CASES- Administrative Law Harrington Final
Bailey v. Richardson (1950)
Dispute: bailey fired on grounds that she was involved with communist party, banned from civil service employment for 3 years legal reasoning/opinion: dismissal from gov service was not subject to safeguards of criminal prosecution. Bailey's employment was considered a privilege, not "property." Dissent: Unanimous
Wyman v. James (1971)
Dispute: An AFDC recipient (Ms. James) refused to allow a "home visit" but would comply with an information request. She argued that the "home visit" violated her Fourth Amendment rights as an "unreasonable search and seizure." Legal reasoning/opinion (blackmun): The "home visit" is not an "unreasonable search and seizure" since there is a public interest in having AFDC "protect and aid-dependent children." The agency must ensure that the public's objectives are carried out. The public has a right to know where its money is going. Ms. James received written notice in advance, specified date, and she is the primary source of information for the agency. If the inspector finds evidence of welfare fraud on the visit, it is a routine fact of life with no greater consequences than those of criminal conduct. The only consequence of her refusal is that the payment of benefits ceases, which is no different from refraining from applying for AFDC benefits. Dissent (Douglas): There is a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
Immigration and naturalization service v. Chadha (1983)
Dispute: An east indian who held a british passport came to the us in 1966 on a non immigrant student visa which expired in 1972, he was required by the Immigration and naturalization service to demonstrate why he should not be deported for having "remained in the US for longer time than permitted". An immigration judge ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended and that he be allowed to remain in the US as a permanent resident alien. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of the resolution. According to the immigration and nationality act, the attorney general must provide Congress "a detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law". Congress delegated INS enforcement powers to the US Attorney General (AG), but Congress reserved its authority to veto the AG's decision in cases where the AG recommends the suspension of deportation. Does this Congressional veto violate the separation of powers doctrine? legal reasoning/opinion: The constitutional role of bicameralism is to be shared by both Houses and the President's "checks and balances" and is the Whig Liberal principle of dividing and dispersing power to protect liberty. The legislative action must contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in character and effect. Delegation of authority is equated with legislative action, and since Congress made the "deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically the Atty. Gen., the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specific circumstances", the decision to delegate authority must follow the procedures of bicameralism and presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. The Court ranked other values, such as the sharing of legislative authority between both houses and the president, higher than efficiency. Dissent (White, rehnquist): Justice White emphasized the historical purpose of the veto as a justification for Congress overseeing its broad delegation. Justice Rehnquist argued that Chadha lacked standing to bring this case since the provision of the statute authorizing the Atty. Gen to suspend deportation was not severable from the legislative veto. If the veto was invalid, then Chadha must still be deported. Rehnquist believed that Congress did not intend to have the veto provision of INS severable (the majority said "yes").
Vance v. Ball State University (2013)
Dispute: An employee who sued her employer, alleging a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the civil rights act of 1964. Who is a"supervisor" for purposes of determining whether an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee's unlawful harassment- quid pro quo or hostile environment? Legal reasoning/opinion: Analytical Jurisprudence A supervisor is a "unitary category" of employees who are formally empowered to take tangible employment action against the victim: such as hiring, firing, promoting, demoting, or reassigning to significantly different responsibilities. The Court noted that the broader control test would be difficult to apply in practice, since it would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the level of control that each alleged harasser had over the plaintiff's daily work activities. The Court reasoned that the narrower supervisor liability rule is consistent with the text and structure of Title VII, which limits employer liability to actions taken by individuals who have the authority to take tangible employment actions. Finally, the Court cautioned that employers can still be held liable for harassment by non-supervisory co-workers or third parties, under the "negligence" or "hostile environment" theories of liability. Dissent: Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayr, Kagan Legal Realism An employer is vicariously liable only when the authority it has delegated to an employee enables that employee to engage in actionable harassment. The majority's definition of "supervisor" is too narrow and conflicts with the purposes of the Act to prevent workplace harassment and to provide victims with effective relief. The majority's rule will make it more difficult for employees to prove harassment claims and will give employers an incentive to limit the power of their supervisors to avoid liability.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971)
