RULES 1 - 14

FACTS: Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit facilities of Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners (Automotive, Asea and Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements, under which Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents of title. Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles. BNP then demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the payment of the amount of US$1,544,984.40 representing Proton's total outstanding obligations. These guarantors refused to pay. So, BNP filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other related charges subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid. The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid at ₱352,116.30. The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees and thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The RTC denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that the docket fees were properly paid since it is the Office of the Clerk of Court that computes the correct docket fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket fees correctly, which they did. According to the RTC, even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly paid, the court cannot just dismiss the case. The Court has not yet ordered (and it will not in this case) to pay the correct docket fees. The CA affirmed the RTC, ruling that Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal amount being claimed in the pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94, petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees as the said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed should be included. There being an underpayment of the docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not BNP paid the correct docket fees. 2. Whether or not the complaint filed by BNP should be dismissed on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since it failed to pay the correct docket fees.

HELD: 1. No. When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998, Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 which provides for the inclusion of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs in the total amount claimed as basis for the computation of docket fees. The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation. (Additionally, the petitioners have adequately proven with documentary evidence that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed was USD 1 = Php 43.21, and not Php 43.00 as determined by the Clerk of Court. This overturned the disputable presumption of regularity of the Clerk's application of the exchange rate.). 2. No. True, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, hence, it concluded that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It bears emphasis, however, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former, there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.

FACTS: RCBC filed against Nation Petroleum and its directors/officers a complaint for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of the Trust Receipts Law. Summons and all pertinent papers were served by the sheriff on the corporation thru Claudia Abante, a liaison officer, upon telephone instruction of corporate secretary Melinda Ang. Copies were also served to other individual defendants in their given addresses, but they allegedly refused to acknowledge receipt causing a substituted service on their respective househelpers. ISSUES: 1. Whether there was a valid service of summons upon the corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary. 2. Whether there was a valid service of summons upon the individual officers/directors of the corporation.

HELD: 1. Yes. There was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary. It is clear that Abante, in receiving the summons, did so in representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person. While it may be true that there was no direct physical handing of the summons to Ang, the latter at least be charged with having constructively received the same, which amounts to a valid service of summons. Having herself instructed Abante to receive the summons, Ang, and for that matter, petitioner corporation, is thus now precluded from impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of invalid service of summons. In point in this regard is the principle of estoppel which, under our remedial laws, is an effective bar against any claim of lack of jurisdiction. Under said doctrine, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. 2. No. It appears that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual petitioners. The "reasonable time" within which to personally serve the summons - 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff as stated in Manotoc - has not yet elapsed at the time the substituted service was opted to. Remarkably, based on the Sheriff's Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal service of summons upon the corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy of their personal and real properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in order to prove impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate, "several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates.

FACTS: Private respondent Carmencita Naval-Sai filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages before the RTC in Kidapawan City against petitioner. The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale allegedly executed between Naval-Sai and petitioner involving Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9. Naval-Sai prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void ab initio because the alleged sale between her and petitioner was a forgery. Naval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots and that her signature in the purported deed of sale is spurious. Petitioner claimed that he and Naval-Sai entered into a valid contract of sale and that the lots were sold for value. The corresponding TCTs were issued in his name shortly thereafter and since then, he had been in complete control of the properties. Petitioner also raised special and affirmative defenses of, among others, non-compliance with the requisite certification of non-forum shopping and prescription. He asserted that jurisdiction has never been acquired over the parties and the subject matter because the certification against forum shopping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for having been merely signed by Naval-Sai's counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification of non-forum shopping.

HELD: A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons. The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and "should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subve1i its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."

FACTS: Mercado had been distributing San Miguel Corporation's (SMCs) beer products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned three China Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out agreement. He also submitted three surety bonds from Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO). Later, SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items he withdrew on credit. Consequently, citing the continuing hold-out agreement, it asked CBC to release the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit. CBC approved SMBs request and informed Mercado. Mercado then filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in the RTC of Manila. Thereafter, SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended that Mercado delivered only two CBC certificates of deposit. SMC also filed a third-party complaint with EASCO. However, Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal of the complaint. He claimed that he was no longer interested in annulling the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment. The RTC, however, denied the motion. During trial, Mercado acknowledged the accuracy of SMCs computation of his outstanding liability as of August 1991. Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Mercado and EASCO to jointly and severally pay SMC. Aggrieved, Mercado and EASCO appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insisting that Mercado did not default in the payment of his obligations to SMC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. EASCO filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court but eventually agreed to settle its liability with SMC. The petition was terminated. Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and was substituted by his heirs. The petitioners subsequently filed a petition asserting that the decision of the CA was void on the ground that the SMC's counterclaim was permissive in nature and that inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim. ISSUE: Whether or not SMC's counterclaim is permissive in nature which requires payment of docket fees before the court could acquire jurisdiction of the claim?

HELD: A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive. When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment (which he executed as security for his credit purchases, he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on credit. Thus, Mercado's complaint and SMCs counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would essentially support or refute Mercado's claim and SMCs counterclaim. Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated. Clearly, SMCs counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado's claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

FACTS: On October 19, 2009, petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr., filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 15, a Complaint against respondents Raymund D. Malapajo, Ramil D. Malapajo and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or cancellation of title and damages alleging, among others, that he was the previous owner of a parcel of land Bolo, Roxas City, covered by TCT No. T-22345; that his title was subsequently canceled by virtue of a deed of sale he allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo for a consideration of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); that new TCT No. T-56840 was issued in the name of respondents Malapajo; that the deed of sale was a forged document which respondents Malapajo were the co-authors of. Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaimcontending that they were innocent purchasers for value and that the deed was a unilateral document which was presented to them already prepared and notarized. Respondents counterclaimed for damages and for reimbursement of petitioner's loan from them plus the agreed monthly interest in the event that the deed of sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery.Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among others, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents' permissive counterclaim; and, that assuming without admitting that the two real estate mortgages are valid, the rate of five percent (5%) per month uniformly stated therein is unconscionable and must be reduced. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss had been Filed alleging that respondents' counterclaims are in the nature of a permissive counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and filing of a certification against forum shopping; and, that the supposed loan extended by respondents' mother to petitioner, must also be dismissed as respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. Respondents filed their Oppositionthereto.The RTC denied petitioner's motion since respondents' counterclaims are compulsory and later denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether respondents' counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan obtained from them in case the deed of absolute sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery, is permissive in nature which requires the payment of docket fees and a certification against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the same.

HELD: A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case. To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants' claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the defendants' counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

FACTS: Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a parcel of land located at Iloilo City. During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages. The first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr. The second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. According to Santiago, he bought the respective interests of majority of the heirs over the subject land, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989 which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject document registered because the latter's refusal to surrender the said title. Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for receivership. The RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. The CA set aside the RTC Rulings stating that Felcon's siblings, as well as Maude's children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago's complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Felcon's siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude's children are indispensable parties to Santiago's complaint for judicial partition.

HELD: An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. x x x(Underscoring supplied; emphases in the original). In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.

FACTS: Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision that for teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating points. Respondent sought recourse from the CBA's grievance machinery, but to no avail. Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circulation and mediation again failed. The parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year period. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed the complaint. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias' petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period

HELD: Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition's dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed. Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

FACTS: Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico (Fermina), represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Catalino V. Noel, entered into a Contract of Lease (lease contract) covering five (5) parcels of agricultural land owned by the latter. Based on the contract, Ogsos, Sr. agreed to pay the Heirs of Fermina 230 piculs or 290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.) of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 2000-2001, as lease rental. The contract was subsequently extended for three years and the lease rental was modified. Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease rentals from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999 were not paid. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents to recover the unpaid lease rentals. In their Answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as embodied in the lease contract and its subsequent amendments. They denied abandoning the leased premises and claimed that sometime in December 1998, petitioner and Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and appropriated for themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the pretext that they would apply the proceeds thereof to the unpaid rent. Respondents filed a counterclaim for lost profits plus damages that it had sustained when petitioner took over the possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents' crops planted therein. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss respondents' counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and that respondents had not paid the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, denied the said motion, declaring respondents' counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents' counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required?

HELD: Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.

FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos. In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. In their Answer, particularly, in paragraph 22, they stated that: 22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 22 of the Answer constitutes negative pregnant

HELD: Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted. In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities. Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

FACTS: Celso M. Paler was a supervising legislative officer of the Commission on Appoints. He filed a request for a vacation leave lasting for 74 working days, which was favorably recommended by his immediate supervisor, the director of the Technical Support Service. By virtue of this favorable recommendation, he went to the United States. Thereafter, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees due to continuous absence without leave effective on indicated date on the letter. Paler moved for reconsideration but was denied for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Paler later appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC reversed and set aside the decision of the Commission Chairman. The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CSC. The Commissioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA affirmed the decision of the CSC. A motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. Hence, the Commissioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by a petition for review under Rule 45. In his comment, Paler questioned the authority of the Commission Secretary, Atty. Tiu, to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission Secretary has the authority to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman?

HELD: First, we tackle Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of nonforum shopping. The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification. With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler's allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.

