Philosophical Ethics

Why Aristotle thinks a proper understanding of our individual happiness will lead us to do good for others (3)

(1) Social virtues (e.g., justice, generosity, friendship, etc.) fulfill our social nature in an excellent, noble manner; (2) Our individual good is tied to the common good of the communities of which we are a part because we are not self-sufficient as individuals for attaining our good; (3) Love/friendship is an essential component of human happiness (since through it we experience a greater fullness of life) and in friendship we regard our friend as a part of our own self and thus we wish and pursue good for them in the same way we wish and pursue good for ourselves.

Arguments in favor of physician assisted suicide

(1) The Autonomy Argument; (2) The Quality of Life Argument (also called the Compassion Argument and the Suffering Argument).

3 Positions on war

(1) political realism (or nihilism); (2) antiwar pacifism; (3) just war theory

Internal Conflict

- "are at odds with themselves, and have an appetite for one thing and a wish for another, as incontinent people do. For they do not choose things that seem to be good for them, but instead choose pleasant things that are actually harmful; and cowardice and laziness causes others to shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. And those who have done many terrible actions hate and shun life because of their vice, and destroy themselves. Besides, vicious people seek others to pass their days with, and shun themselves. For when they are by themselves they remember many disagreeable actions, and anticipate others in the future; but they manage to forget about these in other people's company. These people have nothing loveable about them, and so have no friendly feelings for themselves. Hence such a person does not share his own enjoyments and distresses. For his soul is in conflict, and because he is vicious one part is distressed at being restrained, and another is pleased [by the intended action]' and so each part pulls in a different direction, as though they were tearing him apart...If this state is utterly miserable, everyone should earnestly shun vice and try to be decent; for that is how someone will have a friendly relation to himself and will become a friend to another"

2. Utility friendship

- Coincidental: The friend is not loved for his or her own sake, but because they are useful for some other end. - Not enduring and easily dissolved: the friendship last only as long as the friend continues to be useful. - Common among the old and those who pursue the useful. - Examples: networking friends, study buddies, political friendships, etc.

1. Pleasure friendship

- Coincidental: The friend is not loved for his or her own sake, but for some pleasure that is derived from them. - Not enduring and easily dissolved: the friendship last only as long as the friend continues to be pleasant. - Common among the young. - Examples: party friends, romantic 'flings', shared interest or shared activity friends, etc.

Aristotle's cons of virtue ethics

- Doesn't provide enough action-guidance without appeal to basic rules or principles like Kantianism and utilitarianism (Aristotle only appeals to the person of practical wisdom - some people in fact think this is a good thing about Aristotle's virtue ethics. Also Aristotle does say that some actions are absolutely ruled out, like murder and adultery - see above in the notes for Book II). - Doesn't place enough emphasis on an ethic of universal human concern (though Aristotle does talk briefly about friendship for humanity); doesn't account for human rights/human dignity. This needs to be added. - Because Aristotle begins from common sense and from within a particular ethical upbringing, there is a concern that he may affirm too much of the status quo and does not provide enough critical resources. (This relates to what Pojman identifies as the epistemological problem, or the problem of virtue relativism. Also recall the debate around the dependency thesis) Can Aristotle provide enough critical resources? He thinks we have to start from our particular upbringing but reasoning about what is virtuous and what is not is possible. - Darwinian challenge: can we derive ethics from human nature? It seems like it will have to already be an evaluative account of human nature in terms of what is noble and best about us as human beings (which is then our characteristic activity). Arguably this is in fact Aristotle's view.

Aristotle's argument for his view of true happiness (function argument)

- Function = the characteristic activity of a thing. Ex. the function of a knife is to cut - Function of human beings is rational activity, given our nature as rational animals. Much of this activity will take place in human community because we are social animals - The truly happy life will be the virtuous life. - Commonly mistaken for egoism, but Aristotle clarifies that it's virtue - Aristotle believes that we are rationally social animals, so the most pleasing life will be one designed for rationally social animals. - Friendship is crucial to happiness, in friendship we extend our sense of selves to create a greater happiness. - When we understand our own happiness we will be motivated to take happiness in the happiness of others.

Aristotle's defense of his account of human good

- Happiness consists in virtuous activity, rather than simply pleasure; however, pleasure follows upon virtuous activity. virtue is its own reward; there are goods internal to it. - Whether or not someone takes pleasure in virtuous actions helps to reveal if they have acquired a virtue or not. Further, as we will see next class, the virtuous person is someone who had learned how to be rightly related to pleasure: being pleased at the right things - External goods (e.g., wealth, power, honor, fame, etc.), in terms of which we understand prosperity, are useful for achieving the human good, but they do not constitute the human good. - Friendship is a distinctive case because it can be considered both internal and external.