Dispute: Citizens and conservation organizations vs. the Secretary of the DOT Dispute over the authorization of federal funds to build a highway through a public park in Memphis, TN Citizens argued that the Secretary violated two statutes Legal reasoning/opinion: Statute requires the Secretary to approve routing of interstates through public parks only if no feasible and prudent alternative route exists If no alternative, Secretary must approve construction only if every effort has been made to minimize harm to the park The Secretary argued that it was unnecessary to make formal findings and that he exercised independent judgment based on facts Court held that Secretary violated the statute by failing to make formal findings and failing to show that there was no feasible and prudent alternative route Court established the "hard look" doctrine which requires agencies to take a "hard look" at the evidence before making a decision. The Secretary did not take a "hard look" and therefore the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Dissent: none
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors (1985)
Dispute: Congress created an administrative system for allocating benefits to veterans and allowed fee payments to agents or attorneys representing veterans before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). The statute stated that "the fee shall not exceed $10 for any one claim." National Association of Radiation Survivors argued that this fee limitation denied them the opportunity to obtain legal representation and violated their rights under the 5th and 1st Amendments (due process and freedom of speech). Legal reasoning/opinion (rehnquist) : The fee limitation did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights because it did not prevent them from obtaining legal representation or impair their freedom of speech. The plaintiffs still had a realistic opportunity to obtain representation, and the fee limitation was necessary to prevent abuse of the system. Dissent (stevens, brennan, marshall): The fee limitation violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process and freedom of speech because it effectively denied them the opportunity to obtain legal representation. The fee limitation was an arbitrary restriction on their ability to access the courts and violated the principle of the American rule, which allows successful parties to recover attorney fees.
Matthews v. Eldridge (1976) (entitlement doctrine)
Dispute: Eldridge was terminated without a hearing by the Social Security Administration as they had decided he had recovered sufficiently to hold a job. Denied due process that was based on the precedent set in Goldberg v. Kelly. Legal reasoning/opinion: The Court held that the initial termination of Eldridge's benefits without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court noted that due process was "flexible" and called for "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." The Court found that there were numerous safeguards to prevents errors in making decisions to terminate disability benefits and argued that "[a]t some point the benefit or an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society, in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."
Milner v. Department of the Navy (2011)
Dispute: Glen Milner requested Explosive Safety Quantity Distances (ESQD) information from the Navy about the storage of weapons, ammunition, and explosives at their Naval base on Indian Island in Puget Sound, Washington. The Navy refused the FOIA request, citing that disclosure would threaten the security of the base and surrounding community. Legal reasoning/opinion: Exemption 2 of FOIA only applies to records relating solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency, and not to records that relate to agency "effectiveness or efficiency" or that "substantially affect the public." The term "related solely to" in Exemption 2 means that records must be exclusively about internal personnel rules and practices, and not merely refer to them in passing. Dissent (Breyer): The majority's interpretation of Exemption 2 is too narrow, and will make it more difficult for agencies to protect sensitive information. Exemption 2 should apply to records that are related to internal agency functions, even if they also affect the public.
Heckler v. Chaney (1985)
Dispute: Heckler (FDA) refused to take enforcement action against a drug manufacturer, and a group of inmates sued, claiming the FDA's decision was unlawful Dispute over whether the FDA's decision was reviewable by the court Legal reasoning/opinion: The FDA argued that its decision not to enforce was "committed to agency discretion by law" under section 701, and therefore not reviewable by the court The Court held that a decision not to take enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable, unless the agency's refusal to act was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly defined policy The Court reasoned that the agency is in the best position to decide when and how to take enforcement action, and that allowing courts to second-guess these decisions would interfere with the agency's ability to carry out its mission effectively The Court also noted that the availability of other avenues for relief, such as citizen petitions or congressional oversight, mitigates the need for judicial review in these cases Marshall emphasizes the importance of the problem of agency refusal to act in the modern administrative state Dissent: none
BD of Curators of the University of MO et al. v. Horowitz (1978)
