Terrorism2

Provocation

A provocation strategy is often used in pursuit of regime change and territorial change, the most popular goals of the FTOs (foreign terrorist organizations) listed by the U.S. State Department. To succeed, a terrorist organization must first convince moderate citizens that their government needs to be replaced or that independence from the central government is the only acceptable outcome. Provocation helps shift citizen support away from the incumbent regime. In a provocation strategy, terrorists seek to goad the target government into a military response that harms civilians within the terrorist organization's home territory. The aim is to convince them that the government is so evil that the radical goals of the terrorists are justified and support for their organization is warranted. As one expert has written, "Nothing radicalizes a people faster than the unleashing of undisciplined security forces on its towns and villages." Provocation is a way for terrorists to force an enemy government to reveal information about itself that then helps the organization recruit additional members. Democracies may be more susceptible to provocation than nondemocracies. Counterstrategies, therefore, are influenced in part by the political system from which they emerge.1

Motivation

All terrorism involves the quest for power: power to dominate and coerce, to intimidate and control, and ultimately to effect fundamental political change. Often erroneously seen as indiscriminate or senseless, terrorism is actually a very deliberate and planned application of violence. It may be represented as a concatenation of five individual processes, designed to achieve, sequentially, the following key objectives: Attention: Terrorists seek to focus attention on themselves and their causes through the publicity they receive, most often from news media coverage. Acknowledgement: Having attracted this attention, and thrust some otherwise previously ignored or hitherto forgotten cause on to the state's — or, often more desirably, the international community's — agenda, terrorists seek to translate their newfound notoriety into acknowledgement (and perhaps even sympathy and support) of their cause. Recognition: Terrorists attempt to capitalize on the interest and acknowledgement of their rights. Authority: Terrorists seek the authority to effect changes in government and/or society that lie at the heart of their movement's struggle. Governance: Terrorists seek to consolidate their direct and complete control over the state, their homeland, and/or their people. While some terrorist movements have been successful in achieving the first three objectives, rarely in modern times has any group attained the latter two.1

Samira Ahmen Jaseem

Although the term "black widow" has portrayed women in terrorism as vulnerable victims, other women have played prominent roles in recruitment, fundraising, propaganda and carrying out terrorist attacks. Samira Ahmed Jaseem, a member of the Iraqi-based Muslim extremist group Ansa Al-Sunna, is notorious for recruiting Iraqi women for suicide bombings. Jaseem ordered the rape of over 80 Iraqi women by members of their own group and later recruited these women for terrorist attacks. In many Iraqi communities, a woman who is sexually assaulted brings a loss of honor and profound shame for the victim and her family. Acting as an elderly sister, Jaseem would persuade victims of sexual assault to believe that their lives were over and the only way to rid them of their shame was through suicide bombing. Jaseem was arrested in 2009 for ordering the sexual assault of dozens of women and later confessed to her role in the Islamic militant group.1

The goals of terrorism

Although the ultimate goals of terrorists have varied over time, five have had enduring importance: Regime change Territorial change Policy change Social control Status quo maintenance Regime change is the overthrow of a government and its replacement with one led by the terrorists or at least one more to their liking. Territorial change is taking territory away from a state either to establish a new state or to join another state. Policy change is a broader category of lesser demands. Social control constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the state. Status quo maintenance is the support of an existing regime or a territorial arrangement against political groups that seek to change it. Some organizations hold multiple goals and may view one as facilitating another.1

Attrition

Attrition The most important task for any terrorist group is to persuade the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the enemy yields to the terrorists' demands. During the last years of the British Empire, the Greeks in Cyprus, Jews in Palestine and Arabs in Aden used a war of attrition strategy against their colonizer. By targeting Britain with terrorist attacks, they eventually convinced the political leadership that maintaining control over these territories would not be worth the cost in British lives. States with only peripheral interests at stake often capitulate to terrorist demands; states with more important interests at stake rarely do. Terrorist organizations almost always are weaker than the governments they target, and, as a result, are vulnerable to government retaliation. Democracies may be more constrained in their ability to retaliate than authoritarian regimes.1

