PSC318 Final

"Parcel as a whole" rule

"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses . . . [on] the parcel as a whole.

Cohens v. Virginia (1821)

*11TH AMENDMENT/MARSHALL COURT* The exception to the 11th Amendment. Virginia was allowed to be sued when Virginia didn't give permission.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996)

*11TH AMENDMENT/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Case never went anywhere because the state of Florida didn't give permission to be sued.

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)

*COMMERCE/BURGER COURT (DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE)* Facts: In 1972, NC adopted a regulation requiring all closed containers of apples shipped into the state to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. It barred information based on the grading systems of the state in which the apples were grown. The state argued the regulation would fix the problem confusing purchasers would stop deception and fraud in the market. Washington apple growers challenged the NC regulation. Washington had higher standards than most, including the USDA standards. As such, Washington argued that the NC regulation unreasonably burdened interstate commerce for three reasons: The law discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local grower; forcing Washington growers to use the NC standards would diminish the market advantage they had earned; the NC regulation increased costs for Washington growers in forcing them to make crates for NC different from apples it ships elsewhere. Issue: Does the NC statute violate the Commerce Clause bc it prohibited the display of the Washington State grades on closed containers of apples shipped into the state? Analysis: Not every exercise of state authority imposing some burden on the free flow of commerce is invalid. The residuum of power is left to the states to regulate matters of local concern which do in some ways affect interstate commerce. This is particularly strong when a state is protecting foodstuffs. When discrimination against commerce is found as in this case, the burden falls on the State to justify it in terms of local benefits from the statute and the lack of alternatives of effectuate the outcome. NC has failed on both counts. Test for dormant commerce clause. Conclusion: The NC statute is unconstitutional

United States v. E.C. Knight & Co. (1895)

*COMMERCE/CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION COURTS* Facts: At the end of the 19th century, six companies dominated the American sugar refining industry. American Sugar Refining Company owned 65% of the nation's refineries. In March 1892, it agreed to buy four Pennsylvania refineries, including E.C. Knight Co., that made up 33% of the market. This would have given it 98% of refineries in the U.S. The federal government sued to cancel the acquisition as a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Issue: Does Congress have the power to regulate the manufacture of goods under its power to regulate interstate commerce? Analysis: While the federal government argues that refined sugar is a staple of life, and should therefore be regulated, we cannot agree that the manufacture of sugar is interstate commerce. Indeed, manufacturing precedes commerce. Just because something is manufactured for another state does not make it immediately interstate commerce and intent does not determine when something becomes commerce. Thus, something becomes commerce when it begins to move from one state to another. Conclusion: Congress does not have the power to regulate the manufacture of goods under its power to regulate interstate commerce.

Champion v. Ames (1903)

*COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS (POLICE POWER)* Facts: In 1895, Congress passed a law prohibiting the interstate shipment of lottery tickets and from being sent through the mail. Champion violated the act by arranging for tickets to be sent from Texas to California. He argued that he was not engaged in interstate commerce, that the power to regulate commerce did not include right to prohibit items from such commerce, and that lotteries should only be regulated through the police power of the states. Issue: May the federal government use its commerce clause powers to police the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another, by independent carriers? Analysis: Lottery tickets are subjects to traffic and therefore subjects of commerce, and the regulation of them being carried from state to state is a regulation of commerce among the several states. The law here does not interfere with the internal workings of any state. It affects only those matters which involve the people of the United States. Conclusion: The federal government may regulate the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another.

Houston East and West Railroad Co. v. United States (1914)

*COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS (SHREVEPORT DOCTRINE)* Facts: The Houston E&W Railway Co. managed an interstate railway line that ran between TX and LA. The shipping rates per mile were different, and were in fact, much higher in LA. Shreveport competed with Dallas for shipments from East Texas, but, the skewed price structure (mandated by the Texas Railroad Commission), greatly favored shipments to and from Dallas over Shreveport. A U.S. regulatory agency found "an unlawful and undue preference and advantage" was thereby given to the Texas cities, and ordered the company to change the rate structure to end discriminatory pricing. Issue: Does Congress have the authority to control the intrastate charges on an interstate carrier? Analysis: Congressional authority "necessarily embraces the right to control... operations in all matters having a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms." Regulation of the intrastate line was a means to the end of regulating interstate commerce, and was therefore allowed. Conclusion: Congress has the authority to control intrastate chargers on an interstate carrier.

Stafford v. Wallace (1922)

*COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: Congress passed the 1921 Packers and Stockyard Act to go beyond antitrust considerations in regulating the meatpacking industry. The law forbade packers in interstate commerce from engaging in any unfair, deceptive, or discriminatory practices. All stockyard dealers and commission men had to register with the Secretary of Agriculture. This department then had the power, delegated by Congress, to make rules and regulations to carry out the act, set stockyard rates, and prescribe record keeping procedures. Issue: May Congress enact legislation that regulates the meat packing industry under its powers to regulate interstate commerce? Rule: Regulation of matters in the "stream of commerce" is constitutional - Swift & Co. But, manufacture at a specific site is not commerce - E.C. Knight Co. Analysis: Stockyards are "but a throat" through which commerce flows, and are only incident from the flow of commerce between states. They are, however, necessary for the commerce of moving meat from one place to another. Thus, stockyards are, in essence, the middle men in the road from production to market. The streams of commerce are the very essence of commerce...If Congress can punish conspiracies after they form under the Antitrust Laws, certainly it can prevent conspiracies from ever forming. Conclusion: The Packers and Stockyard Act is constitutional.

Swift & Co. v. United States (1905)

*COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: President Roosevelt orders AG to end "beef trust" using the Sherman Antitrust Act. Six companies owned 50% of the national market and were engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices. Once they were hit with federal injunctions, the six companies merged into one company so that they could continue to trade internally. Issue: Can the federal government regulate the slaughterhouse industry? Analysis: In this case, the chain ran from farm to retail store and crossed many state lines. Conclusion: The federal government can regulate the slaughterhouse industry.

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936)

*COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 replaced the NIRA coal codes. Specifically, they called for the establishment of a commission to develop regulations regarding fair competition, production, wages, hours, and labor relations. To fund the program Congress put a tax (15%) on the mines. While such a tax was strictly voluntary, the incentive to participate was a 90% rebate on the taxes levied. Carter sued the Carter Coal Company to stop it from complying with the law. Issue: May Congress pass legislation that imposes standards on the coal industry and then levy a tax against the coal industry to pay for the program? Analysis: Commerce is "intercourse for the purposes of trade." That commodities produced or manufactured within a state are intended to be sold or transported outside the state does not render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation. All of the evils on which the law focuses are local evils, and thus the federal government has no control over them. In short, federal power does not attach until interstate commercial intercourse begins. Commerce had not begun! Conclusion: Congress may not pass legislation that imposes standards on the coal industry and then levy a tax against the coal industry to pay for the program.