Dispute: Horowitz, a medical student at the University of MO, was placed on academic probation and then dropped from the school when the Council on Evaluation found no "radical improvement" in her performance. She sued the university for denying her procedural due process. Horowitz claimed that the University denied her procedural due process because they did not provide an opportunity to rebut the evidence against her at a hearing. Legal reasoning/ Opinion: Procedural due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The University's procedures did not violate Horowitz's due process rights because they provided her with notice and an opportunity to respond in writing and in person. The University's decision to drop Horowitz was based on academic judgments that are not subject to judicial review. Dissent (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun) Horowitz's interest in her education is a protected property interest that deserves due process protection. The University's procedures were inadequate because they did not provide Horowitz with an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Abbott Laboratories, Inc v. Gardner (1967)
Dispute: In 1962, Congress required prescription drug manufacturers to print generic names alongside brand names on bottles. Abbott Laboratories, along with 36 other drug manufacturers challenged the FDA's enforcement of the rule before it was implemented. Legal reasoning/opinion: The legal question was whether manufacturers could be granted "pre-enforcement review" since the 1962 rule had not yet been enforced by the FDA. Justice Harlan justified pre-enforcement review by stating that administrative actions that may rest on "unwarranted interpretation" of the authorizing statute or of the Constitution may be challenged before they are enforced if some level of harm (time and cost of litigation) can be demonstrated. Dissent: none
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013)
Dispute: In 2008, Congress amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by removing the requirement that the government demonstrate a "probable cause" standard. A coalition of lawyers and human rights, labor, and media organizations filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York (SDNY), alleging that the amendment violated three Constitutional provisions. Legal reasoning/opinion: Plaintiffs must show that the "risk of future harm" is "certainly impending" and "traceable to the FISA provision." The plaintiffs' allegations of future harm are too speculative, and they cannot establish standing to sue. Dissent: The majority's standing requirement is too high and conflicts with prior case law. The harm alleged by the plaintiffs is not speculative, and the FISA provision creates a reasonable fear of future harm.
Lochner v. New York (1905)
Dispute: NLRB charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. with an unfair labor practice (ULP) for refusing to comply with labor organizing sections of the NLRA. Steel company claimed production of steel had nothing to do with interstate commerce, violating the 5th and 7th amendments. legal reasoning/opinion: The steel company argued that the production of steel by their employees had nothing to do with interstate commerce, and therefore the NLRB violated two provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice Hughes and the majority ruled that the NLRB had jurisdiction to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. The Act applies to employees engaged in production and employees have the right to self-organize and select their own representatives for collective bargaining without restraint or coercion by their employer. Dissent (McReynolds): Congress does not have such a broad scope of powers. The right to contract is fundamental and includes the privilege of selecting those with whom one is willing to assume contractual relations.
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. (1978)
Dispute: OSHA inspectors requested to inspect non-public areas of Barlow's Inc. without a search warrant, which was refused by Mr. Barlow citing violation of 4th Amendment rights. Legal reasoning/opinion (Justice White): Reasonableness of a warrantless search depends on the specific needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Government agents seeking entry over an individual's objection is the critical fact, as employees are not being prohibited from reporting OSHA violations, which is beyond the employer's reasonable expectation of privacy. Dissent: Stevens, Blackmun, Rehnquist OSHA's warrantless inspections violate the Fourth Amendment. A warrant requirement is necessary to protect individuals' privacy rights and prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. The government's interest in ensuring employee safety does not outweigh an individual's privacy rights.
Morgan v. United States (1938)
Dispute: Packers/Stockyard Act (1921) authorized sec of agriculture to limit the cost stockyard operators could charge after a "full hearing." Operators argued they were given unfair treatment since they weren't allowed to see bureau's report the secretary relied on. Legal reasoning/opinion: the right to a hearing embraces the right to present evidence and reasonable opportunity to know claims of the opposing party/meet with them. The right to submit an argument in a contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding and be advised of what the Government proposes. Dissent (black): Justice Black believed that the Secretary of Agriculture had acted within his statutory authority in setting the maximum stockyard charges, and that the appellants had not been deprived of due process. He argued that the majority opinion's requirement for an oral hearing was not mandated by the statute and went beyond what was necessary to provide due process. Warned that the majority's decision could hinder the government's ability to regulate business practices and protect consumers.
Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) (neoliberal regulatory takings)
Dispute: Petitioner Dolan requested to expand a parking lot in front of her mechanic shop. The city of Tigard responded with a condition that Dolan also construct an offshoot to divert rainwater to a local creek and a public walkway. Dolan appealed the decision, claiming her 5th Amendment rights were violated. legal reasoning/opinion: The "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests must be met in order for a condition imposed by the government to constitute a valid exercise of its police powers. The condition imposed by the city did not meet these tests, as there was no demonstrated connection between the condition and the impact of the proposed land use. Therefore, the condition was deemed an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Dissent (blackmun, stevens, souter, ginsburg): Stevens, joined by Blackmun, Souter, Ginsburg, maintained that the correct approach to "the taking doctrine" is not just state cases, but also SCOTUS cases that require the analysis to focus on the impact of the city's actions on the entire parcel of private property. "Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." The nondivisibility principle states that where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018)
Dispute: Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their employers? Lewis sued his former employer (Epic Systems Corp.) after his employment ended, alleging that Epic misclassified a group of its employees such that they were excluded from receiving overtime pay. Lewis sought to litigate the federal claim on behalf of a nationwide class under the FLSA's collective action provision, even though the arbitration agreement provided individualized proceedings. Legal reasoning/opinion: The Arbitration Act (1925) requires courts to respect and enforce agreements to arbitrate and specifically directed them to respect and enforce the parties' chosen arbitration procedures. The employees maintain that the Act's "saving clause" allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements on a ground of illegality, such as the misclassification of employees alleged by Lewis. The employees' proffered defense conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures is inconsistent with the Arbitration Act and its saving clause. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not invalidate the Arbitration Act. The Court rejects the employees' argument that the NLRA provides a clear and manifest congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act and require class and collective actions. The Court also finds that the FAA's savings clause does not bar enforcement of the agreement here. In conclusion, the Court holds that the Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements providing for individualized proceedings and bars employees from seeking relief on a class or collective basis. Dissent (ginsberg, breyer, sotomayor, kagan): The employees' right to engage in collective action is a substantive right protected by the NLRA, and the Arbitration Act does not command that this right be overridden. The Court's decision is "egregiously wrong" and will lead to disastrous consequences for employees. The Court's opinion effectively deprives employees of their right to act collectively in seeking relief for commonly experienced wage and hours grievances. The NLRA requires that employees have the right to engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid or protection, and collective action is an essential form of concerted activity. The Court's opinion fails to give proper weight to this important statutory right.
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State BD of Equalization of Colorado (1915)
Dispute: State BD of Equalization raised property taxes in Denver by an across-the-board 40% without notice or a hearing. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the BD's reasonings. Bi-Metallic Investment Company argued that this across-the-board increase in property taxes violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment by depriving the company of "property" without due process. Legal reasoning/opinion: Due process is not required to make a rule, as opposed to adjudicating an outcome. When agencies make across-the-board decisions based on general factual conditions and not the particular situation of any particular regulated party, these facts are referred to as "legislative facts" because they are normally found legislatively. Dissent: none
Department of Air Force v. Rose (1976)
Dispute: Students at NYU Law researching an article on the US air force academy honor code were denied access to case summaries of honors and ethics hearings even though no individuals would have been identified by name. Brought a lawsuit seeking disclosure of the hearing summaries under FOIA. The department of air force argued that the summaries were personnel files and should be protected from mandatory disclosure. They cited exemptions 2 and 6 of FOIA, which prohibit disclosure of internal personnel rules and practices of an agency, including disclosures that would facilitate lawbreaking. Legal reasoning/opinion (brennan, stewart, white, marshall, powell): Congress's revisions to the original FOIA statute support a general philosophy of full-agency disclosure, unless the information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language. Exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. Dissent (burger, blackmun, rehnquist): FOIA requires balancing the public's right to know with individuals' privacy Congressional objective: to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. Nothing in the Act should be read to authorize the withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated. Support a general philosophy of full-agency disclosure, unless the information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language. Exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson (2000)
Dispute: The FDA has not asserted jurisdiction over the regulation of tobacco products since the passage of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1938. In 1996, the FDA issued regulations to restrict the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to protect children and adolescents. The FDA argues that nicotine is a "drug" and cigarettes/smokeless tobacco are the "devices." Legal reasoning/opinion: The FDA's interpretation of the statute is not entitled to Chevron deference. The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products is inconsistent with the FDA's previous position, the structure of the statute, and Congress's intent. The FDA lacks the authority to regulate tobacco products under current law. Dissent (breyer, stevens, souter, ginsburg): The FDA's interpretation of the statute should be given Chevron deference. The FDA's regulations are a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The FDA has the authority to regulate tobacco products under current law.