The Terrorist Mindset

Contrary to popular belief and media depiction, most terrorism is neither crazed nor capricious. Rather, terrorist attacks are generally both premeditated and carefully planned. The tactics and targets of various terrorist movements, as well as the weapons they favor, are therefore ineluctably shaped by a group's ideology, its internal organizational dynamics and the personalities of its key members, as well as a variety of internal and external stimuli.1

Continuation of PLO and the internationalization of Terrorism

For the Palestinians, Munich was in fact a spectacular publicity coup. From Munich onwards nobody could ignore the Palestinians or their cause. gg Yasser Arafat (Source: Wikipedia.org) It is perhaps not entirely coincidental, then, that 18 months after Munich the PLO's leader, Yassir Arafat, was invited to address the UN General Assembly and shortly afterwards the PLO was granted special observer status in that international body. It is doubtful whether the PLO could ever have achieved this success had it not resorted to international terrorism. Within four years, a handful of Palestinian terrorists had overcome a quarter-century of neglect and obscurity. Within the decade, the number of terrorist groups either operating internationally or committing attacks against foreign targets in their own country in order to attract international attention had more than quadrupled.1

Attempts to identify the root causes

Identifying the root causes of terrorism is believed to help structure counterterrorist measures and eventually diminish terrorist activity.1 While some scholars have attempted to identify key indicators that lead to terrorism, others have refuted the study of root causes altogether. This is primarily because it would imply a legitimization of the group's use of violence and would emphasize a sense of moral foundation for their actions.2 In the fall of 2003, Dr. Tore Bjorgo and other prominent scholars held a conference in Oslo to assess several possible determinants for the causes of terrorism. Part of the difficulty in developing these points was due to the lack of consensus in defining terrorism itself, as we saw in Module 1. Other challenged involved the typologies of terrorism, such as left wing, right wing, nationalist, or religious terrorism. Each type of terrorist group possesses a different set of targets, strategies and tactics. There is no one set list for the root causes of terrorism for these factors.3 Terrorism has flourished in all kinds of environments — in democratic and nondemocratic societies, in settings where young people were and were not indoctrinated to commit violence. Some scholars consider liberal democracies less vulnerable to political violence than authoritarian systems because dissent and conflict can be brought into the legitimate political process. Citizens who live in countries with repressive regimes have more reasons to use violence against the ruling clique, but in the absence of civil liberties, it is likely that the authorities detect and crush opposition groups that have committed, or plan to commit, terrorism. If terrorist acts do occur in closed societies, the targeted governments have the means to prevent, curb, or spin the news coverage of such events. Democracies offer citizens opportunities to participate in the decision-making process, but when groups or individuals conclude that their grievances are not adequately addressed, they may be more inclined to resort to violence than their counterparts under authoritarian rule — if only because the free press will spread their "propaganda of the deed." All of this leads to the conclusion that terrorists emerge in poor and in rich countries, in democratic and in authoritarian states, in stable and in nonstable countries, and in societies whose textbooks teach or do not teach to hate other religious or ethnic groups.4

Modern Terrorist Weapons

Kidnapping was frequently used in Latin America as well as in other parts of the world. One of the most dramatic kinds of terrorist action is the hijacking of airplanes. Airplane The first known case occurred in Peru in the 1930s, and there were a few more in the years immediately after World War II. Airplanes are still hijacked, but usually by criminals or lunatics or people trying to escape from dictatorial regimes. What deters terrorists is probably not so much the controls at airports, which are often lax and superficial, but the fact that fewer and fewer countries are willing to listen to any demands from terrorists. Some terrorist groups have tried to cause economic damage to their enemies. ETA conducted a campaign directly against tourist sites; since Spain accommodated a large number of tourists, it was hoped that the damage caused would be substantial. To be effective, terrorist movements depend on popular support, or at least support by a certain segment of society. Nationalist-separatist groups usually have had a broad base of sympathizers; the extremists of the left and right much less so.