Schechter Poultry & Co. v. United States (1935)

*COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: Congress passed the NIRA in 1933, which called for the creation of codes of fair competition for business. The law regulated trade practices, wages, and hours. Trade groups could recommend codes, but the President could draft them himself. There were no standards for President to follow, and therefore he had virtually full discretion to enact codes. Schechter challenged the Live Poultry codes that set the maximum hours of work per week, and the minimum wage for workers. The provisions also established health inspections and other regulations. Schechter ignored the codes and was fined. Issue: May Congress delegate to the president the power to draft and enforce codes that regulate industries? Analysis: Congress is not permitted to give its legislative powers to other branches especially without standards. These regulations are not within the commerce clause powers granted to Congress. Neither the slaughter not the sale of the poultry involved interstate commerce. Where the effect of intrastate transactions only affects indirectly interstate commerce, the power to regulate remains within the states-commerce had ended. Conclusion: The NIRA is unconstitutional.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

*COMMERCE/MARSHALL COURT* Facts: In 1789, Robert Livingston was given a monopoly to operate all steamboats on all waters in New York. He joined with Robert Fulton, and they designed a steamship which made monopoly economically viable. After Livingston and Fulton died, Ogden and Gibbons took over. Gibbons entered into a partnership to carry passengers from NY to NJ. Ogden purchased the rights to operate in NY waters from the Livingston Fulton monopoly, and Gibbons held a federal permit to operate steamships along the coast. With these grants of authority the two could carry passengers between NY and NJ. This partnership dissolved when Ogden was pressured to terminate his relationship with Gibbons. Gibbons then joined with Vanderbilt and began to compete with the New York monopoly. Gibbons and Vanderbilt entered New York water in violation of the monopoly. Ogden convinced New York courts to enjoin Gibbons from entering NY waters. Issue: Does the federal permit granted to Gibbons supersede the New York Law that gives Ogden a monopoly on steamships in New York waters? Analysis: Commerce is the intercourse of goods between nations and parts of nations, and is regulated by prescribing rules for this intercourse. If commerce does not include navigation, then the federal government has no direct power over it. The enumeration of power over commerce means that the federal government has power over such actions that apply to the states generally. Conclusion: The federal permit supersedes the NY law.

Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona (1945)

*COMMERCE/POST-NEW DEAL (DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE)* Facts: In 1912, Arizona passed the Train Limit Law, which made it unlawful for any individual or corporation to operate a train with more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars within the state. Violators were subject to fines. Southern Pacific Company argued that the state law was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Commerce Clause. Issue: May a state limit the number of cars that can be a part of a train within its borders? Analysis: Congress has the power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce. In general, Congress has left it to the courts to determine the rules interpreting the Commerce Clause. Houston EW discriminated against other companies. This case everyone is discriminated against, it is still a burden. The matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which interstate regulations place on the trains. The Operations of long trains is standard practice throughout the country, and national uniformity in regulation is necessary for the industry to operate with any efficiency at all. The Arizona law places a significant burden on the efficient operation of the industry and an impediment to interstate commerce. Various regulations would lead to serious confusion in interstate operations. Conclusion: Arizona law is unconstitutional.

Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

*COMMERCE/POST-NEW DEAL COURTS* Facts: The 1938 Agriculture Adjustment Act allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to place limits on various grains. This was meant to stop swings in the price of these grains by stopping huge surpluses and shortfalls. Filburn raised winter wheat on his farm. Some of this he sold, some he used to graze his livestock, and some was left for his family to consume. In 1940, he was told that in 1941 he would only be able to grow 11.1 acres of this wheat. He planted much more than this, and was fined $117.11 for the over growth. He refused to pay claiming that this violated the power of interstate commerce regulation. Issue: May the Secretary of Agriculture place a quota on the amount of grain that farmers can grow even if the grain is being used only for home purposes? Analysis: Even though an act may be purely local, it could have such an effect on interstate commerce that Congress has the right to oversee such activities. The consumption of home grown wheat will have a substantial influence on how the market works, because it will compete with the wheat that Filburn would have bought had it not been home grown. Thus, it is in this sense that home-grown wheat falls under interstate commerce. Conclusion: The quota of grain is constitutional.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)

*COMMERCE/POST-NEW DEAL COURTS* Facts: Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin by particular forms of public accommodation that operate in or affected interstate commerce. The list included, among other things, inns, hotels, motels, and other lodging facilities of five rooms or more. The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a 216 room motel in Atlanta. It advertised nationally, and had more than 50 billboards around the state. Both the government and the motel agreed the facility met the definition of a public accommodation affecting interstate commerce. The motel also admitted that prior to the 1964 law it practiced racial discrimination and would continue to do so after its enactment. Issue: Does the provision of the civil rights act that prohibits discrimination in any public accommodation that affects interstate commerce violate Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce? Analysis: The power of Congress to deal with these obstructions depends on the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Its meaning was first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden. The determinative question is whether the activity sought to be regulated is "commerce which affects more states than one" and has a real and substantial relation the the national interest. Congress may prohibit racial discrimination by motels no matter how "local" their operations may be. Thus, we conclude that the action of the Congress in adoption of the Act applies to a motel which serves interstate commerce. Conclusion: The provision of the civil rights act that prohibits discrimination in any public accommodation that affects interstate commerce does not violate Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce.

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel (1937)

*COMMERCE/POST-NEW DEAL* Facts: Based on its commerce power, Congress passed the NLRA (the Wagner Act) to protect the rights of employees to organize and join labor unions. The law also authorized the creation of NLRB, which was empowered to hear complaints of unfair labor practices and impose certain corrective measures. Complaints were filed against Jones and Laughlin for engaging in unfair labor practices. The NLRB ruled against the company and ordered it to reinstate employees which has been fired because of their union activities. The company argued that the workers were engaged in a manufacturing activity that had been declared to be intrastate commerce by the Supreme court, and thus it was outside the regulatory power of Congress. Issue: May Congress pass legislation that allows workers to organize, and create an agency to protect these rights? Analysis: "Affecting Commerce" means a dispute that leads to the obstruction of commerce. The effect on commerce is the key, not the source of the injury. Congress has the power to regulate anything that may affect interstate commerce. While some activities may seem to be simply intrastate, if they are closely related to interstate commerce, then Congress cannot be stopped from regulating them. Conclusion: Congress may pass the National Labor Relations Act.

United States v. Lopez (1995)

*COMMERCE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (CUMULATIVE EFFECTS TEST OF COMMERCE)* Facts: Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zone Act in 1990, which forbade the possession of firearm in a school zone. Lopez came to school carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun and ammunition. He was ultimately convicted of violating the Act and sentenced to six months in prison, two years of supervised release, and fifty-dollar fine. He appealed the conviction on the grounds that Congress has no authority-under the Commerce Clause to pass the Act. Congress has not, when it passed the law given any reason why there is a relationship between gun possession on school property and interstate commerce. Issue: May Congress regulate the use of firearms in school zones under its commerce clause jurisdiction? Analysis: Even those cases like Wickard and Jones & Laughlin confirm that even the vast power Congress possesses to regulate commerce is subject to outer limits. This limit suggests that regulation cannot be extended so much as to embrace effects upon commerce that is so indirect and remote that to embrace them would obliterate state and local power. There are 3 broad categories that Congress may regulate: 1) the channels of interstate commerce; 2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and 3) activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The section of the law in question is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with commerce however broadly we define that term. If we accept the government argument that possession would lead to violence which would affect interstate commerce, then there is really no activity that Congress would not have the power to regulate. Conclusion: Congress may not regulate the use of firearms in school zones under its commerce clause jurisdiction.

Maine v. Taylor (1986)

*COMMERCE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE)* Facts: Maine passed a law prohibiting importation of any live fish to be used as bait in state's inland waters. The purpose of the law was to protect indigenous fish from parasites and diseases and to prevent the introduction of fish that might be detrimental to states ecology. The Federal Lacey Law also made it a crime to transport any fish or wildlife in violation of state laws. Taylor operated a bait business and imported bait fish- clear violation of the state law. The fish were confiscated and the fed government indicted Taylor under the Lacey Act. Taylor challenged the Maine law as violation of Commerce Clause. Issue: Does the Maine law that bans the importation of bait fish in to the state violation the Commerce Clause? Analysis: Hunt test for discrimination. The Maine statute restricts interstate trade in the most direct manner possible. The burden falls on the state to show that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose and this purpose could not be served by other non-discriminatory means. The evidence in this case amply supports the District Court's decision that Maine's ban on fish serves legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately served by other non-discriminatory purposes. Conclusion: The Maine law is constitutional.