The conservative view (scruton)

- It is depersonalizing and thus obscene and a form of sexual perversion. It reduces the sexual sacrament to the sexual commodity. - It lacks sexual virtue (viz., chastity, fidelity, and erotic love). - It harms others and oneself in a multitude of ways - For instance: degradation, sexual violence, sex trafficking, harm to marriages and family life, harm to proper sexual life, harm to character, harm to women's self-conception and freedom, harm to non-consenting consumers (e.g., children), etc. - "Those who become addicted to this risk-free form of sex run a risk of another and greater kind. They risk the loss of love, in a world where only love brings happiness" (Scruton, "The Abuse of Sex," p. 125).

3. Virtue friendship

- Not coincidental: the friend is loved for his or her own sake. It is friendship most properly speaking. - Based on virtue, or at least those who desire virtue and are growing in virtue. - Most enduring, since it based on virtue; but also most difficult to acquire since virtue is also difficult to acquire. - Friend is regarded as "another self" to whom we wish and pursue good for in the same way we wish and pursue good for our self. There is shared happiness in virtue friendship. - Examples: soul mates or soul friends, BFF's, familial relationships, etc.

Aquinas on property rights and the claims of need:

- Property rights are granted through human law for our individual good and the common good. But Aquinas say that we ought to share with those is dire need: "whatever a [human being] has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance." This is referenced in Singer's article (though Aquinas is coming from a natural law ethics perspective, whereas Singer is an act-utilitarian).

Aristotle's pros of virtue ethics

- Provides a good answer to the "why be moral question (both utilitarianism and kantianism have trouble with this question) - More holistic; considerations about character/the good life are important (ethics is not one sphere among others in human life). Emotions/feelings also have a greater role. - More attentive to issues about moral education & growth - Can link up with spirituality; appeals to moral and spiritual exemplars (moral heroes and saints); inspirational (rather than focusing on "thou shalt nots" - Allows a place for partiality, especially in its emphasis on the important friendship in human life - More communal focused

The intentionalist/personalist view (scruton)

- Sex is there sphere in which the animal and the person meet, and where the class between the scientific and the personal view of things is felt most keenly. It therefore provides the test of any serious moral philosophy, and of any viable theory of the human world - Interpersonal intentionality:

Interpersonal intentionality

- Sexual desire should be seen as an erotic loving intention directed towards and responsive to another particular person (as an embodied subject not just a body) and its aim is to achieve sexual communion. The erotic love for the beloved is constitutive of the sexual experience. The beloved here is irreplaceable.

Key differences between Virtue ethics and Kantianism and Utilitarianism

- Takes a more holistic approach with concern to the question "what kind of person do I want to be?" when compared to Kantianism or Utilitarianism. - Happiness centered, but it's one's own happiness centered rather than total happiness centered (utilitarianism) - Aristotle begins with happiness and looks at how virtue or morality is built into happiness. Kant and utilitarianism looked at duty first.

Main features of the Liberal view of sexual ethics

- The Consent-Only Model of Sexual Ethics - There is no morality intrinsic to sexual activity; i.e., sex is not morally special. Only general rules of morality apply to sexual activity: viz., respecting autonomous choice (i.e., consent) and filling one's contractual agreement of mutual benefit. - The sexual commodity view - Liberal Kantianism: - According to this liberal sexual ethic, there is nothing wrong with casual sex, promiscuity, prostitution, sadomasochism, pornography, and so forth, as long as everyone involved gives their consent.

Why does Aristotle say that Virtue friendship is the most complete kind of friendship, and thus friendship in the truest sense?

- The virtue of friendship consists more in loving than in being loved. Evidence for this is in the enjoyment a mother takes in loving her child, even when the love is not returned. We also praise those most of all who are lovers of friends. - begins from goodwill (i.e., benevolence) towards another's virtue or potential for virtue, and over time through the mutual acknowledgement of reciprocated goodwill there results a shared life. Benevolence (i.e., good-will) leads to beneficence (i.e., good-deeds) towards the friend (IX.5). Again, recall that Aristotle says that the virtue of friendship consists more in loving than being loved. Pleasure and utility friendships only really involve goodwill towards oneself.