Infamous Female Terrorists

Leila Khaled of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) hijacked an airplane in 1969 in response to the persistent violent activity in the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout the 1960s.1 Wafa Idris detonated a bomb in Israel, killing herself and injuring hundreds of Israelis. She was motivated mainly by a sense of rage and general hopelessness due to the Palestinian occupation in Israel.2 Thenmozhi Rajaratnam of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bowed down to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's feet, pretending to be a female admirer, and then detonated a bomb that killed the two of them along with several others.3 All of these women engaged in terrorist activity not out of vulnerability or in anticipation of religious rewards, but out of nationalist and political fervor.4 While some women have shown leadership in carrying out their terrorist activities, others have been coerced and literally forced to strap a bomb to their bodies. Blume's findings illustrate that some women, such as members of the LTTE, are highly politicized and enthusiastic about joining the organization. Other groups, however, such as those in Chechnya and Iraq, have found women's roles in terrorism to be a family affair. There have also been a number of cases where women were coerced and even drugged during the recruitment period.5

Reasons for Joining Terrorist Groups

Many people join terrorist groups in their youth. One common factor that motivates people to join or support a group is belief in the cause of the group. Provocation and anger can motivate people to support or join terrorist groups. A feeling of hopelessness can drive people to join. Revenge is another powerful motivation. Those who have suffered the loss of family members and friends, their schools or their homes, become the most committed because they have direct and tangible justifications as opposed to an ideological cause. Although conscription is not widespread, terrorist groups also coerce some recruits to join or support them. In Colombia and some African countries there are accounts of terrorist and paramilitary groups raiding villages and kidnapping children, recruiting them, and inducing terror to ensure villager support. Some individuals join or support a terrorist group for social recognition or social acceptance. Some individuals join terrorist groups for economic reasons, much as one might choose a career due to its perceived benefits. Some scholars believe that people join terrorist groups because they have failed to achieve their political goal by political means; in their minds the use of violence is justified because there is no other path available. Terrorist groups often use propaganda to legitimize their cause, and to display their members as freedom fighters and charismatic folk heroes standing up for what they believe, undeterred by the vast odds against them, and taking on the full might of the "enemy" with no regard for their personal safety.1/li>

Organizational Dynamics continued

Newsprint and air-time are thus the coin of the realm in the terrorists' mindset: the only tangible or empirical means they have by which to gauge success and assess their progress. For many terrorists, this equation of publicity and attention with success and self-gratification has the effect of locking them into an unrelenting upward spiral of violence in order to keep the eye of the media and the public on them. Klein describes escalation as a "force of habit" among terrorists; an intrinsic product of their perennial need for validation which in turn is routinely assessed and appraised on the basis of media coverage. The effect is that terrorists today feel driven to undertake ever more dramatic and destructively lethal deeds in order to achieve the same effect that a less ambitious or bloody action may have had in the past. To their minds at least, the media and public have become progressively inured or desensitized to the seemingly endless litany of successive terrorist incidents; thus a continuous upward ratcheting of the violence required in order to retain media and public interest and attention. The terrorists' ability to attract — and, moreover, to continue to attract — attention is most often predicated on the success of their attacks. The main point is to select targets where success is 100% assured. In this respect, terrorists also analyze the "lessons" to be drawn from mistakes made by former comrades who have been either killed or apprehended. Press accounts, judicial indictments, courtroom testimony and trial transcripts are meticulously culled for information on security force tactics and methods and then absorbed by surviving group members.1

