POLS 120 In Class Test 2/Final

Globalization definition:

"As an economic phenomenon, globalization is manifested in a shift from a world of distinct national economies to a global economy in which production is internationalized and financial capital flows freely and instantly between countries."

"Minority" Governments

"Minority" means that the party or the coalition parties forming the government do not have the majority of seats. This means that the government can be easily brought down in a vote of no confidence. And yet such governments are quite common in many countries. So how do minority governments stay in power? : -there are formal or informal agreements allowing parties to obtain some of the benefits of power while technically remaining outside of government -society is not divided by deep economic, social or ideological cleavages, and consequently there are no sharp conflicts over policy (e.g., no party wants to dismantle the welfare state) -parties are mindful of "incumbency costs" (i.e., sometimes parties may prefer to stay out of government for a while, such as during bad economic times, so they are not punished by voters for unpopular policies) Example: Sweden: around ¾ of governments since 1945 have been of the minority type. Why? -PR without a threshold à many small parties à no majority winner in elections -No formal coalition building rules like in Switzerland -Small, and (until very recently) culturally homogeneous society à no deep divisions -Consensus on major social and economic policies (e.g., on maintaining the welfare state) à this lowers the stakes of politics and lessens worries about dramatic policy changes no matter who governs

The logic of the "trade pays" argument:

"Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole." Ricardo's illustration of the concept of comparative advantage. Although Portugal enjoys absolute advantage in production costs of both items (note that both cloth and wine are cheaper to make in Portugal than in Britain), it makes no sense for Portugal to produce cloth.Why not? Because cloth production requires roughly similar amounts of labor in both countries, whereas wine production is significantly more labor-expensive in Britain. Assuming crates of cloth and wine were traded at one-to-one, Ricardo argues that..

Constitution as a set of fundamental laws

"it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force." Alexander Hamilton (1787). The Federalist No. 1. Put another way, according to this "legalistic" meaning, a constitution: •Is something that is brought into existence through a conscious decision by those in the position to do so (which, depending on the time and the place, could be the monarch, the country's elites, or the people as a whole); •Is a set "fundamental and supreme laws, usually written down in a charter." In other words, it's a legal text (D&E, p. 174); •These laws circumscribe the law-making authority of the legislature, defining what itcan and cannot do (e.g. 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion..."); •And because it consists of a set of laws, the constitution creates a need for a body of legal experts charged with the task of interpreting them and resolving disputes about their meaning à i.e., a constitutional court.

Oversized or "Grand" Coalitions

("Oversized" means more coalition partners than necessary to attain a majority in parliament.) Why do such coalitions occur? -Special rules (e.g., extending the principle of proportionality of representation in parliament to proportionality in public office) -Special circumstances (e.g., a country with deep ethnic divisions that call for a maximally consensual, power-sharing style of democratic politics) Example: Why are grand coalitions common in Switzerland? -PR without a threshold à many parties, no majority party -Ethnic divisions à need for power-sharing mechanisms à institutions that feature rules specifically designed to promote consensus:

If a constitution is too flexible

(i.e., if it imposes too few restrictions on political actors' freedom of action and/or is too easy to change), it violates the promise of making life predictable by: - reducing citizens' ability to plan, invest and be confident that their life, liberty or property will not be taken away in the future; - increasing the likelihood that elites will change the rules to benefit themselves (e.g., the Latin American experience of constitutional change has almost always resulted in the expansion of executive power, which in turn was used to channel resources ("who gets what, when and how") to political allies for as long as possible).

-This brings us to an important point: rule of law is one of the major criteria according to which we compare political regimes:

- A simple definition of rule of law is (as per the Oxford English Dictionary) is the "restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by subordinating it to well-defined and established laws" that are the same for everyone or, differently put, it's about "equal justice under law." Accountability •"The government as well as private actors are accountable under the law... Just Laws•The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property and certain core human rights... Open Government•The processes by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced are accessible, fair, and efficient... Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution•Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are accessible, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve..."

The Major Types (a.k.a. "Families") of Political Parties

- As you may recall from our discussion of ideologies, during the past ~100 years politics in democracies have been shaped first and foremost by arguments over: 1. The nature of economic relations (i.e., how much state vs. market in "Who gets what, when and how....") 2. The relationship between the individual and society (i.e., whether people should have to submit to socially prevalent norms, values, customs, lifestyles vs. people should be free to "pursue happiness" in their own ways) - With these two axes we can create a two-dimensional space, in which we can then place the various party families:

Constitutions as "operating manuals": cont.

- Constitutions also specify the fundamental laws (including the rights and liberties of citizens), which ordinary laws and government activities cannot contravene. - But which laws and rights should qualify as fundamental? Countries differ widely in this regard. Note distinction between: •Negative rights: things the state cannot do, e.g., limit freedom of expression or assembly •Positive rights: things the state must do, e.g., right to counsel, to education, to employment, etc. - And the "cannot contravene" part is often problematic as well: authoritarian constitutions often guarantee rights that are meaningless in practice (what matters is the actual practice, not what is written down), and even in democracies defining the scope of rights and freedoms is oftentimes tricky (as with, e.g., defining the limits of freedom of speech).

Constitutions as "operating manuals":

- Constitutions define the organizational framework of government: •the structure of executive, legislative and judicial branches of gov't •the various sub-national levels of gov't (provincial, municipal, etc.) and their respective powers and the responsibilities and power relations among key actors and institutions: •separation of powers (each branch has a distinct sphere of authority) vs. fusion (e.g. in British-type systems, the parliament was historically—less so nowadays—the seat of legislative, executive and judicial power) •checks and balances (a system of mutual vetoes among branches) vs. unitary, centralized government •judicial review: the power of the courts to declare acts of other branches of government unconstitutional and therefore null and void But note that constitutions do not necessarily give a full and complete picture of a political regime (e.g., the U.S. Constitution does not mention political parties, or the cabinet, or judicial review). So again, actual practice is what matters the most.

But this begs the question of why do some countries have high quality, highly capable state institutions and others do not?

- Efficiency? Argument: after much trial and error, societies tend to settle on the most efficient institutions. Problem: weak empirical support because for most of recorded history humanity has operated under very inefficient institutions -Historical accident? Argument: the quality of institutions in post-colonial states may depend on which country was the colonizer. (e.g., Spain's colonialism was more extractive than Britain's, hence differences in development between former Spanish and British colonies in the Americas.) -Ideology? Argument: the choice of institutions has to do with the beliefs of regime-leading elites as to which model is the most desirable, most appropriate, or most compatible with the elite's values. (An extreme example would be Japan's Tokugawa Shogunate, which kept the country almost completely isolated from the rest of the world for ~250 years in the interest of preserving its feudal social order for as long as possible.) - Rulers' self-interest? Argument: institutions are created in the self-interest of specific social coalitions. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, these coalitions (of "altar, sword and throne") were generally more concerned with preserving the social and political status quo than with economic growth (especially growth from trade and commerce, which would have generated new wealth and, with it, a new social class of wealthy entrepreneurs, who before long would have demanded a share of power... )

Some issues in measuring development

- How do we do this for authoritarian regimes, where the data is suspect (recall the argument that information control is one of "dictator's dilemmas"), or from societies afflicted by violent conflict, where measurement is difficult or impossible? - How do we account for informal or illegal economic activities, neither of which is easily measured, yet may account for ~10% of GDP in rich countries and ~50% or more in less developed ones? - How do we account for the fact that prices and average wages vary a lot, meaning that $100 (in US Dollars) buys a lot more in one country and a lot less in another? And, likewise, that the average person needs to work a lot longer to earn $100 in one country compared to another? - One solution is to measure "GDP per capita at purchasing power parity" (GDP at PPP), which takes into account price differences for similar "baskets" of goods in different countries.

Legislatures in Democratic Political Regimes

- If politics is the "activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live" (recall Heywood reading from the 1st module), then legislatures are places where this law-making activity takes place. - Legislatures are also sometimes referred to as deliberative bodies or parliaments (from the French parler , i.e. to speak). - Legislatures are found in democracies and in most non-democracies (and indeed, in some countries they pre-date the arrival of democracy by almost a millennium).

Theories of Development

- No matter how it is measured, and no matter whether we look at economic indicators or at health, education or other statistics, it is clear that there are huge differences in the level of development among countries. - If asked why GDP per capita differs so much among countries, an economist might point to differences in capital, labor or technology. But this only begs the question of why some countries are poor in capital, lack modern technology, why their labor force scores low on productivity, etc.

POSITIVE LAW

- One of the key concepts to be aware of is POSITIVE LAW, which refers to laws that are: •"Man-made" (i.e., found in legal texts and judicial precedents), •designed to govern human behavior, and •enforceable by state action - Historically, positive law—made by kings, legislatures, judges, etc.—has often been contrasted with other normative orders that limited the power of state authorities: divine law, natural law and customary law have all served this function in the past. Today, this function is usually performed by human rights law.

The functions* of constitutions: Constitutions as "billboards" and "blueprints":

- One role of constitutions is as prominent, public expressions of a political regime's philosophy and ideology (the "billboard" aspect). In addition, constitutions often contain statements of goals and purposes of governing, along with general directions for achieving these goals (the "blueprint" role). - The specifics vary widely from constitution to constitution. Such statements may be contained in the constitutional text itself (if there is one) or in ancillary documents (e.g., in the U.S., The Federalist Papers). Here are a few examples:

Theories of Authoritarian Durability: Institutional design

- Recall that in Module 6 we looked at whether authoritarian constitutions are just "meaningless decorations" or whether they perform some useful functions (from the regime's point of view, that is). -The same may be asked about other institutions, e.g., elections. What are they for? -So what purposes do authoritarian elections serve? - election victories depend on the regime's ability to compel the population to turn out, and as such demonstrate its strength and capacity, and deter opposition, especially from other elites. (Yes, results can always be faked, but blatantly fake victories are less credible, so the point is to minimize outright cheating as much as possible) -elections are useful for gauging the competence of officials in mobilizing the population, and to observe incipient resistance if actual turnout doesn't match expectations -elections may be used to facilitate orderly circulation of elites as a way of managing succession problems (i.e., the dictator may use an election as an opportunity to dismiss a competitor or to anoint a successor) -voters may participate or abstain (in some authoritarian regimes participation is not mandatory or not enforced) to express support or dissatisfaction, and thus provide the regime with useful information about the level of support it has in society