Lee and George's Responses to Thomson's Argument

- There is a crucial difference between unplugging the violinist and aborting a human embryo or fetus. In the former case, one is merely allowing the violinist to die of the underlying pathology and does not intend to kill him even though one foresees that death will result as a "side effect" from the unplugging. By contrast, abortion typically involves intentional killing and in a manner that is a direct act of violence against a human life, which is quite different from mere "unplugging." The right to life involves a right - as an innocent human being - not to be intentionally killed, though it allows for allowing a foreseeable death so long as one does not intend the death, the death is a side effect of one's action, and there is strong enough justifying reason for one's action (as in the case of taking a terminally ill patient off of burdensome life support). Under normative circumstance, of course, we should not allow someone to die if we can help.

Aristotle's understanding of the Virtues of Character

- VC's require 'correct reason': This is a common belief that will be assumed, and will be more fully discussed when we come to the person of prudence (i.e., practical wisdom). However, we already know this is important from the function argument. - 'Doctrine of the mean': VC's require avoiding excess and deficiency in feeling or action.

Sexual perversion and obscenity:

- any form of depersonalization, dehumanizing, or objectification (pp. 129-30).

The reductionist view (Goldman)

- desire for contact with another person's body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfill such desires for the agent - On Freud's view, sexual desire aims at "union of the genitals in the act known as copulation, which leads to a release of the sexual tension and a temporary extinction of the sexual instinct - a satisfaction analogous to the sating of hunger" - [Sexual] activity, like other natural functions such as eating, has become embedded in layers of cultural, moral, and superstitious structure, it is hard to conceive it in its simplest terms

Marriage as the proper context for sex:

- erotic love has an inherent 'nuptuality': it has a tendency towards permanence and exclusivity (p. 137).

Sexual virtue

- it does not forbid sexual desire, rather 'it simply ensures the status of desire as an interpersonal feeling;, i.e., as genuine erotic love rather than mere lust (pp. 136-138). Sexual virtues, such as chastity, fidelity, and erotic love itself, are necessary for true sexual fulfillment and human happiness.

The sexual commodity view

- sex is understood as being on part with a business relationship in which each party consents to exchange a 'commodity' for mutual benefit and where they expected to live up to their side of the bargain

Why does Aristotle think that the base/vicious person is neither capable of proper self-love nor good friendship?

- the base/vicious person is in both internal conflict with his or her self and external conflict with others.

Ethics of taboo and pollution:

- the sense of the sacred is behind the strong prohibitions on certain kinds of sexual conduct

The sexual sacrament view (this contrasts with the sexual commodity view):

- there is something inherently sacred or inestimably precious about human sexuality

Liberal Kantianism

- to respect people as ends-in-themselves only requires getting consent and fulfilling our contractual obligations.

Utilitarian version

- war is wrong because the bad consequences of war always outweigh whatever good can be gained. Response: Not all wars result in more bad than good.

2 versions of Political realism

1. Moral Nihilist/Hobbesian Version: 2. Utilitarian Version:

Three objects of choice/desire

1. The Fine (i.e., those actions or feelings that enable us to fulfill our human function in an excellent manner) 2. The Expedient (i.e., the useful/advantageous) 3. The Pleasant.

Three objects of avoidance

1. The Shameful; 2. The Harmful; 3. The Painful.

Three positions on the ethics of pornography

1. The liberal view (Altman); 2. The feminist view (Brison); 3. The conservative view (Scruton).

Two views of sexual desire

1. The reductionist view (Goldman); 2. The intentionalist/personalist view (Scruton).

Aristotle's account of 3 kinds of friendship

1. pleasure friendship; 2. utility friendship; and 3. virtue friendship (or friendship of the good).

External conflict

Base people, however, cannot be in concord, except to a slight degree, just as they can be friends only to a slight degree; for they seek to overreach in benefits [to themselves], and shirk labors and public services. And since each wishes this for himself, he interrogates and obstructs his neighbor; for when people do not look out for the common good, it is ruined. The result is that they are in conflict, trying to compel one another to do what is just, but not wishing to do it themselves

Virtues of Character represented in virtues of courage, temperance, and generosity

Excess (Vice) / Mean (Virtue) / Deficiency (Vice) Rashness Courage/bravery Cowardice Intemperance Temperance Insensibility Wastefulness Generosity Ungenerosity

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Happiness-centered ethics

Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation: All Animals are Equal"

