Government Test 3

Judicial review

Review by the US Supreme Court of the constitutional validity of a legislative act

Civil rights

The rights of citizens to political and social freedom and equality.

Selective incorporation

A constitutional doctrine that ensures states cannot enact laws that take away the constitutional rights of American citizens that are enshrined in the Bill of Rights

writ of habeas corpus

A court order that requires police to bring a prisoner to court to explain why they are holding the person. Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2

Senatorial courtesy

A custom whereby presidential appointments are confirmed only if there is no objection to them by the senators from the appointee's state

What does the exclusionary rule mean?

A rule created by Judiciary branch that prohibits police from using illegally seized evidence at trial.

Judicial restraint

A theory of judicial interpretation that encourages judges to limit the exercise of their own power

How does a case reach the Supreme Court?

After a case has been tried and appealed in the lower and federal state courts, it goes to the supreme court. Acts as the final interpreter of the constitution.

Which amendment did the Supreme Court use to make applicable to the states most protections in the Bill of Rights?

Amendment 14 Clause 1, Citizenship clause Clause 2, Privileges and immunities clause Clause 3, Due process clause; used this clause to make doctrine Clause 4, Equal protection clause

In which amendments to the Constitution is the Due Process clause located? What does due process mean?

Amendment 14 and 5 5- National Government 14- State Government Due process: Protections that individuals have against arbitrary government action. Procedural Due Process: Hears before convict/condemn Substantive Due Process: 1. Look at the content of the law and what the law seeks to regulate 2. What the law seeks to regulate beyond the reach of government

Which amendment to the Constitution is used to strike down laws that discriminate against women and minorities? What passage in the amendment is used?

Amendment 14. Section 1: Equal protection clause.

Which amendments list of protections for those accused of a crime?

Amendments 4, 5, 6, 8

Penumbra

An unstated liberty on the fringes of the more explicitly stated rights

Jury trial in national courts

Article 3, Section 2, Clause 3

Treason and punishment for treason

Article 3, Section 3, Clause 1-2

States guaranteed a republican form of government

Article 4, Section 4, Clause 1

No religious test oaths

Article 6, Clause 3

No ex post facto laws

Cannot be charged with a crime if it was not illegal when you committed the crime Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 (State) Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3 (Government)

Prior restraint

Censorship imposed, usually by a government or institution, on expression, that prohibits particular instances of expression.

Stare decisis

Courts look to past, similar issues to guide their decisions

Chief Justices of the United States

Earl Warren (1953-1969) Appointed by Dwight Eisenhower: Were applied to states while Earl was chief justice and liberal activist court Warren Burger (1969-1986) William Rehnquist (1986-2005) John Roberts (2005-Present)

Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)

FACTS: Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no "negro" or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution. QUESTION: Was Dred Scott free or slave? AMENDMENT: 5th CONCLUSION: 7-2 DECISION FOR SANFORD The majority held that "a negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves," whether enslaved or free, could not be an American citizen and therefore did not have standing to sue in federal court. Because the Court lacked jurisdiction, Taney dismissed the case on procedural grounds. Taney further held that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional and foreclose Congress from freeing slaves within Federal territories. The opinion showed deference to the Missouri courts, which held that moving to a free state did not render Scott emancipated. Finally, Taney ruled that slaves were property under the Fifth Amendment, and that any law that would deprive a slave owner of that property was unconstitutional. In dissent, Benjamin Robbins Curtis criticized Taney for addressing the claim's substance after finding the Court lacked jurisdiction. He pointed out that invalidating the Missouri Compromise was not necessary to resolve the case, and cast doubt on Taney's position that the Founders categorically opposed anti-slavery laws. John McLean echoed Curtis, finding the majority improperly reviewed the claim's substance when its holding should have been limited to procedure. He also argued that men of African descent could be citizens because they already had the right to vote in five states.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

FACTS: In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court. QUESTION/ISSUE: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? SUPREME COURT DECISION/CONCLUSION: 7-2 DECISION FOR GRISWOLD the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void. AMENDMENT(S): *The First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations.* Justice Goldberg, Justices Warren, and Brennan concurred. Rather than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras, Goldberg located it in the *Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.* Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that the *Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy.* Justice White concurred, arguing that the *Fourteenth Amendment* was the proper basis for the decision. DISSENTED: *Stewart* argued that despite his personal view that the law was "uncommonly silly," he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional. Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority, *Black* felt that there was no way to infer that the Constitution contained a right to privacy.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

FACTS: Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy - who was seven-eighths Caucasian - agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he was refused and arrested. At trial, Plessy's lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted. QUESTION: Does the Separate Car Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment? AMENDMENT: 14th CONCLUSION: 7-1 DECISION FOR FERGUSON The Court held that the state law was constitutional. In an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, the majority upheld state-imposed racial segregation. Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law, but held that separate treatment did not imply the inferiority of African Americans. The Court noted that there was not a meaningful difference in quality between the white and black railway cars. In short, segregation did not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination. In dissent, John Marshall Harlan argued that the Constitution was color-blind and that the United States had no class system. Accordingly, all citizens should have equal access to civil rights.