FACTS: Petitioners Eduardo Bandillion, et al. (employees) are truck drivers and employees of respondent La Filipina Uygongco Corporation (LFUC). They filed a complaint for violation of labor standard laws against the latter before the DOLE Region VI.3 Upon inspection, a finding of "no violation" was made by the Labor Enforcement Officer, which was affirmed by DOLE Regional Director. The employees filed an appeal with the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE Secretary). Thus, on June 4, 2003, Acting DOLE Secretary Imson issued an Order overturning the previous order of the DOLE-VI Regional Director. Upon a denial of its motion for reconsideration by DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, LFUC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition, however, and affirmed the decision of the DOLE Secretary. The motion for reconsideration filed by LFUC was likewise denied by the court. A petition for certiorari was filed before SC which was likewise denied. Consequently, the employees filed a Motion for Execution before the DOLE Region VI to enforce the DOLE Secretary's Order of June 4, 2003. After being served with the writ, LFUC filed a Petition14 for certiorari and injunction dated August 15, 2008 with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the writ of execution. In 2011, the CA rendered its decision remanding the case to DOLE VI Regional Director for re-computation of awards and reception of evidence of the parties on the ground that that the office of DRD arrived at its computation without any evidence from the parties. The employees filed an MR to no avail Hence the petition for review on certiorari filed by the employees. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition must fail on the ground that several employees concerned did not sign the SPA authorizing their union president and co-petitioner Payda to file this petition and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

HELD: For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

FACTS: Margarita Jose Alma Jose, sold two parcel of land to herein respondent, Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration. Margarita and Juvenal died, thus it was the petitioner's obligation to register the properties under Torrens Title. However she refuse to comply, instead she introduce some improvements in the land. Thus, respondent commenced on an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. In the appeal the CA mad by the respondent, the petitioner countered that, the respondent was guilty of forum shopping, since while pending appeal, she also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed. The CA in its decision on the appeal, reversed the RTC's decision, it ruled that, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land; that Margaritas undertaking under the contract was not a purely personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had actual possession of the properties. MR was also denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA should outrightly dismiss the respondents appeal, since she was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA.

HELD: Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

FACTS: Ruby Shelter Builders obtained a loan of more than P95M from Tan and Obiedo, secured by real estate mortgages over five parcels of land. The loan became due, but Ruby Shelter was unable to pay it. Tan and Obiedo then granted Ruby Shelter an extended period within which to settle its indebtedness through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). In turn, the MOA required that Ruby Shelter execute simultaneously, by way of dacion en pago, Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Tan and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of land subject of the mortgages. The MOA further gives Ruby Shelter an opportunity to redeem any of the parcels of land and provides for the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Otherwise, Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds to the Office of the Register of Deeds to acquire TCTs in their names. Ruby Shelter defaulted in its obligation, so Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds. They were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land in their names. This prompted Ruby Shelter to file a complaint against Tan, and Atty. Reyes (the notary public who notarized the MOA) for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages before the RTC. Upon filing its complaint, Ruby Shelter paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees. The Clerk of Court initially considered the case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Tan, on the other hand contended that the case involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Since Ruby Shelter did not pay the appropriate docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.The RTC granted Tan's Omnibus Motion. It was held that both Ruby Shelter and Tan must pay the docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Particularly, Ruby Shelter was ordered to pay additional filing fees. The RTC Clerk of Court computed that Ruby Shelter must pay P720,392.60 as additional docket fees. Ruby Shelter then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the same, holding that Ruby Shelter filed the complaint to have the deeds of sale cancelled and ultimately, to recover the possession of the same, thusit is a real action. Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in accordance with Section 7(b), but must comply with Section 7(a). ISSUE: Whether or not the actionfile by Ruby Shelter is a real action.

HELD: In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one 'affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.'" Obviously, respondent's complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto. Considering that respondent's complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees." We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated value" of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of ₱1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty. Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondent's complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.

FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Medado and the estate of the late Antonio Consing represented by Soledad Consing executed Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage for the former's acquisition from the latter of a property. Subsequent to the sale, the Estate of Consing offered the subject property to the government via Department of Agrarian Reform's Voluntary Offer to Sell. The Estate of Consing, instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City an action for recission and damages against Petitioner for alleged failure of to meet the conditions in the agreement. During the pendency of the case, the Land Bank of the Philippines issued in favor of the respondent compensations to the subject property. These prompted the petitioner to file an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order with the RTC of Cadiz City against respondent and LBP. RTC granted the injunction, respondents then filed a petition for certiorari against RTC judge, stating that it violated the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping, however such petition's verification and Certificate of forum shopping was signed by Soledad alone. CA granted the petition, hence Spouses Medado filed a petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a plaintiff in this case Soledad can sign on behalf of the co-plaintiffs in a certificate against non-forum shopping? 2. Whether or not the filing of the complaint for injunction during the pendency of the action for rescission and damages violates the rule against forum shopping?

HELD: In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not deviate from the claims already made by the heirs in Civil Case Nos. 00-11320 and 797-C, both specifically mentioned in the SPA. We emphasize that the verification requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. We rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification and certification against forum shopping filed with the CA. In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action. The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

FACTS: This case revolves around a controversy between squabbling sisters over a certain real property. Lourdes Valmonte, a non resident, was sued by her sister Rosita Dimalanta for the partition of an apartment building and an accounting of the rentals therein. Atty. Alfredo Valmonte, Lourdes's husband was likewise impleaded on the said case. In a letter sent by Lourdes to Rosita, she instructed Rosita to refer to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Upon service of summons, Atty. Alfredo Valmonte only accepted his and refused to accept the summons directed against his wife on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Atty. Alfredo Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. His wife, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason Rosita, moved to declare Lourdes Valmonte in default. Apparently, the RTC denied the said motion. Consequently, Rosita filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Rosita. Spouses Valmonte now assail the decision of the CA contending that there was no valid service of summons in so far as Lourdes Valmonte is concerned. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte

HELD: In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, Sec. 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer. In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, Sec. 17. As provided in Sec. 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice. Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private res- pondent's attorney that "all communications" intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the property in question.

FACTS: Because the respondents' defaulted in their loan obligation to petitioner (MBTC), MBTC filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages securing the loan obligations. According to MBTC, despite the foreclosure sale, there remained a deficiency balance of PhP2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges as stipulated and agreed upon in the promissory notes and deeds of real estate mortgages. Despite petitioner's repeated demands, however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of money against respondents before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance, and that respondents were liable for the said amount, as part of their contractual obligation. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration, prompting for petitioner to file an appeal. The CA reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor of respondents and ordered that Metrobank to refund or return to the defendants-appellants the amount representing the remainder of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale (because there was overpayment). Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting among others that respondents never set up a counterclaim for refund of any amount, but the same was denied, hence, this case. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering a refund to the respondent despite their failure to set it up as a counterclaim?

HELD: In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have, in several cases, utilized the following tests: 1. Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? 4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is the "compelling test of compulsoriness." Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due. Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, we rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same. It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents' belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess, if any, is already barred. With this, we now resolve the substantive issues of this case.

FACTS: Karen Go filed 2 complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed for the issuance of writs of replevin for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarro's possession which were eventually granted. In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase - the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest

HELD: In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other coowners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.

FACTS: In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the crime of murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz. The case was raffled to RTC Roxas City. On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information filed against him on the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No.1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008. RTC dismissed the case and was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to indicate the date and number of MCLE Compliance Certificate in the information would result to its dismissal

HELD: In this case, YES. But for the next cases, the trial court should not dismiss but simply require the investigating prosecutor to number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under Section 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiff's cause or cause of action. The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal construction of procedural rules by arguing that such liberal construction "may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed, the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

FACTS: BPI extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the Spouses Yujuico's loan. Because there was a deficiency, BPI sued the spouses to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC (where the principal office of BPI is located). The spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiff's claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished. Makati RTC denied the Motion. The spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration while BPI filed its comment/opposition to the Motion. The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the first time their objection on the ground of improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were located. Makati RTC denied the MR. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC opining that a suit for recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Thus, the suit for judgment on the deficiency filed by BPI against the spouses, being an action emanating from the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage contract between them, must necessarily be filed also at the RTC of Manila, not at the RTC of Makati. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was properly laid.

HELD: It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one. Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.

FACTS: The Municipality of Agoo entered into two loans with LBP in order to finance a Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality authorized the mayor Eufranio Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan with LBP for the Public Plaza and again for the amount of P28M to construct a commercial center called Agoo People's Center within the Plaza's premises. The Municipality used as collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the south-eastern portion of the Plaza. acayuran and other residents opposed the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means of the funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interest resulting in the desecration of the public plaza. Cacayuran's request for the documents relating to the plaza's redevelopment was not granted. Cacayuran invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against LBP and officers of the municipality but does not include the municipality itself as party defendant. He questioned the validity of the loan agreements and prays that the redevelopment is enjoined. The municipal officers moved for the dismissal but were denied. LBP asserted that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action because he was not privy to the loan agreements. ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indispensable party to the case.

HELD: It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose interest will be affected by the court's action and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. His legal presence is an absolute necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act. Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. The proper remedy is to implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to implead the Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable party that stands to be directly affected by any judicial resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner of the public plaza. It stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the case. The decision of the RTC, affirmed with modification by the CA, and finally affirmed by the SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not impleaded as defendant in the case.

FACTS: Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689 located in Tandang Sora, QC. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro. Pedro sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola (1964). Sometime in 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff's land. To prohibit Judge Baclig of the RTC-QC from issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998 on the ground that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, and since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. CA dismissed the petition and held that the petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in the Civil Case Q-12918 can be enforced against petitioners even though they were not impleaded thereto?