Human beings and non-human animals are morally equal because the only legitimate basis for moral concern is sentience, that is, the ability of a creature to feel pleasure and pain. o Here Singer is putting forward a utilitarian position; indeed he cites the first utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham who says 'The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?' o Singer makes the charge of speciesism against views that claims that human beings are morally special. He thinks this is an unfounded prejudice that is equivalent to sexism and racism. He appeals to case of what he calls 'marginal humans' (i.e., human beings with severe mental disabilities) to show that our preferential concern for humans is not based on our being moral higher beings. However, the question here, as with the abortion debate, is whether our special human dignity should be seen to depend on some level of achieving our distinctive human capacities for rationality and morality or whether it is had simply virtue of being human, i.e., being a member of the kind of beings, namely human beings, who have this capacity (Scruton, like Lee and George, take this latter position). o Does the fact that Singer makes appeals to human beings as moral beings to be vegetarians but does not try to get lions and other predators from ceasing to eat other animals show that human beings are in fact morally special? o It seems that Singer's position is committed to saying that there is no real difference between eating a cow and eating human being, but most people would disagree. • The trivial desire argument o The basic idea here is that most people eat meat because they think it tastes good, but its tasting good is not a weighty enough reason (i.e., it is too trivial) to justify the pain caused to the non-human animal that is raised, killed, and eaten.

Judith Jarvis Thomson's Bodily Rights Argument

Key claim: Even if it is granted that human embryos and fetuses are persons and thus have a right to life, nevertheless, they do not have a right to use a woman's body to sustain their lives. Bodily rights trump the right to life. The Violinist Analogy Argument: o Consider the hypothetical scenario in which you are kidnapped and then hooked up to a famous unconscious violinist with a potentially fatal kidney ailment in order to provide life support, which is required for 9 months, after which time the violinist will be recovered. Would you be required to stay plugged in for the 9 months? Thomson thinks not. Although the violinist is a person and has a right to life, he does not have a right to use another person's body in order to sustain his life. o The analogy here might seem to apply only to case of pregnancy due to rape, but Thomson goes on to argue that it applies to all unwanted pregnancies.

The liberal view (Altman)

Key claim: There is a "moral right to buy and possess a wide range of pornographic materials, including those that depict sexual violence." - Appeals to the value of sexual autonomy: as long as everyone involved consents, there is nothing wrong. - This defense is consumer-centered, whereas defenders have typically appeal to "free speech," which is producer centered. - Altman claims that if the porno actor consents to something, then it can't be humiliating or degrading (p. 231). But even if it is, he thinks this still does not mean it should be allowed

John Cottingham on "Impartiality and Ethical Formation"

Key claim: partiality in seeking self-improvement is a legitimate moral undertaking. We are stewards of our talents. However, such self-improvement needs to be understood in light of an objectivist framework of value. Stewarding my individual resources inevitably requires me to take into account the needs of fellow human beings in the wider world. • Two domains of morality (which are connected yet distinct): o Interpersonal relations (i.e., "how we should treat our fellow human beings") These have been more the concern of modern moral philosophers such as Mill and Kant (though Kant does allow for duties to self, such as cultivating talents). o Intrapersonal ethical formation (i.e., "the individual journey towards self-knowledge, self-development, and harmonious living"). This has been more the concern of classical philosopher such as Aristotle (though we have seen that this will ultimately lead us to do go for others as well). The best kind of view seems to require both.

The feminist view (Brison)

Pornography is "hate speech" - Brison cites Catherine MacKinnon morally-loaded definition of pornography (which contrasts with Altman's morally-neutral definition): - "[The] graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission, servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual" (p. 238). - Brison's own definition: pornography is "violent degrading misogynistic hate speech (where "speech" includes words, pictures, films, etc." (p. 238). - "what is wrong with pornography is not that it morally defiles its producers and consumers, nor that it is offensive or sinful, but, rather, that it is a species of hate literature as well as a particularly insidious method of sexist socialization. [...] [Feminist] critics of such pornography are not criticizing it on the grounds that [...] it constitutes "obscenity"

Deontological Version (Right to life pacificsm)

Right to Life Pacificsm: war is wrong because it violates people's absolute right to life, which means that we ought never to intentionally kill any human being under can circumstances. Response: The right to life claim is contradictory (see Narveson). How should right to life be understood then? The standard sanctity/inviolability of life principle: we ought never to intentionally kill an innocent human being. The basis of Just War Theory. (Notice that it is an absolutist principle.)

Paul Taylor's Biocentric Egalitarianism: all living things are morally equal

The basic argument P [Premise] 1: Humans are members of the Earth's community of life in the same way and on the same terms as all the nonhuman members. P2: Humans and all other species are interdependent elements in a complex web of biological existence. P3: Each organism is an individual striving towards its own good in its own way (i.e., it is a teleological center of life). P4: The claim that humans are superior to other species is unfounded. C [Conclusion]: Therefore, all living things have equal inherent worth and are entitled to equal respect (biocentric egalitarianism).

