Political Science Final

Democratic deficit: the feeling that the government is not fulfilling the goals that the citizenry want it to fulfill 'feelings of mistrust have gradually broadened to include evaluations of the political regime and other institutions in society. The lack of confidence in politics and political institutions is widespread' In sum, even in absence of definitive empirical evidence, it could be sustained that the Western public has experienced a period of malaise, probably re- pressed and cooled by the time of the economic recovery after 1982 Disappointment because the society is interested in post materialist values but the government is promulgating materialist values

Democratic deficit in relation to disappointment with leaders

new research shows a strong relationship between financial crises and swings to the right over the past 140 years across the developed world. Three German researchers looked at data from elections between 1870 and 2014. In all, 827 elections were studied in 20 developed economies including the UK, the US, and Germany. (Poland wasn't part of the cohort.) The study concluded that politics takes a "hard right turn" after severe financial crises (not just "normal recessions"). On average, far-right parties boost their vote share by 30% after crises. General political polarization also increases, but leftwing parties don't see nearly as much of a boost as their counterparts on the right. Why? "After a crisis, voters seem to be particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the extreme right, which often attributes blame to minorities or foreigners," the researchers said. Since the latest global financial crisis, more extreme parties have indeed gained ground. Some have been on the far left, like Greece's Syriza; but Greece has also seen a strong rise on the right in the form of Golden Dawn, a neo-Nazi group.

Financial crises result in far-right sympathies

Free-riding: pushing everyone else to do the right thing but running out first yourself - the guy who says "please keep calm" and then runs out before everyone else - hypocrisy Tragedy of the commons (Ostrom): an economic theory of a situation within a shared-resource system where individual users acting independently and rationally according to their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting that resource

Free-riding and tragedy of the commons

Iverson and Soskice have argued that electoral systems generate different types of class alliances, leading to different types of redistributive behavior Assume that lower classes will be left-leaning, middle classes will be centrist and upper classes will be right-leaning In proportional systems, the middle-class party and the lower-class party are likely to coalesce to tax upper classes. In majority systems, the middle class will split between the left wing (lower-class) party and the right-wing (upper-class) party. As it will be afraid of being taxed by a party it does not dominate, the middle class is more likely to vote for the anti-tax (upper-class, right-wing) party. Hence, there should be less redistribution under majority electoral systems. Proportional systems spend a lot more on social policies than other electoral systems. Different view of things: politicians will only redistribute to active political clients (those who vote). Hence, the lower the turn out, the lower redistribution and the higher inequality.

Iverson and Soskice on electoral systems and their effects on redistributive policies

Main results of RC: intentional and rational actors generate collective outcomes and aggregate behavior that are often socially suboptimal - individuals will pursue their own interests limited by what others want - if everyone is doing this, then the aggregate outcome can be negative: e.g. in a fire, collective rationality tells us to all be calm while individual rationality tells us to engage our survival of the fittest tactics and get out of the building as fast as possible - stamping over people if necessary - which could result in none of us actually escaping Behavioral rational choice includes the use of heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb, techniques based on experience for problem-solving that are readily accessible) - uses social psychology to see how people behave in situations of uncertainty - they result to cognitive shortcuts most of the time e.g. rules of thumb - there is no sense so we try to make sense of it - e.g. every time I go to the toilet, economic market prices goes up so I treat this as a superstition that will always be true Assumption: individual actors make reasoned choices given the likely choices of others and the contextual and institutional constraints in a situation of imperfect information.

Main results of rational choice and behavioral rational choice (definitions)

He argues that ISIS represents a new, Islamist incarnation of radical movements that have existed in Europe and elsewhere for decades, such as the Baader-Meinhof group, in Germany. Roy points out that most of the young men who have committed terrorist acts in France in the past few years have been second-generation French citizens who seem to have had little knowledge of or involvement in Islam prior to joining ISIS (and twenty-five per cent are converts). Roy argues that some second-generation French citizens of immigrant origin have not been able to find an acceptable means of expressing their religious heritage in French society, and that in some circumstances they might be pushed into ungrounded interpretations of it. "We are in a society that is so secularized that it no longer understands the reality of religiosity itself," Roy has said. "It's precisely there that we must make an effort, to normalize the Muslim reality as a religious reality and integrate it into the French cultural space."

Olivier Roy's "Islamization of radicalism."

Many commentators see Cruz as too extreme to be viable in a presidential general election. Masket addresses the claim here, but whether or not it's true isn't my point. What matters is that Cruz demonstrates what many Republicans think about electoral dynamics by rejecting the claim, and invoking Reagan as a demonstration that there is no such thing as too conservative to win. When Republicans make such claims— and Cruz is not alone in making them— they are rejecting the spatial model associated with Downs. In a new paper titled, "Asymmetric Polarization and Asymmetric Models: Democratic and Republican Interpretations of Electoral Dynamics, I argue that asymmetric polarization occurs because Democratic and Republican leaders believe different models of the electoral process. The Downsian model suggests that office-seeking parties must converge to the location of the median voter, and belief in that premise was central to the rise of the DLC. DLC-aligned Democrats can point to Clinton's 1992 and 1996 victories as evidence of the value of moderation, particularly when compared to losing candidates like McGovern and Mondale. In contrast, consider the following commonplace Republican narrative: Reagan's victories in 1980 and 1984 show that voters yearn for a true conservative. When Bush 41 ran on Reagan's legacy in 1988, he won, but lost in 1992 by betraying conservatives when he broke his no-new-taxes pledge. Dole, as Kemp once said, "never met a tax he didn't hike." He wasn't a true conservative, so he lost. Similarly, McCain and Romney were RINOs, so they lost. George W. Bush? Who? Uh, hey, let's name some stuff after Reagan! Lesson: Reagan-style conservatives win, squishes lose. This should be a familiar narrative. Empirical holes notwithstanding, it is embraced by a wide range of Republican candidates and activists— the kind of people who make up the party that, well, "decides" (see what I did there?). And it suggests that Republicans reject Downs. Based on common rhetorical refrains, we can see at least three competing models that have more appeal to Republican elites. Consider, first, the phrase, "we are a center-right nation." Variations on this phrase are so common that we might as well label it "the CRN model." The model is actually just a twist on Downs— one in which the median voter's policy preference leans conservative. Thus, Republicans can run on conservative platforms and still win, even when they are further from some arbitrary location called "centrism" than the Democrats because what matters isn't proximity to that arbitrary location, but proximity to the conservative-leaning median voter.Perhaps more important than either of these models, though, is a model associated with Phyllis Schlafly's book, A Choice Not An Echo, as Jonathan Chait recently noted. Schlafly's model boils down to this: when Republicans nominate true-believer conservatives, they win. When they nominate RINOs, they lose. In my paper, I present a formalization of Schlafly's model. In contrast with Downs, who describes elections as contests between two office-seeking parties who strategically select positions to appeal to voters, a model built around Schlafly more closely resembles a principal-agent model in which the Democratic Party merely exists so that voters can punish Republicans when they succumb to Potomac Fever and move left. The strategic implication of Schlafly is clear: move to the right