HELD: NO, petitioners are not privies (interested in the outcome of the action) and cannot be bound by the judgment against Lising and his predecessors-in-interests. The Medina doctrine relied upon by the CA is markedly different from the one before the court. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918 and petitioners acquired the registered title in their own names. In other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising's Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third-party claim. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.

FACTS: Monark (MEC) filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Asian Construction (ACDC), alleging that ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from MEC, but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor; that various equipment from MEC were leased by ACDC for the latter's power plant; and, that ACDC also purchased and took custody of various equipment parts from MEC, which, despite demands, MEC failed to pay. ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel). In its answer, ACDC admitted its indebtedness to MEC, but alleged the following special and affirmative defenses: that Becthel incurred an obligation with ACDC and refused to pay the overdue obligation; and that the equipment covered by the lease were all used in Becthel's construction project. MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint against Becthel on the ground that ACDC had already admitted its principal obligation to MEC; that the transaction between MEC and ACDC on one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel on the other, were independent transactions. In addition, MEC filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there was no genuine issue as to ACDC's obligation to MEC. ACDC opposed the motion, alleging that there was a genuine issue with respect to the amount being claimed by MEC, and that it had a third-party complaint against Becthel in connection with the reliefs sought against it which had to be litigated. In its reply, MEC alleged that the demand of ACDC in its special and affirmative defensespartook the nature of a negative pregnant, and that there was a need for the hearing on its claim for damages. RTC denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint, and granted the motion of MEC (which the RTC considered as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings). It ordered ACDC to pay MEC the amount alleged. CA affirmed the ruling, adding that since MEC prayed for judgment on the pleadings, it waived its claim for damages other than the amount alleged; hence, there was no longer a genuine issue to be resolved by the court. It also held that the transaction between ACDC and Becthel did not arise out of the same transaction on which MEC's claim was based. ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party complaint should prosper

HELD: NO, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a third-party rests in the discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff's complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint. The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant. The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery against the thirdparty defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.

FACTS: The Estate of Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court's judgment rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, USA in a case against Imee Marcos-Manotoc for the wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court. The trial court issued a Summons addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of Manotoc at that condominium unit. When Manotoc failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default through an Order. Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons, averring that: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile. During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra Homes only two times. She also presented her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore. She claimed that the person referred to as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even be her, but the mother of one Tommy Manotoc. On the other hand, Trajano presented the lead counsel in a case involving the Marcoses who testified that he participated in the deposition taking of Marcos, Jr. The counsel confirmed that Marcos, Jr. testified that Manotoc's residence was at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. The trial court rejected Manotoc's Motion to Dismiss, relying on the presumption that the sheriff's substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and that such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary. The trial court likewise discarded Manotoc's plea for reconsideration for lack of merit. Manotoc then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA. The CA adopted the findings of the trial court. Manotoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid substituted service of summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Manotoc.

HELD: NO. A meticulous scrutiny of the Sheriff's Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises." Besides, apart from the allegation of Manotoc's address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Mantooc. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were "informed, and so [they] allege" about the address and whereabouts of Manotoc. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner's residence or house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.

FACTS: Sometime on March 3, 1997, Atty. Gacott (Gacott) from Palawan purchased two (2) brand new transreceivers from Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey Medestomas (Medestomas), amounting to a total of PI 8,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to major defects, Gacott personally returned the transreceivers to QSC and requested that they be replaced. Medestomas received the returned transreceivers and promised to send him the replacement units within two (2) weeks from May 10, 1997. Time passed and Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed him that there were no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several demands, both oral and written, Gacott was never given a replacement or a refund. The demands caused Gacott to incur expenses in the total amount of P40,936.44. Thus, Gacott filed a complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and Medestomas, afterwhich they filed their Answer, verified by Medestomas himself and a certain Elton Ong (Ong). QSC and Medestomas did not present any evidence during the trial. RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Gacott and issued a Writ of Execution. Gacott learned that QSC is a partnership and not a corporation. He is also discovered that petitioner was appointed as General Manager of QSC. To execute the judgment, Gacott instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor vehicles of Guy. Sheriff attached Guy's vehicle by virtue of the Notice of Attachment upon Personalty. Thereafter, Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon Personalty, arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached. RTC denied his motion. Not satisfied, Guy moved for reconsideration and argued that he was neither impleaded as a defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Guy?

HELD: NO. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action - is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action. Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it opined that it was immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served on the theory that it was a corporation. Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an answer.

FACTS: In 1985, Rosa Elsa Jonas authorized her mother Andrea Serrano thru SPA, to sell a property located in Davao City. The property was mortgaged to Mindanao Development Bank (MDB). In 1996, Cipriano Serrano (brother of Elsa Jonas, son of Andrea) offered to Spouses Bitte. In the same year, Jonas revoked the SPA. After the final negotiation, Elsa Jonas withdrew from the transaction. Spouses Bitte filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against Jonas, Andrea and Cirpriano to transfer the title over the property. In 1998, while the case is pending, Andrea executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Spouses Bitte. MDB foreclosed the property for failure to pay the loan. Spouses Bitte were able to redeem the property, then sold the same to Spouses Yap. In 1999, Spouses Jonas also filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale against Spouses Bitte. The two cases were consolidated in 2001. Spouses Bitte failed to attend the pre-trial. The counsel for Spouses Bitte withdrew and a new one entered his appearance and filed a verified motion for reconsideration. Spouses Bitte once again failed to appear in the pre-trial and were, thus, declared nonsuited. Jonas then presented her evidence ex parte. RTC ruled that the sale was valid and directed the Spouses Bitte to pay the balance. The CA reversed the decision, and rendered the deed of sale null and void. Spouses Jonas called the attention of the Court and contended that since the RTC has declared the Spouses Bitte in default, they have already lost the legal personality to resort to this petition before this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Bitte have already lost the legal personality to resort to this petition before this Court, as they were declared in default by the RTC.

HELD: NO. Spouses Jonas claim that the door to any reliefs for Spouses Bitte, be it through motion for reconsideration or this subject petition, was closed by the finality and immutability of the RTC declaration of their default. In other words, it is their stand that the petitioners do not have the right to obtain recourse from this Court. Spouses Jonas are mistaken. The rule is that "right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on grounds that the amount of judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law". If a party who has been declared in default on the basis of the decision having been issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court. Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all other remedies available to question not only the judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS: Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (British-Hong Kong national), and respondent Benjamin Co (Filipino citizen), were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. Co filed two petitions for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity on two different occasions. Co stated in the first petition that Ong's address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. Co indicated in the second petition that Ong's address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued summons. In the Server's Return, process server stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on Ong. The said documents were received by a security officer. On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding Co's marriage with Ong as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on Ong but she failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period. Sometime in November 2008, Ong, received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (3) Decision dated December 11, 2002 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (4) their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

HELD: NO. The Court held that there is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. The requirements for substituted service of summons (laid down in the Manotoc case) are the following: 1. Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service; 2. Specific Details in the Return and ; 3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion. The summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his server's return, the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons. The server's return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. In the case at bench, the stringent requirements in Manotoc vs. CA were not met and the Court is not inclined to uphold the CA's denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons.

FACTS: Petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd. Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet, was in charge of exportation. His responsibilities included the documentation of export products, presentations with banks, and other duties connected with the export of products. He explained that private respondent Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates. The bill of lading stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union. It was insured by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked. When the cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao received a report dated August 19, 1985, from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of lading. For this reason, petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In its letter, dated August 21, 1985, petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the alleged shortage. As both Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these cases against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of his testimony, he was secretary of Nil Alejandre, manager of Benguet. According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the warehouse at La Union to assist in the loading of the copper concentrates. These copper concentrates were to be loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as evidenced by the Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28, 1985. According to Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to determine how much was loaded on the ship. Cayabyab stated that he saw petitioner Benguet's representative and his immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas, sign the Certificate of Weight. Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of Weight, which stated therein that 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship. Cayabyab likewise confirmed the authenticity of the Mate's Receipt, saying that he witnessed the Chief Mate sign the document. Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate's Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that their contents are true. ISSUE: Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented were properly established by the testimony of the plaintiff's witness, resulting to prima facie presumption that their contents are true.

HELD: NO. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that "the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him." Genuineness and due execution of the instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. It is equally true, however, that 3⁄4 execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.

FACTS: Petitioner Korean Technologies (KOGIES) and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondent's counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioner's motion to dismiss respondent's counterclaims as these counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims. ISSUE: Whether or not payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the respondent's Answer with counterclaim.

HELD: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, "A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein." As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC's Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES' motion to dismiss PGSMC's compulsory counterclaims. At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.

FACTS: In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway.3 The request was approved through the enactment of Resolusyon Big. 027-99. The Technical Committee created by City Ordinance No. 08-98 posted notices to property owners that would be affected by the construction of the city road.Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden Corporation. Armed guards allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move the construction equipment. On January 24, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on February 15, 2002 against Hardrock.On March 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, subject to the posting of a bond by Sunrise Garden Corporation. On March 22, 2002, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., blocked Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. A Motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt was filed on October 11, 2002 by Sunrise Garden Corporation.On November 11, 2002, K-9 Security Agency, joined by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and represented by the same counsel, opposed the Motion to cite them in contempt, raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, since they were not bound by the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc when it sought to enforce the preliminary injunction.

