Chapter 5 - Arrests and seizures without warrants
Requirements for Searches Incident to Arrest
(1) hot pursuit (2) likelihood of escape or danger to others absent hot pursuit; and (3) evanescent evidence. Police officers must often enter a home or building without a warrant while in "hot pursuit" of a suspect who the police believed had just committed a serious crime. Under some circumstances, they are permitted to arrest the suspect, and evidence they encounter within the building may be admissible, under the hot pursuit.Hot pursuit permits warrantless entry only when the police have probable cause to believe that the person they are chasing has committed a crime and is on the premises entered. ( does not mean you can search the house, you need a warrant.) 3. Evanescent Evidence - In some situations, warrantless searches may be permitted securing evanescent evidence, or evidence that may rapidly vanish or disappear. This may include certain types of evidence inside a person, as well as a house, a paper, or an effect. Schmerber v. California* Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted. Rochin v. California Rochin swallowed drug capsules to dispose of evidence. The police pummeled him and jumped on his stomach in a vain effort to make him throw up. They took him to a hospital where a doctor was instructed by the police officers to administer an emetic by forcibly passing a tube into Rochin's stomach. He vomited the capsules and was convicted on the basis of the evidence produced from his vomit.
Scope of the search
A search incident to arrest is also limited scope, or the area that may be searched. The case of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), was the first to set limits on the scope of a search incident to arrest. Officers armed with a valid arrest warrant arrested a man and then conducted a warrantless search of his one-room business, including the desk, safe, and file cabinets. The Supreme Court upheld the search because the room "was small and under the immediate and complete control of the respondent." Nearly 20 years later, the Supreme Court heavily modified the Rabinowitz rule. In Chimel, discussed above, the Court argued that the Rabinowitz decision had been construed to mean that "a warrantless search 'incident to a lawful arrest' may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the 'possession' or under the 'control' of the person arrested." Further, the Court noted that the Rabinowitz standard gave police "the opportunity to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, [but] by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere." To get around this problem, Justice Stewart formulated the armspan rule. (if i'm arrested here, the cops have no reason to look for something in my house in New York) In the Court's words, a search incident to arrest would now be limited to the area "within [the] immediate control" of the person arrested—that is, "the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
Impracticality of Obtaining a Warrant
Coolidge v. New Hampshire In the wake of a "particularly brutal" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a decision in which a number of justices chose to concur in part and dissent in part, the Court held that the searches and seizures of Coolidge's property were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's opinion held that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Coolidge's automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." Stewart also rejected New Hampshire's arguments in favor of making an exception to the warrant requirement. Stewart held that neither the "incident to arrest" doctrine nor the "plain view" doctrine justified the search, and that an "automobile exception" was inapplicable.
Probable Cause Requirement
In Carroll, the Court noted that "where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the Court probable cause." In other words, although police may search a vehicle without a warrant, the search must still be based on probable cause. Note, however, that probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest are not one and the same. While probable cause to search may exist, it does not automatically give probable cause to arrest.
Expansions of the Armspan Rule
In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the incident search in two ways. It held that the police may, as part of a search incident to arrest, look in areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest for other persons who might attack the officers. In such cases, no justification is required to search these persons. The key is that such a search must occur incident to an arrest. Next, the Court held that at any point up to the time the arrest is completed, the police may engage in a protective sweep, defined as "a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding." However, reasonable suspicion must exist for such a sweep to be justified. Thus, no justification is required after arrest, but reasonable suspicion is required to engage in a sweep up to the point of the arrest.
Automobile Searches
In the landmark case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Supreme Court carved out an automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court declared that the warrantless search of an automobile is permissible when (1) there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and (2) securing a warrant is impractical. Carroll was decided in 1925, during Prohibition. The case involved the stop of a vehicle driven by a suspect who was known to have previously engaged in the sale of whiskey. A warrantless search of the car revealed 68 bottles of illegal liquor. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search on the grounds that the evidence would be lost if the police had been required to take the time to secure a warrant. If you're involved in a hit and run- the cops will inspect it. -->Was the search of the car legal? The police had probable cause to search the vehicle. Credit card example. ''The cop had probable cause because he saw suspect with 2 cards and getting declines. '' ''police does not have probable cause because its not enough. '' evidence was dismissed under exclusionary rule. Police often thinks you can search the car without the warrant but you still need probable cause. The police can say ''do you mind if I look into your car or follow him and pull him over for speeding''
Racial Profiling
Racial profiling is legal when used right. Race can't play a role but it is allowed as a factor. (ex. Cops looking for a male suspect, hispanic. So when they look for drivers they will look for that description) Wren v United states Cops stop for traffic violations, defendant claims stop was based on their race. The court ruled it was illegal stop.
Plain view searches
The "plain view" doctrine first emerged in the Supreme Court's decision in Coolidge 403 U.S. 443. (1) the police are lawfully in the area where the evidence is located; (2) the items are immediately apparent as subject to seizure; and (3) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent. The The lawful access requirement* For the plain view doctrine to apply, the police must have lawful access to the object to be seized. As the Supreme Court stated in Coolidge: [Plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle . . . that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances." The Court's opinion in Coolidge reinforces the point that just because the police may see contraband does not necessarily mean they can seize it The "Immediately Apparent" Requirement* In addition to the requirement that the police have lawful access to an object, it must also be immediately apparent that the object is subject to seizure. Immediately apparent means that the officer has probable cause to seize the object. This was the decision reached in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). In that case, the police entered the defendant's apartment without a warrant because a bullet had been fired through his floor into the apartment below, injuring a person there. The warrantless entry was based on the exigency of looking for the shooter, for other potential victims, and for the weapon used in the incident. Once inside the apartment, the officer observed new stereo equipment that seemed out of place, given the surroundings. The officer suspected the stereo equipment was stolen but did not have probable cause to believe that it was, so he picked up a turntable in order to obtain its serial number. He then called in the information and confirmed that it was stolen. The Court held that this warrantless action did not satisfy the plain view doctrine. It was not immediately apparent to the officer that the stereo equipment was stolen.
Rationale for the Automobile Exception
The Court disagreed, citing five characteristics of automobiles: they (1) travel on public roads; (2) are subject to state regulations and licensing requirements; (3) are subject to other strict regulations; (4) are subject to periodic inspections; and (5) may be impounded for public safety reasons (433 U.S. 1 [1977]). Thus, the Court declared that the automobile exception should not apply to the warrantless search of personal items, regardless of their mobility.
Plain Touch, Feel, and Smell*
The term plain view seems to imply that the plain view doctrine is limited to items that the police can see with their eyes. However, in recent years, the Court has extended the plain view doctrine to incorporate items discovered using additional senses, especially smell
Warrantless searches
There are exceptions to the warrant requirement because there are 4 types of warrantless searches that require probable cause. searches incident to an arrest searches conducted under exigent circumstances searches involving automobiles searches based on the "plain view" doctrine. Other warrantless searches exist, such as consent searches, but they do not require probable cause. These exceptions all require probable cause.
Searches Incident to Arrest
When arresting a suspect, police officers can search the person in order to protect themselves from harm and to prevent destruction of evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in favor of Chimel. It held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. (just because you arrest someone, doesn't mean you can go to their house)
Warrantless Arrests*
the Supreme Court has also sanctioned certain types of arrests that may be made without a warrant. They include arrests in the presence of exigent circumstances and arrests in public places. a warrantless arrest, with probable cause, is permissible if any of the following is present: (1) hot pursuit; (2) danger to officers; (3) danger to third parties; (4) escape; and (5) destruction of evidence.