The Republic party undermines the median voter theorem

We have to look not at states, but we have to look at specific welfare state institutions - there are certain contradictions; made models of five different types of logics of social insurance institutions - targeted institutions (safety net); in the corporatist welfare state, would get some degree of support, but for people outside the model, they will get nothing - get what you put in; basic security model - everyone no matter how rich will get the same security e.g. NHS in UK; additional private insurance system; will have a mix of these models - it is this mix that determines the historical type of welfare state

The work by Korpi and Palme (1998) on welfare states

Sometimes, as Krehbiel writes, the policies being voted on are too complex to be placed within a one-dimensional continuum. Buchanan and Tollison also note that this is a problem for the median voter theorem, which assumes that decisions can be made on a one-dimensional field. If voters are considering more than one issue simultaneously, the median voter theorem is inapplicable. This may happen if, for example, voters may vote on a referendum regarding education spending and police spending simultaneously. Sometimes voters don't vote sincerely e.g. a German that loves Merkel but thinks she's overdoing it with migration policy so they vote for the far right party to send a message

inapplicability of the median voter theorem

Mixed or mixed-member electoral systems are looking for the best of both worlds! Usually, voter casts two votes (local constituency + regional or national party list). Germany: seats allocated by half with each system, with compensation mechanisms between both. Existence of compensatory mixed systems (to correct for over- or under-representation in districts): New Zealand, Venezuela; parallel systems make not direct link between both systems: Japan, Pakistan, Russia.

mixed system

Proportional or list systems vary a lot; all achieve to a certain extent proportionality between votes and seats. Dimensions: Size and number of constituencies: magnitude. Upper tiers Allocation method Preferential vote or intra-party choice: open or preferential lists (Chile, Poland) and panachage (Swiss, Luxembourg) Thresholds

proportional system

Hypotheses on political culture Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 1963) proposed three basic models of political culture based on their cross-national survey research on five democratic countries: Italy, Germany, Mexico, US, and UK Hypothesis is that congruence of political culture and institutional setting reinforces political stability. All countries will eventually converge to be like the US. Political culture determined by three main factors: awareness of government (do we know our local MPs etc.); expectations of government; political participation Three types of political cultures: PART A. Parochial culture Low awareness, expectations, and participation. Example: Mexico (in the late 1950s). In this model citizens have no cognitive orientation toward the political system Societies characterized by this type of political culture do not expect anything positive of government, nor do they expect to participate in politics because it is seen as an elite domain. Furthermore, the government is seen as the enforcer of its own rules and consequently, the realm of politics is seen as one to be avoided whenever possible. In today's language, this is (or was) a society with low levels of trust (only trust your family) PART B. Subject cultures Subject cultures: higher levels of awareness and expectation but low participation. Examples: Italy, Germany (in the postwar period) people vote but they won't be vocal about their political views/join parties In this model citizens have cognitive orientations only towards the output aspects of the system. This tends to crystallize in a citizenry that expects positive action from government, but that does not tend to be politically active itself. They, too, see politics as an elite domain only to be engaged in by those with power and influence. PART C. Participant cultures Participant culture: high levels of all three (awareness, expectation, participation). Examples: USA, UK In this model citizens have cognitive orientations toward both the input and output aspects of the system. Societies which possess this type of political culture tend to have citizens with high expectations and a high level of participation in politics - and not only at elections. This type of culture is central to the principles of any democratic society N.B. This theory comes with limits (makes sense intuitively, but in practice we know that countries do not evolve in a linear way.) The study is also permeated with bias since both authors come from the US.

Almond & Verba's hypotheses on political culture; classifications of political culture and limits to their theories

Skepticism about competence of voters linked to the emergence of representative democracy. Early observation of the stability of electoral behavior and of the diverging electoral orientations of territories. Siegfried (1913): geological nature of territories determines housing type, which determines capital ownership, which determines social structure, which determines political orientation. Rural areas vote right wing and cities vote left-wing - farmers are independent, people in cities much more aware of problems of social differences Families who were once farming family (up until third generation) will still vote conservative Bois (1960) built on the example of Sarthe to show that this was more complex: historical trauma can explain unexpected orientations. The study of electoral outcomes led to important results to understand voting behavior. Diffusion of behavior across territories (contagion effect) Contextual determination of behaviors Endogenous dynamics of behavior within territories (conformation effect) Yet, ecological approaches cannot draw inferences about individual behaviors (ecological fallacy). Typical and very common ecological fallacy: Front National has risen a lot in areas that were formerly dominated by the Communist Party. Hence, Communist voters switched to Front national? While such switches do exist they do - probably - not account for the whole rise of the Front national. The Front national is the main "workers"' party, but this may also result from the fact the whole electorate has moved to the right and that workers that used to vote for the Gaullist right have abandoned that party and moved further right.

Ecological approach to voting

Following WWII, remarkable economic growth that brought new conditions into advanced industrial societies - the post-war birth cohorts spent their formative years under levels of prosperity that were unprecedented in human history, and the welfare state reinforced the feeling that survival was secure, producing major differences in the priorities of older and younger generations Scarcity hypothesis: Virtually everyone aspires to freedom and autonomy, but people tend to place the highest value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are immediately linked with survival, and when they are scarce people give top priority to these 'materialistic' goals; but under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to emphasize 'post-materialist' goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction Intergenerational value change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations - so that the values of the entire society will gradually change through intergenerational replacement. As the four oldest birth cohorts die off during the four decades following 1970, we should observe a major shift in the motivations of these societies, with post-materialists becoming as numerous as materialists, bringing a corresponding shift away from economic issues toward increasing emphasis on quality of life and expressive issues.

Effect on culture: Ronald Inglehart's Changing Values Among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006

Duverger's law states that in each local constituency the number of (substantial) parties under FPTP should equal one plus the number of seats being contested (which in this system is 1), so = 2. This holds in the US: majoritarian system with perfect bipartism. However, in the UK it doesn't hold: A highly nationalised political system, like Britain, should also show two parties dominating nationally, although maybe with smaller regional competitors in some cases - as with small special parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The top two parties should accordingly be able to form single-party majority governments.Yet with the 2015 UK general election upon us, a five-year coalition Conservative-Liberal Democrat government has just expired. And competition is taking place within party systems that show multiple (big) parties competing in both England and Wales, and Scotland In England, two old governing parties on the centre-right and centre-left are continuing with flagging support, separated by a small liberal party. The Liberal Democrats' vote has shrunk dramatically from 23 per cent in 2010, as the cost of supporting a Tory-dominated government. The UK Independence Party is a pretty standard "anti-foreigner" party, of the kind present in the European right everywhere now. Its appeal is fuelled by scare stories of immigrant influxes and anti-EU rhetoric. The Greens on the left are still battling to make a mark in the UK, but run third amongst young people. Turning to Scotland, the Scottish National Party (which has a majority government in the Edinburgh Parliament) is riding high on last year's referendum wave - when nine out of every 20 people voted to leave the UK. The SNP's surge has pushed Labour (the traditional hegemon north of the border) to a poor second, and marginalised the other unionist parties. On current form, the SNP might yet win almost every seat in Scotland, unless some Tory and Liberal Democrat voters can bring themselves to back Labour as a tactical vote for unionism. But the key test of Duverger's Law comes at the local seats level: very few MPs will have more than 50 per cent local support in 2015