HELD: No, it did not. Indeed public tria court acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction when it sought the enforcement of its amended writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, who was never a party to the pending case. Worse, it threatened petitioner with contempt of court for not following an unlawful order. Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1st sentence provides, thus: "No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. . ." In the case at bench, petitioner was not only not impleaded as party to the case, but that it was never given prior notice regarding the writ of injunction. Public respondents' [referring to the Republic] assertion that notice was already made to Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. is specious. There is no showing at all as to the relationship between Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. and petitioner. Since there is nothing to prove and establish that Hardrock, Inc. and petitioners are one and the same, then they should be treated as separate and distinct personalities. While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

FACTS: The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages against GV Florida and its bus driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action arose out of a vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan, Cordon, Isabela on May 1, 2007. In its complaint, VLI claimed that Vizquera's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise due diligence in supervising its employee. In its Answer, GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus had factory and mechanical defects which caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate cause of the vehicle collision. On April 8, 2008, GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint against TCC. According to GV Florida, on March 23, 2007, it purchased from TCC fifty (50) brand new Michelin tires, four (4) of which were installed into the bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that though Vizquera exerted all efforts humanly possible to avoid the accident, the bus nevertheless swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus. GV Florida maintains that the "proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was brought about by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party plaintiff GV Florida absolutely and totally had no control over." The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC. In the return of summons, it appears that the sheriff served the summons to a certain Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who represented herself as an accounting manager authorized by TCC to receive summons on its behalf. TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Exparte Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss. Therein, it stated that the summons was received by Gino-gino, its financial supervisor. The RTC granted TCC's prayer for extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint. First, it argued that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of summons. ISSUE: Whether or not summons was validly served against TCC

HELD: No, there was improper service of summons on TCC. We, however, apply jurisprudence and rule that in cases of improper service of summons, courts should not automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is to issue alias summons and ensure that it is properly served. In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it.

FACTS: In August 1995, Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver opened a joint account in China Banking Corporation at EDSA Balintawak Branch.Thereafter, Lim and Oliver applied for a P17 million loan and offered a collateral. On November 17, 1995, Lim and Oliver executed in favor of Chinabank a promissory note for P16,650,000, as well as a Real Estate Mortgage on the property. The mortgage document showed Mercedes Oliver's (Oliver One) address to be No. 95 Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. Later, respondent claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address at No. 40 J.P. Rizal St., San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with damages against Chinabank and the Register of Deeds. Respondent (Oliver Two), claimed that she was the registered and lawful owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage; that the owners duplicate copy of the title had always been in her possession; and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank. She prayed that: (1) the owners duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well as the original title with the Registry of Deeds be cancelled; (2) the mortgage be declared null and void; and (3) the Registry of Deeds be ordered to issue a new and clean title in her name. Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of an indispensable party, the mortgagor. The RTC denied the Motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgagor Mercedes Oliver (Oliver One) is an indispensable party to the case?

HELD: No. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver One's absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. Oliver Two's Complaint was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioner's negligence in not determining the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgage's annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds custody. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without necessarily impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two. Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagor's interest, which involves the land used as collateral for the loan. A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and mortgagor Oliver One. The latter's participation in this case will simply enable petitioner Chinabank to make its claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid the institution of another action. Thus, it was the bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or other action versus the mortgagor Oliver One.

FACTS: All Season Farm Corporation filed an action for the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and damages against Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division) (DOLE) and several of its officers. According to DOLE, an alias summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by DOLE Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole. Thus, DOLE filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of summons; (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (c) All Season was not the real party in interest; and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in their official capacities as corporate officers of Dole. This was denied by the RTC. In the CA, DOLE filed a petition for certiorari contending that the alias summons was not properly served. The appellate court, however, ruled otherwise. It reasoned that DOLE's president had known of the service of the alias summons although he did not personally receive and sign it. It also held that in today's corporate setup, documents addressed to corporate officers are received in their behalf by their staff. In this Petition for Review, DOLE assails the validity of the service of summons on it consequently questioning whether or not jurisdiction over it was acquired by the RTC. nt All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias summons through its president. More so, petitioner had admitted that it received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time filed on May 5, 2003. ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons was valid.

HELD: No. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel. Contrary to private respondents claim that it was received upon instruction of the president of the corporation as indicated in the Officers Return, such fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons which Marifa Dela Cruz signed. There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the president. However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading. Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

FACTS: A complaint for specific performance was lodged by Spouses Jose against Spouses Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Public respondent Judge N.C. Perello issued summons to Spouses Boyon. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to Spouses Boyon failed. Spouses Jose filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication which the RTC granted. Thereafter, the RTC judge, without a written motion, issued an Order declaring Spouses Boyon in default for failure to file their respective answers. Spouses Jose were then allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Jose. Helen Boyon, was then residing in USA, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the RTC. Spouses Boyon then filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The RTC denied the said motion, stating that the defaulted spouses already lost their standing in court. Spouses Boyon filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Meanwhile, Spouses Jose moved for the execution of the RTC judgment and the same was granted. Spouses Boyon filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Spouses Boyon because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an action in personam. Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Spouses Jose aver, among others, that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the service of summons upon Spouses Boyon is valid.

HELD: No. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must: a) b) c) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and, state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate Spouses Boyon. The only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang, to try to serve the summons personally. While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts.

FACTS: On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.'s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The criminal complaint was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. On February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service. The RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC. The CA upon appeal reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over NURC through proper service of summons

HELD: No. It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court state: Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green Star claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC's motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, although the corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice.

FACTS: This case involves a Complaint for Annulment of mortgage with prayer for TRO and PI with damages filed by petitioners against respondents. Petitioner Lolita Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of Lisam Enterprises Inc and a member of its Board of Directors, designated as Corporate Secretary. Petitioners also alleged that defendants Soriano falsified a board resolution and executed a real estate mortgage above the LEI's property in favor of PCIB. RTC issued a TRO then, after hearing, issued a writ of PI enjoining PCIB, now BDO, from proceeding with the auction sale of subject property. BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state cause of action, and litis pendencia. RTC dismissed petitioner's complaint. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. While waiting for the resolution of said motion, petitioners also filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint amending paragraph 13. RTC denied both the MR and the Motion to admit Amended Complaint holding that no new argument had been raised by petitioners in their MR and that the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted because it absolutely changed petitioners' cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' amended complaint, filed after the order of dismissal but before its finality, should have been admitted by the court.

HELD: No. Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners' complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. Amendments are generally favored; it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same. The requisites for filing a derivative suit are as follows: (a) the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of time of the act or transaction complained of; (b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies; (c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the harm having been or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit. A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein. Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of action. As to the contention of BDO that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a defect in the original would be unfair to them, the Court held that they should have been well aware that due to changes by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially amending the same, which course of action is now allowed under the new rules.

FACTS: E.B. Benito is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao City and with branch offices at Parañaque City and Cagayan De Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent, Imperial Development Corporation, executed a Deed of Sale with development agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land belonging to Imperial. On April 3, 1998, Imperial filed a complaint for breach of contract against E.B. Benito before the RTC Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its BRANCH MANAGER Engy. Sabulbero at Cagayan De Oro City Branch. E.B. Benito moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner. On the other hand, Imperial contended that the service is valid alleging that there was a substantial compliance with the rule as it was served through its branch manager. RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and held that there was a valid service of summons. Hence, this petition was filed by EB Villarosa contending that the trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.

HELD: No. Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. This provision revised the former Sec 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that: If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager". As held by Justice Regalado, the aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word "agent". Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Sec 13 of Rule (old rule) has been held improper. The purpose of which is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. Accordingly, the service of summons upon the branch manager at its branch in CDO, instead to the general manager at its principal office in Davao City is improper Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an AGENT of the corporation is NO LONGER authorized." "The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section11, Rule 14. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule." "A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . ." The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.

FACTS: J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). PCIB, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against John Tansipek (respondent). Tansipek failed to answer the third-party complaint and he was declared in default for failure to do so. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Order of Default but was denied by the RTC. Tansipek then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the Default Order and the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. The CA dismissed the Petition for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Later, the CA denied respondent Tansipek's Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time. He did not appeal said denial to the Supreme Court. On the third party complaint, Tansipek is ordered to pay PCIB all amounts that the latter shall have to pay to JOCI on account of this case. Tansipek appealed the Decision to the CA. The CA ruled that it was an error for the trial court to have acted on PCIB's motion to declare Tansipek in default. The CA, thus, remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not Tansipek's remedy against the Order of Default is correct?

HELD: No. Tansipek's remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very beginning. He should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court: (b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur. Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Tansipek's Motion for Reconsideration may be treated as a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has already been dismissed with finality by the CA. Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the CA to the Supreme Court. The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of Tansipek's Motion, thus, constitutes a bar to the retrial of the same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the case. It is important to note that a party declared in default is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decision's being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.

FACTS: Petitioners filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance against the parties including respondent herein. The RTC rendered a decision ordering respondent to indemnify the petitioner and the latter were ordered to immediately vacate the subject property and to pay monthly rental to the former. Petitioners did not file any appeal, hence, the RTC Decision became final and executory.The RTC then issued a Writ of Execution which was not implemented. Five years thereafter, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a "Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel petitioners to vacate his property, the RTC denied the Motion. Respondent filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment which was granted. Petitioners then filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC. The RTC and the CA denied the Notice of Appeal, finding it barred by prescription. ISSUE: Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was filed on time.