Just war theory

The dominant ethical approach to war; war may be justified provided certain conditions are met. This is based on the sanctity/inviolability of life principle: we ought never to intentionally kill an innocent human being. Just war theory acknowledges that though war is a terrible evil, are sometimes morally justified in participating in this evil.

Utilitarian version

The ends justify the means, where the end is the greatest happiness for the great number. Discuss Truman bombing. Was it genuine utilitarianism? *What do you think? It does seem - against "political realism" - that we straightforwardly apply moral norms to warfare and believe that there are some things that should not be done to people even in wartime no matter the consequences (e.g., the slaughter of children, genocide, mass rape, cruelty, ruthlessness, atrocity, massacre, etc.). We experience war in moral categories: innocence, sanctity of human life, cruelty, agony, guilt, etc.

Focus of virtue ethics

The focus is more on what sort of person should I be than on what should I do; the latter will follow the former

David Schmidtz's Biocentric Ineqalitarianism: all (or perhaps almost all) living things have some intrinsic value, but they are not equal in the value

The plus-more argument: '[We] can distinguish, along Aristotelian lines, vegetative, animal, and cognitive goods of one's own. To have a vegetative nature is to be what Taylor [...] calls a teleological centre of life. A being with an animal nature is a teleological centre of life, and more. A being with a cognitive as well as animal nature is a teleological centre of life, and more still. [...] [If] biocentrism involves resolving to ignore the fact that cognitive capacity is something we value—if biocentrism amounts to a resolution to value only those capacities that all living things share—then biocentrism is at least as arbitrary and question-begging as anthropocentrism'. 'Animals have a plant's capacities plus more. In turn, humans (and possibly dolphins, apes, and so on) have an animal's capacities plus more'. *Commentary: It seems that we can distinguish between humans and other animals with higher intelligence can as dolphins, apes, and so on because we have language and rationality (which involves discursive thought drawing on linguistic concepts) and with this comes morality (and we might also add spirituality) and this, it could be argued (as Scruton does), is what makes as really special. We might also say that all existence has value (since existence itself can be awe-inspiring and respect-worthy), including, e.g., non-living things such as rocks. So the order of intrinsic value would go as follows: 1. Existing things 2. Living things: these beings have existence plus life) 3. Sentient beings (of varying degrees of intelligence) with powers of locomotion: these beings have existence and life plus sentience and powers of locomotion. 4. Rational, moral beings: these beings have existence, life, sentience, and powers of locomotion plus rationality and morality (and we might also add spirituality). All of these features can be properly seen as worthy of admiration, awe, respect, reverence, etc. In other words, they can be seen as having varying degrees of intrinsic value.

The consent-only model of sexual ethics

There is nothing wrong with 'plain sex' so long as there is consent.

Why does Aristotle think the fine or the noble should be paramount?

They provide the standard for what is truly useful and pleasant

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George's Personhood (or Sanctity of Human Life) Argument Against Abortion

Three points about the human embryo (p. 14): o "First, it is from the start distinct for any cell of the mother or of the father. This clear because it is growing in its own distinct direction. Its growth is internally directed to its own survival and maturation." o "Second, the embryo is human: it has the genetic makeup characteristic of human beings." o "Third, and most importantly, the human embryo is a complete or whole organism, though immature. The human embryo, from conception onward, is fully programmed actively to develop him or herself to the mature stage of a human being, and, unless prevent by disease or violence, will actively do so." - The three points show that the human embryo is radically unlike sex cells and somatic cells. Summary: "[An] embryo (and fetus) is a human being at a certain (early) stage of development - the embryonic (or fetal stage). In abortion, what is killed is a human being, a whole living member of the species homo sapiens, the same kind of entity as you or I, only at an early stage of development" (p. 15).

Warren's Personhood Argument in Favor of Abortion

Two Senses of Being Human: (1) The moral sense: this pertains to being a "person," which entails moral and legal rights, such as the right to life, i.e., the right not to be intentionally killed as an innocent human being. The concept of personhood here is a moral category that identifies who is in the moral community (recall Kant's moral distinction between persons and things). (2) The genetic (or biological) sense. o Key question: should these two senses of being human be separated? o Warren maintains that one can be genetically (or biologically) human but not human in the moral sense, i.e., one can be human but not a person. For instance, she does not think human embryos, fetuses, and infants are persons in the relevant sense.

