Cognitive psychology- Consciousness
individual differences/ personal significance in SA + unconsciousness
-33% of pps noticed their names being said in non-attended stream (Moray, 1959). -bulimic pps more likely to hear words like 'fat' in non-attended stream (Schotte et al, 1990). -pps w/ reduced attentional control less able to ignore their names said in non-shadowed stream (Conway et al, 2001).
Libet (1983) on consciousness and free will
-EEG evidence: we pursue the 'decision' unconsciously 200 ms in, but we gain CA of it after 500 ms. -the motor cortex initiates the 'flick' after 700 ms.
selective attention ITO consciousness
-SA determines what stimuli we should be consciously aware of, though this can be automatically controlled by the environment. -if we give little to no attention, we would focus on fewer items (Landman et al, 2003).
thought experiment (Jackson, 1982)
-a neuroscientist lives in a fully black and white room her whole life, so has never seen colour. -she understands the brain's processes towards colour and how their names correspond to wavelengths on light spectrum. (ACCESS CONSCIOUSNESS) -BUT doesn't have subjective experience of these colours. (LACK OF SENTIENCE CONSCIOUSNESS)
what is dichotic listening in SA and unconsciousness?
-a psychological test investigating SA and auditory systems within the brain. -consciously isolating and perceiving single streams of info. -different sentences are presented in each ear. pp is required to repeat what they hear. -changing the language in one sentence---> say aloud the sentence w/ native language- automatic processing (Wood + Cowan, 1995). -explains the cocktail party effect as we suspect names being called in a loud environment (Cherry, 1953).
conscious free will?
-activation of the PFC and parietal cortex 7 seconds before CA (Soon et al, 2008). -we can inhibit actions when we're aware of them, but we don't control unconscious initiation.
the couch potato in conscious experience
-consciousness = illusion (Grey, 2002). -conscious self is aware but doesn't initiate.
cognitive approach on the unconscious
-consciousness emphasised as sensation of unitary awareness. -unconsciousness is rather the result of automatic processing, compared to consciousness (controlled processing).
clinical examples of the cognitive unconscious
-patient w/o CA in vegetative state showed distinct brain activation pattern as control pps when asked to imagine tennis (Owens et al, 2006). -BLINDSIGHT: perceptual blindess in visual field area but show response to visual stimuli w/o qualia. pps asked if light was moving despite not being perceptually aware ----> guess correctly if researcher says to have a guess. -VISUAL AGNOSIA: detecting but unable to recognise objects (patient DF- Goodale, 2000). -SPLIT BRAIN PATIENTS: e.g. Sperry (1968); Gazzaniga (2009). anarchic hand syndrome is present in some SB patients, that control over limbs is lost---> unintentional actions.
Jiang et al (2006) on the cognitive unconscious
-presented pics of nude individuals to pps for 100 ms. -founded that pps were unconsciously directed towards spatial locations based on sexual orientation (i.e. hetero pps more drawn towards opposite sex locations, gay pps more drawn towards same sex locations).
the delegator in conscious experience (Donald, 2001)
-responsibility is 'delegated' to unconscious expert processes. -CU makes possibilities of efficient thought. -CA of lower level processing results. -inhibits inappropriate actions.
the control freak executive in conscious experience
-self initiation of consciousness and is aware of every action. -cognitive inefficiency as conscious self has overload. -contrasts w/ evidence.
what are the 3 issues to understanding consciousness? (Pinker, 1997)
-sentience: our experience of subjective info processing. -access: the results/reporting of subjective experience (w/o comprehending the processes). -self knowledge: having conscious awareness of oneself.
what is the definition of consciousness?
-the awareness of our thought processes, surroundings and our interactions w/ them. -use of 'I think therefore I am' (Descartes). -the 'subjective, inner life of the mind'.
what is the hard problem of consciousness? (Chalmers, 1995)
-the hard problem explains how we have qualia: "...the agony of an intense pain, the sparkle of happiness... it is these phenomena that pose the real mystery of the mind" (C, 1995). -in other words, we may be biologically conscious (brain) but our conscious experiences are subjective. e.g. colour-blindess (viewing red as a blue tone).
what is the global workspace theory ITO consciousness in the brain? (Baars, 1988;1997, Baars + Franklin, 2007)
-the theory that in the prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, there's a 'theatre of consciousness'. -in early stages of info processing, specialised unconscious processors (like motion, colour) are responded to and integrated by the ToC.
Freud on the unconscious
-the unconscious mind is rather buried and full of repressed conflicts that is seen as unusual to bring to consciousness. -driven by instinctive urges and if brought to surface, can result in Freudian slips.
Dennett (1991; 2001) on the GWT
-there's no Cartesian theatre (i.e. the GWT is metaphorical- there's no specific brain region for consciousness). -sensory reps are being constantly updated or drafted.
what is the attenuation model? (Treisman, 1960)
this model proposes that rather than an attentional filter, sensory info is condensed by selective attention/'attenuating' the surrounding stimuli in order to focus on a specific one. -the selected attended info is then passed into CP.
what is the attentional filtering model? (Broadbent)
this model proposes that the sensory info we obtain all goes through an attentional filter, which is condensed into CP. the filter acts as a buffer to select which info should gain CA.
