Civil Procedure

Section 1442

(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue. (2) A property holder whose title is derived from any such officer, where such action or prosecution affects the validity of any law of the United States. (3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties; (4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for or relating to any act in the discharge of his official duty under an order of such House. (b) A personal action commenced in any State court by an alien against any citizen of a State who is, or at the time the alleged action accrued was, a civil officer of the United States and is a nonresident of such State, wherein jurisdiction is obtained by the State court by personal service of process, may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division in which the defendant was served with process. (c) Solely for purposes of determining the propriety of removal under subsection (a), a law enforcement officer, who is the defendant in a criminal prosecution, shall be deemed to have been acting under the color of his office if the officer— (1) protected an individual in the presence of the officer from a crime of violence; (2) provided immediate assistance to an individual who suffered, or who was threatened with, bodily harm; or (3) prevented the escape of any individual who the officer reasonably believed to have committed, or was about to commit, in the presence of the officer, a crime of violence that resulted in, or was likely to result in, death or serious bodily injury.

1391

(a)Applicability of Section.—Except as otherwise provided by law— (1) this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United States; and (2) the proper venue for a civil action shall be determined without regard to whether the action is local or transitory in nature. (b)Venue in General.—A civil action may be brought in— (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. (c)Residency.—For all venue purposes— (1) a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled; (2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business; and (3) a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district, and the joinder of such a defendant shall be disregarded in determining where the action may be brought with respect to other defendants. (d)Residency of Corporations in States With Multiple Districts.— For purposes of venue under this chapter, in a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts. (e) Actions Where Defendant Is Officer or Employee of the United States.— (1)In general.— A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party. (2)Service.— The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought. (f)Civil Actions Against a Foreign State.—A civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be brought— (1) in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; (2) in any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated, if the claim is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title; (3) in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or is doing business, if the action is brought against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of this title; or (4) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. (g)Multiparty, Multiforum Litigation.— A civil action in which jurisdiction of the district court is based upon section 1369 of this title may be brought in any district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the accident giving rise to the action took place.

1446

(a)Generally.— A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. (b)Requirements; Generally.— (1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. (2) (A) When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action. (B) Each defendant shall have 30 days after receipt by or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons described in paragraph (1) to file the notice of removal. (C) If defendants are served at different times, and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal. (3) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. (c)Requirements; Removal Based on Diversity of Citizenship.— (1) A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action. (2) If removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a), the sum demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy, except that— (A) the notice of removal may assert the amount in controversy if the initial pleading seeks— (i) nonmonetary relief; or (ii) a money judgment, but the State practice either does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded; and (B) removal of the action is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy asserted under subparagraph (A) if the district court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount specified in section 1332(a). (3) (A) If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable solely because the amount in controversy does not exceed the amount specified in section 1332(a), information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an "other paper" under subsection (b)(3). (B) If the notice of removal is filed more than 1 year after commencement of the action and the district court finds that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith under paragraph (1). (d)Notice to Adverse Parties and State Court.— Promptly after the filing of such notice of removal of a civil action the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded. (e)Counterclaim in 337 Proceeding.— With respect to any counterclaim removed to a district court pursuant to section 337(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the district court shall resolve such counterclaim in the same manner as an original complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that the payment of a filing fee shall not be required in such cases and the counterclaim shall relate back to the date of the original complaint in the proceeding before the International Trade Commission under section 337 of that Act. (g) [1] Where the civil action or criminal prosecution that is removable under section 1442(a) is a proceeding in which a judicial order for testimony or documents is sought or issued or sought to be enforced, the 30-day requirement of subsection (b) of this section and paragraph (1) of section 1455(b) is satisfied if the person or entity desiring to remove the proceeding files the notice of removal not later than 30 days after receiving, through service, notice of any such proceeding.

Section 1441

(a)Generally.— Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. (b)Removal Based on Diversity of Citizenship.— (1) In determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded. (2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. (c)Joinder of Federal Law Claims and State Law Claims.— (1) If a civil action includes— (A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (within the meaning of section 1331 of this title), and (B) a claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute, the entire action may be removed if the action would be removable without the inclusion of the claim described in subparagraph (B). (2) Upon removal of an action described in paragraph (1), the district court shall sever from the action all claims described in paragraph (1)(B) and shall remand the severed claims to the State court from which the action was removed. Only defendants against whom a claim described in paragraph (1)(A) has been asserted are required to join in or consent to the removal under paragraph (1). (d)Actions Against Foreign States.— Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury. Where removal is based upon this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any time for cause shown. (e)Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction.— (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a defendant in a civil action in a State court may remove the action to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the action is pending if— (A) the action could have been brought in a United States district court under section 1369 of this title; or (B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a United States district court and arises from the same accident as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have been brought in a district court as an original matter. The removal of an action under this subsection shall be made in accordance with section 1446 of this title, except that a notice of removal may also be filed before trial of the action in State court within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first becomes a party to an action under section 1369 in a United States district court that arises from the same accident as the action in State court, or at a later time with leave of the district court. (2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection and the district court to which it is removed or transferred under section 1407(j) [1] has made a liability determination requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district court shall remand the action to the State court from which it had been removed for the determination of damages, unless the court finds that, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should be retained for the determination of damages. (3) Any remand under paragraph (2) shall not be effective until 60 days after the district court has issued an order determining liability and has certified its intention to remand the removed action for the determination of damages. An appeal with respect to the liability determination of the district court may be taken during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction over the district court. In the event a party files such an appeal, the remand shall not be effective until the appeal has been finally disposed of. Once the remand has become effective, the liability determination shall not be subject to further review by appeal or otherwise. (4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by appeal or otherwise. (5) An action removed under this subsection shall be deemed to be an action under section 1369 and an action in which jurisdiction is based on section 1369 of this title for purposes of this section and sections 1407, 1697, and 1785 of this title. (6) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the authority of the district court to transfer or dismiss an action on the ground of inconvenient forum. (f)Derivative Removal Jurisdiction.— The court to which a civil action is removed under this section is not precluded from hearing and determining any claim in such civil action because the State court from which such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.

Pennoyer v. Neff

1. Pennoyer v. Neff: Would there be a different result in Pennoyer v. Neff had Pennoyer come to Oregon and Mitchel had him served while he was in the state? Would Oregon then have jurisdiction? Possibly; in personam depends on presence. Judge Field says Oregon doesn't have jurisdiction over someone who isn't in state's borders a. Trial court- affidavit was invalid, so Mitchell v. Neff was invalid b. SC must determine if Constitution regulates about Oregon's authority over Neff c. Need to determine defendant and foreign state d. Holding: affirmative statement of the rule of law that the court had to decide in the case e. Mitchell v. Neff: why judgement shouldn't be enforced? FFC, problem not involved in direct review, needed 14th amendment for that. After 14th amendment, ability to go through appeal process, due process and FFC f. "Rule" of law: attach the property at the outset a. Who owns this property situated in our borders? Question is ownership of the property- everyone in world who has ownership of property Attorney Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon state court for failure to pay for legal services. Mitchell submitted affidavit, saying that Neff owned land in Oregon, he was living somewhere in California. You have to attach property on the outset of lawsuit for certainty that judgment can be collected (this was a quasi-in-rem proceeding, not true in rem proceeding). Notice of the suit was published in the newspaper for 6 weeks, and Neff never answered or appeared in court. A default judgment was given to Mitchell, and he enforced the judgment by securing a writ of execution against Neff's property. Neff's land was sold and bought by Mitchell. The title of the estate was transferred to Pennoyer. In 1874, Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court. The Court said the original judgment in Mitchell v. Neff was invalid because the lower court had no jurisdiction over the defendant. There was no personal jurisdiction because plaintiff filed "in personam" meaning against the person (who was out of state), instead of filing "in rem" meaning against the property (involves property and rights of everyone in the world). Mitchell should have used quasi-in-rem jurisdiction (suit doesn't involve property but it is means of establishing jurisdiction) by attaching Neff's land in the beginning of the lawsuit. It is important to note that today, the state would not be able to exercise personal jurisdiction simply because a quasi in rem attachment. This attachment would have to meet the standard set out in International Shoe. Because the judgment was invalid or null, full faith and credit is not given by another state to enforce the judgment.

Transfer/Change of Venue

1.) Intra-system a.) Moving from a trial court in a judicial system to another trial court in the same judicial system. (THIS IS NOT REMOVAL) b.) Can transfer between trial courts in same state court systems. Can't switch from AL to TN state trial court. c.) If we're in federal court in AL, you CAN transfer to a federal trial court in TN because they are of the same judicial court system. d.) You CAN consent to venue. 2.) Terminology a.) Transferor - Court from which we are transferring b.) Transferee - Court to which we are transferring 3.) In both federal transfer statutes, the transferee court must be a proper venue and it must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Must be true without waiver. a.) 1404(a) - In a 1404 transfer, the transferor court is a proper venue and we may transfer based upon three things: i.) Convenience of the parties ii.) Convenience of the witnesses iii.) Interests of Justice - Another place that is "just better" than the proper venue. Look at practical concerns, evidence, law, where would it be more appropriate, etc. - The transferee court applies the choice of law rules of the transferor court, when both were proper venues. b.) 1406(a) - In a 1406 transfer, venue in the transferor court is improper. The court may transfer in the interest of justice and efficiency or it may dismiss. - Even if they don't have personal jurisdiction, they can still transfer. - Since it is a transfer from an improper to proper, transferee court choice of law rules will apply. (It is the proper court) D.) Forum Non Conveniens 1.) This is where the court dismisses a case because litigation would be far more convenient in some other court. a.) The center of gravity and more appropriate place is somewhere else. b.) You would dismiss when transfer is not available, usually when the more appropriate court is in a different judicial system. c.) Comes up often when most convenient court is in a foreign county. 2.) Piper v. Reyno: Plane crash in Scotland, killed Scottish citizens, operated/owned by Scottish citizens, but the plane was manufactured in the U.S. Suit was brought against manufacturer in PA, but SCOTUS said that district court ought to dismiss the case (can't use 1404(a) because it's a foreign country - not intra-system) and let the parties litigate in Scotland. They use factors to weigh this: a.) Public Factors; what law would apply, what community will be burdened, etc. b.) Private Factors; where is the evidence, where are the witnesses, etc. 3.) When a court dismisses under Forum Non Conveniens it can impose certain conditions on the defendant: a.) Court will dismiss and defendant will have to waive personal jurisdiction defense or statute of limitations argument. b.) The fact that the plaintiff will recover less in another court can be thrown into mix of factors, but by itself it is not determinative. 4.) Note the choice of law issues in Piper: Case was originally in CA district court where venue was proper for one defendant and not another. One transferred to PA according to 1404 and the other via 1406. So there was a conflict when one defendant required CA law and the other PA as its first proper venue

BK again

20 year long term agreement. Difference between commercial and consumer transaction. Case can decide status. Can't decide money based on in rem. Appellate review- sufficient evidence; light in favor of prosecution. Review of statute-lenity "Once decided defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with FS these contacts may be..." Reference to quantitative quality of the contact. Up to plaintiff to prove. 'purposefully'- directed activity. Next section, qualitative 2 things in BK that led Court to believe met Due Process clause? 20 year length of contract, choice of law (Fla.), plaintiff and BK interacting in commercial transaction. "Directed action at forum resident". Could meet Int. shoe standard and not meet 14th amendment issue; burden on the defendant for this (prove jurisdictionally unreasonable) "compelling case" which is very difficult. Venue inconvenience, choice of law Demonstrate defendant had directed (purpose) activity toward FS (plaintiff). Analyze qual and quant aspects Reasonableness evaluation of qual and compelling case

