Philosophy 1

According to Peter van Inwagen, when we reflect intuitively on what free will is, we believe it's much like...

A garden of forking paths

Accidental Identity

A property y is accidental to something x if and only if there is some possible world in which x exists and lacks y. Examples of accidental properties: being funny-smelling, being the brother of John.

Essential Identity

A property y is essential to something x if and only if there is no possible world in which x exists and lacks y. Examples of essential properties: being consistent with 2+2=4, being self-identical.

Which of the following questions is NOT asked by Feldman: A. Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence have reasonable disagreements? B. Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their own belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also reasonable? C. Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence just agree that atheism is obviously true?

C. Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence just agree that atheism is obviously true?

Bertrand Russell quotes the Catholic Church as claiming that the existence of God...

Can be proven by "unaided reason"

The Uniqueness Thesis

For any body of evidence, that body justifies exactly one doxastic attitude for any proposition: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment

The Soul Stuff Objection

Of what is the soul composed? What kind of stuff is it? It's hard to see what it could be, so it's impossible for there to be such a thing -Plantinga replies that there are plenty of things that exist (propositions, electrons), yet we have no idea what they're made of. Also, God is an immaterial soul and isn't made up of stuff and isn't an abstract object.

Russel's First-Cause Argument

Russell doesn't give anything like an explicit reconstruction of any "first cause" argument, but it goes something like this: (P1) Everything that exists is caused to exist by something else. (P2) The universe exists. (C1) Therefore, the universe is caused to exist by something else. (P3) If the universe is caused by something else, then God caused it to exist. (C2) Therefore, God caused it to exist.

Russels first objection to First Cause Argument

Russell's First Objection P1 creates real problems for theists. (P1) Everything that exists is caused to exist by something else. God exists, so something other than God caused God to exist. But then God doesn't explain everything in the universe. Worse, we don't even need God's existence to explain the universe. We could just say that the train of causes stops at the universe, instead.

Russel's second objection to the Natural Law Argument

Russell's Second Objection P2 is false. -Natural laws are descriptions of natural regularities. -They aren't like moral laws, which prescribe behavior. -They're natural laws, which describe behavior. -You don't need God to explain why things behave the way they do (and not some other way)

Free Will

S has free will if and only if it is sometimes the case that there is some action, x, where S can perform x and S can refrain from performing x

van Inwagens No Choice Principle

if it is now not up to me that p, and if p entails q, then it is now not up to me that q.

van Inwagen: Centrality of Alternate possibilites

if you don't do x freely, then you aren't morally responsible for x. So, if you're morally responsible for x, then you do x freely. And if you do x freely, then you had alternate possibilities when it came to x.

According to Peter van Inwagen, if determinism is true, then if God (or someone) "rewound the clock" of time...

Everything would go exactly as it did before

According to Alvin Plantinga, the following is an example of an objection to dualism/substance dualism...

"It's unscientific"

The Main Skeptical Argument

(1) If we know that the external world is real, then we know that we aren't in a matrix (or something like it). (2) We don't know that we aren't in a matrix (or something like it). (3) Therefore, we don't know that the external world is real. -If you no p is true then you know not-p is false Ex: if you know theism is true, you know atheism is false.

Objection 3: The Worse Evils Objection

(1) We're justified in believing "God's goodness wouldn't allow us to be massively deceived" only if we're also justified in believing "God's goodness wouldn't allow there to be holocausts, world hunger, and other worse evils." (2) We're unjustified in believing "God's goodness wouldn't allow there to be holocausts, world hunger, and other worse evils," since those things have occurred. (3) So, we're unjustified in believing "God's goodness wouldn't allow us to be massively deceived." --Howell isn't criticizing God's goodness. He's merely showing that, even if God is good, that doesn't entail that he wouldn't permit massive deception any more than he wouldn't permit holocausts

Moral Arguments for Deity

(P1) If God does not exist, then moral realism is false. (P2) Moral realism is true. (C) God exists.

