F8 - Organizations as politics

Holgersson, Charlotte, (2013), "Recruiting Managing Directors: Doing Homosociality"

This article examines homosociality in the context of top management recruitment in Sweden, and how it is possible that such a gender-neutral country still has such a biased distribution of leaders. It is also argued that homosociality and gender discrimination can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Homosociality is a concept that has been used to describe a preference for relations with the same gender. Practices in which men orient themselves towards other men within a patriarchal gender order 'The seeking, enjoyment, and/or preference for the company of the same sex' (Lipman Blumen). Suitability: criteria that have to be met to qualify for the position (formal criteria) Acceptability: appearance, attitude, personality Informal criteria: age, gender, and social or ethnic background and influence more or less overtly the co-option decisions. Co-option follows two principles: the dominant group has the privilege to select a new member and the new member should in some way contribute to the status of the group. The analysis suggests that it is through two main practices that homosociality is done in the recruitment process. 1. (re)defining competence: comprises defining acceptability criteria so that what preferred male candidates do appears important and what women do appear less important, and defining suitability criteria according to a traditional bourgeois male norm and applying a different set of criteria for women as a group. It involves redefining flaws displayed by preferred male candidates as neither disqualifying nor aggravating and even as competence. 2. doing hierarchy: Doing hierarchy entails senior men having the prerogative of defining competence as well as identifying, grooming, and selecting younger prospects. It also involves younger men making themselves available and visible, not challenging the hierarchy but conforming to the management norm and contributing competence that is considered new and valuable. This reproduces a specific type of male manager and perpetuates a specific masculine managerial culture. 🡪 These practices are composed of linkages between formal and informal practices and perceptions of gender and management. They result in the performance of men and the exclusion of women and contribute to the reproduction of traditional management cultures that are not gendered as male but also marked by age, sexuality, and class. The discussion also suggests that the preference for men can be understood as an unreflexively practice. It is not necessarily men's negative perceptions of women that lead them to recruit men, but rather their preference for certain men and the complex web of homosocial relations surrounding management careers that direct their attention to other men. The exclusion of women can be seen as a result of an active preference for men rather than conscious discrimination of women. Few reflect upon their own preference for certain men and that it contributes to male dominance = an unreflexive practice, enabling men to simultaneously reproduce male dominance in management while portraying themselves as pro-equality. This can also explain why many gender equality initiatives targeting management levels have limited success as they seldom focus on making men more aware of their own homosocial practices.

Courpasson, D., 2000 'Managerial strategies of domination: Power in soft bureaucracies.

This paper discusses the emergence and reinforcement of organizational political regimes, based on domination and centralization, in French organizations. Domination and power are two old concepts in organizational sociology. Weber and crozier suggest that domination is still very useful for understanding how business leaders govern organizations today. This paper suggests that organizations should be seen as "soft bureaucracies", in which centralization and entrepreneurial forms of governance are combined. From a Weberian point of view, this paper simultaneously describes organizations as "structures of domination" and as "structures of legitimacy". It defends the idea that the re-emergence of bureaucracies is a sign that organizations are more and more politically centralized and governed. How can more flexible, organic, decentralized organizations be governed? More specifically: how can organizations both be innovative (organic structures work best) and be able to implement and control these innovations (bureaucratic organizations work best)? - Organizational scholars today: soft control, managerial practices, and policies have supplanted (undanträngt) bureaucratic and hierarchal control and that the entrepreneurial form is pervasive. - But is that really the case? This article means that the answer is not that simple. The hypothesis is that strategies of "soft control" are not the opposite of hierarchal and bureaucratic governance. To some extent, we can even assume that "soft governance" is infused with and governed by legitimate authority. In other words: Existing legitimate authority perpetuates (bevarar) itself by incorporating soft practices and articulating these with hierarchal and formal bureaucratic practices. 🡪 this is the consequence of the fact that games and soft controls are influenced by prevailing (rådande) authorities. This prevalence is what we could call "domination". Weber and Crozier Weber: Power occurs within the order governing the organization (structures of domination). Power is the instrument of "structures of domination" whose objective is to construct, stabilize obedience for people. Legitimacy is "the recognition of the right to govern". Crozier: Power is a resource in the face of uncertainty. The control of uncertainty takes place in an already set power structure, and does not take domination into account. People play with constraints and rules, not with abstract or terrifying forms of domination. Legitimacy is not included. Organizational governance is produced by a set of local games, not by a political centralization. Two case studies Analyzed two cases of "strategies of domination" in relationship to "planned redundancy schemes" and strategies of control over professional elites. Case studies confirm: 1. How can redundancy decisions be legitimized? The existence of liberal legitimacy is based on ineluctability and powerlessness. Tends to increase managerial power. Dismissal is more accepted if they are accompanied by "soft" measures which minimized the effect of the dismissal. Managerial power can therefore be shared, once the decision is made legitimized. 2. How can rules be imposed on "professional elites? Professional elites appear to develop "self-leadership" and "self-governing-rules" which can be connected with two strategies of domination. Self-governing rules created by professional elites: 1) Responsibility rules: The power of the elite comes from their control of an area of uncertainty. 2) The rule of personal reputation: elite often have a large responsibility in org. and high interaction. Dominant behavior of the elite is not only guided by innovation and entrepreneurial spirit, also on rewarding initiatives and personal reputation for professional development = can appear as legitimate in case of problems. Case conclusion: domination is the core of managerial strategies even organic, flat organizations. Jobs and responsibilities have become more decentralized, but political decisions more centralized. The concept of "soft" bureaucracy The system of governance in "soft bureaucracies" is characterized by four components: - Combination between personal and impersonal obedience: bureaucratic domination is impersonal, but the traditional and charismatic types are personal. Charismatic domination is based on personal obedience. - Centralization as a means of legitimating political decisions: Bureaucracy aims to get rid of particularism (discrimination). Securing legitimate use of managerial criteria. Reducing discretionary power over others. Centralization can be the guarantee that some political decisions will be made sustained by the same people. - Governance based on soft coercion and protection: Soft bureaucracy is a coercive and protective form which can be tailored to the contemporary problems of individual vulnerability (that's why it's softened). - Fusing internal and external legitimacies: finally, the bureaucracy is called "soft" because of the specific nature of its structure of legitimacy. 3 forms of legitimacy: instrumental, liberal, political