Electoral systems don't only affect electoral results but also the party system

PART A: Liberal welfare state UK and Ireland are liberal welfare states - unemployment insurance will be proportional to what you paid into the unemployment insurance (low deommodification); not supposed to effect social stratification - it's poor relief - not going to help you do better, but if you really can't do anything after you've sold everything etc. once you've spent all other money you had, then I will help you PART B: Conservative welfare state (Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) - moderate decommodification: pay into common social pot, if you lose job you are entitled to certain things (unemployment benefits); keep your level of wealth, I will help you from falling in the social ladder; they don't change social structure; ensuring that everybody stays at the level that they came in PART C: Nordic social democratic welfare state (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) - doesn't matter how much you pay in, you are entitled to high unemployment benefits - same entitlements if you moved to Sweden six months before you lose your job compared to if you had been paying into the social pot for 25 years - this is idealized; complete decommodification; in terms of stratification, it's ambitious - should help recalibrate life chances/opportunities between different people from different origins - almost a socialist goal; everybody no matter where they came from could achieve anything despite the accidents of life

Esping-Anderson's three-fold classification of welfare states

Franklin (2004) claims that 3 consecutive strikes and you're in for life - your first three elections are very important and will determine what you do for the rest of your political life The context of early adulthood political socialization is very important, it has consequences for the whole life cycle (cohort effect). Voting age regulations and closeness of elections during initial socialization are the two key factors. Decline in turnout is explained by the voting age fixed at 18 instead of 21 in many advanced democracies (they changed the voting age in the 1970s): 20-year-olds are - on average - less certain about their future (job, family, politics etc.) than 23-year-olds. In the 1970s at the age of 23, you'd probably met your partner, you were entering a job more securely - made major decisions. At 20, you hadn't chosen profession. By lowering the voting age, you would confront people with more uncertain/difficult situation - they would turn out less than the 23 year old - diminishing turnout could be explained by the fact that there's a constant share of the new voters that will not vote because they're unsure - and this sets a pattern for the rest of their life Generation has now been replaced, however, so this decline shouldn't maintain itself Criticism - his theory doesn't hold up because things haven't remained stable - we will continue spending parents money until 26/27 on university education - much less stable much longer, labor markets have changed/demand for skills have changed - need more skills than in the 1970s so this means that the generation replacement will not result in a stabilization and increase of voter turnout

Franklin's theory on the decline in voter turnout

Proportional: seats based on how many votes you get - not the case under a majoritarian system E.g. UK: Let's start with a simple case, and look at the number of seats won by the SNP. According to the electionforecast.co.uk model, the SNP is likely to poll roughly 3 percent of the vote in Great Britain. With that 3 percent, the SNP is forecast to win 35 seats. Put slightly differently, if turnout in 2015 is similar to turnout in the last election, the SNP would win one seat for roughly every 26,000 votes it gets. Things are not so fortunate for the Green Party. They're forecast to get 4 percent of the vote - but only 1 seat. That means one seat for every 880,000 votes.That astonishing difference results from the very different concentration of the two parties' votes. Whilst SNP votes are, unsurprisingly, concentrated in Scotland, Green party votes are spread out across the country. We can see a similar phenomenon with UKIP and the Liberal Democrats. UKIP's vote share is difficult to forecast. We don't really know where its pockets of strength are. But because UKIP support is spread out, and once again assuming that turnout is similar to 2010 levels, then each extra seat cost UKIP 1,700,000 votes. The Liberal Democrats, who have spent the past twenty years fighting local battles and building pockets of strength, win one seat for every 150,000 votes Of course, the big beneficiaries of the electoral system are Labour and the Conservatives. But here, the devil's in the details. Labour votes tend to be more concentrated. They have fewer wasted votes. And Labour tends to win constituencies with fewer voters. All this means that Labour can win more seats on fewer votes than the Conservatives. That's still true despite Labour's meltdown in Scotland. In order to reach a majority, the we forecast that Labour would need around 36.3 percent of the vote. But for the Conservatives to reach a majority, they'd need more: about 38.2 percent. That difference is likely to matter a great deal in a close election.

Majoritarian vs. proportional determining control of government (UK example)

Paradox of collective action (Olson): Everyone will act in groups; having a group behind you when facing a big organization is how politics works Group interest and individual interest are not identical; even though we benefit from groups, it might be interesting to do something different As there is a cost to mobilization, each individual must weigh costs and benefits The rational strategy is that of the free rider. As we have seen before, individual rationality and the rationality of collective strategies are in opposition; let others do the work and just tack on once all the hard work is completed so you benefit from the results but don't have to get your hands dirty Therefore, groups should not exist Rationality tells us not to mobilize for collective action, but we do - why is that? This is the paradox

Paradox of collective action

The Michigan school provides the first nation-wide study for the US (presidential election of 1948). Party identification becomes the key predictor. Party identification is group identification (reference group), built during early political socialization, and largely inherited from parents. In Europe, concept has been translated as party proximity (instability of party systems,...) but does not convey the same emotional attachment. Risk of endogeneity in surveys (i.e. inducing an answer due to the question). The most proximate functional equivalent in Europe is the left - right position. Sociological, psychological and economic approaches to voting

Party identification as the main predictor of voting behavior

Globalization has led to supranational organizations sometimes having too much power over members states/nations - re-articulation of the state-society relationship in the sense that the citizen now is entitled to less rights (less welfare) State has even less of a say in the lives of the citizen, which they initially lost because of a rollback of the state The state is now subordinate to greater organization e.g. European Commission on Human Rights - the citizen now has much more protection However, some nations feel that supranational organization wield too much power...

Power of globalizing forces vs. state-society relations

When gang members meet radicals in prison, they are able to supplant one gang identity or cause with that of another: violent Islamism. In this context, Islam the religion is used as a cover for gang-like behavior. For example, Amedy Coulibaly, the gunman at the Jewish supermarket in Paris, had served a prison sentence for armed robbery. He was radicalized in prison by an al Qaeda recruiter. In the US, Islamic leaders are forbidden from entering prisons - converted inmates only come into contact with Islam in its radicalized format Strong emphasis on communal prayer (jamaat) that, in the words of the study, helps "sustain strong internal attachments." one researcher explains how this communal-based worship operates in an incarcerated environment: Historically, christian prison reformers envisioned conversion as cloistered reflection or silent prayer. islamic teaching, however, changes self-image and social relationships primarily through communal prayer

Prisoners: radicalization

Ted Gurr: "a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modeling or 'imitative' behavior occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt." The idea that terrorists have a community supporting them is important: Radicalization can be the result of socialization, but it is appears to be more the result of social environment, rather than individual characteristics. Unlike the idea of the lone psychopath, terrorists radicalize within social groups. It is the proximity to like-minded individuals that facilitates radicalization. Focus of attention has to be shifted from individual irrationality to collective goals: from terrorists' characteristics to recruiters' strategies Usually, radicalized citizens do it with other peer groups Azeem Ibrahim: "What [former CIA case officer Marc Sageman] discovers is that terrorists are most likely to be motivated not by disadvantage but by a sense of moral disgust. . . . It is sparked when the individual reacts to stories of Muslim suffering around the world with moral outrage. Some of those who feel outraged will progress to the second stage, in which they interpret that suffering in the context of a wider Manichaean war between Islam and the West. Of those who take that view, a minority will progress to the third stage, in which their smoldering resentment will be fueled by bad personal experiences in western countries. . . . Of those who undergo these three stages, fewer undergo the fourth, in which the individual joins a circle of friends which becomes like a family closed to the outside world. . . . They read, listen to and watch only material which stokes their view of the world and prepares them for action and, in some cases, the murder of innocents."