HELD: No. The Notice of Appeal was not filed on time. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from." Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for the Heirs of Miranda, Sr. filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of their Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

FACTS: Angelina Lopez filed a petition for "Appointment as Sole Administrtrix of Conjugal partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc" against Alberto Lopez and Imelda Relucio. Angelina alleged that sometime in 1968, her husband, Alberto, abandoned her and their 4 children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that Alberto, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with Relucio since 1976. It was further alleged that Alberto and Relucio, during the period of their cohabitation, have amassed a fortune which are in the names of Alberto and Relucio. It was also averred that Alberto has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership with the Angelina and either spent the proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of Relucio and their two illegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach of the private- respondent and their four children. Relucio filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her. An order was issued denying the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the Relucio's petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether Relucio's inclusion as a party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy

HELD: No. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists. The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground. A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630. If petitioner is not a real party-in-interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. Respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis. Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied. Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, holding that only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU's failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act). The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion. Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari but the petition for certiorari was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner complies with the rule on proof of service.

HELD: No. The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted. Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of service.

FACTS: Juana Complex and its residents and other neighbor subdivision filed a complaint for damages against Fil-Estate for they were deprived of the use of Lapaz Road. The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again. JCHA et al prayed for immediate issuance of TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Fil-Estate from stopping and intimidating them in their use of Lapaz Road. TRO was issued for period of 20 days and conducted hearing for propriety of writ of preliminary injunction. Fil-Estate filed motion to dismiss arguing that it failed to state a cause of action and was improperly filed as a class suit. RTC issued writ of PI. Fil-Estate file a motion for reconsideration - denied. Fil-Estate filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA where it restated its first argument and added that the issuance of writ PI that JCHA failed to show that they had clear right to use Lapaz Road and that Lapaz Road is torrens registered and neither there was voluntary or legal easement. CA granted the petition WPI annulled because JCHA failed to prove their clear and present right over the road. CA found that complaint sufficiently state the cause of action that had been using the road for more than 10yrs and it was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained class suit because there was common interest and that the individuals were numerous and impractical to include all of them. ISSUE: Whether or not it was improperly filed as class suit.

HELD: No. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. The suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

FACTS: SLI (Southern Luzon Institute, an educational institution in Bulan, Sorsogon) asserts absolute ownership of a 7,516-squaremeter parcel of land situated in Brgy. Poblacion, Bulan, Sorsogon. However, petitioners (defendants in the court a quo) who were occupying a portion of said land refused to vacate it despite demand prompting SLI to file a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against petitioners (defendants) Alonzo Gipa et.al., The defendants asserted in their answer that they did not heed the demand as they believe that they have the right over the land they occupy and which was also occupied by their predecessors-in-interest which, according to them, dates back to as early as 1950. Impugning SLI's claims, the defendants averred that SLI had not even for a single moment taken possession of the subject property and was merely able to procure a title over the same thru fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation. The RTC (court a quo) ruled in favor of SLI. The petitioners appealed to the CA. Their appeal was initially dismissed since it was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. Through a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) with an attached Certification that they already paid the appeal fee, the CA reinstated the appeal. Subsequently however, the CA required the petitioners to pay within 10 days from receipt of minute resolution the amount of 30.00 pesos as legal research fund. It was received by their counsel on March 13, 2006. Even after a lapse of 9 months, the petitioners still failed to comply with this directive resulting in the dismissal of their appeal. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari and are invoking the principle of liberality in the application of technical rules considering that they have paid the substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by the meager amount of ₱30.00. They assert that they come under the exception, in the name of substantial justice and fair play. ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of liberality in the application of the rules should be applied despite the non-payment of the 30-peso legal research fund to perfect the appeal?

HELD: No. The procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. Suffice it to say that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reasons warranting such departure.

FACTS: Spouses Mason owned two parcels of land located along EDSA in Pasay City. They entered into a lease contract with Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation, where Columbus undertook to construct a building worth P10 million at the end of the third year of the lease. For failure to comply with this stipulation, the Spouses filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against Columbus before the RTC. Summons was served upon Columbus through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described her as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff's return indicated that she is a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.Columbus failed to file its answer, hence, spouses Mason filed a motion to declare it in default. The motion was granted and the spouses were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses. That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, Columbus filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by the spouses. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court denied the motion to lift order of default on the ground that the decision has already become final and executory. Consequently, the spouses' Motion for Execution was granted. Columbus filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, it filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution but was also denied for being dilatory. It then appealed to the CA, which ruled in its favor. The CA pointed out that Columbus was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Spouses Mason filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review. Spouses Mason stressed that even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk of Columbus, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached said corporation. This can be gleaned from the motion to lift order of default where Columbus did not question the validity of the service of summons but explained that its failure to answer was due to its impression that the case would not be pursued by the spouses on the ground that payments were already made to them. The spouses also cited Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan, and maintained that this Court, by referring to E.B Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito, effectively ruled that said provision is the statement of the general rule on service of summons upon corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception. ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid service of summons on Columbus for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction?

HELD: No. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in E.B. Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, the Court held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Also in that case, the Court discarded substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and ruled that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is stressed. Neither can herein petitioners invoke the ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. It must be stressed that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by spouses Mason where the doctrine of substantial compliance was upheld must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case. At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. The Court will deprive Columbus of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if compliance with the rules on service of summons will be disregarded.

FACTS: The petitioners Basan et al., who were working as route helpers, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, alleging that respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice required by law. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and found that since they were performing activities necessary and desirable to the usual business of petitioner for more than the period for regularization, petitioners are considered as regular employees, and thus, their dismissal was done contrary to law in the absence of just cause and prior written notice. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Coca-cola then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that petitioners were regular employees. The CA reserved the ruling of the NLRC. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was thereafter denied. Hence, this petition with the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45. Coca-cola contended in its comment that the petition should be denied due course for its verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether the petition should be given due course even though its verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners

HELD: On the procedural issue, we hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of nonforum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement. Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with substantial justice to overlook petitioners' procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.

FACTS: On July 15, 1999, Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Silay City, Branch 40, a complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera, praying for the following reliefs: issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of nullity of the mortgage constituted over petitioners property in favor of respondent; and award of damages.On July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale set on July 23, 1999, as agreed upon by the parties. Notwithstanding said directive, another foreclosure sale was scheduled on October 15, 1999. Per RTC Order dated October 14, 1999, the October 15 scheduled sale was held in abeyance; but rescheduled the sale on November 15, 1999 for the following reasons: However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial institution to foreclose collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and other charges amount to at least 20% of the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the books of the financial institution. Moreover, no restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided by said law. x x x the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines and Eric B. De Vera, Sheriff of this Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction which it denied due course and dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, which was eventually denied by the CA. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties subject of this case.

HELD: Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner's bone of contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted."

FACTS: FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against Evangeline Alday (Alday) amounting to P114,650.76. Alday filed her Answer by way of counterclaim and asserted that it is FGU who owes them P104,893.45 in direct commissions, profit commissions, and bonuses from July 1, 1986 to December 7, 1986 and for premium reserves amounting to P500,000. She also prayed for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded actions filed by FGU. FGU then moved to strike out Alday's answer and to declare her in default for filing the answer out of time. The motion was denied. FGU again moved to dismiss Alday's counterclaim by contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of non-payment of docket fees. Alday also in response, asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that FGU be declared in default for failing to answer such counterclaim. The trial court ruled in favor of FGU by dismissing Alday's counterclaim and consequently denied Alday's motion. It found Alday's counterclaim to be merely permissive and that failure to pay the docket fees prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. Alday moved for reconsideration but was denied. The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the trial court, and her motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.' ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is bound to pay for docket fees for her counterclaims

HELD: Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the "compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires "a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court." Non - payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal. In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim.

FACTS: Dynamic Builders bid for the construction of a rubble concrete seawall along the Respondent municipality's shoreline which had been found by the BAC to be unresponsive. Dynamic Builders sought reconsideration but was denied.Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest against Respondent Presbitero to set aside the BAC's decisionbut the protest was also denied. Dynamic Builders filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC of Bago City Negros Occidental for assailing the decision of Respondent Presbitero denying Dynamic Builders Motion for Reconsideration and pursuant to Art XVII Sec 58 of RA No. 9184, known as the Government of Procurement Reform Act. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated the rules against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits and forum shopping

HELD: Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts." Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision and Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This violates the rule against forum shopping.

FACTS: Petitioner (Remington Industrial Sales Corp) filed complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract against Industrial Steels with Ferro Trading GMBH as principal defendant, and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and BS separately moved for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions and the MR. ISL filed answer. British Steel separately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA claiming that complainant failed to show that it had committed any act or omission violating Remington's rights. Complaint only stated that BS and Ferro were just mere suppliers of goods for ISL. Remington then sought to amend the complaint by incorporating additional FACTS to have a cause of action against BS by using Sec 2, Rule 10, stating that it can amend its complaint as a matter of right because respondent (BS) has not yet filed a responsive pleading. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against BS for lack of cause of action under the original complaint even if it was already amended as a matter of right, and sufficient causes of action are averred in the amended complaint.