Terrorist weapons

Originally, the dagger and later the pistol were the favored weapons of terrorists. The Russian terrorists of Narodnaya Volya, which included some accomplished scientists, were the first to use dynamite, which had recently been discovered. Explosives were perfected during the First and Second World Wars, and these innovations soon reached the hands of terrorists. Automatic rifles and pistols replaced the old revolvers and guns, and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) were first used in Ireland, France, Germany and Italy in the 1970s. The old terrorist movements and many of the more recent ones have employed intelligence officers who penetrate "enemy" installations and provide maps and timetables. This was of great importance as long as the attacks were directed against specific individuals. Once terrorism became more indiscriminate, intelligence became less important, as a bomb could be put in any supermarket or bus. Nineteenth-century terrorist groups, as well as the IRA and Irgun, invested much effort in liberating from prison comrades in arms who had been captured. More recently, such operations have become rare because they involve too many risks.

Outbidding

Outbidding arises when two key conditions hold: two or more domestic parties are competing for leadership of their side, and the general population is uncertain about which of the groups best represents their interests. Three reasons help to explain why groups are likely to be rewarded for being more militant rather than less. First, in bargaining contexts, it is often useful to be represented by an agent who is more hard-line than oneself. Second, uncertainty may also exist about the type of adversary the population and its competing groups are facing. A third factor that may favor outbidding is that office-holding itself may produce incentives to sell out. Outbidding will be favored when multiple groups are competing for the allegiance of a similar demographic base of support. One solution to the problem of outbidding would be to eliminate the struggle for power by encouraging competing groups to consolidate into a unified opposition. If competition among resistance groups is eliminated, the incentive for outbidding also disappears.1

The organizational Dynamics of Terrorist Groups

Rappaport estimates that the life expectancy of at least 90 per cent of terrorist organizations is less than a year, and that nearly half of those that make it as far as that have ceased to exist within a decade. Some categories of terrorist groups admittedly have better chances of survival — and perhaps success — than others. In modern times ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups have typically lasted the longest and been the most successful. However, except in the immediate post-war era of massive decolonization, success for ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations has rarely involved the actual realization of their stated, long-term goals of self-determination or nationhood. The ethno-nationalists' comparative success may have as much to do with the clarity and tangibility of their envisioned future — the establishment (or re-establishment) of a national homeland from within some existing country — as to other characteristics. Left-wing terrorist movements, by comparison, appear doubly disadvantaged. Not only do they lack the sizeable existing pool of potential recruits available to most ethno-nationalist groups, but among all the categories of terrorists they have formulated the least clear and most ill-defined vision of the future. For the terrorist, success in making this impact is most often measured in terms of the amount of publicity and attention received.

Right-Wing Terrorists

Right-wing terrorism has often been characterized as the least discriminating, most senseless type of contemporary political violence. If the means of the right-wing terrorists sometimes appear haphazardly planned and often spontaneously generated, their ends are hardly less indistinct. Essentially, right-wing terrorists' ostensible goal is the destruction of the liberal-democratic state to clear the way for a renascent National Socialist ("Nazi") or fascist one. The right-wing terrorists believe that their nation's survival is dependent upon the exorcism of certain elements from its environs: only by becoming politically, radically and culturally homogeneous can the state recover its strength and again work for its natural citizens rather than the variegated collection of interlopers and parasites who now sap the nation of its strength and greatness. Like all forms of terrorism, even right-wing violence is not based on some pathological obsession to kill or beat up as many people as possible, but rather on a deliberate policy of intimidating the general public into acceding to specific demands or pressures. For religious terrorists there are demonstrably fewer constraints on the actual infliction of violence and the category of targets/enemies is much more open-ended.1