"Weberian" Bureaucracies

- The most influential conceptualization of bureaucracy in political science comes from the works of Max Weber and includes: - impartiality and independence: officials who serve the state (or, ideally, the "public interest") and not partisan, personal or private interests - hierarchical organization ("pyramid of authority") - functional specialization: departments and agencies dedicated to specific administrative or regulatory tasks (think "Department of Energy," "Department of Health and Human Services" or "alphabet soup" agencies such as the FAA, IRS, FCC, FEC, etc.) - reliance on rules and standard operating procedures, meaning well-defined, predictable patterns of behavior) - reliance on "files": i.e., records, written or electronic documents; also known as "institutional memory") - merit promotions rewarding knowledge, expertise, education though exams, elite schools, etc. - permanence in the sense that, in a Weberian bureaucracy, civil servants remain in office even when governments change - Weber saw bureaucracy as an integral part of the modern state, contrasting it with pre-modern models of authority (e.g., those rooted in feudalism) that—apart from very few exceptions—lacked a professional bureaucratic apparatus. -This was because pre-modern states were typically limited in their capacity, relying on private individuals (primarily the landowning nobility) and non-state organizations (most notably the Christian churches, in the cases of Europe and Latin America) to raise armies, deliver justice and law enforcement, as well as provide rudimentary social services such as health, education and aid for the poor (e.g., Church-run schools, charities and hospitals). - In the early modern period (6th-18th centuries) as states sought to expand their capacity, they often did so by selling offices to those with the interest and money to pay for them. These offices included everything from the governorship of a province, to a court clerkship, to a commission as an army officer, to a monopoly on running the country's postal service. - Bureaucracies in Weber's sense of the term begin to appear only in the 19thcentury, and are related to the processes of constructing culturally and administratively unified nation-states out of disparate collections of peoples and territories. The goals of these processes are listed in the box to the right. "...the civil service was developed and adapted as a means for the state to pursue the goals of penetration (territorial consolidation and the integration of peripheries), standardisation (increased predictability of the rules and bureaucratic expression of the state) and accommodation (including pacification, buying loyalty and power-brokering). The civil service played an integral part in both the consolidation of states and, subsequently, the psychological integration of elements of states into nations..." Avis, p. 3. - In the cases of European settler societies (e.g., in North and South America) and colonies (e.g., in Africa and Asia), the result of state-building efforts was often "hybridity" in the sense that these states combined aspects of European models with forms of authority rooted in local cultures and traditions: "Transplanted colonial administrations interacted with pre-existing institutional features (formal and informal), which encouraged the reinterpretation of both. Hybrid political orders developed that relied on 'local/traditional' institutions to extend the power of the state into regions where this was often absent, limited or contested. Customary law, societal structures (extended families, clans, tribes, religious brotherhoods, village communities etc.) and 'traditional' authorities (such as village elders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers, religious leaders) have proved profoundly adaptive and resilient...to the incursion of colonial rule and post independence state- and nation-building projects ... These structures have, and continue to, determine the everyday social reality in many developing countries, particularly in rural and remote areas. " Avis, p. 10. - If we add to this mix the legacies of 20th century ideologically-driven state-building projects (e.g., those rooted in nationalism or Soviet-type socialism), we see today a complex pattern of different administrative models, some close to the Weberian type and others far removed from it.

Constitutions as "window dressing":

- This function of constitutions, especially in the context of authoritarian regimes, is to obscure and deceive (e.g., to "guarantee" civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, which cannot be exercised in practice, or to promise social rights—to education, housing, healthcare, etc.—which are fulfilled poorly or not at all). - The goals of such deception typically include: •Bolstering the regime's legitimacy (i.e., the perception that its claim to power and authority is right and proper) in the eyes of domestic audiences, including both elite actors and members of the general public. •Bolstering the regime's international standing, especially in the eyes of donor/sponsor countries or international bodies disbursing foreign aid and investment. - This function of constitutions, especially in the context of authoritarian regimes, is to obscure and deceive (e.g., to "guarantee" civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, which cannot be exercised in practice, or to promise social rights—to education, housing, healthcare, etc.—which are fulfilled poorly or not at all). - Constitutions may therefore be classified using a simple 2x2 typology of what they promise (much / little) vs. what they actually deliver (much / little). - This gives four possible types: "sham", "weak," "modest" and "strong"constitutions; - Empirical evidence (from 1996, so not exactly current) presented on the graph to the right suggests that sham and strong constitutions are the two most prevalent types, with the former typically found in authoritarian regimes and the latter in democracies.

Presidentialism

- Voters elect BOTH the parliament AND, separately, the president who is the chief executive. (The two elections may take place on the same day, as in the U.S., or on different days.) - The president remains in office for a fixed term and cannot be ousted by the parliament, except through impeachment - The president selects cabinet ministers (in the U.S., "heads of departments", e.g., Treasury, Labor, Commerce, etc.) from among members of parliament and/or outsiders ** , and may also fill key positions in the bureaucracy (in the U.S., appoint "heads of agencies" e.g. FCC, EPA, FEC, etc,) , but most rank-and-file civil servants are on permanent appointments. - The president also performs the ceremonial role of head of state. - There is formal separation of powers with checks and balances among the branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial). - Note that presidential powers vary considerably from country to country. The power to veto legislation (subject to override by the legislature) is common, as is the power of legislative initiative (i.e., the ability to propose new bills), but beyond those two there is much variation. - Also, the number of presidential powers enumerated in countries' constitutions varies, as shown in the graphic to the right.

Semi-Presidential Systems

- Voters elect members of parliament and then a prime minister and a cabinet are formed out members of the legislature just like in parliamentary systems; - Voters also choose the president in a direct election; - In some semi-presidential systems, the elected president performs only a ceremonial role, but in others he/she is unquestionably the head of government, and in still others the president shares power with the prime minister (see the French example on the very last slide). What are the benefits of semi-presidentialism? - a "safety valve" aspect, (i.e., the ability to remove unpopular/incompetent/corrupt governments combined with the stability of fixed presidential terms); - checks and balances, which are absent in pure parliamentarism. And the disadvantages? - blurred accountability (Who is in charge? The president or the prime minister? Who is to blame when things go wrong?) - makes governing more complicated (i.e., more likelihood of "gridlock", more difficult to "get things done").

Parliamentarism

- Voters elect only the parliament (i.e., there is no separate election to choose the executive). - The elected government (meaning "the prime minister and the cabinet") is then formed from among members of parliament *, typically by the party or coalition that has the majority of seats ** - The government remains in office for the customary term as long as it retains the "confidence" of parliament (that is, it can be ousted at any time in a "vote of no confidence"). - The government is assisted by the bureaucracy, responsible for the practical "executing" of policies and programs. Most civil servants are on permanentappointments (i.e., don't get fired/hired when govt's change). - The prime minister is not the head of state *** - There is no "separation of powers" between the legislative and executive branches

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: The Problem of Authoritarian Control

-An authoritarian system cannot be run by coercion alone because coercion is costly (soldiers and police need to be equipped and paid), and because ramping it up brings diminishing returns (too much repression and the economy—and eventually society as a whole—will crash). So all authoritarian systems need the cooperation of at least some portion of the general public. -The problem can be addressed in part by inventing some legitimating story, e.g., about the divine right of kings or about some special knowledge or skill that those in power possess. -Additionally, dictators can offer so-called "authoritarian bargains," whereby citizens reconcile themselves to giving up civil and political rights in exchange for: -economic benefits: e.g. promises of redistributing wealth from the "haves" to the "have nots," promises of secure employment, access to various state-run services (health, education), cheap food and housing, etc. -non-economic benefits: dictators can also promise to "redistribute status", i.e. to elevate the esteem of some groups at the expense of others (e.g. in communist systems workers and peasants were celebrated, while the middle and upper classes were vilified in official propaganda).

The Costs of Globalization:

-Are there any down sides to globalization? Some say there is nothing to worry about: sure, there are short-term "losers" from globalization, but in the longer run "everyone wins" and problems can be addressed by:- Markets: both countries' economies would grow, so workers in the "losing" sectors (e.g., wine-makers in Britain, cloth-makers in Portugal) would eventually find employment in growing sectors of their respective national economies (this is known as the "rising tide lifts all boats" argument).- Institutions: the "losers" can be compensated by redistributing some of the newly created wealth to them (this can be done by the state, e.g., by using tax revenues to pay for re-training programs, or by creating tax breaks for new businesses in depressed regions; or by businesses in partnership with labor unions, e.g., by offering laid-off workers severance pay or early retirement). - But others are more skeptical: 2a. Dependency theory:- Argument: poorer countries do not benefit from international trade; on the contrary, it makes them worse off. Why? Because poor countries often rely on exports of raw materials to rich countries, which in turn manufacture high value-added products out of these materials and sell these products back to poor countries at a premium (resulting in e.g., high prices for foreign cars because there aren't any cheaper, domestically-produced ones).- Proposed solution: poorer countries should pursue "import substitution" policies, i.e., they should place high tariffs on imports and develop their own industries.- But is it a good solution? Developing countries that tried import substitution (e.g., India from around 1950 to 1990) experienced slow growth and eventually discarded this approach. 2b. The "race to the bottom" argument:- Globalization allows financial capital to flow into places where it faces the fewest restraints: the least democracy, the weakest trade unions, the weakest health and safety laws, the weakest environmental regulations, the weakest incentive and capacity of states to redistribute wealth, etc.- In other words, globalization threatens to "undo" many of the gains and protections that labor has won over capital in the course of the past 100 years thanks to democratization. (Why? Because it was democracy that enabled "the many" —the bulk of the population in working- and middle classes—to restrain the power of "the few," i.e., the economic elites).- So, instead of making everyone better off, globalization hurts labor in wealthy and poor countries alike by reducing the capacity of national governments to "compensate the losers" through redistribution (Why? Because if regulation and redistribution are attempted, in a globalized world capital will flee from countries with higher tax and regulatory burdens to places where these burdens are lower, hence the "race to the bottom.")- Consequently, some scholars argue that democracy, globalization and the nation-state are in fundamental tension:- You can either have a world in which democratic nation-states succeed in placing restraints on globalization in reflection of the values they espouse (e.g., prohibiting sale of goods made overseas by child workers),- or a world in which globalization prevails, eroding the power of democracies to restrain it (and thus, perhaps, undermining the long-term sustainability of democracy),- or a globalized world which is democratized at a supra-national level with something like the EU as a model (if pushed to its logical conclusion, this would mean nation-states eventually fading away in favor of supra-national federations).

Theories of Authoritarian Durability: Historical institutionalism

-At critical historical junctures—meaning moments of disruption sparked by war, natural catastrophes, technological progress or geopolitical shifts (i.e., the rise and fall of great powers)—coalitions of social groups create political institutions to serve their interests, meaning they create institutions that will allow them to reap benefits under these new circumstances, or to prevent losses of material wealth, status or core values. -Political institutions may therefore be thought of as attempts to "freeze" a set of power relations by incentivizing their beneficiaries (KTLF use the term "constituents") to support them, and by placing steep barriers against action by any would-be challengers. This makes these institutions last (possibly for quite a long time) until another disruptive event comes along. -For example, European feudalism—a type of traditional authoritarianism—emerged around the 9th century C.E. out of the disruptive period of the so-called "Dark Ages" as an alliance of "throne, altar and sword" (i.e., state-building elites, religious elites and warrior elites) and proved highly resilient for hundreds of years. It was only gradually undermined by economic, social and technological changes from the 16th century onward.