Asahi again

3rd party action when defendant brings someone else in who isn't part of action saying 'if I'm liable to plaintiff, you're liable to me for all/part" Court says Cali lacked personal jurisdiction. No majority opinion on whether 100,000 units sufficient for 'purposeful contacts' why qual are we saying 14th amendment would be violated? State has no interest in proceeding; had already settled with... had intent, would have to do more analysis

Hertz Corp v. Friend

28 USC 1332 (c)(1) says "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of a State by which it has been incorporated and of a State where it has its principal place of business." Two employees of Hertz want to bring a class action suit against Hertz for alleged violation of CA's wage and hour laws. Plaintiffs wanted to sue in state court, but through the removal doctrine, defendant removed suit to federal court. Hertz argues in favor of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, stating its principal place of business is in New Jersey (leadership of Hertz domestic subsidiaries located in corporate headquarters in NJ, core executive and administrative functions carried out there). CA had only 273/1606 car rentals, 2300/11,230 employees, $811 million/ $4.4 billion annual reveue, 3.8 million/ 21 million annual transactions. US District Court of Northern District of California typically uses the general business activities test (place where the majority of executive and administrative functions are performed) and also say that if the amount of activity substantially predominates in one State, that State is the company's principal place of business. It said Hertz was a citizen of CA because a plurality of the relevant business activity occurs in CA and the amount of activities in CA compared to the next closest state was significant. The Court found the principal place of business refers to the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, or coordinate the corporation's activities. The "nerve center" will typically be found at a corporation's headquarters provided that it is the direction, control, and coordination. The reason behind the rule shouldn't control the outcome of a case. Ninth circuit's judgment is vacated and case remanded. Different circuits and different courts within a circuit applied highly general multi factors tests in different ways (nerve center, locus of operations, confer of corporate activities) in an effort to find the state where a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice in a local court. Principal place of business refers to a place where a corporation's officers direct, control and coordinate corporation's activities (nerve center). It is normally the place where a corporations maintains its headquarters (simply holding board meetings there is not enough). Ninth circuit was wrong in its general business activities test because if a corporation may be deemed a citizen of CA on the basis of activities that reflect CA's larger population, nearly every national retailer would be deemed a citizen of CA for diversity purposes. The principal place of business is the center of overall direction, control, and coordination. The mere filing of a form by Securities and Exchange Commission listing a corporation's principal executive offices is not enough, unless accompanied by more proof to establish the nerve center. Nerve center approach is supported by 1) language of statute 2) it is simple to apply comparatively speaking (preserve judicial resources, promote greater predictability) 3) statues legislative history reveals Congress wants a test that is not complex or impractical to apply. Anomalies will arise that create counter-intuitive results. However, this is a price to pay for the necessity of having a clearer rule and more uniform legal system. In this case, petitioners declaration suggests that Hertz's center of direction, control, and coordination is the same as its corporate headquarters and are located in New Jersey (diversity of citizenship).

Goodyear v. Brown (2011)

A bus accident outside of Paris took the lives of two 13 -year-old boys from North Carolina. The parents attributed the accident to defective tires manufactured in Turkey by Good Year subsidiary. The parents filed suit in NC, suing Goodyear USA (didn't contest jurisdiction), and three indirect subsidiaries located in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. These companies manufacture tires primarily for the European and Asian markets. The tires differ in size, construction from those sold in US. North Carolina courts exercised jurisdiction over defendants, saying the tires made abroad reached North Carolina through "the stream of commerce" and that connection was sufficient for NC to exercise jurisdiction. They exercised general jurisdiction, stating the defendant had "continuous and systematic" connection with the state because they placed their tires in the "stream of commerce" which reached NC through a "highly organized distribution process." Furthermore, the courts recognized NC's interest in providing a forum for its citizens to seek redress for their injuries and to avoid their citizens traveling to a country where they have no ties to litigate. They found the cause of action did not have to arise out of the subsidiaries' contacts with the forum state. The U.S. Supreme Court found the connection between the foreign subsidiaries and forum state is inadequate for general jurisdiction because petitioners are not domiciled in North Carolina, there are no "systematic and continuous general business contacts" with the forum state, and that claim is unrelated to the defendant's activities with the forum state. There is a difference in general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction happens when a foreign cooperation or subsidiary has affiliations with the forum state that are "continuous and systematic" and the company is domiciled there or incorporated there. A high level of contact is required. Specific jurisdiction the cause of action arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state or the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activity in the forum state (International Shoe). The bus accident occurred in France and the tires were manufactured and sold abroad. North Carolina does not have specific jurisdiction. Does North Carolina have general jurisdiction? No, because their connection through the "stream of commerce" does not establish "continuous and systematic" contacts. Petitioners are not registered to do business in NC, they have no place of business there, they have no bank accounts there, they do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products there, they do not do business there, they do not sell or ship tires there. The tire that caused the accident was never distributed in NC. The stream of commerce argument (products traveled through extensive chain of transactions before reaching the forum state) only helps to establish specific jurisdiction (the cause of action arised out of the controversy that took place in the state), not general jurisdiction. Stream of commerce contacts are not enough for general jurisdiction. For a state to have general jurisdiction of a foreign company or subsidiary, the company has to have "continuous or systematic" connections with the state and the company is domiciled in the state, the company is incorporated there.

In rem

A true in rem case: Person A vs. the World If property is within the state, and we attach it, we have possession. Personal obligation issue versus previous property ownership interests Expanded notion in Pennoyer v. Neff Quasi-in rem: no relationship between claim and the property

Venue

A.) Steps to get case into Court 1.) Personal Jurisdiction 2.) Subject Matter Jurisdiction a.) Simply says you can go into Federal Court. b.) Does not tell us "which" federal court. 3.) Venue a.) There is no constitutional right to venue, deals completely with statutes. b.) It is a question of Geography 4.) SEE PROBLEMS ON P. 246-247 (#1-3) B.) Basic Provisions for Proper Venue 1.) In removal cases, venue is in the district embracing the state court. 2.) Local actions must be brought in the district where the land lies. a.) Local actions are cases about ownership, possession, or injury to land b.) Includes trespass c.) Historically, this used to be applied. Now treated same as transitory. 3.) The Rules for the regular/transitory case. (COME FROM STATUTE) a.) Transitory cases are anything that is not a local action. b.) For most cases, rules for diversity and federal questions are the same. i.) The plaintiff has too basic choices of where to lay venue: (1) Any district where all defendants reside - "Resides" for a human being is usually the same as domicile. - A corporation resides in all districts where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the case is commenced. NOT CITIZENSHIP. - If all defendants reside in different districts of the same state, you may lay venue where any of them reside. (2) Any district where a substantial part of the claim arose. - Look to where the conduct took place, but there's some dispute. ii.) No preference, it is the plaintiff's choice. c.) There is a slight difference between FQ and diversity, rarely come into play. i.) If there is no district in the US where all defendants reside or where a substantial part of the claim arose do you go to the "third" choice. (3) If there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. ii.) Usually deals when the claim arose overseas.

Mennonite v. Adams

An Indian statute requires notices to be posted to the county courthouse and published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks when there is a sale of real property due to nonpayment of property taxes. A purchaser of the sale of property acquires a certificate, but the property can be redeemed for 2 years. If no one redeems the property, the purchaser may apply for a deed to the property. However, the auditor must inform the former property owner that he is entitled to redeem the property. If the property is not redeemed in 30 days, the purchaser may acquire the title for the auditor for a small fee and bring a suit to quiet the title. Appellant held mortgage on property which was sold to the appellee due to nonpayment of property taxes. He was not notified of the pending sale and did not learn of it for more than 2 years when it was no longer redeemable. The mortgager (person renting property?) still owed appellant money. The Court found that notice given to the appellant did not meet the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because anyone who has a property interest in the property should be notified if they are "knowable" in a way that is reasonably calculated to give them actual notice (Mennonite Notice). Prior to an action that will affect life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause, state must provide "notice reasonably calculated" to inform the interested parties of an action and afford them an opportunity to argue their objections. Notice by publication is not reasonably calculated to inform interested parties when they can be modified by a more effective means such as mail or personal service. Constructive notice (notice by posting and publication) is not sufficient to mortgagee who is easily identifiable in the public record. Notice by mailer personal service is required when mortgagee is identifiable. In this case, notice through mail (to Adams) is an insufficient means for someone who desires to actually inform the mortgagee (Mennonite) to reasonably accomplish it. Thus, mailed notice to the property owner who has not taken steps to pay taxes in not sufficient for actual notice for mortgagee.

Federal Jurisdiction

Based on Constitution, If Congress wanted to say "Any lawsuit filed in a federal court can cause any citizen of US to answer" could they? Yes. Has Congress done so? 4k1a (No) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. (1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located; so Federal courts do not have personal jurisdiction unless the state in which it resides does (Rule 4k(1)(A)). There are exceptions: Jurisdiction when authorized by federal statute. Nationwide service of process permit defendant to be served anywhere in US and for the court to have personal jurisdiction regardless of whether there would have been jurisdiction in any state court. This is in the area of antitrust, securities, bankruptcy, and interpleader. Rule 4(k)(2) says if the claim is based on federal law, jurisdiction is constitutional, and there is no state that would have personal jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is permitted. Many courts have held that all the Fifth Amendment requires is contact with the sovereign (the US). The forum must not be unreasonably burdensome • How do you determine if federal district court has jurisdiction over a defendant outside the district? • Look at state law that purports to claim jurisdiction over the person • Notice: given notice/ told they're being sued • In personam jurisdiction: amenability, whether court has jurisdiction over the defendant; 'amenable to service of process' • SMJ stipulates diversity of citizenship, does federal court automatically have in personam jurisdiction? No, 4k1a. need IPJ, not just SMJ

Mullane v. Central Hanover

Because administration of small trusts is undesirable to corporate trustees, a majority of states including New York have permitted pooling small trust estates into one fund for investment administration. Each trust shares in the common fund, but it is managed controlled by the trust company. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company established a common trust fund (113 trusts $3 million) and petitioned Surrogate's Court for the settlement of its first account. Some of beneficiaries of the trust were not residents of New York. The only notice of the settlement given to beneficiaries was by publication in a local newspaper in compliance with the minimum standards of the New York Banking Law. It stated the trust company, name of common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts, or funds. However, before this, the trust company sent each known beneficiary "entitled to share in the income" mail. Trust company petitioned the Surrogate's Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee. Appellant (Mullane) argued that notice and the statutory provisions for notice were inadequate to afford due process. Surrogate Court overruled objections that the statutory notice violates requirements of the 14th Amendment; Account beneficiaries were not deprived of property without due process of law. A final decree was entered, accepting the accounts and settling "all questions respecting the management of the common fund." Every right the beneficiaries would have had against the trust company for improper management was sealed (negligence, breach of trust). This is Res Judicata (no appeal, barred by the judgment from re-litigation). This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The Court found that the minimum standards for notice of judicial settlement accounts required by the New York Banking Law is not compatible with requirements of the 14th Amendment because it deprives known persons, whose whereabouts are known, of substantial property rights. Does the court even have personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants? (Think about Shaffer and Hansen). Must meet requirement of International Show to have jurisdiction because this is quasi in rem. Defendants entered into agreement on the outset of the common trust for a contractual relationship (directed activity towards the forum state). They are amenable (court has personal jurisdiction). Proceeding is in personam rather than en rem. However, this case had characteristics of both in rem and in personam (intangible property, rights of person). The requirements of the 14th Amendment for due process do not depend upon a classification of true in rem, in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam. Regardless of the technical definition of its chosen procedure, the interest of all claimants to have full opportunity to appear and be heard. Due Process Clause requires at a minimum that deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing. This proceeding is one that might deprive claimants of property rights; notice and hearing must measure up to the standards of due process. However, due process cannot go so far as to place impossible or practical obstacles for notice (only non-resident beneficiaries who can be determined). There is no formula for what notice must meet, but there are a few principles. 1) Notice must be reasonably calculated when the proceeding is one of finality 2) The notice must reasonably convey the information (reasonable certain to inform) and afford a reasonable time for parties to make an appearance 3) The form of chosen notice must not be substantially less likely to bring notice than other feasible means. Known beneficiaries with a known place of residence, notice must be reasonably calculated to reach interested parties: mailed notice is sufficient. The local newspaper is inappropriate in this situation because 1) the names and addresses of beneficiaries are at hand and 2) it is not reasonably certain to inform beneficiaries of the preceding (doesn't name parties, small type, back pages of newspaper). Personal service to everyone is not required. Notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested is likely to safeguard all a situation like this where there are a large number for small interests. Thus, in this case, the statutory notice is inadequate, not because it fails to reach everyone, but because it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could be informed by others means. The newspaper is an acceptable publication when it is not reasonable or practical to give adequate warning. We know that postal notification is not a serious burden to the trust company because they sent mailed notice when common trust was established. Knowable persons: those in records (like heir in record). Notice must be reasonably calculated to inform knowable persons; however, no undue burden. Unknown persons whose whereabouts could not be easily ascertained, the statutory notice is sufficient. An investigation to discover the beneficiaries and supply them with notice is not required because of practical difficulties and cost of investigation. The publication of notice in a local newspaper is sufficient in the case of unknown beneficiaries and poses not constitutional objection because in a class action, a majority of people know of the litigation and protect the interests of all.