Terrorist Tactics and Targets

Tactics are methods employed by terrorist groups to conduct operations. Targets are either personnel or infrastructure attacked by terrorist groups. Terrorist groups also use threats to advance their aims and objectives. The threat of violent action (bomb, assassination) to cause fear or coerce an action or inaction is also an act of terrorism. Terrorist targets include humans and infrastructures in land, air and sea. Human targets include political leaders, administrators, military personnel, business leaders, and large populations. Infrastructure targets include aviation, maritime, symbolic, and other national critical infrastructure. Terrorist targets include diplomatic, foreign or domestic businesses, domestic or foreign military, transportation assets, domestic government, foreign government, foreign, religious, ethnic or racial, the general public, and humanitarian workers. Because it is impossible to protect all likely targets, governments and corporations adopt target-hardening measures that make it costly and difficult for a terrorist group to attack the protected target. These include: Alarms Sensors Close-circuit television Special glass Metal detectors X-ray technology Space or vision barriers Quality training of personnel However, the key to thwarting a terrorist attack is intelligence, often developed by infiltrating a terrorist group using human agents.1

Terrorist strategies

Terrorism involves careful planning. The habits and movements of the targets have to be watched, weapons have to be procured, and transport as well as safe houses have to be provided. Ideally, terrorist units should be small, because the bigger they are, the more open to infiltration they are. But very small units often have not had the resources and the know-how to carry out major operations. To be effective, terrorists need the anonymity of a big city for their operations; in a small town people know each other, and new faces attract attention and suspicion. Modern terrorists need money to finance their operations, whereas 19th-century terrorism could be run on a shoestring. The money needed is obtained from wealthy well-wishers at home or abroad, through robbing banks, or from foreign governments that, for reasons of their own, support terrorist groups as surrogates in the struggle against a common enemy. Some terrorist groups forge money, others engage in kidnapping and other forms of blackmail, including protection money, and others, such as the IRA, run legitimate businesses. Of late, some terrorist money has come from drug dealers and cartels.

Gender differences in terrorism

Terrorism is always disturbing, but there is an extra level of disquiet when the terrorists are female. In spite of these reactions, female terrorists are not a recent phenomenon. Although there were in the past and are today, more male than female terrorists both as leaders and followers, taken together the number of women in the organizations was and is substantial. Some estimates range from 20 to 30 percent for many domestic and international terrorist groups. The membership of some terrorist organizations was and is all male, and a few have been known to have only female members, but most of these groups are composed of both men and women. Typically, Far Left terrorist groups have emphasized the recruitment of females, and Far Right groups have not. Regardless of the Far Left/Far Right divide in this respect, terrorists in all kinds of countries, regions, and continents have for a long time recognized the advantage of incorporating females into their operations. Indeed, since the beginning of modern-day terrorism, females were actively involved in political violence — beginning with their roles in the anarchist bombings of nineteenth-century Europe. In a number of prominent terrorist organizations, women were represented in large numbers as rank-and-file members and held leadership positions. When arrested and imprisoned, women have proven more committed to the terrorist cause and their comrades than their male counterparts.1

The stages leading to terrorism

Terrorism is rarely, if ever, the result of a sudden impulse. Ehud Sprinzak identifies three stages leading to terrorism in liberal democracies: Crisis of confidence Conflict of legitimization Crisis of legitimacy Once a group enters into the last stage, its grievances turn increasingly into intense hatred of the enemy, who is dehumanized. The portrayal is not accidental and occasional but repeated and systematic. This pattern of dehumanizing the enemy applies to all types of terrorist groups. According to Merkl, "Once an enemy had been declared and made into absolute moral evil, the world became simple, and any means were justified for fighting this evil. Soon the 'struggle' itself became the goal, and this in turn could satisfy deep personal needs." First dehumanization, then the justification of killing as morally and religiously justified, are part of a mechanism of moral disengagement on the part of groups that decide to commit terrorism. In examining the causes of terrorism, Martha Crenshaw distinguishes between two major factors: The preconditions that are at the heart of political, socioeconomic, or religious grievances felt by social subgroups; and The precipitants or specific events that trigger terrorist acts. Typically, military or other violent government actions, often reactions to nonviolent or violent dissent, serve as catalysts for the formation of terrorist groups.1