Theories of Authoritarian Durability: Barriers to Collective Action

-Authoritarian regimes maintain themselves through a combination of cooptation and repression, i.e., "carrots and sticks." There are benefits for individuals and groups that cooperate, and there are costs imposed on those who challenge the rulers. -When a regime is strong, the cost/benefit ratio is very much in favor of cooperation (or at least passive acceptance), but this can change very quickly in times of crisis.4. Barriers to Collective Action -In other words, rational calculations and personal incentives can explain both the persistence of repressive regimes, and cases of their sudden collapse:- as long as the number of challengers is low, there is the "free rider" problem: the costs of protest are high and benefits uncertain, so rationally it makes sense to let others take the risk (i.e., go out and demonstrate at the cost of persecution, imprisonment or even death);- but when the challenge gathers momentum, it becomes risky not to join in because if the challengers win, you may face scorn or sanctions as a coward or worse;- so eventually there comes a "tipping point" at which the regime's supporters — including the police and military—suddenly quit or defect to the opposition. -The problem lies in getting the protest started in the first place: in the absence of effective coordination (which the rulers do their utmost to prevent, e.g., by censoring the news or limiting Internet access in times of crisis), an authoritarian regime can try to minimize risks from social protests.

First Past the Post (FPTP), also known as Single Member District (SMD) systems

-Categorical ballot (each party submits one candidate per district; voters choose one candidate only) -The winner in each district is decided by the plurality of votes (meaning that whoever wins the largest number of votes - not necessarily the majority - wins the single seat for that district) -A party's national election result is a simple sum of its district victories (i.e., the number of districts in which the party's candidate came first = the number of seats this party will have in parliament)

Constitutions: Rigidity vs Flexibility

-Constitutions can take different forms, but whether they are written, unwritten or some combination of both, they are mechanisms that restrict (whether by custom or written law) the political actors' freedom of action (i.e., they limit "who can do what to whom"), and thus make political, social and economic interactions more predictable and, at least in some cases, more equitable (see the Lepore reading). -In order to achieve this predictability, constitutions need to be meaningful (i.e., not just "decorations") and durable, so as to place key decisions about societal goals, values and procedures beyond easy reach of self-interested elites or temporary majorities within the general public; -But the benefits of predictability need to be weighed against the need to adapt to changing circumstances (because societies are not static and their populations, economies, and even values change over time); -So the trick is to find the right balance between constitutional rigidity and flexibility, but this isn't easy because...

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: Escalating Predation Problem

-Corruption is inherent in authoritarian rule (why? dictators need to use payoffs to keep their allies loyal, so corruption is a "feature, not a bug"), but tends to get worse over time:• -Authoritarian regimes founded by groups formed in an ideologically-driven, violent struggle (e.g., guerrilla combat) may be relatively resistant to economically-motivated abuses of political office at first; -However, successive generations are likely to both more cynical and more preoccupied with amassing personal wealth; -Also, turning a blind eye to escalating corruption by top elites is often accompanied by extremely unpopular crackdowns on corruption by everyone else (It's one thing to allow the dictator's top cronies to evade taxes, but if everyone does it, state finances will collapse. However, going after the little guys while the fat cats keep stealing with impunity is deeply unpopular.)

What Causes Democratization?: Cultural explanations

-Cultural theories say that broadly shared attitudes, beliefs, values, or practices can increase or reduce the probability that a society will be democratic. Since religion has traditionally been the major source of values, one approach is to examine the different faiths' views on how society ought to be organized. Hence the argument, most famously made by the political scientist Samuel Huntington in "The Clash of Civilizations," which says that: - democratization in the "West" (especially in north-West Europe and the Anglosphere countries) was the consequence of the Protestant Reformation (because of Protestantism's individualistic values, which eventually spilled over into politics); - the persistence of authoritarianism in Latin America (and generally in traditionally Catholic countries) is the consequence of Catholicism because the Catholic Church, as an authoritarian, absolute monarchy, provided a model for political authoritarianism; - authoritarianism in Russia is the consequence of Orthodox Christianity because this religion never developed a distinction between religious and secular authority; - likewise, authoritarianism in the Middle East is the consequence of Islam because this religion also never developed a distinction religious and secular authority; - authoritarianism in Asia is the consequence of Confucianism and its emphasis on respect and deference to authority, placing the group above the individual, etc.

Transitions from Authoritarianism: "Top-down" pathways: Death of Supreme leader

-Death in office, especially in the absence of a succession mechanism, is another "top-down" pathway through which authoritarian regimes may come to an end (but regime failure following death of leader is far less likely than with coups or other pathways.)

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: The Information Control Problem.

-Dictators (both individual and collective, e.g., ruling parties) claim to "know best" how to lead the country, but since they do not in fact have superior knowledge and are as likely as anyone else to make mistakes, they suppress debate and discussion (by officials, media outlets, even individual citizens) to prevent criticism of their regimes. -Fear of reprisals for speaking the truth leads to widespread "preference falsification" (i.e., a situation where "everyone is lying to everyone about everything"). This culture of lying (including to one's superiors) spreads to government agencies as well, so eventually no one knows the true state of the economy, the mood of the public, etc., and consequently dictators end up making decisions on the basis of false information. -Widespread lying also means that dictators don't know how much support they really have. They try to address this problem by making lying more costly, e.g., by forcing individuals to engage in public displays of loyalty—the more over the top, the better—hence the phenomenon of "personality cults."

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: Accountability Problem

-Dictators often claim to know which policies are best, and they are in a position to actually carry them out without the messiness of democratic accountability. -But dictators don't really have any superior knowledge or insight (i.e., they do not really possess the extraordinary insight or skills they often claim to have). -And since there is no democratic accountability or constraints imposed by public opinion, the media or the courts, there is no way to stop really bad policies before they lead to disaster (e.g., in the Chinese political tradition, this is called the "bad emperor" problem).

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: Loyalty vs Merit Problem

-Dictators often reward loyalty rather than competence because they fear competent individuals as potential rivals. -Consequently, authoritarian systems tend to degenerate over time as promotions go to incompetent loyalists rather than to the "best and brightest." -This happens because loyalty turns into a kind of currency with which ambitious individuals buy their way to the top. But as more and more people do it, flattery becomes devalued, leading to ever more elaborate, over-the-top displays (this is called in the political science jargon "flattery inflation").

To sum up, modernization theory's argument boils down to this:

-Economic development increases people's capabilities to act according to their preferences... -while cultural change (especially value change away from subject and toward emancipatory values) affects the importance people attach to being able to do so ... -this, in turn, drives democratization the sense of increasing popular pressure for accountability of the rulers to the ruled through mechanisms such as free, fair and competitive elections that incumbents can actually lose. In other words: Social change -> Value change -> Political change

Why is democracy so "weird?" At first glance, it seems improbable that elites would ever agree to it because:

-Economic power is highly unequal pretty much everywhere, so how do you square that with the radically egalitarian principle of universal suffrage and "one person, one vote"? (Differently put, there are always many more "have nots" than "haves," so why on earth would the "haves" ever agree to a system where decisions are made on the basis of numerical vote counts, under which they would always be outnumbered?) -Likewise, cultural power—the power to define the values that underpin a social order—has historically been very unequal as well, generally having been the reserved domain of the clergy and hereditary nobility. The very idea that the "rules under which we all shall live"—for example, whether divorce should be legal or not—should no longer be treated as something grounded in God's will or timeless custom, but should be determined by counting everyone's votes, was seen by these traditional elites as an abomination. -And political power is a highly valuable good in of itself. Free, fair and competitive elections mean that the people can "throw the bums out," meaning that under democracy politicians risk losing access to power and its benefits, including the opportunity to profit (either legally or corruptly) from holding public office.

Globalization history:

-Globalization is not a new phenomenon: -the first wave of globalization can be traced back to European colonial expansion into the New World, which created global markets for commodities such as sugar and cotton; -the second wave was set off by the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, which revolutionized transport (steamships and railways) and communication (telegraph); -and the third wave, brought about by the computer/Internet revolution of the past three decades. -And it's not linear in nature: rather, the world has experienced alternating cycles of increasing and decreasing globalization (the former: driven by technological change; the latter prompted by wars and economic crises)

Today we come to the "So what" question about political regimes: What does it matter whether a country is democratic or authoritarian?

-In answering this question it's worth keeping in mind that the genocidal totalitarianisms of the 20th century—Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule, China under Mao Zedong—were the exceptions. As the political scientist Tom Pepinsky has argued, in most authoritarian regimes today life for ordinary people is generally "boring and tolerable." -So why should we care about regime types? 1. The normative criterion, meaning the fundamental issue of people's preferences as to how society ought to be organized. 2. The empirical criteria, meaning the kinds of outcomes associated with different regime types that we can observe in the real world (e.g. economic growth, human development, physical security, etc.).

Bureaucracies

-In both parliamentary and presidential systems, the political executive is assisted in its tasks by an entity generically referred to as the "bureaucracy." -But exactly who, or what, is covered by this term? The Avis article makes a useful distinction between: -the civil service (officials and administrators in government departments and agencies) and the -public service (police officers, teachers, social workers, etc.). -Generally speaking, the term "bureaucracy" is used to refer to the former and not the latter.

Economic Drivers of Democracy

-In the previous lecture (recall slide #5) we saw that global democratization began to take off only in the second half of the 19th century and became a major world-wide phenomenon only in the 20th. -Why then? What else happened during the 19th century? The chart on right shows that this was when prolonged economic stagnation suddenly gave way to economic growth. The quote below may be hyperbolic, but it gets this point across very well: -To be sure, this economic takeoff didn't happen everywhere in the world at the same time or at the same rate. -Nonetheless, authoritarian norms (selection of rulers by heredity or other special status as good and desirable) began to give way to democratic ones (selection by the people) correlated with the economic takeoff.

Institutional Theories of Democratic Development

-In the previous module (#11.2) we considered social and economic conditions (wealth, inequality, urbanization, literacy) that make it more or less likely that a given society will make a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and, subsequently, that democracy will survive in that society; -Of course, there are always exceptions: there are historical cases (most notably India since 1949) of democracy emerging and surviving in very poor societies, and cases of democracy breaking down in relatively wealthy countries (e.g., in Hungary since 2010); -Clearly, then, social and economic conditions are not the whole story. But what else might matter? -One argument, sometimes called the "great leader" view of history, emphasizes the role of political agency, i.e., the choices made by key individuals at crucial historical junctures, where it was possible for events to take one path or the other depending the choices made by key actors there and then. -What choices? Generally speaking, these theories emphasize the importance choosing the right institutional design - "right" in the sense of creating institutions that, even if not fully democratic at the outset, were amenable to subsequent democratization (e.g., in the United States this is the "wisdom of the Founders" line of argument.)