Granholm v. Heald (2005)

*COMMERCE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE)* Facts: Michigan and NY had a three tier regulatory scheme for wine producers, wholesalers, and retailers. The controversy here surrounds provisions in both states that allow in state wineries to sell and ship directly to residents of that state, but either directly prohibit such practice for out of state wineries, or places such prohibitive Analysis: The mere fact of non-residence should not foreclose a producers in one state from access to the markets in another state. Laws of the type here essentially produce a low level trade war. Thread of police power, articulating specific safety concerns. The state interest in stopping underaged drinking does not hold. There is little evidence that purchase of wine on the internet by minors is a problem. The tax allocation argument is also insufficient. Conclusion: A state may not create regulations that allow in-state wineries to sell and ship to state residents but not afford the same opportunities for out of state wineries

United States v. Morrison (2000)

*COMMERCE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: Christy Brzonkala alleged that Morrison (and his companion Crawford) assaulted and repeatedly raped her in the fall of 1994. She filed a complaint under Virginia Tech's Sexual assault policy, and claimed that she had twice told Morrison "no" while he claimed the sexual activity was consensual. The university judicial committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault. He appealed his conviction and was retried under the university's Abusive Conduct Policy. His punishment from this committee was set aside by the provost because she believed it was excessive. Brzonkala then filed suit in federal district court under the Violence against Women Act of 1994. Issue: Does Section 13981 of the U.S.C fall within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce? Analysis: Lopez suggests that Congress' commerce clause regulatory powers have effective limits. We explain in that case (see Lopez brief) three broad categories that may be regulated. Since Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified our cases law governing the category of a "substantial relation to commerce" it is the proper framework for deciding this case. With the principles outlined in Lopez (that it was a criminal statute, etc.), the proper resolution of this case is that gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity. The mere existence of congressional findings that violence against women may affect interstate commerce is not sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of this commerce clause legislation. If we accepted such a regulation then congress could regulate any criminal activity that had a substantial effect on employment, production, etc. Conclusion: Section 13981 of the U.S.C does not fall within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.

Gonzalez v. Raich (2005)

*COMMERCE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: In 1996, California passed the Compassionate Use Act which allowed seriously ill state residents to use marijuana for medical purposes. The law also exempted patients, doctors, and caregivers from prosecution for cultivating or possessing marijuana for medical reasons. Raich used marijuana due to an inoperable brain tumor, and Monson used it for chronic spinal pain. In 2002, sheriff and federal drug agents entered Monson's house. The sheriff found no illegal activity but the federal agents seized her marijuana plants as a violation of the federal Controlled Substance Act. Issue: Does Congress' authority under Article I, Section 8 to regulate commerce include the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law? Analysis: Reiterates 3 criteria established in Lopez, and repeated in Morrison. Case law (Wickard) firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. It has this power even if the activity is not purely commercial in nature. Be it wheat or marijuana, home consumption has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. All Congress needs here is a rational basis to reach this conclusion, and we have no difficulty believing that it has such a basis under the CSA. Conclusion: Congress' authority under Article I, Section 8 to regulate commerce includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with CA law.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)

*COMMERCE/TANEY COURT (DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE)* Facts: Congress passed a statute in 1789 pertaining to the regulation of ports. It said that, until Congress acted otherwise, state and local authorities would continue to control ports and harbors. In 1803, PA passed a regulation requiring all ships to hire a local pilot to guide ships in and out of Port of Philadelphia. Those who did not comply were fined. Cooley owned a ship and sailed into the Port without a local pilot. He was fined by the port's board. He responded by claiming that the PA law was unconstitutional because only Congress could regulate the port as it was an integral part of interstate commerce. Issue: Does the grant of the commercial power to Congress per se deprive the states of all power to regulate pilots? Analysis: The regulation of qualification of pilots does constitute regulation of navigation and consequently of commerce, within the meaning of the Constitution. The regulation of pilots here also has an intimate connection with the general subject of commerce over which Congress has control. The grant of commercial power to Congress does not expressly exclude states from exercising power over the subject matter. The mere grant to Congress of power to regulate commerce does not deprive the states of power to regulate pilots. Therefore, the state law is not in conflict of any law of Congress. Conclusion: The Board of Wardens regulation is constitutional.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012)

*COMMERCE/TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The purpose of the law was to increase the number of American covered by health insurance and to decrease the cost of health care. At the heart of the ACA is a requirement known as the "individual mandate" (also known as the "minimum coverage" requirement). This provision directs that most Americans purchase "minimum essential" health insurance coverage for themselves and their dependents if they do not receive such coverage from their employers. Those who do not comply with this provision are required to make a "shared responsibility" payment to the federal government. The act provides that this "penalty" will be paid to the Internal Revenue Service and "shall be assessed and collected in the same manner" as tax penalties. Issue: Does Congress have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to mandate individual health care coverage?; and are the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA constitutional uses of Congress' power to tax and spend? Analysis: The national government possesses limited power; the people and the state retain the remainder. The Commerce power only reaches "activity." Wickard does not apply because that case regulated activity and here the government only deals with inactivity. We have been very deferential to Congress's determination that a regulation is "necessary." But we have also carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution. Such laws, which are not "consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution," McCulloch, are not "proper means for carrying into Execution" Congress's enumerated powers.The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without health insurance looks like a tax in many respects. For taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors a taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status. The requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS, which... must assess and collect it "in the same manner as taxes." This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the Government. Conclusion: Congress does not have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to mandate individual health care coverage. But the ACA is a legitimate use of Congress' power to tax and spend.

Alden v. Maine (1999)

*FEDERALISM/11TH AMENDMENT/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY)* Facts: The 11th Amendment states that "the judicial power of the U.S. shall not be construed to extent to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another states, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state." One exception to this has been the FLSA, which enables states employees to bring federal suits against their states. In 1992, five probation officers sued the state of Maine for violating the overtime provision of the FLSA. When a new Supreme court precedent stopped the suit in federal court, the employees turned to a Maine state court. Here, however, the suit was dismissed based on sovereign immunity. Issue: Do the powers delegated to Congress under Article I include the power to subject non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts? Analysis: While sovereign immunity was directed toward federal courts, it applies with even greater force that states are immune from suits against themselves in their own courts. State has not consented to this type of lawsuit. Sovereign immunity does not bar all judicial review. First, it only bars suits in the absence of consent. The 14th Amendment also suggests that states surrendered a portion of sovereignty under the section 5 enforcement power. Conclusion: The powers delegated to Congress under Article I do not include the power to subject non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts.

Michigan v. Long (1983)

*FEDERALISM/BURGER COURT (ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT GROUNDS TEST)* Facts: Police search of Long's car resulted in a substantial seizure of marijuana. The state Supreme Court reversed Long's conviction and held that the search was in violation of both the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution. Because the Michigan Supreme Court relied on federal and state constitutions, the ruling fell into an ambiguous zone. Issue: Did the Michigan Supreme Court rely sufficiently on state grounds so that the U.S. Supreme Court should not review its decision? Rule: Under the adequate and independent state grounds test, the Supreme Court refrains from reviewing state court interpretations of state constitutions and laws unless those decisions implicate issues of federal law. Analysis: If a state court indicates clearly and expressly that its decision is based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, this court will not undertake to review the decision. In this case, Michigan court relied almost wholly on Terry v. Ohio, which is a federal case. Conclusion: The decision of the Michigan Supreme court did not rely on adequate and independent state grounds.