Strategies of Terrorism

Terrorism often works. The October 1983 suicide attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, for example, convinced the United States to withdraw its soldiers from Lebanon. The Philippines recalled its troops from Iraq nearly a month early after a Filipino truck driver was kidnapped by Iraqi extremists. In fact, terrorism has been so successful that between 1980 and 2003, half of all suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed by substantial concessions by the target governments. These tactics can be surprisingly effective in achieving a terrorists group's political aims. Despite the salience of terrorism today, scholars and policymakers are only beginning to understand how and why it works. Effective counterstrategies cannot be designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives terrorist violence. Terrorism works not only simply because it instills fear in target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists' cause. That so many targeted governments respond in the way that terrorist organizations intend underscores the need for understanding the reasoning behind this type of violence. Because it is hard for weak actors to make credible threats, terrorists are forced to display publicly just how far they are willing to go to obtain their desired results.1

Intimidation

Terrorists are often in competition with the government for the support of the population. Terrorists can also use an intimidation strategy to gain greater social control over a population.2

Conclusion

Terrorists use violence to signal their strength and resolve in an effort to produce concessions from their enemy and obedience and support from their followers. No Simple Answers Taken together, a variety of political, socioeconomic and religious motives combined with personal conditions and trigger events provide clues for understanding the making of terrorist groups, the motivations of individual recruits, and the decisions to commence violent campaigns. But in the absence of a predominant causal model, it is always difficult for target societies to fully comprehend the complex causes of a particular terrorist threat and more thorny yet to alleviate the roots of terrorism.

Implications of the Internationalization of Terrorism

The PLO, as a terrorist movement, is arguably unique in history. Not only was it the first truly "international" terrorist organization, it also consistently embraced a far more internationalist orientation than most other terrorist groups. The PLO was also one of the first terrorist groups actively to pursue the accumulation of capital and wealth as an organizational priority.1

The internationalization of Terrorism

The advent of what is considered modern, international terrorism occurred on July 22, 1968. On that day three armed Palestinian terrorists, belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), one of the six groups then comprising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. Although commercial aircraft had been hijacked before, the El Al hijacking differed significantly from all previous ones. Aircrafts Airport © Roger G. Erickson First, its purpose was not simply the diversion of a scheduled flight from one designation to another—this hijacking was a bold political statement. Second, unlike previous hijackings, where the origin or nationality of the aircraft that was being seized did not matter, El Al—as Israel's national airline and by extension, therefore, a readily evident national "symbol" of the Israeli state—had been specifically and deliberately targeted by the terrorists. Third, the terrorists succeeded in forcing their avowed enemy, Israel, to communicate directly with them and therefore with the organization to which they belonged, despite the Israeli government's previous declarations and policy pronouncements to the contrary. Finally, the terrorists discovered that they had the power to create major media events—especially when innocent civilians were involved.

Spoiling

The goal of a spoiling strategy is to ensure that peace overtures between moderate leaders on the terrorists' side and the target government do not succeed. A spoiling strategy works by persuading the enemy that moderates on the terrorists' side cannot be trusted to abide by a peace deal. The Israel-Palestinian conflict, and in particular the Oslo peace process, has been plagued by spoilers. When mutual trust is high, a peace settlement can be implemented despite ongoing terrorist acts and the potential vulnerabilities the agreement can create. Trust, however, is rarely high after long conflicts, which is why spoilers can strike with a reasonable chance that their attack will be successful.1

What was thought to be the initial cause of terrorism?