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The Political Metaphor Energies that drive organizations together, and apart. Organizations are populated by individuals that have different opinions, aspirations, and interests. Organizations can thus be viewed as a system of government that varies according to the political principles employed. Systems of political activity. The main ingredients of Politics constitute power, interests, and conflicts. Interests: - ... of different stakeholders. -.... of different career aspirations of individuals. Conflicts (arise when interests collide): - Is counter-productive and should be removed through appropriate managerial action (unitary view) - is part of organizational affairs and could be potentially positive and functional (the pluralist view) - is part of a wider class conflict in society (radical view) Power: Is the medium through which conflicts are resolved. Influences who get what, when, and how. - Power bases - As an interdependent relationship. The greater B's dependency on A, the greater power A has over B. Dependency increases the more the resources are important, scarce, and non-substitutable. Morgan's fourteen power sources: 1. Formal authority 2. Scarce resources 3. Organizational structure, rules, regulations 4. Decision processes 5. Knowledge and information 6. Boundaries 7. Cope with uncertainty 8. Interpersonal relationships 9. Interpersonal alliances, networks, and control of "informal" organizations 10. Control of counter organizations 11. Symbolism and the management of meaning 12. Gender and the management of gender relations 13. Structural factors that define the stage of action 14. The power one already has The "Glass-ceiling" effect: gender biases found in language, myths, that prevent women from achieving positions of power and prestige, It is called this since it is covert and can not be seen. It is built into taken for granted norms and values of society. Holgersson: Investigating top management recruitment in Sweden. 76% of all managers in Sweden are men. 87% of board directors are men, and 84% of the members of management in private business are men. RQ: Why does this continue, when aware of the situation? Mitchell et al. Stakeholder: any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the organization's articles. - Power Coercive, utilitarian, normative - Legitimacy A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. Socially and culturally defined, it varies over time and space. - Urgency The degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention. The more attributes a stakeholder is perceived to have by the managers, the more attention it will get. They divide the stakeholders into different classes depending on these factors. Attributes. - Variable - Socially constructed - Consciousness may or may not be present Politics permeate (Hickson) The political character of decision-making processes. - Some have greater stakes than others. - Some are more influential than others (because others are dependent on their services, their work is non-substitutable and their activities reduces the level of uncertainty felt within the organization). - Often some solutions precede decisions ('garbage can' processes). The Garbage Can model (Cohen et al.) Problems, solutions, and preferences of different individuals compete for organizational attention and action. Organizations could just as well start making decisions from the solution side (as from the problem side). • Sporadic processes: often the process most likely to be politically charged. Concern particularly 'weighty and controversial matters' such as new products or take over bids. • Constricted processes: often concern recurrent matters such as the budget. • Fluid processes: least political. Focus on unusual but non-controversial matters, smooth committee-coordinated processes. Courpasson (2000) How can organizations be both simultaneously innovative (organic structures work best) and yet able to implement and even control these innovations (bureaucratic structures work best)? Today, most organizations' scholars assume that soft control, soft managerial practices, and policies have supplanted hierarchal and bureaucratic control and that the entrepreneurial form of governance is pervasive. Is it that easy? No, it is not that easy. Two case studies - one focusing on the question of the decision of redundancy and the other one about how business leaders control professional elites. Result: So-called "soft bureaucracies" - within which domination is not essentially exerted by means of, e.g- violence, direct punishment, or local hierarchal supervision, but through sophisticated managerial strategies. Strengths and limitations of the Political Metaphor: + Helps us understand the relationship between politics and organization and the role of power in determining political outcomes. + Helps us explode the myth of organizational rationality. + Helps us overcome the idea that organizations are functionally integrated systems. - We begin to see politics everywhere and to look for agendas even when there are none. - May overstate the power and importance of the individual and underplay the system dynamics that determine what becomes political and how politics occur.