The Consequence Argument

(P1) If ND is true, then everything that is happening now is either necessarily true or accidentally necessarily true. (P2) If everything that is happening now is either necessarily true or accidentally necessarily true, then my current action is either necessary or accidentally necessary. (P3) If my current action is either necessary or accidentally necessary, then I can't refrain from performing my current action. (P4) If I can't refrain from performing my current action, then my current action is not free. (C) So, if ND is true, then my current action is not free -"If determinism is true, then our acts are the result of the laws of nature and past events. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of those things, including our present acts, are not up to us" (An Essay on Free Will) If the argument is valid and sound, then it shows the incompatibility of ND and FAT

Peter van Inwagen calls The Mind Argument

(P1) If determinism is false, then indeterminism is true. (P2) If indeterminism is true, then if you rewound the world an infinite number of times and changed nothing, agents would sometimes perform x and would sometimes refrain from performing x despite nothing changing. (P3) If agents would sometimes perform x and would sometimes refrain from performing x despite nothing changing, then agents would make decisions that were utterly detached from the reasons they have (i.e., their choices would be random). (P4) If agents would make decisions that were utterly detached from the reasons they have (i.e., their choices would be random), then their choices would not be free. (C) If determinism is false, then choices would not be free.

Russel's Argument from Design

(P1) The universe meets the precise conditions for human existence. (P2) If the universe meets the precise conditions for human existence, the universe is designed by God. (C) The universe is designed by God.

Two types of determinism:

-Broad Determinism: every true proposition is necessarily true: it is true in every possible world -Narrow Determinism: every true proposition is either necessarily true or accidentally necessarily true

Objection 1: The Talented Demon Objection:

-Descartes argues that an evil demon could deceive us about certain mathematical truths, like "2+2=4." -He then argues that we couldn't be deceived about other claims, like "I am a doubting thing," because that would lead to contradiction. -But it's just as much a contradiction to say "2+2" equals anything but 4. -So, if we can't know "2+2=4" even though doubting it would lead to contradiction, how can we know "I am a doubting thing" simply because doubting it would lead to contradiction?

what is Epistemology?

-Epistemology is the branch of philosophy dedicated to questions about the nature of knowledge and rational/warranted/justified belief (among other things). -Epistemologists seek to understand the nature of knowledge.

Russel's first objection from the Argument from Design

-Evolutionary theory explains why the universe meets the precise conditions it does. -Evolutionary processes are random: sometimes things turn out well for organisms, and sometimes not. -Things will turn out some sort of way or other, and it just so happened to turn out that human beings exist. --Example: if you throw a billion darts at a dartboard and Dart 1459 hits the bullseye, does that mean that the dartboard was designed to be hit by Dart 1459? Clearly not. -So, there is no design. Just chance.

Gettier's two assumptions:

-First Assumption: it's possible for there to be justified false beliefs. Justification is a function of evidence, not truth. ---Example: Because the toys look red, I am justified in believing that they are red, at least at first. That the toys are red is what my total evidence (at first) indicates. It turns out I'm wrong and the toys aren't red, but that doesn't mean I was unjustified in believing as I did. -Second Assumption: justification is logically transitive. If I am justified in believing p, and I know that p entails q, then (on the basis of this recognition) I am justified in believing q. ---Example: If I am justified in believing "students exist," and I know that "students exist" entails "something exists," then (on the basis of this recognition) I am justified in believing "something exists.

the essential/accidental distinction

-For anything and anyone, if it has a property y, it has y either essentially or accidentally. -If it has y essentially, then it is numerically identical with y. -If it has y accidentally, then it isn't numerically identical with y.

two senses of identity

-If we mean "S is a member of the set of y's," then we're talking about predication. -If we mean "S is numerically identical with y," then we're talking about identity.

Grau's view on Skepticism

-It appears to be possible that we are massively deceived, and that what we believe is reality isn't. -So everyone should concede that it's possible that we're brains in vats. But they should also concede that we would know whether or not we're brains in vats only if we aren't brains in vats. Because if we were brains in vats, we wouldn't know we were. So if we do know one way or the other, then we must not be brains in vats. And worse: if that's true, then any argument we give to prove that we aren't brains in vats must already assume that we aren't brains in vats, which is circular.

Grau: is it possible to prove we have justified belief's?

-No -Suppose that I asked you to prove to me that we could have justified beliefs. To do this, you can't assume we have justified beliefs. That would be circular. Suppose that you offer some evidence (maybe an argument) that we have justified beliefs. In order for that to be good evidence (or a good argument), we must know what good evidence (or a good argument) is. But that requires us to have justified beliefs! So you can't prove that we have justified beliefs. Similarly, you can't prove that we aren't brains in vats unless you assume that we aren't brains in vats.