The idea that socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty, lack of education, and high unemployment, provide fertile ground for terrorism predates the precipitation of international terrorism in the last thirty-five years or so, and, more importantly, the recent focus on the roots of terrorism in Arab and Muslim countries. At first sight, the argument that poverty breeds terrorism carries little weight with respect to the experiences in the West from the late 1960s through the 1980s, when some of the world's richest countries (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium and the United States) produced a relatively large number of very active terrorist groups of the left-wing variety. Regardless of such findings, the idea that terrorism is the result of "poverty, desperation, and resentment" in less developed countries around the globe has survived as one plausible explanation in the search for the causes of group-based political violence. Yet, Walter Laqueur has pointed out that "[i]n the forty-nine countries currently designated by the United Nations as the least developed, hardly any terrorist activity occurs." Recent studies contradict the economic deprivation thesis with respect to terrorism and terrorists in the Middle East. These findings have profound implications for policy makers in their fight to alleviate the roots of terrorism. If indeed economic and educational conditions do not cause terrorism, efforts to improve economic conditions, especially individual outcomes and educational opportunities, would not decrease the number of terrorists or do away with terrorism altogether. Individuals who commit terrorist acts do not have specific characteristics in common.1 While some are profoundly religious, others are motivated by a political question or by an injustice which they believe they have suffered from, and some are motivated by a combination of these reasons. Although many are associated with a sectarian group with totalitarian ideas, many are not associated with a single religious group. Terrorists can occupy any profession, including engineers, artists, day labourers and farmers. They can be rich or poor, old or young. They act in groups or alone. The one identifying characteristic of a terrorist group is that the majority of participants are male.2

Left-Wing Terrorists

The overriding tactical—and, indeed ethical—imperative for left-wing terrorists has been the deliberate tailoring of their violent acts to appeal to their perceived "constituencies". For this reason, left-wing terrorists' use of violence historically has been heavily constrained. Their self-styled crusade for social justice is typically directed against governmental or commercial institutions, or specific individuals who they believe represent capitalist exploitation and repression. They are therefore careful not to undertake actions that might alienate potential supporters or their perceived constituency. Even when less discriminate tactics such as bombing are employed, the violence is meant to be equally "symbolic". The use by left-wing terrorists of "armed propaganda" (i.e. violent acts with clear symbolic content) is thus a critical element in their operational calculus.1

The PLO and the Internationalization of Terrorism

The premier example of terrorism's power to rocket a cause from obscurity to renown was without doubt the murder of 11 Israeli athletes seized by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Both the hostage seizure and the rescue attempt that took place as a result were colossal failures. International opinion was virtually unanimous in its condemnation of the terrorists' operation. The Olympic tragedy provided the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks which fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the media's attention. In terms of the publicity and exposure accorded to the Palestinian cause, Munich was an unequivocal success. The Black September (Munich) terrorists attained the operation's two objectives: World opinion was forced to take note of the Palestinian drama. The Palestinian people imposed their presence on an international gathering that had sought to exclude them.1

Recruitment Techniques

Theorists have long argued that poverty, lack of education, and unemployment produce terrorist recruits and supporters. Although those who are in poverty, are unemployed, or underemployed are most vulnerable to ideological indoctrination, it also generates recruits and supporters for terrorism in developed countries, as well as among wealthy and educated classes. Through propaganda, terrorist ideologues indoctrinate members, supporters, sympathizers, and potential recruits.1

Strategic logics

There are five principal strategic logics of costly signaling at work in terrorist campaigns: Attrition Intimidation Provocation Spoiling peace overtures between moderate leaders and the main gov must be destroyed. Outbidding two or more parties are competing for leadership and population in uncertain about who to support (fatta and hamass) Understanding these five distinct strategic logics is crucial not only for understanding terrorism but for designing effective antiterror policies.1

Trends in female terrorism

There has been a spike in female terrorist activity in the last three decades. Originally, most women terrorists were involved solely in secular forms of terrorism. However, the growing acknowledgement of women's tactical value in terrorist operations has increased female membership in terrorist organizations in all ideologies, belief systems and religious terrorist groups.1 Several religious groups and charismatic leaders, primarily of the Islamic faith, have manipulated religious texts to advocate the role of women in terrorist activities. Women terrorists are found in all parts of the world including West Germany, Italy, Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya and Sri Lanka. According to Christopher Harmon, more than 30 percent of international terrorists are women.2 Generally, men are believed to pursue terrorist tactics because of their political views, while women have sought terrorist tactics for personal or emotional reasons such as family honor, loss of loved ones and vengeance. Female terrorism expert Mia Blume suggests that this is not always the case. Although many women have been vulnerable and coerced into recruitment because of family pressure and victimization, others are highly politicized and actively seek leadership roles in terrorism.3