HELD: The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint because it the amendment made by Remington was done in a timely manner and as a matter of right, which was before BS gave its answer in accordance to Sec 2, Rule 10 of the ROC. The decision of the CA will result into multiple suits. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF IT BEING DISMISSED. Sec 2, rule 10 - Before the answer, a complaint may be amended as a matter of right. It can amend to introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. During this time, rights of defendant have not yet been violated because he hasn't filed an answer yet. Considerable leeway is given the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PRIOR the filing of answer. Sec 3, rule 10 - After the answer, substantial amendment of complaint is not allowed without leave of court. RATIONALE: any material change in the allegations already contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of defendant who has alerady set up his defense in the answer.

FACTS: Petitioners De Castro were co-owners of four (4) lots located in EDSA. In a letter Francisco Antigo was authorized by the De Castro's to act as a real estate broker in the sale of properties5% of which will be given to him as commission. Antigo found Times Transit Company, as a prospective buyer which desired to buy two (2) lots only. Antigo however only received P43, 893 as commission and asserted that his commission should be P325,500 which is 5% of the agreed price of P7,050,000 paid by Times Transit Corporation to the De Castro's for the two (2) lots. Francisco Artigo then sued petitioners Constante De Castro and Corazon De Castro to collect the unpaid balance of his broker's commission from the De Castro's. One of the defenses advanced by the De Castro's is that the complaint failed to implead their other siblings who were co-owners as well. The De Castro's argue that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead all of the co-owners of the two (2) lots. The former claimed that the Artigo knew that the two (2) lots were owned by the other siblings. The De Castro's contend that failure to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since, Artigo as agent of all the four (4) co-owners, would be paid in funds by the other co-owners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case for failure to implead indispensable parties.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the Courts action in litigation and without whom no final determination can be had of an action. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of the proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the Court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party. However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case. Under the note sent by De Castro to Antigo, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between the two parties, whether Constante appointed Antigo as agent, in Constante's individual or representative capacity, or both. The De Castros cannot seek dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.

FACTS: Millenium Industrial Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over its real property in favor of Respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of petitioner's indebtedness to Respondent. Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the Regional Trial Court. Summons and copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the Sheriff's return as a draftsman, a person of sufficient age and discretion working therein. He is the highest-ranking officer of defendant's Corporation, to receive processes of the Court. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service of summons upon it. As a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the Sheriff's return was valid as he is not the one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that in fact he was not even its employee. Hence this petition before the High Court. ISSUE: Whether or not summons upon a draftsman was valid.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. Petitioner contends that the enumeration contained in Rule 14 is exclusive and that service of summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. The Court enumerated requisites for substantial compliance, namely: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served. In example transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt for the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained. There is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third there is no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the service of summons to any of the officers of the corporation. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown.

FACTS: Petitioner, in a complaint filed by private respondent Salud M. Gegato, was charged with Grave Threats before MCTC Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur. Before arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash based on the ground of jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, but Other Light Threats under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the same Code. MCTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guily beyond reasonable doubt of Light threats. Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for review within the 15- day period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another 15 days within which to file his petition for review. Afterwhich, petitioner filed his petition. Thereafter, the CA, in its Resolution8 dated August 2, 2007, dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed three Motions for Reconsiderations before the CA, all of which were denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to file an appeal under Rule 45 may be barred by filing three motions for reconsiderations; 2. Whether or not the right to appeal may be barred by failure to pay correct docket fees on time

HELD: The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared: In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules. Petitioner failed to present compelling justification or reason to relax the rules of procedure.

FACTS: Domingo Carabeo (Carabeo) and Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (Sps. Dingco) entered into a contract "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa" whereby Carabeo agreed to sell his rights over a land situated in Bataan to the spouses for P38,000.00 Sps. Dingco tendered their initial payment of P10,000 upon the signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990. When they were about to pay the remaining balance, Carabeo requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going "squabble" over the land. The spouses continued giving Carabeo small sums of money which totaled P9,100 due to the spouses' inability to pay the amount in full. Despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted that Carabeo accept the remaining balance of P18,900 but Carabeo remained firm in his refusal, reasoning out that he would register the land first. In 1994, Sps. Dingco learned that the problem has been settled. Hence, they offered to pay the balance but Carabeo declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, thus, a complaint for specific performance was filed before RTC Bataan. Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land. In any event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, respondents' failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would render the action premature. For, contrary to respondents' claim, petitioner maintained that they failed to pay the balance of ₱28,000 on September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept installment payments totaling ₱9,100. After the case was submitted for decision, Carabeo passed away. The records do not show that petitioner's counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court. The trial court ruled in favor of Sps. Dingco ordering Carabeo to sell his right over the land. Carabeo's counsel filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Carabeo causes the dismissal of the action filed by Sps. Dingco; their action being an action in personam

HELD: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives. It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner's death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner's legal representatives or successorsin-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned. In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner's counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court's decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.

Biaco. Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by promissory notes. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand . The written demand, however, proved futile prompting respondent bank to file a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office. Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the respondent bank. The respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by the court as Commissioner. RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. In case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of this Court is ordered to sell at public auction the mortgaged Lot, a parcel of registered land to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus if there be any should be delivered to the defendants spouses Ernesto and Ma. Threresa Chaves Biaco. In the event however[,] that the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgage[d] property is not enough to pay the outstanding obligation, the defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of the judgment as their personal liability. Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. . She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other cannot be considered extrinsic fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent upon her thereby violating her right to due process?

HELD: The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.

FACTS: Respondent Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen who was employed by Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ), and was assigned as Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI), a local subsidiary of PCIJ, sector manager in the Philippines. The General Conditions of Employment appended to the employment contract of Schonfeld with PCIJ stated that for "Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee and the Company which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London." Schonfeld's employment was eventually terminated. Schonfeld filed with the Labor Arbiter a case for illegal dismissal against Petitioners. In its defense, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss wherein it argued that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, and argued that venue was improperly laid, citing the arbitration clause in the General Conditions of Employment. The LA held in favor of Petitioners, stating that the Philippines was merely the duty station, and that PCIJ remained its employer. It was upheld by the NLRC upon appeal, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The CA held that Schonfeld was an employee of PPI; and, on the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the contract of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue can be brought to venues other than those specified in the contract

HELD: The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save '," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except '," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.

FACTS: On January 24, 1991, Segundina Cebrero, through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot, executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property located in Sampaloc, Manila covered by TCT No. 158305 registered under the name of Cebrero's late husband Virgilio Cebrero (Virgilio) as security for the payment of the amount of P8 million, pursuant to an amicable settlement dated January 11, 1991 entered into by the parties in the case of annulment of revocation of donation in Civil Case No. 83-21629. In the said settlement, Josefina Gabriel recognized Cebrero's absolute ownership of the subject property and relinquished all her claims over the property in consideration of the payment of the said P8 million. Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension until December 31, 1991, Gabriel filed in 1993 an action for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage docketed as Civil Case No. 92-62638. The RTC ruled in Gabriel's favor and ordered Cebrero to pay the P8 million and interest, or the subject property shall be sold at public auction in default of payment. On November 27, 1996, Eduardo Caniza (Caniza), allegedly in behalf of Gabriel, instituted a Complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 225341 of the subject property registered under Progressive, a single proprietorship represented by its President and Chairman, respondent Manuel C. Chua (Chua). In their Answer, respondents alleged that Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was bedridden and confined at the Makati Medical Center since 1993. The complaint should be dismissed because Caniza signed the verification and certification of the complaint without proper authority. On October 14, 1997, Gabriel died during the pendency of the case, thus her heirs substituted her. The RTC ruled for the Heirs of Gabriel, but the CA reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the defect was cured when Caniza, being one of the heirs, substituted Gabriel when she died during the pendency of the case before the trial court

HELD: The substitution of heirs in a case ensures that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. The purpose behind the rule on substitution is to apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. It is for the protection of the right of every party to due process. Proper substitution of heirs is effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he or she was not apprised of the litigation.

FACTS: From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007 FME, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC. (Wesleyan) hospital. According to FME, Wesleyan has failed to pay its full obligation but on February 11, 2009 both FME and Wesleyan entered into agreement that FME would reduced Wesleyan's liabilities and provided for a term of payment. However, such agreement was then retracted by FME when it changed management. FME claims that such contracts should be rescinded as it would be disadvantageous to FME due to the economic lesion it would suffer and that such agreement was entered without prior board approval from FME. FME then filed a complaint for sum of money in the RTC due to Wesleyan's failure to heed their demands. Wesleyan then filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. Thus, Wesleyan filed their answers and admitted the following: (a) the four transactions for the delivery and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the Wesleyan University; (c) the payments made by the Wesleyan University; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement. The Wesleyan denied the rest of the complaint "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof", inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines. FME then filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the Wesleyan had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The Wesleyan opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint. The RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings of the petitioner. The CA affirmed the lower court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sufficiently denied the material allegations in the petitioner's complaint.

HELD: The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.

FACTS: Nelson Valdez charged Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Valdez, which was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation. Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his reputation. In his Comment, Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits were nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor. The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his Report and Recommendation, finding that the charge against respondent Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently proven and it was also adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP and denied Atty. Dabon's Motion of Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dabon's denial of the complaint against him constitutes negative pregnant

HELD: To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself. In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.