Morgan Ch. 6

Basic politics: The basis of day-to-day order in these organizations tends to be autocratic rather than democratic in that the ultimate power to shape action rests in the hands of a single individual or group, who typically makes all the important decisions. Autocracy: absolute government where power is held by an individual or small group and supported by control of critical resources, property, or ownership rights, tradition, charisma, and other claims to personal privilege. Bureaucracy: rule exercised through the use of knowledge, expert power, and the ability to solve relevant problems. Technocracy: rule exercised through the use of knowledge, expert power, and the ability to solve relevant problems. Codetermination: the form of rule where opposing parties combine in the joint management of mutual interests, as in coalitions government. Mixed types are found in practice. Organizations as systems of political activity To understand the political dynamics of an organization, it is necessary to explore the detailed processes through which people engage in politics. We can analyze organizational politics in a systematic way by focusing on relations between interests, conflict, and power. Politics arise when people think and want to act differently. - Interests: Predispositions embrace goals, values, desires, expectations, etc, that lead people to act in one way rather than another. Task interests are connected to the work one has to perform. Career interests regard the job and future aspirations of a person. Extramural interests exist outside of work. They all exist in relation to each other and serve as the main source of potential politically related tension. - Conflict Arises when interests collide. - Power The medium through which conflicts of interest are ultimately resolved. Power influences who gets what, when, and how. Sources of power include formal authority, control of scarce resources, use of organizational structure and rules, control of decision processes, control of knowledge and information, symbolism and the management of meaning, gender, etc (see page 167, Morgan). Managing Pluralist Organizations Handles the pluralist (multiple), for it emphasizes the plural nature of interests, conflicts, and sources of power that shape organizational life. Stands in contrast with the unitary (integrated whole) and radical (comprising antagonistic class interests) frame of reference. Can be concretized as the balancing between being assertive - unassertive and uncooperative - cooperative, leading to managing conflicts by being avoiding, compromising, competition, accommodation, collaboration. Strengths and limitations of the Political Metaphor + It encourages us to see how all organizational activity of interest is based and to evaluate all aspects of organizational functioning with this in mind. + Helps explode the myth of organizational rationality. Organizations may pursue different things, but for whom is it really rational and efficient? Rationality is always political, no one is neutral in the management of organizations. + It helps us find a way of overcoming the limitations of the idea that organizations are functionally integrated systems. Much organization theory has built on the assumption that organizations, like machines or organisms, are unified systems that bind part and whole in a quest for survival. The political metaphor suggests otherwise, pointing to the disintegrative strains and tensions that stem from the diverse sets of interests on which an organization builds. + It politicizes our understanding of human behavior in organizations. + It encourages us to recognize the sociopolitical implications of different kinds of organizations and the roles that organizations play in society. - Political danger. I.e. the political view of organizational activity leads to harmful and misleading political acting and thinking, e.g. thinking someone has a hidden agenda when they do not. It becomes a tool to advance personal interests, rather than generating new insights and understandings. - Is it realistic to presume a plurality of interests and power of holders? A case can be made for the idea that the interests of individuals may be best served if they recognize affinities of a class kind and act in a unified manner. Furthermore, although everyone has access to sources of power, ultimate power rests with the people or forces that are able to define the stage of actions on which the game of politics is played.

Hickson, D. J. (1990) Politics permeate.