Determinism and possible words:

-Possible worlds: complete world histories 1. different realities of different worlds -Talking about possible worlds illuminates the meaning of "necessary truth" If p is a necessary truth, then p is true in every possible world Put differently: if p is a necessary truth, then p is true no matter how reality turns out to be It also illuminates the meaning of "accidentally necessary truth" If p is an accidentally necessary truth, then for every world in which some fact f is true, p is true Put differently: if p is an accidentally necessary truth, then p is true in whatever world some other fact, f, is true -If Broad Determinism (BD) is true, then every true proposition is a necessary truth: true in every possible world If Narrow Determinism (ND) is true, then every true proposition is either a necessary truth or an accidentally necessary truth

Gettier ex: case 3

-Smith goes on a drive in the country. He sees what looks like a sheep in the field, and forms the justified belief "There is a sheep in the field." Smith's belief is also true. But Smith does not see a sheep, only a sheepdog that looks like a sheep. However, there is a sheep in the field out of Smith's sight. -Does Smith know there is a sheep in the field? No, because Smith's evidence is defective: it justifies his belief, but it relies on a falsehood.

Clearing up Doxastic Attitude, Uniqueness, and Equal Weight thesis

-The Doxastic Attitude Thesis is pretty straightforward: for any proposition, you either believe it, disbelieve it, or don't know what you think about it. -The Uniqueness Thesis doesn't imply that we can rightly identify what any given body of evidence in fact supports (in fact, that's often what creates disagreement), or even that we can rightly identify a relevant body of evidence. -The Equal Weight Thesis doesn't imply that we know who's peers with whom, or that anyone has a peer, or that peers disagree, or that peers will always share their testimony.

Russel's first objection to the Natural Law Argument

-The law of statistical averages entails that things must turn out to be some way, and it's no more surprising that things turned out this way (instead of some other way) given the law of statistical averages. -If you rolled dice and they turned up double sixes, that wouldn't be design. It would be chance. -If, on the other hand, the dice turned out to be double sixes every time, that would be surprising and apparently designed.

What are the different types of epistemic peerhoods?

-Truth peerhood: S1 and S2 are equally skilled at getting to the truth. -Justification peerhood: S1 and S2 are equally skilled at acquiring justified beliefs. -Evaluator peerhood: S1 and S2 are equally skilled at being virtuous in evaluating evidence.

Feldman claims it matters that people disagree with us because of...

-peerhood...specifically "epistemic peerhood" -if S1 and S2 are epistemic peers, then they are equally skilled at gaining knowledge and justified belief.

Personal Identity wrap up...

-personal identity is an enormously complex issue. -Some thinkers, like many Buddhists, believe that there is no personal identity. -Others believe that there is personal identity. -Puzzles like Dennett's make it seem unclear who's right: --If there is no personal identity, why do we have all these intuitions about metaphysics (e.g., why do we think we can't switch brains with someone)? --If there is personal identity, why can't we (so to speak) identity what and where we are?

According to Descartes, how do we know we aren't under control of a madman or an evil demon?

1. We can doubt anything: that there are trees, that "2+2=4," that we have hands, that there are other people, and so on. 2. We cannot doubt, however, that we are doubting. 3. If you doubt that you are doubting, you believe "I am doubting that I am not doubting": but that's a contradiction! 4. Since we must be things that doubt, we must exist: nothing can doubt if it doesn't exist. 5. Descartes believes that we can treat other topics this way, too: - We perceive clearly and distinctly that we doubt. (In other words: we can see that we doubt.) - We also perceive clearly and distinctly that there is a God who, being morally perfect, would never deceive us or allow us to be massively deceived. - Because we perceive this clearly and distinctly, we should conclude that there is a God with that nature. - That gets us out of skepticism: God wouldn't let us be caught in a Matrix.

Russell claims that believers in God sometimes claim something like this: "There are injustices in the universe. There must be a remedy for this. It won't happen in this life, so there must be an afterlife where every injustice is remedied. If that's true, then God exists." According to Russell, what's the problem with this argument? [HINT: basket of oranges example.]

Because there are injustices in this life, it's more likely that there will be injustices in the next life (if there is one) than a remedy for all injustices in the next life.