FACTS: Antonio Lim Tanhu was the original owner of the lot which is the subject matter of the controversy. Allegedly, he sold the lot to Spouses Cabansag; then Spouses Cabansag sold the same to Serafin Uy (respondent). Serafin then filed a petition before the RTC praying for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate TCT in his name. The petition was initially granted but subsequently nullified because Lim Teck Chuan (petitioner) filed his Opposition alleging that he is one of the 6 legitimate descendants of Antonio and that the original TCT was not lost and has always been in his custody. In the meantime, a certain Henry Lim sold the same lot to Leopolda Cecilio by virtue of an Affidavit of Sole Adjudication/Settlement of the Estate of Antonio Lim Tanhu with Deed of Sale. Serafin then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title impleading Leopolda, Henry and the petitioner. Leopolda averred that she is a buyer in good faith and for value. Petitioner set up a counterclaim against Serafin and a cross-claim against Lopeolda contending that the property was never transferred and encumbered to any person during Antonio's lifetime. During the proceedings, both and Serafin and Leopolda entered into an amicable settlement and they both filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the main ground that the case had become moot and academic since Serafin's title to the subject lot had been allegedly quieted. Petitioner opposed the MTD on the ground that he was not included in the settlement. The RTC, however, granted the MTD and it also dismissed petitioner's counterclaim and cross-claim. Petitioner filed directly with the SC a petition for review under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's counterclaim or cross-claim could be prosecuted in the same action despite the dismissal of the main complaint?

HELD: Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.

FACTS: Spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos (Spouses Zulueta), registered owners of several parcels of land, obtained various loans secured by the mother titles from the GSIS. When Spouses Zulueta defaulted in their payment, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgages wherein the latter emerged as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was then issued. GSIS, however, consolidated its title on all of the three mother titles, including the 78 lots which were expressly excluded from the mortgage contract. Thereafter, Spouses Zulueta were succeeded by Antonio Zulueta (Antonio), who transferred all his rights and interests in the excluded lots to Eduardo Santiago (Eduardo). Claiming his rights and interests over the excluded lots, Eduardo, through his counsel, sent a letter to GSIS for the return of the same. Antonio, as represented by Eduardo, filed an Action for Reconveyance of the excluded lots against the GSIS. Subsequently, Antonio was substituted by Eduardo. Upon Eduardo's demise, however, he was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Rosario. Later, respondent Antonio Vilar (Vilar) filed a Verified Omnibus Motion (for Substitution of Party-Plaintiff With Authority to Implement Writ of Execution Until Full Satisfaction of the Final Judgment of the Court) before the RTC. In his motion, Vilar alleged that after Antonio transferred his rights and interests to Eduardo, the latter assigned to Vilar 90% of his interest in the judgment proceeds of the reconveyance case. Further, Vilar averred that he and Eduardo agreed that the Deed of Assignment shall still take effect despite the fact of substitution. The CA granted Vilar's petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in impleading Vilar as party-plaintiff in substitution of Rosario.

HELD: Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the action of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter of litigation as the party-plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court differs with the CA in ruling that the petition for certiorari filed before it merely delves into the issue of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court. Guilty of repetition, the final determination of the case would pry into the right of Rosario as party-plaintiff before the lower court who is entitled to the proceeds of the judgment award. As it is, the CA did not actually rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion alone as its corollary ruling inquired into the right of Rosario. In ruling for Vilar's substitution, the right of Rosario as to the proceeds of the judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively ordered that the proceeds pertaining to Rosario be awarded instead to Vilar. Likewise, the Court finds merit in Rosario's contention that her failure to participate in the proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her constitutional right to due process. Hence, failure to implead Rosario as an indispensable party rendered all the proceedings before the CA null and void for want of authority to act.

FACTS: Camaso alleged that on July 15, 2014, he signed a contract of employment with respondents TSM Shipping (Phils), Inc., Utkilen, artd Jones Tulod (respondents) to work as a Second Mate on-board the vessel "M/V Golfstraum," for a period of six (6) months and with basic monthly salary of US$1,178.00. On October 18, 2014, he joined his vessel of assignment. Prior to said contract, Camaso claimed to have been working for respondents for almost five (5) years and boarded eight (8) of their vessels. Sometime in November 2013, Camaso complained of a noticeable obstruction in his throat which he described as akin to a "fishbone coupled [with] coughing." By February 2014, his situation worsened as he developed lymph nodules on his jawline, prompting him to request for a medical check-up while in Amsterdam. As Camaso was initially diagnosed with tonsillar cancer, he was recommended for medical repatriation to undergo extensive treatment. Upon repatriation to the Philippines on September 8, 2014, he reported at respondents' office and was referred to a certain Dr. Nolasco of St. Luke's Medical Center for testing. After a series of tests, it was confirmed that Camaso was indeed suffering from tonsillar cancer. Consequently, he underwent eight (8) chemotherapy sessions and radiation therapy for 35 cycles which were all paid for by respondents. He likewise received sickwage allowances from the latter. Thereafter, respondents refused to shoulder Camaso's medical expenses, thus, forcing the latter to pay for his treatment. Believing that his sickness was work-related and that respondents remained silent on their obligation, Camaso filed the instant complaint for disability benefits, sickwage allowance, reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, and other consequential damages before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC Case No. OFW (M) 07-09270-14. After efforts for an amicable settlement between the parties failed, they were ordered to file their respective position papers. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Camaso's petition for certiorari before it for nonpayment of docket fees

HELD: Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

FACTS: Go Tong Electrical applied and was granted a loan by DBS Bank of the Philippines (formerly BSA) which is covered by a Promissory Note. Go also executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement (CSA) covering any and all obligations undertaken by Go Tong Electrical. Because of its failure to pay the loan, respondent file a complaint for sum of money against it. In their Answer with Counterclaim (Answer), petitioners merely stated that they "specifically deny" the allegations under the complaint. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The CA sustained the RTC's ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was able to sufficiently deny the allegations in the respondent's complaint.

HELD: While the failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing," none of these defenses were adequately argued or proven during the proceedings of this case. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed.

FACTS: To secure the loan of SRADEC from United Resources Asset Management, Inc, several stockholders, including Yujuico, of STRADEC executed Pledge Agreements whereby they pledged a certain amount of their stocks in the said company in favor of United Resources. Not having been able to comply with its loan obligations, a Notice, signed by Atty. Nethercott, informing them about the impending auction sale were sent to STRADEC and its stockholders. Nethercott claims that he is United Resources' attorneyin-fact. As response, Yujuico filed before the RTC an injunction complaint seeking to enjoin the sale at public auction mentioned in Atty. Nethercott's notice. In his complaint, Yujuico asserts that the planned auction sale is void as Nethercott was not authorized to initiate the sale in behalf of United Resources. However, the auction sale pushed through with United Resources emerging as the winning bidder. Thereafter, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which effectively prevented United Resources from appropriating the stocks it had purchased during the auction sale. Nethercott filed his answer denying the material allegations of the injunction complaint. However, United Resources agreed with Yujuico that the sale was void and that it never authorized Nethercott to cause the sale. It pointed out that since United Resources never sanctioned the sale, thus, it should not be liable for the prejudice caused by the sale and asked for the dismissal of the case. Yujuico then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment grounded on Atty. Nethercott's lack of authority to cause the auction sale of pledged stocks; hence, there was no longer any genuine issue left to be resolved in trial. However, the resolution of the motion was deferred due to the TRO issued by the SC which remained in effect for more than a year. United Resources then changed its counsel and then filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim. In its amended answer, it now claims that Nethercott was duly authorized by the Board to cause the sale. RTC allowed the said amended answer despite Yujuico's protest. But on Yujuico's MR, RTC set aside its previous resolution, explaining that it cannot admit the amended answer as leave of court was not obtained prior to its filing. In compliance, United Resources filed the pertinent motion which was granted by the RTC. In a petition for certiorari in the CA, the CA sustained the allowance by the RTC of the amended answer. ISSUE: Whether or not the amended answer of United Resources may still be allowed.

HELD: Yes. A party in a civil action may amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served or if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served. Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. Hence, so long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion. Here, United Resources filed its motion for leave seeking the admission of its amended answer more than two (2) years after it filed its original answer. Despite the considerable lapse of time between the filing of the original answer and the motion for leave, the RTC still granted the said motion and was later affirmed by the CA. Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129. Hence, allegations (and admissions) in a pleading—even if not shown to be made through "palpable mistake"—can still be corrected or amended provided that the amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10.Nevertheless, even if we are to apply Section 4 of Rule 129 to the present case, we still find the allowance of United Resources' amended answer to be proper. To our mind, a consideration of the evidence that United Resources' plans to present during trial indubitably reveals that the admissions made by United Resources' under its original answer were a product of clear and patent mistake.

FACTS: Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad, as represented by Atty. Lucila, filed a petition before the RTC praying that Ma. Hazdina A. Tujan-Militante be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the owner's duplicate copy of the TCTs which were all issued in Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles. Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul Proceedings averring that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons. The RTC denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Tujan-Militante filed an MR and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. She likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case, she prayed that the OSG and the LRA be impleaded. Moreover, she prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. RTC denied the MR. Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her Motion. Tujan-Militante's MR, was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Tujan-Militante through voluntary appearance?

HELD: Yes. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, a party is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Here, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court's jurisdiction.

FACTS: An illegal dismissal case was filed by Erlinda Dela Cruz, et. al against Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. and 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services. They alleged that they were hired by 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services, and was assigned with Lotte Phil, Co., Inc., herein petitioner to perform piece works and as repackers or sealers. They were dispensed with their services due to the expiration of the service contract between 7J Maintenance and herein petitioner and that they were told by 7J that the latter will call them if they will be needed for work. However, they were never called back. Thus, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring 7J being the respondent's employer and that the former was guilty of illegal dismissal. Respondents then appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, praying that herein petitioner be declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only contractor. NLRC's decision affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari, thereafter, was filed by the respondents before the Court of Appeals. Lotte Phils. Co moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the respondents failed to implead 7J which was the party-in-interest to the said case. The rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the real employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte. ISSUE: Whether or not 7J Maintenance should have been impleaded in the petition before the Court of Appeals as an indispensable party.