Burger King (1985)

Burger King Corp's principal offices are in Miami. Burger King oversees its franchise through a two-tiered administrative structure: the principal contract is established in Miami and governed by Florida law, as well as the require payments and notices that are handled in Miami. Their 10 district offices handle the day-to-day monitoring of the franchises. The defendant (Michigan resident and citizen) agreed to open up a franchise with another, but he paid thousands in restaurant equipment and was personally obligated to pay $1 million over the 20-year agreement. The Michigan district office handled the initial joint application, however the application was entered into a contract in Miami. Disputes were negotiated in both Michigan and Miami. The franchisees fell behind in monthly payments to Miami and were sent notices of default. Negotiations began with both the district and Miami headquarters. They were unsuccessful and Miami headquarters terminated the franchise in which the defendant refused and continued to operate. A diversity of citizenship suit was filed in a US District Court in Florida and the court exercised personal jurisdiction over the Michigan defendant (seeking diversity jurisdiction as well as original jurisdiction for federal trademark disputes (USC 1338 (a)). Due Process "gives a degree of predictability" that allows potential defendants to "structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit" (World-Wide Volkswagen). It was foreseeable that the defendant would be called to account in Florida for injuries because he voluntarily formed an agreement there and continued use of Burger King after his franchise was terminated (However, foreseeability alone is not enough). The defendant purposefully directed activity toward the forum state to create a "substantial connection." They were not present in the state, or transacting business in the state. However, the cause of action arises out of action directed at the forum state (breach of contract). The Court found that because the defendant established a continuing relationship with Burger King in Miami, received fair notice that he might be sued in Florida from contract documents, and failed to prove any offense of constitutional right, the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction pursuant of the Florida Long-Arm statute does not violate due process. The defendant argued the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant was bereft of reasonable notice and financially unprepared for litigation in Florida. They claimed that the jurisdiction offends the fundamental fairness laid out in the 14th Amendment. Minimum requirements of "fair play and substantial justice" may defeat personal jurisdiction even if the defendant has engaged in purposeful forum activities (World-Wide Volkswagen). However, there is no proof in this case to establish unconstitutionality of the personal jurisdiction. Justice Stevens and Justice White's Dissent Defendant was financially unprepared to meet the added costs of litigating in Florida, the particular distribution of bargaining power in the franchise relationship, defendant is severely impaired in his ability to call Michigan witnesses who might be essential to defense or counterclaim. Two defendants ran BK franchise in Michigan, sued in Miama (BK headquarters in Fla.). first important because SC says international shoe minimum contacts standard does give two part test, contact part and fairness part. Must have relevant contact before we look at fairness. Sliding scale; stronger showing of fairness may tip scales with smaller contact. Contact: franchisees entered 20 year, million dollar relationship, contract said florida law would apply. SC said tough defendant, burden on defendant to show forum is unconstitutional. Very tough burden; have to show gravely difficult/inconvenient, severe disadvantage. Relevant wealth of parties doesn't matter.

calder again

Calder v. Jones- Cali focal point of libel/tort. Where Jones lived, actions expressly aimed at California. Interviewed people there, circulation of magazine there

Hess v. Palowski (1927)

Cause of action in Massachusetts. Defendant not in state; he's in Pennsylvania (no in personam jurisdiction) Mass statute- enter state and have accident in state (automobile), consent to public official being served on your behalf; deemed to have consented. Official is in the state. Driving in state sufficient relationship with forum state for jurisdiction. What are limits to implied consent? Arises out of accident. State's interests in regulating 'dangerous machines' on its highways. Doesn't have same interest in contracts? No, but sufficient if dangerous contract (ex. Selling securities Doherty and Co v. Goodman). Otherwise not so much Which facts of case really relevant? Pawloski sued Hess in a previous lawsuit and won. Hess then appealed to recover damages for personal injuries. Pawloski alleged that Hess (resident of Pennsylvania) negligently drove a motor vehicle on a public Massachusetts's highway and because of this, the car struck and injured Pawloski. Hess had no service of process (had notice but no due process) and then leaves the state. Instead, the service of process was made in accordance with Massachusetts statutory law that states that if a nonresident drives on a public highway in the commonwealth, he assumes all rights as if he had an attorney (person at DMV) living in the state to represent him to be served in that state (this is implied consent limited to just vehicle collisions and accidents on that states highways). Case expanded consent to include implied consent; Commissioner of Transportation as agent. The nonresidents acceptance of operation (driving in Massachusetts) is significant to his agreement to be served in that state and not served personally. Hess moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that there was no personal jurisdiction and that there was no service of process because it would deprive him of his property without due process (violation of 14th Amendment). The Court ruled that the MA statute is not unconstitutional because the state may declare the use of highway by a nonresident as equivalent to him having an appointee there to be served and tried in their courts. A single act can be sufficient for jurisdiction if the claim arises out of that conduct in a state. Hess: qualitative nature of the contacts; different in Hess (danger) v. shoes in International shoe

Qualitative Evaluation

Defendant can argue that conducting in litigation in the forum state deprives him of due process: The burden is on the defendant to prove the forum is inconvenient. He can argue that he is put at "a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent" as seen in Burger King. This is a very difficult standard to meet, and the defendant usually will not be able to meet it simply by showing that the plaintiff has superior economic resources. Factors to consider are the distance the defendant has to travel, where the evidence is, how substantial the contact was (was is over a contract for only $2500). But could defendant show justification would be unreasonable and unfair? What is the state's interest in regulation and pursuing the lawsuit? Does it violate due process of that individual (due process protects an individuals right to be deprived of life, liberty, and property only by the exercise of lawful power (Nicastro) Defendant must make a compelling case that presence of other consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Will jurisdiction inhibit First Amendment rights (freedom of speech)? Does jurisdiction offend "fair play and substantial justice: Burden on the defendant, forum state's interest in the dispute, plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, etc (World-Wide Volkswagen). Is the burden on the defendant unreasonable and unfair (Asahi)? Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction: can

Related Entities and In Personam

Defendant parent- pre-Damler court looking at actions of subsidiary to determine if they'll have power over parent based on subsidiary's activities. Defendant subsidiary activities of parent to pull in subsidiary Damler: informing us for 1st time and SCOTUS level how you address this in I/P Jurisdiction Theory. Daimler p.11 court has not yet addressed for corporation.. based on in state sub. Only when former so dom by later as to be its alter-ego. Test by 9th circuit agency theory; if it's important to company that activities be done court will impute. Can't be sustained; no jurisdiction. P.39 while it has been held...arising from dealing entirely distinct from those activities. Problematic. General jurisdiction not related to, doesn't arise out of; over after Daimler. When do you worry about general jurisdiction now? Claim doesn't arise out of /not related to activities in FS. Principle place of business and place incorporated- for purpose of in personam jurisdiction, they're 'present'. Everything else- Int. shoe and progeny jurisdiction. After Daimler only time exc. When incorporated or principle place of business. Legal theory in terms of legal entities related with state- presence. So what does 'arises out of' mean? Look at activities, look at causation, see if claim arises out of. 'related to' p.103 item 7. Perkins case: Daimler; not saying some exceptional case where may be able to use jurisdiction Harris v. Balk: Harris owes Balk money- Balk owes Epstein money- Harris visits Maryland. Epstein suing Balk, attaching debt to Harris. Defendant over whom we need jurisdiction- Balk. Basis of jurisdiction? Debt travels wherever Harris travels. Quasi in rem (PvN); different in this case type of 'property'. Theory of Pennoyer applied to movable/incorporeal property. Incorporeal property- obligation- thing in the state (follows defendant) Schaffer v. Heitner: Response to Harris v. Balk decision. Court has to decide what vilated due process of law. Shareholder derivative action- class action with some people present representing others. Person (Heitner) suing on behalf of corp. nature of claim- officers and directors breached fiduciary duty when allowed antitrust activity in Oregon, opened corporation to criminal charges. Evaluate if they directed activity toward FS that's related to the claim. SC- conflict not related to the property. What was sequestered? Stock. Affected corporeal possession? Not in state of Delaware. In terms of quasi in rem jur. Deemed to be in state based on P v. Neff ruling (statute). Holding on constitutionality of the Delaware statue (unconstitutional). Presence in state still viable concept. No nexus between type of property and the claim. New statute- about officers and directors who are nonresidents. How did they direct activity to FS? Running a corporation in FS (Delaware). After Damler, still analyze beyond incorporation/place of business Holding: Delaware statue was unconstitutional, violates due process. Establishes statutory property statues in state to justify jurisdiction in Del. Hypo: punitive defendant who beats someone at Atlanta airport. Plaintiff hires La. lawyer when gets home. Defendant from Mexico City. Is it justiciable? Yes. How do we get jurisdiction? 4k1a tells us nothing (SMJ) activity resulting in injury directed by defendant in FS. Hague Treaty. Go check if defendant has property in state (LA). he does have 1/3 undivided interest in the property. Not ture in rem, quasi like Pen y Neff. 13.3201b long arm statute. Problem with proceeding under this statute. Under Int. Shoe and Schaffer v. Heitner. What activity of defendant in FS? Owns property. But does it arise out of, reliance to property. Value of judgement in personam related to value of property in FS. Risks- property may not be there at time of judgement. So defendant sells the property International shoe and Non-res attachment; not so simple to say unconstitutional full-stop; that was dicta in Schaffer v. Heitner. Qualitative FS has greater interest with property within its boundaries. Existence of property within state is significant but next cases need to determine nexus between cause of action and the property. Do we apply International Shoe to everything or should history carry the day? Hasn't been answered w/ NR attachment. Does Daimler give us a hint? What court prefers? Go back to theory of presence

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Does this court have authority over this particular type of case. Example, diversity of citizenship. Diversity of citizenship: looking at citizenship of parties rather than nature of case. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Authority of a court over a particular class of cases. Congress major part due to ability to create inferior courts and certain authority to grant authority to these courts

Transient Presence

Does transient presence apply to International Shoe? In 1990, US Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction based solely on the fact that defendant was physically in the state when served with process. 9 Justices agreed that transient jurisdiction was constitutional, but for different reasons. Scalia and a two other justices: International Shoe should not be applied to transient presence (service of process in the state). Transient jurisdiction is upheld because it is tradition in America's legal system. This jurisdictional principle is both favored and firmly approved by tradition. Brennan and three other Justices: Transient Jurisdiction is subject to International Shoe. "All rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process." Justice White and Stevens: Transient jurisdiction is widely accepted throughout this country, he could not possibly strike it down. There has been no showing that the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in that it should be held to violate due process. However, transient presence cannot be used with fraud or deceit (fraudulently getting defendant to travel to state to be served).

