PoliSci 300 Final Exam

Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)

A person has the right to an attorney once the accusatory stage/suspect stage begins

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) Warren's opinion? White's dissent?

Fact: Miranda was questioned for kidnapping and rape of a young women in Phoenix. During questioning Miranda confessed to the crime. Attorney argued that police interrogation is already coercive. Question: Does the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination extend to the police interrogation of a suspect? Conclusion: The Court found 5-4 that the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination extended to police interrogations Chief Justice Warren's Opinion of the Court: Just like in Escobedo this is not a new concept but an application of principles long recognized by the court. Modern interrogations are more psychological than physical. "At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent". This warning must be accompanied by the explanation that "anything said can and will be used" against them in the Court. The court recognizes that this places a burden on law enforcement, but it is not an undue burden. Justice White's dissent: The majority opinion doesn't want for suspect's confession to ever be used. There is nothing "wrong or immoral" in questioning the suspect. "The most basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property". The new warning will adversely effect law enforcement's capabilities

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Brown's opinion? Harlan's dissent?

Facts: 1890 - Lousiana passed the Separate Car Act. Plessy was "7/8th Caucasian and 1/8th African". Challenged the law as a violation of the 13th and 14th Amendment. The lower court and the Lousiana Supreme Court denied Plessy's motion. Question: Does the Separate Car Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court in a 7-1 decision stated the law was constitutional Justice Brown's opinion of the Court: 14th Amendment's purpose. Separate but equal has worked and is constitutional. Separate but equal cars does not create superior and inferior races. Justice Harlan's dissent: argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights.

Gregg v. Georgia (1976)

Facts: A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Question: Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment. Conclusion: No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) What type of cases does the 6th Amendment extend to in this case? Black's opinion, fair trial concept?

Facts: Clarence Gideon was charged with breaking and entering a poolroom. The trial judge refused to assign an attorney to him, referencing Florida law. Gideon appealed to the Supreme Court. Question: Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony defendants in state courts? Conclusion: In a 9-0 decision, the court found yes it does extend to felony defendants in state courts Justice Black's opinion of the Court: It is necessary to reconsider Betts. Everyone is entitled to a fair trial.

Craig v. Borens (1976) What was created in this case? Brennan's opinion? Rehnquist's dissent?

Facts: An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. Question: Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? Conclusion: Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review -- rational basis -- but less demanding than the highest standard -- strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard -- intermediate scrutiny

Miller v. Johnson (1995) Kennedy's opinion

Facts: Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community." Question: Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process

Citizen United v. Federal Election Commission (2010)

Facts: Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim. Question: 1) Did the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell resolve all constitutional as-applied challenges to the BCRA when it upheld the disclosure requirements of the statute as constitutional? 2) Do the BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering requirements because they are protected "political speech" and not subject to regulation as "campaign speech"? If a communication lacks a clear plea to vote for or against a particular candidate, is it subject to regulation under the BCRA? Should a feature length documentary about a candidate for political office be treated like the advertisements at issue in McConnell and therefore be subject to regulation under the BCRA? Conclusion: No. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions. In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.

Romer v. Evans (1966) Kennedy's opinion

Facts: Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Question: Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Conclusion: Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) Warren's opinion, "non-tangible factors"

Facts: Consolidation of 5 different cases based on similar issues. The Browns lived in a predominately white neighborhood. Question: Does the segregation of public education based solely on race violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court unanimously found that the segregation of public education based on race was a violation of the 14th Amendment. Chief Justice Warren's Opinion of the Court: "Separate but Equal". The schools here are equal when it comes to tangible factors. Overturned Plessy v. Ferguson.

Atkins v. Virginia (2002)

Facts: Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded. Question: Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961) Clark's opinion? What did it say about the States creating their own rules?

Facts: Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Question: Were the confiscated materials protected from seizure by the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion: In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule. Overturned Wolf v. Colorado, States cannot chose how to apply the exclusionary rule. This comes from the federal government. It would be super confusing for every state to have different exclusionary rules, also most of the laws benefited the states and not the people. Incorporates the exclusionary rule to the states.

Bush v. Gore (2000) Rehnquist's opinion? Stevens' dissent? Ginsburg dissent?

Facts: Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later. Question: Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Conclusion: Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted. The per curium decision was for the equal protections challenge (7-2

Fisher v, University of Texas (2016) Kennedy's opinion/review of Fisher I, holistic review process

