infanticide in Ancient Greece and among Eskimos (also would let elderly starve) and a tribe in East Africa (threw deformed infants to the hippopotamus); Stealing in Sparta and among the Dobu of New Guinnea; Canibalism among certain African tribes; sexual practices various across cultures and time (e.g., polygamy); ways of disposing the dead (Callations vs. Greeks); genital mutilation in parts of northern Africa; widows being obliged to burn themselves with their deceased husbands in India. Custom is king? Think also of changes in our own country: slavery, attitudes towards premarital sex and adultery, abortion, etc. b. Contrast C. S. Lewis: 'This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world. What purports to be new systems or (as they now call them) 'ideologies', all consist of fragments from the Tao itself, arbitrarily wretched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. [...] The rebellion of new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if the rebels could succeed they would find that they have destroyed themselves. [...]If we lump together, as I have done, the traditional moralities of East and West, the Christian, the Pagan, and the Jew, shall we not find many contradictions and some absurdities? I admit all this. Some criticism, some removal of contradictions, even some real development, is required. [...] [The] Tao admits of development from within'. c. And also contrast Hampshire: '[There] is one feature of familiar moralities which utilitarian ethics famously repudiates, or at least makes little of. There are a number of different moral prohibitions, apparent barriers to action, which a man acknowledges and which he thinks of as more or less insurmountable [...]. [In] addition to certain fairly specific types of killing, certain fairly specific types of sexual promiscuity, certain takings of property, there are also types of disloyalty and of cowardice, particularly disloyalty to friends, which are very generally, almost universally, forbidden and forbidden absolutely. They are forbidden as being intrinsically disgraceful and unworthy, and as being, just for these reasons, ruled out: ruled out because they would be disgusting, or disgraceful, or shameful, or brutal, or inhuman, or base, or an outrage'. (2) The weirdness objection to ethical objectivism: the idea that there are intrinsic values (or 'moral facts') is just too weird to be true. Scientific views intrinsic values as weird. *Critiques: (1) Although there is moral diversity, there is also a lot of moral commonalities that seem to count as evidence in favor of ethical objectivism (e.g., prohibitions against murder, theft, lying, and cruelty; prescriptions in favor of kindness, restitution and reciprocity, mutual obligations between parents and children, the Golden Rule, etc.). There is often surface diversity but deeper commonality (see the example of different funeral practices: all agree that we ought to show respect for the dead). Also, just because there is moral diversity does not mean that there are not views that are superior to others (e.g., that the views of Mother Theresa are superior to those of Hitler). (2) Intrinsic values are not weird; they only seem so if we adopt a scientistic perspective (i.e., a perspective that claims that only the natural sciences can give us knowledge about the world). We all experience intrinsic values (e.g., the intrinsic value of human life, virtue, knowledge, friendship, beauty, etc.) and they are important to our self-understanding (we understand our lives in terms of our orientation towards these intrinsic values and we can assess our selves in light of them). (3) Subjectivism makes morality useless since no interpersonal moral judgment is possible (e.g., there is no way of judging that Mother Teresa is a better person than Hitler or that torture is wrong if that is what someone is "in to"). Notions of good and bad, right and wrong cease to have interpersonal meaning. The social world becomes a world of conflict, domination, manipulation, and the like. But this view is belied by the facts that we develop in families and mutually dependent communities where we share much in common and we do make interpersonal judgments. (4) Makes morality like a preference for a flavor of ice cream, but this seems different from our feeling that murder is wrong and that kindness ought to be pursued and cruelty shunned. This misses the strong evaluative element of morality. (5) Subjectivism is incoherent. Pojman thinks that morality is necessarily related to our interpersonal relations, and so this means really that there is no morality, i.e., it ultimately entails moral nihilism (nothing really matters).

Cultural relativism (moral diversity):

there is moral diversity across cultures and over time within a culture (we might actually go further in saying that even within a culture at a given time there can be great moral diversity, as we see currently in U.SA.). This is a descriptive thesis that there is moral diversity in the world.

Two Major Kinds of Moral Reasoning for Action-Guidance: Consequentialism (represented by the ethical theory of utilitarianism):

o The morality of an action depends on whether it maximizes valuable or desirable consequences; thus, there are no actions that are intrinsically right or intrinsically wrong. o The ends justify the means (e.g., the Truman case: if a dropping a bomb on an innocent civilian population ends a war and prevents more deaths, then this end [preventing greater causalities] justifies the mean). o Motives are not morally significant in themselves (e.g., if someone saves a child from drowning in order to get fame or get paid rather than out of compassion or a sense of duty, there is no moral difference; the only significance would be if compassionate motives or motives of a sense of duty tended to lead more often to valuable/desirable consequences).

Two Major Kinds of Moral Reasoning for Action-Guidance: Deontology (represented by the ethical theories of natural law ethics [including Aristotelian virtue ethics] and Kantianism):

o The morality of an action does not depend on the consequences it produces; rather, the morality of action is intrinsic to the nature of the action itself; in other words, some actions are intrinsically right (being honest, being respectful towards others, etc.) or intrinsically wrong (murder, stealing, etc.) o The ends do not justify the means; moreover, most deontologist hold that there are some actions that are always right or always wrong (e.g., respecting human rights, avoiding murder, etc.) -> moral absolutism (see Anscombe's criticism of Truman: she called him a mass murderer). o Motives are of central moral significance (see Kant on the good will).

incommensurability feature

which has to with the way in which strong goods are judged to be of incomparably higher worth than weak goods and cannot be weighed against them.

Strong ought - unconditional imperative:

you ought to do y. Based on a strong good: a good that you ought to desire, if you don't.