Transitions from Authoritarianism: "Bottom-up" pathways: Insurgency

-Insurgencies are episodes of armed confrontation between regime and opposition forces. For an insurgency to have a realistic chance, large numbers of people need to be equipped, trained and organized for combat, which is difficult in the absence of support from an outside power, which in turn makes it difficult to differentiate between insurgencies and foreign-imposed (or at least foreign-assisted) regime change.

International Drivers of Democracy

-Internationally-focused theories emphasize that polities are not isolated but embedded in the international system of states. -For example, we know from history that democratization often comes in "waves" (i.e. many transitions concentrated in both space and time) -This suggests that the causal story of democratization (and democratic reversals) may be as much about what is happening at the international level (especially in a country's immediate neighborhood) as it is about what is happening inside these countries. -Some internationally-focused theories emphasize "diffusion," i.e. the idea that transitions to or from democracy in one country can lead to spill-over ("contagion") to its neighbors through mechanisms such as learning from foreign examples. (Note that this can work both ways: pro-democracy forces can learn from successful examples abroad, but likewise dictators can learn from successful efforts by other dictators to defeat challenges to their rule.) -Other theories focus on the concepts of international linkage and leverage, which include the potentially democratizing impact of trade relationships with other democracies, dependence on foreign aid and membership in international institutions: A cartoon from Egypt from the time of the Arab Spring illustrating the idea of democratic "contagion" "...western leverage [is] the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure ... linkage [is] the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organization al) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and western-led multilateral institutions." Levitsky and Way. (2006). "Linkage versus Leverage", p. 379 -Last but not least, there is geopolitics, meaning competition among the world's great powers and its consequences for smaller states. As an example, during the Cold War some countries became—voluntarily or not—"satellites" or client states of one of the superpowers (e.g. the persistence of authoritarianism in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1989 is largely explained by de-facto conquest of this region by the Soviet Union toward the end of WWII).

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing

-It is easy to caricature dictators as unhinged, power-mad egomaniacs, but it is important to remember that not all authoritarian regimes are personalistic, and even in those that are, the dictator's personality—unhinged or otherwise—is not the whole story. In short, "dictatorship is not about the dictator." So what is it about? To survive, authoritarian regimes must address a variety of problems, sometimes referred to as "dictator's dilemmas": -Like all regimes, authoritarian systems need to perform the basic tasks of statehood: raising revenues, maintaining order, defending borders, providing at least some public goods, managing the economy, etc. These tasks are complex and require the cooperation of many individuals and groups: bureaucrats, soldiers, bankers, judges, business and labor leaders, etc. -Dictators gain the cooperation of the groups they need by promising outsize benefits (rapid promotions, access to lucrative government contracts, opportunities to profit from corruption) to those who agree to serve the system (on the flip side, those who do not cooperate are shut out of these opportunities, imprisoned or worse). -However, these promises lack credibility (the dictator can always renege on any promise, and there is no independent authority—like a proper court of law—to do anything about it). Both sides know this, so dictators attempt to solve these credible commitment problems by creating institutions (e.g. political parties) to regulate access to benefits in a predictable way (e.g. recall from previous module that party-based regimes are very durable). -Hence one of dictator's dilemmas is that stronger institutions (i.e. more predictable, more rules-based) help to solve commitment problems, but weaken the dictator's ability to act unfettered.

Theories of Authoritarian Durability: Poverty and Economic Inequality

-Just as economic prosperity is correlated (and perhaps causally connected) with democracy (more on this next week), poverty and inequality are connected with authoritarianism:• -Poverty leads to greater concern with economic issues than with political liberties, and provides opportunities for authoritarians to claim that they are protecting the "haves" (or helping the "have nots"). -Economic inequality leads to fear and mistrust between groups: -1. the wealthy and the middle classes want to protect their material possessions -2. traditional elites (nobility, churches) want to defend their status and privileges -3. the poor want redistribution The first two groups fear losing out under democracy, and thus might favor the continuation of authoritarian rule.

Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown: Succession Problem

-No dictator lives forever, so authoritarian regimes - with their weak institutions and often unclear rules for succession - face the problem that no one really knows what will happen after the dictator's death: close allies of an aging ruler may want to strike first to keep their place at the top; those who have been sidelined sense an opportunity to gain power and may also want to strike first, so authoritarian systems (especially of the "personalistic" type) often experience a period of turmoil after the dictator dies. (The recent movie The Death of Stalin is very good on this.)

Once democracy is established, why does it last?

-Oftentimes it doesn't: many attempts at democratization are not successful (see next slide) -Democracies can fail: a. Through war, revolution or coup b. Through deliberate action on part of rulers to create "incumbent advantage" (that is, by efforts to rig the game so that incumbents are unlikely to lose, e.g. by changing electoral laws, controlling the media, patronage, or in some cases, the harassment of political opponents. In other words, the outward appearances (elections, etc.) are preserved, but the resulting system is no longer a democracy but rather "electoral authoritarianism." c. Without a deliberate effort by the rulers, by a mechanism where more and more people opportunistically join the ruling "party of power" and opposition parties compete, but never win. Is this still a democracy? Cases like these are difficult to classify.

Transitions from Authoritarianism: "Bottom-up" pathways: Protests

-Peaceful mass protests by members of the general public are the most common "bottom-up" pathway to authoritarian regime collapse, accounting for 17% of such events, compared to half that (8%) for insurgencies.

So what specific aspects of institutional design might matter for democracy's chances of taking hold and surviving?

-Political Parties:- Rooted in actual social interests and identities vs. created on the spur of the moment to serve politicians' immediate needs and discarded afterward (e.g. back in the 1990s, observers of Russian politics talked about "taxicab parties" into which politicians would hop in, ride for a short while, and then hop off) -Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism: - recall Juan Linz's "perils of presidentialism" argument about the dangers for democracy inherent in presidentialism's essential "winner take all" character -Proportional vs. First Past the Post electoral system: recall arguments about:- FPTP may increase tensions in divided societies and perhaps undermine democracy- PR may make governing so difficult as to cause systemic failure; -Unitary vs. Federal System: - unitary constitutions may facilitate forging a single nation out of diverse regional identities and subcultures, but on the flip side, may drive these subcultures into opposition to the nation-building project (including, in some cases, support for outright secession).- federal systems may help stave off secessionist pressure, but on the other hand, may make it possible for sub-national pockets of authoritarianism to survive in democratizing societies. -Another type of choice had to do with decisions by these founding figures not to abuse the power they had under historical circumstances that gave them great stature and prominence (e.g., one could easily imagine the histories of India and South Africa taking very different paths if Jawaharlal Nehru and Nelson Mandela chose to entrench their personal power). -The more general version of this argument is that while formal institutions do matter, so do informal norms of behavior. Which norms are especially important? -"Mutual toleration, or the understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and -forbearance, or the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives." -To the above one could also add the norm of "loser's consent" i.e. learning to lose and step down graciously in the expectation that one will have another shot at power the next time around. (There is some evidence to back this up: the graph shows that each peaceful transfer of power increases the chances that such peaceful transfers will continue in the future.)

Authoritarianism today

-Recall that in Module 5 we looked at the prevalence of various regime types since the Second World War. -The takeaway from that module was that although certain specific sub-types of authoritarian rule (e.g., military autocracies or communist regimes) are less common today than, say, 40 years ago, authoritarianism is still very much with us, and some of these regimes have been quite durable. -In this module, we will explore a set of theories that seek to explain authoritarian durability.

One way to think about the preservation of democracy is as a case of the prisoner's dilemma game:

-So, what does game theory tell us about why some democracies last and others don't? - if neither side misbehaves and a democracy is lucky enough to survive its first few years, the participants may learn to trust each other and to accept the principle of "certain rules, uncertain outcomes" (this is the so-called the "habituation" argument). Cooperation may be a win-win, (bottom right), but if you don't trust the other side, you have a strong incentive to make the first move and seize power before they do. The other side reasons likewise and the result is a fight-fight scenario (top left). - if the game is played many times (a popular revolution, followed by a military coup, followed by another revolution, followed by another coup) the players may realize on their own that they are better off cooperating (the "evolution of cooperation" argument) - because the payoff matrix could change over time, making the seizure of power less attractive. This could happen as a consequence of developing a complex economy where wealth is generated in a variety of ways and not just through control of natural resources or state institutions).

Transitions from Authoritarianism: "Top-down" pathways: Elections

-Sometimes authoritarian rulers chose to negotiate their way out of power rather than risk being forced out. This often takes the form of an agreement ("pact") with the opposition, followed by competitive elections. -Why would authoritarian rulers do that? Mainly for their own protection: dictators (and, more broadly, members of the former ruling group) face far less likelihood of death, prison, or exile after a transition to democracy compared to a transition to another autocracy

What Causes Democratization?: Threat-based explanations

-The 19th century was a time of great social tension that periodically manifested itself in outbreaks of revolutionary violence (in France alone there was not just the Revolution of 1789, but also 1830, 1848 and 1871). -There was a feeling that, in the words of the writer Thomas Carlyle, "if something be not done [about the condition of the working classes], something will do itself one day, and in a fashion that will please nobody.", i.e., it's better give them ballots so they won't turn to bullets... -In the case of Britain, the succession of Reform Acts (that gradually expanded the franchise during the course of the 1800s) was a consequence of fear of revolution on the part of the ruling classes. -But what explains the timing and location? i.e., why the late 19th century, why in the West? Because the industrial revolution concentrated the poor in cities and factories -> this increased their capacity to organize and resist ->which increased the risk of revolution in rapidly industrializing countries of the West.

Conceptualizing Development

-The concepts of development and modernization are related; however, development is concerned more with social and economic change over time (e.g., in wealth, living standards, literacy, etc.) than with value change or political change, which are modernization's theory major points of focus. -To begin: looking at historical data on development, we see that the world as a whole is much less poor and less unequal than it was 200, 100 or even 50 years ago. -Which is not to say that extremes of poverty have disappeared: if the world had 100 people, 48 would live on less than $2 per day, and 1 out of 2 children would live in poverty.

Presently, self-definition of countries as democracies is almost universal

-This doesn't mean that all of these self-defined democracies meet even the most minimalistic, procedural criteria we discussed back in Module 5 (they don't), but it shows democracy's normative power as something that is good and desirable. What is notable is how new this is. As recently as a century ago, the norm was that power ought to be held by the few, not the many. -As the graph shows, through much of the 19th century few countries held any elections at all, and those few that did severely restricted the franchise. -Another way of interpreting the graph to the right is that democratization happened earlier in some countries than in others ... .. and, indeed, in some countries it has never happened at all, ever. (The graphic below shows that something like 68 out of 188 countries—including such major powers as Russia and China—have never experienced a peaceful turnover in power through free elections in their entire history.)