Notice/Opportunity

Due Process Clause and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment require reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard. The Due Process clause sets the constitutional minimum standards for notice. However, court rules and RDCP Rule 4 and 5 detail the requirements for notice. Service of process must comply with both the constitutional minimum and any additional statutory or rule requirements. Different forms of Notice and Constitutional Standard Personal service or Actual Notice: summons and complaint handed to defendant while they are in the state. This signifies governmental action. There is no amenability when this is done. This is not technically actual notice because 1) it does not insure defendant avoid read and understand notice or 2) that he read notice. Actual notice (notice actually received) is not required. It is only required that the notice be "reasonably calculated" to inform the party. Although actual notice is not constitutionally necessary, it is constitutionally sufficient for notice.

Diversity of Citizenship

Diversity of Citizenship and Alienage Jurisdiction: Article III, Section II of Constitution and federal statutes 28 USC Sect. 1332(a)(1)(2). 28 USC 1332—Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy, costs a) District courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75K AND is btw: 1) Citizens of different states 2) Citizens of a state and citizens of a foreign state, but district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection btw above stated who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the US AND are domiciled in the same state. 3) Citizens of different states and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties. b) Except where provided in a statute, if plaintiff ends up recovering less than 75K then the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and in addition may impose costs on the plaintiff. c) For purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title— 1) A corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every state and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the state or foreign where it has its principle place of business, except that in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or K of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of— a. Every state and foreign state of which the insured is a citizen b. Every state and foreign state by which the insurer has been incorporated; and c. The state or foreign state where the insurer has its principal place of business; and Diversity of Citizenship occurs when a suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state. The term citizen is respect to subject matter jurisdiction is different from the term citizenship when it is used for homestead exception or fall college fees. Traditional view is that DJ provides a neutral forum, free from local bias, for resolution of a case between citizens of different states. Policy consideration developed in the past that impartial federal forum may have made it easier to invest in other states, fostering economic expansion. Opponents (SC justices, federal judges): DJ no longer provides intended benefit because it cannot protect litigants from biased state laws. Diversity cases make up a considerable amount of workload (35%) and we have limited federal resources. There is still some evidence of local bias by state judges and juries (re-election of state judges), and federal courts generally draw juries from wider geographic areas, lessening impact of local bias. American citizens domiciled abroad can neither sue or be sued under diversity or alienage jurisdiction in a federal court unless there is some other basis of jurisdiction such as federal question. Cases must be filed in state courts otherwise. 1332 (e): a citizen of DC is not a citizen of a state for diversity purposes. This had been upheld as constitutional but for different reasons by SC justices. If on review, a court believes a person in suit does not have DJ, Federal Rule 32 gives district courts and appellate courts the authority to dismiss non-diverse parties for a lawsuit or judgment. However, SC questions this by saying incomplete diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims. Courts still use Rule 21 to drop "jurisdictional spoilers" if the party or parties are not "indispensable." If a person has dual citizenship, most courts will not allow the foreign citizenship to create alienage jurisdiction where DJ would not exist. Citizenship of entities: Business fall into 2 categories: corporation or non-corporations (associations, labor unions, partnerships, limited liability companies etc). Corporations have entity status because the corporation is seen as a thing unto itself. Thus, if a corporation commits a tort, the company (not people running it) will be liable (limits liability). This is governed by 28 USC 1332 (c)(1). A corporation is a citizen of a state in which it is incorporated and also where it has its principal place of business (nerve center). For a non-incorporated business (llcs, partnerships, association, business for profit, labor unions, insurance associations), the business is considered a citizen of all states oh which its members are citizens. If a non-corporation has members who are citizens of every American jurisdiction, it could not sue or bed sued in DJ unless some other ways for subject matter jurisdiction. Assignment of Claims and Representative Suits: Some people try to manufacture diversity of citizenship. Through assignment, a would-be plaintiff can assign her claim to be argued by a citizen of a different state. 1359 guards against collusive assignment versus true assignment by saying that a district court has no jurisdiction over cases "in which any party, by assignment m has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke jurisdiction." Assignment is ignored when the assignee is a mere collection agent. However, an assignment of adequate consideration does not violate 1359. 1359 does not apply to a single litigant's changing her domicile to create diversity. This is allowed even if motivated solely by a desire to gain access to federal court. 1132(c)(2) says courts look to the citizenship of the decedent, minor, or incompetent and not the citizenship of their representative. Limitations to DJ: Domestic relations exception: federal courts can refuse to hear domestic relations cases only in the narrow case of divorce, alimony, or child custody, child support. This is because state courts are more suited to work of this type. Probate exceptions: federal courts do not administer a decedent's estate or appoint an executor. This exception is also narrow and does not mean that federal courts will never hear cases involving the conduct of those who administer estates (they hear cases not associated with property, probate, or annulment of will). These are en rem actions because they are things in the state. Jurisdictional statutes (1332), not Article III of the Constitution, require an amount in controversy limitation. In 1997, Congress increased it so that the amount tin controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff's good faith allegation that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied is enough unless it appears "to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount." This is a high standard. Courts have no obligation to inquire absent some "apparent reason" to do so (defendant, pleadings, evidence). When one plaintiff and one defendant, the plaintiff may aggregate claims to reach $ requirement even if the claims are unrelated. If plaintiffs claim is $40,000 and defendants claim is $40,000 you cannot aggregate the plaintiffs and defendants claim. If for both viewpoints, the cost of the either compliance or noncompliance of the injunction exceeds $75,000 it meets requirement (either defendants or plaintiffs claim). Which state law to apply? Federal courts in DJ must apply the same law that the state court would apply. Some states apply the law of the place of the accident; other places apply the law of the place the parties reside. It is not always clear which state's law should apply. HOWEVER, it is unconstitutional for a state with no connection to the transaction or parties to apply its law even if it has jurisdiction.

SMJ

Federal courts do not have a general power to review state court decisions. State courts are supreme. Appeal is subject to review only by appellate court in that system (state system or federal system). Exception is US Supreme Court. You cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction because it concerns the administration of the courts, not waivable by parties. Courts are allowed to hear only certain types of cases. The plaintiff must file a suit in a court permitted by relevant law to entertain the type of claim asserted. First step is to have personal jurisdiction in a state. Next step is to determine what court to go to in that state. Does a subject belong to a court at all? (Justiciability) Trial (District) Courts: courts of original jurisdiction. State trial courts have general subject matter jurisdiction (may hear cases of all subject matter). Intermediate (Appellate) Courts: appellate jurisdiction. A state may permit an appeal of right to these courts. Supreme Courts: Supervisory jurisdiction: higher courts have an obligation to monitor other courts' jurisdiction. In federal and state supreme courts, the Supreme Court almost always has discretion in picking what civil cases to hear (writ court). US Supreme Court agrees to hear less than 4% of cases it is asked to review. Federal Courts: limited subject matter jurisdiction (Article III section 2 all that is required in citizens of different states and to cases arising under US law). There is a presumption against federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish federal jurisdiction and lack of is a defense that cannot be waived at any time. These courts can only hear certain cases prescribed by US Constitution and federal statutes. Jurisdiction is not granted to the full extent that the Constitution Article III would allow and is limited by FRCP 1332 (1331 does not restrict federal question jurisdiction). Only some cases heard in federal court. Three major types of cases heard: 1)"Diversity of citizenship" cases in which amount exceeds $75,000 (all that is required is citizens of different states: same as Article III). This is governed by 1332 2) Alienage Jurisdiction: 3)"Federal question" cases in which plaintiff's claim arises under federal law However, most of claims arising under federal law these can also be filed in state courts (choice of fora). This is governed by FRCP 1331

Hanson again

Hanson v. Denckla: does Fla. Have jurisdiction over trustee in Delaware. Mrs. Donner- settlor, puts assets in trust. Trustee (bank in this case) administrator of trust. Probate (succession) proceeding in Fla. Has florida expressed qualitative interst in this case? Not really in this particular type of transaction. Locked jurisdiction. Why would you argue they do? In rem jurisdiction. Mrs. Donner domiciled there. Court rejected that b/c probate courts would have nation- wide jurisdiction. Dealing with incorporeal obligation. Did they avail themselves of benefit and protection of state? Factually yes but court says no. what must you do to 'avail' yourself in relationship with in personam jurisdiction? What would trustee have to have done in order to have jurisdiction? Mailing not enough; directed activities toward the forum state. Like in McGee "Fairness and Justice": incorporation doctrine of Constitution- only protected originally from federal government 14th amendment: used to incorporate those protections vis a vis state actions. Individual liberty and problem of calling defendant. Is it liberty interest of defendant in civil proceeding? Is it something clearer about that? Relationship between the states. Where are we as of 1980- first tort SCOTA had to address

Nat'l Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding

For more than 1/2 a century, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have permitted service by leaving a summons and complaint "at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode." Service was made to defendant's housekeeper while defendant was in his $25 million NY apartment. Housekeeper testified that defendant stayed there for 34 days during 1986 (year service was made). He is citizen of Saudi Arabia and stayed at his home there for only 3 months. He travelled the world and stayed at his various homes the remaining 9 months. Before this, he transferred ownership of his apartment to Akorp (owned parent company). US District Court of NY entered into default judgment against Khashoggi under Federal Rules of CP 60(b)(4). The court acknowledged that this apt was not his dwelling house or usual place of abode, but justified service on the grounds that defendant had actual service (knew about suit). Defendant appealed judgment, arguing that he has numerous residences world-wide, but his "dwelling house or usual place of abode" is in Saudi Arabia. He says pursuant to rule 4(e)(2)(B) service of process must be there, and service made to his apartment in NY was void and conferred no jurisdiction. The court affirmed lower courts decision, not because actual notice cured a void service, but because the NY apt is properly characterized as defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode. Rule 4(e)(2)(B) permits service in which summons and copy of complaint is delivered to the individual personally, left in the individuals dwelling house or usual place of abode, or left with some person of suitable age and discretion. Housekeeper was of suitable age and discretion. As far as issue of dwelling house, there is no set definition for what it means. Court does not want to create a principle, but has a very narrow holding specific to this case. It would be illogical to say defendant has only one usual place of abode considering he is an international traveller, owns 12 homes around the world, and does not usually stay in any one of these locations. In this highly mobile society, it is unrealistic to say that a defendant has only one dwelling house. Some courts have solved this issue by saying service is valid when made at a dwelling house in which the party is then living. In this case, service to his NY apt in which he was staying was if not the most likely way to give notice, it was the reasonable calculated method to ensure that he received summons and complaint and actual notice.