Politics permeate (genomsyrar) organizations since organizations are made up of humans who have different past experiences, current circumstances, and differing interests. Different departments usually have different interests within an org. They influence and inspire each other. Politics in this sense need not and should not have a negative connotation. "Decision-set" of interests: When interests can influence decisions. In some decision-making processes, some have a large impact and some not. Assortment of interests coming in at one stage and exiting at another stage of the process of moving towards a decision. - Heavyweights: involved in most decision-making with high influence - Lightweight: involved in a few decision-making processes with a low influence Reasons for influence in the decision Some individuals or groups have more influence than others in putting forward "solutions" and knocking others. From their position in the organization, others become dependent upon them and susceptible to their influence. Three reasons: 1. if a department or other grouping within an organization is central to the workflows between subunits (so the work of others waits upon what it does) 2. when its work is non-substitutable (no one else either inside or outside the org. can do what it does) 3. when what it does effectively reduces the overall level of uncertainty felt within the organization Some decision-making processes will be more political than others: - High political. sporadic processes. Concern particularly weighty and controversial matters with serious consequences, (such as new products or take-over bids: acquisition) - Less political. constricted (förlängd) process: normal and recurrent (återkommande) matters (company plan, budget) - Least political: Fluid process: usual but non-controversial matter without serious consequences.

Mitchell, Ronald, Bradley Agle & Donna Wood, 1997, Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts.