Contextualists response to main skeptical argument

Contextualists believe that we are justified in our anti-skeptical beliefs. They also believe that we are unjustified in our anti-skeptical beliefs. That sounds like a contradiction, and it would be except the term "justification" is ambiguous, according to contextualists. On the contextualist view, what counts as justified belief differs from case to case. Ex: a four year old and medical student say Alzheimers is when you forget things. According to contextualists, Little Debbie knows but the Medical Student doesn't. The standards of knowledge for a four-year-old are lower than they are for a doctor. Debbie, being four, meets the pretty minimal standards. The Medical Student, having been through much medical training, should have given a much better answer.

Ockhamist Reply to the Main Skeptical Argument

Don't believe in things for which you have no evidence. ex: you come home to your house being a mess, do you think alien invasion, govt invasion, or dog messed it up? dog.

What does Gettier argue?

Gettier argues that our definition of knowledge is too broad and includes cases that aren't knowledge at all

Gettier's cases:

Gettier's cases: -Case 1: Smith and the Coins Smith and Jones apply for a job. Smith's evidence indicates both that Jones will get the job and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith infers, "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket." Unbeknownst to Smith, he too has ten coins and his pocket and he, but not Jones, will get the job. ---Smith's belief that "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" is justified, because his total evidence indicates that Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. It's also true, because Smith gets the job and Smith has ten coins in his pocket. But it isn't a case of knowledge because Smith believes something true on the basis of misleading evidence. -Case 2: Smith and the Ford Smith's evidence indicates that Jones owns a Ford. Smith infers from this that "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Jones is in Barcelona." Jones does not own a Ford, but Jones is (by freakish coincidence) in Barcelona ---Smith's belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Jones is in Barcelona" is both true and justified, but it isn't knowledge. The reason is the same: Smith believes something true on the basis of misleading evidence. ex: : "Either God exists or God does not exist."

What are the Four kinds of skepticism

Global skepticism: skepticism that applies to all of our beliefs Local skepticism: skepticism that applies to only some of our beliefs Knowledge skepticism: skepticism that applies to claims about knowledge (e.g., "S knows that p") Rational skepticism: skepticism that applies to claims about justified belief (e.g., "S is justified in believing p")

Ultimately, according to Descartes, there can be no massive deception because...

God exists

According to Alvin Plantinga, Christians shouldn't think that it's impossible for immaterial minds to interact causally with the material world, because...

God is an immaterial mind who interacts causally with the material world

Frankfurt's argument on Alternate possibilities

He argues that there is a possible world in which someone performs x without alternate possibilities yet is morally responsible for x. -In other words, alternate possibilities aren't necessary for moral responsibility. -If he's right, then a major motivation for being an incompatibilist is undermined. Here's why: -We care about free will primarily because we care about attributing things to agent: praise, blame, intent, and so on. -But if those things can be explained without appealing to or assuming free will, then what we (primarily) care about doesn't have to do with free will at all - it's independent of it. -And if that's true, then we lose our primary motivation for caring about free will. -ex of Jones wanting to kill black, white has thought of killing black, white either goes through with killing black or jones makes him-no alternate possiblilty

The Natural Law Argument

Here's a reconstruction: (P1) There are natural laws. (P2) If there are natural laws, there is a Natural Lawgiver. (C1) There is a Natural Lawgiver. (P3) If there is a Natural Lawgiver, the Natural Lawgiver is God (and God exists). (C2) The Natural Lawgiver is God (and God exists).

The Equal Weight Thesis

If S1 and S2 are peers with respect to evaluating some proposition, p, then S1's testimony counts the same as S2's testimony with respect to p.

The Causal Objection

If dualism is true, then persons are immaterial objects who cause material events. It's impossible for immaterial objects to cause material events. So, dualism is false.

could there be a single possible world, W, in which both Narrow Determinism (ND) and Free Action Thesis (FAT) are true?

If there is such a world, then compatibilists are right If there is no such world, then incompatibilists are right

In order for it to be a disagreement it must...

In order for it to be real disagreement, those disagreeing must... (A) Be referring to the same proposition (B) Have different beliefs about the truth value of that proposition (C) Realize A and B (i.e., that they are referring to and have incompatible beliefs regarding that exact proposition)

According to Peter van Inwagen, incompatibilists believe that free will and determinism are...

Incompatible

Descartes Skepticism: The Evil Demon

It might be that there is some evil demon with immense knowledge and power who deceives us every day about everything. Every time we try to compute "2+2," this demon causes us to believe "=19."

In Frankfurt's examples, the actors are...