HELD: Yes. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J. In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff's failure to comply therefor. Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair play.

FACTS: The facts show that in July 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos applied for several credit lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the construction of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas, Nueva Ecija. The said application was approved for P40,000,000.00, secured by Real Estate Mortgage dated July 25, 2012 over properties owned by the spouses. Subsequently, Spouses Ramos requested for additional loan and PDB allegedly promised to extend them a further loan of P140,000,000.00, the amount they supposed was necessary for the completion of the construction of the warehouse with a capacity of 250,000 cavans of palay. Despite the assurance of the bank, only P25,000,000.00 in additional loan was approved and released by PDB, which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over four (4) real properties. Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their obligations as they fell due. They appealed to PDB for the deferment of debt servicing and requested for a restructuring scheme but the parties failed to reach an agreement. On April 23, 2014, PDB filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. On June 18, 2014, Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages and Promissory Notes, Accounting and Application of Payments, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against PDB and its officers also before the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Instead of filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the venue of the action was improperly laid considering that the real estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be filed in Makati City only. It further noted that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and must therefore be dismissed. The RTC denied the Urgent Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the autonomy of contract wherein venue can be waived. The CA likewise denied the petition for certiorari filed by DBP. ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation as to venue between the parties must be upheld

HELD: Yes. Based on the foregoing, the general rules on venue admit of exceptions in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. In view of the foregoing, the RTC should have granted the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed by PDB on the ground that that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint being one for annulment of real estate mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature of a personal action, the venue of which may be fixed by the parties to the contract. In this case, it was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or the promissory notes must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation on venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them, and thus, should be complied with in good faith.

FACTS: On October 2, 2008 at around 12:51 in the afternoon, when a copy of Alias Summons dated September 9, 2008 issued in the entitled case together with a copy of the complaint and annexes attached thereto was brought for service to the President/General Manager of CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORP., in the person of Marcial M. Samson and/or Nieva A. Cabrera at its office address at Unit 601 Prestige Tower Condominium, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, 1605 Pasig City, undersigned was informed by the secretary of the company in the person of Ms. Vina Azonza that the above mentioned persons were not around and there was no one in the company authorized to receive the aforesaid summons. That the undersigned went back to the said office on October 16, 2008 at around 3:08 in the afternoon and was entered by Ms. Lorie Fernandez, also an employee of the company who is authorized to receive the said process. On October 27, 2008, at around 2:23 in the afternoon, undersigned tried again to serve the same process to the President/General Manager of Carson Realty & Management Corp. but with the same result. Finally, on October 28, 2008 at around 1:03 in the afternoon, the undersigned went back to the said company to personally serve the Alias Summons together with the other pertinent documents, just the same, the President/General Manager of the company was not around, hence, substituted service of summons was resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its employee, Ms. Lorie Fernandez, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process. ISSUE: Whether or not Carson was properly declared in default

HELD: Yes. In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the defendant.

FACTS: Spouses Salvador were registered owners of a lot in Mandaluyong which were rented out by Sps. Rabaja. Sps. Salvador decided to sell the lot through their agent Gonzales. Sps. Salvador and Rabaja entered into a contract to sell. Sps. Rabaja made several payments totaling P950,000.00 which were received by Gonzales. However, Sps. Salvador complained to Sps. Rabaja that they did not received any payment from Gonzales. This prompted sps. Rabaja to suspend payment and as a consequence they received a notice to vacate for non-payment of rentals. Sps. Salvador instituted an action for ejectment while sps. Rabaja filed an action for rescission of contract. The MeTC ruled in favor of sps. Salvador in the ejectment case, the RTC reversed the ruling and it was overturned by the CA. The decision of the CA was not appealed therefore it became final and executory. In the rescission case, the RTC declared sps Salvador in default for failure to attend the pre-trial conference and allowed sps. Rabaja to present their evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of sps. Rabaja. It held that what was executed was a contract of sale and not contract to sell and could be validly rescinded. It also stated that Gonzales who was duly equipped with SPA was the attorney-in-fact of sps. Salvador. The CA affirmed the said ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference warrants the presentation of evidence ex-parte by Spouses Rabaja

HELD: Yes. In the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The stringent application of the rules on pretrial is necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation process. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. "The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized." There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as codefendant was able to attend the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on the evidence presented during the trial.

FACTS: George Philip Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz (petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction against Planters Development Bank. Summons was served to PDP and it filed its answer. However, PDP failed to attend the last pre-trial hearing and it failed to file its pre-trial brief. Thus, Palileo and Dela Cruz were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of Palileo and Dela Cruz. PDP received a copy of the RTC Decision on July 17, 2006. On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service — specifically LBC — an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial. Petitioners' copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC, but in their address of record — Tupi, South Cotabato — there was no LBC service at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well. The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground that it violated the Rule on Motions as it set the hearing on August 18, 2006 or 16 days after filing (under the Rules; it must not be later than 10 days). Since the Motion was pro-forma, it did not toll the running of the reglementary period thus making the RTC's decision final and executory. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the decision of the RTC but on MR, the CA decided to relax the rules and held that the Motion was not pro-forma considering that the address of the trial court as well as that of the opposing counsel is too distant from the office of the counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not PDP's Omninus Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial was filed late?

HELD: Yes. PDB's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial court's June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days — or up to August 1, 2006 — within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2, 2006. Its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB refiled and resent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired. Thus, the RTC's decision had become final and executory by the failure of PDP to file a timely appeal.

FACTS: Powerhouse hired herein respondent employees as operators for its foreign principal, Catcher Technical Co. Ltd./Catcher Industrial Co. Ltd. (Catcher), based in Taiwan, each for the duration of two years commencing upon their arrival at the jobsite. They were deployed on June 2, 2000. Sometime in February 2001, Catcher informed respondent employees that they would be reducing their working days due to low orders and financial difficulties. The respondent employees were repatriated to the Philippines on March 11, 2001. Respondent employees then filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against Powerhouse and Catcher before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which were later consolidated upon their motion. They alleged that on March 2, 2001, Catcher informed them that they would all be repatriated due to low orders of Catcher. Initially, they refused to be repatriated but they eventually gave in because Catcher stopped providing them food and they had to live by the donations/dole outs from sympathetic friends and the church. Furthermore, during their employment with Catcher, the amount of NT$10,000.00 was unjustifiably deducted every month for eight to nine months from their individual salaries. On the other hand, Powerhouse maintained that respondent employees voluntarily gave up their jobs following their rejection of Catcher's proposal to reduce their working days. It contended that before their repatriation, each of the respondents accepted payments by way of settlement, with the assistance of Labor Attache Romulo Salud. During the proceedings before the LA, Powerhouse moved to implead JEJ International Manpower Services (JEJ) as respondent on account of the alleged transfer to the latter of Catcher's accreditation. JEJ submitted its position paper, arguing that the supposed transfer of accreditation to it did not affect the joint and solidary liability of Powerhouse in favor of respondent employees. It averred that any contract between JEJ and Powerhouse could not be enforced in the case as it involved no employer-employee relationship and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. ISSUE: Whether or not Powerhouse is liable for the monetary claims.

HELD: Yes. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract. The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.

FACTS: PNOC Exploration filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos, Jr. with the RTC of Pasig City for the unpaid balance of a car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, upon respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent then moved for the reception of its evidence ex parte upon the failure of the petitioner to file its answer within the prescribed period. Thereafter, the case was submitted for a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, he alleged that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also alleged that rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, and not actions in personam like a complaint for sum of money. Hence, he filed a Petition for Review with SC. ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons by publication to Petitioner Santos.

HELD: Yes. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. Moreover, service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant's last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address." The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication. Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

FACTS: Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by its officers applied for a real estate loan with Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM). One of its loans was not guaranteed by a collateral, so the bank required all the members of the Board of Directors of the Corp. to become sureties. A Surety Agreement was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary public on the same date. All copies of the Surety Agreement, except two, were kept by bank. (One copy was retained by the notary public for his notarial file and the other was sent to the Records Management and Archives Office). The bank then demanded payment. Unable to collect, the bank's counsel filed a complaint before the RTC for collection against the directors. On their answer, the directors alleged among other things, that they were not personally liable on the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities as officers of the corp. They claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to the complaint were falsified, considering that when they signed the same, the words in his personal capacity did not yet appear in the document. They attached a copy from the Records Management and Archives Office). Because of this development, the bank's counsel searched for and retrieved the file copy of the Surety Agreement. It was discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor, in accordance with bank standard operating procedures. However, the notary public was never informed of the insertion. The bank then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute Annex A of the Complaint wherein it attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of the notary public. RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the altered document with the original Surety Agreement. Aggrieved, petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which dismissed the petition for lack of merit Hence, the current petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution of the document should have been allowed?

HELD: Yes. With respect to the bank's right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend. In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY were inserted to conform to the banks standard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. The Bank's counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved. Moreover, the opposing party could not be prejudiced by the substitution since they can still present the substituted documents, as part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses. Besides, they are not precluded from filing the appropriate criminal action against the bank for attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any.