Radicalization usually happens in social groups

Rational choice depends on preferences and beliefs of individuals - we care about things that are important to us/close to us e.g. don't have strong opinions on the Turkish attacks, but strong opinions on the Paris attacks because live close to Paris The origins of these preferences and beliefs are often considered to be exogenous (i.e. they're part of us before we arrive; not studied). Culture is one answer to the origins of these preferences and beliefs. That is why rationality and culture may be considered as complementary rather than competitive views on political behavior.

Rational choice as a function of culture

Conventional forms of participation have declined over the past few decades, though this decline is neither homogeneous nor systematic. Beyond electoral participation, conventional participation has evolved towards less demanding and less systematic forms of participation. Organizations such as political parties have changed to provide more individualistic opportunities of participation (i.e. one member one vote principle). André Breton, a famous surrealist writer, wanted to join the Communist party in France so assigned him to a cell so he would know what living the real life was like (he was from an upper class background) - wouldn't have this today - if a high-profile figure wants to join a political party they are moved straight to the top Participation in organizations has more generally declined (Putnam: decline of social capital). Yet, we observe new modes and new repertoires of collective action; unconventional forms of political participation have risen. Rise in cause-oriented activism (specific issues, consumption).

Rise in unconventional modes of political participation

Results: turn towards far-right parties because they almost represent the anti-government/politics vote Dissatisfaction towards parties, the way in which democracy works and the output of the system in relation to physical security tend inevitably to feed opposition and/or antisystem parties. The distrust facing parties and institutions and the loss of confidence in the tradi- tional channels of participation (Hardinget al., 1988:77-81, Kaase, 1990)have thus found their expression not only in new left politics but also in the extreme right. Only ERPs offer the electorate a right wing radical alternative to the establishment's political discourse. Only ERPs want to 'throw the rascals out' and modify the rules, kicking out politicians and hiring honest technicians. Only ERPs offer simple remedies to unemployment and tax burden. Only ERPs play upon an harmonious and idyllic past where conflicts and anxiety about the future did not exist. Only ERPs, last but not least, invoke law and order and a xenophobic policy against Third world immigrants. The inability of the established parties to perceive, and to deal with relevant issues such as immigration and security, and the failure of conservative parties to suggesting tough policies, are related to the rise of ERPs. Neoconservatism: This new set of issues includes right to life, creationism, antipornography, support for traditional and moral values, strong defence, patriotism, law and order enforcement, anti-minority rights, xenophobia'. (Flanagan, 1987: 1308,1312). Neo-conservatism has provoked, directly and indirectly, a higher polarization both in terms of ideological distance and in terms of ideological intensity This cultural movement has become highly influential all over Western societies in the 1980s and it has contributed in the affirmation of conservative- confessional-liberal parties. Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal (and France for two years, 1986-88) turned to the right and were governed by conservative parties or coalitions In conclusion, the new cultural movement of neoconservatism has engen- dered a process of radicalization and antisystem polarization not controlled by the 'conservative' parties, from which the more extreme right-wing parties have benefited. In addition, mass public attitudes and behaviour characterized by a growing crisis of confidence in institutions, parties and party systems, the working of democracy, and by non-response to salient issues such as immigra- tion and security, have favoured the development of ERPs

Rise of far-right parties as a reaction towards distrust towards government

The National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution created socio-economic and cultural conflicts. Lipset and Rokkan (1969) named these conflicts "cleavages." Cleavages stemming from the National Revolution Center periphery cleavage because of: Administrative centralization (fiscal integration) Cultural standardization (compulsory schooling, national language) ⇒ Regionalist parties State-Church cleavage: National revolution based on liberal ideology: secular institutions State-Church conflict: abolition of Church privileges ⇒Conservative and religious parties Cleavages stemming from the Industrial Revolution: Rural-urban cleavage Conflicts about trade policies: barriers (farmers) vs. open markets (industrialists) ⇒Agrarian parties Workers-employers cleavage Conflict between labor and capital Demands of social rights and welfare provisions ⇒Social democratic parties. This family is later divided by the Bolshevik revolution. The post-industrial revolution: towards new cleavages? Materialism vs. post-materialism cleavage (Ronald Inglehart) Conflict among generations, younger preferring more liberal and non materialistic values ⇒Green parties but also new social movements Globalization (Kriesi): Cleavage between losers (workers, unemployed) and winners (civil servants, upper class) of globalization ⇒Extreme right or left parties

Social cleavages with political consequences

Bethnal Green girls Atran says ISIS, working through existing social networks, is adept at leveraging idealism: A recent survey of ISIS social media found their foreign followers are often adolescents or young adults. Atran says recruiters often spend hundreds of hours showing young people how the problems they see in the world and in their own lives are connected to larger problems that ISIS is fighting online - they're halfway across the world, but use online networks to get in touch with potential jihadists Gets in contact with Westerners: From its start, social media has been integral to ISIS's rise. It enables ISIS militants to raise its prestige among terror groups, and overtake older jihadist competitors like al-Qaeda. It serves to coordinate troops and win battles. And it allows the group to administer the territory under its control. Now ISIS is using social media to expand its war far beyond its borders. What started with the choreographed execution video of James Foley, blasted across the Web through an army of dummy Twitter accounts, has now morphed into something more devious and distributed. Rather than calling followers to the front lines, ISIS's social-media strategy cultivates them at home in the U.S., Europe, Africa, and Asia. Enlistment: ISIS militants cultivate vulnerable recruits with sympathetic messages, and engage them via secure messaging services. Recruiters will occasionally ship gifts to the targets—and sometimes, even an airline ticket. If the recruit cannot travel, they are encouraged to launch terror attacks at home.