Schaffer v. Heitner

Heitner is a non-resident of Delaware and the owner of one share of stock in Greyhound Corp., a business incorporated in Delaware. He filed a shareholder's derivative suit (claimed the officers/directors breached duties to the corporation by engaging in activities that violated anti-trust laws, which costs it millions of dollars) against Greyhound, its subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and 28 officers/directors in Delaware. The action "arises" out of the corporation's activities in Oregon. Heitner filed a motion for an order of sequestration of the Delaware property of the officers/directors under Del. Statute. The property was approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to 19 defendants (quasi-in-rem jurisdiction). The sequestration was accomplished by putting a "stop transfers" order on the books of Greyhound Corp. The stock was considered to be in Delaware. The appellants responded by entering a special appearance to vacate the sequestration order on the grounds that 1) it did not accord them due process of law and 2) the property (common stocks) was not capable of attachment in Delaware. They also argued that the Delaware court did not have jurisdiction because they did not have sufficient contacts in Delaware (International Shoe). Court of Chancery rejected these arguments, saying the purpose of the statute and sequestration was to compel the defendant to answer and defend a suit brought against them. They said the limitations on sequestration (purpose and length of time) made the due process requirement "inapplicable." They said the statute did not violate state or federal constitutional barriers. They also held the stock as property did belong to the state of Delaware, allowing them to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The Delaware SC affirmed this. Appellant argues that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 14 Amendment because 1) permits state to exercise jurisdiction despite the fact that there are not sufficient contacts and 2) deprive them of property without adequate safeguards (SC focuses on 1st argument). The U.S. Supreme Court found Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over appellants is inconsistent with constitutional limitations of state power. The U.S Supreme Court found that the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe applies to both in personam and in rem. The court's sole purpose of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is to provide a basis for bringing a defendant into court. This is not a strong enough reason. This is a direct assertion of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in rem is subject to the same standard of "fair play and substantial justice" as jurisdiction in personam because it is jurisdiction over the person's interest in a thing (property). The minimum contacts standard of International Shoe applies to both in personam and in rem. The presence of property isn't enough for a state to establish jurisdiction. There has to be some other tie. For example, the cause of action or controversy must "arise" out of the property the defendant has in the state (true in rem). Delaware courts based their jurisdiction solely on property within the state. The property is not an underlying cause of action. This is not enough to establish jurisdiction; there needs to be evidence of minimum contacts. The appellants have never been to Delaware, the cause of action does not "arise" out of activities in Delaware (activities in Oregon). The fact that the defendants are directors/officers of a Delaware corporation is not enough because the legislature has not enacted a statute to protect a state's interest in supervising the management of a Delaware corporation. There is no evidence that the officers/directors "purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state." Brennan dissent: agreed with way of analysis but felt directors voluntarily associated with forum state (business incorporated in Delaware) sufficient for jurisdiction

Does Schaffer apply to true in rem?

If a person has a relationship with forum state, forum state has a great interest in title to property (It would be unusual for state not to have jurisdiction- Shaffer SC dicta). Shaffer only overturns Pennoyer v. Neff in that quasi in rem must reach standard of International Shoe. However, it is less clear if International Shoe applies to in rem and true in rem proceedings. • True in rem: adjudication against everyone in the world, lawsuit directly involves ownership of property (such as a piece of land or a car when seized by drug dealers). International Shoe is easy to meet (very unusual that true in rem wouldn't meet International Shoe) • In rem: adjudication is between plaintiff and defendant, directly involves ownership of property (such as a mortgage). The only interests this lawsuit recognizes is those of the parties (not the whole world). International Shoe standard can be met because of state interest, but can still be met by contract ("inherited property subject" to contract). • Quasi in rem (lawsuit is not dispute over land, land is a means to establish jurisdiction). Cause of action is unrelated to the property. Performs a conservatory function allows person to conserve property pending the litigation. This is to ensure defendant does not sale property or spend money. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is harder to apply to International Shoe: State interest in controlling property, cause of action does not arise out of defendant's contact with forum state. The judgment is only as much as the value of the property. The plaintiff would want to sue in personam (unlimited judgment). Could establish jurisdiction if the person pays taxes, pays mortgage (could establish minimum contacts).

Keeton v. Hustler (1984)

Keeton (citizen of New York with little connection to New Hampshire) brought a libel action against a magazine in New Hampshire because that was the only state he was not barred by statute of limitations. Hustler magazine was distributed in NH (10,000-15,000 copies, small percentage) and nationwide. The SC upheld personal jurisdiction for the injury she suffered in New Hampshire and for the injury she suffered in all other states as a result of the copies that were distributed there (single publication rule). The Court said New Hampshire had a "substantial interest in cooperating with other states... to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and damages...in a unitary proceeding. The Court upheld jurisdiction for causes of action related to defendant's activities (circulation of magazine). Hustler carried on a part of its general business in New Hampshire and this was sufficient to support PJ.

Opp to be heard

In addition to notice, Due Process Clause of 5th and 14th Amendments require an opportunity to be heard. This can be accomplished in less formal proceedings. The defendant must receive sufficient advance warning to allow time to prepare an adequate defense. The amount of advance warning depends on the proceeding. In determining how much notice is required by the Constitution, the courts do a cost benefit analysis, weighing the value of a party's rights against costs of additional process. Ordinary proceeding: ordinary civil action carried out. There is a summons and complaint, motions (motion for summary judgement-summary process), discovery, trial, judgement. Summary Proceeding: a civil action commenced by a quick summary proceeding: pleading (rule to show cause, writ of habeus corpus) preceding commenced different from an ordinary one; it is commenced by a rule to show cause. An ordinary proceeding has a lot of processes. This is a special motion to quicken it. Executory Process: specialized proceedings generally related to security devices, mortgages. Plaintiff starts with a confessed judgment (I confess judgement in the amount of $x and I waive ordinary trial ordinarily entitled to). Notice is different here than other two proceedings. Sequestration: a type of seizure to protect security interests (mainly in Louisiana and NY). This protects the plaintiff's interest in the defendant's property. The property has to be seized early (includes liens, mortgages, sales of property, vendors privilege, etc,). This avoids defendant from selling property and plaintiff not getting judgement. For sequestration, legislature authorized person to seize immovable without prior notice or opportunity when there is a security interest in the property. This is constitutional because it provides a post-deprivation hearing, an option of damages, detailed affidavit, judge rather than clerk reviews affidavit, requires plaintiff to put up a bond. Attachment: Defendant's action in which he or she wastes property, lets it go to ruin, harms property and plaintiff has interest in property (inherited, etc.). This involves action before ordinary proceeding. Injunctive Proceedings: Rule 65: equitable remedy that is an order from the court for the defendant to do or not to do something. • If permanent injunction with no urgency, it is ordinary proceeding with extraordinary relief. • If urgency is involved, there is a preliminary injection involving a quick hearing (summary process) under an ordinary proceeding. • If there is extreme urgency, there is temporary restraining order (most common) (ex parte: don't give other side any notice) if plaintiff had irreparable harm (no amount of money is sufficient for harm done). This is similar to prejudgment relief. There is no notice and no opportunity to be heard. All of these injunctions involve ordinary proceedings. So, request for injunctions have to be accompanied with paperwork for lawsuit.

WWV Again

Mfg V/W/Audi; Distributor WW (in NY, NJ, Conn), Retailer Seaway (NY). Legally relevant facts? Holding doesn't relate to manufacturer; they weren't there/involved in this part of proceedings (dicta) What do we know that we didn't know before? Foreseeability not sufficient for jurisdiction? According to dissent yes, majority no. reasonably expect products in state or when does seller reasonably expect to be called into court. Is seller directing activity toward forum state even if he knew the car would end up in FS? No What is required under Due Process clause? What does Hanson say about convenience? We don't care about it. Why would court repeat this stuff? Discussing 14th amendment. Stream of commerce (Asahi case). Plaintiff has to demonstrate what? That defendant has directed activity toward FS. In this case they did not. What didn't they do? Didn't do business or direct activity (ex. Ads, marketing) toward FS. Ad in magazine that goes to Dki. Seller didn't have to know product would end up in FS WW Volkswagon: Brennan- facts of WWV would be in outer limits of jurisdiction for seller, etc. but should weigh all together (state's interest, plaintiff's relationship with FS)

McGee v. International Life

McGee is a California citizen who purchased a life insurance policy from an Arizona insurance co. A Texas insurance co later took over the company and mailed a reinsurance certificate to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sent his premiums from California to Texas. The insured died and the company refused to pay because he committed suicide. The plaintiffs sued the Texas Company in California, and the US Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction despite the fact that the plaintiff had not solicited business in California and that the Texas company had not done any insurance business in California besides this policy. The Court upheld jurisdiction because the suit was based on a contract that had substantial connection with that state. The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there, and the decedent was a resident there. It was the only contract of insurance in Cali. for that company. Court stressed defendant solicited contract from Cali. plaintiff's claim arises from defendant's contacts with the forum. Might make up for small amount quantitatively of contacts. Also state's interest in insurance contracts, protection of citizens. California also has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for citizens when insurers refuse to pay. The plaintiffs would be put at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to go to a different state to hold company accountable (the travelling, cost of bringing action in foreign forum when the claims are small or moderate, crucial witnesses in local area). State's interest in insurance regulation. Highly regulated by state (qualitative) 'manifest interest'. Why did Cali have jurisdiction over defendant in terms of relationship between defendant and forum state? Based on international Shoe- type of relationship? 1 contact- casual and irregular; did it arise out of? Other relevant contacts (under international shoe) collection of premiums over period of time across state lines- solicitation after sellout of insurance agency; insurance policy contract initiated in Cali. Expansion b/c fewer contacts than in International Life

Mas v. Perry again

Mr. Mas is citizen of France, Mrs. Mas is citizen of MI. They were married in MI, but lived in LA for 2 years. They then moved to Illinois intending to return to BR for husband to finish doctorate degree. It was undecided where they would reside after. During the 2 years they lived in BR after marriage, they rented apt from appellant who had installed two-way mirrors and viewed them in intimacies after marriage. District court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. He argues that the appellees failed to prove diversity of citizenship among the parties. Jury returned verdict for plaintiffs for $5,000 and $15,000. The court affirmed the district court decision. The District Court had jurisdiction because there is a claim by an alien against a state citizen and an action between citizens of different states. Furthermore, the claims of Mas' arise from the same operative facts and are almost completely interdependent. A woman doesn't necessarily take the domicile of her husband upon marriage. A person can have only one domicile at a time. There are two requirements for changing domicile: 1) physical requirement of moving 2) mental requirements of intending to make the new state one's fixed home (factors in assessing intent include voter registration, purchase of a house, payment of taxes, and in-state college tuition). When deciding domiciliary, remember the purpose it serves (protect nonresidents from possible prejudice they might encounter in local courts). USC Section 1331, Article III section II of Constitution, allows for jurisdiction of federal courts when civil actions are between citizens of different states or between citizens of a state and a foreign state if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 (it is now $75,000). Under 1332 (a)(1) federal judicial power extends to Mr. Mas' claim against appellant, citizen of LA. It also extends to Mrs. Mas (citizen of MI) vs. defendant (diversity of citizenship). An American woman does not lose her US citizenship just because she married an alien. Because she was a graduate assistant at LSU, her domiciliary did not change when she was a resident of LA. They were in LA only as students. Complete diversity is required: no party on one side can be a citizen of the same state of any person on the other side. A person's citizenship is determined by federal and state law at the time the suit is filed (subsequent changes of citizenship do not affect suit). Domiciliary is judged by citizenship not by residence. It is "true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment to which a person has the intention of returning when absent." A person can change their domicile by 1) changing residence 2) intention to remain there. The court could not see a change in her domiciliary because no one could demonstrate clearly that she changed her domicile (burden on defendant). Amount in controversy is determined by the amount the plaintiff claimed in good faith. Mercury standard: accept plaintiff's claim to a legal certainty