The normative criterion of democratic vs. authoritarian

-This ultimately boils down to a fundamental disagreement as to whether:• The country's political regime ought to reflect the value of fundamental equality of all human beings, with the goal of letting individuals set their own life goals ("pursue happiness," in the language of the U.S. Declaration of Independence) in their own ways. At the level of political institutions, this belief in equality is typically expressed in the principle of "one person, one vote" under a universal franchise, or -That the political regime ought the reflect the fundamental value of order and hierarchy in the service of some collective goal—the pursuit of national greatness, creating God's kingdom on earth, the "radiant future" of communism, or whatever—which takes priority over individual goals and aspirations, all of which is underpinned by the belief that human beings are not created equal and ought to be ruled in a paternalistic manner by their elders and betters.

Bottom line on cultural explanations:

-Today, "strong" culturalist arguments in the mold of Huntington's thesis are largely dismissed: the idea that some cultures are intrinsically incompatible with democracy, cannot be squared with the historical record of cultural change. (The most obvious example would be how the Catholic Church has reconciled itself with an existence under democracy, and how democracy has taken root in traditionally Catholic countries) -However, some scholars still argue in favor of so-called "weak" culturalist arguments, which hold that a supportive cultural environment is necessary for democracy to emerge and endure, but that cultural traditions are malleable and subject to change both from above (i.e. by concerted effort by political elites) and from below (i.e. by value change among the general public that happens as consequences of e.g. rising education levels). (More on this last point when we look at Inglehart and Welzel's article next time.)

In both cases (authoritarian control and authoritarian power-sharing) balancing cooptation vs. repression is difficult because:

-Too little repression may facilitate popular revolt; -Too much repression may lead to catastrophic economic damage; -Payoffs that are too small give regime supporters little reason to stay loyal; -Payoffs that are too big may be crippling for the economy, and may make some elites strong enough to challenge the dictator in a coup (and it's coups that dictators fear the most.)

Summing up:

-With the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Soviet-style communism there was a widespread temptation to believe that history itself had "ended" (Francis Fukuyama wrote a much-cited article in 1989 titled "Have we reached the end of history") and that henceforth liberal democracy would have no credible alternatives. -There was also a tendency to conflate modernization with democratization, i.e., believing that both processes operated like a one-way ratchet (just as countries don't become "less modern" over time, they would likewise not become less democratic). In retrospect, this was wishful thinking. The prevailing view today is that democratization is not a one-off event but a "dynamic process that always remains incomplete and perpetually runs the risk of reversal." C. Tilly. 2007. Democracy. -But the same can be said about autocratization: a weakened democratic regime isn't destined to backslide all the way to autocracy, and no autocracy is immune from the forces of democratization. -Like much else in politics, institutions—be they authoritarian, democratic, or somewhere in between—are best conceptualized as outcomes of prolonged struggles by competing social groups over economic resources, status and power, struggles that are inconclusive and have no end point.

-Rule of law can be contrasted with "discriminatory legalism," where instead of "equal justice under law":

-access to state law is denied to some groups altogether (historically, in many feudal-type systems, access to the courts was reserved for the elite or, at best, for property holders; by contrast, for tenant farmers, serfs and enslaved persons the only "justice" available was that meted out by the local landowner). -the law is applied unevenly and enforced selectively in a way that reflects social hierarchies (as in the old catchphrase: "It's one law for the rich and another for the poor", or in the phrase made famous by the notorious tax-evading heiress Leona Helmsley: "Only the little people pay taxes"). -or is "weaponized" by the rulers and used as a cudgel against their opponents (as in the phrase "Para mis amigos todo, para mis enemigos la ley", For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law," attributed to Oscar Benavides, President of Peru during the early 20th century). -Much as we did with democracy vs. authoritarianism, we may gather empirical data on the uses and abuses of law throughout the world and then place political regimes on a "rule of law" scale. -Indeed, many of the more complex, less "minimalistic" measures of democracy tend to include rule of law. -The question of why we see these differences is therefore not all that different from the question of why some countries are democratic, others authoritarian, and still others somewhere in between. (We will address this question later in the semester, in Module #11.)

Globalization aspects

-economic: trade (imports and exports as % of GDP), foreign direct investment, capital flows, labor migration -cultural: cultural change due to migration, cross-border interpersonal contacts, rise of global consumer culture (movies, music, fashion) -technological: telecommunications, Internet, transport infrastructure -political: global spread of values, ideas and models of government (both democratic and authoritarian); also, note that in a globalized world mobility can substitute for political activism (i.e. for those living under authoritarian regimes, it's now easier to "vote with one's feet" and move to another country rather than press for change at home)

The Functions of Parties in Democracies

1) State-society linkages: - identification of demands from the public ("interest articulation") - "packaging" of demands into broad programmatic statements ("interest aggregation"), usually guided by an ideology - political education and mobilization of the electorate - recruitment and nomination of candidates for office - organizing and managing election campaigns 2) Functions within state institutions: - formation of a government/administration (e.g. in parliamentary systems, the leader of the winning party becomes prime minister and appoints other senior party members to the cabinet; in presidential systems, the president is typically able to appoint top officials who will serve in the executive branch) - structuring of activity within the legislative branch (e.g. enforcing of party discipline in roll call votes) - formulation and implementation of public policy (which allows parties to deliver on their election promises, not just for the general good but also for their key constituencies in the form of clientelism e.g. government contracts, subsidies, "pork-barrel" spending, etc.) - filling of positions in the state bureaucracy and the public sector of the economy (which allows parties to engage in patronage, i.e. rewarding supporters with government jobs)

The empirical criteria of democratic vs. authoritarian

1. "Democratic Peace": One important finding from the international relations literature is that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, meaning that a more democratic world means a more peaceful world (The reason why this is so is disputed: some argue it's because the domestic democratic norm of resolving disputes through bargaining and negotiation is carried over into the international arena; others point to factors such as trade linkages or the invention of nuclear weapons (which have been around for around half of the entire period that modern democracies have been around). 2. Economic outcomes (growth, living standards, etc.): on the whole, democracies tend to be wealthier than non-democracies (as you will recall from our module on development, why this is so is disputed: does it have to do with democracy, or with geographical factors, or with legacies of colonial rule?); additionally, there is evidence showing that, other things being equal, democratization pays dividends in the form of increased economic growth. To be sure, the economic picture today is not as clear-cut as it was a few decades ago, when wealthy non-democracies were few and far between. (Again, the reason why this is so is contested: some argue that non-democracies have the advantage of effectiveness, i.e., of being able to pursue pro-growth policies without "interference" from the unpredictable nature of democratic politics. This is doubtful: efforts to gauge the effectiveness of governments across the globe show that, generally speaking, non-democracies are less effective.)

Why have party systems in many democracies changed over the past decades?

1. After World War II, party systems in many democracies began to experience slow "dealigntment:" rising prosperity and reduced inequality meant that class cleavages became weaker. Growing secularization meant that religious cleavages weakened as well, Consequently, political parties could no longer position themselves as natural or "default" representatives of large social groups such as industrial workers, farmers, Catholics, etc.

Theories of Development (3)

1. Geography: some countries are rich and others poor because of unequal natural endowments such as climate (temps and rainfall), topography, rivers (for irrigation and navigation), soil types, mineral resources, as well as plant, animal and germ species. These arguments are sometimes used to explain the persistent poverty in the world's tropical regions compared to temperate zones. 2. Culture: some cultural beliefs, norms, customs, habits and values affect economic attitudes and behaviors and these, in turn, lead to higher or lower levels of wealth in a given country. Which beliefs? For example: is acquisitiveness—or greed, if you want to be blunt—seen as a good thing or as a moral failing? Do cultural narratives about wealth and poverty emphasize individual agency or the "hand of fate"? 3. National Institutions: 3.a. Free markets: greater ability of individuals to engagein self-interested economic transactions makes thewhole society better off: 3.b. States: markets do not exist in a vacuum; how well they function depends on state-based economic and political institutions such as stable constitutions, secure property rights, enforceable contracts, predictable patterns of taxation and redistribution, etc. In general, state-focused theories argue that effective, inclusive (as opposed to extractive) state institutions lead to more economic development But states can do more than simply provide public goods: they can also plan, direct, coordinate, invest, create incentives (e.g. tax breaks) or even take over and run key sectors of the economy by themselves. According to state-centric theories, then, it is both state quality and state capacity that affect economic performance.

How do these negotiations and pacts work? There are two basic models:

1. Regime elites take lead -> transformation (a.k.a. "reforma" a.k.a. "transaction"), e.g. Spain & Portugal in mid-1970s, Brazil in 1980s 1. Emergence of a reform-minded faction within ruling regime; 2. Regime reformers take power, but fail to liberalize the regime and recognize the need for more substantial changes, while reassuring regime hardliners that their interests will be protected; 3. Agreement with moderate opposition to bring it into new ruling coalition with regime reformers. 2. Both regime and opposition elites act jointly -> "transplacement" (a.k.a. extrication), e.g. Poland & Hungary (1989) 1. Regime faces a major crisis (of power, legitimacy, economic performance); 2. Regime initiates controlled liberalization; 3. Opposition exploits this opening to organize and challenge the regime; 4. Regime signals preparedness to contain opposition by force if necessary; 5. Standoff emerges, both sides negotiate a way out.

Is globalization a "good thing" or a "bad thing"?

1. The Benefits of Globalization: - the "trade pays" argument: globalization leads to greater economic growth, especially in poorer countries: - on the flip side, we now know that income gains in less developed countries (especially in China and India) went together with middle-class income stagnation in developed economies, fueling support for populist parties (recall the Inglehart and Norris' article); put another way: in the last 30 years the world as a whole has become less unequal, but inequality within countries has increased.

How do we measure "development?"