Utilitarianism

• A kind of consequentialism; the consequence it is concerned with is promoting the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. • The Greatest Happiness Principle (or the Principle of Utility): "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (7). o In short: An action is good or bad to the extent that it promotes the greatest happiness (hedonistically understood) for the greatest number. • Mill's view of happiness is hedonistic: "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure ... pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things [...] are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain" (7). o Hedonism is a monistic view of value: i.e., there is one kind of thing that has positive value, viz., pleasure (the corollary is that there is one kind of thing that has disvalue or negative value, viz., pain). • Question: What is the sphere of moral concern? Who or what is included in the 'greatest number'? (Mill says concern extends to "the whole sentient creation" [12]; the sentience involves the capacity to feel pleasure and pain). • The Impartiality Requirement: "the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator"(17). • Question for discussion: Is this requirement too demanding? How would this require us to act, e.g., with respect to the issue of world poverty? Animal welfare?

Action-Guidance thought experiment

• Consider Socrates: 'It is better to suffer evil than to do evil' (from Plato's Gorgias). Do you agree? Why or why not? • Considers examples: capital punishment, euthanasia, abortion, war, etc. • Consider: o The runaway trolley case #1: original scenario o The runaway trolley case #2: the onlooker and the heavy man o The runaway trolley case #3: loved one on the track o The organ "donor" case: Is it ok to kill a homeless person to harvest his organs so that five other people can survive? [Raises the justice/individual rights issue]. o In each case we have conflicting moral principles: (1) Save as many lives as possible (moral mathematics). (2) It is wrong to kill an innocent person even for a good cause. o Is there a moral difference between intending and foreseeing but not intending some bad effect? Recall the Doctrine of Double Effect that was discussed in Ch. 4 of Pojman's How Should We Live? This will be important in some of the applied ethics issues we look at latter in the semester (viz., abortion, physician assisted-suicide and euthanasia, and war).

Argument Against Utilitariniasm Qualitative Hedonism

• Objection: The focus on pleasure and pain reduces human existence to a base, pig-like existence. It misses higher ends than pleasure [e.g., the noble]. • Aristotle on the three objects of choice: 1. The pleasant; 2. The useful; 3. The noble. [The term 'utilitarianism' is somewhat misleading because it suggests the useful, when it really aims at the pleasant; though Mill wants to also include concern for the noble, but the problem is that this then no longer seems to be a hedonistic view. For Aristotle, we should aim at the noble and pleasure follows upon noble activity, but we are not just aiming at this pleasure. What is truly useful and truly pleasant, for Aristotle, is what aims at the noble.] Mill's reply: Qualitative Hedonism o Quality as well as quantity needs to be included in the calculation of pleasure and pain for human beings. o Higher Pleasures vs. Lower Pleasures: Higher pleasures are based on our higher faculties [the realm of the 'mental'], such as intellectual capacities, aesthetic tastes, and moral sentiments. These are the pleasures of intellect, of feeling and imagination, and of moral sentiments (8). Lower pleasures are based on our lower faculties [the realm of the 'body'], such as our animal appetites for food, drink, sex, shelter, security, etc. [Are these necessarily lower pleasures just because they are 'animal appetites'? They are often transformed in light of higher human meanings (e.g., the contrast between lust and erotic love). Mill seems to allow for this on p. 11.] • "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides" (10). o Mill relates our preference for the higher faculties to a sense of dignity (9). o Question: Is this consistent with Mill's utilitarianism? There seems to be a tension between Mill's utilitarianism and his qualitative hedonism. Indeed, one can argue that the idea of qualitative hedonism is incoherent because it requires a standard independent of pleasure to judge its quality (again, recall Aristotle on the three objects of choice: 1. The noble; 2. The useful; and The pleasant). Pojman: 'Is Mill assuming some nonhedonic notion of intrinsic value to make this distinction [between higher and lower pleasures]—that is, that knowledge, intelligence, freedom, friendship, love, health, and so forth are good things in their own right? Or is Mill simply saying that the lives of humans are generally such that they will be happier with more developed, refined, spiritual values?' (115). • Mill appeals to the competent judge, who has experienced both kinds of pleasures, in order to show that he or she would prefer the higher pleasure. Or, if two people disagree, he appeals to the majority opinion of those who have experienced both (8-9, 11). o Some questions: Is this the right way to decide the issue? Why should the majority opinion decide the issue, especially if the concern is the truth? Is it possible that one might experience both kinds of pleasures, but prefer what Mill would consider being the lower one? (Examples: pushpin [or video games] vs. poetry; Miley Cyrus vs. Mozart or Beethoven; a Big Mac vs. a Filet Mignon at a fine restaurant; Jersey Shore vs. Shakespeare's Romeo & Juliet; etc.). Couldn't a few well-cultivated people be right and the majority wrong? What is required to be a 'competent' judge (see 10-11)? Mill is trying to be metaphysically minimalist, but is this possible on this issue? • Mill acknowledges that his qualitative hedonism is not indispensable to acceptance of the utilitarian standard. The standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest happiness of all, and so this requires 'noble' character (if it cannot be shown that the nobler character is always the happier for its nobleness) (11). o Question: Could the cultivation of the higher faculties come into conflict with promoting general happiness? • Discussion questions regarding hedonism: Should happiness be understood merely in terms of pleasure and the absence of pain? Or does it have to do with living a worthwhile, meaningful life? Consider the case of the experience machine. Is hedonism as a monistic theory of value adequate? It seems that there is a plurality of things that have value, not just one thing (pleasure). For instance: human dignity, virtue, beauty, knowledge, friendship, etc.