Nicastro again

NJ SC not just about fairness/reasonableness. Stream of commerce doesn't help. Due Process is not met in this situation. What about Ohio? Where distributor is. Mcintyre sold stuff to this distribution directed activity toward Ohio. Does cause of action arise out of? Maybe. Qualitative evaluation nature of activity. Foreseeability not enough Breyer and Alito concurrence. Concerned they didn't analyze/discuss everything needed. Kennedy says plaintiff must show 'intent to submit" and "targeted forum'. How would you demonstrate this? What theory of jurisdiction? Consent. How to prove intent of a corporation? 'Purposefully availed' is conclusion, not analysis. 4k2 arises under federal law, not state jurisdiction meets Due Process. Issue of related entities (Dammler)

McIntyre v. Nicastro (2011)

Nicastro seriously injured his hand while using the petitioner's recycling product while in New Jersey. The machine was manufactured and England, where J. McIntyre is incorporated and operates. The manufacturer did not advertise or ship goods to the state and he had not targeted the state. Nicastro's counsel argues that 1) an independent company agreed to sell petitioner's products in the US 2) Petitioner came to states for to advertise at annual conventions 3) At least one product ended up in New Jersey. Furthermore, petitioner held both European and US patents. The Plurality Opinion (Justice Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas) found that the "stream of commerce" doctrine was carried to far as to violate due process. New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over petitioner because the manufacturer did not purposefully avail itself of the privileges of conducting activities in the state. Contact with and activity directed at the state may justify personal jurisdiction. The petitioner did not "purposefully avail itself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum state (Hanson v. Denckla). Defendant did not own an office in New Jersey, did not pay taxes or own property there, did not advertise there or send employee there. US Supreme Court makes it clear that it is the defendant's actions, not his expectations, that empower the courts to subject him to judgment (foreseeability is not enough). The petitioner intended to serve the US market, not the specific state's market. Petitioner did direct marketing and sales efforts at the US. BUT it is the petitioner's purposeful contacts with the state of New Jersey, not the US, that are relevant. The State does have a "strong interest in protecting its citizens from defective products," but the Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty for the sake of expediency. Concurring opinion by Justice Breyer and Alito: A single isolated sale even if accompanied by sales efforts is not sufficient. A single sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a different state is not a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction. Jurisdiction should lie where a sale in a State is part of the "regular and anticipated flow" of commerce into that state. HOWEVER, they keep with the reasoning that the manufacturer must have delivered its goods in the stream of commerce with the expectation they will be purchased there (citing WW). Dissenting Opinion for Justice Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan They say of course there is not general jurisdiction over McIntyre because it is hardly "at home." But, they say that it should be subject to specific jurisdiction because of the affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy. When a manufacturer or distributor aims to sell its products to customers in several states, it is reasonable to subject it to suit in anyone of those states if its allegedly defective product has been the source of injury. They say McIntyre aimed to sell its products in the US by engaging a distributor to promote product, appearing at tradeshows, and it had a website advertising products to world. They say it does not matter that McIntyre advertised to whole country. They said personal jurisdiction is justified because the machine arrived at plaintiff's workplace in New Jersey not randomly, but as a result of the US connections and distribution system McIntyre arranged. McIntyre endeavored to reach and profit from US market as a whole; the forum is appropriate. They say the state in which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a product liability tort claim.

Calder v. Jones (1984)

Plaintiff filed suit in California and was a resident of California. The editor and writer were citizens of Florida, neither had travelled to California, the article was written and edited in Florida. The Court upheld jurisdiction based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California because the story concerned the California activities of a California resident, focused on the plaintiff's career in California, the article was drawn from California sources, the brunt of plaintiff's harm was suffered in California. California was the focal point both of the story and the harm suffered. Furthermore, it was published in National Enquirer, and it has its largest circulation there.

Gray v. American Radiator (1961)

Plaintiff sued a Titan Valve Co., an Ohio corporation, in Illinois alleging that they had negligently constructed a safety valve. Titan manufactured the product in Ohio, sold it to a Pennsylvania company, and it was then sold to plaintiff through "the course of commerce." Titan had not done any business in Illinois. The court upheld jurisdiction because it is a reasonable inference that its commercial transactions result in substantial use and consumption in the state. Because Titan's business is directly affected by transactions occurring in Illinois, it enjoyed benefits of the laws of this State. The court found that it does not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into the forum state. If a cause of action arises out of defects of product, it is not unreasonable to say that this is sufficient contact with the state when the use of product came in the ordinary course of commerce. This reasoning of stream of commerce has been largely criticized in Asahi and McIntyre.

Connecticut v. Doehr

Plaintiff submitted application to have defendant's home ($75,000) attached to lawsuit. The suit did not involve his home nor did plaintiff have any preexisting interest in his real estate (prejudgment attachment of real estate property). Plaintiff made affidavit of claims and Superior Court found probable cause to sustain claims that amounted to 5 sentences. Only after attachment of defendant's property to the lawsuit did he learn of it. He had not been served. The attachment notice informed defendant that he could argue for no probable cause, vacation/ modification of attachment, some property was exempt from execution. He instead filed suit against plaintiff claiming Section 52-278ea1 (statute) was unconstitutional. This is an ordinary proceeding. Connecticut law authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without affording prior notice or the opportunity to be heard in a prior hearing if the plaintiff submits affidavit and court finds probable cause to sustain plaintiff's cause of action and if the prejudgment remedy is the attachment of real property. The statute does not require plaintiff to post bond for damages to defendant if suit is unsuccessful, prior notice, and without an extraordinary circumstance. District Court upheld statute and granted summary judgment for plaintiff. US Court of Appeals reversed with divided panel. The Court found that the state statute violates due process clause of 14th Amendment because it fails to provide a pre attachment hearing and does not require some exigent circumstance (persons security interest, person threatening to ruin property). Furthermore, there is a need for posting of a bond by the plaintiff even if there is a full hearing pre-attachment because a bond protects defendant in a risk that his property will be wrongfully deprived and enables defendant to readily recover damages without having to file another suit or counterclaim to be argued at his expense. A bond does not replace the need for a hearing or other safeguards because a wrongful attachment can inflict injury that will not fully be redressed by recovery. Due process requires 1) the posting of a bond by the plaintiff 2) a pre-attachment hearing, a show of exigency, or both. Do not have to have all of these, just look at all of these. To determine what process is due when a private party deprives another private party of property, courts consider 1) private interest that will be affected by prejudgment measures 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the 3) probable value of other safeguards 4) interest of the party seeking prejudgment attachment and 5) governmental interest in carrying out procedure (fiscal and administrative proceedings, policy considerations to foster economy). 1) Property interests that attachment affects is significant (colds title, impairs ability to sell real estate or alienate the property, credit ratings, reduces chance of home equity loan, place an existing mortgage in technical default). In Sniadach, their wages were garnished before notice (defendants need to pay rent, eat). This is significant. 2) Risk of erroneous deprivation is high. For probable cause to be granted, plaintiff must show the objective likelihood of plaintiff's suit. An affidavit stating plaintiff's claim is not enough, absent any countervailing consideration. The potential for unwarranted attachment is too great to satisfy the requirements of due process. A judge could make no realist assessment concerning the likelihood of the suit because it only lists plaintiff's argument and it presents complicated matters. 3) Safeguards do not reduce the risk. The statute provides for a later hearing post attachment, but this does not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented. 4) Interests of the plaintiff is too minimal (no existing interest in real estate, no allegation defendant was about to transfer real estate or take any action to make real estate unavailable). Nearly every state requires either a pre-attachment hearing or a showing of some exigent circumstance

Revell v. Lidov (2002)

Revell, former Associate Deputy Director of FBI, sued in Texas Lidov, an assistant professor of Harvard, and Columbia University for an allegedly defamatory article written by Lidov and posted on a bulletin board of the Journalism School at Columbia. The article signals out Revell, accusing him of complicity in the conspiracy and cover-up of Pan Am Flight 103. The article charges Revell with knowledge of the terrorist attacks, making certain his son previously booked on Pan Am 103 switched. Revell resides in Texas; Lidov resides in Massachusetts, and Columbia's main offices are in NYC. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Revell appealed, arguing that Columbia's website is enough for jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that merely operating a website does not provide the minimum contacts necessary for in personam jurisdiction. The court found that Revell failed to establish personal jurisdiction, considering the "effects" test of Calder and the low level of interactivity of the bulletin boards. For specific jurisdiction: The cause of action "arises" out of the maintenance of the bulletin board. The controversy lies in the website's posting of an alleged defamatory article. The Zippo scale is used to measure a websites connection with the forum state (passive website, interactive website, owner has repeated contacts with forum residents). Columbia's website is interactive, enabling individuals to send info to be posted and to receive info that others have posted. Columbia's contacts with Texas to not survive the "effects" test of Calder: 1) alleged libelous story concerns the forum state activities of a forum state resident 2) the defendant's career was centered in the forum state 3) article was drawn from forum state sources 4) harm was suffered by the plaintiff in the forum state 5) the forum state was the focal point of the story 6) forum state has largest circulation of publication The article contains no reference to Texas, does not refer to Texas activities of Revell, article was not directed at Texas readers (directed at D.C.), Texas sources were not relied upon, Texas was not the focal point of the story or the harm suffered. The plaintiff's residence in the forum state and suffering of harm there does not alone constitute jurisdiction. The sources relied upon and the activities described should in some way connect the publication to the forum state if Calder is to be invoked. The newspapers must, through Internet postings, have intent to target and focus on the forum state readers. General jurisdiction: There is no general jurisdiction because, although the website is continuously present everywhere, the cited contacts of Columbia (website owner) with Texas are not "substantial." Even if the website has repeated contacts with the forum state, this may not constitute the substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts for general jurisdiction (defendant has to be domiciled or incorporated there). Only 20 residents of Texas have subscribed to Columbia Journalism Review and the university is not domiciled or incorporated in Texas. Due process requires that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he could reasonably anticipate being sued there (foreseeability, Burger King). The publication must have knowledge that the possible plaintiff will fill the brunt of harm in the forum state 1) to anticipate being hauled there and 2) reaffirms the fact that the forum state is the focal point of the story. Fairness of due process is rooted in the reasonable expectations of the defendant to be sued in a forums state.