Strategies of Terrorist Violence

Thomas Thornton offers five proximate objectives: Morale building Advertising Disorientation (of the target population) Elimination of opposing forces Provocation Uncertainty has long been understood to be a cause of conflict. Uncertainty about a state's willingness to fight can cause conflict. Uncertainty about trustworthiness or moderation of preferences can also cause conflict. If uncertainty about power, resolve and trustworthiness can lead to violence, then communication on these topics is the key to preventing (or instigating) conflict. The problem is that simple verbal statements are often not credible because actors frequently have incentives to lie and bluff. To obtain their goals, terrorists need to provide credible information to the audiences whose behavior they hope to influence. Terrorists play to two key audiences: governments whose policies they wish to influence and individuals on the terrorists' own side whose support or obedience they seek to gain. The targeted governments are central because they can grant concessions over policy or territory that the terrorists are seeking. The terrorists' domestic audience is also important, because they can provide resources to the terrorist group and must obey its edicts on social or political issues. The challenge for policymakers in targeted countries is to calibrate their responses in ways that do not further any of the terrorists' goals.1

Women Terrorists

While terrorism in general is regarded as a disturbing form of violent activity, there is an extra level of disquiet when the terrorists are female.1 Women have often been perceived as less likely than males to pursue political violence and will only use violent methods as a last resort. Why are women the weapon of choice for terrorist organizations? It is a general assumption that women are more vulnerable to recruitment because of personal loss or hardship resulting from a death in the family or rape. Women are considered non-threatening in nature and can therefore move more freely at security checkpoints as compared to men. Security searches in airports are less thorough with women than with men mainly because they are perceived as less suspicious than their male counterparts. Additionally, in countries like Iraq, where the majority of checkpoint security guards are male, women are less likely to be frisk searched. Women are better able to conceal weapons under their clothes under the pretence of being pregnant. Women are often considered to be victims of violence rather than perpetrators of violence, and overall less likely than men to be suspected as terrorists.2

The Terrorist Personality

With regard to questions concerning whether there is a "terrorist personality", much has always depended on the social and political conditions in which terrorism occurred. Most terrorists have been young. Calls to action fill younger people with greater enthusiasm than they do the middle-aged or the elderly. Furthermore, terrorism requires strength, stamina, and speed, physical qualities of youth. Nor is there a clear pattern with respect to family background and beliefs.

Internationalization part 2

With the El Al hijacking the nature and character of terrorism demonstrably changed. For the first time, terrorists began to travel regularly from one country to another to carry out attacks. In addition, they also began to target innocent civilians from other countries who often had little if anything to do with the terrorists' cause or grievance, simply in order to endow their acts with the power to attract attention and publicity that attacks against their declared or avowed enemies often lacked. These dramatic tactical changes in terrorism were facilitated by technological advances of the time that had transformed the speed and ease of international commercial air travel and vastly improved both the quality of television news footage and the promptness with which that footage could be broadcast around the globe. At the forefront of this transformation were the constituent groups of the PLO. Between 1968 and 1980, Palestinian terrorist groups were indisputably the world's most active, accounting for more international terrorist incidents than any other movement. The success achieved by the PLO in publicizing the Palestinians' plight through the "internationalization" of its struggle with Israel has since served as a model for similarly aggrieved ethnic and nationalist minority groups everywhere, demonstrating how long-standing but hitherto ignored or forgotten causes can be resurrected and dramatically thrust on to the world's agenda through a series of well-orchestrated, attention-grabbing acts.1