Social media has become a huge social group that makes it easier for jihadists to get in contact with young people susceptible to radicalization

An important aspect of social and political change over the past two decades has been the Europeanization of identities. This can be seen in at least two ways. First, there is the increasing importance of European identities in the sense of identities that involve some degree of reference or orientation to Europe. There is considerable empirical research demonstrating the existence of European identification at least as a secondary identity that complements national and regional identities. European identity especially among young and educated people is much stronger than what is often thought. As with many identities, a European identity may co-exist alongside other identities, since individuals generally have more than one identity. Indeed, such European identities may not always recognise themselves as such, since the European dimension is only one level and interacts with other levels. The emergence of the notion of Europeans as bearers of European identity is a relatively recent phenomenon and has been much influenced by European policy making around cultural issues, such as the European Capitals of Culture programme, Erasmus exchange programmes, European research, and a communication policy, the idea of a European citizenship. There can be no doubt that Europe has become the phenomenological basis of a shift in identities away from the nation as the exclusive reference point. Mobility is a key aspect of European identities. The more Europeans travel the more likely they are to have a degree of European identification. This suggests that the clash of values is more likely to be generational than territorial. It is not then the case that one part of Europe is more European than another. These cleavages are not primarily national. Secondly, European identity can be seen, not as an identity that is outside or anti-national, but as an internal transformation of national identities. In these terms, it is not a case of European versus national identities, but of the Europeanization of national identities that is significant. Thus it is the case that many national identities have found within the project of European integration the means of advancing their interests, but too of re-orienting their self-understanding. Germany is a very good example of this process of the Europeanization of national identity in the context of a more critical approach to history. As Habermas has argued, the movement of European integration had unavoidable normative lessons to offer Germany, and Europe. Other examples are Portugal and Spain. In these cases European integration offered a means of re-positioning national identity in the aftermath of the end of the dictatorships when democracy was slowly introduced. In the case of Ireland, European integration was a means of re-orienting national identity in a more positive direction than one that was predominantly shaped by negative relations with the UK Fear: The further unification of Europe is regarded by many Europeans as a threat to the survival of national cultures and identities. They fear that the disappearance of the internal borders between the European Union states may ultimately result in a loss of variety in national cultures and of distinct national identities.

The Europeanization of national identities

A change with the Maastricht Treaty: not overly positive anymore - some people don't think the EU is necessarily a great thing - younger, more educated and highest positions on occupational scale people are more likely to think the EU is a good thing (however, could do with the idea that they're not the losers of globalization) Maastricht Treaty as a turning point - permissive consensus to constraining dissensus - everybody thought the EU was a good thing. Helmut Kohl - personal memory of the war, so EU means something very strong - it had put an end to intra-European war - following generations, don't have the same feeling towards the EU because they don't fear war since they haven't lived through it - for Kohl and Mitterand the EU was very important - war question has faded ever since to be supplanted by the economic question. Maastricht Treaty is what brought about the single currency, the economic question. Currency tied to national identity - this is where the anti-Europe discourse came out. Far-Right parties use this issue. Also has to do with the fact that EU engages in subterfuge to get its policies past - they change the name or nature of the agreement that's voted down via referendum - we've seen a decrease in EU-related referenda

The Maastricht treaty as a turning point for European convergence

The family is responsible for, among other things, determining one's attitudes toward religion and establishing career goals. Families exert the first and most important influence on the formation of individual values. The values which are transmitted in the early years of learning are generally kept throughout life. Family is also one of the central influences in preparing individuals for their role in society. The process of socialization by the family begins in infancy. Children begin to develop attitudes towards authority based on how the parents treat them from birth. Studies have shown that families have a homogeneous political outlook. Parents generally share similar political beliefs. According to one study in the U.S. in the 1970s, 83% of husbands and wives shared the same political party affiliation, but this has strongly declined since. In families with homogeneous political outlook, children receive consistent political messages. When both parents share a party affiliation, children will most likely hold that same party affiliation. When both parents are independents, their children overwhelmingly identify themselves as independents

The family as the most important agent of sociaization

(Siegried) - how geology interacted with social structures and political behavior - depending on soil, either agricultural techniques or urbanization will develop more strongly - agricultural will mean more conservative parties will develop In Corez (department in France): during revolution, big scientific controversy over which farming technique should be used - the northern half disagreed with southern half and they used different techniques - the revolution ended up promoting one of the two, pushing the other out of business - and this created a strong political divide, making the north very pro-revolutionary and the south being counter-revolutionary; this political divide persisted generations after the original division - if differences don't correspond anymore, make new ones up to justify the divide

The impact of geology on political culture

The notion of Social capital (Coleman 1990) provides a new understanding of civic culture. Aims to explain institutional and democratic performance. Social capital is different from economic capital and cultural capital (Bourdieu). It adds two main elements to it: trust and social networks (covers associations of civil society, communities,...). Putnam (1993) about Italy: the performance of a regional government is very closely related to the civic character of social capital in this region. Putnam 1995 Social capital has declined Trust in government has decreased. Hence a feeling of a "democratic deficit" (disparities between the perceived performance of institutions and public aspirations). Linked to increasing demands (participation, efficiency,...) resulting from growing cognitive skills and self-expression values, coverage of government by the media, and policy building limitations.

Trust/social capital

Issue voting (Stokes 1963) Issues may be important to explain change in voting behavior if they cut across cleavages, if parties have clear and divergent views on them, and if they are salient. A weaker version of cleavage- and value-based explanations. Spatial models of voting behavior (Downs 1956) Voters choose by choosing the most proximate party to them in the policy space Valence issues have been introduced to compare the quality of candidates on top of positions of candidates

Voting for policies is an important factor that determines how people vote.

For many younger people an identity crisis isn't uncommon, regardless of their religion. Some teenagers react by rebelling. Others, more extreme, will turn to crime and gangs. Many second- and third-generation Muslim children may be raised believing that their heritage is of one or both of their parents. Sometimes when these children visit the villages of their parents, they find they are teased because they don't fit in. That yearning for a clear identity can leave them facing a personal crisis, vulnerable to radical exploitation in person or online. In the simplest sense, Islam teaches us that our lives are a struggle, or jihad, to live a good life and refrain from bad deeds. At the end of our lives, we will be judged on whether the good deeds outweigh the bad. Those who seek to radicalize scare these young people by saying they can't win that struggle while living in "decadent" modern Western culture. The radicalizers anger the young by showing them propaganda and images of Muslims being killed by Western forces in Middle Eastern conflicts. Then they convince them that there is a shortcut to paradise by taking revenge in the name of God. We know this is nonsense. But a scared and angry young person with an identity crisis may not be so sure. (NPR) Atran says these young people "self-radicalized." They were searching for meaning in their lives and found it through friends who shared their idealism. ISIS recruiters promised them glory, adventure, and purpose - things that appeal to many young people.