Federalism

States maintain own governments but are not independent completely Supremacy Clause (Article VI)- federal law overrules conflicting state law File in federal court: 1. Diversity of citizenship (citizens of different states and amount exceeds $75k; 2. Federal question case- plaintiff's claim arises under a federal law Many still go to state court, even those above. Exceptions exist e. antitrust, patent law, others federal law, others federal question in which federal court jurisdiction is exclusive of states Once filed, subject to appellate court, only of that system Supreme Court of US reviews decision only as to matters of federal law'

WWV (1980)

The Robinsons purchased a new Audi from WW in New York. The next year they left New York and moved to Arizona. When traveling through Oklahoma, another car struck the Audi from the rear, causing a fire that severely burned Mrs. Robinson and her two children. World Wide (regional distributor) is incorporated and has its business office in New York. It distributes vehicles and parts to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Seaway (retailer) is incorporated and has its business in New York. The Robinsons brought a product liability suit in District court in Oklahoma (where the accident occurred). They sued the manufacturer (Audi NSU Auto Union), the importer (Volkswagen of America, Inc), the regional distributor (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.) and the retail dealer (Seaway). It is important to note that Audi and Volkswagon did not contest jurisdiction. WW and Seaway claimed that they had no "minimal contacts" in Oklahoma. The Court found that the Oklahoma court did not have jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products liability action because the companies' only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that the accident occurred there. There is no evidence that World Wide and Seaway do any business in Oklahoma. They did not avail themselves of any privilege or benefit of the Oklahoma law. They did not solicit business there. They do not regularly sell wholesale cars there (therefore they did not have connection with the state). . What about regional distributor? Only Conn, NY, NJ area where they did business. What about retailer? Only did business in Messina. Neither over them because no relevant contact with Oklahoma. Car got to OK through unilateral act of third party (plaintiff), not the defendants; no purposefully availing by defendant. Family: foreseeable that car sold in Messina would go elsewhere, but not relevant inquiry. Relevant- foreseeable that defendant could get sued in Ok, not that the product could get there. 'hailed into court'. Why isn't it foreseeable if product problem? Court didn't feel that way. State closer to new York- maybe? No way to tell "Foreseeability" alone is not sufficient for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Defendants have to direct activity toward the forum state! Defendant must have conduct and connection there. However, the Court says the forum state does not exceed its power under Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over the corporation that delivers the products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state (citing Gray). The Court says this is not a stream of commerce issue because WW is limited to dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. There is no evidence that any cars distributed to WW are sold to customers outside these areas. Jurisdiction on the basis of stream of commerce has been questioned in Asahi and McIntyre. Justice Brennan's Dissent (Says we should focus more on the state. His test is look at plaintiffs interest, defendants interest, and states interest then you apply legal concept of fair and reasonable.) Too much inference on the defendant. Justice Brennan is concerned with the inconvenience of the plaintiff and Oklahoma's interest in pursuing litigation. He says the accident occurred in Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were hospitalized there, and essential witnesses and evidence were there. The state has an interest in enforcing its laws to keep its highway system safe. He says the state interest and burden on the plaintiff to litigate should be given as much weight as the interests to the defendant. Justice Brennan also said WW intended the purchasers would use the automobiles to travel to distant states where they do no directly do business and that the sale of cars does purposefully inject the vehicle into the stream of interstate commerce.

Article III s.1

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Federal Question

The most compelling reason for federal question subject matter jurisdiction is to have a federal fact-finding forum (it does not necessarily create uniform federal laws). Article III of Constitution and 1331(concurrent subject matter jurisdiction) provides general federal question statute: allows any claim arising under federal law to be brought in federal court. This does not contain an amount in controversy requirement (abolished in 1980). Thus, there is a requirement that the federal law be a claim, not a defense, and federal law must be sufficiently central to the claim asserted in a well-pleaded complaint not anticipating defenses. "Arising under" federal question is read narrowly by courts. There is a federal question when there is a federal cause of action. If the remedy is dependent upon federal law (broadest language). However, (Grable) the US SC says the question is whether the claim necessarily raised a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities (the division of labor between the state and federal courts assumed by Congress). Federal courts are not equipped to handle every tort claim involving a federal statute. Many other specialized federal question statutes: anti trusts (1337), bankruptcy, insurance claims, patent and trademark (1338), civil rights claim (1343). These are not allowed to be filed in state court (no concurrent jurisdiction) except for the civil rights claim and 1338. Declaratory action: A civil action either involves money, injunction, or a declaration. 28 USC 2201 authorizes federal courts to give a declaratory judgement whether or not further relief is or could be sought. allows federal courts tot declare rights and legal relations of interest parties whether or not further relief is or could be sought (able to get declaratory relief along with money or injunction which is called actual relief). However, Article III limits this by requiring a real case and controversy. We do not allow federal courts to issue advisory opinions. This is only a remedy; it does not provide a jurisdictional bases (still has to arise under the Constitution or federal laws). 28 USC 2202 . Article II requires federal courts to hear claims involving cases and controversies. The declaratory action can be entertained in federal court only if the coercive action might have been brought. A declaratory judgement may consist of an advisory opinion (not justiciable).

Quantitative Evaluation

This concerns defendant's directed activity toward the forum state: • Does the cause of action arise out of defendant's contact with the forum state (Hess v. Pawloski)? This is sometimes called specific jurisdiction. • Is the contact with the forum state continuous and systematic (International Shoe)? This is sometimes called general jurisdiction. This could be marketing, selling products to forum state, advertising, etc. • Does defendant have property located within the state (Pennoyer v. Neff)? However, unless proceeding is true en rem (property is at issue in the case), the International Shoe standard must be applied. • Is the defendant "present" in the state by being incorporated in that state or is forum state its principal place of business? (International Shoe)? • Did the defendant purposefully direct activity at the forum state (Burger King)?

Kulko (1977)

This suit involves payment of child support. Kulkos have been domiciled in New York. After the divorce, the woman moved to California and the husband remained in NY with the two children. They children wanted to live with mother, and father bought a one-way plane ticket for one child. Upon arrival, mother filed suit in California for child support. The Court said that California did not have jurisdiction over the defendant because a father who complies with requests of children to promote family harmony does not purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of California's laws.

Forum State's Interest

What is the state's interest in regulation and pursuing the lawsuit? The forum may have a legitimate interest in providing redress for its residents. There may be a great state interest in regulation of dangerous products, insurance policies, state programs (employment fund), interstate travel, contractual relationships, liable actions, etc.

Other Jur. Considerations

Will jurisdiction inhibit First Amendment rights (freedom of speech)? The plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief (World-Wide Volkswagen).

International Shoe (1945)

What does Hess v. Polawski add to theory? Implied consent (fictive). 'Dangerous' element. Status in rem. Why is International Shoe not in Washington in traditional sense? Headquarters in Delaware, incorporated there: Missouri factory/principal place of business. Traditional thinking doesn't solve this problem. Why is serving salesman as agent insufficient for exercise of jurisdiction over NR jurisdiction? Corporation separate legal entity from natural person (agent) in state. Corporation only manifests itself through activities under theory of presence. International Shoe no longer a push or expansion of traditional basis. New procedure to make state lines somewhat less important. Court has jurisdiction when such 'minimum contacts with the forum so that exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'- very pretty but without substance. Nowhere does international shoe overrule Pennoyer v. neff. Test for non-resident defendant: contacts and fairness. Washington statutes set up a scheme for unemployment compensation funded by employers. The employers must pay a specified percentage of wages paid annually to employees. The state of Washington Commissioner (defendant) is responsible for the assessment for delinquent contributions. A notice of assessment was hand delivered to an employee of International Shoe Co (sales solicitor). A copy of the notice was mailed to appellant (Delaware company but primary place of business is Missouri). International Shoe moved to dismiss charges on the ground that the service to the sales solicitor is not proper service upon the appellant because International Shoe was not a corporation of the state of Washington nor were they doing business there nor did they have an agent within the state upon service could be made. The appellant does not have an office in Washington, make no contracts there, maintain no stock of merchandise there, and makes no delivers of goods on the interstate there. The company hired 11-13 sales solicitors who resided in Washington. The sales solicitors resided in Washington, activities were confined to the state, they were compensated by commission that totaled more than $31,000 (they were definitely selling stuff in Washington). On occasion, they rent rooms to display sample shoes. The cost of rental is reimbursed by International Shoe. The salesmen transmit orders to appellant's office and then orders are shipped from appellant to customers. The Court held the forum state had personal jurisdiction because the activities carried out by International Shoe Co. in the state of Washington were systematic and continuous throughout the years in question (they were neither irregular nor casual). Furthermore, the obligation being sued upon arises out of those activities (specific jurisdiction). The company's operation established sufficient contact with the state of Washington because 1) the company's activities resulted in a large volume of interstate business in which the company received the benefits and protection of Washington and 2) the company has "presence" within the state if there are activities carried out on its behalf by those who are authorized to do it. This case established the "minimum contact" rule in which a cause of action that arises out of activities that are "systematic and continuous" make on liable for suit in a forum state (quantitative standard). Quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the law (taxing, employment fund collection) either satisfies or dissatisfies due process (Qualitative standard).

Asahi (1987)

stream of commerce case. Ex. Make valves in state A, send them to manufacturer in state B. manufacturer puts them in widgets, which are sold to states C, D, and E. but valve explodes in C,D, or E and wants to sue valve-maker. Does valve maker have relevant contact? Split 4-4. Two viable theories but no reliable law. Brennan- is relevant contact if put product in stream of commerce and reasonably anticipate it'll get to the forum. O'Conner- you need that plus intent/purpose to serve forum ex. Advertising in state or customer service. Stevens didn't take stand Plaintiff, resident of California, was injured when an allegedly defective rear tire on his motorcycle lost air. Plaintiff sued Taiwanese manufacturer, and he joined the Japanese valve manufacturer, Asahi. Asahi moved to dismiss suit in CA for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court found that California lacked personal jurisdiction, but for different reasons. Regardless of whether the defendant had purposeful contact with California, asserting PJ over Asahi is unreasonable looking to the state interest, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the burden on the defendant. The burden on the defendant is severe: must defend in a foreign legal system. Justice O'Conner plus 3 other Justices The placement of a product in the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state. Justice Brennan plus 3 other Justices The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents of isolated incidents, but to the regular and anticipated flow of the products from manufacturer to distribution to retail sale. As long as the manufacturer is aware that the final product is being marketed to the forum state, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.

Hypo Jur

• Defendant in the forum (Oregon), No money, no property in state of Oregon and go to California where has lots of money, go to California court saying want to enforce it because has right to full faith and credit under Constitution (if present in Oregon) • Judgement for $1000 in Oregon, only get $250 for property, go to Cali. Not entitled to ffc for $750. • Issue: amenability; how do all people in world (or 50 states) get subject to court; how does court get jurisdiction over them? According to Pennoyer v. Neff • State has exclusive authority within its boundaries, in rem proceeding • What about jurisdiction over the defendant? We are dealing with people's interest in the property. Why does it satisfy due process of 14th amendment? • A v. B title, Lot 1 Blackacre- how different from true in rem? • True in rem: win title to property • A v. B: determine title between A and B, not against 'world' like true in rem. Still with respect to the property- smaller scope of judgement • Theory of jurisdiction: property within boundaries, state has interest in real property • A v. B nonresident attachment of property quasi in rem • Different than 1 and 2 because expanded jurisdiction (like Pennoyer v. Neff); limited expansion • Expanding in rem theories of jurisdiction based on theories of presence and power • Money judgement- limits are value of property • Personal obligations not just adjudicating things related to property/arising out of property • Personal jurisdiction: they have you in state, then sue you and can claim money even with no property in state. Quasi in rem different because theory of jurisdiction different

Strawbridge v. Curtis

Complainants were citizens of MA. Some defendants were also citizens of MA. Curtis was citizen of Vermont. District Court in MA dismissed complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court found that jurisdiction cannot be supported because where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue in federal court (aka have to be members of different states). Complete diversity rule: this is not required by the Constitution or 1332: jurisdiction exists only if all plaintiffs are of diverse citizenship from all defendants (this is not constitutionally required; the court simply interprets the statute). Statutory Exceptions: Federal Interpleader Act or Concursus in LA 1335 (legislative extension of federal jurisdiction) in which the statute grants federal subject matter jurisdiction based upon "minimal diversity," having at least one adverse claimant of diverse citizenship from another. This can happen when there is a fund that is being argued over or there (can be as low as $500) or there is minimal diversity and the money litigated exceeds a certain amount and raises a federal question. This is actually needed because there is still local bias even if one of the named defendants it a citizen of the forum state (out of state defendant is now the only non-local). Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act that permits minimal diversity in cases arising from accidents causing at least 75 deaths. Class Action Fairness Act which allows minimal diversity when the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

Randazzo v. Eagle-Pitcher

Complaint alleges Bevco, CE Refractories has a "registered office" in Delaware and is organized and exists under Delaware laws. Complaint also alleged that Bevco Industries is duly organized to do business in PA and is domiciled in PA. The complaint said nothing about incorporation or principal place of business laid out in 1332 (c)(1). The court found that because the complaint failed to properly state the principal place of business, the judge had no jurisdiction over company and the complaint dismissed with prejudice (not prejudice on the merits) (plaintiff is not permitted to file a new case in federal court but can file in state court). A corporation is a citizen of any state where it is incorporated and any state in which it has its principal place of business. A corporation can have only one principal place of business. Plaintiff must state in pleading a short and plain statement the existence of whatever is essential for federal jurisdiction. A corporation has dual citizenship and is deemed a citizen of any state it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business 1132 c1. Thus, the plaintiff must allege a corporation's state of incorporation and principal pace of business 1132 and Rule 8. The plaintiff cannot choose to allege only one of the corporation's citizenships. 1332 c1 was designed to reduce the caseload for Federal courts. These courts do not have general jurisdiction and the plaintiff must rebut the presumption that a Federal court lacks jurisdiction over a particular case. To consider a case not properly within the jurisdiction of Federal Courts is an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states.