1. Using economic indicators:• the absolute "size of the pie" (GDP, GNI) • but population sizes vary and local prices vary, so another common measure is the size of the pie, per person, adjusted for local prices (GDP/capita at PPP)• is the pie getting bigger or smaller (GDP growth)• are the slices getting more or less expensive (inflation)• who gets how many slices (the "Gini coefficient" of inequality, ranging from 0—everyone has same income, to 1—one person has all the income) 2. Using indicators of human development, such as life expectancy, health, education, crime, social trust, happiness, etc. 3. Considering access to civil liberties and political rights, including opportunities for political expression and participation;Source: 2015 UN Human Development Report http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries 4. Being mindful of absolute vs. relative measures of wealth/poverty (e.g., "absolute" in the sense of a minimum needed to cover basic necessities vs. "relative" (e.g., anything below 40% of median household income for the country in question) 5. Being mindful of measures collected at the national level vs. regionally, or broken down by social groups (e.g., by race, ethnicity, gender), or by geographical localities (e.g., many countries have both wealthier and poorer regions) 6. Utilizing other indicators that capture the costs and benefits of economic change (e.g., environmental damage on the cost side vs. the capability of people to act in accordance with their preferences on the benefit side)

The Functions of Parties in Authoritarian Regimes

1. Within the ruling elite •Maintain elite cohesion •Manage intra-elite conflict •Manage elite recruitment and succession 2. Within state institutions •Guide and oversee the work of legislatures •Guide and oversee the bureaucracy, the courts and agencies of coercion (army, police, security service, etc.) 3. State-Society linkages •Legitimize the regime by propagating an official ideology •Mobilize popular support to deliver electoral victories •Buy popular support through clientelism (e.g. granting special benefits to groups in society whose support is deemed important by the regime) •Intimidate the population through pervasive monitoring (e.g. by party cells embedded in factories, schools, offices, religious organizations, etc.)

What about the evidence? For theories of development

Does geography matter? Yes, there is a correlation, but it may have less to do with geography and more with something else, e.g. with culture or the legacies of colonial rule... How about the role of state institutions, e.g. rule of law, operationalized below as "protection against risk of expropriation": And one more on institutions: control of corruption may be seen as an indicator of extent to which state institutions are inclusive (i.e. serve everyone) vs extractive (i.e., serve the interests of corrupt officials) In short, many things can matter for economic development. What we need, then, are comparisons where we can hold some things constant (e.g. geography or culture) in order to isolate the effect of other things (e.g. political institutions).

"Written" vs. "Unwritten" Constitutions

In modern political science usage, the term "Constitution" may mean: - An actual document (usually titled "The Constitution of...") that performs different functions in different countries But note that some written constitutions indeed act as fundamental laws and effectively restrain what the state can and cannot do, while others are just "decorations"—meaningless "scraps of paper" in Bismarck's words. There are also historical cases of constitutions being transformed from meaningful to meaningless by autocratizing regimes [More on this next time]. - A set of rules related to governing, which may or may not be written down Some countries rely on written documents, others on unwritten norms and traditions, and still others on a combination of both; again: in some countries such unwritten rules and traditions meaningfully constrain what rulers may do, but these kinds of self-imposed limitations may prove fragile.

Judicial Review

In some countries, rule of law also means that the courts have the power to declare acts of other branches of government unconstitutional and therefore null and void. This is called "judicial review." Also, in some countries (especially those in the common law tradition) the courts participate in law-making by issuing decisions ("precedents") that other courts will refer to in the future. This body of legal precedents is called "judge-made law." In the U.S., the principle of judicial review was not present in the 1787 constitutional text itself; it was established only later, in the 1803 Marbury v. Madison case. It has slowly spread beyond the U.S., first to Latin American countries, then to Europe, then to Asia and Africa. Note that judicial review can be implemented in different ways: •through the ordinary court system with a final court of appeal (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court) •through a special constitutional court •or even through a supra-national court (e.g., the European Court of Justice). and with variation in how insulated these courts are from democratic accountability (e.g., limited terms in office for justices are common, lifetime appointments are very rare).

To continue the argument of modernization theory:

Modernization (meaning the processes of urbanization, industrialization, education, rising economic prosperity for many, not just few), helps to bring about democracy because it: -gives lower classes a stake in political moderation (i.e. paraphrasing Marx, it gives them "more to lose than their chains"); -leads to the emergence of a middle class, which helps to moderate social conflict between the "haves" and "have nots;" -results in more people being able to participate in politics (thanks to education, comprehension of the political world, time and other resources needed to participate); -fosters a culture where "losers' consent" takes hold (i.e. rising prosperity makes it easier to contemplate changes of government because the more egalitarian and prosperous a society becomes, the less likely people are to think that their livelihoods will be at stake if a different elite group gains power.

Government formation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems: Pattern 1: "Single Party" Governments:

Under what circumstances do we see single party governments? -Typically, it's because a country has a First Past the Post-type of electoral system, which "magnifies" the largest party's seat share in relation to its vote share. -In such cases, one party typically wins >50% of seats and forms a "majority" government. What's the process? -The leader of the winning party becomes the prime minister (PM) . -The government (the PM + the cabinet of ministers) is formed from among members of parliament of the PM's choosing. -The government remains in office for the customary period of time, or until it loses a vote of no confidence called by the opposition. (A loss isn't likely as long as the governing party: 1. controls the majority of seats in the legislature, and 2. its members support the government in such a vote).

"Minimal Winning" coalitions

Why are "minimal winning" coalitions the most common type? -the fewer/smaller coalition partners there are à more gov't jobs for each partner -the fewer coalition partners à easier to minimize ideological differences among them -the fewer coalition partners à fewer conflicting policy priorities that need to be accommodated Example: Why have "minimal winning" coalitions been so common in Germany? -PR electoral system à typically no party wins the majority -5% threshold à not too many parties win seats in parliament; instead, the usual pattern is two larger, but not majority parties (CDU/CSU and SPD), plus several smaller parties (FDP, Greens, Linke, AfD) that can make up a majority by teaming up with one of the larger parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) à so the usual pattern has been one of "1 large + 1 small" party in coalition together, although "2 large" party coalition have also occurred. -Also, constitutional requirement that no-confidence votes need to be "constructive" (i.e. they simultaneously express lack of confidence in current prime minister (called the Chancellor) AND must propose the successor) à this makes them less likely to succeed, hence governments don't feel the need for "cushion" of additional coalition partners à more likely to favor minimal rather than oversized coalitions).

So why do some constitutons last and others don't?

With "last" meaning: when they are not discarded all at once (as in a coup), or piecemeal ("salami" style, one slice at a time), or left in place but emptied of substance (i.e., turned into "decorations") Several possible answers have been proposed: 1.Constitutions last if they reflect societal consensus about the character and values of the political community (e.g., Do we want a to live in a secular republic or in a religious ethnostate? Do we as a nation prioritize individual liberty or social solidarity?) 2.Constitutions last if the underlying socio-economic circumstances favor stability: e.g., Countries with higher levels of wealth, lower levels of inequality, and fewer easily "lootable" natural resources (such as oil or gas) are less at risk; conversely, countries undergoing rapid social, cultural or economic change are more at risk. 3.Constitutions last if they represent a kind of stalemate, a point of exhaustion in a "prolonged and inconclusive struggle"* between social forces with different economic interests or value systems that would like to, butcannot prevail over each other despite having tried to do so. (Memory of a bloody but ultimately inconclusive civil war is often a factor).

So, is there something inherently problematic about presidentialism?

Yes, according to these arguments: •Competing claims to democratic mandate and, by extension, to legitimacy. In other words, who represents the "will of the people": the president or the parliament?; •Rigidity: the president's fixed term in office means that an unpopular or ineffective leader cannot be easily replaced; •Zero-sum politics: presidential elections are, literally, "winner-take-all"; •Potential for slippery slope toward dictatorship (or at least a "dictatorial style") by presidents pushing the bounds of their authority (e.g. using emergency powers or issuing decrees) and claiming a mandate from the people to act in this way; •Potential for demagogic outsiders to seek and perhaps even win the presidency, and govern in a populist style (invoking "the people vs the elites" line of division) that destabilizes political institutions; • Potential for a paralyzing gridlock * as a consequence of a.) presidentialism's checks and balances, especially when combined with b.) ideological polarization **. * In a parliamentary system, a government that cannot secure parliamentary backing for its policies is dissolved, and either a new government is formed or new elections are called; but under presidentialism there is no way out of gridlock until the next elections, which may be 4-5 years away. ** Writing in the late 1980s, Linz attributed the "American exception"—i.e. the U.S. as the only presidential system that "worked"—to the "ideologically undisciplined" character of American political parties; however, that was before the current era of intense polarization).

Constitution as political culture

a nation's way of thinking about itself and about political power (i.e., who, how, and to what end should exercise political power): "What is ... called 'making a constitution' is a thing that has never happened in history ... a constitution only develops from the national spirit ... it is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation ... by which constitutions have been and are made." G.W.F. Hegel. (1830). Philosophy of Mind. Put another way, according to this "cultural" meaning, a constitution is: •Not consciously designed; •Not written down; •Analogous to a national language in that it evolves slowly over time and is inextricably linked to a particular set of culturally-specific meanings. (This is because concepts like "nation", "state", "government", etc. may mean different things in different countries — recall our discussion of "civic" vs "ethnic" nationhood from a few weeks ago).

But others have pointed out that presidentialism has benefits too:

•Accountability: it's clear that "the buck stops here" - with the president, that is; •The people as a whole get to directly choose the head of the executive; •Presidentialism helps to keep the size and scope of government limited thanks to checks and balances; •And it enhances predictability thanks to fixed terms (no removal except through impeachment). So what accounts for the poor survival rate of presidentialism? - During the Cold War era, failures of democratic regimes were overwhelmingly concentratedin Latin American countries (almost 40% of regime changes were in this part of the world) that also happened to have presidential regimes, and which also happened to have lower levels of economic development, more inequality, and a history of political meddling by the armed forces. - Therefore, some argue that it was not presidentialism as such, but the specific Latin American circumstances that were to blame (in other words, that the correlation of presidentialism with democratic failure does not mean a causal connection; the "omitted variable" was region, i.e. Latin America). - Others point out, however, that presidential or semi-presidential democracies have failed in other parts of the world as well (most notably in Russia), and that the poor survival rate of presidentialism persists even after controlling for economic performance.