FTC v. American Tobacco Co
Dispute: The FTC ordered two tobacco companies to produce all letters and telegrams sent and received by the companies from all of their customers in 1921. The companies challenged the order, arguing that it violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. Legal reasoning/opinion (justice holmes): Administrative agencies like the FTC have the authority to order companies to produce documentary evidence as part of their investigation into alleged violations of the law. However, this right of access is limited to only those documents that are relevant and potentially contain evidence. The agency cannot engage in a "fishing expedition" by demanding all documents without a valid reason. The agency must have some reasonable grounds to believe that the documents being requested contain relevant evidence. Mere suspicion is not enough to justify an administrative investigation. Dissent: none
Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. (1984)
Dispute: The National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) "bubble concept" in 1981, which was created to implement the permit program for "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution under the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. NRDC argued that the "bubble concept" was not consistent with what Congress intended when it amended the Clean Air Act in 1977. legal reasoning/opinion: When a court reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute, it first determines whether Congress directly addressed the precise question at issue. If Congress did not directly address the precise question, the court determines whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. The EPA's flexible interpretation of the term "source" before and after the 1977 Amendments convinced the court that the agency has consistently interpreted the statute in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex field. Dissent: none
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1983)
Dispute: The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NHTSA) of 1966 authorized the Sec. of Transportation to issue motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." The passive restraint (seat belt) regulation was introduced in 1967 and passed in 1977. The Reagan Administration rescinded NHTSA's seat belt standard in 1981, arguing that the automatic restraint requirement was no longer "reasonable or practicable" because the auto industry was working on air bag safety. Legal reasoning/opinion: NHTSA failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement, and that the agency must either consider the matter further or adhere to amending Standard 208 along the lines of its analysis. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the 1974 Amendments concerning occupant crash protection standards indicate the standards are to be promulgated under the informal rulemaking procedures of ss 553 of the APA. The agency's action may therefore be set aside if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The process of revoking a rule is subject to the same test. Reversing the agency's former views as to the proper standard requires the new Secretary to be accountable and obligated to give a reasoned analysis for the change. Dissent (rehnquist, CJ Burger, Powell, O'Connor): the majority's decision was an example of "political jurisprudence." It would impose additional procedural requirements on agency decision-making that were not required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Munn v. Illinois (1877)
Dispute: The case, also known as "The Granger cases," involved a provision in the Illinois Constitution (1870) that declared grain elevators as "public warehouses" and authorized the state legislature to pass legislation related to grain storage. The Illinois legislature then passed an act creating a state commission (1871) to license warehouse operators and regulate the rates that warehouse owners can charge. Munn and Scott, two Chicago managers, were convicted and fined $100 for operating without a license and charging farmers higher prices for storing more grain than the commission allowed. Munn and Scott sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error, challenging the authority of the state commission to fix, by law, maximum charges for grain storage, arguing that the U.S. Constitution delegated to Congress the power to "regulate commerce" in Article I, Section 8. legal reasoning/opinion: CJ Waite's opinion focused on the meaning of the word "deprive" in the 14th Amendment, which states that "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Waite argued that when one becomes a member of society, they necessarily part with some rights or privileges, and that "a body politic" is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." He further argued that from this source comes the police powers, which are nothing more or less than powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, and that the government regulates the conduct of its citizens towards one another. Waite also argued that statutes regulating the use or price of private property do not necessarily deprive an owner of their property without due process of law. He contended that the power to regulate stems from the state's power to police, also known as "police power jurisprudence," and that private property "affected with a public interest" ceases to be juris privati only when used in a manner that makes it of public consequence and affects the community at large. Dissent (field, strong): Field and Strong argued that there is no magic in the language, though used by a constitutional convention, which can change a private business into a public one or alter the character of the building in which the business is transacted. They maintained that the power of the State over the property of the citizen under the constitutional guarantee is well defined, and that the State may take his property for public use upon just compensation being made, control the use and possession of his property so far as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of others, and secure to them the equal use and enjoyment of their property. They argued that the legislation in question is nothing less than a bold assertion of absolute power by the State to control, at its discretion, the property and business of the citizen and fix the compensation they shall receive.