National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)

*FEDERALISM/BURGER COURT* Goes back to dual federalism. Out of nowhere the Court reverses 3 decades of law. 45 states immediately filed suit to help determine "what is an essential and traditional state function..."

Murdock v. City of Memphis (1875)

*FEDERALISM/CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION COURTS (ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS TEST)* Created the adequate and independent state grounds test because there was no Supreme Court jurisdiction then. Liberals on the Burger Court used this as a way to keep cases out of federal courts. Burger Court turned this analysis on its head in Michigan v. Long (1983)

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Association (1985)

*FEDERALISM/COMMERCE/BURGER COURT* Facts: This case is virtually a carbon copy of National League of Cities v. Usery. It focused on an amendment to FLSA that required states to pay virtually all public employees minimum wages and overtime. In 1959, San Antonio created a mass transit system (SAMTA) which was ultimately subsidized by federal grants. In 1979 the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA must abide by the FLSA. Garcia and other employees filed a suit for overtime pay from SAMTA. Issue: May the federal government impose FLSA standards on a city's transit authority? Rule: National League of Cities v. Usery. Analysis: The traditional governmental function framework created in National League is unworkable and inconsistent with ideas of federalism. As such, we now overrule National League of Cities. The constitution limits state sovereignty. For example, Article I, Section 10 withdraws powers from states, and section 8 gives Congress a great deal of power over state sovereignty (the elastic clause). The constitution does not explicate any state power that Congress may not displace. The Court has no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the commerce clause. Conclusion: The federal government may impose FLSA standards on SAMTA.

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

*FEDERALISM/COMMERCE/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill. Case involved Fidelity Cotton Mill in North Carolina, which employed Dagenhart and his two sons. Under state law, his sons could work 11 hours a day, but the federal law allowed Dagenhart's older son to work only eight hours a day and his younger son could not work at all. Issue: May Congress use its power to control interstate commerce to enforce labor standards within states? Analysis: The 10th Amendment allows the states to exercised police power over local trade and manufacture; The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to control the states in their exercise of police power over local trade and manufacture. Conclusion: No. 5-4 vote. Congress may not use its power to enforce labor standards within states.

United States v. Darby Lumber (1941)

*FEDERALISM/COMMERCE/POST-NEW DEAL COURTS* Facts: In 1939, the federal government sought and obtained an indictment against Darby for violating the FLSA requiring all employers in interstate commerce to pay employees a minimum wage. Employees working more than 40 hours per week were also to be paid 1.5x their regular pay. The indictment alleged that Darby, the owner of a lumber company, was engaged in the production and manufacturing of goods shipped out of state, but that he had not abided by either of the FLSA's major pay requirement. Issue: Does Congress have the constitutional power to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods made by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at the wage are grater than a prescribed maximum? Does congress have the power to prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods for interstate commerce at other than prescribed wages and hours? Analysis: The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control. The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision an that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest [the 10th amendment] was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. Conclusion: Congress has the constitutional power to prohibit the interstate shipment of goods made by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater than a prescribed maximum. Congress has the power to prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods for interstate commerce at other than prescribed wages and hours.

Crosby v. NTFC (2000)

*FEDERALISM/COMMERCE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: In 1996, MA passed a law barring state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma. Three months later, Congress enacted a statute imposing sanctions against Burma, authorizing the president to impose further sanctions. In 1997, the president signed an EO that prohibited any new investment in Burma by a United States citizen. Then, Congress imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Member of National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) were affected by the Massachusetts act. Thus, they brought suit against Massachusetts claiming the state law conditionally infringed on the federal trade powers, violates the Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the federal act. Issue: Is the Massachusetts Burma law, restricting the authority of its agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business in Burma, invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution? Analysis: When Congress intends federal law to occupy a field, state law in that area is preempted. The state argues that absent express preemption, there is no implication of approval, particularly in light of occasional instances of express preemption of state sanctions in the past. This argument is unconvincing on several levels. Conclusion: Massachusetts statute is unconstitutional.

Missouri v. Holland (1920)

*FEDERALISM/LAISSEZ FAIRE COURTS* Facts: In 1913, Congress enacted legislation to protect migratory birds in dangers of extinction, but the act was struck down as unconstitutional because of its use of its Commerce power. Three years later, the U.S. and Britain entered into an agreement over the same concern. Both agreed that their making bodies should take step to avoid the extinction of these birds. To enforce this agreement, Congress enacted another Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918, which banned the killing, capturing, or selling of any bird cited in this way. Issue: Are the treaty and the 1918 statute void because they interfere with the rights reserved to the states? Rule: Treaty power (Article II, Section 2); Supremacy clause Analysis: Through Article II, Section 2 and Article VI, the U.S. government has the power to engage in treaties, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. If a treaty is valid there can be no disputing that it is valid under the necessary and proper clause. Valid treaties are as binding within the territorial limits of the states as they are effective through the territory of the U.S. Conclusion: The treaty and subsequent statute are valid.

Lochner v. New York (1905)

*FEDERALISM/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS (POLICE POWER)* Facts: The Bakeshop Act was a New York state labor law which prohibited bakery employees from working for more than sixty hours per week or ten hours per day. Lochner permitted an employee to work in his bakery for more than sixty hours in one week and was convicted of his second offense and fined. Lochner appealed his conviction on the grounds that the law violated his freedom to contract under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Issue: May New York regulate the number of hours a bakery employee may work? Analysis: The court must determine whether the legislation is a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to enter into a contract related to his business. Conclusion: The regulation of a bakery employee is not permissible.

Coyle v. United States (1911)

*FEDERALISM/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to admit new states. Congress exercised this power by passing the Enabling Act, conditionally inviting the Oklahoma territory to join the Union. One of those conditions required that the state capital be in Guthrie, where territorial capital was located, and that the state refrain from relocating the capital or making any provisions for relocation before 1913. The terms of the Enabling Act were to be "irrevocable." The territory accepted the terms of the invitation, and in 1907 Oklahoma became the 46th state. But just three years later, the state's voters supported a measure to move the capital to Oklahoma City. The state immediately enacted implementing legislation and began securing the necessary funds to effect the relocation. Issue: Is the provision of the enabling act a valid limitation upon the power of the State, after its admission to the U.S.? Analysis: The power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers. [W]hen a new state is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compact, or stipulations embraced in the act under which the new State came into the Union which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after admission. Conclusion: Oklahoma has the right to determine where its seat of government is. The Enabling Act's restriction on moving the state capitol is unconstitutional.

Arizona v. United States (2012)

*FEDERALISM/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: Faced with large numbers of unauthorized aliens within its borders and frustrated by the federal government's inability to resolve the nation's immigration issues, the Arizona legislature in 2010 passed the Support our Law Enforcement and Neighborhoods Act. The stated purpose of the legislation was to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the U.S. The law established a state policy of attrition through enforcement. The Arizona law had four controversial provisions: First 3 make it a state crime; Fourth, Section 2(B). Issue: Under the preemption principles, does federal law permit Arizona to do this? (Think supremacy clause.) Analysis: Congress has the power to preempt state law. Specifically, states may not regulate conduct in a field that Congress has acted within its proper authority. State laws are also preempted when they conflict with federal law. Conclusion: Three provisions of AZ law fall on grounds of preemption and one is not yet ripe for a decision (section 2(B))

New York v. United States (1992)

*FEDERALISM/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: In 1980, Congress passed the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWP). The act declared that states were responsible for their own waste within its borders and encouraged states to develop disposal sites. The law allowed South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada sites to impose surcharges on waste that originated in noncompliant states. Three incentives were used to encourage compliance: First, 25% of the surcharge would go to the secretary of energy and would be distributed to compliant states; Second, the longer a state failed to comply the higher the surcharge that would be imposed on their waste brought to existing sites; Third, any state still noncompliant by 1996 would be fully responsible or disposing of its own waste. New York argued that the incentives violated the 10th amendment. Issue: May the federal government constitutionally command states to carry out the LLRWP? Analysis: The constitution does not allow Congress to commandeer the state legislative process. Congress may, however, encourage states to comply with a federal regulation. It can do so in a number of ways: First, Congress may attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds; Second, Congress may offer states the choice of regulating the activity themselves (cooperative federalism). When such encouragement happens, states remain responsive to its own citizens' preferences and state officials remain accountable to the people. Conclusion: The federal government may not constitutionally command states to carry out the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWP).