Left without alternate possibilities

Moorean response the the Main Skeptical Argument

Moore's Argument Against Skepticism: (1) If we know that the external world is real, then we know that we aren't in a matrix (or something like it). (2) We know that the external world is real. (3) Therefore, we know that we aren't in a matrix (or something like it). This argument is just as valid as the Main Skeptical Argument. It just turns things around on the skeptic -The Hand Argument (1) Here is one hand. (2) Here is another hand. (3) If 1 and 2, then there are at least two objects in the external world. (4) Therefore, there are at least two objects in the external world. The premises of this argument (1, 2, and 3) are more obviously true than the premises in the Main Skeptical Argument. So, we should accept this argument and reject the Main Skeptical Argument.

In Feldman's view, can there be reasonable disagreements (in the sense he means it)?

No

Problems with Descartes approach:

Objection 1: The Talented Demon Objection Objection 2: The God Allows Deceit Objection Objection 3: The Worse Evils Objection

Plantinga's escape to the causal objection

Occasionalism: only God causes things, but he causes them in cooperation with your plans. Pre-established Harmony: God designed the universe so that material events happen in harmony with the choices of immaterial beings. Counterfactual Causation: to say "x causes y," you don't need to say anything like "x pushes y" or "x's atoms push y's atoms." You can just say this is what "cause" means: if you willed y to happen, then it would.

If we combined the different types of peerhood what would we get

Overall epistemic peerhoood: S1 and S2 are equally skilled at getting to the truth, acquiring justified beliefs, and being virtuous in evaluating evidence.

Russel's second objection to First Cause Argument

P1 is false. Not every existing thing has a cause. Consider numbers, which are existing things: what caused them to exist? Nothing, yet they exist. It's possible for the universe to have existed eternally, without any cause (or first cause). Maybe there was an infinite series of past causes

Russel's second objection from the Argument from Design

P2 is false, at least if God is omniscient and omnipotent. An omniscient God would know how to create a universe without design flaws (e.g., bad vision, evolutionary dead-ends, cancer). An omnipotent God would have the power and intent to create a universe without design flaws. Yet there are design flaws. So, either God isn't omniscient or isn't omnipotent. Either way, an omniscient, omnipotent God doesn't exist or didn't design the universe.

Parity Objection

Peter van Inwagen argues that it seems impossible for a material thing to think. But it seems no less impossible for an immaterial thing to think. After all, we can't form a mental picture of what that would even look like. -Plantinga replies that there are plenty of things we can't picture, yet they're true (79 being prime, a 1000-sided figure). We can also imagine impossible things (propositions being red or looking like elephants).

the unscientific objection to materialism

Plantinga replies that we're interested in whether dualism is true, not whether it bows the knee to science. It's unclear why any view needs to be scientifically verified to be true. Clearly, things were true long before science verified them

Harry Frankfurt attempts to show that the ___________ is false.

Principle of Alternate Possibilities

specific peerhood

S1 and S2 might be generally just as epistemically virtuous. But suppose S1 isn't very objective about science, because he hates science. S2, on the other hand, has no feelings whatsoever about science, but (unlike S1) hates philosophy. In this case, S1 and S2 might be equally virtuous in general, but they aren't peers about science and philosophy. When it comes to science, S2 is more virtuous than S1. When it comes to philosophy, S1 is more virtuous than S2

Feldman: What is disagreement?

S1 disagrees with S2 if and only if there is some proposition, p, that S1 believes is true (indeterminate, false) and S2 believes is false (true, indeterminate).

Descartes Skepticism: The Madman

Some persons really are insane and have all sorts of false and unjustified beliefs about the world. Persons suffering from Capgras delusion, for example, believe that their loved ones have been replaced (by aliens, government agents, etc.).

Objection 2: God allows Deceit

Someone is always massively deceived -ex: Atheists believe nothing in the world was created by God, Theists believe everything was created by God. They both can't be right, so one of them must be massively decieved

According to Frankfurt, it doesn't matter whether or not it was in some sense necessary for an agent to do x, because...