Virtue ethics version

Virtue ethics pacifism seeks to inculcate the kind of respect for persons that makes it difficult to create the necessary distance between ourselves and other human beings so that killing is possible. There is a tension between not distancing ourselves from others and yet respecting ourselves so that we are obliged to defend ourselves. *Wants to defend a pacifist position that is against killing, not against all violence. *Argues against Narveson's 'incoherency' charge; rights do imply an entitlement to defend the right, but does not imply one can take any action; the pacifist rejects the proportionality criteria; Ryan thinks rights-based arguments will get us nowhere.

Aristotle's view on why be moral?

Virtue is its own reward. Virtue is constitutive of happiness. Here there is a strong evaluative view of happiness (a normatively higher, nobler, more fulfilling life that we ought to desire); more of an objective state of well-being than a subjective feeling.

Antiwar pacificism (4 Views)

War is never morally justified; all wars are wrong; 1. Absolute pacifism: 2. Utilitarianism view 3. Deontological Version: 4. Virtue Ethics Version (Cheney Ryan) - Orwell example. Fascist vs. fellow-creature. - The pacificst does not want to create the necessary objectification and distance for killing another person; the fact that others do is taken to reflect badly on them; the pacifist position is motivated by a picture of ideal personal relationships. - Dilemma between self-respect and respect for others for the pacifist.

Jus in bello (Just war theory) (2)

What actions are morally permissible in the conduct of war? 1. Discrimination between combatants and non-combatants/innocents - The killing and wounding of non-combatants/innocents in war, though inevitable, must be unintended, otherwise it is murder. We should do what we can to avoid or minimize such death of innocents. To what extent is it realistic to uphold this distinction in modern war? Should one bomb a military base if one 'foresees' that it will surely kill those in the school next door? Are those who support the war effort combatants or non-combatants? Discuss also Sandel's example (the Lone Survivor case). Do soldiers have a responsibility to risk their own life to protect noncombatants? Nagel on non-combatants: those who are currently harmless, as opposed to doing harm. Who falls into this group? Women, children, the elderly, [wounded soldiers?,] etc. What about supporting personnel, such as medical staff, farmers, etc.? What about "dual use" targeting, such as water and power supplies, transportation, and communication centers? 2. The proportional use of force - the level of violence (especially as it pertains to unintended harm to innocents) should not exceed what is needed to achieve the good or avoid the evil in question.

Jus ad bellum (Just war theory) (6)

When is resorting to war morally permissible? 1. The conflict is endorsed by legitimate authority (Q: what counts as a legitimate authority?) 2. The cause is just - viz., self-defense or the defense of the innocent lives of others. (Q: Does the other party have to actually be engaging in an attack, or is it enough if they are preparing to attack? Or could it be enough that one fears another group as a threat, even if the threat is more distant and uncertain? Discuss preemptive and preventive war. Many recognize the former but not the latter. Discuss the war in Iraq.) 3. The war is waged with rightful intentions - this means either to advance the good or to avoid evil. Bad motives would include hatred, greed, vengeance, bloodlust, and lust for domination. Discuss doctrine of double effect. 4. The war is the last resort 5. The good accomplished by going to war is proportional to the evil that the conflict causes (the consequentialist argument for pacifism is relevant here). 6. There is reasonable possibility of success

The Sanctity of Life Argument against physician assisted suicide (Keown)

a. This is often associated with a natural law perspective (this is Keown's view: here life is seen as a basic or intrinsic good [like friendship and knowledge] to which we are naturally oriented and can grasp through reason and which is constitutive of human flourishing or fulfillment; see Keown, p. 41) or a strong Kantian perspective (see Kant on suicide). b. The basic idea here that all human life has not only instrumental value, but also intrinsic value or dignity, indeed it has sacred value (in virtue of our radical capacity for rationality and morality), where there is a basic inviolability from being intentionally killed as an innocent human being. The sanctity of life principle includes the requirement that 'one must never intentionally kill an innocent human being' (Keown). It also requires us to positively help others in need where appropriate. However, unlike the vitalist view which says that we must preserve life at all costs, the sanctity of life does allow that when someone is terminally ill that one can cease treatment if it is no longer beneficial or overly burdensome and if one does not intend the death but only foresees its possibility. See Keown's discussion of the distinction between intention vs. foresight and the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment on pp. 41-44. c. The value of human life (i.e., its sacred value) override the value of autonomy. Keown says: 'an exercise of autonomy merits respect only when it is exercised in accordance with a framework of sound moral values. d. Just like the issue of abortion, where one stands on this issue is going depend on how one values human life and how one values autonomy and which they think should be given precedence.