Facts: In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in admission. Abigail N. Fisher, a Caucasian female, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent of her class, so she competed for admission with other non-top ten percent in-state applicants. The University of Texas denied Fisher's application. Fisher filed suit against the university and other related defendants, claiming that the University of Texas' use of race as a consideration in admission decisions was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The university argued that its use of race was a narrowly tailored means of pursuing greater diversity. The district court decided in favor of the University of Texas, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Fisher appealed the appellate court's decision. Questions: Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit the consideration of race in undergraduate admissions decisions? Conclusion: Yes, but only under a standard of strict judicial scrutiny. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that, in affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals did not hold the University's admission policies to a standard of strict scrutiny, so the judgment was incorrect. Based on previous judicial precedent in cases dealing with minority admissions, the Court has held that such cases are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment and that they must be reviewed under a standard of strict scrutiny to determine whether the policies are "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." If the policy does not meet this standard, race may not be considered in the admissions process. The Court held that it was the duty of the reviewing court to "verify" that the University policy in question was necessary to achieve the benefits of diversity and that no race-neutral alternative would provide the same benefits. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not conduct a sufficient strict scrutiny examination in this case. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Constitution prohibits governmental discrimination on the basis of race. However, because this case did not ask the Court to overrule precedent that allowed universities to consider diversity a compelling interest that justified race-based admission policies, he joined the majority's opinion in full. In his separate concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he joined the majority's opinion that the lower courts did not sufficiently apply strict scrutiny, but he also argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state's use of race as a factor in higher education admissions. He further argued that there is nothing "necessary" about the benefits that flow from racial diversity in higher education, so there in no compelling state interest to promote it. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the University's admission policy treats race as merely one factor in the overall decision to admit a student, which is permissible under previous judicial precedent. She also argued that the Equal Protection Clause does not require that state universities be blind to the history of overt discrimination and that it is preferable that they explicitly include race as a factor in admission decisions rather than attempt to obfuscate its role. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case. We read Fisher II, Fisher I was brought before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court sent it back because the rational basis test was used, when strict scrutiny should be used because race was the issue

Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008) Stevens' opinion

Facts: In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law's requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Question: Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens' right to vote? Conclusion: By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory." Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent

San Antonio Independent School v. Rodriguez (1973) Powell's opinion?

Facts: In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures. Question: Did Texas' public education finance system violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by failing to distribute funding equally among its school districts? Conclusion: No. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states, it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education, "the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."

United States v. Jones (2012) Scalia's opinion of the Court? Sotomayor's concurrence? Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?

Facts: Jones owned a nightclub in DC. The FBI started investing him and placed a GPS on his car without a valid warrant. He was then found guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute Question: Did the warrentless use of a tracking device on Jone's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones's Fourth Amendment rights? Conclusion: The Court, in a 9-0 decision, that Jones's Fourth Amendment rights were violated Justice Scalia's Opinion: The placement of the GPS in it of itself constitutes a "search". The government argues because of Katz there is no "reasonable" expectation of privacy in a vehicle or highway. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence: A Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: certain areas, or aspects of one's personal life in which a reasonable person would expect some level of privacy.

Loving v. Virginia (1967) Warren's opinion, State's arguements

Facts: Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving married in Washington D.C. Charged for evading the State's law. Judge suspended the sentence. Question: Does a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: The Court, in a 9-0 decision, found that the law was unconstitutional Chief Justice Warren's opinion of the Court: State argument. The Court rejects the "equal application" argument of the state. The Court has held that laws based off of the distinction of citizens based on their ancestry are unconstitutional. The law is also a violation of the Due Process Clause. State's argument: the law did not violate equal protections because the law was applied equally to blacks and whites.

Missouri v. Seibert (2004) Souter's opinion? Does the two-step interrogation process work? When does it and when does it not? Kenney's concurrence? What case and tenants should be upheld and used? O'Connor's dissent?

Facts: Seibert was convicted of second degree murder. The officer withheld Seibert's Miranda warnings initially and was eventually convicted of the crime. Officer claimed to be following an interrogation technique he was taught. Question: Does an un-Mirandized confession and then subsequent Miranda warning which leads to a restatement of the initial confession still apply when the initial confession is the result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold her Miranda Warnings? Conclusion: In a 5-4 decision the court found that the confession does not stand. Justice Souter's opinion of the Court: What is the admissibility of a repeated statement. Questioning first and then offering Miranda Warning goes against the intent of Miranda Justice Kennedy's Concurrence: THe tatic relies on an intentional misrepresentation of the intent of Miranda. Elstad's tenants should still be used unless the two-step interrogation process was intentionally used Justice O'Connor's dissent: Using the tenants found in Elstad the confession should stand

Shelby County, Albama v. Holder (2013) Robert's opinion? Ginsburg's dissent?

Facts: The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time. Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination. Question: Does the renewal of Section 5 of the Voter Rights Act under the constraints of Section 4(b) exceed Congress' authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and therefore violate the Tenth Amendment and Article Four of the Constitution? Conclusion: Yes, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining whether changes to a state's voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the voting turnout gap in the states in question. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments encompasses legislative action such as the Voting Rights Act. The legislative history and text of the Amendments as well as previous judicial precedent support Congress' authority to enact legislation that specifically targets potential state abuses. However, Congress does not have unlimited authority but must show that the means taken rationally advance a legitimate objective, as is the case with the Voting Rights Act. The evidence Congress gathered to determine whether to renew the Voting Rights Act sufficiently proved that there was still a current need to justify the burdens placed on the states in question. She also argued that, by holding Section 4 unconstitutional, the majority's opinion makes it impossible to effectively enforce Section 5. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent

Reed v. Reed (1971) Burger's opinion

Facts: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. Question: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." Used the rational basis test