Printz v. United States (1997)

*FEDERALISM/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: In 1993, Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 with the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The law required the Attorney General to create a national database for instant background checks of those wanting to buy handguns. In the interim, those who already possessed a handgun permit or who lived in states with existing background checks could purchase guns. Where these alternatives were not available, the Act mandated that local chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) receive handgun purchase forms and make a reasonable effort within 5 business days to verify that the proposed sale was not to a person unqualified under the law. In short, CLEOs were required to conduct background checks. These responsibilities were to terminate once the federal instance check program would become operative. Issue: Does the Brady bill provision commanding local law enforcement to do background checks violate the constitution? Rule: The 10th Amendment indicates that the powers not delegated to the U.S. nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the States of to the people. Analysis: The Framers designed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people. The 10th Amendment indicates that the powers not delegated to the U.S. nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the States or to the people. The Constitution indicates that ONLY the president can administer laws exacted by Congress - The Brady Bill effectively transfers this power to CLEOs in the 50 states. When the Necessary and Proper Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty it is not proper for carrying into execution the Commerce Clause. Conclusion: The part of the Brady Bill requiring CLEOs to perform background checks is unconstitutional.

Scott v. Sanford (1857)

*FEDERALISM/TANEY COURT* Facts: Scott was a slave, purchased in Missouri, of John Emerson. In 1834, Emerson took Scott to the free state of Illinois, and in 1836 to the Upper Louisiana Territory which was to remain free under the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Scott and Emerson returned to Missouri and Emerson died shortly thereafter. Irene Sanford Emerson then inherited Scott, but when she moved to Massachusetts she left Scott and his family behind. Scott believed he no longer had slave status and sued for his freedom in Missouri. While he won at trial, he lost in the Missouri Supreme Court and ownership was transferred to Emerson's brother-in-law John Sanford. Issue: Can an individual, whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such be entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen? Analysis: We think Scott's class of people is not, and were not, to be included under the words "citizens" and can therefore they cannot claim any of the rights and privileges. We must not confuse the rights of citizenship which a state may confer within its limits and the rights of citizenship as a member of a union. The right of property in a slave is expressly confirmed in the Constitution. The government also pledged to protect owners at all times if slaves escaped. Additionally, no words in the constitution give Congress greater power over slave property. The only power it has is the power to guard and protect owner rights. Given these considerations, the Act of Congress (The Missouri Compromise) is void. Conclusion: Scott does not gain freedom; The Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

*FEDERALISM/TAXING AND SPENDING/MARSHALL COURT (INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY)* Facts: During the 1790s, Congress enacted a bill for the creation of a national bank of the United States. The first bank of the U.S. was established in 1791. Congress refused to renew the Bank's charter in 1811. After the War of 1812 there was pressure to create a second bank and Congress did so in 1816. Congress held hearings on the Bank while some states simultaneously attempted to regulate the banks within their borders. When a state official came to collect taxes from a Baltimore branch of the Bank of the U.S., McCulloch (the bank's cashier) refused to pay. Issue: Does Congress have the power to charter a national bank? Did the state of Maryland exceed its power by trying to tax a federal entity? Rule: Necessary and proper clause Analysis: Even the 10th Amendment omits the word "expressly" when referring to the fact that powers not delegated to the U.S., nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the state or to the people. This means the power to create a bank is an implied power that Congress can retain for itself. The government of the U.S. was not designed to depend on the states. The people of the state created the government and have conferred on it the general power of taxation. The states have no power to impede (by taxation or otherwise) the operation of the constitutional laws passed by Congress. Conclusion: Congress has the power to charter a national bank. Maryland exceeded its power by trying to tax a federal entity.

Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. City of New York (1978)

*TAKINGS CLAUSE/BURGER COURT (PARCEL AS A WHOLE)* Facts: NY passed the Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965 as a part of an effort to protect historic buildings and districts. The commission administering the law was to identify buildings and areas that held special historic or aesthetic value. The buildings were then discussed in hearings to determine is landmark status should be conferred. If a building was designated, historic owners were required to not alter the building without securing approval. Wanted to build a 53 story office building above it and change existing facade. The commission rejected both this proposal and a second one. Penn Central then filed suit claiming the law constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. Issue: Does the commission's rejection of a plan to change the facade of Grand Central Station constitute a taking under the 5th Amendment? Analysis: The law here does not interfere with any the present uses of the terminal in question, which means that it does not interfere with the primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel. Thus, the landmark has not affected a taking of property. Unlike the government acts in Causby... the NY City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the Terminal. Its designated as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years; as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions Conclusion: The rejection of the plan is not a "taking."

United States v. Causby (1946)

*TAKINGS CLAUSE/POST-NEW DEAL COURTS (EMINENT DOMAIN)* Facts: The Causby's owned land, on which they raised chickens. In 1942, the federal government leases a local airfield at which bombers, fighters, and the other planes flew in and out. The end of the runway was close to the Causby's property, and planes frequently flew. This activity led to considerable economic loss for the family as the productivity of the chickens decrease, and significant numbers of them died of panic when planes flew over. The property could no longer be used as a commercial chicken farm. Issue: Has the government taken the Causby's property without just compensation because planes fly over it, thus making the property useless as a chicken farm? Analysis: It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measurement of the value of the property taken. We have said that airspace is a public highway. Yet, it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. (Lose during time of federal power.) Conclusion: The government took Causby's property without just compensation.

Berman v. Parker (1954)

*TAKINGS CLAUSE/POST-NEW DEAL COURTS (PUBLIC USE)* Facts: Concerned about growing slums and urban blight, DC passed the DC Redevelopment Act of 1954. It authorized the National Capital Planning Commission to develop comprehensive land use plans to improve the District's public and private land use for the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens. The commission created Project Area B in Southwest DC, which redevelop the area in the interest of public health. Under the plan, Max Morris' property would be sold or leased to other private owners for redevelopment Issue: May the government take the property under the 5th Amendment, when it is to be given to another private owner, rather than used for a public purpose? Analysis: The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. Here is the rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive just compensation which the 5th Amendment exacts as the price of the taking. Conclusion: The government may take private property and give it to another private owner

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992)

*TAKINGS CLAUSE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (EMINENT DOMAIN)* Facts: Lucas paid $975,000 for two vacant oceanfront lots on a barrier island near Charleston, SC with the intention of building single family homes similar to those built on adjacent lots. Shortly thereafter, the state passed an Act that gave the state coastal council increased authority to protect certain shoreline areas against erosion and other dangers. The council added that Lucas' lots were critical area and prohibited any new construction. Lucas claims that the new regulations amounted to a taking, even though it was Issue: Does a regulation that inhibits an owner from building on private property constitute a taking under the 5th Amendment? Analysis: The argument that land title is subjected to the "implied limitation" that the state may eliminate all economically valuable use it consistent with the historical compact in the Takings Clause. The total taking inquiry we require will ordinarily entail analysis of the degree of public harm to public land and resources or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant proposed activities... Here to win the its case, South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislatures declaration that the uses Lucas's desires are inconsistent with the public interest or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common law maxim. Conclusion: The regulation constitutes a taking under the 5th Amendment

Kelo v. City of New London (2005)

*TAKINGS CLAUSE/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (PUBLIC USE)* Facts: New London, CT was in serious economic decline. State and local officials created the New London Development Corporation in an effort to revitalize the city. The NLDC obtained a commitment from Pfizer to build $300 million research facility in the city. The master plan from the NLDC called for a hotel, conference center, other amenities and new residential housing. TO do so it had to acquire 115 privately owned parcels of land. Most landowners sold, but the city Issue: May a state or local government use its power of eminent domain to procure property that will be used for economic revitalization in the city in its public interest? Analysis: Without exception our cases have defined the concept of public interest broadly because that plan clearly serves the public interest, public use meets the requirement of the 5th Amendment. Conclusion: The government can take the land and it is constitutional.