The autonomy argument

a. This is often based on a form of liberal Kantianism that interprets the second formulation of the categorical imperative to respect human beings as ends in themselves in terms of respecting their autonomy. Contrast this with Kant himself who was strongly against suicide. b. See Dworkin et al., 'The Philosophers' Brief', which is a famous brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court at a time when the Court was considering two cases involving state bans on physician-assisted suicide (the Court in fact upheld these bans and rejected appeals for a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide). c. Dworkin et al.: 'These cases [regarding physician-assisted suicide] do not invite or require the Court to make moral, ethical or religious judgments about how people should approach or confront their death or about when it is ethically appropriate to hasten one's own death or to ask others for help in doing so. On the contrary, they ask the Court to recognize that individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in making those grave judgments for themselves, free from the imposition of any religious or philosophical orthodoxy by court or legislature. [...] Denying that opportunity to terminally-ill patients who are in agonizing pain or otherwise doomed to an existence they regard as intolerable could only be justified on the basis of a religious or ethical conviction about the value and meaning of life itself. Our Constitution forbids government to impose such convictions on its citizens'. The authors go on to say: 'Death is, for each of us, among the most significant events of life. [...] Most of us see death [...] as the final act of life's drama, and we want that last act to reflect our own convictions, those we have tried to live by, not the convictions of others forced on us in our most vulnerable moments'. They conclude that each person has a right to make the 'most intimate and personal choices central to personal dignity and autonomy', which includes 'the right to exercise some control over the time and manner of one's death'. In short, the basic idea here is that the Court should be neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the meaning and value of human life and thus allow individuals the autonomy to make these decisions for themselves according to their conscience. d. Response: Is such a view in fact really neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the meaning and value of human life? Michael Sandel in 'Last Rights' contends that the brief actually does affirm a view of what makes life worth living, namely, 'the best way to live and die is to do so deliberately, autonomously, in a way that enables us to view our lives as our own creations. The best lives are led by those who see themselves not as participants in a drama larger than themselves but as authors of the drama itself'. One's life is seen here as one's own possession and Sandel notes that this is 'at odds with a wide range of moral outlooks that view life as a gift, of which we are custodians with certain duties. Such outlooks reject the idea that a person's life is open to unlimited use, even by the person whose life it is'. Here there is fundamental divide between those who adopt a controlling stance to the world and those who believe that in certain cases an accepting stance is most important, particularly with regard to giftedness of life (where we should not try to 'play God' by exceeding the proper limits of human activity). The authors of the brief might respond by saying that people who want to see their life as a gift and as part of a larger drama remain free to do so. But Sandel contends that a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide 'would not simply expand the range of options, but would encourage the tendency to view life less as a gift and more as a possession. It might heighten the prestige we accord autonomous, independent lives and depreciate the claims of those seen to be dependent'. He worries that this could affect attitudes and treatment of the young, the old, the disabled, the infirm, and the poor. It should also be noted that the life as a gift view is often linked to a belief in the 'sanctity' (that is, inviolability) of human life, which requires, among other things, that one never intentionally kills an innocent human being, whether it be others or one's self (see Keown). Here the demands of the sanctity of human life are seen as overriding all considerations about quality of life and autonomy. For anyone who affirms such a view it is unlikely that they will see it as reasonable to bracket this view when considering the direction of public policy. e. It is noteworthy that Dworkin et al. link the autonomy argument with cases of terminal illness and suffering, suggesting that autonomy alone is not sufficient. In other words, the autonomy argument and the quality of life argument need to go together.

The quality of life argument

a. This most commonly associated with a utilitarian perspective. b. The basic idea here is that people should be allowed to end their suffering, that is, if they determined that their quality of life is too poor. c. Response: But does life only have instrumental value, that is, it is only valuable insofar as it involves more pleasant experiences than painful experiences or a certain quality of life threshold? Or does life have intrinsic value, including perhaps sacred value or inherent dignity?

Absolute pacifism

all violence and all killing are morally wrong; some may allow for use of violence in personal self-defense or law enforcement but hold that war is immoral.

Moral Nihilist/Hobbesian Version

morality does not apply to war; the only legitimate concern is whether the war advances the state's interests or the leader or those in power; no means are excluded: 'all is fair in love and war'; 'might makes right' (though 'right' loses its typical meaning; akin to the problem with divine command morality). The nihilist or 'realist' about war can arise from skepticism about morality generally or from the idea that moral standards pertain only to persons and not to states.