Belleville Catering v. Champagne

Complaint filed by plaintiff to invoke diversity jurisdiction under 1332 said the corporate plaintiff was incorporated in Missouri and had its principal place of business there. It said that the 5 individual plaintiffs were citizens of Missouri. It alleged defendant was a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in Illinois. The lower court accepted these allegations and a verdict was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appealed tracking allegations of complaint. Defendant says jurisdictional statement is "complete and correct." The lower court said federal jurisdiction has not been established. The judgment of the district court is vacated and case remanded to dismiss complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Case must be brought to state court or settlement. Jurisdictional statements are incorrect because lower court and attorneys assumed that an LLC is treated like a corporation. It is not, its treated as a partnership, which takes the citizenship of every general and limited partner. JS is also incorrect because plaintiff is incorporated in Illinois, not Missouri. Attorneys amended suits: Plaintiffs says that Belleville is and has always been incorporated in Illinois. Defendant says LLC has several members who are citizens of Illinois. Citizens on both sides of the suit are from Illinois. No diversity jurisdiction under 1332. Attorneys cannot assert confidentiality for its members and their citizenship. It is not possible to litigate Diversity citizenship if details are kept confidentially from the judiciary. Lawyers for plaintiffs as well as defendants must investigate rather than assume jurisdiction (don't want to get judgment and then have it overturned because of jurisdiction).

Consent

Consent: consent helps to further the state's interest in litigation and is a significant factor to consider. Usually there is a statute that establishes either implied or actual consent. For example, a defendant can have actual knowledge of the state's interest in regulating conduct when he/she signs to become an officer of a state's corporation. A corporation gives actual consent to jurisdiction when it becomes authorized to do business in forum state or incorporated in the forum state. Implied consent is based on one's conduct rather than from one's direct expression (did cause of action arise out of defendant's contacts with the forum state? When the state has substantial reason to regulate the in-state activity of a nonresident of the state, it may provide that by engaging in such activity, the nonresident thereby appoints a designated state official as his agent for service of process. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has upheld statutes that use such implied consent to subject a nonresident motorist to jurisdiction in any state in which he has an accident. [Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)] Consent to personal jurisdiction is evident when: 1) a person or company appoints an agent for service of process within the state 2) conduct in litigation (filing a complaint and having to answer to counterclaim, failure to raise a timely objection). Procedural default: If a defendant brings a counterclaim, he can no longer claim lack of personal jurisdiction. This is implied consent because he filed a suit in that court. 3) forum selection agreements of private parties via contracts A person may consent to a State's authority by 1) Explicit consent 2) Presence within a state at the time the suit is commenced 3) incorporation or principal place of business within the state. Consent only helps establish the state's interest in litigation because it shows that the state drafted statutes in hopes to exercise jurisdiction over this defendant in this situation. Express consent also shows that it was foreseeable to the defendant that he could be sued there. It does not justify personal jurisdiction alone, but is a great factor to consider.

More notice

Constructive Notice: publication of notice, posting notice to property, and domiciliary service (most common). This is defined differently in different jurisdictions. This is when process is served on a person of suitable age and discretion at usual place of abode of defendant. Some jurisdictions require notice to be given to someone who resides in the abode. This is sufficient to satisfy statutory notice. This is reasonably calculated to give actual notice. • When there are unknown beneficiaries or unknown addresses of beneficiaries (those that you cannot reasonably find), notice is satisfied via publication in a local newspaper. There is an obligation to do what is reasonable under the circumstances to find the knowables. In most cases, the secure posting of notice on or around property is likely to offer property owner sufficient warning and notice. This is sufficient where the location of the defendant is not known • When the beneficiaries are known and addresses are known, publication in a local newspaper is insufficient and violates due process because there is a more adequate means to inform the parties (mail) (Mullane). With an increased reliance on electronic media, print newspapers are even less likely to give actual notice. • However, posting of notice on property is inappropriate when the names of defendants/addresses are easily ascertainable from public records (Schroeder). It is also inappropriate when the process serves known notice is unlikely to be given to property owners (children removing notice in Greene). In a situation in where there are a large number of small interests, notice to everyone individually is not required because notice to most of the interested parties act as a safeguard to the interests of all (Mullane). Professionalism: More than just skill, this is behavior and a sense of obligation to society. Sense of fairness: If person has actual knowledge that defendant did not receive notice, it violates due process. If it is known that defendant is mentally incompetent, service is not constitutional (Curators are appointed to represent them). Pragmatism: common sense that if kids are running around, don't post notice on a door.

Hanson v. Denckla (1958)

Donner created a trust while she was in Pennsylvania. The trust was executed in Delaware and a Delaware bank became the trustee. She continued relationship from home in Penns., turning property over, trustee manages it. Donner later moved to Florida and named who the recipients of the trust would be. She dies, dispute between daughters. This case was over the validity of a trust; a dispute arose between Donner's will recipients and the trust beneficiaries. Her will was probated in Florida. The question was whether Florida had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware bank (the trustee). The U.S Supreme Court found that Florida did not have jurisdiction because there was no connection with Florida when the trust was created, and Donner's later move to Florida was not sufficient for jurisdiction. The court found that the unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. The Delaware trust company had no office in Florida, transacted no business there, and none of trust assets had ever been held or administered in Florida. Not based on plaintiff's actions. Did not purposely avail themselves of forum. No such contacts with that state existed as would give Florida court "in personam" jurisdiction over trust company although (1) that settlor had thereafter become domiciled in Florida, (2) that trustee had remitted trust income to her in that state and (3) that powers of appointment granted by trust agreement had been exercised in Florida It is essential that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activity within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. The Court distinguished this case from McGee: Donner carried on several bits of trust administration that may be compared to the mailing of premiums in McGee, but there was no instance in which the trustee performed any acts in Florida similar to the solicitation seen in McGee (directing activity toward the forum state).

Justiciability

Has everything been done to solve the matter? Is it a case or controversy? The "justiciability" of issues: a plaintiff cannot sue until he or she has a "standing" (an injury or personal stake in the litigation). U.S. Constitution talks about cases and controversies. For example, a federal law can only be overturned if there is a real case and controversy involving the statute (must have a tort or a money claim), and then it is proper for courts to address it. First thing you think about in connection with litigation process: Justiciability- divide into 3 components 1. Ripeness: whether enough has happened such that it's appropriate to be litigated at this point; generally require everything to happen 2. Right of action: who owns the cause of action? Those who can't said to 'lack standing' 3. Separation of powers: usually in connection with public litigation, rarely private; does this issue even belong in court or does it need to involve legislature, executive, etc.

Personal Jurisdiction

If person not domiciled, didn't consent, no agent etc. only way to get jurisdiction over defendant is to have him in the state General jurisdiction: The casual presence of a company or even one single conduct or isolated items of activity in the state on the corporation's behalf are not enough are not enough when the cause of action is unconnected with the activities there. However, the continuous corporate operations within a state are thought to be so substantial as to justify suit when the cause of action is entirely distinct from those activities. General jurisdiction when jurisdiction exists regardless/irrespective of nature of activities that caused claim Specific Jurisdiction: When defendant has given consent to service and suit, consent implied from its presence in the state though the acts of its authorized agents, personal jurisdiction is upheld. The Court said that due process only requires that in order for a defendant to be subject to a judgment in personam, he have certain minimum contacts with the state so that the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and justice." In personam jurisdiction

Mas v. Perry

Mr. Mas is citizen of France, Mrs. Mas is citizen of MI. They were married in MI, but lived in LA for 2 years. They then moved to Illinois intending to return to BR for husband to finish doctorate degree. It was undecided where they would reside after. During the 2 years they lived in BR after marriage, they rented apt from appellant who had installed two-way mirrors and viewed them in intimacies after marriage. District court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. He argues that the appellees failed to prove diversity of citizenship among the parties. Jury returned verdict for plaintiffs for $5,000 and $15,000. The court affirmed the district court decision. The District Court had jurisdiction because there is a claim by an alien against a state citizen and an action between citizens of different states. Furthermore, the claims of Mas' arise from the same operative facts and are almost completely interdependent. A woman doesn't necessarily take the domicile of her husband upon marriage. A person can have only one domicile at a time. There are two requirements for changing domicile: 1) physical requirement of moving 2) mental requirements of intending to make the new state one's fixed home (factors in assessing intent include voter registration, purchase of a house, payment of taxes, and in-state college tuition). When deciding domiciliary, remember the purpose it serves (protect nonresidents from possible prejudice they might encounter in local courts). Under 1332 (a)(1) federal judicial power extends to Mr. Mas' claim against appellant, citizen of LA. It also extends to Mrs. Mas (citizen of MI) vs. defendant (diversity of citizenship). An American woman does not lose her US citizenship just because she married an alien. Because she was a graduate assistant at LSU, her domiciliary did not change when she was a resident of LA. They were in LA only as students.

Long-arm

• Once establish Constitutional limits to personal jurisdiction, also must determine statutory limitations • Most states have enumerated act long-arm statutes. Acts of defendants/claims must be enumerated by the statute. Must have a statute to authorize jurisdiction • Whole point to satisfy due process • 14th amendment does not give jurisdiction, it sets limits on jurisdiction and gives permission within the Constitutional boundaries to make courts • True not just for minimum contacts but any type of jurisdiction • When court exercises general in personam jurisdiction it still needs statutory basis • Many states have statutes that allow jurisdiction over a defendant that is 'doing business' in the state. These are generally interpreted to authorize general in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, even for claims that arose outside the fs. Constitutionally permissible if defendant has ongoing, extensive in-state contacts • Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.: broad interpretation of 'commits a tortious act within this state', based on where injury suffered. Vs. Feathers v. McLucas, opposite result in NY • Fifth Amendment contains similar due processs clause that applies to federal government and its courts. Clause has been held to allow a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if she has an appropriate relation to the US s a whole, not to a particular state. Seldom do federal courts exercise this broad jurisdiction • 4k1a defines reach of personal jurisdiction in the federal courts. Restricts federal jurisdiction in many cases. Won't be able to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant in federal court unless capable in local state courts • Congress authorized nationwide jurisdiction in particular types of cases ex. 28 USC §1361 (interpleader cases) • Some states long-arm statutes "to the limits of due process", others more limited. What does it mean? Court will construe the specific provisions of its long-arm statute as broadly as possible without overreaching constitutional bounds. If multiple interpretations, court will opt for broadest interpretation consistent with due process constraints

Article I s. 8

• The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; • To borrow money on the credit of the United States; • To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; • To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; • To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; • To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; • To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; • To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; • To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; • To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; • To provide and maintain a navy; • To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; • To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And • To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Article III s. 2

• The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. • In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. • The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.