Complete Auto Transit v. Brady (1977)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/BURGER COURT (BRADY TEST)* Facts: Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corp doing business in Mississippi. It transported new vehicles manufactured out of state and brought into Mississippi by rail. There is no doubt that Complete's business was interstate commerce. It provided the last segment in the transportation of goods manufactured out of state to their retail destinations within the state. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the privilege of doing business in the state at a rate of 5% of gross income from state business. In 1970 the MS Tax Commission informed Complete that it owed over 122 thousand dollars in taxes. It received another bill in 1972. It paid the taxes and sued for a refund. Issue: Does the MS law run afoul of the Commerce Clause when it applies the tax it imposes on the "privilege of doing business" within the state? Analysis: The Spector rule... looks only to the fact that a tax (such as the one here) is for the "privilege of doing business". It deems irrelevant any consideration of the practical effect of the tax. In short, this rule suggests that interstate commerce should enjoy a sort of free trade immunity of state taxation. There is an economic consequence that follows from the use of the words "privilege doing business." Conclusion: Spector overruled. MS tax is constitutional. Criteria for state tax on interstate commerce to be constitutional: 1) Targeted activity must be sufficiently connected to the state to justify a tax; 2) The tax must be fairly apportioned so that the levy is based on intrastate activity or income not subject to taxation by other states; 3) The tax must not be discriminate against interstate commerce; 4) The tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the state. (State tax version of Hunt Test.)

Michelin Tire Corporation v. Wages (1976)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/BURGER COURT* Facts: Michelin owned a warehouse outside of Atlanta. It imported tires from France and Nova Scotia and stored them in this warehouse for later distribution to retail outlets. The county tax assessor levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on inventory. The company sued the tax commissioner claiming that the tires were in their original containers therefore free from state taxation. Issue: Are inventories stored in a warehouse subject to state taxation? Analysis: Nothing in the history of the Import-Export Clause even remotely suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax which is also imposed on imported goods that are no longer in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded as objectionable by the framers. Nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes do not interfere with the free flow of imported goods among the states. Conclusion: Inventories stored in warehouse are subject to state taxation. Original package doctrine overturned here.

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1895)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION COURTS* Facts: Pollock was a shareholder in the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company. He filed suit on behalf of himself and his fellow stockholders to block the company from paying the national income tax on the ground that the tax was unconstitutional. Issue: Is a tax upon a person's entire income a direct tax and therefore unconstitutional because it is not apportioned among the states? Rule: Taxes on income are not direct taxes. - Springer Analysis: The constitution ordains affirmatively that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states according to numbers, and negatively that no direct tax shall be laid in proportion to the enumeration. The framers anticipated that, while states and localities would use direct taxation, the federal government would raise taxes mostly through indirect taxes. We have already decided that the federal government cannot tax municipal bonds. It follows, then that the same rule applies to revenue raised from any other source not subject to the tax. The lack of power to levy any but an apportioned tax on real and personal property equally exists as to the revenue therefrom. Conclusion: Taxes on real estate and on income from real estates are both direct taxes; taxes on personal property or the income of person property are direct taxes; all the sections that deal with the direct tax are unconstitutional.

Springer v. United States (1881)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ERA COURTS* Facts: Springer filed a Federal income tax return for the tax year 1865 showing income and income tax, but refused to pay the tax. Springer's income was from two sources: income in his profession and interest income on United States bonds. Issue: Is the income tax imposed by the statute a direct tax not apportioned among the states according to the population of each state under Article I? Analysis: The tax here in question falls within neither of these categories. It is not a tax on the "whole...personal estate" of the individual, but only on his income, gains, and profits during a year, which may have been but a small part of his personal estate, and in most cases would have been so. Conclusion: Taxes on income are not direct taxes.

McCray v. United States (1904)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: As oleo margarine grew in popularity in the 19th century the dairy industry became concerned and lobbied to have the Oleomargarine Act passed. The law imposed an excise tax of one-quarter cent per pound on uncolored margarine, and ten cents per pound on artificially colored margarine. While the act raised revenue, its central purpose was to protect the dairy industry by raising the price or margarine and discouraging the sale of colored margarine. McCray was assessed a penalty for knowingly purchasing margarine. The package bore the one-quarter cent tax stamps, but was colored and therefore subject to the higher tax. McCray argued the tax was a regulation on intrastate commerce and therefore a sphere of authority reserved for the states. Issue: Does the oleomargarine act exert a power not conferred on the federal government by the Constitution? Analysis: On its face, it is clear that this act levies an excise tax. Therefore, it is within the power of Congress. And, the act may not be judicially restrained because of the results that arise from the passage of the act. Indeed, the judicial branch cannot prescribe to the legislative department limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers. Nothing in the 5th of 10th amendments takes away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. Conclusion: The tax is constitutional.

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: Congress passed the Child Labor Tax law which imposed an excise tax of 10% on net profits for a company hiring a child. Employing children was defined as hiring anyone under the age of 16 in a mine or quarry, or under the age of fourteen in any mill, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment. It also included children between 14 and 16 who worked more than 8 hours a day or more than 6 days a week or between 7pm and 6am. Drexel received a notice that it owed over $6000 in excise taxes for employing a child during the 1919 tax year. It paid the tax but sued for a refund, arguing that the tax was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate manufacturing. Issue: Does the Child Labor Tax law impose a tax with the actual intent to regulate an industry? Analysis: Taxes are meant to raise revenue and only incidentally may have the incidental motive of discouraging onerous activity. But there comes a time when the penalizing features take the tax into the realm of being a regulation and punishment. The analogy to Dagenhart is clear. When Congress tried to regulate labor as part of interstate commerce we ruled that this was actually a regulation of state concerns and therefore invalid. Conclusion: The Child Labor Tax law imposes a tax with the actual intent to regulate an industry, and is unconstitutional.

United States v. Butler (1936)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/LAISSEZ-FAIRE COURTS* Facts: The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was meant to reduce the amount of acreage being farmed in the U.S. To accomplish this goal, the federal government would "rent" a percentage of the nation's farmland and leave this acreage unplanted. To fund these payments, the AAA imposed an excise tax on the processing of agricultural products. Butler was the Bankruptcy receiver for Hoosac Mills Corporation. When the government imposed the tax on Hoosac, Butler took legal action to avoid payment, claiming the AAA exceeded the taxing and spending power of the federal government. Issue: Does the AAA violate the taxing and spending power of the federal government? Analysis: The power of taxation which is expressly granted may be adopted as a means to carry into operation another power, but taxing to effectuate an end which is not legitimate is not within the scope of the constitution. Conclusion: The AAA violates the taxing and spending power of the federal government.