Types of legislatures:

•Unicameral: one chamber (e.g. Israeli Knesset, Swedish Riksdag) •Bicameral: two chambers, typically with members elected or appointed in different ways powers (e.g. U.S. Congress, U.K. Parliament) Why two chambers? And why the terminology of "lower" and "upper" houses? "Lower": •representation of many geographical localities (e.g. the name of the British House of Commons comes from the French word communes) •ideological "snapshot" of society, especially under proportional representation (PR) systems •responsiveness to voters (e.g. more members, more frequent elections) "Upper": •federalism (i.e. representation of larger sub-national political units, such as U.S. states or German länder) •representation of "establishment" interests (e.g. the British House of Lords, which once consisted of hereditary nobility and Church of England bishops; nowadays most of its members are appointed for life) •oversight (or "sober second thought", i.e. part of the system of checks and balances)

Constitutions as "operating manuals": cont. pt 2

- Constitutions also define means of choosing and changing political elites: - Because states are "organizations with continuous operations" that transcend human life spans, it is necessary to have mechanisms for: - how political elites replenish themselves (recruitment) - how power is transferred in the event of death or due to legally-mandated term limit (succession). - how competition for power is managed (i.e., how to make alternation in power possible) - Constitutions define ways of managing these tasks by e.g., specifying the electoral system (how many representatives are elected, who can vote, how often elections are held, by what procedure, etc.) - but note that sometimes even very detailed constitutions may leave things out: e.g., the U.S. Constitution does not contain an explicit "right to vote," which leaves a lot of leeway to the states to make voting either easy or difficult for citizens - Lastly, constitutions also specify a way of changing the constitution itself: - this can be easy (recall "flexible" constitutions, where changes can take place through simple acts of parliament), or difficult (as in "rigid" constitutions, where changes require complex amendment procedures)

Transitions from Authoritarianism: "Top-down" pathways: Coup

-A coup is a "sudden seizure of power to oust a leader or regime through extra-legal means." (KTLF, p. 304). Typically, the term is applied to situations where the initiative comes from regime insiders, either high-ranking civilians (in which case the term "palace coup" is used, or from the military and security forces ("military coup"), or from a partisan judiciary ("judicial coup"), or even from the legislature using questionable procedural tactics ("parliamentary coup"). -Coups do not necessarily result in the change of political regime type: -In authoritarian regimes, coups are oftentimes the means by which one faction within the ruling group seizes (or attempts to size) power from another faction, but otherwise things go on as before. -Sometimes coups do result in regime change: e.g., if a democratically elected government turns a country into an autocracy by extra-legal means, this is called an autogolpe (or "self-coup"). -It is also possible, though not especially likely, for a coup in an autocracy to lead to its eventual democratization. -Coups were more frequent during the Cold War owing to:• greater intensity of ideological competition (from far left to far right); -fragility of institutions in many newly independent post-colonial countries; -the fact that coup plotters could oftentimes count on support from one of the superpowers. -That said, even in the current era, older, economically troubled authoritarian regimes with an aging ruler are at risk of coups:

A couple of final notes:

-Authoritarian breakdown does not necessarily lead to democracy; oftentimes it simply means a transition to another authoritarian regime. -After authoritarian breakdown, some countries may democratize in a slow, linear manner. Others may experience democratization followed by democratic erosion. Still others may oscillate between episodes of democratic and authoritarian rule.

Common Aspects of Electoral Systems

1. Franchise: - 1./ who can vote, who can run as a candidate and be elected?; 2/. is voting compulsory or a matter of choice?; 3./ who is responsible for voter registration: the government or the citizens themselves? 4./ is access to polling places easy, convenient, and safe? 2. Election Interval: - fixed (e.g. on a specific, set day, once every 4 or 5 years) - variable terms (the government chooses a date with a 4-5 year interval) 3. Ballot type: - categorical: the voter chooses one option (one candidate or one group ("list") of candidates - ordinal: the voter can rank the candidates/parties in order of preference, by writing in numbers for their 1st choice, 2nd choice, etc. - combination: ballots that include several different methods 4. District type: - size: 1./ single-member vs. 2./ multi-member vs. 3./ country-wide - boundaries: 1./ fixed vs. 2./ subject to gerrymandering (i.e., district boundaries drawn for partisan advantage) 5. Electoral Formula: -The method of converting votes into seats; the two most widely used systems are : 1./ single member districts (also known as "first past the post"), and 2./ proportional representation (PR)

This gives us the third model, which isn't so much about negotiation as outright collapse of the old regime:

3. Opposition groups take lead -> replacement (a.k.a. "ruptura" a.k.a. "breakdown"),e.g. Argentina (mid-1980s), East Germany (1989) 1. Crisis, followed by erosion of popular support, gradually spreading from students and intellectuals to workers and the middle class, and eventually to the military and security services; 2. Mass protests -> regime faces choice "to shoot or not to shoot" -> uncertainty over whether soldiers and police would obey such an order -> regime decides against violence; 3. Rapid collapse of the old regime, establishment of "forward legitimacy" through competitive elections.

Executives: Some data on prevalence and performance

All three types are widely used: - parliamentarism predominates in Western Europe and in Commonwealth countries (i.e., those with historic ties to Britain); - presidentialism is most common in the Americas (i.e., in countries whose constitutions were inspired by the U.S. model); - semi-presidentialism is found in some African and post-communist East European countries (often in countries where democratization happened in consequence of a pact between the outgoing regime and the opposition: "you get the presidency, we get the prime ministership"). But presidential regimes don't last as long as parliamentary ones (i.e., are more likely to be overturned in a revolution or a coup): - The expected life of a parliamentary democracy in the post-World War II era was 58 years*, whereas for a presidential democracy during the same period it was 24 years* - The United States is the one exception - the only long-lived presidential democracy in the world ("aside from the United States, only Chile has managed a century and a half of relatively undisturbed constitutional continuity under presidential government", Juan Linz (1990), "The Perils of Presidentialism").

The Functions of Legislatures in Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarian legislatures are sometimes dismissed as meaningless decorations or "rubber stamps" that do whatever the rulers tell them to do. However, this view may be overly simplistic. Current political science research tends to argue that authoritarian legislatures perform a number of different functions: "Provide fig leaf of legitimacy, both domestic and international, for the regime. Can be used to incorporate moderate opponents into the political system. [i.e., serve the function of cooptation--HT] Raising grievances of constituents and lobbying for local interests provide a measure of integration between the centre and the periphery. [i.e., perform theinformation-gathering function—HT] Provide a convenient pool of potential recruits to elite. Gandhi (2008): Serve as controlled channels through which outside groups can make demands and leaders can 'make concessions without appearing to cave into popular protest'." [i.e., the function of interest articulation--HT]

2 graphs

As an example, here is a visualization of the correlation between education (operationalized here as literacy) and democracy (operationalized as the number of people living under different political regimes over time). Taken together, the two charts show a transition from an overwhelmingly illiterate and authoritarian world 200 years ago to a world that is literate and increasingly democratic.

Europe example of political parties

Bearing in mind the limitation that this graph is for Europe only, we can see that over the past ~100 years electoral competition in many democracies has been defined by two families of large, centrist parties: Conservatives (who in some countries called themselves Christian Democrats) on the center-right and Social Democrats on the center-left. Liberals (in the non-US sense of the term, i.e., combining cultural left and economic right) and the Radical Left (i.e., Communists) had smaller electorates. Green (i.e., pro-environment) parties began to appear in the 1980s. The Radical Right—long considered toxic in the wake of interwar fascism and World War II—has made a comeback in the last few decades.

Development of Political Parties

Elite-based parties: before the era of mass democracy, parties were small groups of influence-seeking notables and their patronage-seeking clients Mass-based and Ethnicity-based parties: the arrival of universal franchise led to the emergence of parties that grouped large numbers of ordinary citizens, often on the basis of a common identity, such as social class, ethnicity or religion (this was the era of workers' parties, farmers' parties, religious parties, etc.) Electoralist parties: weakening of class and religious divisions made it necessary for parties to seek support in new ways: personalistic parties drew on the charisma of their leaders, catch-all parties sought support from broad cross-sections of the general public, while programmatic parties made more narrowly targeted, issue-based appeals. Movement parties: recent decades have witnessed the emergence of parties that invested relatively few resources into large memberships or complex organizational structures, relying instead on loose networks of activists, financial sponsors and media allies, and typically appealing to heterogeneous electorates.

How does the d'Hondt formula actually work? Think of it as a piece of computer code that runs in a "repeat-until" loop:

Example: d'Hondt "Highest Average" Proportional Representation formula 1. compute the "average" for each party in district, where "average" A = (total votes for A in district) / (total seats already allocated to A in district) + 1 2. give one seat to the party with the highest "average" 3. increment the denominator (under d'Hondt, the sequence is: 1, 2, 3, ...) and recalculate the averages 4. are the any seats still unfilled? If so, go back to step 1; otherwise stop

Parties vs. Regime Types:

Democratic parties seek political power by democratic elections, and are ready to give up power after losing democratic elections "Hegemonic" parties, typically found in hybrid regimes, which have power through democratic means but intend to keep it "by hook or by crook", i.e., by fair means if possible, or by foul if necessary. Authoritarian parties have or seek power and want to remain in power without respecting the democratic process Revolutionary parties seek political power by revolution"

What are the consequences of this "rewarding" and "penalizing"? in SMD elections

Duverger's Law: SMD elections will, over time, result in two-party systems Why does this happen? - The "mechanical" effect: - the mathematical process of calculating seat shares from vote shares (as shown in previous slides) is advantageous to larger parties and disadvantageous to smaller ones, which leads to... - Psychological effects: - voters do not want to "waste" their votes on small parties that are not likely to win many seats anyway, so they vote "strategically" for one of the large parties, typically for the one they regard as the "lesser evil" - elites do not want to invest time or money into smaller parties (i.e.don't want to run as small-party candidates, or provide financing, or otherwise support them) because such parties are unlikely to win many seats; over time the smaller parties decline and disappear - likewise, elites in two-party systems will not create new parties because of the presumption that such parties will fail

Examples of party systems in Authoritarian regimes

Hegemonic party regimes: Mexico 1929-1997, Malaysia 1969-, Zimbabwe 1979-, Nigeria 1999- Single party regimes: Soviet Union 1917-1991, China 1949, Kenya 1968-1992 Multi-party autocracies without a dominant party: Morocco 1977-, Belarus 1994-, Iran 1979-, Sri Lanka 1995- No-party regimes: Saudi Arabia 1932-, Myanmmar 1988-, Chile 1973-1989

Theories of Authoritarian Durability: Political culture

The argument in these theories is that some countries have cultural traditions more suited to authoritarianism in that they emphasize e.g., authority, obedience and the good of the group over individual liberty. If a particular way of understanding authority is deeply embedded in national culture (e.g., the nation understood as a kind of family, with a father figure at the top), this may also affect the type of authoritarianism that emerges (personalistic rather than, say, party-based).