That may tell us nothing about why the agent did it, and why the agent did it is the really important thing for moral responsibility

Overview of the Main Skeptical Argument

The Main Skeptical Argument (1) If we know that the external world is real, then we know that we aren't in a matrix (or something like it). (2) We don't know that we aren't in a matrix (or something like it). (3) Therefore, we don't know that the external world is real. A Moorean Reply: it's clearer that there is an external world than that there isn't, and we should accept what's more clearly true. An Ockhamist Reply: skepticism isn't on par with non-skeptical realism because it makes more claims than we have evidence for. A Contextualist Reply: standards for knowledge differ by context, and we know that there's an external world in ordinary contexts (where the standard of knowledge is low) but not when faced with skeptical arguments (where the standard of knowledge is high).

Which of these arguments is not criticized by Bertrand Russell in the reading?

The Ontological Argument

According to Feldman, if S1 and S2 are epistemic peers, then...

Their testimonies are equally epistemically virtuous

The Doxastic Attitude Thesis

There are exactly three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment.

According to Harry Frankfurt, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is sometimes confused with...

The thesis that coercion is incompatible with moral responsibility

According to Peter van Inwagen, whether we have free will is a mystery because...

There are very clever arguments for both compatibilism and incompatibilism

The Free Will/Free Action Distinction

Think first of a Garden of Forking Paths We believe that when it comes to our future, it's often up to us what will happen For example, I believe that my wife will call me tonight and, when she does, it's up to me whether I pick up I have the power to pick up the phone I have the power to refrain from picking up the phone The capacity to exercise this power is free will If you have free will when it comes to a particular action, then that action is a free action

Free Action

When it comes to two forks in a road, we're free to choose which path we take S is free with respect to x if and only if S can perform x and refrain from performing x

According to Alvin Plantinga, we aren't our bodies (or our brains, or some part of our brains) because...

We could exist without them

important points on peerhood

We don't always know who our peers are. Someone could be your peer (or, for that matter, your epistemic superior or inferior) and you'd never realize it. We could be mistaken about who our peers are. Someone could be your peer when you think she isn't. Someone could be your superior or inferior when you think she isn't either one.

The practical problem of Disagreement

We have peers who disagree with us, with whom we've shared all our evidence, and we justifiably believe (and perhaps even know) that they're our peers.

Descartes Skepticism: Dreaming

We might all be dreaming. We sometimes assume that we know when we're awake and when we aren't, but maybe we don't know that. After all, they both seem quite real when they're happening!

Russell claims that believers in God sometimes claim something like this: "Everything that exists is caused to exist by something else. The universe exists. Therefore, the universe is caused by something else. That something else is God. Therefore, God exists." According to Russell, what's one really obvious problem with this argument? [HINT: don't select Russell's criticism of another argument.]

What caused God? Since God exists, she must have been caused to exist by something else. But then God doesn't help explain why everything exists because her own existence isn't explained by herself.

The Dependance Objection

When certain material events happen (you get hit hard on the head; your brain is chopped up and incinerated), you disappear. That's unlikely if dualism is true. -Plantinga replies that dualism can account for this. Nothing about dualism claims that the wellbeing or state of your body can't or doesn't affect you. Recall occasionalism, pre-established harmony, etc

According to Descartes in the Meditations, we might be deceived by...

an evil demon

what was peter van Inwagens argument over determinism?

argued that determinism implies that because of things we can't change, like past events and the laws of nature (and perhaps God's belief about the future), our current actions aren't up to us.

Does David Lewis agree or disagree with Peter van Inwagens views

disagrees

The Explanatory Impotence Objection

dualism doesn't explain anything-thats bad -Plantinga replies that dualism isn't trying to explain anything. It's merely describing the way reality is. Materialism also explains nothing, or at least not hugely important things: like how thought is possible if materialism is true.

what is a defeater?

evidence that makes your belief no longer reasonable to believe.

According to Alvin Plantinga, materialism is...

false

Does Planinga believe materialism is true or false?

false -Since thoughts mean something and material stuff can't account for aboutness, we can't both have thoughts and be material objects

compatibilists:

hold that free will and determinism are compatible

incompatibilists:

hold that free will and determinism are incompatible

Materialism

is the thesis that human persons are identical to a material object. It's open to materialists to say which object. Maybe you're your brain, or your body, or some specific part of your brain

Descartes claims that we must begin as if we know...

nothing

According to Feldman, the problem of disagreement revolves around...

peerhood

Descartes claims that the only thing we can first be sure of is...

the fact that we exist

Plantinga view on disagreement

theres no real problem on disagreement

According to Peter van Inwagen, is there a distinction between free will and free action?

yes

if Materialism is true then...

you're identical to some material object