Steward Machine v. Davis (1937)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/POST-NEW DEAL COURTS* Facts: In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act to provide economic security to groups of individuals who were in need including the elderly, dependent children, and the handicapped. The Act imposed an excise tax on employers who hired more than eight workers, and it was based on the total amount of wages paid. Employers could receive a tax credit not to exceed 90 percent of their unemployment tax obligations made to the state. The states had to meet federal specifications. The Steward Machine Company paid the taxes then sued for a refund. Issue: Does the Social Security Act violate the 5th Amendment, and unlawfully invade power reserved to the states? Analysis: The Social Security Act is an attempted to find a method by which all public agencies may work together to a common end. No taxpayer or state is coerced into compliance. To hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties. Conclusion: The SSA does not unconstitutionally infringe on the 5th or 10th Amendment.

Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury (1989)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY)* Facts: Michigan's revenue code provided that retirement benefits paid to individuals by the state or any of its subdivisions were exempt from state income taxes. Benefits from others sources, including federal retirement income, were subject to the tax. Davis spent his career in federal service. As a Michigan resident, he paid state income taxes on his federal retirement benefits. He petitioned the state for a refund based on a federal statute. The state rejected the claim because Davis was no longer a federal employee - he simply received benefits from the state. Issue: Is the Michigan tax imposed on federal retirement benefits barred by the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity? Analysis: The imposition of a heavier tax burden on those who deal with one sovereign than others, who deal with the other sovereign, must be justified by significant differences between the two classes. But the state's interest in adopting the discriminatory tax is simply irrelevant to an inquiry into the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent treatment. A tax exemption truly intended to account for differences in retirement benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the sources of those benefits, as the law here does. Conclusion: The Michigan tax violates principles of intergovernmental tax immunity and is unconstitutional.

South Carolina v. Baker (1988)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS (INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY)* Facts: Municipal and state bonds have traditionally been free from federal taxation on interest earned. In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). Section 310 (b)(1) removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered bonds issued by state and local government. South Carolina sued Secretary of the Treasury Baker to have the law declared unconstitutional as a violation of the 10th Amendment and the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. Issue: Does Section 310 of TEFRA violate the 10th Amendment and the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine? Analysis: Under the current doctrine, states can never tax the U.S. directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does business, as long as the tax does not discriminate. The tax is imposed on the bondholders not on the states and any increased costs incurred by states in implementing the registration system are not taxes within the meaning of the tax immunity doctrine. Conclusion: Section 310 of TEFRA does not violate the 10th Amendment.

South Dakota v. Dole (1987)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: 23 U.S.C. 158 directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a portion of federal highway funds from any state that did not establish a minimum drinking age of 21. The purpose of the law was to decrease car accidents among a group that statistics showed had a high percentage of accidents. South Dakota allowed person over 19 years old to buy 3.2 beer, and argued that the law infringed on the state's power under the 21st Amendment to regulate alcohol. Issue: May Congress attach a minimum drinking age requirement for any state that takes federal highway funds? Analysis: Under the General Welfare Clause, Congress may attach restrictions on the receipt of federal funds to further broad policy objectives. But the spending power is not unlimited. Conclusion: Congress may attach a minimum drinking age requirement for any state that takes federal highway funds.

United States v. United States Shoe Corp. (1998)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: In the Water Resources Development Act, Congress imposed the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT). It assessed a uniform charge of .125 percent of the cargo's value on shipments of commercial cargo through the nation's ports. The Customs service collected the revenue and Congress could appropriate amounts of the revenue to pay for harbor maintenance and development programs including costs associated with the St. Lawrence Seaway. Issue: Is the HMT a levy a tax on exports in violation of the constitution? Analysis: While the Export Clause bars Congress from levying export taxes, it does not rule out a user fee provided that the fee lacks the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and is instead a charge designed as compensation for government supplied services. The connection between the service rendered and the compensation received must be closer than it is here. Thus, we must hold that the HMT violates the Export Clause as applied to exports. Conclusion: The Harbor Maintenance tax is a tax on exports and is unconstitutional.

Quill Corporation v. North Dakota (1992)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: Quill was an office supply company with offices in Illinois, California, and Georgia. None of its employees worked in North Dakota, and the company had no real estate there. Quill was, however the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in the state. In 1987, North Dakota amended its constitution to impose a use tax on sales made by companies who regularly or systematically solicit customers in the state. Thus, Quill had to collect a tax on all sales made in North Dakota. It refused to do so, claiming that North Dakota had no taxation authority over corporations that did not have physical presence in the state. Issue: Does the imposition of a tax on a company that solicits business within a state violate the Commerce Clause? Analysis: The Due Process clause requires a link or "minimum connection" between a state and the person or transaction it seeks to tax. Additionally, the income attributed to the state for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state. Given that the nexus requirements are different for due process and commerce clause cases a corporation may have the minimum contacts necessary for a due process claim, but lack a "substantial nexus" required for a commerce clause claim. Conclusion: Tax on company that solicits business in a state violates the commerce clause.

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon (1994)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Facts: The ODEQ is in charge of the state's comprehensive policy for the management, reduction, and recycling of solid waste. In 1989, the state legislature decided to assess an additional surcharge for disposing of any solid waste generated out of state and authorized the department to set the surcharge rate based on the costs to the state of disposing of such Issue: Does Oregon's cost based surcharge on in-state disposal solid waste generated in other states violate the commerce clause? Analysis: The first step to analyze any law under the negative commerce clause is to determine whether it "regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce. The purpose of a law has no bearing on whether it is facially invalid. The fact remains that the differential charges favors shippers in Oregon. As a result, the surcharge must be invalidated unless the state can demonstrate that it serves a legitimate local interest that cannot be accomplished by nondiscriminatory means. All we intimate here is that the state's discretion is bounded by relevant limitations of the federal constitution- here the negative commerce clause. Conclusion: The surcharge is unconstitutional.

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (2018)

*TAXING AND SPENDING/REHNQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS* Overturns Quill

Franklin D. Roosevelt

32nd US President - He began New Deal programs to help the nation out of the Great Depression, and he was the nation's leader during most of WWII.

National Industrial Recovery Act

A New Deal legislation that focused on the employment of the unemployed and the regulation of unfair business ethics. The NIRA pumped cash into the economy to stimulate the job market and created codes that businesses were to follow to maintain the ideal of fair competition and created the NRA.

export

A good or service produced in the home country and sold in another country.

dual federalism

A system of government in which both the states and the national government remain supreme within their own spheres, each responsible for some policies.

Cooperative Federalism

A system of government in which powers and policy assignments are shared between states and the national government. They may also share costs, administration, and even blame for programs that work poorly.

duty

A tax on imported goods

direct tax

A tax that must be paid by the person on whom it is levied

impost

A tax, particularly a tariff or duty on imported goods.

Burger Court (1969-1986)

A transitional court, did not dismantle the Warren precedents, includes Roe v. Wade decision. Weakening support for cooperative federalism, occasional decisions in favor of dual federalism.

16th Amendment

Amendment to the United States Constitution (1913) gave Congress the power to tax income.

John Marshall

American jurist and politician who served as the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1801-1835) and helped establish the practice of judicial review.

Ratification clause

Article Five of the United States Constitution describes the process whereby the Constitution, the nation's frame of government, may be altered. Altering the Constitution consists of proposing an amendment or amendments and subsequent ratification.

General welfare taxation

Article I Section 8 Clause 1: The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the US; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. This clause allows the levying of taxes to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the population.

taxing and spending

Article I Section 8 Clause 1: The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes, duties, impost, etc. This permits the levying of taxes for two purposes; to pay the debts of the US, and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the US. Taken together, these purposes have traditionally been held to imply and to constitute the federal government's taxing and spending power.

supremacy clause

Article VI of the Constitution, which makes the Constitution, national laws, and treaties supreme over state laws when the national government is acting within its constitutional limits.