Stakeholder theory has been a popular heuristic for describing the management environment for years, but it has not attained full theoretical status. Our aim in this article is to contribute to a theory of stakeholder identification and salience based on stakeholders possessing one or more of three relationship attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. By conibining these attributes, we generate a typology of stakeholders, propositions concerning their salience to managers of the firm, and research and management implications. Who Is a Stakeholder, and What Is a Stake? There is not much disagreement on what kind of entity can be a stakeholder. Persons, groups, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, societies, and even the natural environment are generally thought to qualify as actual or potential stakeholders. We find that it is the view mtaken about the existence and nature of the stake that presents an area of argument, because it is upon the basis of "stake" that "what counts" is ultimately decided. Early vagueness in definition. In an early statement Jones defined corporate social responsibility as "the notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract, indicating that a stake may go beyond mere ownership" (1980: 59-60). He then asked the pragmatic questions stakeholder theory still seeks to answer: "What are these groups? How many of these groups must be served? Which of their interests are most important? How can their interests be balanced? How much corporate money should be allotted to serve these interests?" (1980: 60). Broad or narrow view? Windsor (1992) correctly points out that stakeholder theorists differ considerably on whether they take a broad or narrow view of a firm's stakeholder universe. Freeman and Reed (1983) recognized early on that there would be serious differences oí opinion about broad versus narrow definitions of "Who or What Really Counts." Their broad definition of a stakeholder as an individual or group who "can affect the achievement of an organization's objectives or who is affected by the achievement oí an organization's objectives" (1983: 91) is virtually identical to Freeman's (1984) definition. And their narrow definition reverted to the language of the Stanford Research Institute (1963), defining stakeholders as those groups "on which the organization is dependent ior its continued survival" (1983: 91). Freeman's now-classic definition is this: "A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can afiect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (1984: 46). This is certainly one of the broadest definitions in the literature, ior it leaves the notion oí stake and the field of possible stakeholders unambiguously open to include virtually anyone. In this definition the basis of the stake can be unidirectional or bidirectional—"can aifect or is affected by"—and there is no implication or necessity oí reciprocal impact, as definitions involving relationships, transactions, or contracts require. This search for legitimacy, we argue later, is necessary to understand fully a firm's stakeholder environment, but it also can be a powerful blinder to the real impact of stakeholder power and claim urgency. We argue, in contrast to the position of all those who appear to iocus primarily on legitimacy, that this narrower view captures only one key attribute of stakeholder salience to managers. Between the broad and narrow are many other efforts to define what constitutes a stakeholder. Major differences between broad and narrow views. Narrow views of stakeholders are based on the practical reality of limited resources, limited time and attention, and limited patience of managers íor dealing with external constraints. In general, narrow views of stakeholders attempt to define relevant groups in terms of their direci relevance to the íirm's core economic interests. For example, several scholars define stakeholders in terms of their necessity for the firm's survival (Bowie, 1988; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Näsi, 1995); as noted, Clarkson (1995) defines stakeholders as those who have placed something at risk in relationship with the firm, whereas Freeman and Evan (1990), Hill and Jones (1992), and Cornell and Shapiro (1987) speak oí stakeholders as contractors or participants in exchange relationships. Claimants versus influencers. In order to clarify the term "stake," we need to differentiate between groups that have a legal, moral, or presumed claim on the firm and groups that have an ability to influence the firm's behavior, direction, process, or outcomes. Savage, Nix, Whitehead, and Blair (1991) consider two attributes to be necessary to identify a stakeholder: (1) a claim and (2) the ability to influence a firm. Brenner (1993) and Starik (1994), however, pose these attributes as either/or components of the definition of those with a stake. Actual versus potential relationship. Another crucial question leading to the comprehensibility of the term "stake" is whether an entity can be a stakeholder without being in actual relationship with the firm. Some scholars {e.g.. Ring, 1994) emphatically answer, " No." We argue that, on the contrary, the potential relationship can be as relevant as the actual one. Power, dependence, and reciprocity in relationships. If the firm and a stakeholder have a relationship, what is the nature of that relationship? The literature offers a confusing jumble of answers to this question, but most answers use a power-dependence frame of some sort. What Added Value Does a Theory of Stakeholder Identification Offer? This stateof-the-field provides an opportunity for a theory of stakeholder identification to move us forward by showing how power and legitimacy interact and, when combined with urgency, create different types of stakeholders with different expected behavioral patterns regarding the firm. Agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories are particularly helpful in explaining why power plays such an important role in the attention managers give to stakeholders. A final attribute that profoundly influences managerial perception and attention, although not the primary feature of any particular organizational theory, is implicit in each. Defining Stakeholder Attributes - Power - Legitimacy - Urgency Some examples of why a stakeholder would view its relationship with the firm as critical include the following: • ownership—the stakeholder's possession of firm-specific assets, or those assets tied to a firm that cannot be used in a different way without loss oí value (Hill & Jones, 1992; Williamson, 1985), making it very costly for the stakeholder to exit the relationship; • sentiment—as in the case of easily traded stock that is held by generations of owners within a family, regardless of the stock's performance; • expectation—the stakeholder's anticipation that the firm will continue providing it with something of great value (e.g., compensation and benefits in the case of employees); or • exposure—the importance the stakeholder attaches to that which is at risk in the relationship with the firm (Clarkson, 1994). Additional Features of Stakeholder Attributes 1. Stakeholder attributes are variable, not steady state. 2. Stakeholder attributes are socially constructed, not objective, reality. 3. Consciousness and wiJlful exercise may or may not be present. STAKEHOLDER CLASSES Latent Stakeholders With limited time, energy, and other resources to track stakeholder behavior and to manage relationships, managers may well do nothing about stakeholders they believe possess only one of the identifying attributes, and managers may not even go so far as to recognize those stakeholders' existence. Discretionary stakeholders. Discretionary stakeholders possess the attribute of legitimacy, but they have no power to influence the firm and no urgent claims. Demanding stakeholders. Where the sole relevant attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship is urgency, the stakeholder is described as "demanding." Expectant Stakeholders As we consider the potential relationship between managers and the group of stakeholders with two of the three identifying stakeholder attributes, we observe a qualitatively different zone oí salience. In analyzing the situations in which any two of the three attributes—power, legitimacy, and urgency—are present, we cannot help but notice the change in momentum that characterizes this condition. Dominant stakeholders. In the situation where stakeholders are both powerful and legitimate, their influence in the firm is assured, since by possessing power with legitimacy, they form the "dominant coalition" in the enterprise (Cyert & March, 1963). Dependent stakeholders. We characterize stakeholders who lack power but who have urgent legitimate claims as "dependent," because these stakeholders depend upon others (other stakeholders or the firm's managers) for the power necessary to carry out their will. Dangerous stakeholders. We suggest that where urgency and power characterize a stakeholder who lacks legitimacy, that stakeholder will be coercive and possibly violent, making the stakeholder "dangerous," literally, to the firm. Definitive Stakeholders Previously, we deiined "salience" as the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims. By definition, a stakeholder exhibiting both power and legitimacy already will be a member of a firm's dominant coalition. When such a stakeholder's claim is urgent, managers have a clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that stakeholder's claim. The most common occurrence is likely to be the movement oí a dominant stakeholder into the "definitive" category. In sum, we argue that stakeholder theory must account lor power and urgency as well as legitimacy, no matter how distasteful or unsettling the results. Managers must know about entities in their environment that hold power and have the intent to impose their will upon the firm. Power and urgency must be attended to if managers are to serve the legal and moral interests of legitimate stakeholders.