Kelo v. City of New London (2005) (neoliberal regulatory takings)
Dispute: The city of New London, CT was going to develop housing in an occupied area of the city. In the process, the city would have to move people already living there, although moved persons would receive compensation. Some people took it, but others decided to stay in place. These people sued the city, claiming that their 5th Amendment rights were violated. legal reasoning/opinion: The Court held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The city's taking of private property was for a public purpose, namely, the economic development of the community, which was a permissible use under the Takings Clause. The Court also deferred to the city's determination that the taking of the land was necessary for the project, as long as it was not "clearly erroneous." What society needs has changed over time and varies from place to place. The courts have not set strict rules for when the government can take private property, but rather they have given the government the freedom to decide what is in the public's interest. Dissent (rehnquist, o'conner, scalia, thomas): Justice O'Connor wrote a strong dissent, arguing that the majority's decision would allow local governments to take private property from homeowners and give it to businesses in the name of economic development, even if the homeowners did not want to sell. The dissent argued that the majority's decision would weaken the protections of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which was meant to protect individual property rights against government power.
Ventura v. Shalala (1996) U.S.C.A., D.C.Cir
Dispute: Ventura had applied for these benefits, but the Social Security Administration (SSA) had denied the claim, finding that Ventura was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Was the SSA's decision to deny his claim was based on substantial evidence and followed the proper legal procedures? Legal reasoning/opinion: The court found that the Social Security Administration had not provided sufficient evidence to support its determination that Ventura was not disabled. The court determined that the SSA's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and therefore could not be upheld. The court held that the SSA had failed to properly evaluate Ventura's medical evidence and had not given proper consideration to the opinions of Ventura's treating physicians. Dissent: none
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1978)
Dispute: whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 precluded the imposition of additional regulatory requirements by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on nuclear power plants beyond those explicitly authorized by the Act. Legal reasoning/opinion: the NRC had the authority to regulate nuclear power plants in accordance with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. the federal courts did not have the authority to impose additional procedural requirements on the NRC beyond those provided for by Congress. Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of adhering to the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. Dissent: none
Humphrey's Executor v. US (1935)
Dispute: whether the President had the power to remove commissioners from independent regulatory agencies without cause. Legal reasoning/opinion: The Supreme Court ruled that the President could not remove commissioners from independent regulatory agencies without cause. The Court held that independent regulatory agencies are different from executive agencies and are not subject to the same kind of presidential control. The Court cited the language of the statute creating the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as evidence that Congress intended for the FTC to be independent of presidential control. The Court also emphasized the importance of preserving the independence of regulatory agencies to carry out their statutory duties. Dissent: none
Goldberg v. Kelly (1970)
John Kelly's benefits under the NY State Home relief program were terminated without a hearing. NY State's procedure for termination of benefits did not provide a fair hearing at the time of termination. legal reasoning/opinion: Welfare entitlements are property that the 14th Amendment's due process clause protects. The court established a test to determine when constitutional restraints must apply to the withdrawal of public assistance: Consider the extent to which NOT providing some form of procedural due process would impose on the beneficiary a grievous loss. Determine whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. The government's interest in "summary adjudication" is to conserve financial resources and administrative time by limiting evidentiary hearings until after benefits have been terminated. Dissent (black, burger, stewart): Justice Black and Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the court should defer to the states in establishing their own procedures for terminating welfare benefits. Justice Stewart also dissented, arguing that the court should not have intervened in the state's process before the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Mistretta v. US (1989)
challenging the sentencing reform act of 1984 Dispute: Mistretta challenged the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established the US Sentencing Commission and gave it authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines for federal courts. legal reasoning/opinion: The Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine or the separation of powers doctrine. The Court reasoned that Congress had provided an "intelligible principle" to guide the Commission's exercise of its delegated authority, and that the Act did not impermissibly intrude on the judicial branch's authority. Dissent (Scalia): Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the Act violated the non-delegation doctrine and the separation of powers doctrine. Scalia believed that the Act gave the Commission too much discretion and failed to provide a meaningful standard to guide its exercise of authority. He also believed that the Act improperly assigned judicial functions to the Commission, which violated the Constitution's allocation of powers.