Roe v. Wade (1973)

FACTS: Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. QUESTIONS: Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? AMENDMENT: 14th CONCLUSION: 7-2 DECISION FOR JANE ROE The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.

Reed v. Reed (1971)

FACTS: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court. QUESTION: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? AMENDMENT: 14th CONCLUSION: UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR SALLY REED In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."

United States v. Virginia (1996)

FACTS: The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court. QUESTION: Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? AMENDMENT: 14th DECISION: 7-1 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsburg's announcement of the Court's opinion may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

FACTS: This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the "separate but equal" doctrine.) QUESTION: Does the segregation of public education based solely on race violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? AMENDMENT: 14th DECISION: Unanimous decision in favor of Brown Justices : Warren, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its logic.

The grand jury provision is located in the Fifth Amendment. What is the role of grand juries and trial juries in the American legal system?

Grand Jury: Group of citizens who decide if there's enough evidence for case to go to trial Trial Jury: Makes the decision through group of people

Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

Facts: Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Question: Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? Amendments: 1st Amendment 4th Amendment Decision: 6-3 in favor of Mapp In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule. Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

Facts: Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. Question: Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? Amendments: Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment Civil Rights Act of 1964 Decision: 8-1 in favor of Bakke No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)

Facts: Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief. Question: Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony defendants in state courts? Amendments: 6th Amendment Decision: Unanimous in favor of Gideon The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived. Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Clark and Harlan concurred in separate decisions.

Furman v. Georgia (1972)

Facts: Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively). Question: Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Amendments: 8th and 14th Amendment Decision: 5-4 in favor of Furman Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Facts: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Question: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? Amendments: 14th Amendment 1st Amendment Decision: 5-4 in favor of Obergefell Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court's authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

Texas v. Johnson (1989)

Facts: In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. Question: Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? Amendments: 1st Amendment Decision: 5-4 in favor of Johnson In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Engel v. Vitale (1962)

Facts: The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments. Question: Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment? Amendments: First Amendment Decision: 6-1 in favor of Engel The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion. In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the Court held that respondent's decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. The Court held that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment on the ground that the state's financing a religious exercise violated the First Amendment. Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that no "official religion" was established by permitting those who want to say a prayer to say it.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

Facts: This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation. On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel. Question: Does the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination extend to the police interrogation of a suspect? Amendments: 5th Amendment Decision: 5-4 in favor of Miranda The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant's interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent. Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Facts: Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they were not valid until their commissions were delivered by Secretary of State James Madison. William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions. Question: Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions? Can they sue for their commissions in court? Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their commissions? Amendments: Article 3, Section 2 Decision: Unanimous for Marbury The Court found that Madison's refusal to deliver the commission was illegal, but did not order Madison to hand over Marbury's commission via writ of mandamus. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court's original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established. Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws. In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.

How is the judicial system structured at the national level?

Federal court system: U.S. Supreme court, U.S. court of appeals, U.S. district courts State court system: Highest state courts, State intermediate appellate courts, state trial courts

How did the Supreme Court extend protections in the national Bill of Rights down to the states?

Incorporation doctrine, selective incorporation and incorporation theory.

What are the different types of judicial philosophy in how to interpret the Constitution and law?

Judicial restraint: Posits courts should allow decisions of other branches of government to stand, even when they offend a judges own principles Judicial activism: Posits judges should use their power broadly to further justice

Judicial activism

Judicial rulings that are suspected of being based on personal opinion, rather than on existing law

No titles of nobility

No positions based on heredity Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8

No bill of attainder

No punishment without trial Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 (State) Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3 (Government)

Did women have political rights shortly after ratification of the Constitution?

No, not until 1919 was the the 19th amendment passed which gave women the right to vote

De jure segregation

Official segregation / discrimination: by law De facto segregation / discrimination: Results from economic conditions and residential patterns

Civil liberties

Personal guarantees and freedoms that the government cannot abridge, either by law or by judicial interpretation, without due process.

Privileges and Immunities Clause

Prevents a state from treating citizens of other states in a discriminatory manner. Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1

Solicitor General

Represents the administration in cases before the Supreme Court

What does the Bill of Rights say about search warrants?

Search are only issued with a probable cause.

Amicus curiae

Someone who is not a party to a case and may or may not have been solicited by a party and who assists a court by offering information, expertise, or insight that has a bearing on the issues in the case

In which amendment to the Constitution is the Equal Protection clause located? What does the Equal Protection clause mean?

The 14th amendment. "nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" Guarantees that all citizens receive "equal protection of laws"

Judicial implementation

The process by which a court's decision is enforced

Writ of certiorari

The Justices select cases for review

Rule of Four

The Supreme Court will hear a case if four justices agree to do so.

U.S. District Courts

The courts where most federal cases begin, the U.S. District Courts are courts of original jurisdiction and hear civil and criminal cases. Judges have life tenure and are appointed by the President but approved by Senate.

How can federal courts be checked?

The president nominates federal officials, and the Senate confirms those nominations

Affirmative action

an action or policy favoring those who tend to suffer from discrimination, especially in relation to employment or education

US Circuit Courts

the 12 U.S. courts of appeals, which are empowered to review federal and state appellate court cases on substantive and procedural issues involving rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 3 Judges hear the appeal. En bac- All judges hear the appeal (rare)