Government formation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems: Pattern 2: Coalition Governments

If no single party wins a majority of seats—as frequently happens in countries that use PR-type electoral systems—it is usually necessary to find a combination of parties that will be able to govern together by agreeing on: -"Jobs" (i.e., how many ministers and other government appointments for each party) -Policy (which party's or parties' favored policies will be implemented) Customarily, the leader of the party that won the most seats has the first crack at forming a coalition government. The various possibilities include: -"Minimal winning" coalition (just over 50% of seats) -"Minority" government with under 50% of seats; informally supported by one or more other parties) -"Oversized" or "grand" coalition (much more than 50% of seats)

Party Systems in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes

In authoritarian regimes, party systems are defined and classified differently, typically around the questions of: 1. whether the regime makes the investment into creating a ruling ("dominant") party 2. whether other parties are allowed to compete in elections Today, about half of authoritarian regimes have dominant parties (we will look at the question of why authoritarians may want to invest in ruling parties later in the semester)

Party Systems in Democracies

In democratic regimes, the term "party system" is used to describe the set of political parties fielding candidates in elections. The concept of the party system includes: 1. The number and relative strengths , i.e., what % of votes each party typically receives (we may talk about a two-party system, a multi-party system, or a dominant party system) 2. Volatility (do we see the same set of parties receive roughly the same percentage of votes in election after election, or do we see some parties decline & others rise?) 3. Party ideologies (e.g., when ideologies are far apart, we talk about a "polarized" system) and party behavior (Are parties capable of both competition and cooperation? Do all of them respect the constitution and unwritten norms? Do they all accept democracy as the "only game in town"?) 4. Voter alignments (when voters' choices match their social identities—e.g., the working class is voting for working class parties, Protestants are voting for Protestant parties, etc.—a party system is "aligned." Conversely, when social identities no longer predict how people will vote, a party system is "dealigning").

But if a constitution is too rigid,

It risks: -creating "gridlock" and hampering the political community's ability to "get things done" (i.e., to enact and implement policies favored by majorities) by making political power too difficult to exercise; -"congealing" the relations of status and power within a society, usually to the advantage of elites and dominant groups, making it easier for them to block emancipatory social change -So there is a bit of a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" aspect to constitutional rigidity. Nonetheless, we see a strong association between constitutional rigidity and a variety of positive indicators of political and economic development.

Parties vs. interest groups:

Like parties, interest groups are organizations, typically narrow in focus, that seek to influence policy on behalf of their constituents, but—unlike parties—they do not seek to gain control of the state (by running candidates in elections or by other means).

Parties vs. ideologies:

Many parties around the world adopt ideological labels (e.g., Conservative Party of ..., Socialist Party of ..., etc.), so the concepts of party and ideology are sometimes conflated. But there is a key distinction: "... ideology and party are independent things. Both are ways of organizing coalitions, telling political actors who is their ally and who is their enemy ... parties are about who stands with whom; ideologies are about what some group stands for."

PR system implications

Note that in PR-type systems there tend to be more than two parties, so no single party is likely to win a majority Generally speaking, forming a government requires assembling a parliamentary majority, i.e., controlling >50% of seats (there are exceptions, the so-called "minority governments" that we'll look at in the next module of the course) In most cases, getting to more than 50% requires that two or more parties agree to form a coalition. Oftentimes, more than one coalition is possible. This means that: - forming a coalition may take some time (as in weeks or even months of negotiations among prospective coalition partners) - voters do not pick governments directly (e.g. as an SPD voter you may think that a "grand coalition" of SPD + CDU/CSU is a terrible idea, but you will have no say in this matter: politicians will decide on their own, behind closed doors, after the election takes place)

But the fact that economic growth and democratization tracked each other only shows correlation, and, as we know, correlation is not necessarily indicative of causation. So, what causal connections might be possible?

Option 1: growth -> democracy Economic growth -> social change -> value change -> pressure for democracy (this is known as modernization theory). Option 2: democracy -> growth Democracy leads to wealth because it is more economically efficient, better at finding optimal courses of action through open airing of different ideas, better at avoiding and correcting policy mistakes before it's too late (recall the "bad emperor" problem inherent in authoritarianism, mentioned in Lecture 10.2) Option 3: democracy <--> growth The relationship is reciprocal (i.e. democracy and wealth feed off each other in a mutually reinforcing relationship).

Assessment: First-Past-the-Post vs PR: FPP pros and cons

Pro: •usually (not always) produces decisive outcomes (i.e., there is a clear winner, able to govern on its own) •biased in favor of large, centrist parties and against small, extremist ones (assuming a unimodal distribution of popular preferences, parties will seek to appeal to the "median voter") •appropriate for "trusteeship" style of representation (i.e., having one representative per district means a stronger link between voters and their representatives than in systems with 5, 12 or 20 representatives per district) Con: •"rewards" large parties and "penalizes" small ones à this reduces the number of parties, a phenomenon called "defractionalization" à resulting in fewer choices for voters •"magnifies" small shifts in vote shares and thus arguably distorts the popular will (i.e., when the winners gloat about their "landslide" win, they are making the proverbial mountain out of a molehill) •produces large numbers of "wasted" votes (i.e., votes cast for candidates who did not win) •produces divisive results: parties either "win big" or "lose big", risking the danger of arrogant winners and sore losers

Assessment: First-Past-the-Post vs PR: PR pros and cons

Pros: •Parliament more likely to reflect the ideological composition of society, including voice for marginal parties •Allows voters to express their first choice (i.e. no need to vote for the "lesser evil") •May promote power-sharing in divided societies •All votes matter (i.e., no "wasted" votes) •Less sensitivity to small shifts in vote shares à continuity and stability of policy Con: •Makes party system fractionalization (i.e., multipartyism) more likely •Usually results in coalition governments, which complicates policy making and means that voters don't pick governments directly •May allow extremism to have a voice in parliament (but perhaps better in parliament than in the street?) •Multiple seats per district mean weaker voter-representative links than under First Past the Post

The Functions of Legislatures in Democracies

Representation Legislation Authorizing expenditure Making governments Deliberation Oversight

Let's zoom into Option 1, also known as "modernization theory." This is the argument that societies change over time in a specific, one-directional, non-random manner. Differently put, all the arrows below point only one way, meaning that e.g., once urbanized and industrialized, societies do not revert back to a rural/agrarian existence:

Social and economic conditions: rural -> urban/industrial subsistence -> surpluses dispersed -> concentrated illiterate -> literate passive -> mobilized Culture and values: religious -> secular collectivist -> individualist hierarchical -> egalitarian and, eventually, materialist -> post-materialist

So, does institutional design matter for an authoritarian regime's chances of survival?

The answer would appear to be yes: aside from traditional monarchies and oligarchies, party-based authoritarian regimes are the most durable type (the red line in the chart to the right shows that party-based regimes have something like a 65-75% chance of surviving for 80 years), whereas e.g., military regimes tend to be very short-lived.

In addition, the working class itself began to change:

The service sector has grown ever larger compared to manufacturing The working class has become more diverse in terms of race and ethnicity... ...although white/non-immigrant workers still dominate in manufacturing Then, as the post-WWII "baby boom" generation came of age in the late 1960s, it ushered in significant value change. As Inglehart and Norris explain (this is their "silent revolution" argument), the baby boomers rebelled against their parents' cultural conformism and preoccupation with material prosperity. Instead, they articulated "post-materialist" demands for individual fulfillment ("self-actualization"), and for the inclusion in political debates of voices from hitherto underrepresented or marginalized groups (women, as well as racial, ethnic and sexual minorities). Since then, every new generation has been more post-materialist than the previous one. In consequence of both growing prosperity and post-materialist turn in values, theprominence ("salience") of economic issues in party programs has declined and the prominence of non-economic issues has increased since the 1960s. But issues of economic security did not vanish from democratic politics. On the contrary, as incomes stagnated, members of hitherto privileged or dominant groups (white males in the U.S., native-born/non-immigrant males in other Western democracies) became •anxious about their economic prospects and •worried about losing their dominant position in the social hierarchy, which is why....... we see especially strong support for the populist radical right among non-college white men.

Party List Proportional Representation (PR) systems

Under PR, a party receives parliamentary seats in proportion to its share of the total vote (i.e., the goal in PR is that a party with 10% of votes getsapproximately 10% of seats). PR systems vary in terms of: 1. District magnitude (how many seats per district) HIGHER MAGNITUDE (i.e., more seats to be won) à MORE PROPORTIONAL RESULTS 2. Thresholds (e.g., 5%, intended to discourage small parties from competing) HIGHER THRESHOLD à LESS PROPORTIONAL RESULTS 3. Ballot structure Closed list --> parties, meaning party leaderships, set the order of names (e.g. if a party wins 5 seats in a district, they go to the top 5 names on the party's candidate list for that district). Open list --> voters have some influence on who is elected (i.e. if enough people mark your name on ballots, you get elected no matter where on the list your name is located); this takes some power away from party leaders. 4. Electoral formula (the actual algorithm for translating votes into seats; among those currently in use, the "d'Hondt formula" is the most popular).

Legislatures and Representation

We often hear that legislatures are representative bodies, but their design reflects different normative ideas about representation, i.e., who or what ought to be represented. It is worth noting that the concept of representation may mean different things: •ACTING FOR the represented, in the sense of being... •a delegate , i.e., an agent who carries out the will of some particular constituency, usually defined in geographical terms (district, state, province), or in social class or other group terms (e.g., some authoritarian systems allow different ethnic groups or economic interests to be represented in parliament). •or a trustee (i.e., a person using their best judgment to advance the interests of the represented, not necessarily in accordance with their current wishes) •or an ombudsperson, someone who intermediates between the represented and the institutions of government (as in e.g., performing constituency service). •STANDING FOR the represented, in the sense of reflecting their: •views (i.e., ideology, values, policy preferences) •demographic characteristics (as with legislatures that strive to achieve e.g., gender balance) (Whether it's in terms of views or demographics, the goal in this model of representation is to create a deliberative body that reflects the makeup of the broader society).

Constitution as a set of customary ways of exercising political power

[A constitution is an] "inheritance derived to us from our forefathers and to be transmitted to our posterity ... by a constitutional policy working after a pattern of Nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives." Edmund Burke. (1790). Reflections on the Revolution in France. According to this "customary" meaning, a constitution is: •Not crafted all at once, but accumulated slowly over time; •Not necessarily written down (hence the concept of "unwritten" constitution—more on this in a moment); •Analogous to "common" law (more on the distinction between "common" and "code" law traditions in Lecture 6.3) in that it evolves slowly through practice and precedent.

A typology of constitutions

sham constitution: Sudan strong constitution: Finland weak constitution: Saudi Arabia modest constitution: Australia

Also, we should be aware that different LEGAL TRADITIONS define the origins, nature, purposes and scope of law in different countries:

•"Code" (or "civil") law: based on standardized, comprehensive collections of written laws (famous historical examples include the codes of Hammurabi, Justinian and Napoleon), which judges must consult when deciding cases; •"Common" (or "case") law: based on the principle that judges must take account of precedents (i.e. how similar cases were decided in the past), whereby each precedent adds to the body of law (hence: common law is sometimes called "judge-made law") ; •Legal cultures of authoritarian and totalitarian states: law not as a restraint on, but as an instrument of state policy (more on this on side #3); •Religious legal cultures: law as divinely ordained (e.g. ,Islamic Sharia law).

Political Parties

•Some of these definitions focus on the purpose of parties (e.g., gaining control over the state, enacting policy, following a particular ideology) •Others emphasize their structure (e.g., defining parties first and foremost as organizations) •Still other definitions stress the nature of parties' linkages to society.