Young people: radicalization

One of the most recurrent themes of analysis is class voting in Europe, i.e. the stable support of workers to left wing parties. This has been measured by the Alford index (Proportion of the working class voting Labour, minus the proportion of the middle class voting Labour.) Class voting is decreasing (dealignment). Objective class vs. social identity (Michelat & Simon). Competing cleavages: religion. In 2004, for 12 out of 17 European countries religion has a significant relation with vote choice (but not in Denmark, Sweden, UK) If you go to church at least once a month, you are more likely to vote conservative Cross-cutting cleavages: gender, race,... Social and economic inequalities are still viewed as important determinants of vote choice. Class voting is decreasing in Europe, except in the UK The socio-economic model: socio-economic status of individuals determines their attitudes (efficacy, alienation, involvement, obligation); wealth, education and non-minority status lead to higher participation

class approach to voting

Unrealistic sociological assumptions Concept of rationality may be "western-centered": what is rational may be different from one place to another. It's a cultural model - those people aren't rational because they don't behave the way we do (globalization has diffused this kind of norm) - rationality is dependent on culture, but different cultures think different things are rational Culture as an underpinning may provide patterns not only for preferences, but also for the way people reason. e.g. in some cultures, financial distress is shameful so you rationally keep this information to yourself - in other cultures, it's rational to ask for help. Preferences are not exogenous, they change with context and over time e.g. with age you get more conservative People are never alone: their preferences and perceptions are (co-)shaped by reference groups e.g. we're shaped by family and friends' opinions

critiques of rational choice as a function of culture

Electoral systems: sets of rules which define how voters are cast and seats are allocated.

electoral system definition

Extreme right wing parties have proliferated since the mid-1980s. These parties are however of different kinds: anti-establishment, anti-immigration, nationalist,... Explaining their success: Hypothesis on the role of immigration (as a threat to national culture and indentity) Hypothesis on the role of economic crisis and unemployment Hypothesis on interaction between immigration and unemployment Hypothesis on the role of the electoral system (expressive or protest vote only?) Results: immigration, unemployment conditional on immigration, and permissive electoral systems are central explanations. In part, the rise of the far right coincides with fears aroused across Europe by a tidal wave of desperate migrants. At least 550,000 refugees have arrived in Italy and Greece in 2015 alone. By some estimates, Germany could receive 1.5 million migrants this year. In 2013, Germany spent roughly $14,340 to house and feed each refugee in its care. Multiplied by 1.5 million people, that's a bill of roughly $21.5 billion at a time of economic stagnation in much of Europe. Despite all their bluster, the migration crisis is a godsend for Europe's far right: it gives both new and older parties an opening to capitalize on the rising fear of voters that might never otherwise consider supporting them. As ultra-nationalists who want to protect the strong welfare systems their citizens currently enjoy, they frequently couch their criticism of migrants in terms of economic pragmatism, explaining there is simply not enough money and jobs to go around. Though these parties often have extensive histories of racist comments and policy proposals, their economic message now resonates across a continent exhausted by multiple crises in recent years.

extreme right as opposition to gloablization

Two reactions when there is a confrontation between the state and groups: the principled/fundamentalist view Rousseau's Social Contract: The general will is always right and tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally correct. Our will is always for our own good, but we do not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad. But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State. [...] It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts. Questions only come when people are unhappy with the status quo; we all meet at the town hall and we live all our other allegiances at the entrance; you cease to be everything but a citizen (but how can you cease to be who you are? This is a more idealistic view) the pragmatic view: cannot durably outlaw them so might as well get along Madison's Federalist Papers: Outlaw factions? "Remedy worse than the disease" - historical context is also important (Rousseau is thinking about Geneva who all share same language/religion/beliefs - therefore these people probably can put off other identities since they share most identities - Madison is dealing with a multinational state; the problems are more difficult) Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.

fundamentalist and pragmatic views on collective action

This will have an enduring effect on party competition, leading parties to compete for the median voter - this means that in terms of policy goals, parties will converge around the policy position of the median voter, leading to greater policy stability Parties will mold their strategy on the centrist voter - they will devote their resources to know exactly what C's preferences are - political competition will involve around the center (central pedal) - ultimately, political actors have little convictions of their own (cynical view of political actors) - political actors will do whatever it takes to win power Essentially, the idea is this: Any politician who strays too far from voters at the philosophical center will soon be out of office. In fact, there is a dynamic that pushes politicians to embrace the preferences of the typical or "median" voter, who sits squarely in the middle of public opinion. A significant move to either the left or the right would open the door for a rival to take a more moderate stance, win the next election and change the agenda. Median voters make policies e.g. in referenda, the median voter will determine the result

implications of the median voter theorem

Groups are natural Bentley: belonging to groups is sown into the nature of men e.g. America naturally divides itself into groups based on ethnicity/religion; to understand society have to understand groups Truman: groups are part of our first socialization; we don't choose our groups - we were told that we were part of Irish/Italian culture and that distinguishes us from other groups and we are good at this (stereotypes); not just part of one group - part of people living in particular part of town (allegiance/identity) - learn a particular profession and that's a group you're part of; we're all made up of many different identities - many of these are active though Groups are part of every differentiated society Some are active: living in Reims and becoming very attached and passionate about Reims - for majority of Sciences Po students, Reims is just a passing identity, but for others it's an active identity/group Some are latent: they're under the surface; not overly important to the group member The "group basis of politics" (Latham) Government is all about competition between groups; elections are an appendix to this process; government has to regulate this competition so that's it's not detrimental to greater number - if everyone is equally selfish this should work - our collective selfishnesses will keep us in check Bentley: "when groups are adequately stated, everything is stated" (1908) Criticism of this: the logic of collective action

interest groups

The theory of Anthony Downs, stating that parties will in the long run converge in order to increase their vote share, is questionable because it implies an end of ideology, or at least a severe weakening of the ideological identities of parties Preferences of voters are assumed to be a function of proximity: the smaller the ideological distance, the smaller the ideological distance, the stronger the preference. Parties are expected to move towards the position of the median voter which cannot be defeated by any other in a majority vote. In doing so, the potential number of voters is maximized. When a party is successful with this strategy it may become a pivot party which occupies a position on the middle of the ideological spectrum Party system convergence: established parties tend to move to moderate ideological positions. No general tendency towards catch-allism in Europe - ideology remains an important tool for most parties to profile themselves

limit of the median voter theorem: doesn't take ideology into account enough

Single-member plurality (first past the post): choice of a candidate seat awarded to candidate who receives most votes - UK, US, Canada, India etc. Two round-system or runoff: choice of a candidate; if no candidate wins absolute majority of votes in first round, a second round takes place with a certain number of candidates; the rule for the second round is plurality e.g. France Alternative vote (AV) and Single transferable vote (STV): ranking candidates; least supported candidates are eliminated (and vote is transferred to other candidates) so that a candidate wins a quota or a majority e.g. Australia, Ireland Only 33.7% people voted for the majority but they are the ones whose interests will be represented - it's a plurality vote "elective dictatorship" (Lord Hailsham) Exclusion of smaller candidates - very difficult for small parties to win a constituency e.g. Lib Dems in the 1980s (had a negative premium of -21.9% in 1983 - Thatcher)

majoritarian system

Size matters: easier to organize in smaller groups if the entire group is very large Selective incentives: all abut restoring excludability and rivalry of public goods - you create a trade union (deal with working conditions for specific trades) - people who are not part of the trade union will also benefit from the successes of the trade union - why do people then pay the fee to a member of the trade union? There are benefits specific to this group - organizer of the trade union has to show that it's worth being part of the trade union - creation of selective incentives e.g. some trade unions provide advantages with holiday tariffs/subscription tariffs to things like gyms; also a means of socialization Political entrepreneurs Salisbury: a larger view of incentives/benefits; the problem with Olson is that he only looks at material benefits - people aren't just interested in material benefits but also moral benefits: the feel-good factor: the feeling that you're helping those in your profession on the whole against the system The entrepreneur will organize mobilization and create an equilibrium between material and expressive benefits Expressive groups are cheap and short-lived e.g. joining a protest for the sake of protesting; they want to be heard even if they don't know what they want to be heard on - by mobilizing they will learn about it - people do it for the feeling they get from mobilizing with others Material groups are more stable; you feel yourself existing - you want to express your existence; your will to exist - very popular with young people

overcoming the paradox of collective action

Post WWII: There's an establishment of successful capitalist economies that used Keynesian economics to create three decades of prosperity. These capitalist states focused on the welfare of the citizens, inculcating a new idea that emphasized the role of the state should be to care for the individuals that make up its' community. This prosperity, however, was rooted in oil, so when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries restricted its output of oil in 1973, oil prices soared and inflation increased, bringing high unemployment and recession with it. The crisis led to political experimentation, and adversarial states embraced neoliberal policies. Neoliberal policies changed the role of the state from welfare-oriented to a role of reduced state intervention in the lives of the market and the citizens, which can be defined as a rollback of the state.

overview of the welfare state

A decade ago, the public was less ideologically consistent than it is today. In 2004, only about one-in-ten Americans were uniformly liberal or conservative across most values. Today, the share who are ideologically consistent has doubled: 21% express either consistently liberal or conservative opinions across a range of issues - the size and scope of government, the environment, foreign policy and many others. The new survey finds that as ideological consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly aligned with partisanship. Ideologically consistent people have more influence on the political process: They are more likely than those with mixed views to vote regularly and far more likely to donate to political campaigns and contact elected officials. Beyond the rise in ideological consistency, another major element in polarization has been the growing contempt that many Republicans and Democrats have for the opposing party. To be sure, disliking the other party is nothing new in politics. But today, these sentiments are broader and deeper than in the recent past.

party polarization: Rise in ideological consistency and contempt for the other party

People move more towards the right when a financial crisis hits New research shows a strong relationship between financial crises and swings to the right over the past 140 years across the developed world. Three German researchers looked at data from elections between 1870 and 2014. In all, 827 elections were studied in 20 developed economies including the UK, the US, and Germany. (Poland wasn't part of the cohort.) The study concluded that politics takes a "hard right turn" after severe financial crises (not just "normal recessions"). On average, far-right parties boost their vote share by 30% after crises. General political polarization also increases, but leftwing parties don't see nearly as much of a boost as their counterparts on the right. After a crisis, voters seem to be particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the extreme right They found that elections following a financial crisis almost always benefit the far right, resulting in increasing political polarization.

party polarization: reinforced by financial crisis

When it comes to getting news about politics and government, liberals and conservatives inhabit different worlds. There is little overlap in the news sources they turn to and trust. those with the most consistent ideological views on the left and right have information streams that are distinct from those of individuals with more mixed political views - and very distinct from each other. Pew Research center: Overall, the study finds that consistent conservatives: Are tightly clustered around a single news source, far more than any other group in the survey, with 47% citing Fox News as their main source for news about government and politics. By contrast, those with consistently liberal views: Are less unified in their media loyalty; they rely on a greater range of news outlets, including some - like NPR and the New York Times- that others use far less. Express more trust than distrust of 28 of the 36 news outlets in the survey. NPR, PBS and the BBC are the most trusted news sources for consistent liberals.

party polarization: reinforced by media outlets

a set of attitudes and practices held by a people that shapes their political behavior. It includes moral judgments, political myths, beliefs, and ideas about what makes for a good society. A political culture is a reflection of a government, but it also incorporates elements of history and tradition that may predate the current regime. Political cultures matter because they shape a population's political perceptions and actions. Governments can help shape political culture and public opinion through education, public events, and commemoration of the past. Political cultures vary greatly from state to state and sometimes even within a state. Generally speaking, however, political culture remains more or less the same over time.

political culture definition

Political socialization: The values and assumptions people hold about politics are acquired in a process called political socialization, i.e. the learning of political values and factual assumptions about politics.Through (and thanks to) political socialization people understand, accept, and usually approve and support the existing political system. The persons by which and the setting in which the process of political socialization is accomplished are called the agents of political socialization

political socialization and agents of socialization

Europe: from continuing inter-state war to pacific unification without domination; strongly limited war-making 1948: In the wake of World War II nationalism is out of favour in large parts of continental Europe and support for federalism is high. The European Union of Federalists organises a Congress at The Hague in 1948 in the hope of drawing up a European constitution. 1950: French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announces a plan for France and Germany to pool coal and steel production and invites other states to join them. His plan is based on the idea that European unity is the key to peace. Solidarity in production he said would make war between France and Germany "not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." 1951: Treaty of Paris establishes European Coal and Steel Community: Six countries sign the treaty France Germany the Benelux states and Italy. It sets up a High Authority to manage the coal and steel industries and a Common Assembly a precursor of the European parliament. The Dutch supported by the Germans also insist on the creation of a Council of Ministers made up of ministers from member states to counterbalance the supranational High Authority.

post-war need for European integration

Relative deprivation: the sense of deprivation is such as to involve a comparison with the imagined situation of some other person or group. This other person or group is the "reference group", or more accurately the "comparative reference group" - need to compare yourself to someone else to feel deprived If people feel deprived, they will mobilize to correct injustice If over time, the conditions for a specific group are increasing and then suddenly decrease - they will mobilize to correct this injustice Ted Gurr (1970): "The primary causal sequence in political violence' is 'first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors" The US Civil Rights Movement crystallizes all of this; Rosa Parks and Little Rock Rhoda Luis Blumberg (1984): Events that made the transition to protest possible: Mass migration of black peasantry out of the South, transformation into an urban group; the reference group for blacks changes - creation of new social groups; new awarenesses; new debates White violence/discrimination against black urban newcomers who they see as competitors in labor markets; immigration doesn't generate violence, but the fear of the consequences of immigration creates violence World Wars and Great Depression; the Depression had traumatized the US economy and led to reorganization; have to rethink things - rigid orders that dominated the South were preventing development; need more active/competitive labor markets - World Wars: people had been fighting on the front irrespective of race, so blacks now have to go back after fighting for the country into the same demeaning social order? An effective equality is created at the front because they're all dying and going through the same struggles irrespective of skin color Years of litigation and first legal victories: Brown v. Board of Education (1954) - huge pro-civil rights achievements in the mid-1950s Development of community institutions and organizations in the Cities with the advent of new social groups; networks are good for mobilization - people will mobilize more easily - and there were great leaders e.g. MLK Rise of leaders/political entrepreneurs, able to exploit mobilization potential. Changed international climate: following WWII most European colonies were decolonizing; recognizing wrongdoings; the US was going to keep segregating at home even though they had been fighting segregation in Europe?

relative deprivation theory

Olson applied to Social Movements: The spatial distribution of the mobilization is more strongly correlated with the availability of resources than just with the spatial distribution of injustice or grievance Different type of supporters will provide different types of resources Material resources (finance) Moral resources (symbolical support, approval): Hollywood stars would speak up for civil rights because they'd go abroad and be asked what was wrong with their country Expert resources (specific skills and knowledge, access to the media etc.) Human resources (time) Organizational resources (pre-existing networks organizations, e.g.: NAACP, Church) Doug McAdams 's study on Freedom Summer shows that supporters may seek only moral retribution. This will, in turn, considerably lower the cost of mobilization - engaging in the protests can shape the rest of people's lives Newer approaches have kept much of the Olsonian heritage, but have also re-emphasized the importance of ecological approaches. Structure of political opportunity (SPO): mobilization and protest may depend on context (Kriesi et al 1995) Territorial structure of state: is it centralized/federal Institutional architecture: how easy is it to access senators/administration Bureaucratic autonomy: can access local bureaucratic leaders and influence decisions? The prevailing strategy towards civil society: hostile towards public mobilization or focus on negotiation with mobilizers Others have emphasized the importance of cognitive frames and frame alignment. Much recent research has insisted on the importance of social networks and social capital (Putnam); coordination of social movement action

resource mobilization theory

Social progress has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The founding fathers of the EU believed that economic integration would promote progress in social protection across participating countries, such that convergence of social protection systems would follow more or less spontaneously. However, the welfare state literature indicates that economic integration may also be harmful to social protection systems. Fears for a social race to the bottom have been expressed. In the 1990s both the European Council and the European Commission adopted a more active convergence strategy: they proclaimed the objective of a convergence of social policies of Member States and the development of common objectives of social policies. In 2000 the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic growth, social cohesion should also be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). Even within Europe, the burden of comparative analysis of welfare over the past twenty years emphasizes the diversity of capitalist democracies. Famously, Esping‐Andersen has suggested that there are three ideal types of (capitalist) 'welfare state regime' (1990). The states that approximate most closely to two of these types ('socialist' Sweden and 'conservative' Germany) are members of the European Union.

social convergence in the EU?

Downs specifies the conditions under which stability can be achieved: a single issue dimension: a political system where people vary along one dimension (left - right dimension; has to do with redistribution/taxes - conservatives favor lower taxes for example - this depends on the country though, conservative party in Sweden would be considered liberal in a Latin American country, for example) an odd-number of voters - shouldn't be equal sections of society voting for each political party with single-peaked preferences and who vote sincerely there are only two parties

structure of the median voter theorem

Supranational approach: what is really important is that you create functional solidarity - idea that if we tie together those absolutely strategic raw materials then this will spill over into neighboring areas - tying together coal and steel will have impact on car industry - industries are tightly linked - so will start regulating heavy industries (spillover effect) - here with tying together raw materials, we created a driving force that spilled over into new areas - industry regulation to social regulation because if we regulate the industry, this will force us to look at working and environmental conditions

supranational approach to explaining European integration

The intergovernmental approach as an explanation for European integration: states have a national interest - this interest leads them to delegate some degree of power/decision-making autonomy to regional level - European integration results from intense bargaining among sovereign states - it's in their best interests to found a permanent peace agreement in order to be able to do all the other things a state has to do - caring about wellbeing of citizens, helping the economy etc. Liberal intergovernmentalism: international decision-making is a two-level game with a domestic and international game. Mainly economic actors and interest groups that determine this. States attitude towards international agreements will depend on competitiveness of national economy - this will determine whether states want more or less integration

the intergovernmental approach to explaining european integration

PART A. Pluralism One of the founding paradigms of US political science A great number of interest groups cutting across multiple cleavages; people are part of many different groups; they may mobilize for different reasons at different times Competition between interest groups, no interest group dominates because there are checks and balances Public good is attained through invisible hand - if everyone acts selfishly then everything will work out PART B. Neo-corporatism Experience of several (northern) European states Some interest groups are stronger than others, some cleavages more significant than others There are few groups, which are very strong and hierarchically organized, potentially only group in sector Interest groups participate in policymaking, often through institutionalized procedures Corporatism: organization of society into interest groups/corporations subordinate to the state Size Corporatism is a small-country phenomenon Trade openness Trade openness encourages all kinds of internal coordination (and corporatism) And small countries are more trade open on average Number of parties Bipartism "favors" corporatism PART C. Statism Not a model as such, but the result of crowding out generated by state interventionism Weak interest groups in great numbers State dominates relations with interest groups Access to state is limited to few and private channels, others are constrained to outside lobbying

three major types of ideal-type relations

Milbrath (1965): political participation ranges from apathy to activism ("gladiators") - divided US population into four different categories Gladiators (about 1 to 7 % of U.S. population): hold electoral office, run as candidate, active member of a political party, actively participates in electoral campaigning. Transitional activities: attending a political meeting, money donations to political parties, entering into contact with political leader (another small share) Spectator (about 60% of U.S. population): has political stickers on car, tries to convince relative to vote for a given candidate, talks about politics, votes, gets informed about politics Verba & Nie (1972) propose 4 models of political participation, that split the "spectator category" proposed by Milbrath. Voting (in all elections): only participatory technology we know of that includes the vast majority of people Campaigning (and donations): going out and convincing people to vote for certain candidates (more demanding than voting - you have to be convinced yourself that your candidate is the worthy; you have to be outspoken/passionate about the candidate) Cooperating and mobilizing at the local level: similar to campaigning Getting in contact with officials for a specific reason: specific problem that you personally have; need to file a request - further you get the more demanding it becomes basically Apathy: no political activity (everybody else)

types of political participants

The school is the agency responsible for socializing groups of young people in particular skills and values in society. In all countries, there is some degree of guided socialization through the schools. Schools attempt to mold the citizenry according to the ideals of the state - more or less knowingly. Peer groups refer either to a group of people who are friends or to people of similar age and characteristics (e.g., students in a college class). Peer groups are extremely influential in developing adolescents' tastes and their view of the world but they vary considerably in their political impact. Mass Media include newspapers, magazines, radio, and films, CDs, internet, etc. We are dependent on the media for what we know and how we relate to the world of politics because of the media-politics connection. We read or watch political debates followed by instant analysis and commentary by experts. Other Agents: State, Religion, Political Events, Art... Primary groups are the agents of socialization with which an individual has regular face-to-face interactions (e.g., family, friends, and work associates). Secondary groups tend to be more large-scale and diffuse (e.g., religious, civic, and professional associations)

various agents of socialization

The cultural approach: likelihood of participation is different across countries; depends on culture and institutions. No actual explanation. Could have to do with different value systems The D Term (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008) Gerber, Green and Larimer try to estimate the importance of voting as a social norm. This norm may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. For example, making it a social event: the whole family goes to vote and then they go for lunch - the children will then take their children to do the same thing They run a fieldwork experiment on 180,000 Michigan households for the primary elections of 2006. Households are divided into 5 groups. No treatment - witness group, same characteristics as treatment groups They receive a postcard that says voting is a civic duty Postcard: same + your vote will be registered and will be studied (Hawthorne effect) - I'll know if you don't go and vote Postcard: same + display of voting history of household over past three elections; you haven't voted last time, I know, and it's very important that you do vote Postcard: same + display of voting history of neighbors over past three elections - all your neighbors have voted; but you haven't - you're lacking Did the same thing in LA but added an ethnic element - reminded the African Americans how the Latinos voted and vice versa

we vote because we feel social pressure to vote