The Prize Cases (1863)

Case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1862 during the American Civil War. The Supreme Court's decision declared constitutional the blockade of the Southern ports ordered by President Abraham Lincoln. Was the end of the dual federalism of the Taney Courts.

Korematsu v. U.S. (1944)

Case concerning the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066, which ordered Japanese Americans into internment camps during World War II regardless of their citizenship.

Ex parte Quirin (1942)

Case during World War II that upheld the jurisdiction of a United States military tribunal over the trial of eight German saboteurs in the United States.

Ex parte Milligan (1866)

Case that ruled the application of military tribunals to citizens when civilian courts are still operating is unconstitutional. End of dual federalism (Post-Taney, Civil War/Reconstruction Era)

Marshall Court (1801-1835)

Chief Justice John Marshall; established the power of the federal government over the states; supremacy clause; supported by McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden. (Cooperative federalism)

John Roberts

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

necessary and proper clause

Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) setting forth the implied powers of Congress. It states that Congress, in addition to its express powers, has the right to make all laws necessary and proper to carry out all powers the Constitution vests in the national government

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3

Commerce clause

marble cake federalism

Conceives of federalism as a marble cake in which all levels of government are involved in a variety of issues and programs, rather than a layer cake, or dual federalism, with fixed divisions between layers or levels of government.

Rehnquist and Roberts Courts (1986-present)

Conservative courts. (Limited dual federalism)

Civil War/Reconstruction Courts (1865-1895)

Cooperative federalism

Post-New Deal Courts (1937-1969)

Cooperative federalism.

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)

Court rules on a case brought by citizens of South Carolina suing Georgia. Case that caused the passing of the 11th Amendment.

5th Amendment

Criminal Proceedings; Due Process; Eminent Domain; Double Jeopardy; Protection from Self incrimination

Laissez-faire Courts (1896-1936)

Dual federalism.

United States v. Gamble (_____)

Facts: Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called "separate sovereigns" exception). Under this binding precedent, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. Issue: Should the Court overrule the "separate sovereigns" exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Virginia Uranium v. Warren (_____)

Facts: The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium "until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute." Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect. Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court's conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Issue: Does the federal Atomic Energy Act preempt a Virginia ban on non-federal uranium mining?

Shreveport doctrine

Federal government has the power to regulate intrastate commerce when a failure to do so would cripple, retard, or destroy interstate commerce.

Sturgeon v. Frost (____)

Federalism and commerce case. Can state-owned and privately-owned Alaskan lands within the boundaries of a national park be regulated by the National Park Service?

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952)

In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America. The Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."

traditional state functions

Included in the opinion of National League of Cities v. Usery. 45 states immediately filed suit to help determine "what is an essential and traditional state function..."

Categorical test of commerce

Is the regulated activity "in" or "outside" the stream of commerce, whether the activity is "local" or "interstate" and whether the effects of the activity on interstate commerce are "direct" or "indirect"?

Federalist #39

James Madison's writing on the merits of division of power in government. You must know what Madison means: extent of power, and what is essential in government. Talked about the republican nature of the proposed Constitution.

Empirical test of commerce

Looks at the magnitude of the effect that the regulated activity has on interstate commerce, without special regard to how the activity is categorized.

Eras of federalism

Marshall Court (1801-1835), Taney Court (1835-1864), Civil War/Reconstruction Courts (1865-1895), Laissez-faire Courts (1896-1936), Post-New Deal Courts (1937-1969), Burger Court (1969-1986), Rehnquist and Roberts Courts (1986-Present)

Eminent domain

Power of a government to take private property for public use.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 1

Power to lay and collect taxes

Article I, Section 9

Powers denied to the federal government

Police powers

Powers possessed by the states as part of their inherent sovereignty. These powers may be exercised to protect or promote the public order, health, safety, morals, and general welfare.

court-packing plan

President FDR's 1937 proposal that attempted to increase the number of US Supreme Court Justices in order to save his New Deal programs from constitutional challenges

taking

Process of land being taken from a property owner for public use through eminent domain with the requirement that the owner be compensated fairly.

11th Amendment

Prohibits citizens of one state or foreign country from suing another state.

Taney Court (1835-1864)

Replaced the Marshall Court. Dred Scott vs. Sanford case was discussed. Under the Taney Court, economic opportunity was expanded. Also under the Taney court the ideas of private property were protected. (Dual federalism)

dormant commerce clause

Restriction on states' authority to pass laws that substantially affect interstate commerce.

Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor (1951)

Spector Rule: Looks only to the fact that a tax (such as the one here) is for the "privilege of doing business." Overturned in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady (1977)

Owen Roberts

Supreme Court justice whose "switch in time" to support New Deal legislation helped undercut FDR's court-packing scheme

Adequate and independent grounds test

The Supreme Court will refrain from reviewing state court interpretations of state constitutions and laws unless those decisions implicate issues of federal law. If a state court indicates clearly and expressly that its decision is based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, this court will not undertake to review the decision.

commerce clause

The clause in the Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1) that gives Congress the power to regulate all business activities that cross state lines or affect more than one state or other nations.

intergovernmental tax immunity

The exemption of state and national governmental agencies and property from taxation by each other. (McCulloch v. Maryland.)

Four Horsemen

The group of four justices that struck down the majority of FDR's New Deal legislation before the switch in time that saved nine.

10th Amendment

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

New Judicial Federalism

The practice whereby state judges base decisions regarding civil rights and liberties on their state's constitution, rather than the U.S. Constitution, when their state's constitution guarantees more than minimum rights.

Three Musketeers

The three justices on the Supreme Court that usually voted together to uphold FDR's New Deal legislation as constitutional before the switch in time that saved nine.

Separate sovereigns exception

Under this doctrine, the prohibition on double jeopardy does not prevent dual prosecution when the prosecutions are each by separate sovereigns. Thus, a criminal defendant can be prosecuted by a state court and then by a federal court (or the other way around).

William Rehnquist

United States jurist who served as an associate justice on the United States Supreme Court from 1972 until 1986, when he was appointed chief justice (born in 1924)

Roger Taney

United States jurist who served as chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. Wrote the opinion for Scott v. Sanford.

Preamble to the U.S. Constitution

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Original package doctrine

a principle of constitutional law which says an item in its original package retained its character as an import and was thus free from state taxation as long as they are unsold and remain in the original packaging.

ad valorem tax

a tax based on the assessed value of an item such as real estate or personal property. The most common of these taxes are property taxes levied on real estate. However, they may also extend to a number of tax applications, such as import duty taxes on goods from abroad.

indirect tax

a tax levied on one person but passed on to another for payment to the government

excise tax

a tax on the production, sale, or consumption of goods produced within a country.

stream of commerce doctrine

allows federal regulation of interstate commerce from the point of its origin to the point of its termination

import

bring (goods or services) into a country from abroad for sale.

layer cake federalism

federalism characterized by a national government exercising its power independently from state governments.

cumulative effects test of commerce

legal principle that says that commerce clause can regulate a transaction affecting interstate commerce in a trivial way if this taken together with other similar transactions establishes a combined effect on interstate commerce that is not trivial.

Public use

requirement of taking clause that once meant that the use of seized property had to be beneficial to all citizens such as the building of roads or park and not just private parties

just compensation

the amount of money the government must pay the owner of property it seizes through eminent domain.

switch in time that saved nine

the name given to what was perceived as the sudden jurisprudential shift by Associate Justice Owen Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1937 case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.

sovereign immunity

the rule that a citizen cannot sue the government without the government's consent