Warren's personhood criteria

o Consciousness and in particular the capacity to feel pain (i.e., sentience) o Reasoning o Self-motivated activity o The capacity for complex communication o Self-awareness

Main features of the Traditionalist view of sexual ethics

o Consent is necessary but not sufficient for an adequate sexual ethic. We also need to avoid depersonalization/objectification and cultivate and express sexual virtue (chastity, fidelity, and erotic love). o Human sexuality is inherently of deep significance; i.e., it morally and even spiritually special. o The sexual sacrament view (this contrasts with the sexual commodity view): o Ethics of taboo and pollution: Scruton argues that this sense of the sacred is needed in order to make sense of the wrong of rape and other forms of sexual violence (pp. 133, 137). o Sexual perversion and obscenity: According to the traditional sexual ethic, there is something wrong with casual sex, promiscuity, prostitution, sadomasochism, pornography, and so forth. o Sexual virtue: o Marriage as the proper context for sex: Vow vs. contract

The human good

the excellent fulfillment of the human function

Roger Scruton's "Eating our Friends"

• Human beings are morally special in virtue of being moral beings: Scruton thinks the charge of speciesism is misplaced because the issue is really whether one is moral being or not: 'It is not the difference of species that I endow with moral significance, when I distinguish people from other animals. It is rather the difference between a moral being, who lives as the subject and object of judgement, and a non-moral being, who merely lives. Maybe all moral beings belong to a single species: but it is not the species that I consider, when I distinguish the life and fulfillment of a person from the life and fulfillment of a dog. And if any distinctions are morally relevant, then surely the distinction between moral and the non-moral is one of them' (p. 50). • Scruton's response to the 'marginal human' (as Singer calls them) case: 'It is often objected that we do in fact make descriminations on the grounds of species membership, since we afford to 'marginal humans', who lack the capacities that distinguish the moral being from the rest of nature, some, although not all, of the privileges of fully responsible people. [...] To this I would respond that we do this because the human form is, for us, the outward sign and symbol of the moral life, and because we never wish to foreclose the possibility that each human body harbours, in whatever embryonic form, a personality. This reaction is part of piety; it may be hard to justify it in terms of the cold, hard, utilitarian reasoning that appeals to Peter Singer; but the fault lies in that cold, hard form of reasoning. Utilitarianism overlooks precisely what is so distinctive of our condition, which is our rooted disposition to understand ourselves as moral beings, bound in relations of accountability to others of our kind. We define human nature in terms of its normal development, along the trajectory of the personal and responsible life. That is the kind of thing that we are; and it is the kind to which even the tragically abnormal human beings belong, and from which dogs, cats, horses and all other animals with which we habitually have dealings are by their nature excluded' (pp. 50-51). • Although Scruton thinks that human beings are morally special, he thinks we also owe a respect or reverence (based on natural piety). Thus, he makes a distinction between being a virtuous and vicious carnivore (Scruton perspective has aspects of Kantian, natural law, and virtue ethics): o The vicious carnivore: the person who eats meat without proper reverence and gratitude; the burger-stuffer. o The virtuous carnivore: the person who does eat meat with proper reverence and gratitude; this person remoralizes eating meat in a celebrating, feasting context and achieves a higher form of self-consciousness. o Scruton says: 'Although I do not think that there is a compelling moral argument against meat-eating, I do believe that the onus lies on the carnivore to show that there is a way of incorporating meat into a life that respects the moral and spiritual realities, and which does not shame the human race, as it is shamed by the solitary 'caveman' gluttony of the burger-stuffer' (p. 54). o Scruton thinks we should return to kinder, smaller forms of animal raising; hence the title of the essay 'Eating our Friends'. • Response to the trivial desire objection: we can achieve a higher form of self-consciousness through eating meat in the mode of the virtuous carnivore, i.e., by 'remoralizing' our meat-eating practices in the context of feasting and celebration and where there is reverence and gratitude (see pp. 61-63).

Singer on "Famine, Affluence, and Morality"

• The strong principle: "If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral important, we ought, morally, to do it." • The moderate principle: "if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it." o Singer accepts the strong principle, but thinks establishing the moderate principle is enough to make his point. • Establishing the moderate principle: the drowning child example o What would you do? o What are the implications for our moral responsibilities with regard to famine relief and world poverty? Singer thinks there are radical implications: we "ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents—perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility [at least on the strong principle], at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal." "People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. (Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them.) This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified."