IEC

1.01 know & utilize mandatory duty equipment for flight personnel

-ABUs/OCPs for Security Forces members -Blue uniforms for DOD security personnel. - SF Shield and qualification badge is mandatory 1.4.1.2. Equipment Requirements: 1) Plate Carrier System w/Kevlar inserts 2) Helmet 3)Whistle 4)Flashlight 5) Gas Mask (w/Inserts) 6)Handcuffs with key 7) weather gear 8) Military ID/Restricted Area Badge (if applicable) 9) Traffic Vest 1.4.2. equipment will be clean and serviceable, (damaged gear must be turned into supply).

1.16 know procedures for political asylum/seven bridges

8.14.1. When anyone claims political asylum, initiate a "Seven Bridges". Contact the BDOC so they can initiate QRC. 8.14.2. Conduct simple frisk. Once completed move the person out of sight from the general public (i.e. inside the gate). Hide intelligence. DO NOT ! 8.14.2.1. Question them. 8.14.2.2. Blind fold them. 8.14.2.3. Use physical restraints. 8.14.2.4. Use rank or titles in front of them. If OSI request the defector be transported to the OSI office, have them lay in the back seat of vehicle. Keep them out of view from the public. DON'T let them gather intelligence. 8.14.4. If individual is in possession of a weapon, ask them to surrender their weapon. If compliant secure the weapon. In the event that the individual does not surrender their weapon immediately inform BDOC. 8.14.5. If person tries to leave the installation let them unless they have broken a law.

1.79 know and perform procedures to preserve evidence

8.2. Preserving Evidence. Evidence must be protected from destruction, alteration or change. Collect identified evidence as soon as possible and carefully document where, when and who collected the evidence and the condition of the item. SF will maintain the chain of custody by exercising the following procedures: (T-1) 8.2.1. The SF member seizing or otherwise receiving an item of evidential property ensures all such property is immediately recorded on AF Form 52, Evidence Tag, and ensures the form is affixed to the item(s) of evidence. 8.2.2. Record all circumstances surrounding the discovery of evidence (e.g., vehicle and/or property inventory, location of the discovery, date and time, witnesses present, etc.). These notes provide facts for an incident report. Additionally, SF personnel may use these notes to refresh their memory before testifying in court. As a minimum, file a copy of the notes with the incident report. Retain original notes as required by the Jencks Act. 8.2.3. Ensure the AF Form 52 is annotated with the date, location, Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS) case number (or blotter reference number), quantity, item, size, color, brand/style/model number, markings, approximate value, if known, and condition of the property, as well as the location of seizure and summary of incident. Additionally, if the evidence was taken directly from a person, annotate the name, grade, status, unit and duty phone number of the individual from whom the property is received or seized. Ensure the tag is error-free and legible. 8.2.4. A single AF FM 52 may be used if several items are seized in relation to the same case from the same location by the same SF member. Several items seized by the same person, found in the same place and related to the same case may be listed on a single AF Form 52. If all required information fits within the tag, then each of these tags, regardless of amount, will be labeled 1 of 1. If additional space is needed to describe or list items from the seizure, then list those additional tags as 1 of 3, 2 of 3, etc. NOTE: Use a separate AF Form 52 to receipt for controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, firearms and ammunition from other items. This is due to these items requiring specialized storage separate from other items. 8.2.5. Ensure the AF Form 52 is properly witnessed upon initial acquisition. 8.2.6. Mark each item of evidence as soon as possible after its receipt/seizure. Place your initials, time and date of receipt/seizure in a place least likely to affect the item's shape, appearance and monetary or evidentiary value. If the evidence cannot be marked, place it in a suitable container; seal and mark the container with your initials, time and date of discovery. Exercise sound judgment to avoid damaging a valuable item which may be eventually returned to its owner. 8.2.7. The property receipt portion of the AF Form 52 is given to the person relinquishing the property. This applies to all property, even if the person relinquishing the property is not the owner of the property. If the individual declines or refuses to accept the receipt portion of the AF Form 52, that portion will be annotated to indicate the refusal or declination of the receipt. The completed AF Form 52 is then attached to the property. 8.2.8. SF units must maintain the capability to store and release evidence IAW AFI 31-206. Security Forces members collecting evidence own the responsibility of ensuring the actions above are completed. S2I will not assume responsibility for evidence until evidence is turned over for inventory. Coordinate all releases of evidence with the SJA. 8.2.9. In the event that evidence is explosive in nature, such as bulk explosives or military ordnance, the SF organization will request support from the installation's (or closest unit's) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team to provide guidance to the safe handling, packaging and storage of the explosive material. EOD teams will not be responsible for taking custody or storing the material

1.21 know public affairs/media considerations

8.7.15. Public Affairs tours and media visits: 36 WG/CC will designate in writing to 36 SFS/S3L or S5B and the 36 WG/PA personnel authorized to escort. This letter will be maintained at the VCC and the Installation Entry Control Points. The visitor center or installation entry controller will verify the identity of the escort official before permitting entry.

1.09 know procedures for armored car services entering installation

8.8. Armored Car Service: Armored car service personnel will enter through the main entrance to the installation only in a vehicle which is clearly marked and identified as an armored car service. 8.8.1. The entry controller will notify the BDOC by telephone that the armored car is on the installation. 8.8.2. Upon exit of the armored car, the entry controller will telephone the BDOC and advise armored car has departed the installation.

1.53 know photography/video and audio recordings

9.6. Photography/Video and Audio Recordings: Photography, video, and audio recordings are permissible within restricted areas upon prior authorization. Photography, video, and audio recordings are permissible within AAFB without prior authorization, but may not capture flight line or restricted area operations within such photos or videos. NOTE: Individuals or agencies requesting photography authorization of the flight line or other restricted areas will submit a request through 36 OSS/CC to the 36 OG/CC (for flight line), applicable rotation EBS/CC to the 36 OG/CC CC (B2/PL II Area), DET 2/CC for DET 2, or DET 3/CC for Hangar #1. If approved, the original copy with 36 OSS/CC, EBS/CC, 36 OG/CC or DET 2/DET 3 CC's signatures will then be hand-carried to 36 SFS/S5 for authentication. 36 SFS/S5 will post two copies of the letter in BDOC for distribution. S5 will file the original copy of the item in the sections file plan by date of expiration. 9.6.1. Each individual listed will have a copy of this letter in their possession while performing photography or escorting a photographer. They will also notify the BDOC prior to commencing any photography operations. The BDOC will maintain copies of approved photography request letters and notify posted security forces when approved photography is permitted. Security forces will be alert to detect unauthorized photography, and when detected, must notify the BDOC to determine if photography has been approved. 9.6.1.1. In the event photography is required in a time-critical situation, verbal authorization from the commander responsible for the restricted area will suffice for approval. The approval will be provided to the BDOC by the responsible commander. Authorization should be followed up with a signed letter as soon as practical. 9.6.2. Unauthorized photography in a restricted area will be investigated, personnel detained and transported to BDOC for further processing if necessary. Security Forces may confiscate photography equipment and/or film as part of an investigation. Ensure the AF Form 52, Evidence Tag is properly filled out and personnel get the appropriate copy. BDOC will make notifications and ensure S2I is notified to obtain further guidance. 9.6.3. Personnel taking photos outside the base are not in violation of any law or regulation, however, this scenario presents an anti-terrorism risk. If personnel are discovered taking video or photographs near the installation perimeter within the base jurisdiction, such as installation gates, patrols will approach and make contact with any such individuals. Patrols will attempt to identify the personnel and ascertain the nature of the photographs. Patrols will up channel the individual's full name, gender, national origin, and social security number or passport number if available. Patrols will attempt to make a photo copy of credentials if possible. BDOC will notify OSI immediately and ascertain whether OSI will respond to conduct a field interview with the person. If OSI does not respond, BDOC or Flight Chief will take guidance from OSI and as a minimum advise the patrol to ask the individuals to delete any digital photos and complete an AF Form 3907, Field Interview Card. Ensure two copies are completed. One will be routed to S5 to be filed and the second copy will be given to the Investigations Section. 9.6.3.1. A blotter entry will accomplished. Title the entry "Picture Taking". NOTE: SFS will request assistance from GPD for personnel outside of the base's jurisdiction. S3 or higher authority will dictate SF response outside base jurisdiction

1.68 know restricted area badge checks

9.8. Restricted Area Badge Checks: 9.8.1. Each flight line ID patrol will conduct a minimum of three random restricted area badge checks for 30 minutes each shift. Conduct these checks in areas that are occupied by aircraft and at established ECPs. The ID patrol will positively identify all personnel prior to allowing entry to restricted areas during these checks. 9.8.2. Notify the BDOC when you initiate and terminate the restricted area badge checks. When the badge checks are completed, contact the BDOC with the number of badges checked for inclusion in the Daily Check log located in the share drive.

1.73 Know and perform vehicle operations

AF Form 1800, Operator's Inspection Guide Report will be completed by each operator at the start of shift and will be initialed by operator. The inspection includes all equipment required for the post and an operational test of equipment (i.e., radios, emergency lights, etc.). Periodic checks will be conducted to ensure compliance by S4V/VCNCO. All permanently assigned Security Forces vehicles with the exception of S2I assigned vehicles, must be properly marked, have emergency lights, sirens, and a public address system. 1.5.1.1. Ensure vehicle discrepancies are repaired or dead lined and turned in to S4V/VCNCO, as appropriate. 1.5.1.2. If a vehicle is dead lined and cannot be moved, ensure all portable SF equipment is removed from the vehicle and the doors secured. If vehicle is deadline off base, periodic checks of the vehicle should be conducted until it can be towed to the base motor pool. 1.5.1.3. Turn in all SF equipment removed from the vehicle to the armory or transfer required equipment to the newly assigned vehicle. A blotter entry will be accomplished. 1.5.1.4. BDOC controller and/or Alarm Monitor will update vehicle status as changes occur and notify the VCO (36 SFS/S4V) via email or in person with all vehicle issues, to include dead lined vehicles or other mishaps. 1.5.2. All permanently assigned Security Forces vehicles must be properly marked; have emergency lights, sirens, and public address system. When temporary vehicles are used, the ranking member of each patrol and Internal/External Security Response Team will ensure their vehicle is properly marked with magnetic signs ("Security Forces" or SF shield), and equipped with portable emergency lights, sirens, and PA systems. 1.5.3. All standby vehicles will be parked in the lower SF parking lot adjacent to Bldg 23020. 1.5.4. Flight Line Vehicle Operations: All SF vehicle operators must have a current AAFB flight line driving certificate and government vehicle license in their possession while operating a vehicle on the flight line. Fire department vehicles, ambulances, Security Forces, Airfield Management, and Transient Alert may exceed the established speed limits only if adherence to the speed limits would prevent a timely response during an emergency. All emergency response vehicles must obtain control tower approval prior to entering the Controlled Movement Areas (CMA). 1.5.4.1. Runway crossing for convenience is prohibited. All vehicles entering/exiting the runway environment will enter/exit at Taxiway Golf (Attachment 3). Vehicle operators requiring emergency response to the North or Center Ramps via Taxiway Golf must obtain Control Tower approval prior to entering the Runway/Helipad environments. Communicate with the Control Tower will be via DIRECT two-way radio. After obtaining Control Tower's permission, you are expected to visually check for approaching aircraft and vehicles in all directions prior to proceeding. Vehicle emergency flashers or headlights will be turned "on" for all operations (day and night) while operating in the runway environment. Monitor and comply with the Control Tower lights should you lose radio communication with the tower. NOTE: Only drivers with CMA access annotated on their flight line permit may cross the active runway or be escorted by the Fire Chief. SOI 24-301 CH 2-6 Chapter 2 VEHICLE OPERATOR RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1. Licensing. Personnel will only operate vehicles for which they have a valid Operators Permit Standard Form (SF) 46 or Air Force (AF) Form 2293, US Air Force Motor Vehicle Operator Identification Card. Vehicle operators must have either an SF 46 with annotated flight line validation or an AF Form 2293 in addition to an AF Form 483 before they drive on the flight line. Security Forces Training (S3T) will be responsible for initiating flight line driving orientation. An AF Form 171, Request for Driver's Training, will be completed by the VCNCO along with training for the following Vehicle Management Codes: BXX1, B192, B199, B222, and any Other Government Motor Vehicle Conveyance (OGMVC) as defined by AFI 91-207. 2.2. Inspection. Prior to accepting responsibility for the vehicle or relieving off-going personnel, all vehicle operators will: 2.2.1. Check the entire vehicle for damage, operational equipment, and verify all open discrepancies annotated on the AF Form 1800 with the ECC. 2.2.2. Verify all accountable items are accounted for and secured inside the vehicle. Accountable items are as follows: Patrolman Kit, AED (if assigned), Spare Tire, Fire Extinguisher, Tire Jack System, and Vehicle Log Book with all appropriate paperwork (AF Form 1800, SF 91, DD Form 518, Permanent Waiver Card). 2.2.3. Notify flight leadership, through the ECC, of any vehicle damage not annotated on the AF Form 1800 or the Permanent Waiver Card. ECC will notify the off-going and on-coming flight leadership and obtain a completed AF Form 1168 from the off-going vehicle operator, annotate a blotter entry and notify the VCNCO by telephone and email. 2.2.4. Flight Chiefs will ensure missing equipment is annotated and determine the reason for missing items prior to reporting to the VCNCO. The 36th Security Forces Squadron Commander (36 SFS/CC) will determine if a Report of Survey will be initiated for damaged or missing equipment. 2.2.5. Vehicle operators will not relieve off-going personnel until the vehicle damage is properly annotated and instructed to do so by flight leadership. Discrepancies that cannot be corrected by the operator are annotated and reported to the ECC for annotation in the blotter. 2.2.6. Physically check fluid levels to include oil, coolant, transmission, windshield wiper, fuel, and brake fluids. 2.2.7. Use a flashlight when conducting vehicle inspections during hours of darkness. 2.2.8. Ensure the vehicle is clean before acceptance and maintained inspection ready throughout the shift. 2.2.9. The AF Form 1800 must be annotated with the operator's last name/section/flight/element to record the operator's vehicle inspection and ensure they indicate mileage and tire pressure was checked within the first ten days of each month. The vehicle operator is responsible for the safe operation and care of assigned vehicles and associated equipment. The operator may be held financially liable for damage due to gross negligence, unauthorized use, willful misconduct, or failing to discover and properly report vehicle damage immediately upon assuming post. 2.3. Unsafe Vehicles. Unsafe vehicles will be deadlined at the time and place they are discovered unsafe. Examples of unsafe vehicles include: inoperative horn, bald tires, malfunctioning brakes, inoperative brake lights, or headlights and leaking fluids, etc. Notify the VCNCO by telephone and email of all deadlined vehicles. 2.4. Safety Standards. The vehicle operator is responsible for the safety of all occupants, to include his or her self, pedestrians and other vehicle traffic. 2.4.1. Operators will ensure vehicles do not have more passengers than they are designed to carry, and each passenger is properly fastened in with a properly working seatbelt before starting the ignition. 2.4.2. Operators are responsible for performing first echelon maintenance as soon as a discrepancy is identified. First echelon maintenance is defined as any discrepancy within the operator's span of control, such as flat tires and low fluid levels. 2.4.2.1. The operator will change the flat tire with the spare and the flat tire and the VCNCO will take the vehicle to the transportation contractor DZSP21, NLT the next duty day for repair. If the rim is damaged along with the tire, the operator will need to accomplish an AF Form 1168. Additionally, the ECC will complete a blotter entry and notify the VCNCO by telephone and email. 2.4.3. Operators will not leave the vehicle unattended with keys and fuel-link inside or with the motor running except in emergencies. Exceptions to this rule: When the operator is a Military Working Dog (MWD) Handler with an MWD inside, the operator will leave the vehicle locked and running, utilizing the remote key for access. Vehicle operators are ultimately responsible for vehicles when left unattended. Anytime a vehicle is left unattended, the vehicle will be in park with the emergency-parking brake set. 2.4.4. Vehicles will not be operated when the operator is fatigued, under the influence of alcohol or medication, or in a state not conducive to safe operation of the vehicle. Operators will not engage in any activity that could distract their attention while driving. These activities include, but are not limited to, reading, utilizing electronic devices, eating, and drinking. Drivers must always remain alert to the environment, weather conditions, location of aircraft, etc. Chapter 3 STAND-BY VEHICLE INSPECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1. Stand-by vehicle inspector responsibilities. Each Flight Chief will assign a different daily stand-by vehicle inspector to ensure all stand-by vehicles are checked prior to guard mount of each shift. The inspector will: 3.1.1. Ensure the AF Form 1800 is properly annotated. 3.1.2. Ensure vehicles have all required paperwork and equipment as noted in 2.2.2. 3.1.3. Ensure the Patrolmen Kits are sealed (unsealed Patrolmen kits will be reported each shift to ECC for accountability) unless needed. If opening the kit is needed, annotate a blotter entry and notify the VCNCO by telephone and email. 3.1.4. Check the status of the fire extinguishers. Fire extinguishers should be in good working order and have the pin securing the handle to ensure the unit does not accidentally discharge. Coordinate with the VCNCO regarding acquisition of any vehicle equipment such as fire extinguishers and first aid kits. The intentional misuse of a fire extinguisher could result in administrative action 3.1.5. Notify the ECC of any discrepancies. The ECC will be responsible to make all other notifications. Chapter 4 VEHICLE OPERATING PROCEDURES 4.1. Vehicle Operators: 4.1.1. Be familiar with and follow the procedures in this Operating Instruction. 4.1.2. Prepare AF Form 1800, Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report. The current month's AF Form 1800 must be in the vehicle and available at all times. If the form is missing, contact the Vehicle Control Non-Commissioned Officer (VCNCO) for a replacement. 4.1.3. Day shift conducts the first inspection on the 1st day of the month. The operator conducting the first inspection of the month will ensure all open discrepancies are transcribed to the new AF Form 1800. The tire pressure will be checked within the first seven days of every month and annotated on page 2 to its entirety. 4.1.4. Inspect and service as vehicle as required. 4.1.5. Operators will print last name in the appropriate block on page 1 of the AF Form 1800 before operating the vehicle. 4.2. Vehicle operations. Vehicles will be operated in a reasonable and prudent manner, taking into consideration weather, visibility, road conditions, and traffic when responding to emergencies. Operators will remain cognizant of road conditions during and following inclement weather. Never attempt to cross an area that is flooded or excessively muddy. 4.3. Parking. Vehicle Operators will maintain a minimum of a 2 foot clearance between vehicles and stationary objects when parked or operated. This rule also applies anytime 2 SF vehicles must meet for any reason. Operators will park a minimum of 2 feet away and dismount if required to communicate or deliver items. 4.4. Reversing. Spotters will be used when backing a government vehicle. If a spotter is not available, the operator will accomplish a complete walk-around to clear the backing area. The operator will activate all emergency lights and sound the horn before backing the vehicle. 4.5. Driving off hardened surfaces. GSA Sedans will not be driven off hard surfaces unless directed by flight leadership or higher authority during real-world emergencies. Trucks and SUVs may be operated off the hard surface, when approved by flight leadership or higher authority, for conducting base boundary checks or during real world emergencies. Operators not familiar with the base boundary or other off-hardened surface terrain will use a ground spotter if available. 4.5.1. Munitions area patrols are authorized to drive off hard surfaces provided such roads are improved (improved roads are ones that are packed earth and not rutted). Munitions patrols will not operate on un-improved roads during rainy periods. If there is any doubt or safety concern, the vehicle operator will not operate the vehicle on these roads. 4.6. Official use of vehicles. In accordance with AFI 24-301, Vehicle Operations, utilization of government vehicles is strictly limited to official government use only. NOTE: The use of any restaurant drive-thru lane, on or off Andersen AFB, is not authorized. 4.7. Tobacco Use. IAW AFI 40-102, Tobacco Use in the Air Force and AFMAN 24-306, Manual for the Wheeled Vehicle Driver, the use of all tobacco products or the consumption of alcohol is prohibited when operating or riding in a GOV. Chapter 5 VEHICLE MAINTENANCE 5.1. Maintenance procedures. Vehicle malfunctions and vehicles requiring maintenance must be reported to the VCNCO immediately by telephone. 5.1.2. On each shift, the ECC controller will list all vehicle discrepancies on the blotter back and send this report to the VCNCO. The VCNCO will review the blotter back report from the ECC controllers daily for an update on the status of all assigned vehicles. 5.1.3. Before any vehicle can be turned into vehicle maintenance for routine issues, the operator will clean and vacuum the vehicle, inside and out, wash the exterior and then park the vehicle in the first row of the lower parking lot. The VCNCO will ensure all required equipment is removed from the vehicle and turn in vehicles to DZSP21 for maintenance. 5.1.3.1. If additional vehicle support is needed, the VCNCO will request temporary vehicles from 36 LRS Vehicle Dispatch on a loaner basis. 5.1.4. When turning in or deadlining vehicles for maintenance issues, the operator will first contact the ECC. Once the ECC has made the appropriate notifications, the operator will proceed to sign- out or sign-in keys from the Security Forces Armory Bldg. 23020. The operator will advise ECC of the location of the vehicle and the type of malfunction (if the vehicle was deadlined). ECC will annotate the discrepancy on the blotter back. 5.2. Recording Vehicle Discrepancies. ECC will enter into the AF Form 53, Security Forces Desk Blotter the following information when a vehicle is deadlined: 5.2.1. Vehicle registration number. 5.2.2. Where the vehicle was deadlined 5.2.3. Why the vehicle was deadlined 5.2.4. When the vehicle was deadlined 5.2.5. Who deadlined the vehicle 5.2.6. Ending mileage. 5.2.7. Who was notified. Chapter 6 SFS GOVERNMENT VEHICLE ACCIDENT PROCEDURES 6.1. SFS vehicle accident procedures: 6.1.1. A certified accident investigator will conduct an accident investigation on all major accidents. For minor vehicle accidents involving 36 SFS vehicles, a separate patrol not involved in the accident, will conduct the investigation. The investigating patrolman will conduct all required paper work for the investigations. The ECC will annotate accidents in the blotter and make appropriate notifications. 6.1.2. The Accident Investigator, (if warranted) and Flight Chief will make recommendations to the 36 SFS/CC if the vehicle operator should be escorted to the medical clinic for a command directed urinalysis. 6.1.3. The Vehicle Control Officer (VCO), with guidance from the 36 SFS/CC, will initiate a Report of Survey to determine fault and appropriate actions to be taken. This report will be turned into the 36 SFS/CC for review. 6.1.4. The Flight Chief will: 6.1.4.1. Suspend the driving privileges and obtain the driver's license of the vehicle operator deemed at fault. Turn the license into the Branch Superintendent. 6.1.4.2. Ensure ECC and vehicle operators complete all required reports and forms. 6.1.4.3. Review and approve the briefing prepared by the vehicle operator. Attend the briefing presented to the 36 SFS/CC. 6.1.4.5. Ensure the at-fault driver completes the actions listed in paragraphs 6.1.5. through 6.1.5.1.10. and the Vehicle Accident/Abuse Checklist (Attachment 2) 6.1.5. Operators will immediately report all vehicle accidents/incidents to the ECC regardless of the presence of visible damage. Failure to report a vehicle accident is a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ and may result in disciplinary action. 6.1.5.1. Vehicle operators involved in an accident or case of abuse will: 6.1.5.1.1. Develop a briefing outlining the details of the accident/abuse within 48-hours of the event. The briefing must include: 6.1.5.1.2. Timeline leading to accident/abuse. 6.1.5.1.3. Cause of accident/abuse. SFS SOI 10 24-301, 25 February 2014 6.1.5.1.4. Description of damages, estimated cost of repair, and photographs. 6.1.5.1.5. Corrective actions. 6.1.5.1.6. Lessons learned. 6.1.5.1.7. Schedule a time to present the briefing to the 36 SFS/CC through the respective Branch Superintendent. 6.1.5.1.8. Once approved by the 36 SFS/CC, provide the accident brief to all flights within 7 days. 6.1.5.1.9. Complete the computer based Defensive Driving Course. 6.1.5.1.10. Complete a day of vehicle care and maintenance training at the SF vehicle section. 6.1.5.1.11. Complete the Vehicle Accident/Abuse Worksheet (Attachment 2) 6.2. Reinstatement of license. The 36 SFS/CC may reinstate the license their discretion. If the vehicle operator is found to be at fault in an accident, additional disciplinary action may be imposed, up to and possibly including permanent loss of driving privileges. 1.74 KNOW POST CHECK/VISIT PROCEDURES REF SOI 31-118 PARA 4.4 & AFI 31- 118 PARA 4.3-4.4 SOI 31-118 4.4 4.4. Post Checks: Conduct post checks/inspections of all personnel while on post at least once per shift. Post checks will be operationally oriented and are intended to ensure personnel remain alert of assigned duties and responsibilities. Determine personnel's knowledge and ability to effectively perform assigned duties, status of equipment, compliance of standards, and cleanliness of the facility/vehicle. Additionally, the Flight Chief should check each posts AF Fm 1800 and AF FM 1801 to ensure each member has conducted a thorough and proper changeover. Be alert for health, welfare, and morale problems during the check. Up-channel any potential negative trends to S3O or higher authorities. AFI 31-118 4.3-4.4 4.3. Post Visits. Post visits are a means for Senior Wing/Base Leaders, First Sergeants, Chaplains, etc., to inspect facilities, take questions, ascertain the welfare of personnel and build morale. Post visits should be conducted during both day and night hours and be documented in the AF Form 53. 4.4. Post Checks. Unit leadership and on-duty supervisory personnel will conduct post checks to ensure posted personnel remain alert and are knowledgeable of assigned duties and responsibilities. Post checks also include inspection of SF facilities and vehicles, as well as individual and post-related equipment. Post checks must be documented in the AF Form 53. (T2)

1.31 Know and prepare security forces forms

AF Form 52, Evidence Tag AF IMT 1168, Statement of Witness/Subject continuation sheets for AF IMT 1168 AF Form 1176, Authorization to Search and Seize AF Form 1364, Consent to Search AF Form 3226, Authority to Apprehend in Private Dwelling AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log AF Form 3907, Field Interview Card DD Form 1408, Armed Forces Traffic Ticket DD Form 1805, United States District Court Violation Notice (BDOC) DD Form 1920, Alcohol Influence Report DD Form 2701, Victim, Witness Assistance Program SFAR Form 7, Temporary Revocation of Commissary, Exchange, and Theater Privileges SFAR Form 8, Temporary Sponsorship Revocation Order SFAR Form 10, Temporary Limited Order Not to Enter Air Force Property SFAR Form 13, Temporary Revocation of Driving Privileges SF Minor Vehicle Accident Form NOTE: Complete all AF and DD Forms

1.82 know establishing security areas

AFI 31-101 PARA 5.4-5.7.3.4 5.4. Restricted Areas. Installation Commanders approve designations for restricted areas and identify their location in the IDP. When establishing restricted areas, mass similar PL-1, 2, or 3 resources into defined areas and control them using a single security control system. Restricted areas are defined as an area under military jurisdiction in which special security measures are employed to prevent unauthorized entry. 5.4.1. Definitions. Restricted areas may be permanent or temporary. 5.4.1.1. Permanent areas containing PL-1, 2, or 3 resources on a continuous basis. 5.4.1.2. Temporary areas containing PL-1, 2, or 3 resources for limited periods of time. 5.4.2. General Requirements. Make restricted areas as small as possible to eliminate the need for securing and maintaining unnecessary terrain. Consider the quantity of PL-1, 2, or 3 resources to be protected, nature of the operational mission, and general terrain characteristics when deciding area size and configuration. Consideration can also be given to projected operational mission growth in order to optimize physical security systems installed to protect PL resources. 5.4.2.1. When possible, locate the boundary barrier for restricted areas at least 250 feet from the base perimeter or property line. This limits visibility of activities in the restricted areas, and provides standoff which will allow ID forces to observe and react to hostile activity directed at the resource. 5.4.2.2. Do not routinely establish more than one ECP for each restricted area; if necessary, the IDC decides whether additional ECPs are needed and where to place them. Select their location on operational requirements and logical routes of travel. NOTE: Entry points for the purpose of providing more or easier routes of travel (e.g., for convenience purposes) for personnel working in restricted areas should not be established. If an ECP needs to be established for convenience, it will be manned by the requesting agency with direct communications with BDOC. 5.4.2.3. Consolidate, consistent with operational requirements, resources of similar PLs for efficient use of available security personnel and resources. 5.4.2.4. Clearly mark the boundary of each restricted area. 5.4.2.4.1. Mark the boundary of mass parking and temporary restricted areas with an elevated boundary marker (such as rope, chain or tape) if possible. 5.4.2.4.2. If elevated markers cannot be used, mark the boundary with a painted line four to six inches wide using a bright color, such as red-orange, fluorescent or other reflective color. These markings should be of the same color and laid on the ground or parking surface. NOTE: Chapter 6 outlines the type of boundary barrier system and warning signs required for PL-1, 2, or 3 resources. 5.5. Controlled Areas. Installation Commanders approve designations for controlled areas, which are defined areas containing PL-4 resources or other valuable resources and functions. Controlled areas are identified in the IDP. Only authorized personnel designated by a unit commander have access to controlled areas. The designation "controlled area" carries the same legal restrictions as a physical barrier. Unless physical barriers are specifically required, the actual effectiveness of a controlled area may depend entirely on the security awareness of the people working in it. Paragraph 4.9. provides examples of controlled areas. NOTE: PL-4 resources contained within a restricted area may not require the controlled area designation. 5.5.1. General Requirements. Properly mark the area boundary and keep entrances to the minimum necessary for access/circulation control, safety and security. The IDP designates permanent controlled areas by building number or name of the area involved. Properly post and clearly define all controlled area boundaries. 5.5.1.1. Controlled areas may be established within restricted areas and vice versa. 5.5.1.2. If an area is designated as a temporary controlled area, the Installation Commander specifies in writing the period of designation. Mark the boundary with temporary boundary markers and warning signs. Consider the use of physical safeguards (e.g., ECPs or locks.) during non-duty hours if feasible. 5.5.1.3. The owner/user designates in writing a controlled area monitor and provides the letter to the RPP manager. The monitor is responsible for monitoring, programming, and coordinating all protection requirements to support the controlled area. 5.5.1.4. Any physical changes to a controlled area (i.e., transfer of ownership, downgrading the status, modifying boundaries) is coordinated with the RPP manager and approved in writing by the Installation Commander. 5.5.2. Considerations for Establishing Additional Controlled Areas. Not all areas qualify for controlled area status. Unit commanders consider the following when requesting to establish a controlled area: 5.5.2.1. Criticality to mission accomplishment. 5.5.2.2. Resource location and current TA. 5.5.2.3. Number and clearance level of personnel requiring access. 5.5.2.4. Existing internal security, physical safeguards and floor plan. 5.5.2.5. For new construction projects, CES with the assistance of the Contracting office, as appropriate, will ensure all security requirements are addressed in the construction plan to include alarms that annunciate/tie-in to existing systems, forced entry delay times, and entry/circulation control. 5.5.2.6. If the facility is an existing structure, an assessment by CES personnel will be accomplished to determine whether the facility meets the necessary structural requirements for the proposed controlled area. 5.5.2.7. History of losses, damage, or theft. 5.6. Free Zones. These areas are established within restricted areas when construction projects and similar activities make it inappropriate or impractical to apply normal circulation controls. In such cases, establish a Free Zone corridor from some point on the restricted area boundary to the work project. Limit Free Zones to mission essential activities only (e.g., construction work, or site surveys). 5.6.1. Free Zone Procedures for PL-1, 2 and 3 Resources. Free Zones require IDC chairperson approval. If a contractor is doing the work, the Installation Contracting Officer gives the contractor a letter signed by the Installation Commander or the group commander responsible for the security of the area. The letter will outline the contractor's security responsibilities. It specifically describes Free Zones associated with contract performance, installation entry requirements (if required), restricted area entry requirements, and the contractor's responsibilities and penalties for non-compliance. (T-2) 5.6.2. Free Zone Requirements for PL-1, 2 and 3 Resources. Apply the following minimum requirements: 5.6.2.1. There must be no PL-1 - 3 resources inside or immediately adjacent to the Free Zone. (T2) NOTE: Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) will establish Free Zone requirements for space launch resources. 5.6.2.2. The organization or agency most directly associated with the project provides escorts as necessary. The escorts provide immediate visual assessment (IVA) of the Free Zone boundary, and control entry/exit to the Free Zone area. NOTE: SF will not be used to conduct any of these actions. (T-3) 5.6.2.3. Mark the Free Zone boundary and entry point with elevated ropes, barriers, fencing, or other suitable materials, to clearly delineate it from the restricted area. 5.6.2.4. Owners/users close and secure the Free Zone at the end of normal working hours. NOTE: Owners/users notify SF when Free Zones are opened and closed. 5.6.2.5. SF conduct a sweep of the Free Zone area when closed for the day in areas containing PL-1 and 2 resources. 5.6.3. Free Zones for PL-4 Resources (Controlled Areas). Free Zones are established within controlled areas when construction projects and similar activities make it inappropriate or impractical to apply normal circulation controls. In such cases, establish a Free Zone corridor from some point on the controlled area boundary to the work project to aid in moving personnel and equipment. 5.6.3.1. Free Zone Procedures for PL-4 Resources (Controlled Areas). Procedures shall be determined locally based on the assets near the Free Zone, the quantity of workers, and the work to be accomplished. As a minimum, commanders responsible for the area establish Free Zone procedures to include: boundary markings; who performs entry control duties; how entry is controlled; arming requirements; and escort ratios. Coordinate the establishment of Free Zones with SF and other necessary work centers. 5.6.3.1.1. Consider removing PL-4 resources and other mission-essential resources from the Free Zone area. 5.6.3.1.2. The organization or agency most associated with the project will maintain surveillance over the Free Zone boundary as determined by the commander responsible for the controlled area. NOTE: SF are not to be used to conduct these activities. 5.6.3.1.3. Close the Free Zone and secure the controlled area after normal work hours. 5.6.3.2. Contractors. Contractors are provided a signed letter from the Installation Commander, or their designee, describing procedures for Free Zone utilization. Owner/user personnel responsible for the respective Free Zones are responsible for completing this requirement. 5.7. NDAs. NDAs are temporarily established in the U.S., its territories or possessions when necessary, in an emergency, to protect designated DoD property located off a military installation. NOTE: Although NDAs cannot exist in foreign lands, comparable procedures for the protection of designated DoD property outside the U.S. will be established based on consultations and host nation agreements. Commanders should consult with their local SJA to ensure an NDA or OCONUS area complies with legal and policy considerations. 5.7.1. Who May Establish NDAs. The Installation Commander responsible for the property, a nearby Installation Commander, or other superior or subordinate commander directly responsible for the property may establish NDAs and do not need to be physically present to do so. A subordinate commander to whom responsibility for protecting the property has been entrusted (e.g. convoy commander in the case of missile transport) may establish the NDA when time does not reasonably permit securing an order from the responsible Installation Commander. The senior AF military or Department of the AF civilian representative at the scene must mark the boundary of the NDA. This official acts under the authority of the commander responsible for the resource involved. Authority for establishing an NDA is shown on a temporary sign. 5.7.2. When NDAs are Established. It may be necessary to establish NDAs in the following emergency circumstances: 5.7.2.1. Aircraft are sent to civilian airports and unforeseen, inadequate or uncontrollable civilian security concerns create an emergency. 5.7.2.2. An aircraft with sensitive equipment or capabilities, such as a PL-1, 2 or 3 resource crashes. 5.7.2.3. Other unplanned emergencies occur. 5.7.3. Requirements for NDAs. Installation Commanders, through their on-site mission commander or IC, establish NDAs. Minimum requirements are as follows: 5.7.3.1. Use a temporary barrier to mark the boundary of the area. 5.7.3.2. Post Air Force Visual Aid (AFVA) 31-102, Restricted Area Sign-National Defense. 5.7.3.3. Explain the situation to authorities having jurisdiction and/or landowners, including why it is necessary to set up the area and the types of controls in effect. Although not necessary for implementation/establishment, consent and cooperation of the authorities with jurisdiction and/or landowner is preferred. 5.7.3.4. To the greatest degree possible, let civilian authorities handle civilian arrest and detention. If local civil authorities are not present, military personnel may detain violators or trespassers. Work with the SJA office to release violators and trespassers to proper authorities as soon as reasonably practical. SOI 31-118 PARA 9.1-9.5, 11.2-11.2.5.3, 15.17-15.17.12 9.1. Physical Security Checks: ID patrols will visually inspect all locked gates, boundary barrier systems, grills, doors, and other openings for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative equipment with in their sector. In addition, ID patrols will conduct checks of clear zones and adjacent areas once per day shift and once per mid shift. The results of these checks will be annotated in the blotter and building/facility checklist. (See SSI's for approved security deviations/compensatory measures for frequency.) 9.2. Restricted Area Boundary Barrier Procedures: Security fences and signs are used to identify boundaries. Red painted lines, traffic cones, ropes and stanchions are placed on taxiways, aircraft parking aprons, and/or around resources to represent security boundaries when fences cannot be used. Personnel are prohibited from crossing these lines or ropes except: 9.2.1. In an emergency: 9.2.2. For aircraft movements: 9.2.3. To move equipment or material that cannot use area entry control points. Security Forces will approve movements across restricted area lines or ropes only after owner/user coordination through 36 OSS, Transient Alert (TA), or 734 AMS/ATOC/MOCC. Owner/users will hold at the restricted area line or rope until security forces have granted approval from 36 OSS, TA, or 734 AMS/ATOC/MOCC. Deviations from these procedures will result in a security force response and up-channel report. 9.2.4. The ID patrol will establish a temporary restricted area around all Protection Level 1-3 aircraft parked outside permanently marked restricted areas or in maintenance hangars. The ID patrol will establish the area by placing ropes and stanchions or orange traffic cones and restricted area signs and an entry control point sign to delineate the restricted area. BDOC will request all-purpose lighting (i.e. a light cart, through 36 MXS or 734 AMS) to illuminate the area when existing lighting is deficient. Security forces determine sufficient lighting per AFI 31-101. 9.2.4.1. Do not place boundary barriers (to include signs) closer than 10ft to protection level resources. Boundaries may be placed as far away from protection level resources as necessary to accommodate operational needs. 9.3. Restricted Area Lighting Checks: Visual checks of perimeter, area, and special purpose lighting will be conducted by the flight line ID patrols and DET 2 ID patrol. Airfield restricted area lighting discrepancies will be reported to Base Operations. DET 2 restricted area lighting discrepancies will be reported to the DET 2 facility manager to initiate a work order. 9.4. Free Zones: Free Zones (zones that contain no protection level resources) are created inside restricted/controlled areas when construction projects and similar activities make normal circulation controls inappropriate. 9.4.1. Security Procedures for Free Zones: 9.4.1.1. The USAF organization or agency most directly associated with the project must establish the Free Zone boundary, provide surveillance of the boundary, provide escorts and prevent unauthorized entry into the restricted or controlled area. 9.4.1.2. Entry control to restricted areas containing Free Zones will not be delegated to contractors. 9.4.1.3. The person performing immediate visual assessment of the Free Zone boundary must have the capability to contact security forces and request assistance. 9.4.1.4. Mark the Free Zone boundary with elevated ropes, barriers, fencing, or other suitable materials to clearly delineate it from the restricted area. 9.4.1.5. Owner/user personnel will open and close and secure the Free Zone at the end of normal working hours. (Owner/User must contact BDOC to initiate opening and closing of the Free Zone. These times and locations will be annotated in the blotter). 9.4.1.6. ID patrols will enforce all free zone/escort procedures. The ID patrol will report all Free Zone discrepancies and escort violators to the BDOC. 9.5. Restricted Area Work Requests: All work orders or construction projects in a restricted area must be coordinated through the commander responsible for the area and 36 SFS/S5C. This rule also applies to construction and modifications outside the restricted area boundary but in a restricted area clear zone. 11.2. Foreign Aircraft in Transient Status, Deployed, or Participating in Training Exercises: 11.2.1. Foreign Aircraft: SF will provide a secure area and the appropriate security measures to protect all aircraft that are in transit, deployed, or participating in training exercises at AAFB. Establish a successive series of security screens and active patrolling to reduce the standoff threat. 11.2.2. At a minimum, non-US aircraft will be placed in controlled areas with boundaries of rope and stanchions. Aircraft may be placed inside existing restricted areas to provide additional security, but are not considered PL resources. Further guidance on standards for foreign aircraft is outlined the Integrated Defense Plan. NOTE: Other DOD service component aircraft should be provided security IAW AFI 31-101 and Integrated Defense Plan. 11.2.3. The 36 SFS will provide general aircraft security requirements for all aircraft which are transient, deployed or participating in training exercises to include foreign deployed aircraft as outlined in this chapter and Chapter 11 of this instruction. 11.2.4. If any type of security incident occurs involving these aircraft, the aircraft commander or a member of the aircrew will be responsible for responding to make a competent assessment of damages and/or validate aircraft integrity. 11.2.4.1. While these type aircraft are at AAFB, owner/user personnel are required to inform the BDOC or Base Operations of their location at all times in case a security response is required. 11.2.5 Emergency Landings. Any aircraft operator who experiences an inflight emergency may land at any US Air Force installation without prior authorization. An inflight emergency is defined as a situation which makes continued flight hazardous. 11.2.5.1 Security Forces are immediately dispatched to the scene to secure the aircraft. Security Forces and supporting force (owner or user) personnel will increase their security vigilance and prepare to implement additional actions and quick reaction checklists as required. 11.2.5.2 Transit alert will lead aircraft to the appropriate parking location and display appropriate foreign language signs (if available) to facilitate identification of the aircraft. 11.2.5.3 The pilot, aircrew, and passengers aboard a foreign aircraft that made an unauthorized landing will not be detained longer than necessary for identification and obtaining information required IAW Integrated Defense Plan. They may be permitted to remain in a lounge or waiting area on the base for this purpose. 15.17. Diversion of USAF Aircraft to Won Pat International Airport: Upon notification of diversion, the BDOC controller or on-duty Flight Chief will immediately notify S3/S3O personnel who will convene to determine the protection level of the aircraft and SF manning requirements. 15.17.1. PL 3 resource posting requirement is a Close Boundary Sentry, Entry Controller and a two person external security response team. The DFC may approve deviations from the above posting requirements during manning shortfalls. 15.17.2. A National Defense Area (NDA) may be established when military aircraft are sent to civilian airports. Other circumstances also warrant a NDA to be established i.e. military aircraft crashes or other unplanned emergencies. Explain the situation to authorities having jurisdiction and/or landowners, including why it is necessary to set up the area and the types of controls in effect. Notify 36 WG/JA for any issues concerning jurisdiction. 15.17.3. Use a temporary barrier comprised of ropes, cones, and stanchions to mark the boundary of the area. 15.17.4. Post sufficient Air Force Visual Aid 31-102, Restricted Area Sign-National Defense signs. 15.17.5.. For any other unplanned emergencies or crashes follow guidelines IAW AFI 31-101. 15.17.6. Once the BDOC will contact the Won Pat security office for instruction/escort on to the airfield environment (via Gate 13) and to obtain one of their radios for emergency response communications. 15.17.7. Inquire with Won Pat airport personnel on the availability of temporary lighting for the NDA. If they cannot provide temporary lighting, arrange for light-all carts with 36 MXS or 734 AMS. Two light-all carts are required per wide-bodied aircraft, and one per fighter type aircraft. Ensure adequate lighting is planned. SF determines adequate lighting requirements. 15.17.8.. The BDOC controller will contact S4 who will be responsible for additional vehicles from LRS vehicle dispatch personnel and request additional vehicles for security force support, if needed. 15.17.9. Responding SF personnel must have the following equipment prior to departing AAFB: 15.17.10.. Sufficient ropes/stanchions or cones, at least four NDA signs, SSI, AF Form 1109s, M9/M4 rifles, radios (with extra battery), NVG (one PAQ-4 per ISRT and ESRT) and foul weather/alert gear (i.e. body armor, helmet, and gas mask). 15.17.11. Upon arrival ensure SF personnel obtain the aircraft crew-orders for use as an EAL from the aircraft commander and coordinate security procedures. SF supervisor authentication (E-5/GS-6 or above) is required for all aircrew orders used as an EAL. 15.17.12. To the greatest extent possible, let civilian authorities handle civil arrest and detention. If local civil authorities are not present, security forces may detain violators or trespassers until arrival of civilian authorities. NOTE: SF has exclusive jurisdiction over NDA

1.83 know restricted area badge procedures

AFI 31-101 PARA 7.4-7.4.2.3, 7.7.3-7.7.5 7.4. Supplying and Issuing RABs. RABs are official documents used for controlling entry to restricted areas and may be used for controlled areas. As such, follow the established control procedures for obtaining, storing, and issuing RABs. RABs must be retained by the individual issued the RAB. (T-3) Lost badges will be turned into the badge issuing office for temporary safekeeping. Failure to turn in lost badges is a violation of Article 92 of the UCMJ. If the owner of the badge is not located within 2 weeks, the badge will be destroyed. 7.4.1. Supplying AF RABs. Installations may produce the AF Form 1199, Air Force Entry Control Card, with a secure commercial system (e.g., Vindicator V). Additionally, installations may use SFMIS to produce the AF Form 1199. SFMIS version 5.3 or higher is capable of generating the AF Form 1199 series of RABs (AF Form 1199, 1199A, 1199B, 1199C and 1199D). The SFMISgenerated badges are in the same format and with the same field data as the Air Force Departmental Publications Office (AFDPO) AF Form 1199 series badges. NOTE: SFMIS-generated RAB software and hardware requirements can be found at: https://sfmis.csd.disa.mil/SFMIS/DoD.html. Approved RABs are as follows: 7.4.1.1. AF Form 1199, Air Force Entry Control Card (Blue). AF Form 1199-1, USAF Entry Control Credential, Front Label, and AF Form 1199-2, USAF Entry Control Credential, Pressure Sensitive Label. 7.4.1.2. AF Form 1199A, USAF Restricted Area Badge (Green). 7.4.1.3. AF Form 1199B, USAF Restricted Area Badge (Pink). 7.4.1.4. AF Form 1199C, USAF Restricted Area Badge (Yellow). 7.4.1.5. AF Form 1199D, USAF Restricted Area Badge (Blue). 7.4.2. Issuing RABs. Individuals applying for unescorted entry ensure the completed AF Form 2586 is received by the badge issuing official. Badge issuing officials verify the form, complete Section V, authenticate it and issue the RAB. The person receiving the RAB will electronically acknowledge receipt by signing the appropriate block in Section V. When issue is complete, a copy of the AF Form 2586 is sent to the badge requesting organization where it is kept on file. 7.4.2.1. RABs show the bearer's photograph, signature, and other pertinent identification data. For each RAB, badge issuing officials accomplish the following. NOTE: MAJCOMs may apply additional security measures if deemed necessary. 7.4.2.1.1. Indicate "grade" on the badge by "OFF" (officer), "ENL" (enlisted), "CIV" (civilian), "OSI" (AFOSI special agents), "ART-OFF" (Air Reserve Technician-Officer) or "ART-ENL" (Air Reserve Technician-Enlisted). For automated systems that may only have space for four characters in the "grade" block, use "R-OF" and "R-EN" in lieu of "ART-OFF" and "ART-ENL." 7.4.2.1.2. Enter the individual's DoD ID number in the block marked "Control Number" to enhance identity verification. 7.4.2.1.3. Block-out unused numbers on the badge to show specific restricted areas on the installation where the bearer may not enter unescorted. 7.4.2.1.4. Mark the badge with a locally devised authentication feature before laminating it. 7.4.2.2. For AF reserve members who have dual status as Federal employees on the installation, issue one AF Form 1199 series badge showing both the civilian and officer or enlisted reserve requirements. In the "grade" block of AF Form 1199, indicate "CIV-ENL" or "CIV-OFF." Ensure both the civilian and reserve units have copies of the AF Form 2586. Reissue the badge if the individual separates from either position. 7.4.2.3. RABs may be coded (electronically for use with AECS or physically on AF Form 1199s) for level of security clearance and SAPs. However, do not use specific terms visible on the form, such as "top secret", "secret", etc. Do not use the badge as the sole verification to grant access to classified information. 7.7.3. Identity and Authority. Identity and level of authority must be established prior to granting unescorted entry authority IAW paragraphs 7.2.1. - 7.2.3. (T-1) ECs positively identify all personnel prior to allowing entry to restricted areas where manned ECPs are required. (T-1) NOTE: AECS fulfills this requirement when installed. 7.7.3.1. PL facilities/areas within an already established PL area of the same or higher level are not considered stand-alone areas. Entry control, to include identity and authority, are established at the ECP to the all-encompassing area. Access to the individual facilities/areas is further controlled by internal circulation control. This internal circulation control is obtained via either a minimum of Level II AECS, or other physical means. 7.7.4. Use of RABs. RABs show the bearer's photograph, signature, and other pertinent ID data and are used for controlling entry to restricted areas. Personnel may use RABs at more than one installation for unescorted entry when the badge is used with a valid Entry Authority List (EAL). 7.7.5. Displaying RABs. RABs will be worn in a conspicuous and readily identifiable location at all times while inside restricted areas unless directed otherwise by Installation Commanders for safety reasons. (T-3) Personnel must remove (not display) RABs when not in a restricted area. (T-3) 36 WG IDP 31-101 APPENDIX 4-5 TO ANNEX K APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) RESTRICTED AREA BADGE (RAB) PROCEDURES (OPR: 36 SFS) Reference: AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense 1. SITUATION: See Basic Plan 2. MISSION: RAB-Issuing Officials. The DFC designates 36 SFS/S5B, NCOIC Visitor Control Center (VCC) as the primary badge-issuing official. The alternate issuing officials perform duties in the absence of the NCOIC. They are enlisted members or DoD civilians assigned to the badge issuing activity. The VCC is the primary office for all RAB issue and turn-in. 3. EXECUTION: Badges will be created with the Vindicator Badging System Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS) generated AF Form 1199's will no longer be issued. Units are not authorized to fabricate any form of badges as means of access control. c. Completing and Issuing RABs: The electronic AF IMT 2586, Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate, is the source document used to document, coordinate and approve unescorted entry authority and issue restricted area badges. Unit Security Managers (USM) will initiate the AF IMT 2586 and submit it to the approval authority. The approval authority will review the form and once approved send the digitally signed form back to the USM via digitally encrypted means (digitally encrypted email, SharePoint, etc.) so the electronic form can be verified. The USM will instruct the member to proceed to VCC for badge issuance. The VCC/USM will maintain a copy of the AF IMT 2586 until the badge is returned. The completed AF IMT 2586 will be returned to USMs, who will file a copy of AF IMT 2586 and letters, if any, at the requesting unit. d. All personnel issued a RAB will be trained as escort officials IAW AFI 31-101. No additional "approved escort official" markings are required. USMs or persons designated by the unit commanders will document initial escort training in the "remarks" section of the AF IMT 2586 during initial RAB issue. Recurring escort training will be conducted annually and documented locally. e. Unit commanders must provide the VCC section with a memorandum identifying who may electronically sign the AF Form 2586 in section II and IV. The memorandum will include the Electronic Data Interchange Personal Identifier (EDIPI) of the named individuals. (1) For printed versions of the AF Form 2586, use a form of signature verification (i.e., a letter showing sample signatures) for those persons signing Sections II and IV. If using digital signatures, the signature verification form should include the EDIPI for comparison. Signature verification forms should contain both written signatures and EDIPI to ensure either version of the form can be used as needed. Compare the signature (written or digital) on the AF Form 2586 with the signature verification form. f. Restricted Area Entry Approval Officials: Personnel assigned to the following duty positions are designated as entry approving officials for the areas indicated and authorized to sign section IV of the AF IMT 2586. NOTE: Unit security managers are responsible for initiating AF IMT 2586s. Each unit security manager's authority to issue the AF Form 2586 will be verified by the badge issuing official. When the AF IMT 2586 is presented for issue at the VCC, it will be compared against the unit security manager's name and signature on each unit's authorization letter maintained at the VCC. g. Below is the list of approving officials associated with their respective areas: Area 1, Andersen AFB Command Post: o The 36 WG/CP Area 2, Mass Aircraft Parking Area: o The 36 WG/CC/CV o The 36 OSS/CC o The DFC and S3 (when on "G" series orders) o The 36 EAMXS/CC o The 36 MXS/CC o The 734 AMS/CC/CCE/CCX o The 36 OSS/CC Area 3, Munitions Storage Area: o The 36 WG/CC/CV o The 36 MUNS/CC/CCQ o The 36 MUNS/MXW (Munitions Operations Officer) o The DFC and SFO (when on "G" series orders) Area 4, Crisis Action Team and Executive Crisis Action Team floor: o The 36 WG/CC/CV o The 36 WG/CP o The DFC and S3 (when on "G" series orders) Area 5, Detachment 1, 69 RG, (Global Hawk/Hangar 1) o The 36 WG/CC/CV o The 69 RG Det-1/CC o The DFC and S3 (when on "G" series orders) o Area 6, HSC-25, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 25 Area 6, HSC-25, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 25 o The HSC-25 CC/CV Area 12, 21 SOPS, Detachment 2, Guam Tracking Station: o The 36 WG/CC/CV. o The Det 2/CC o The DFC and S3 (when on "G" series orders) Area 20, 94th AAMDC/TASK FORCE TALON: o The 94th AAMDC/CC Area FL, Flightline Access o The 36 WG/CC/CV o The 36 OSS/CC o The DFC and S3 (when on "G" series orders) o The 36 MXS/CC o The 36 EAMXS/CC o The 734 AMS/CC/CCE/CCX o The 36 OSS/CC f. The following units can initiate an AF IMT 2586: 36 WG 36 WG/CP 36 CES 36 CONS 36 CPTS 36 CRG 36 CS 36 FSS 36 LRS 36 MDG 36 MDOS 36 MSG 36 MXG 36 OG 36 OSS 36 WSA 44 APS 254 ABG 69 RG 734 AMS 736 SFS 94 AAMDC AFOSI, Det. 602 21 SOPS, Det. 2 HSC-25 h. General Escorted Entry Requirements: Commanders of all restricted and controlled areas are authorized to appoint escort officials for the respective areas. i. Auditing RABs: The DFCs must appoint a commissioned officer or SNCO to audit and account for all in-stock and issued badges annually. Additionally, incoming and outgoing issuing officials will conduct a joint audit/inventory and account for all in-stock and issued badges before the incoming issuing official assumes responsibility for the badges. Results of these audits are documented and maintained until the next audit is completed. j. Lost RABS: When a member loses a RAB, the following procedures apply: (1) In the event of a lost or missing RAB, personnel will immediately notify their USM. USMs will immediately notify 36 SFS/S5B when a RAB is lost or missing and the USM will complete an internal report. (2) Found badges will be turned into the badge issuing activity for temporary safekeeping. If the owner of the badge is not located within 2 weeks, the badge will be destroyed. (3) The commander or USM will investigate the loss and prepare a report. The report will be conducted within the unit and will include the member's name, rank, SSN, badge number, and all pertinent facts (how, when, and where the badge was lost), and action taken to recover the badge. (4) The report must be approved by the Unit Commander. The member will report to 36 SFS/S5B with the report and original AF Form 2586 for badge reissue. (5) The 36 SFS/S5B will review the report and approve reissue of a new badge. All administrative requirements must be met before badge reissue. Upon reissue, a new photograph will be used. k. Restricted Area Badge Turn-In: (1) Unit Commanders and USMs must ensure personnel departing their unit surrender their RAB to 36 SFS/S5B (Visitor Control Center) at least three duty days before departing the unit. Unit Commanders will ensure RAB turn-in procedures to 36 SFS/S5B are included in out-processing checklists. This process is currently handled through the virtual out-processing checklist managed by the 36 FSS. (2) When the RAB is turned in, 36 SFS/S5B will stamp, sign and date the original AF Form 2586 "BADGE RETURNED." The member will return the form to the unit security manager for destruction. (3) Unit Commanders and USMs are authorized and will collect and turn in RABs for contractors that no longer require access to RAs and did not provide advanced notice (quit, fired, etc). l. Revoking Unescorted Entry To Restricted Areas: Unit commanders and security managers must ensure that RABs issued to bearers are returned immediately to the badge issuing office (36 SFS/S5B Visitor Control Center) once entry authority is permanently withdrawn. 36 SFS Badge issuing officials will destroy surrendered or confiscated badges immediately and record destruction on the destruction log. The SFMIS database should also be used to track RAB destruction. Ensure the following minimum information is recorded: Badge number(s) destroyed. Date of destruction. Signature of an authorized destruction official. m. Restricted Area Number Designation: The following numbers correspond to the "open" areas on the RAB (AF Form 1199 series): Area 1 - Andersen Command Post EA Cell(Restricted Area). Area 2 - Hangars, North, Center, and South Ramp Aircraft Parking Areas (Restricted Area). Area 3 - Munitions Storage Areas (MSA) (Controlled Area). Area 4 - Andersen Crisis Action Team (CAT) (Restricted Area). Area 5 - 69 RG/DET -1, Global Hawk (Hangar 1) (Restricted Area). Area 6 - HSC-25 Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Area 12 - Detachment 2, 21 SOPS, Guam Tracking Station (Restricted Area). Area 20 - 94th AAMDC/Task Force Talon (Temp Restricted Area). FL - Flightline (Controlled Area). 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan. APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) ENTRY AUTHORITY LIST REQUIREMENTS (OPR: 36 SFS) Reference: AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense 1. SITUATION: Entry Authority Lists (EAL) are used on a temporary basis for granting unescorted entry in conjunction with home base or temporary AF Form 1199 RABs (i.e. inspection and staff assistance visits). Additionally, EALs are used as a supporting technique to the single badge system used on AAFB and in conjunction with escorted entry procedures as a means of identification prior to allowing entry. 2. MISSION: Ensure entry requirements are met. EALs are authenticated by a SF supervisor, (E5/GS-7 or above (or other designated civilian equivalent)) IAW AFI 31-101. NOTE: After authentication from SF, owner/users are responsible for the distribution of EALs to their respective personnel and areas of responsibility. 3. EXECUTION: EALs must identify whether or not an individual is authorized unescorted entry or requires an escort into a restricted area. All EALs will be formatted IAW AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, Attachment 13. a. Post EALs at applicable entry control points or SF patrols, restricted area owners/users and BDOC as necessary to meet mission requirements. Maintaining EALs. Installations maintain EALs as a computer product, card file, AF IMT 2586 file, message, or memorandum. Maintain the most current authenticated EAL as possible to minimize additions and deletions. VCC will produce a hard copy Master Entry Authority List (MEAL) on the final duty day of the month and provide a copy to BDOC, CP and maintain one copy on file in the VCC section. Establish and use a formal procedure for authenticating and distributing EALs through SF supervisors. b. Requirements: The following information will be provided on the EAL 1. Name, rank, and last six numbers of the SSN. 2. Organization. 3. Badge number. 4. Clearance status. 5. Dates of visit. 6. Expiration date. c. Authentication Procedures. A SF supervisor, (E-5/GS-7 or above (or other civilian equivalent)) will be responsible for validating and authenticating the EAL. Authenticate the EAL by writing the following information near the bottom of the document of the last page: a. Printed name/rank of authenticator b. Signed name of authenticator c. Date and time authenticated d. Number of pages authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages) e. All other pages, to include page #1 of the cover letter will be numbered (X of X) and the authenticator will place their initials by the page number of each additional page. d. Aircrew Orders. Crew orders must contain as a minimum; name, rank, last four numbers of the SSN, organization, clearance status, and inclusive dates of travel. Aircrew orders may be used as an EAL for transit aircraft in lieu of the procedures stated above. Establish and use a formal procedure for authenticating crew orders. Compare a home station AF Form 1199, Military ID/CAC, or other ID (credential) with information contained on the crew order for positive identification prior to allowing entry. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan

1.56 Know bomb threats / suspicious package procedures

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES/BOMB THREATS (OPR: 36 SFS) Reference: AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense 1. SITUATION: To establish procedures for response forces and personnel at or in the area of a bomb threat, for the persons receiving the threat and for personnel should an actual bombing occur. Analysis of past bomb threats reveals many are made for the sole purpose of seeing the response forces use their emergency lights and sirens and/or general disruption caused, such as: evacuation of facilities, work stoppage, etc. Therefore, it is essential responses be kept as low key as possible with little or no use of sirens and lights. 2. MISSION: To ensure prompt evacuation and provide a low key search of buildings, facilities and areas where a potential hazard exists; to quickly neutralize any explosive devices; and to prevent the loss of life and/or injury to personnel. It must be considered that bomb threats in themselves serve to hamper resource protection efforts because they tie up law enforcement, owner/user, civil engineer, medical, EOD and command personnel. Additionally, all threats, whether fictional or actual, must be considered real and handled accordingly. 3. EXECUTION: a. Concept of Operations: 36 SFS and 36 CES/Fire Department units will respond to all bomb threats immediately upon notification of a threat. The 36 SFS, EOC (if activated) and CAT (if activated) will act as the control points for notification of other response forces and/or personnel. The persons receiving a threat must listen very carefully for all details and attempt to preserve all evidence. In the event an actual detonation occurs, all possible efforts must be directed toward the prevention of further loss of life and/or personnel injury and the immediate treatment of the injured. b. Tasks: (1) Persons receiving a bomb threat call will: (a) Listen carefully. (b) Ask for as much information as the caller will give. Complete the AF Form 440, Bomb Threat Aid, which should be posted near each telephone. (c) Do not hang up the phone. Leave the telephone receiver off the hook when the caller hangs up. (d) Alert co-workers to contact the SF using 911. (e) Transmit data from the AF Form 440 to the BDOC. (d) Evacuate the facility immediately c. 36 SFS will: (1) Act as the central control point for all actions dealing with bomb threats/actual bombings, when the CAT is not activated. (2) Dispatch sufficient patrols to notify personnel within the affected facility/area; establish a cordon (see example below); establish and maintain an entry control point and evacuate facilities as directed by on duty Flight Sergeant or IC (usually the Fire Chief). NOTE: If the person making the threat gave a specific time for the bomb to go off . Personnel should be kept out of the area for at least 1 hour past the deadline as an extra margin of safety. If the detonation time is known, search the affected area up to 30 minutes prior to detonation and resume an area/facility search 1 hour following detonation time. (3) Follow all locally generated Quick Reaction Checklists and procedures. NOTE: The on duty Flight Sergeant will be dispatched to all reports of suspected suspicious packages. Once on scene, the on duty Flight Sergeant will determine whether the package is suspicious and if further response is required. e. Cordon requirements: (1) Brief case size - a minimum of 500 feet. (2) Sedan - a minimum of 1000 feet. (3) Large Vehicle - a minimum of 2000 feet (4) Facilities containing high explosives/hazardous materials - initial cordon 2,500 feet (for such materials as chlorine gas, liquid oxygen, large fuel supplies, explosives, etc.) (5) The IC may increase or decrease the cordon as necessary. f. Notify the EOC and CAT, if activated or command post of the cordon size and ECP location. g. Consider the implementation of FPCON BRAVO if not already done so. Remember, this could be a diversionary tactic. h. If a bomb threat is directed against a priority resource, ensure the appropriate reports are generated. i. If the explosive device is found inside the restricted area, initiate a COVERED WAGON. j. Wing Command Post will: (1) Notify the 36 WG/CC, CE Readiness and Emergency Management, MSG/CC, EOD and other agencies, as directed by the 36 WG/CC. (2) Activate the CAT when directed by the 36 WG/CC. k. All staff agencies/organizations responsible for buildings that house or service masses of people will prepare separate plans for rapid evacuation of their facilities. m. If EOD support is not readily available or cannot respond, remove flammable materials from the building. This should only be done in cases of extreme necessity. n. If there is a response to the Commercial Vehicle Inspection area adjacent to the Main Gate, responses will be IAW local SF operating instructions. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan. SOI 31-118 16.3.1.1-16.3.2.2 & 16.3.7-16.3.7.1 16.3. Bomb Threat/Suspicious Packages/Suspicious Devices 16.3.1. 1. Bomb Threat Procedures: When you receive a threat or are notified of a threat by another person, use AF Form 440, Bomb Threat Aid, in addition to the checklist, to record information and prompt questions. An AF Form 440 is required next to all telephones. Once a call has been received, attempt to trace the call using the following steps: 16.3.1.2. If the caller hangs up, DO NOT HANG UP YOUR PHONE. Take the following steps immediately: 16.3.1.3. While the phone is off the hook, press *57 (star 57), annotate the time of the call and the line the call came in on your notes. 16.3.1.3.1. Once you press *57 you may hang up the phone. 16.3.1.3.1.1. Contact 119, which is 36 CS/Telephone Systems, identify yourself, and provide them the time/date and line the call came in. Inform them the reason for the call trace. 16.3.2. BDOC Controller Responsibilities: 16.3.2.1. Initiate appropriate Quick Reaction Checklist; if PL 1-3 resources is affected initiate a SECURITY INCIDENT/COVERED WAGON report as appropriate. 16.3.2.2. Plot an appropriate cordon using the following criteria: 16.3.2.2.1. Small Packages up to the size of a 55-gallon drum: Using the center of the plotting disc, plot a 500 ft. cordon from each corner of the affected facility. When available, use GeoBase to plot the cordon. NOTE: This initial procedure is also utilized whenever the exact location of the device is not known. 16.3.2.2.2. Large Packages exceeding the size of a 55-gallon drum: Plot a 1000 ft. cordon. If BDOC is in the affected area, evacuate BDOC only at the direction of the Flight Chief or higher authorities and activate the Alternate BDOC with another certified BDOC if manning permits. Cease all radio transmissions from the primary control center until the area is declared safe. Flight Chief will assume responsibilities of the security net until activation of Alternate BDOC is complete. 16.3.7. Suspicious Package Procedures: The on duty Flight Chief will be dispatched to reports of suspicious packages. Once on scene, the Flight Chief will determine whether the package is suspicious or not. If the Flight Chief deems the package suspicious, initiate procedures stated above. 16.3.7.1. DO NOT use MWD explosive detector dog teams for suspicious packaged, suspicious devices, or unattended baggage.

1.54 know & recite FPCONS ref 36 WG

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) OPERATIONS: FPCON CHANGES (OPR: 36 WG/ATO) Reference: AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) 1. SITUATION: Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are implemented at the direction of the Installation Commander upon receipt of a Force Protection Condition Alerting Message (FPCAM) or when local intelligence indicates an increase in the likelihood of terrorist actions against the installation or personnel. Once a decision is made to implement a higher FPCON, posts will be immediately manned in accordance with the SF post priority chart or as the situation dictates. Refer to 36 Wing Antiterrorism Plan, 10-245, for local actions and requirements during implementation of FPCONs. 2. MISSION: Protect personnel, resources, and information from threats that could destroy, damage, or compromise the capability of the Air Force to perform its assigned missions. Increased protection can be provided systematically through Integrated Defense forces. 3. EXECUTION: Establish policies, guidelines, and procedures to be used in protection of mission support assets within the jurisdiction of AAFB, during normal operations and periods of increased threat (e.g., increased FPCON). The 36 WG/CC implements FPCON actions based upon the assessment of the local threat, and recommendations from the TWG. Actions are outlined in the FPCON Matrix and 36 WG AT plan. All AAFB personnel will perform the functions mandated by the specific FPCON level. PACAF may declare or amend the implementation of a FPCON, based on command-wide or geographical area of influence or activity. Upon declaration of a lesser security condition from PACAF, the 36 WG/CC may continue to adjust the FPCON based on local threat estimates and intelligence reports. Only the implementing authority for an FPCON can terminate or lower the stated FPCON. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: During increased FPCONs or periods of reduced manning, additional augmentation forces will be provided by the 36 WG via 36 FSS/FSM-1 in the form of Augmentation Duty personnel. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan. TAB 1 TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) OPERATIONS: FPCON CHANGES - FPCON NORMAL (OPR: 36 WG/ATO) Reference: AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) 1. SITUATION: Implement when there is a general global threat of possible terrorist activity that warrants a Routine Security Posture. 2. MISSION: To maintain a high level of security and protection for priority resources, and to prevent, detect, deter, defend and defeat any terrorist threats to AAFB resources, facilities, and personnel until termination of the FPCAM by the originating authority. 3. EXECUTION: SF will conduct the following procedures on a day to day basis as directed by the DFC. Procedures outlined in this tab are considered as "routine security postures". a. Secure and randomly inspect buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use. b. Conduct random security checks of vehicles and persons entering facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States. c. Conduct random vehicle inspections at installation entry points in addition to Random Installation Entry/Exit Vehicle Check (RIEVC) as directed by installation commanders. Implement 100% inspection of large commercial vehicles(larger than a sedan or pick-up truck). d. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic. e. Implement a daily RAM program involving the entire installation with emphasis on identifying surveillance activities and disrupting the terrorist attack cycle. RAM program will meet the possible local threat and mitigate vulnerabilities. f. Conduct 100% hands-on identification verification of all vehicle operators and pedestrians entering installations. g. Where no permanent channeling measures are built into the gates, emplace barriers or obstacles on inbound and out-bound lanes at installation entry points to mitigate high-speed installation access through entry and exit lanes, IAW UFC 4-022-01. Prevent base entry through exit lanes. Ensure sufficient number and types of barriers remain for increased FPCON/RAMs. h. Identify local vendors that are able to provide rapid stocks of emergency response equipment and supplies IAW local response plans. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan TAB 2 TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) OPERATIONS: FPCON CHANGES - FPCON ALPHA (OPR: 36 WG/ATO) Reference: AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) 1. SITUATION: Implement this condition applies when there is an increased general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs measures resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. AAFB baseline measure is FPCON ALPHA. 2. MISSION: To maintain a high level of security and protection for priority resources, and to prevent, detect, deter, defend and defeat any terrorist threats to AAFB resources, facilities, and personnel until termination of the FPCAM bythe originating authority. 3. EXECUTION: The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely. Transition from FPCON ALPHA to a higher FPCON will be completed in sufficient time to prevent the destruction of resources. NOTE: Trusted Traveler is authorized during FPCON NORMAL and ALPHA. a. Fully implement all measures of FPCON NORMAL. b. At regular intervals, inform personnel and family members of the general situation. Ensure personnel arriving for duty are briefed on the threat. Also, remind them to be alert for and to report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels and possible surveillance attempts. c. Post signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level. Increase random security checks of vehicles and persons entering installations or facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States. d. The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Plans should be in place to execute access control procedures. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available. e. Initiate food and water risk management procedures, brief personnel on food and water security procedures and report any unusual activities. f. Test mass notification systems weekly. g. Review all plans, identify resource requirements and be prepared to implement measures of the next higher FPCON level. h. Review intelligence, CI and operations dissemination procedures. i. Review barrier plans. j. Secure access to all bulk quantity storage areas containing hazardous and flammable material. k. Review and be prepared to implement CBRNE detection plan, ensuring it uses available detectors (deployment and home station assets). l. Review and be prepared to implement plans for centralized mail handling. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan. TAB 3 TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) OPERATIONS: FPCON CHANGES - FPCON BRAVO (OPR: 36 WG/ATO) Reference: AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) 1. SITUATION: Implemented when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. 2. MISSION: To maintain a high level of security and protection for priority resources, and to prevent, detect, deter, defend and defeat any terrorist threats to AAFB resources, facilities, and personnel until termination of the FPCAM by the originating authority. 3. EXECUTION: Sustaining BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect operational capability and military-civil relationships with local authorities. Transition from FPCON BRAVO to a higher FPCON will be completed in sufficient time to prevent the destruction of resources. Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels. NOTE: Trusted Traveler is terminated in FPCON BRAVO. a. Brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures. Update signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level. b. Increase frequency of daily RAMs. Focus additional RAMs on current situation and nature of threat. c. Have intelligence and OSI provide a CBRNE threat briefing to the TWG or equivalent, if there is a threat of CBRNE. Include specific information such as probability of CBRNE use, type(s) and amount of CBRNE material, likely CBRNE material release mechanisms and probable targets. d. Contact local hospitals and establish/ensure lines of communication for notification of the installation in the event of significant increase in antibiotic use or people exhibiting symptoms of exposure to CBRNE materials. Verify the interoperability of CBRNE response procedures with local community resources, to include activities outlined in the CEMP 10-2, DCP, and MCRP. e. Enforce control of entry into facilities containing defense critical infrastructure and critical assets, BSAT, lucrative targets, or high-profile locations. Randomly search vehicles entering these areas. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large explosive device sufficient to cause catastrophic damage to property or loss of life (e.g., cargo vans or delivery vehicles). f. Keep cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) away from buildings to reduce vulnerability to bomb attacks. Apply this criterion to all critical and high-occupancy buildings (consider applying to all inhabited structures to the greatest extent possible). Standoff distance should be determined by the following factors: asset criticality, the protection level provided by the structure, and IED or Vehicle Borne IED (V-BIED) threat and available security measures. Consider centralized parking and implementation of barrier plans. Utilize UFC 4-010-01 and UFC 4-010-02. AFH 10-2401, Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide (FOUO), is an additional tool for standoff planning. g. Secure and periodically inspect all buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use. At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at random intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages. h. Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels. i. Randomly inspect commercial deliveries. Advise family members to check home deliveries. j. Increase random security checks of vehicles and persons entering installations or facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States. Inspect all commercial deliveries k. Randomly inspect food and water for evidence of tampering or contamination before use by DoD personnel. Inspections should include delivery vehicles, storage areas/facilities and storage containers l. Increase security measures and guard presence or initiate increased patrols and surveillance of DoD housing areas, schools, messes, on-base clubs, military treatment facilities and similar highoccupancy targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and family members. m. Implement plans to enhance off-installation security for DoD facilities. In areas with Threat Levels of Moderate, Significant, or High, coverage includes facilities (e.g., DoD schools and daycare centers) and transportation services and routes (e.g., bus routes) used by DoD employees and family members. n. Consult local authorities on the threat and mutual AT measures. As appropriate, brief law enforcement agencies who provide support to the installation and request assistance as necessary to ensure protection of resources and personnel. As appropriate, coordinate with local authorities regarding infrastructure outside the installation, e.g., infrastructure supplying energy to the installation. o. The following Transportation Protection Procedures are implemented during this measure. Postpone nonessential movements of Arms Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Category I and II items, classified munitions, and ship by military air if feasible. Plan for possible use of the installation as a DoD Safe Haven and review physical security standards in AA&E holding areas. Consider liaison with civil authorities to review specific local threat conditions or convene the Threat Working Group (TWG) to address the threat situation and possible additional protective measures. p. Verify identity of visitors to the installation and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels and other containers. Visitors are defined as non-DoD affiliated personnel who do not have official DoD credentials authorizing installation access. q. Conduct random patrols to check vehicles, people and buildings. As necessary, implement additional security measures for High-Risk Personnel (HRP). r. Place personnel required for implementing AT plans on call; commanders should exercise discretion in approving absences. Identify and brief personnel who may augment guard forces. Review specific rules of engagement including the use of deadly force. s. Review status and adjust as appropriate operations security, communications security and information security procedures. t. (Airfield-specific) Limit access points in order to enforce entry control. As appropriate, erect barriers and establish manned checkpoints at entrances to airfields. Verify the identity of all individuals entering the airfield (flight line and support facilities) with no exceptions. Randomly inspect vehicles, briefcases and packages entering the airfield. u. (Airfield-specific) Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraft departure and approach flight paths with local authorities. Be prepared to activate contingency plans and issue detailed air traffic control procedures. As appropriate, take actions to mitigate the threat of surface- to-air missiles or standoff weapons that can be delivered from beyond the airfield perimeter. v. Ensure CBRNE detectors are operational as outlined with the detection plan (deployment and home station assets). w. Review all higher FPCON measures. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan. TAB 4 TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) OPERATIONS: FPCON CHANGES - FPCON CHARLIE (OPR: 36 WG/ATO) Reference: AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) 1. SITUATION: Implemented when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely. 2. MISSION: To maintain a high level of security and protection for priority resources, and to prevent, detect, deter, defend and defeat any terrorist threats to AAFB resources, facilities, and personnel until termination of the FPCAM by the originating authority. 3. EXECUTION: Prolonged implementation of CHARLIE measures may create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel. Transition from FPCON CHARLIE to a higher FPCON will be completed in sufficient time to prevent the destruction of resources. Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels. a. Brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures. Update signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level. b. Focus additional RAMs on current situation and nature of threat. Recall additional required personnel IAW AFPAM 10-243; Augmentation Duty. c. Be prepared to react to requests for assistance from both local authorities and other installations in the region. d. Ensure flow of information between on and off-base medical treatment facilities participating in the medical surveillance program. e. Implement procedures to expedite the entry of first and emergency responders onto the installation during emergencies. Ensure these procedures prevent unauthorized entry. f. Ensure or verify the identity of all individuals entering food and water storage and distribution centers using sign-in and sign-out logs at access control and entry points, and limit or inspect all personal items. g. If a CBRNE threat exists, ensure all shortages of CBRNE equipment and its potential impact is briefed to the installation commander. h. Increase standoff from sensitive buildings based on the threat. Implement barrier plan to hinder vehicleborne attack. i. Increase protection for all defense critical infrastructure, critical assets or Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) facilities. Give special attention to and coordinate with local authorities regarding infrastructure outside the military establishment. Consider closing or enhancing security at remote sites and alternate, practice or training airfields. j. To reduce vulnerability to attack, consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities and coordinate any other precautionary measures taken outside the installation perimeter. k. Provide armed military escort in separate military vehicles for all AA&E Category I and II items and classified munitions and conduct liaison with state and/or local law enforcement officials prior to off-base movements. l. Review personnel policy procedures to determine appropriate courses of action for dependent family members. m. Consider escorting children to and from DoD schools (among options to consider are escorting school buses, recommending parents escort children to/from school, etc.). Review school closure procedures with the local school district. n. (Airfield-specific) Reduce flying to only essential operational flights. Implement appropriate flying countermeasures as directed by the Wing Commander (military aircraft) or Transportation Security Administration (civilian aircraft). Consider relief landing ground actions to take for aircraft diversions into and out of an attacked airfield. Consider augmenting fire-fighting details. o. Consider aircraft dispersal, or the dispersal of other high value assets, based on assessment of local threat from standoff weapons, vulnerability of the assets and operational feasibility. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan. TAB 5 TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) OPERATIONS: FPCON CHANGES - FPCON DELTA (OPR: 36 WG/ATO) Reference: AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT) 1. SITUATION: Implemented in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is imminent. 2. MISSION: To maintain a high level of security and protection for priority resources, and to prevent, detect, deter, defend and defeat any terrorist threats to AAFB resources, facilities, and personnel. 3. EXECUTION: FPCON DELTA is usually declared as a localized condition. FPCON DELTA measures are not intended to be sustained for an extended duration. Transition from FPCON DELTA to a higher FPCON will be completed in sufficient time to prevent the destruction of resources. Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels. a. Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas. b. Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation. Selected prescreened and constantly secured vehicles used to transport escorted very important personnel may be exempted. c. Control facility access and implement positive identification of all personnel with no exceptions. d. Close all schools located on the installation. e. Restrict all non-essential movement. f. Temporarily suspend all AA&E shipments in and out of the local area except those needed for critical operational requirements; ship critical items by military air if feasible; and provide armed military escort for all AA&E shipments. g. (Airfield specific) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized operational sorties. Be prepared to deploy light aircraft and/or helicopters for surveillance tasks or to move internal security forces. Implement, if necessary, appropriate flying countermeasures. h. (Airfield specific) As appropriate, airfields should prepare to accept aircraft diverted from other stations. i. If permitted, close public and military roads and facilities. If applicable, close military roads allowing access to the airfield. j. Begin continuous monitoring for chemical, biological and radiological contamination. k. If not already accomplished and a credible threat exists, initiate collective protection operations and/or Shelter In Place (SIP) operations, as explained in AFMAN 10-2503; Operations in a CBRNE Environment. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: See Basic Plan. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: See Basic Plan.

1.76 know and perform apprehension

APPREHENSION, DETENTION AND CUSTODY 6.1. Apprehension Considerations. Immediately upon apprehending a suspect, handcuff and conduct a search of the suspect and the area under their immediate control for weapons and any evidence the suspect could remove or destroy. This emphasizes the safety of SF members and the apprehended individual. During incidents in which a subject is detained but not under apprehension, if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the subject may possess a weapon, as a minimum, conduct a protective frisk for weapons. 6.1.1. When to Apprehend: Apprehensions are based upon probable cause, which means there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been or is being committed and the person to be apprehended committed or is committing it. If the facts and circumstances reasonably indicate a person committed or is committing an offense, then apprehension is justified. 6.1.1.1. By Observation. SF member observes the actual offense. Disorderly conduct and traffic violations are common examples. Planned offenses usually are not committed while SF are in the area. When SF members observe an offense that requires apprehension, they must act immediately. 6.1.1.2. By Report. Many complaints are received at the BDOC by telephone or in person. A patrol may be dispatched to investigate and make necessary apprehensions or the complaint may be referred to SF Investigations (S2I), depending upon the need for immediate action. 6.1.2. Approach. Two factors responders need to keep in mind when approaching a suspect to affect an apprehension are position and attitude. 6.1.2.1. Position. When approaching a suspect, move toward the person from a direction most advantageous to the SF member. When addressing a suspect, the individual naturally tends to face the person speaking. If the SF member plans to question the person or check identification, ensure to maintain a proper reactionary gap. The assisting patrolman must take a position of advantage. 6.1.2.2. Attitude. A smooth, courteous and efficient approach with a firm, but friendly, conversational tone may calm all but the most violent offenders. 6.1.3. Evaluation. SF must evaluate the attitude and physical condition of a suspect before deciding on a course of action. 6.1.3.1. Attitude of Suspect. SF will maintain situational awareness and a reactionary gap even when a suspect has a cooperative attitude. Keep alert and be ready to employ counter measures in the event the situation becomes hostile. 6.1.3.2. Physical Condition. SF will request medical attention for any injury sustained by a suspect. An apparent minor injury could be serious and immediate medical attention can prevent serious injury or death. (T-1) 6.2. Apprehension on Military Installations. On duty SF personnel performing official police or guard duties have the authority to apprehend any person subject to the UCMJ, regardless of rank. SF personnel may apprehend any person subject to the UCMJ if they have probable cause/reasonable belief to believe an offense has been or is being committed and the person being apprehended committed or is committing the offense. 6.2.1. The DFC, with the advice of the SJA, will establish local procedures for handling civilian offenders. (T-1) 6.2.1.1. Civilians may be detained for offenses committed on a military installation. Since civilians are not normally subject to the UCMJ, refer civilian violators to a US Magistrate for judicial disposition or to the local civil authorities having jurisdiction. 6.2.1.2. For minor offenses, release civilian offenders to their military sponsor. If they do not have a military sponsor, release them to a relative, friend or on their own recognizance. 6.2.2. IAW AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, the installation commander or appointed magistrate must authorize apprehensions of military personnel in on-base private dwellings. The rule applies if the subject is in the subject's quarters or someone else's. Obtain authorization to apprehend on an AF Form 3226, Authority to Apprehend in Private Dwelling. NOTE: This procedure is not required during emergencies to save a person's life or prevent serious bodily harm (e.g., gunfire or screaming being heard from outside quarters). (T-0) 6.3. Off Installation Patrols. 6.3.1. SF performing patrol duties off the installation have the authority to apprehend military personnel, subject to probable cause requirements and the rules governing apprehensions in a private dwelling. Off installation patrols must use civilian law enforcement officials to identify all suspected military violators in civilian clothing if possible. Develop policies and procedures for patrol activity conducted off the installation in consultation with local law enforcement officials and SJA. (T-0) 6.3.2. OCONUS. The installation commander may authorize off installation patrols. Coordinate with the MAJCOM SJA before authorizing off installation patrols. SF maintains the authority to apprehend military personnel on or off the installation in an OCONUS environment in accordance with Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or host nation agreements. The authority to detain civilians on a US military installation varies in each host nation. Bilateral agreements and directives must specify such limitations. (T-0) 6.4. Custody. Custody is the restraint of free movement. An apprehension occurs when an SF member clearly notifies a suspect they are under apprehension. This notice should be given orally or in writing, but it may be implied by the circumstances. Once apprehended and in custody, the apprehending officer must control the movements of the offender. Protect the health and welfare of all apprehended suspects.

1.77 know procedures involving juveniles

APPREHENSION, DETENTION AND CUSTODY 6.1. Apprehension Considerations. Immediately upon apprehending a suspect, handcuff and conduct a search of the suspect and the area under their immediate control for weapons and any evidence the suspect could remove or destroy. This emphasizes the safety of SF members and the apprehended individual. During incidents in which a subject is detained but not under apprehension, if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the subject may possess a weapon, as a minimum, conduct a protective frisk for weapons. 6.1.1. When to Apprehend: Apprehensions are based upon probable cause, which means there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been or is being committed and the person to be apprehended committed or is committing it. If the facts and circumstances reasonably indicate a person committed or is committing an offense, then apprehension is justified. 6.1.1.1. By Observation. SF member observes the actual offense. Disorderly conduct and traffic violations are common examples. Planned offenses usually are not committed while SF are in the area. When SF members observe an offense that requires apprehension, they must act immediately. 6.1.1.2. By Report. Many complaints are received at the BDOC by telephone or in person. A patrol may be dispatched to investigate and make necessary apprehensions or the complaint may be referred to SF Investigations (S2I), depending upon the need for immediate action. 6.1.2. Approach. Two factors responders need to keep in mind when approaching a suspect to affect an apprehension are position and attitude. 6.1.2.1. Position. When approaching a suspect, move toward the person from a direction most advantageous to the SF member. When addressing a suspect, the individual naturally tends to face the person speaking. If the SF member plans to question the person or check identification, ensure to maintain a proper reactionary gap. The assisting patrolman must take a position of advantage. 6.1.2.2. Attitude. A smooth, courteous and efficient approach with a firm, but friendly, conversational tone may calm all but the most violent offenders. 6.1.3. Evaluation. SF must evaluate the attitude and physical condition of a suspect before deciding on a course of action. 6.1.3.1. Attitude of Suspect. SF will maintain situational awareness and a reactionary gap even when a suspect has a cooperative attitude. Keep alert and be ready to employ counter measures in the event the situation becomes hostile. 6.1.3.2. Physical Condition. SF will request medical attention for any injury sustained by a suspect. An apparent minor injury could be serious and immediate medical attention can prevent serious injury or death. (T-1) 6.2. Apprehension on Military Installations. On duty SF personnel performing official police or guard duties have the authority to apprehend any person subject to the UCMJ, regardless of rank. SF personnel may apprehend any person subject to the UCMJ if they have probable cause/reasonable belief to believe an offense has been or is being committed and the person being apprehended committed or is committing the offense. 6.2.1. The DFC, with the advice of the SJA, will establish local procedures for handling civilian offenders. (T-1) 6.2.1.1. Civilians may be detained for offenses committed on a military installation. Since civilians are not normally subject to the UCMJ, refer civilian violators to a US Magistrate for judicial disposition or to the local civil authorities having jurisdiction. 6.2.1.2. For minor offenses, release civilian offenders to their military sponsor. If they do not have a military sponsor, release them to a relative, friend or on their own recognizance. 6.2.2. IAW AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, the installation commander or appointed magistrate must authorize apprehensions of military personnel in on-base private dwellings. The rule applies if the subject is in the subject's quarters or someone else's. Obtain authorization to apprehend on an AF Form 3226, Authority to Apprehend in Private Dwelling. NOTE: This procedure is not required during emergencies to save a person's life or prevent serious bodily harm (e.g., gunfire or screaming being heard from outside quarters). (T-0) 6.3. Off Installation Patrols. 6.3.1. SF performing patrol duties off the installation have the authority to apprehend military personnel, subject to probable cause requirements and the rules governing apprehensions in a private dwelling. Off installation patrols must use civilian law enforcement officials to identify all suspected military violators in civilian clothing if possible. Develop policies and procedures for patrol activity conducted off the installation in consultation with local law enforcement officials and SJA. (T-0) 6.3.2. OCONUS. The installation commander may authorize off installation patrols. Coordinate with the MAJCOM SJA before authorizing off installation patrols. SF maintains the authority to apprehend military personnel on or off the installation in an OCONUS environment in accordance with Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or host nation agreements. The authority to detain civilians on a US military installation varies in each host nation. Bilateral agreements and directives must specify such limitations. (T-0) 6.4. Custody. Custody is the restraint of free movement. An apprehension occurs when an SF member clearly notifies a suspect they are under apprehension. This notice should be given orally or in writing, but it may be implied by the circumstances. Once apprehended and in custody, the apprehending officer must control the movements of the offender. Protect the health and welfare of all apprehended suspects.

1.29 know blood borne pathogen procedure

ATTACHMENT 9 BLOOD-BORNE PATHOGEN EXPOSURE CONTROL PLAN A10. General: Every member of the Security Forces Squadron, based on their duty responsibilities has an inherent risk of exposure to blood-borne pathogens. All security forces members run the risk of being exposed to contaminated material. A10.1. Procedures: The most effective way to minimize exposure to blood and other potentially infectious materials is the use of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE). NOTE: It is your responsibility to inventory these items before you accept your post/vehicle. Contents in BBP kit are as follows: A10.1.1. Safety Shield A10.1.2. Medical Gloves A10.1.3. Protective Apron A10.1.4. Disinfectant Solution A10.1.5. Identification Tag A10.1.6. Bio-Hazardous Bag A10.1.7. Scoop and Scraper A10.1.8. Towellette (wipes) A10.2. SF Response: If a SF member is responding to an incident where they may feel exposure to infectious material is possible, members are to protect themselves with the necessary PPE prior to their arrival, or as soon as they arrive on scene. A10.2.1. Use only the necessary items you will need to protect yourself for the task you will be performing. A10. 2.2. Anyone conducting a baggage/room search or handling evidence will protect themselves by wearing PPE (I.E. surgical gloves). In addition, when conducting a search of detained/apprehended personnel and you feel there is a risk of exposure to contaminated material; protect yourself with the correct PPE before conducting the search. A10.3. Exposure: A10.3.1. Once someone believes they have contacted blood, bodily fluid, or other contaminated material, follow these steps: A10.3.1.1. Wash with soap and warm running water immediately after removing gloves or other PPE. A10.3.1.2. Mucous membrane areas (such as eye, etc.) should also be flushed with water immediately or as soon as possible following contact with potentially contaminated material. A10.4. In ALL cases where personnel believe they contacted potentially contaminated material; they must contact their immediate supervisor/Flight Chief, then seek immediate medical attention. A10.5. The Medical Treatment Facility (MTF): should be contacted for assistance in disposal of contaminated materials. Military Public Health is available for consultation on the proper method of cleaning contaminated PPE and equipment. A10.8. Safety: Individuals involved in blood borne pathogens exposure incident, and their respective supervisor, must complete an Incident Report and a PACAF Form 161 (Notification of Civilian/Military Injury or USAF Property Damage Ground Mishap Report (if necessary), and forward these reports to Unit Safety Personnel. Unit Safety will document and track all blood borne pathogens exposure incidences IAW OSHA Standard 1910.1030. A10.8.1. Unit Safety Personnel will immediately review and evaluate the circumstances surrounding each and every exposure incidence. Unit Safety Personnel will develop a report detailing their findings, to include suggested recommendations to amend processes and procedures to minimum to risk of exposure to blood borne pathogens, to the Commander within one (1) working day. A10.9. Training: SF personnel will be trained on Blood Borne Pathogens annually

1.07 know installation entry requirements

All personnel entering or exiting the installation are required to stop and identify themselves upon request. All personnel with escort privileges are authorized to physically escort up to seven guests unless stated otherwise

1.72 know the punitive articles

Article 77 - Principals: Association - Article 77 does not define an offense. Its purpose is to make clear that a person need not personally perform the acts necessary to constitute an offense to be guilty of it. Article 78 - Accessory after the fact Article 79 - Conviction of lesser included offenses Article 80 - Attempts Article 81 - Conspiracy Article 82 - Solicitation Article 83 - Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation Article 84 - Effecting unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation Article 85 - Desertion Article 86 - Absence without leave (AWOL) Article 87 - Missing movement Article 88 - Contempt toward officials Article 89 - Disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer Article 90 - Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer Article 91 - Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer Article 92 - Failure to obey order or regulation Article 93 - Cruelty and maltreatment Article 94 - Mutiny and sedition Article 95 - Resistance, flight, breach of arrest, and escape Article 96 - Releasing prisoner without proper authority Article 97 - Unlawful detention Article 98 - Noncompliance with procedural rules Article 99 - Misbehavior before the enemy Article 100 - Subordinate compelling surrender Article 101 - Improper use of countersign Article 102 - Forcing a safeguard Article 103 - Captured or abandoned property Article 104 - Aiding the enemy Article 105 - Misconduct as a prisoner Article 106/a - Spies / Espionage Article 107 - False official statements Article 108 - Military property of the United States—sale, loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful disposition Article 109 - Property other than military property of the United States—waste, spoilage, or destruction Article 110 - Improper hazarding of vessel Article 111 - Drunken or reckless operation of vehicle, aircraft, or vessel Article 112 - Drunk on duty Article 112a - Wrongful use, possession, etc., of controlled substances Article 113 - Misbehavior of sentinel or lookout Article 114 - Dueling Article 115 - Malingering Article 116 - Riot or breach of peace Article 117 - Provoking speeches or gestures Article 118 - Murder Article 119 - Manslaughter Article 120 - Rape and carnal knowledge Article 120 - Rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct. Article 120a - Stalking Article 121 - Larceny and wrongful appropriation Article 122 - Robbery Article 123 - Forgery Article 123a - Making, drawing, or uttering check, draft, or order without sufficient funds Article 124 - Maiming Article 125 - Sodomy Article 126 - Arson Article 127 - Extortion Article 128 - Assault Article 129 - Burglary Article 130 - Housebreaking Article 131 - Perjury Article 132 - Frauds against the United States Article 133 - Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman Article 134 - General article Article 134-1 - Abusing public animal Article 134-2 - Adultery Article 134-3 - Assault—indecent Article 134-4 - Assault—with intent to commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, sodomy, arson, burglary, or housebreaking Article 134-5 - Bigamy Article 134-6 - Bribery and graft Article 134-7 - Burning with intent to defraud Article 134-8 - Check, worthless, making and uttering—by dishonorably failing to maintain funds Article 134-9 - Cohabitation, wrongful Article 134-10 - Correctional custody—offenses against Article 134-11 - Debt, dishonorably failing to pay Article 134-12 - Disloyal statements Article 134-13 - Disorderly conduct, drunkenness Article 134-14 - Drinking liquor with prisoner Article 134-15 - Drunk prisoner Article 134-16 - Drunkenness—incapacitation for performance of duties through prior wrongful indulgence in intoxicating liquor or any drug Article 134-17 - False or unauthorized pass offenses Article 134-18 - False pretenses, obtaining services under Article 134-19 - False swearing Article 134-20 - Firearm, discharging—through negligence Article 134-21 - Firearm, discharging—willfully, under such circumstances as to endanger human life Article 134-22 - Fleeing scene of accident Article 134-23 - Fraternization Article 134-24 - Gambling with subordinate Article 134-25 - Homicide, negligent Article 134-1 - Impersonating a commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer, or an agent or official Article 134-26 - Indecent acts or liberties with a child Article 134-27 - Indecent exposure Article 134-28 - Indecent language Article 134-29 - Indecent acts with another Article 134-30 - Jumping from vessel into the water Article 134-31 - Kidnapping Article 134-32 - Mail: taking, opening, secreting, destroying, or stealing Article 134-33 - Mails: depositing or causing to be deposited obscene matters in Article 134-34 - Misprision of serious offense Article 134-35 - Obstructing justice Article 134-36 - Wrongful interference with an adverse administrative proceeding Article 134-37 - Pandering and prostitution Article 134-38 - Parole, Violation of Article 134-39 - Perjury: subornation of Article 134-40 - Public record: altering, concealing, removing, mutilating, obliterating, or destroying Article 134-41 - Quarantine: medical, breaking Article 134-42 - Reckless Endangerment Article 134-43 - Requesting commission of an offense Article 134-44 - Restriction, breaking Article 134-45 - Seizure: destruction, removal, or disposal of property to prevent Article 134-46 - Self-injury without intent to avoid service Article 134-47 - Sentinel or lookout: offenses against or by Article 134-48 - Soliciting another to commit an offense Article 134-49 - Stolen property: knowingly receiving, buying, concealing Article 134-50 - Straggling Article 134-51 - Testify: wrongful refusal Article 134-52 - Threat or hoax: bomb Article 134-53 - Threat, communicating Article 134-54 - Unlawful entry Article 134-55 - Weapon: concealed, carrying Article 134-56 - Wearing unauthorized insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon, device, or lapel button

1.47 clearing barrel procedures M240b

Attachment 10 M240B MACHINE GUN (MG) ( 7.62MM) A10.1. General Information. M240B loading/unloading procedures are IAW TO 11W2-6-5-1, Technical Manual, Operator's Manual, Machine Gun, 7.62MM, M240B. A10.2. Issue. The armorer will use the following procedures when issuing the M240B MG: A10.2.1. Remove the MG along with its spare barrel from its storage rack or container and proceed to the issue-point clearing area at "port-arms," bolt in the forward (closed) position and safety in the fire (F) position. (T-1). A10.2.2. Place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe (S) position. (T-1). Do not place finger inside trigger guard. A10.2.3. Open the cover and visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber and receiver to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A10.2.4. Issue the MG and spare barrel to the individual arming, "butt" first, muzzle elevated, bolt to the rear (open) position and safety in the safe position. (T-1). A10.2.5. Ensure the individual receiving the MG raises the cover, inspects the feed tray, receiver and chamber then closes the cover prior to acceptance. (T-1). A10.3. Clearing Upon Issue. The individual issued the MG will use the following procedures: A10.3.1. Proceed to the clearing zone with the MG held in the "port-arms" position, muzzle elevated, cover closed, bolt to the rear (open) position and the safety in the safe position. (T-1). A10.3.2. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place finger inside the trigger guard. A10.3.3. Visually inspect that the safety is in the safe position and open the cover. (T-1). Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber and receiver to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A10.3.4. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the MG contains no ammunition and is safe, close the cover and place the safety to the fire position. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A10.3.5. With the right-hand, grasp the "cocking handle" and pull it fully to the rear. (T-1). With the left-hand, pull the trigger. (T-1). Allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by "riding" the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow bolt to slam forward. (T-1). A10.3.6. The MG is now cleared; the cover is closed, the bolt is forward and the safety remains in the fire position. Note: Manipulating the weapon to achieve a safe position when the bolt is forward can damage the weapon and may result in unintentional discharges, or a runaway gun. Under no circumstances should the safety be engaged with the bolt in the forward position. The MG is not loaded at a clearing barrel. It is loaded as outlined in paragraph A10.4. A10.3.7. Exit the clearing zone with the MG slung over the shoulder, or across body. (T-1). If the individual is to be armed, proceed to A10.4. A10.4. Loading. The MAJCOM/A4S determines when to load the M240B and in what configuration (Half-Load and Full-Load) it is employed. These procedures are prescribed in local contingency plans or other appropriate installation/unit documents. A10.4.1. Half-Load. The half-loading procedures start with a cleared MG. The individual issued the MG will use the following procedures: A10.4.1.1. Ensure the MG is cleared; the cover closed, bolt is forward with the safety on fire. (T1). A10.4.1.2. Attach the ammunition assault pack to the ammunition adapter located on the left side of the weapon. (T-1). A10.4.1.3. Visually inspect the bandoleer to ensure all ammunition is in the bandoleer with the open side of the belt links pointing downward. (T-1). A10.4.1.4. Open the cover and place the ammunition belt onto the feed tray with the belt link open side pointing downward. (T-1). Place the first round into the feed tray groove against the cartridge stop. (T-1). A10.4.1.5. Close the cover. (T-1). The MG is now half-loaded. Ammunition is inserted, the bolt is forward and the safety remains on fire. Under no circumstances should the safety be engaged with the bolt in the forward position. A10.4.2. Full-Load: The full-load may be achieved by starting with a cleared MG or the MG in the half-load configuration. The full-load should only be used when hostilities are expected and the MG must be available to fire with minimal delay. A10.4.2.1. From Half-Load. The individual issued the MG will use the following procedures: A10.4.2.1.1. Pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). Leave the weapon on safe if there is not a need to fire immediately. (T-1). A10.4.2.1.2. The MG is now fully loaded. Ammunition is on the feed tray, the bolt is locked to the rear and the safety is on safe. Do not move the safety to the fire position until the MG is needed to engage a target/threat. (T-1). A10.4.3. From a Cleared Weapon. The individual issued the MG will use the following procedures: A10.4.3.1. Ensure the weapon is cleared; the cover closed, bolt forward with the safety on fire. (T-1). A10.4.3.2. Attach the ammunition assault pack to the ammunition adapter located on the left side of the MG. (T-1). A10.4.3.3. Visually inspect the bandoleer to ensure all ammunition is in the bandoleer with the open side of the belt links pointing downward. (T-1). A10.4.3.4. Pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). A10.4.3.5. Open the cover and visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber and receiver to ensure no ammunition or obstruction is present. (T-1). Ensure the bolt is to the rear (open) position and the safety in the safe position. (T-1). A10.4.3.6. Place the ammunition belt onto the feed tray with the belt links open side pointing downward. (T-1). Place the first round into the feed tray groove against the cartridge stop. (T-1). A10.4.3.7. Close the cover. (T-1). The MG is now fully loaded. Do not move the safety to the fire position until the MG is needed to engage a target/threat. (T-1). A10.5. On-Post Unloading and Clearing. The MAJCOM/A4S determines when to unload and/or clear the M240B. These procedures are prescribed in local contingency plans or other appropriate installation/unit documents. Note: If the M240B is in the half-load configuration, it can be transported safely in a vehicle and should only be unloaded on-post when the armed person is relieved from post or duty location. If the M240B is in the full-load configuration, it is not safe for transport in a vehicle and must be unloaded prior to transporting the MG for relief or breaks. (T-1). It is the responsibility of the armed individual and the posting supervisor (or fire team leader) to verify the MG contains no ammunition or is in the half-load configuration prior to transport. A10.5.1. Half-Load. The individual issued the MG will use the following procedures: A10.5.1.1. Point the muzzle in a safe direction and open the cover. (T-1). A10.5.1.2. Remove the ammunition belt, and place the belt back into the assault pack. (T-1). Remove the ammunition assault pack from the ammunition adapter. (T-1). A10.5.1.3. After the posting supervisor (or fire team leader) verifies the ammunition belt is removed, pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). Do not place finger inside trigger guard. A10.5.1.4. Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber and receiver to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A10.5.1.5. After the posting supervisor verifies the MG is unloaded and no ammunition is present, close the cover and place the safety to the fire position. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A10.5.1.6. With the right-hand, grasp the "cocking handle" and pull it fully to the rear. (T-1). With the left-hand, pull the trigger. (T-1). Allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by "riding" the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow bolt to slam forward. (T-1). A10.5.1.7. The MG is now cleared; the cover is closed, the bolt is forward and the safety remains in the fire position. A10.5.2. Full-Load. The individual issued the MG will use the following procedures: A10.5.2.1. Point the muzzle in a safe direction, ensure the safety is on "safe," and open the cover. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A10.5.2.2. Remove the ammunition belt, and place the belt back into the assault pack. (T-1). Remove the ammunition assault pack from the ammunition adapter. (T-1). A10.5.2.3. Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber and receiver to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A10.5.2.4. After the posting supervisor (or fire team leader) verifies the MG is unloaded and no ammunition is present, close the cover and place the safety to the fire position. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A10.5.2.5. With the right-hand, grasp the cocking handle and pull it fully to the rear. (T-1). With the left-hand, pull the trigger. (T-1). Allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by "riding" the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow bolt to slam forward. (T-1). A10.5.2.6. The MG is now cleared; the cover is closed, the bolt is forward and the safety remains in the fire position. The MG can now be safely transported. A10.6. Unloading and/or Clearing prior to Turn-in. Individuals preparing to turn-in the MG approach the clearing area with the MG free of ammunition with the bolt forward and the safety on fire, the MG slung over the shoulder, slung cross-body or carried by the carrying handle, and will use the following procedures: A10.6.1. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and immediately place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A10.6.2. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the ammunition assault pack is removed, pull the cocking handle to the rear to lock the bolt to the rear (open) position, and push the cocking handle to the forward position. (T-1). A10.6.3. Place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A10.6.4. Open the cover and visually inspect the cover, feed tray, receiver and chamber to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). The clearing barrel attendant ensures the MG contains no ammunition and is safe for turn-in. A10.6.5. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies no ammunition is present, close the cover and ensure the safety is in the safe position. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A10.6.6. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the MG is cleared (cover closed, bolt to the rear (open) position and safety in the safe position), exit the clearing area with the MG at "portarms" and proceed to the turn-in area. (T-1). A10.7. Turn-in. When directed by the armorer, the individual approaches the turn-in point and hands the MG to the armorer "butt" first, muzzle elevated, bolt to the rear position and safety in the safe position. The armorer takes possession of the MG and immediately places the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. Do not place fingers in the trigger guard. The armorer will use the following procedures: A10.7.1. Ensure the safety is in the safe position and open the cover. (T-1). Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber and receiver to ensure the MG contains no ammunition and is safe for storage. (T-1). A10.7.2. Close the cover and place the safety in the fire (F) position. (T-1). A10.7.3. With the right-hand, pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, with the left-hand, pull the trigger. (T-1). Allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by riding the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow the bolt to slam forward. (T-1). Ensure all optics, pointers, and illuminators attached to the MG are turned off. (T-1). A10.7.4. The MG is now "rack safe," free of ammunition, the bolt is forward, the cover is closed and the safety remains on fire. Store the MG in an approved storage rack or container. (T-1).

1.48 clearing barrel procedures M249 automatic tifle

Attachment 11 M249 AUTOMATIC RIFLE (AR) ( 5.56MM) A11.1. General Information. M249 AR loading/unloading procedures are IAW TO 11W3-5-5- 51, Operator Manual, Machine Gun, 5.56MM, M249 W/Equipment. A11.2. Issue. The armorer will use the following procedures when issuing the AR: A11.2.1. Remove the AR and its spare barrel from its storage rack or container and proceed to the issue-point clearing area with the AR held at "port-arms," bolt in the forward (closed) position and safety in the fire (red band visible) position. (T-1). A11.2.2. Place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe (red band not visible) position. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A11.2.3. Open the cover and visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber, magazine well (insert two fingers) and receiver to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A11.2.4. Issue the AR to the individual, "butt" first, muzzle elevated, bolt in the rear (open) position, and safety in the safe position. (T-1). A11.2.5. Ensure the individual raises the feed tray, inspects the chamber then closes the cover prior to acceptance. A11.3. Clearing Upon Issue. The individual issued the AR will use the following procedures: A11.3.1. Proceed to the clearing zone with the AR in the "port-arms" position, muzzle elevated, cover closed, bolt to the rear (open) position and the safety in the safe position. (T-1). A11.3.2. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). A11.3.3. Ensure the safety is in the safe position and open the cover. (T-1). Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber, magazine well (insert two fingers) and receiver to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A11.3.4. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the AR contains no ammunition and is safe, close the cover and place the safety to the fire position. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A11.3.5. With the right-hand, grasp the cocking handle and pull it fully to the rear. (T-1). With the left-hand, pull the trigger and allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by "riding" the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow bolt to slam forward. (T-1). A11.3.6. The AR is now cleared; the cover is closed, the bolt is forward and the safety remains in the fire position. Note: Manipulating the weapon to achieve a safe position when the bolt is forward can damage the weapon and may result in unintentional discharges, or a runaway gun. Under no circumstances should the safety be engaged with the bolt in the forward position. A11.3.7. Exit the clearing zone with the AR slung over the shoulder or across the body. (T-1). If the individual is to be armed, proceed to paragraph A11.4. (T-1). A11.4. Loading. The MAJCOM/A4S determines when to load the M249 AR and in what configuration (Half-Load and Full-Load) it is employed. These procedures are prescribed in local contingency plans or other appropriate installation/unit documents. A11.4.1. Half-Load. The half-loading procedures start with a cleared AR. The individual issued the AR will use the following procedures: A11.4.1.1. Ensure the AR is cleared; the cover closed, bolt is forward with the safety on fire. (T1). A11.4.1.2. Attach the ammunition assault pack into the receiver dovetail located underneath the receiver. (T-1). A11.4.1.3. Visually inspect the assault pack bandoleer to ensure all ammunition has the open side of the belt links pointing downward. (T-1). A11.4.1.4. Open the cover and place the ammunition belt onto the feed tray with the belt links open side pointing downward. (T-1). Place the first round on the feed tray groove against the cartridge stop. (T-1). The lead-link tab (green plastic tab) assists in the correct positioning of the ammunition belt. (T-1). A11.4.1.5. Close the cover. (T-1). The AR is now half-loaded. Ammunition is inserted, the bolt is forward and the safety remains on fire. If accomplished correctly, the lead-link tab is visible on the right side of the AR, flush against the ejection port. Under no circumstances should the safety be engaged with the bolt in the forward position. A11.4.1.6. The half-load can also be achieved with the 30-round, M16-style magazine. The bolt is forward, the safety is on fire, the cover is closed and the magazine is inserted into the magazine well. The use of a magazine should be used as a last resort, when MAJCOMs authorize this configuration and belted ammunition is not available or is not suitable for tactical operations. A11.4.2. Full-Load. The full-load may be achieved by starting with a cleared AR or an AR in the half-load configuration. The full load should only be used when hostilities are expected and the AR must be available to fire with minimal delay. A11.4.2.1. From a Half-Load. The individual issued the AR will use the following procedures: A11.4.2.1.1. When transitioning to the full-load from the half-load, pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). Leave the weapon on safe if there is not a need to immediately fire. (T-1). A11.4.2.1.2. The AR is now fully loaded. Ammunition is on the feed tray, the bolt is locked to the rear and the safety is on safe. Do not move the safety to fire until the AR is needed to engage a target/theat. (T-1). A11.4.2.2. From a Cleared Weapon. The individual issued the AR will use the following procedures: A11.4.2.2.1. Ensure the weapon is cleared; the cover closed, bolt forward with the safety on fire. (T-1). A11.4.2.2.2. Attach the ammunition assault pack to the receiver dovetail underneath the receiver. (T-1). A11.4.2.2.3. Visually inspect the assault pack bandoleer to ensure all ammunition has the open side of the belt links pointing downward. (T-1). A11.4.2.2.4. Pull and hold the cocking handle to the rear, locking the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the cocking handle to the forward position and place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). A11.4.2.2.5. Open the cover and visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber, receiver and magazine well (insert two fingers) to ensure no ammunition or obstruction is present. (T-1). A11.4.2.2.6. Place the ammunition belt onto the feed tray with the belt links open side pointing downward. (T-1). Place the lead link tab or first round into the feed tray groove against the cartridge stop. (T-1). A11.4.2.2.7. Close the cover. (T-1). The AR is now fully loaded. If accomplished correctly, the lead-link tab is visible on the right side of the AR, flush against the ejection port. Do not move the safety to the fire position until the AR is needed to engage a target/threat. A11.4.2.2.8. The full-load can also be achieved with the 30-round, M16-style magazine. The bolt is rearward the safety is on safe, the cover is closed and the magazine is inserted into the magazine well. The use of a magazine should be used as a last resort, when MAJCOMs authorize this configuration and belted ammunition is not available or is not suitable for tactical operations. A11.5. On-Post Unloading and Clearing. The MAJCOM/A4S determines when to unload and/or clear the M249 AR and in what configuration (Half-Load and Full-Load) it is employed. These procedures are prescribed in local contingency plans or other appropriate installation/unit documents. Note: If the M249 is in the half-load configuration, it can be transported safely in a vehicle and should only be unloaded on-post when the armed person is relieved from post or duty location. If the M249 is in the full-load configuration, it is not safe for transport in a vehicle and must be unloaded or placed in the half-load configuration prior to transporting the AR. (T-1). It is the responsibility of the armed individual and the posting supervisor (or fire team leader) to verify the AR contains no ammunition or is in the half-load configuration prior to transport. (T1). A11.5.1. Half-Load. The individual issued the AR will use the following procedures: A11.5.1.1. Point the muzzle in a safe direction and open the cover. (T-1). A11.5.1.2. Remove the ammunition belt, and place the belt back into the assault pack. (T-1). Remove the ammunition assault pack from the receiver dovetail. (T-1). A11.5.1.3. After the posting supervisor (or fire team leader) verifies the ammunition belt is removed, close the cover. (T-1). No ammunition is present in the weapon, the cover is closed, the bolt is forward and the safety remains in the fire position. A11.5.1.4. If the AR is in the half-load configuration with the 30-round magazine, simply remove the magazine. (T-1). The cover should remain closed with the bolt forward and the safety in the fire position. A11.5.2. Full-Load. The individual issued the AR will use the following procedures: A11.5.2.1. Point the muzzle in a safe direction, ensure the safety is on safe. (T-1). Do not place finger in the trigger guard or touch the cocking handle. A11.5.2.2. Open the cover, remove the ammunition belt and place the belt back into the assault pack. (T-1). Remove the ammunition assault pack from the AR (remove the magazine if present). (T-1). A11.5.2.3. Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber, receiver and magazine well (insert two fingers) to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A11.5.2.4. Close the cover and pull the cocking handle fully to the rear position and hold. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A11.5.2.5. Place the safety to the fire position. (T-1). While holding the cocking handle rearward, with the left-hand, pull the trigger. (T-1). Allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by "riding" the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow bolt to slam forward. (T-1). A11.5.2.6. The AR can now be safely transported. No ammunition is present, the cover is closed, the bolt is forward and the safety remains in the fire position. A11.6. Unloading and/or Clearing Prior to Turn-in. Individuals preparing to turn-in the AR approach the clearing zone with the AR free of ammunition, with the bolt forward and the safety on fire; with the weapon slung over the shoulder or across-body and will use the following procedures: A11.6.1. When directed by the clearing barrel official, enter the clearing zone and immediately place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A11.6.2. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the ammunition assault pack is removed, pull the cocking handle to the rear and lock the bolt to the rear (open) position then push the cocking handle to the forward position. (T-1). A11.6.3. Place the safety to the safe position. (T-1). Do not place fingers inside the trigger guard. A11.6.4. Open the cover and visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber, receiver and magazine well (insert two fingers) to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A11.6.5. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies no ammunition is present, close the cover and ensure the safety is in the safe position. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A11.6.6. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the AR is cleared (cover closed, bolt to the rear (open) position and the safety in the safe position), exit the clearing zone with the AR at "port-arms," and proceed to turn-in area. (T-1). A11.7. Turn-in. When directed by the armorer, the individual approaches the turn-in point and hands the AR to the armorer "butt" first, muzzle elevated, bolt to the rear position and safety in the safe position, and no fingers in the trigger guard. The armorer takes possession of the AR and immediately places the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. The armorer will use the following procedures: A11.7.1. Ensure the safety is in the safe position and open the cover. (T-1). Visually inspect the cover, feed tray, chamber, receiver and magazine well (insert two fingers) to ensure the AR contains no ammunition and is safe for storage. (T-1). A11.7.2. Close the cover and place the safety in the fire position. (T-1). A11.7.3. With the right-hand, grasp the "cocking handle" and pull rearward. (T-1). With the lefthand, pull the trigger. (T-1). Allow the bolt to slowly move to the forward (closed) position by "riding" the cocking handle forward. (T-1). Do not allow the bolt to slam forward. (T-1). Ensure all optics, pointers, and illuminators attached to the AR are turned off. (T-1). A11.7.4. The AR is now "rack safe," free of ammunition, the bolt is forward, the cover is closed and the safety remains on fire. Store the AR in an approved storage rack or container. (T-1).

1.46 clearing barrel procedure m9 semi automatic pistol

Attachment 2 M9 SEMIAUTOMATIC PISTOL (9 MILLIMETER [MM]) A2.1. General Information. M9 loading/unloading procedures are IAW TO 11W3-3-5-1, Operator Manual Pistol, Semiautomatic, 9mm, M9. A2.2. Issue. The armorer will use the following procedures when issuing the M9 pistol: A2.2.1. Remove the pistol from its storage rack or container and proceed to the issue-point clearing area with the weapon carried in the raised pistol position, barrel pointed up, safety on and slide forward (closed). (T-1). A2.2.2. Visually inspect the pistol to ensure there is no magazine inserted and the decocking/safety lever is in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A2.2.3. Place the muzzle in the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel, lock the slide to the rear and visually inspect the chamber and receiver area to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A2.2.4. Issue the pistol to the individual "butt" first, muzzle elevated, decocking/safety lever in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing) and slide locked to the rear (open). (T-1). A2.3. Loading. The individual issued the pistol will use the following procedures: A2.3.1. Proceed to the clearing zone with the pistol barrel pointed up, slide locked to the rear (open) and decocking/safety lever in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). A2.3.2. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A2.3.3. Visually inspect the pistol to ensure the decocking/safety lever is in the safe (down) position (red dot indicator not showing), and there is no ammunition present in the chamber or receiver. (T-1). A2.3.4. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the pistol contains no ammunition and is safe; insert and lock a loaded magazine into the pistol if arming. (T-1). If individual is not arming, proceed to the next step without inserting a magazine. (T-1). A2.3.5. Depress the slide stop, and move the decocking/safety lever to the fire (up) position (red dot showing). (T-1). Note: If a loaded magazine was inserted, a round of ammunition is now present in the chamber. When there is a round in the chamber, the extractor protrudes laterally (showing red) making it possible to check visually (and to feel) if there is a round in the chamber without having to retract the slide or remove the magazine. A2.3.6. After loading is complete, insert the pistol in the holster (ensure the finger is off the trigger and outside the holster) and secure the pistol in the holster. (T-1). Note: It may be necessary to place the thumb on the back of hammer to prevent the slide from moving back when inserting the weapon into a tight fitting holster. CAUTION: When individuals are using shoulder/chest mounted or concealed carry holsters, they need to exercise increased caution to ensure they keep the muzzle of the pistol pointed in a safe direction and do not point it at personnel when placing the weapon into the holster. A2.3.7. When armed, do not remove the pistol from the holster except in the line of duty or when clearing it for turn-in. (T-1). A2.4. Unloading and/or Clearing. Individuals preparing to unload and/or clear their pistol approach the clearing zone with their pistol holstered and will use the following procedures: A2.4.1. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone, step up to the clearing barrel, unfasten holster, draw the pistol (if left-handed, transfer the pistol to the right hand after removing from holster) and immediately place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. CAUTION: When individuals are using shoulder/chest mounted or concealed carry holsters, they must exercise increased caution to ensure they keep the muzzle of the pistol pointed in a safe direction and do not point it at personnel when removing the weapon from the holster. A2.4.2. Move the decocking/safety lever to the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T1). The clearing barrel attendant verifies the pistol is safe in order to proceed. A2.4.3. Press the magazine release button to remove magazine from the pistol (if present) and give the magazine to the clearing barrel attendant. (T-1). A2.4.4. Grasp the slide with the left hand, cupping the palm of the hand over the ejection port, and rotate the pistol 90 degrees to the right. (T-1). A2.4.5. Retract the slide to the rear, catching the ejected round of ammunition if present, push the slide stop up with the thumb to lock the slide back (open), and give the ejected round to the clearing barrel attendant. (T-1). The clearing barrel attendant will insert the round into the magazine. (T-3). A2.4.6. Visually inspect the pistol to ensure the chamber and receiver areas are clear (no magazine or ammunition present) and the decocking/safety lever is in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). A2.4.7. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the pistol contains no ammunition and is safe for turn-in, proceed to the turn-in point with the pistol in the raised pistol position, slide open and the decocking/safety lever in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). A2.5. Turn-in. When directed by the armorer, the individual approaches the turn-in point and hands the pistol to the armorer "butt" first, muzzle elevated, decocking/safety lever in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing) and slide locked to the rear (open). At no time during the turn-in procedures should anyone place fingers into the trigger guard. The armorer takes possession of the pistol and immediately places the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. The armorer then will use the following procedures: A2.5.1. Visually inspect the pistol chamber and receiver to ensure it contains no ammunition and is safe for storage. (T-1). A2.5.2. Depress the slide stop and allow the slide to move forward to the closed position. (T-1). A2.5.3. Ensure the pistol hammer is in the down (forward) position and the decocking/safety lever is in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). A2.5.4. The weapon is now "rack safe," free of ammunition, the slide is forward (closed) and the decocking/safety lever is in the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). Store the weapon in an approved storage rack or container. (T-1). A2.6. Lowering Cocked Hammer. If during any operations with the M9 pistol, the hammer must be lowered from the cocked (rear) position, the operator will use the decocking/safety lever to lower the hammer to the uncocked or forward position, by moving the decocking/safety lever to the safe (down) position (red dot not showing). (T-1). Under no circumstances will the operator attempt to manually lower the hammer by pressing the trigger.

1.44 clearing barrel procedures M4/M16A2 carbines

Attachment 4 M16 SERIES RIFLES AND M4 SERIES CARBINES ( 5.56MM) A4.1. General Information. M16 series rifles and M4 carbine loading/unloading procedures are IAW TO 11W3-5-5-41, Operator's Manual for Rifle, 5.56 MM, M16A2 W/E, Carbine, 5.56 MM, M4 W/E. A4.2. Issue. The armorer will use the following procedures when issuing the 5.56mm rifle or carbine: Note: All future references to "rifle" include the M4 carbine. A4.2.1. Remove the rifle from its storage rack or container, and proceed to the issue-point clearing area with the weapon held in the "port-arms" position. (T-1). Do not place fingers into trigger guard. A4.2.2. Place the muzzle in the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel and attempt to place the selector lever in the safe position. (T-1). Note: If the rifle was properly stored with the hammer in the forward position, the selector lever will not go into the safe position. A4.2.3. Visually inspect the rifle to ensure there is no magazine inserted. (T-1). Note: If a magazine is inserted, depress the magazine catch button and remove the magazine before proceeding. A4.2.4. Pull the charging handle to the rear while depressing the lower portion of the bolt catch, and lock the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the charging handle to the forward position. (T-1). A4.2.5. Place the selector lever in the safe position and visually inspect the chamber and receiver area to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A4.2.6. Issue the rifle to the individual "butt" first, muzzle elevated, bolt locked to the rear (open position) and the selector lever in the safe position. (T-1). Do not place fingers on trigger or into trigger guard during issue. A4.3. Loading. The individual issued the rifle will use the following procedures: A4.3.1. Proceed to the clearing zone with the rifle held in the "port-arms" position, bolt locked to the rear and selector lever in the safe position. (T-1). A4.3.2. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with axis of barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers into trigger guard. A4.3.3. Visually inspect the rifle to ensure the selector lever is in the safe position and there is no magazine or ammunition present in the chamber or receiver area. (T-1). A4.3.4. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the rifle contains no ammunition and is safe, depress the upper portion of the bolt catch, allowing the bolt to move to the forward (closed) position; close the ejection port cover. (T-1). A4.3.5. If the individual is to be armed, insert a loaded magazine and ensure it is secured into the magazine well. (T-1). The individual is now considered armed. A round will not be chambered. (T-1). If the individual is not arming, proceed to next step without inserting a magazine. A4.3.6. Sling the rifle with the muzzle pointed either in the up or down position. (T-1). During inclement weather, the rifle should be slung with the muzzle pointed down. A4.4. Unloading and/or Clearing. Individuals preparing to unload and/or clear SA/LW approach the clearing zone with the rifle in the "sling-arms" or "port-arms" position and will use the following procedures: A4.4.1. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone, unsling the rifle and immediately place the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guard. A4.4.2. If a magazine is in the magazine well, depress the magazine catch button, remove the magazine and hand the magazine to the clearing barrel attendant. (T-1). A4.4.3. Visually inspect the rifle to ensure the selector lever is in the safe position, pull the charging handle to rear while depressing the lower portion of the bolt catch and lock the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the charging handle to the forward position. (T-1). A4.4.4. Visually inspect the rifle chamber and receiver area to ensure no magazine or ammunition is present and the selector lever is in the safe position. (T-1). A4.4.5. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the rifle contains no ammunition and is safe for turn-in; proceed to the turn-in point with the rifle held at "port-arms", bolt locked to the rear (open) position, and selector lever on safe. (T-1). A4.5. Turn-in. When directed by the armorer, the individual approaches the turn-in point and hands the rifle to the armorer "butt" first, muzzle elevated, bolt locked to the rear (open) position and the selector lever in the safe position. The armorer takes possession of the rifle and immediately places the muzzle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with axis of barrel. Do not place fingers into trigger guard. The armorer will use the following procedures: A4.5.1. Visually inspect the chamber and receiver area; ensure no ammunition or magazine is present and the rifle is safe for storage. (T-1). A4.5.2. Depress the upper portion of the bolt catch and allow the bolt to move to the forward (closed) position. (T-1). A4.5.3. Place the selector lever on semi and pull the trigger, dry-firing the rifle into the clearing barrel. (T-1). Close the ejection port cover. (T-1). Ensure all optics, pointers, and illuminators attached to the rifle are turned off. (T-1). A4.5.4. The rifle is now "rack safe," free of ammunition, bolt forward (closed) and selector lever in the semi position. Note: The selector lever cannot be placed on safe after the rifle has been dry-fired. Store the rifle in an approved storage rack or container. (T-1).

1.45 clearing barrel procedures M203 grenade launcher

Attachment 7 M203, M203A1 & M203A2 GRENADE LAUNCHER (GL) (40MM) A7.1. General Information. M203 series GL loading/unloading procedures are IAW TO 11W3-9- 4-1, Technical Manual Operators Manual Grenade Launcher, 40-MM: M203. The M203 series GL is intended to be mounted to either the M16A2 rifle or M4 carbine. The grenadier must be aware that either adding or the removal of the GL from the rifle or carbine will have an effect on the zero of the rifle/carbine. Permanent removal of the M203A2 from the rifle/carbine when using the quick release mount requires the user to re-accomplish zero of the sights on the rifle/carbine, if they were zeroed with the GL mounted. Likewise, if the rifle/carbine is zeroed without the GL mounted, mounting the GL changes the zero of the rifle/carbine. Because the weapon system consists of both rifle/carbine and GL, clearing and handling must be inclusive of both rifle/carbine and GL procedures. Clearing and handling procedures, to include issue and turn-in, are completed with the GL mounted to the rifle/carbine. Unit commanders may prescribe whether the rifle or the GL is cleared first, as the carbine barrel will not fit into some clearing barrels when the GL barrel is in the forward position. Note: Future references to the GL include the rifle or carbine with GL attached and future references to the "rifle" include the carbine. A7.2. Issue. The armorer will use the following procedures when issuing the M203 GL: A7.2.1. Remove the GL from its storage rack or container and proceed to the issue-point clearing area in the "port-arms" position. (T-1). A7.2.2. Place the muzzle in the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel and visually inspect the weapon system to ensure there is no magazine in the rifle. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guards. A7.2.3. Pull the rifle charging handle to the rear while depressing the lower portion of the rifle bolt catch, and lock the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the charging handle to the forward position. (T-1). A7.2.4. Move the rifle selector lever to the safe position and visually inspect the chamber and receiver area to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A7.2.5. Depress the GL's barrel latch, slide the barrel assembly to the forward (open) position and move the GL's safety to the safe (rearward) position. (T-1). A7.2.6. Visually inspect the GL to ensure there is no ammunition present and it is safe for issue. (T-1). A7.2.7. Issue GL to the individual "butt" first, muzzle elevated, rifle bolt locked to the rear (open) position, GL barrel assembly forward (open) and safeties in the safe position. (T-1). Note: Ensure the M203A1 is attached to the rifle prior to issue. A7.3. Loading. The individual issued the weapon will use the following procedures: A7.3.1. Proceed to the clearing zone with the GL held in the "port-arms" position, rifle bolt locked to the rear, GL barrel assembly in the forward (open) position, and safeties in the safe position. (T-1). CAUTION: Under no circumstances will the GL be loaded at a clearing barrel. (T-1). It is loaded outside of facilities/vehicles, the muzzle of the weapon pointed in a safe direction and as directed by AFIMSC, MAJCOM and local procedures. A7.3.2. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and place the muzzle of the rifle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with the axis of the barrel. (T-1). Do not place fingers into the trigger guards. A7.3.3. Visually inspect the GL to ensure each safety is in the safe position, no magazine is inserted and there is no ammunition present in the rifle chamber and receiver area or GL barrel. (T-1). A7.3.4. After the clearing barrel attendant verifies the GL contains no ammunition and is safe, depress the upper portion of the rifle's bolt catch, allow the rifle bolt to move to the forward (closed) position, and close the rifle's ejection port cover. (T-1). A7.3.5. Pull the GL's barrel assembly to the rear (closed) position and lock it into place. (T-1). A7.3.6. If the individual is to be armed, insert a loaded magazine in the rifle and ensure it is secured into the magazine well. (T-1). The individual is now considered armed. A round will not be chambered. (T-1). If the individual is not arming, proceed to next step without inserting a magazine. A7.3.7. Sling the GL over one shoulder with the muzzle pointed either in the up or down position. (T-1). During inclement weather, the GL should be slung with the muzzle pointed down. A7.4. Unloading and/or Clearing. If the GL was loaded, it must be cleared in a commander designated area. (T-1). The GL will not be unloaded at a clearing barrel. (T-1). Individuals preparing to unload and/or clear their GL approach the clearing zone with GL in the "sling-arms" or "port-arms" position and will use the following procedures: A7.4.1. When directed by the clearing barrel attendant, enter the clearing zone and give the clearing barrel attendant the removed, loaded magazine. (T-1). Place the muzzle of the rifle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with axis of barrel. Do not place fingers into the trigger guards. Note: If rifle is loaded, depress the magazine catch button, remove the magazine and hand the magazine to clearing barrel attendant. (T-1). A7.4.2. Visually inspect the rifle to ensure the selector lever is in the safe position. (T-1). Pull the charging handle to the rear while depressing the lower portion of the bolt catch, and lock the bolt to the rear (open) position. (T-1). Return the charging handle to the forward position. (T-1). A7.4.3. Visually inspect the rifle's chamber and receiver area to ensure there is no ammunition present. (T-1). The clearing barrel attendant verifies the rifle contains no ammunition and is safe for turn-in. A7.4.4. Ensure the GL is in the safe position then depress the GL barrel latch and slide the barrel assembly to the forward (open) position. (T-1). A7.4.5. Rotate the GL 180 degrees, visually inspect the barrel of the GL to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). The clearing barrel attendant verifies the GL contains no ammunition and is safe for turn-in. A7.4.6. Upon direction of the clearing barrel attendant, proceed to the SA/LW turn-in point with the GL held in the "port-arms" position, rifle bolt locked to the rear (open) position, GL barrel in the forward (open) position, and safeties in the safe position. (T-1). A7.5. Turn-in. When directed by the armorer, the individual approaches the turn-in point and hands the GL to the armorer "butt" first, muzzle elevated, rifle bolt locked to the rear (open) position, GL barrel in the forward (open) position and the safeties in the safe position. The armorer takes possession of the GL and immediately places the muzzle of the rifle into the clearing barrel aiming point in line with axis of barrel. Do not place fingers into the trigger guards. The armorer will use the follow procedures: A7.5.1. Visually inspect the rifle's chamber and receiver area to ensure no ammunition is present. (T-1). A7.5.2. Depress the upper portion of the rifle's bolt catch and allow the bolt to move to the forward (closed) position. (T-1). A7.5.3. Place the rifle's selector lever in the semi position and pull the rifle trigger, dry-firing into the clearing barrel. (T-1). Close the ejection port cover. (T-1). A7.5.4. Visually inspect the GL barrel to ensure it contains no ammunition. (T-1). A7.5.5. Pull the GL's barrel assembly to the rear (closed) position and move the GL's safety to the fire (forward) position. (T-1). Pull the GL's trigger, dry-firing into the clearing barrel aiming point. (T-1). A7.5.6. The GL is now "rack safe," free of ammunition, the rifle bolt is in the forward (closed) position, the GL barrel assembly is in the rear (closed) position, the rifle selector lever is in the semi position and the GL safety is in the fire position. (T-1). Ensure all optics, pointers, and illuminators attached to the GL are turned off. (T-1). Store the weapon in an approved storage rack or container. (T-1). Note: The quadrant sight (if installed) should be removed, or set according to the technical order to prevent damage.

1.30 know military authoritiy

Authority: The 36 WG/CC has the authority to ensure safeguarding personnel, facilities and property on Andersen AFB and supported Detachments.

1.10 know & recite legislative jurisdictions

Authority: The 36 WG/CC has the authority to ensure safeguarding personnel, facilities and property on Andersen AFB and supported Detachments. Jurisdiction: Andersen AFB (AAFB) is a closed installation, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all areas of the installation.

1.25 know and understand security forces pledge

I am a Security Forces member. I hold allegiance to my country, devotion to duty and personal integrity above all. I wear my shield of authority with dignity, restraint, and promote by example high standards of conduct, appearance, courtesy and performance. I seek no favor because of my position. I perform my duties in a firm, courteous and impartial manner, irrespective of a person's color, race, religion, national origin and/or sex. I strive to merit the respect of my fellow Airmen and all with whom I come in contact.

1.24 know base curfew for minors

Minors, dependents and sponsored guests under 18 will not be away from their quarters without parents or sponsor between hours of 2200-0500, Sunday-Thursday, and 2400-0500, Fridays, Saturdays and nights preceding holidays. Take in to consideration minors might travel to their place of work during summer break. This is an exception. 15.4.1. The 36 MSG/CC is approval authority for extensions of curfew for special occasions or circumstances. A copy of the approved extension will be sent to BDOC. 15.4.2. SF will detain all curfew violators and transport them to the BDOC. Notify the sponsor/legal guardian to report to the BDOC and sign for the violator, via DD Form 2708. NOTE: If the sponsor/legal guardian cannot be contacted, contact their First Sergeant or Commander. 15.4.3. Accomplish a blotter entry titled "Curfew Violation." 15.4.4. If the violator is non-military affiliated, SF will contact the GPD for disposition and follow the procedures for escort violation, if necessary. 15.4.5.1. If the violator was not sponsored on to the installation accomplish an AF Form 3907, ascertain how the violator gained access to the base, and contact GPD for disposition. 15.4.5.2. If it is determined the violator gained access to the installation illegally, consider barment for trespassing. Contact SJA, S3/S3O for further guidance. 15.4.6. Accomplish a blotter entry titled "Curfew Violation", "Escort Violation" or "Trespassing". Consider all three titles if the situation dictates.

1.97know and perform final denial barrier operations

OPERATIONAL USE OF THE FINAL DENIAL BARRIERS A11. Final Denial Barriers: The Final Denial Barriers are designed to deter and/or stop unauthorized vehicle traffic attempting to enter the installation (Gate Runner). All personnel will be properly trained on the operation of the barriers before testing, operating or employing the barriers. Any training concerning the final denial barriers will be annotated and tracked by the S3T office. A10.1. The checklist will be followed when testing the barriers. All pedestrian and vehicle traffic will be stopped while testing, operating, or employing the barriers. Ensure all safety lighting is in working order before/during barrier testing. A10.2. Andersen Air Force Base currently has two barrier operating systems. The Delta Wedge Barriers located at Masada Gate (Santa Rosa), Fortress Gate (Main), and Watchtower Gate (Northwest Fields) and the Smith and Wesson Barriers located at North Gate. Both systems are to be operated in the same manner. A11.3.1. Characteristics: A11.3.1.1. The Delta Wedge Barriers: The barrier is operated by a hydraulic power unit (HPU) that contains the hydraulic pump and motor, accumulators, control circuits and main power used to operate the barrier. A11.3.1.2. The barricade system is a shallow foundation 18' depth, 4-ton sheet of medal laid across each lane of traffic which has the capability of stopping and destroying vehicles weighing up to 20,000 pounds and traveling at 70 mph. The barrier is certified by the US Department of State with a rating of K12/L3 (15,000 lbs @ 50 mph with less than 3 feet of penetration). It is designed to operate 27,000 cycles without any major damage to the barrier(s) or the need for major repairs. A11.3.1.3. The barrier has two control panels (master and slave controls that raise and lower the barrier(s) with features allowing security personnel to have positive control of the barrier at all times. The system cycles at a rate of 5 - 10 seconds under normal operation. The system is adjustable by the customer to conform to local directives. A11.3.2. The Smith and Wesson Active Wedge Barriers: The barrier is powered by a hydraulic power unit (HPU). The HPU is a system of components that build, store, monitor and discharge hydraulic pressure on command to the wedge barrier in order to raise the Attack Plate. A11.3.2.1. The barricade system a shallow foundation 18' depth, 4-ton sheet of medal laid across each lane of traffic which has the capability of stopping and destroying vehicles weighing up to 15,000 pounds and traveling at 50 mph with zero penetration. The barrier is certified by the U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy with a rating of M50 (P1) resisting the impact with zero penetration. It is designed to operate over 30,000 cycles under its own power, and demonstrated an Emergency Fast Operate (EFO) deployment speed of less than 2 seconds. A11.3.2.2. The barrier has two control panels (master and slave controls that raise and lower the barrier(s) with features allowing security personnel to have positive control of the barrier at all times. The system cycles at a rate of 5 - 10 seconds under normal operation. The system is adjustable by the customer to conform to local directives. A11.4. OPERATIONS: Each system can be operated in two modes NORMAL and EMERGENCY. A11.4.1. NORMAL Operation: During NORMAL operation, the main power key switches should be left in the "ON" position. The operator can CLOSES (raise barrier) or OPEN (lower barrier). In NORMAL Operation mode the barriers will deploy in approximately 3-5 seconds, as well as CLOSE (raise barrier) in 3 - 5 seconds. While in the NORMAL Operation mode barriers can be controlled separately by pushing the appropriate control button. See Figure A10.8 and Figure A10.9. A11.4.2. EMERGENCY Operation: During the EMERGENCY Operation mode the barrier has no safety mechanism and will fully deploy all barriers in 2 seconds. In the case of an emergency, activate the EMERGENCY Toggle Switch, this will allow both barriers to immediately CLOSE (raise). See Smith and Wesson SSI Attachment #5 and Delta Wedge Barrier SSI Attachment #4 for further details. A11.4.3 Safety Mechanism: The both barrier systems will not rise if the sensor detects any obstruction such as a vehicle within 2 feet of the barrier. The sensors are buried and enclosed within the road surface positioned 24 inches prior to and 18 inches just after each barriers. When operating correctly, the barriers will not rise under both normal and emergency operations if a vehicle and/or large metal object is detected within the sensor's range. A11.4.4 Traffic Lights: Traffic lights are positioned before the barriers on approach and remain YELLOW while the system is not activated and the traffic lanes are clear. The traffic lights will flash RED prior to the system barrier being deployed. They will become steady RED when the barriers are up and in use. A11.5.Gate Runner: The sentry will deploy the barriers during all gate runner scenarios. The barriers will be deployed in the "EMERGENCY Operation" mode for these situations. Prior to deploying the barrier the sentry will visually check to ensure the barrier is clear of all vehicle traffic before deploying the system. Once deployed, the sentry will not lower the barriers until directed by the on-duty Flight Chief or higher authority for termination of the situation. Prior to lowering the barriers following termination, the sentry will visually check to ensure the barrier area is clear before lowering the barriers. A11.6. Barrier Function Test: Barrier systems will be tested daily and annotated in the blotter. Blotter entry will only contain Gate Location and Patrols conducting the test. Any and all discrepancies will be routed to the 36 WG/ATO and/or S3L and WILL NOT be annotated in the blotter. Flight Chiefs or certified Flight Chiefs will supervise all Barrier Tests. A11.6.1. The barrier test consists of blocking off roads and pressing the appropriate buttons to activate and retract the barriers. Upon closure of any Installation Gate the barriers the will be left in the "UP" Position (road closed) and the main power turned off. A11.7. All operators need to be extremely careful when operating the barriers, as they will crush any object within the operating path. Do not stand, sit, or place any objects on or near the barriers during operations. The Barriers control panel is sensitive. SF members should use extreme caution around the control panel to prevent unintentional barriers activation. Figure A11.8. The close pushbutton CLOSE the roadway (raises barrier) and the "Down" pushbutton OPENS the roadway (lowers barrier). Figure A10.9. Close road pushbutton CLOSES the roadway (raises barrier) and the open road pushbutton OPENS the roadway (lowers barrier). A11.8. Final Denial Barriers POC is 36WG/ATO and/or S3L and can be reached at 366-2503. A11.9. 36 SFS/S3T Training office is the primary POC for ensuring all personnel are properly trained to operate the barriers.

1.89 know the 36 SFS mission statement

The 36 SFS mission statement is to Secure, Protect, Defend, and, if needed, FIGHT in order to enable airpower projection in support of joint, coalition and USAF missions.

1.40 Know natural disasters

The primary SF mission in response to natural disasters is to protect lives. Specific tasks may include, but are not limited to: securing facility shutters, closing nonessential facilities, additional traffic control measures at ECPs, preparing for power outages, directing evacuations, posting aftermath cordons and conducting recovery operations. ECC will implement the appropriate checklist(s) as directed by Flight Chief or higher authority.

1.84 know and perform incident reporting and procedures

Use hand and arm signals, whistle, or any means available to notify other personnel in the area. The SECURITY INCIDENT and COVERED WAGON manual signal techniques for Andersen are Wave one hand above head in a side to side motion and shout "SECURITY INCIDENT ". Alternate signal: Short intermittent blasts from either a whistle or vehicle horn. During hours of darkness: Short intermittent flashing signal from either a flashlight or vehicle headlights. 2.3.2. COVERED WAGON: With your arms extended upward, wave both hands above head in a side to side motion and shout "COVERED WAGON". Alternate signal: Long intermittent blast from either a whistle or vehicle horn. During hours of darkness: Long intermittent flashing signal from either a flashlight or vehicle headlights. Serious Security incidents includes unlawful entry to aircraft, sabotage or attempted sabotage to AF aircraft, a breach of aircraft security, vandalism to AF priority resources, hijacking unauthorized entry.

1.85 know child restraint requirements

WGI 31-218 PARA 4.14.1.2.2 -4.14.1.2.3 4.14.1.2.2. Child restraint systems are required IAW the Child Passenger Protection Act, paragraphs 1104 and 1104a. The driver of a motor vehicle in which a child under four (4) years of age is being transported, shall secure the child during transit in a child passenger restraint system which meets federal motor vehicle safety standards and manufacturer's operating instructions. 4.14.1.2.3. The driver of a motor vehicle in which a passenger less than four feet nine inches (4'9") tall and between four (4) and eleven (11) years of age is being transported shall secure the passenger during transit in a booster seat or appropriately fitting child restraint system that meets federal motor vehicle safety standards and manufacturer operating instructions IAW Guam Code Annotated, Title 16, Ch. 26. AFMAN 31-116 PARA 4.1.1.-4.1.1.2 4.1.1. Restraint systems. 4.1.1.1. Require the use of child safety seats consistent with state, territory or host nation laws. If there is no state, territory or host nation law, all children under 4 years of age or less than 50 pounds regardless of age are to be properly secured in an appropriate child restraint system. Children ages 4 through 7, weighing 50 pounds or more and less than 4 feet 9 inches in height are to be properly secured in a booster seat or other appropriate child restraint system. Children ages 8 and above and no less than 4 feet 9 inches in height will be properly secured in a vehicle seat belt or booster seat. The child safety seat or booster seat must be certified by the manufacturer to meet all applicable Federal performance standards or host nation requirements and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. 4.1.1.2. Commanders will ensure all drivers and passengers on Air Force installations wear seat belts, or in the case of infants, be properly restrained. (T-1).

1.88 know Guam's customs operations

15.19. on-duty Customs Officer will notify BDOC, give name, badge #, aircraft tail number, aircraft parking spot, and estimated time of arrival to aircraft. -BDOC controller will pass all information on to designated ID patrol. 15.19.1. Customs Officers will travel in a marked Customs vehicle, be in uniform, and carry their official Customs credentials while performing duties on AAFB. -Customs Officers will clearly display their Guam international Airport credentials. Customs Officers may/may not be armed. 15.19.2. SF will always receive the first copy of an aircrew's orders/manifest; this ensures the SF will allow only authorized personnel into the area. 15.19.3. If a Customs Officer breaks red in a vehicle, follow these procedures.

1.50 know Posse Comitatus Act

3.1.2.4. Civilian Defenders, in the scope of their employment, are considered part of the AF and, as such, are subject to the restrictions on aid to civilian law enforcement imposed by 10 USC § 1385, commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act. Accordingly, the servicing Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) must review any proposed aid to civilian law enforcement. (T-1) 3.1.3. Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC §1385). The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of military forces and equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes, unless a statutory exception applies. This law applies to both SF military Defenders and Civilian Defenders. See also 10 USC § 275.

1.70 know post relief procedures

1.3. Flight Chief/BDOC Controller will report for duty, (NLT) 30 mins prior to the flight's scheduled guardmount. BDOC controller will complete the post inspection checklist. checklist will be annotated and signed by on-duty BDOC controllers and posted throughout each 24-hr time period. 1.3.1. BDOC controller will inventory all forms, letters, and ensure the following are available to all on-duty security forces: 1.3.1.1. BDOC Inventory/Changeover Check Sheet (electronic) 1.3.1.2. All on-duty SF personnel will report to duty NLT 30 minutes prior to flight's guardmount. 1.3.2. Flight Chief will review pass-ons, emails, blotters, etc., published since their last duty day and prepare to brief flight personnel on all pertinent information. Receive a briefing from the off-going Flight Chief regarding events currently in progress or changes in operating procedures. 1.3.2.1. If minimum post manning cannot be met, immediately notify S3/S3O for guidance. 1.3.2.2. Flight Chiefs will ensure a competent clearing barrel official is posted for issue and turn in and wearing proper eye protection (optional). 1.3.3. At start/end of each shift, or any time a SF member is relieved from his post, conduct a joint post equipment inspection with off-going 36 SFS Form 1801; Gate Changeover Checklist . Do not depart until your relief has assumed responsibility for the post. Inspect all required materials and report any discrepancy to the BDOC controller and/or Flight Chief. Discuss all pass-ons, pick-up/restriction orders, etc., published since the last shift. 1.3.3.1. Report any discrepancy that cannot be corrected on the spot to the BDOC controller. If discrepancies are noted, you will not relieve the off-going personnel until approval from your Flight Chief is obtained.

1.91 know objective reasonableness and totality of circumstances

1.3. Objective Reasonableness and Totality of Circumstances. The force used will be objectively reasonable. (T-0) When feasible and circumstances permit, warn and give a threatening force the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions, as appropriate and consistent with the lawful objectives or mission requirements of the officer/sentry. Law enforcement or security personnel may have an obligation to apprehend rather than permit an individual to withdraw. In some circumstances, force, including deadly force, may be the only option available to respond to a hostile act or hostile intent. The use of force must be objectively reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude based upon the totality of the circumstances to counter the threat. (T-0) 1.3.1. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the US Supreme Court established the Fourth Amendment standard of "objective reasonableness" as the appropriate standard for assessing the use of force in the context of making an arrest or other seizure of a person. The Court explained its application in these terms: "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight...[T]he 'reasonableness' inquiry...is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them..." 1.3.2. The Supreme Court recognized in Graham v. Connor that law enforcement and security personnel have to make "split-second judgments" concerning the use of force under "circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving..." The Supreme Court has held that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require the least intrusive force alternative be applied, only a reasonable one. In effecting a seizure, individuals performing law enforcement or security duties draw from a reservoir of options, ranging from simple displays of authority, to the application of various levels of less-lethal force, to the use of deadly force itself. Facts dictate the appropriate response, and those facts, as well as the choice of response, are subject to scrutiny. 1.3.3. In search, seizure, or apprehension situations, an officer/sentry must look at the totality of the circumstances when determining the reasonable amount of force necessary. (T0) In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court emphasized four factors affecting the use of force in a particular situation. These four factors are the severity of the crime, whether the person poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, whether the person is actively resisting, or whether the person is attempting to evade apprehension by flight.

1.80 know procedures for testifying

12.1. The Importance of Testifying. The final and most important test of an SF member's effectiveness will be their appearance in courts-martial, federal magistrate court appearances, pretrial investigations and discharge boards. The preparation of a case is made with the ultimate goal of presentation. The precautions taken at the crime scene, preservation of evidence, questioning of witnesses and suspects, as well as detailed incident reporting will all come together at the trial or hearing. Through adequate preparation, appropriate attitude and testimony, personnel will assist in securing a just decision. NOTE: Prior to testifying and preparing for court or hearing appearances, SF members must consult with the servicing legal office.

1.14 know procedures for discovery of classified materials

8.12.4. If classified material is found, the individual must have a DD Form 2501, Defense Courier Authorization, on their person which expires 5 years from issue date. 8.12.4.1. If individual doesn't have DD Form 2501 in their possession or an individual does not have appropriate authorization to remove classified material from the installation, they will be detained. Seize classified material and contact an individual within the work center who possesses the required clearance and a DD Form 2501or a letter from their CC. 8.12.4.2. A SFMIS report and/or AF Form 3545and blotter entry will be accomplished for "Unauthorized Possession of Classified Material." 36 SFS Security Manager will be notified immediately.

1.58 know diversion of USAF aircraft to won pat

15.17.2. A National Defense Area (NDA) may be established when military aircraft are sent to civilian airports. Other circumstances also warrant a NDA to be established i.e. military aircraft crashes or other unplanned emergencies. Explain the situation to authorities having jurisdiction and/or landowners, including why it is necessary to set up the area and the types of controls in effect. Notify 36 WG/JA for any issues concerning jurisdiction. 15.17.12. To the greatest extent possible, let civilian authorities handle civil arrest and detention. If local civil authorities are not present, security forces may detain violators or trespassers until arrival of civilian authorities. NOTE: SF has exclusive jurisdiction over NDA.

1.87 know diversion of civilian air craft

15.18. Upon notification BDOC will use camera to record the aircraft landing. flight line patrol, designated by the Flight Chief will shadow the aircraft as the "Follow-Me" vehicle takes the aircraft to a designated parking spot. 15.18.1. If passengers disembark the aircraft, the flight line patrol will assist the AMC representative/keep passengers in one area until they are bused to Won Pat and/or are put back on to the aircraft. 15.18.2. Won Pat Customs officials and the maintenance crew for the aircraft will arrive at the main gate. will be escorted by a DOD civilian representative. If the representative is not with them, verify their credentials, and have a patrol escort them to the flight line. 15.18.2.1. Won Pat Customs officials are employed by the Gov. Guam therefore don't need to be escorted on to the installation. However, due to their unfamiliarity with the installation, Flight Chief will designate a patrol(s) to escort them to the flight line. 15.18.1. The flight line patrol wont need to perform immigrations/customs requirements. Guam Customs officials will perform immigrations once passengers reach Won Pat International Airport

1.15 know reveille/retreat procedures

8.13. When retreat sounds, installation entry control gates will stop both inbound and outbound lanes of traffic, face the music and salute. Upon completion of the National Anthem, traffic will be released. NOTE: One member will ensure to face on-coming traffic/sector.

1.86 know defense biometric identification systems

15.2. Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS). DBIDS is a DoD-owned and -operated system developed by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) as a force protection program to manage personnel and access at DoD installations. It is a networked client/server database system designed to easily verify the access authorization of personnel entering military installations by the use of barcode, contactless and fingerprint biometric technology. The program supports the adding, retrieving, updating and displaying of information for individuals who require military installation access. The DBIDS software application is used to enter personnel data into a database, capture biometric information and retrieve that data and biometric information for verification and validation at a later time. DBIDS enhances the military law enforcement mission to provide a safe and secure community through the electronic interrogation of access credentials which provides positive identification of individuals requesting access to the installation. DBIDS is the Physical Access Control System (PACS) of choice for the USAF. The use of DBIDS is mandatory.

1.57 know and perform rights advisement

18.2. Rights Advisement: Individuals suspected of committing a crime, depending on their status, may require advisement of their rights. Determine whether an individual is a suspect by evaluating all known surrounding circumstances, not just by opinion or belief and if he/she is in custody and subject to being interviewed. When questioning a witness, if the interviewer seeks responses that could be incriminating, they should advise the individual of his/her rights. 18.2.1. Civilian offenders: Advise any civilian suspects of their rights IAW the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution. 18.2.2. Military: Advise any military suspects interviewed in connection with an incident/offense of his/her rights in accordance with Article 31, UCMJ. AFI 31-118 6.5-6.5.2, 6.8.6.6, 10.1-10.4.8 6.5. Rights Advisement. Prior to asking questions related to the offense under investigation, advise suspects of their right against self-incrimination IAW the UCMJ, Article 31, for active duty military personnel. For civilian personnel, advise suspects of their right against selfincrimination IAW the US Constitution, Fifth Amendment, if conducting a custodial interrogation. Use the AFVA 31-231, Advisement of Rights, for verbal advisement (usually onscene), or the AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complainant, for written proof of rights advisement (usually prior to taking a written statement). If possible provide the Advisement of Rights in front of a witness. Questions concerning a suspect's identity, address, status, health, welfare or questions not related to the offense under investigation do not require a rights advisement. For further guidance on rights advisement, see Chapter 10 of this instruction. 6.5.1. Suspects on verified active orders (i.e., active ANG personnel while on Title 10/federal orders, and AFRC personnel while serving in an active duty positions) will be advised of their rights IAW the UCMJ, Article 31. NOTE: Contact local SJA when duty status is in question. 6.5.2. Spontaneous Utterances. Situations will arise when an individual contacted by SF personnel will voluntarily make an incriminating statement. A common example occurs when a suspect, upon initially being contacted and informed of the purpose of the contact, offers a voluntary statement prior to the administration of any rights advisement. Another example is the statement made by a suspect after being detained while being transported in a government vehicle. Spontaneous utterances are generally admissible in courts-martial. No follow-up questions to the utterance can be conducted until a proper rights advisement has been made. 6.8.6.6. Both the parent or guardian and the juvenile will be advised of the juvenile's rights IAW 5th Amendment, US Constitution. Document rights advisement via AF Form 1168. The juvenile and/or parent or guardian acknowledges their rights by initialing and signing the AF Form 1168. Check with the servicing legal office for applicable local laws. (T-0) RIGHTS ADVISEMENT 10.1. The Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution specifies that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". This means that individuals subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement personnel must be informed of their Constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. (T-0) 10.2. Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Under Article 31, UCMJ, it is not necessary for a military member to be apprehended or arrested for Article 31 rights to apply. Personnel who are subject to the UCMJ must always be informed of their Article 31 rights, before any questioning, as soon as they are suspected of a crime. (T-0) 10.2.1. Article 31 (b) states, "no person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him." 10.2.1.1. The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable only to evidence that is of a testimonial or communicative nature. The privilege applies to more than verbal or written statements or confessions. Nonverbal communicative acts, such as head, hand or eye movements may also be protected. Additionally, a person has the right to not make a statement, even if they do not appear incriminating. 10.2.1.2. Compulsion or coercion is any kind of mental or physical force that causes a person to do something against their will. The suspect must not be threatened, tricked or coerced into waiving any rights; nor can they be promised anything to waive their rights. 10.2.2. Article 31 (b) states, "No person subject to this chapter may interrogate or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by courts-martial." Always use either AFVA 31-231 or an AF Form 1168 to inform a person of their rights. Prior to any interrogation or statement request, Military Rules of Evidence (MRE) Rule 305 (c) and (d) requires that an accused or a person suspected of an offense be (T-0): 10.2.2.1. Informed of the Nature of the Accusation. Suspects must be informed of the nature of the offense for which they are being questioned. Do not quote specific articles, instead use common language of the type of crime suspected. The explanation of the nature of the offense must include the crime involved and the place of the incident (example: Theft of government computers from Building 1351, Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland TX). It should not normally disclose the identity of witnesses or sources, specific detailed testimony or facts. It is not considered adequate to simply advise the suspect the investigation concerns a specific case type such as larceny, misconduct, etc. 10.2.2.2. Advised of the right to remain silent; that is say nothing at all. 10.2.2.3. Advised that any statement made may be used as evidence against the accused or suspect in a trial by courts-martial. 10.2.2.4. Advised they have a right to legal counsel and to have a lawyer present during the interview. 10.2.2.4.1. As a result of court decisions, a person accused or suspected of an offense has a right to consult a lawyer before being questioned and a right to have a civilian lawyer present during any questioning; and that, if they are unable to afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for them, at their request. Under military law, this applies to military members, with the further provision that a military lawyer will be provided on request regardless of whether the member is able to afford a lawyer. 10.2.2.4.2. Consult the servicing legal office before interviewing subjects on behalf of a foreign law enforcement agency. (T-1) 10.2.3. Ensure the suspect understands his/her rights and is willing to answer questions. Suspects must understand their rights before they can execute a valid waiver of those rights. Evidentiary problems may result if a statement is taken from a suspect who is too intoxicated or unable to understand their rights advisement for any reason, i.e., language barriers, mental challenges, etc. 10.2.4. Cleansing Statements. If, during the course of an investigation it is discovered that a suspect was questioned or an incriminating statement made without a proper rights advisement, the information obtained may be inadmissible in a court-martial proceeding. The remedy is for the SF member to stop further questioning, advise the suspect that any statement(s) previously made was (were) obtained in violation of their rights and cannot be used against them. The SF member must then conduct a proper rights advisement and should the suspect waive their rights begin the questioning over. NOTE: Truly spontaneous exclamations or unsolicited statements made by suspects do not require a cleansing statement. 10.2.5. Identify Conflicts of Interest. Immediately inform your Flight Chief if a conflict of interest exists (i.e., tasked with interviewing a relative, friend(s) or person(s) with whom the SF member is affiliated). Although the SF member may be comfortable with the interview, the potential perception of favoritism, discrimination or unfavorable bias must be taken into consideration. 10.3. When to Advise. 10.3.1. Military members or personnel subject to the UCMJ suspected of committing a crime must be advised of their rights before questioning. Determine whether or not the member is a suspect by all known surrounding circumstances, not just by opinion or belief. If, when questioning a witness, the witness makes a statement that may be incriminating or causes suspicion, then at that point, the witness becomes a suspect. The SF member must stop the questioning and advise the individual of their rights. 10.3.2. Civilian suspects do not have to be advised of their Fifth Amendment rights until they are in custody (a custodial situation is one in which the suspect's freedom of movement is restrained although they may not be apprehended). 10.3.3. Whenever there is doubt, consult with SJA. 10.4. Rights Advisement Procedures. While there is no requirement that Article 31 (military) or the Fifth Amendment (civilian) rights be read verbatim to an accused, it is essential that the applicable rights provision be clearly stated before the suspect is questioned. Rather than attempting to advise a suspect of their rights from memory, which may be called into question during a court-martial, use the appropriate advisement of rights (Article 31, UCMJ, or Fifth Amendment, US Constitution) directly from AFVA 31-231. Rights advisement must be given to all suspects regardless of any explanation or statement by the suspect that they understand their rights so they need no advisement. Advise the individual of their rights in the same manner prior to any re-interview or questioning concerning any offense that would not be covered by the original advisement and remind the individual of the original rights advisement. (T-1) 10.4.1. In lieu of using the AFVA 31-231 for rights advisement, the advisement can be given directly from the AF Form 1168. This form is read, dated, completed and signed by the suspect before the actual questioning occurs. Before any statement obtained from a suspect during an interrogation may be admissible in court, the government must establish that the suspect waived their right to remain silent. The AF Form 1168 provides written documentation the prosecution may offer as evidence at a court-martial. The form also helps establish the suspect was properly advised of their rights. If the suspect declines to sign the AF Form 1168 (but does not request an attorney), the advisement of rights must be witnessed and the AF Form 1168 annotated to reflect the fact that the subject was so advised and refused to sign the form, but verbally consented to the interview. The form must be dated and signed by the interviewer and the witness. AF Form 1168 contains both the military and civilian rights advisement. 10.4.2. Do not begin the interview until the suspect specifically states they understand and waive their rights. For example, if after the advisement of rights, the suspect states they do not want to answer questions or make a statement, but would like to ask some questions, the suspect should be allowed to ask the questions or otherwise make unsolicited comments. The interviewing SF member may make direct replies to such questions, but will not pose any questions or prolong the conversation in any way. The point of discussion should be to either proceed with the interview under the advisement or terminate the interview. If the suspect subsequently waives their rights, the interview may begin. If the suspect initially exercises the right to remain silent or exercises that right at any time during an interview, the interview must be terminated. Similarly, if the suspect initially exercises the right to counsel or exercises that right at any time during the interview, the interview must cease until counsel is present. The SF member must not reinitiate questioning without first coordinating the interview with the SJA. (T-1) 10.4.3. If the suspect (or parent or guardian in cases involving juveniles [check local laws to define a juvenile]) states they want a lawyer, the interview must stop. The suspect must have an opportunity to contact and consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during any subsequent questioning. (T-1) 10.4.4. In cases involving juveniles, after proper advisement of rights and consent to be interviewed is granted, the interview should be done in the presence of at least one parent. If a parent or guardian cannot be present during the interview and the juvenile is 12 years of age or older, two SF personnel, preferably with one being the same sex as the suspect, will be present during the interview. No juvenile under the age of 12 will be interviewed as a suspect without a parent or guardian present. Also, if no parent is present, the SF member making contact with the parent or guardian must inform the parent or guardian that the juvenile has a right to counsel prior to the interview. Refer to local state laws for the definition of a juvenile. NOTE: If local law stipulates conflicting ages, contact the local SJA for guidance. (T-1) 10.4.5. When an SF member interviews an individual of the opposite sex, another SF member of the same sex as the interviewee should be present to witness the interview. If an SF member of the same sex is not available, a second SF member or investigator must witness the interview. (T-1) 10.4.6. In foreign countries, consult the servicing SJA to determine the proper procedure for advising foreign nationals of their rights prior to an interview. (T-1) 10.4.7. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, stop the interview. (T-0) 10.4.8. If a member requests legal counsel, you must wait 14 days before re-approaching. If after 14 days the member has not obtained legal counsel, you may attempt another interview according to US Supreme Court's ruling in Mary

1.04 know when duress words are changed

2.5. Duress Procedures: duress procedures are initiated when an individual, post, or patrol needs assistance. Duress can be passive and positive. 2.5.1. Passive Duress: Indicated by failure to follow procedures. For example, if post/patrol fails to answer the radio after three transmissions or driving in an irregular manner, etc. 2.5.2. Positive Duress: Implemented by passing the wing duress word or activating duress alarm or portable duress. Duress words are locally developed words or phrases that can be used during normal conservation, which would indicate the sender is under duress. (Example: If the wing duress word is "Grapefruit", you might say: "I had the best grapefruit for breakfast today"). 2.5.3. 36th Wing Duress Words: The primary, alternate and exercise duress words will be briefed at every guard mount. These words are FOUO and only the primary/alternate words will be changed every 6 months or when compromised. These are locally developed words or phrases that can be used in normal conservation, which would indicate the sender is under duress. 2.5.4. Duress and Authentication: Locally devised Security Forces authentication (based on the last name), is the primary means used to determine security status for on-duty Security Forces.

1.03 know & perform radio frequency change procedures

2.5.11. Radio Frequency Change Procedures (Code 9): During duress situations, direct a radio frequency change to the alternate SF frequency (freq 2). 2.5.11.1. The BDOC/Flight Chief directs patrols to change frequency IAW this instruction. All posts/patrols will immediately adjust their radios to the alternate frequency as directed and standby for BDOC to conduct communication checks/ status checks. 2.5.11.2. Once duress situation is terminated, patrols receive radio frequency guidance from the BDOC or Flight Chief.

1.69 know integrated defense procedures

3.1. Authority: The restricted areas described in this instruction are established pursuant to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5200.8, Security of DoD Installations and Resources, and Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50 U.S.C. 797). Specific written permission by the 36th Wing Commander or a designated representative is required for entry into restricted areas. 3.2. Purpose: This operating instruction implements the U.S. Air Force Integrated Defense (ID) concept at AAFB. ID is the integrated application of offensive and defensive action, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the battle space to achieve local and area dominance in support of force protection (FP). ID organizes security flights/patrols as a system designed to achieve desired effects. It represents a divergence from traditional installation security program standards, which are requirements-driven, to those that are effects-based. WGI 31-101, Integrated Defense Plan contains roles, responsibilities and how to conduct Integrated Defense Operations. 3.2.1. The principles of ID are to see first (delay, use sensors, WSTI/CCTV), understand first (plan and identify vulnerabilities), and act first (neutralize the threat before it reaches the resource). 3.2.2. In order to counter vulnerabilities, an ID defensive posture was created. This provides better security for Andersen's 22,000 acres of military property and resources by utilizing a flexible, mobile force, capable of patrolling all areas of the base and perimeter. NOTE: During increased FPCON's arming requirements will be dictated by the DFC. 3.2.3. The resources unique to AAFB are designated in priority order utilizing the Integrated Defense Risk Management Process. This priority is further broken down in each of the Patrol Zones by priority response. 3.3. Base Security Zone (BSZ): The BSZ for AAFB will extend 8.5 miles off the west end of the runway, extend North on the boundary of Northwest Field, extend 3 miles from the east end of the runway and encompass Mount Santa Rosa and Andersen South. Refer to Attachment 2. 3.4. ID Zones: The following ID zones were created in order to better encompass and protect key resources at Andersen AFB. Refer to Attachment 2 of this OI for a detailed sector map. 3.4.1. ID Zone Organization: The installation is divided into 7 ID zones. These zones are organized to distribute ID assets to cover critical mission delivery capability and protection level resources. The net result is a protection scheme that pushes detection and response assets out of the cantonment area into typically unmonitored areas of the base

1.26 know SF S-function

3.25.1. Security Forces Squadron (SF) Functions and Responsibilities. Protect installations, personnel, and resources from terrorism, criminal acts, sabotage and acts of war. (Note: S-1 is the office symbol used by the Commander's Support Staff in this squadron instead of CCQ.) 3.25.2. Security Forces Management (SFM). Functions include senior SF enlisted leader and standardization and evaluation of Security Forces functional mission performance. 3.25.3. Intelligence Flight (S-2). Functions include force protection intelligence (FPI) liaison and investigations. 3.25.4. Operations and Training Flight (S-3). Functions include day-to-day installation security, confinement program management and military working dog management. Administers all SF training programs and performs unit scheduling. 3.25.5. Logistics Flight (S-4). Functions include SF resource advisor, mobility (unit deployment) management, armory, combat arms training, weapons maintenance, supply management, vehicle management and electronic system security management. 3.25.6. Plans and Programs Flight (S-5). Functions include pass and ID; reports and analysis; plans administration; installation security; resource protection; physical security; crime prevention; antiterrorism program; police services planning; Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS); and contractor oversight.

1.66 know desired effects of integrated defense

3.5. ID Response Force Descriptions and Responsibilities: 3.5.1. The overall responsibility of all ID response forces is to Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Assess, Warn, Defeat, Delay, Defend, Recover, and if necessary, neutralize any hostile threats as far away from critical resources and infrastructure as possible. This will provide additional time for back-up forces to arrive and maneuver to block access to resources and defeat the threat. 3.5.1.2. Security Response Teams (SRTs) are two-person mobile team capable of patrolling anywhere on installation property. 3.5.1.2.1. SRTs will be armed IAW Post Priority Chart. 3.5.1.2.1. Flightline SRTs: Will provide immediate armed response to all resources within their area of responsibility to detect hostile acts directed towards Protection Level Resources in their area and provide final denial actions if necessary. 3.5.1.2.1.1. Security 6: Will be a one man patrol and will provide patrol coverage for the entire flightline and extend to the east end of Arc Light Blvd, to include MSA 2. Security Six will not extend west of Carolines Avenue/Arc Light Blvd or Chicago Ave, unless directed by the Flight Chief or higher authority. Security 6 will be posted with a Flight Chief certified member. If situations arise where a Flight Chief certified member is not available, S3/Operations Leadership will be notified immediately for appropriate approval. 3.5.1.2.1.2. Security 5: Will be a two-person patrol and will provide patrol coverage for the entire flightline to include both west and east perimeter roads and MSA 2. Security 5 will not leave their AOR without being properly relieved by their Area Supervisor/Security 6. 3.5.1.2.1.3. Security 4: Will be a one man patrol and will provide patrol coverage for the flightline's west perimeter road and Taxiway Golf, unless directed by the Flight Chief or higher authority. 3.5.1.2.1.4. Security 3: Will be a one man patrol and will provide patrol coverage for the flightline's east perimeter road to Taxiway Golf, unless directed by the Flight Chief or higher authority. 3.5.1.2.1.5. Security 2: Will be a one man patrol and will provide patrol coverage for the flightline's east perimeter road, center ramp up to C29/C30 hardstand and north ramp up to N19 hardstand, unless directed by the Flight Chief or higher authority. 3.5.1.2.1.6. Security 1: Will be a one man patrol and will provide patrol coverage for the flightline's west perimeter road, center ramp up to C27/C28 hardstand and north ramp up to N19 hardstand, unless directed by the Flight Chief or higher authority.

1.59 know requirement to operates motorcycle, moped, two wheeled vehicles on AAFB

3.6. Motorcycle and All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) Safety. Operators and passengers of a motorcycle, ATV or three-wheeled vehicle will ensure the following safety requirements are followed: 3.6.1. Headlights (when equipped). All motorcycles and ATVs will have headlights turned on at all times when operating on a DoD installation on or off road, except where prohibited during military mission or by state, local or host nation law. (T-0) 3.6.2. Passengers. Passengers are not authorized on motorcycles, ATVs or three-wheeled vehicles unless they are specifically designed (as determined by the manufacturer) to carry a passenger. 3.6.3. Personal Protective Equipment. Motorcycle, ATV and Three-Wheeled vehicle riders will wear: 3.6.3.1. Head Protection. A helmet, certified to meet current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 218 (DOT), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Standard 22.05, British Standard 6658, or Snell Standard M2005 or higher, shall be worn and properly fastened under the chin. (T-0) For personnel riding motorcycles and ATVs outside the United States, helmets must also meet the host-nation standards. (T-0) Commanders may authorize use of combat helmets for operating tactical vehicles (e.g., motorcycles and ATVs) during operations and training based on a risk assessment IAW AFI 90-802. 3.6.3.2. Eye Protection. Goggles, wrap-around glasses or a full-face shield designed to meet or exceed American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard Z87.1, or UNECE 22.05 or BS6658 in effect when manufactured, will be properly worn. (T-0) A windshield does not constitute proper eye protection. Host nation equivalent is acceptable if it meets or exceeds ANSI Standard Z87.1. 3.6.3.3. Protective Clothing. Wearing of long-sleeved shirt or jacket, long trousers and fullfingered gloves or mittens is required. (T-0) Gloves or mittens will be made from leather or other abrasion-resistant material. (T-0) Wearing of a motorcycle jacket and pants constructed of abrasion-resistant materials containing impact absorbing padding is strongly encouraged. Riders are encouraged to select PPE that incorporates fluorescent colors and retro-reflective material. 3.6.3.4. Foot Protection. Sturdy over-the-ankle footwear that affords protection for the feet and ankles. (T-0) 3.6.3.5. Tactical Motorcycle and ATV Rider Protection. In addition to the above listed items, government-owned motorcycle and ATV operators during off-road operations should also wear knee pads, shin guards and padded full-fingered gloves. 3.6.3.6. MAJCOM/Installation-specific PPE requirements may not be used as criterion to deny access to any visiting person whose PPE meets the requirements of this section. 36WGI 31-218 4.2-4.2.9.3 4.2. Operation of Motorcycles and Mopeds: 2/3/4 -Wheeled Motor Vehicles. 4.2.1. Per AFI 91-207, a motorcycle is defined as any motor vehicle with an engine displacing 50cc or greater, having a seat or saddle for the use of its operator and designed to travel on not more than three wheels (includes mopeds and seated motor scooters, but does not include ATVs). 4.2.2. Military personnel (and DoD civilians) operating motorcycles, motor scooters or mopeds on AAFB must complete a safety course (Course IVA, MRC:RSS or Course IVB, ERC) that includes hands on training and evaluation. Beginning riders will be required to attend Course IVA, MRC: RSS, which is a three day course taught by Naval Base Guam (NBG) Safety Office/DP: 339-7233. Course IVB, Experienced Rider Course is also taught by the NBG Safety Office. 4.2.3. Motorcycles or motor driven cycles on AAFB must be registered for roadway operation. Two-wheeled vehicles not registered under state law are not authorized on AAFB, except in specific areas set aside by the 36 WG/CC. 4.2.3.1. No motorcycle or motor driven cycle may be legally operated on AAFB unless the vehicle and driver comply with the following requirements: Headlights (turned on at all times while operating), license plate light, taillight, stoplight, muffler, brakes, handlebars, seats designed for the number of persons carried, handgrips for passengers in a sidecar, footrests for passengers, rearview mirror, horn, Department of Transportation (DOT) approved protective helmets for driver and passengers, shatter resistant wraparound sunglasses, goggles, or helmet face shield, motorcycle windshield alone does constitute adequate eye protection, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Motorcycle riders will wear PPE IAW AFI 91-207. 4.2.4. The wearing of portable headphones, earphones or other listening devices while riding or operating any motor vehicle on the roads and streets of AAFB is prohibited. 4.2.5. All motorcycles are entitled to full use of a traffic lane and no motor vehicle will be driven in such a manner as to deprive any motorcycle the use of a lane. 12 36WGI31-218 15 JANUARY 2015 4.2.6. Motorcycle operators will not pass in the same lane occupied by the vehicle being overtaken. 4.2.7. Motorcycles will not be operated between lanes of traffic or through rows of stopped vehicles. 4.2.8. Motorcycles will be operated in single file. 4.2.9. Any person operating a moped upon a roadway will ride as near to the right side of the roadway as practical, exercising due care when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction of travel. When stopping a moped or executing a right or left turn, the operator will execute the following hand signals with the left hand: 4.2.9.1. Stopping: Left arm extended and bent downward. 4.2.9.2. Left turn: Left arm extended. 4.2.9.3. Right turn: Left arm extended and bent upward

1.67 know off base response/contingency posting

3.8. Off Base Response: All responses off the installation must be approved by the MSG/CC. Command Post will contact the MSG/CC for approval. The BDOC Controller/Alarm Monitor will gather all pertinent information from the complainant, contact GPD and dispatch a patrol as required. For all alarm activations off base follow the appropriate QRC procedures and ensure it is annotated on AF FM 340 and AF FM 53. Ensure prior to dispatching a patrol the status of the facility has been verified via CCTV if applicable. For all SF responses to resources assigned to Andersen AFB follow the appropriate QRC, contact GPD, dispatch patrol as required and make all appropriate notifications.

1.75 know and perform post reporting procedures

4.6. Post briefings are a SF tradition and help our defenders verbally articulate their connection to the Air Force and installation missions. SF members provide post briefings as part of a formal post check or visit by the chain of command or DVs escorted by the chain of command. SF members report the status of their post to the senior person conducting the post check or visit. Post briefings will not be provided to personnel sitting in vehicles or within traffic lanes. 4.6.1. Security must be maintained during a post check or visit and post briefings should not distract posted SF members from their primary duties. If required, additional armed SF will maintain security during post briefings.

1.81 know protection levels

4.6. Protection Level 1 (PL-1) Resources. Assign PL-1 to AF PPAs for which the loss, theft, misuse, compromise, damage or destruction results in unacceptable mission degradation to the strategic capability of the US or catastrophic consequences for the nation. There is no absolute protection against the vast number of threats that may affect all resources. Accepting risk is an integral part of the PL designation process and the factors in Attachment 4 should be used to help gauge the degree of risk acceptable. Limited funding dictates our most important national defense assets receive the greater share of available SF resources. 4.6.1. Designating PL-1 Resources. In deciding whether to designate a resource as PL-1, consider the possible impact, damage to or destruction of a resource would have in the areas listed below. 4.6.1.1. Our national defense at home and abroad. 4.6.1.2. Our status as a world power. 4.6.1.3. Our ability to deter hostilities. 4.6.1.4. Our ability to successfully execute contingency plans and conduct warfare. 4.6.2. Examples of PL-1 Resources. Listed below are some examples of PL-1 resources. 4.6.2.1. Nuclear weapons and/or critical components. 4.6.2.2. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems critical to the success of active nuclear missions. 4.6.2.3. Designated critical space and launch resources. 4.6.2.4. Aircraft designated to transport the President of the United States (POTUS). 4.6.3. Level of Security for PL-1 Resources. This level of security must result in the greatest possible deterrence against hostile acts. Failing the ability to deter, defensive measures will provide maximum means to detect, and defeat of a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. Owners/users of PL-1 resources must be actively involved in security of their assets. Response is provided by SF. 4.6.4. Desired ID Effects. ID measures must Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Assess, Warn, Defeat, Delay, Defend and Recover from threats or hostile actions to these resources. ID measures must ensure that unauthorized access to resources is denied before their seizure, loss, damage or destruction. 4.7. Protection Level 2 (PL-2) Resources. Assign PL-2 to AF assets for which the loss, theft, misuse, compromise, damage or destruction results in significant mission degradation to the war fighting capability of the US. An important aspect of risk management is an understanding, based upon factors in the PLDM, that similar resources could require different PLs. For example, a CONUS Satellite Communications (SATCOM) facility supporting one wing and part of a network capable of performing the same mission without loss of mission or support may be designated a PL-2 asset. In comparison, a SATCOM facility location OCONUS with no redundancy and supporting a joint theater may be designated PL-1. 4.7.1. Examples of PL-2 Resources. Listed below are some examples of PL-2 resources. 4.7.1.1. Non-nuclear alert forces. 4.7.1.2. Expensive, few in number, or one of a kind systems. 4.7.1.3. Selected critical command, control and communications (C3) facilities, systems, or equipment. 4.7.1.4. Vital computer facilities and equipment. 4.7.1.5. Intelligence-gathering systems critical to US operational capability. 4.7.2. Level of Security for PL-2 Resources. This level of security must result in significant deterrence against hostile acts. Failing the ability to deter, defensive measures will ensure a significant probability to detect, and defeat a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. Owners/users of PL-2 resources must be actively involved in security of their assets. Response is provided by SF. 4.7.3. Desired ID Effects. ID measures must, as a minimum, Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Asses, Warn, Defeat, Delay and Defend against threats or hostile acts to these resources. 4.8. Protection Level 3 (PL-3) Resources. Assign PL-3 to AF assets for which the loss, theft, misuse, compromise, damage or destruction results in mission degradation to the war fighting capability of the US. 4.8.1. Examples of PL-3 Resources. Listed below are some examples of PL-3 resources. 4.8.1.1. Weapons systems capable of being on alert status. 4.8.1.2. Selected C3 facilities, systems, and equipment. 4.8.1.3. Intelligence-gathering systems not critical to US operational capability. 4.8.2. Level of Security for PL-3 Resources. This level of security results in a reasonable degree of deterrence against hostile acts. Failing the ability to deter, defensive measures should be able to delay a hostile force and limit damage to resources. Owners/users of PL-3 resources should be actively involved in security of their assets. Response to threats is provided by SF. 4.8.3. Desired ID Effects. ID measures at a minimum, Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Assess and Delay threats or hostile acts to these resources. 4.9. Protection Level 4 (PL-4) Resources. Assign PL-4 to AF operational or MSAs that directly or indirectly support PPAs and the war fighting mission which loss, theft, misuse, compromise or destruction would adversely affect mission capability. PL-4 resources are contained in controlled areas with owners/users being responsible for security. SF provide response to threats. NOTE: Areas that provide adequate protection through proper employment of circulation controls may not require a controlled area designation. 4.9.1. Examples of PL-4 Resources and Controlled Areas. Listed below are examples of PL-4 resources (e.g. training aircraft) and controlled areas (e.g. pharmacy, funds vault). 4.9.1.1. Facilities storing any number of Category I, II, or III sensitive conventional AA&E and those storing 30 or more types of Category IV AA&E resources. 4.9.1.2. Flightline parking ramps (other than those designated as PL-1, 2, or 3 restricted areas) to include mission support, depot maintenance and other Services' transient aircraft areas. 4.9.1.3. Mission essential communications facilities and computer centers, Radar Approach Control (RAPCON) facilities, to include off installation navigational aids and related resources, control towers, power plants, and environmental control systems critical to operational capability. 4.9.1.4. Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) and Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Storage Areas. 4.9.1.5. Warehouses storing aircraft or weapons systems spare parts. 4.9.1.6. Financial Services Office vault areas and areas routinely storing $100,000 or more. 4.9.1.7. Areas where large volumes of classified material are processed (Secured Room/Open Storage). 4.9.1.8. AF pharmacies and medical logistics vaults. 4.9.1.9. Fixed Site Single Channel Anti-Jam Man Portable (SCAMP) Terminals. 4.9.1.10. Areas storing Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT). 4.9.1.11. Any other area containing mission essential resources affecting operational capability. 4.9.2. Level of Security for PL-4 Resources. This level of security reduces the opportunity for theft of or damage to resources. Owners/users of PL-4 resources are actively involved in security of their assets. Response is provided by SF. 4.9.3. Desired ID Effects. ID measures must, as a minimum, Anticipate, Deter, Detect and Assess threats or hostile acts to these resources. (T-1) 9.2-9.10.6 9.2. Securing PL-1 Non-Nuclear Resources. As stated in Chapter 4, security for PL-1 nonnuclear resources must result in the greatest possible deterrence against hostile acts. Failing the ability to deter, defensive measures will provide maximum means to detect, assess, warn, delay and defeat a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. NOTE: The following paragraphs describe the baseline ID capability required to secure PL-1 resources. However, unique circumstances may make it necessary to deviate or adjust these requirements. In these instances, Installation Commanders may make risk-based decisions to reasonably reconfigure ID forces to secure the resource after completing a thorough risk analysis as part of the IDRMP described in Chapter 3. 9.2.1. PL-1 Security Measures. Use the following measures to secure PL-1 non-nuclear resources: 9.2.1.1. Control entry to the restricted area and the individual resource(s) IAW Chapter 7. (T-3) 9.2.1.2. Establish a successive series of security screens and active patrolling to reduce the standoff threat. (T-3) NOTE: Refer to Chapter 2 for analyzing the terrain susceptible for threat use of stand-off weapons. 9.2.1.3. Provide continuous intrusion detection and assessment at the restricted area boundary and individual resource. (T-3) Use posted sentries when IDS is not installed or not operational. (T-3) NOTE: Close-boundary sentries are required for PL-1 aircraft that do not have installed or operational IDS. (T-3) 9.2.1.4. Provide dedicated response elements (armed and equipped IAW Chapter 11) as follows: 9.2.1.4.1. At least one SF member dedicated for immediate internal response to the resource. (T3) This can be the EC, provided ECP surveillance is maintained. 9.2.1.4.2. At least one other SF member dedicated to the restricted area capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP, to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs. (T-3) This can be the boundary sentry provided boundary surveillance is maintained. 9.2.1.4.3. An external two-person response team (typically an ESRT) capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP, to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs. (T-3) 9.2.1.4.4. An area supervisor. (T-3) The area supervisor may be the dedicated internal SRT leader or external SRT leader, or another SRT leader with responsibilities for other PL resources. 9.2.1.5. For PL-1 aircraft, the presence of Two-Person Control (TPC) material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires TPC outside the aircraft and it requires SF personnel to be certified IAW AFI 31-117. (T-1) If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. (T-1) SF subsequently ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. (T-1) Enforce TPC by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to allowing entry. (T1) Chapter 7 explains the process for authenticating EALs. 9.2.2. The following are examples of PL-1 aircraft: 9.2.2.1. Alert National Airborne Operations Centers (NAOC) modified 747 E-4B aircraft. 9.2.2.2. C2 Aircraft. Alert Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) E-6A or E-6B. NOTE: Reference AFMAN 31-123, Physical Security Requirements for Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) Facilities Manual, for physical security requirements for NC2 facilities. 9.3. Securing PL-2 Resources. As stated in Chapter 4, security for PL-2 resources must result in significant deterrence against hostile acts. Failing the ability to deter, defensive measures will provide maximum means to detect, assess, warn, delay and defeat a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. Owners/Users of PL-2 resources must be actively involved in security of their assets. Security response is provided by SF. (T-3) NOTE: The following paragraphs describe the baseline ID capability required to secure PL-2 resources. However, unique circumstances may make it necessary to deviate or adjust these requirements. In these instances, Installation Commanders may make risk-based decisions to reasonably reconfigure ID forces to secure the resource after completing a thorough risk analysis as part of the IDRMP. 9.3.1. PL-2 Security Measures. Use the following measures to secure PL-2 resources: 9.3.1.1. Provide positive entry control for the restricted area IAW Chapter 7. (T-3) 9.3.1.2. Provide continuous intrusion detection and assessment at the restricted area boundary and individual resource. (T-3) Use posted sentries when IDS is not installed or not operational. (T-3) NOTE: Close-boundary sentries are required for PL-2 aircraft that do not have installed or operational IDS. (T-3) 9.3.1.3. Provide dedicated response elements (armed and equipped IAW Chapter 11) as follows: 9.3.1.3.1. At least one SF member dedicated for immediate internal response. (T-3) NOTE: For individual aircraft not located within a permanently established PL-2 area where ECs and boundary sentries are posted, the immediate internal response can be the EC or boundary sentry, provided entry point and boundary surveillance is maintained. 9.3.1.3.2. An external two-person response team capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP. (T-3) 9.3.1.3.3. An area supervisor. (T-3) The area supervisor may be the dedicated internal SRT leader or external SRT leader, or another SRT leader with responsibilities for other PL resources. 9.3.2. Securing PL-2 Aircraft. 9.3.2.1. Alert Aircraft. MAJCOMs must develop procedures IAW this paragraph for aircraft maintained on alert status in permanent or dispersal areas. (T-2) Any repositioned aircraft will be afforded the same degree of security. IAW JP 1-02, ground alert is defined as "That status in which aircraft on the ground/deck are fully serviced and armed, with combat crews in readiness to take off within a specified short period of time (usually 15 minutes) after receipt of a mission order." NOTE: Aircraft not meeting this definition of ground alert are secured IAW their normal day-to-day assigned PL. Exception: Refer to paragraph 9.4.3.16. for information on alert aircraft performing CONUSBased Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) missions. 9.3.2.1.1. Secure PL-2 aircraft not on alert IAW paragraph 9.3.1. above. (T-3) 9.3.2.1.2. If TPC materials are involved, use the procedures identified in paragraph 9.2.1.5. 9.3.2.2. Refueling Aircraft Tasked to Support Nuclear Loaded Aircraft. Apply the procedures in paragraph 9.3.2.1. for alert aircraft, along with the following additional measures: 9.3.2.2.1. All visits to aircraft will require preannouncement to SF. (T-3) Procedures must be established to ensure only the aircraft commander or his or her designated representative is the sole authority for granting entry. (T-3) 9.3.2.2.2. If these aircraft are repositioned outside of a permanently established area, use the following guidance: 9.3.2.2.2.1. Restricted areas will be clearly marked and defined IAW paragraph 5.4. (T-2) Individual restricted areas for each aircraft or a temporary restricted area for all aircraft may be used. 9.3.2.2.2.2. Portable light units will be used during the hours of darkness to illuminate approaches to the area if existing lighting is insufficient. (T-3) 9.3.2.3. SCI Configured Aircraft . In addition to the procedures identified in paragraph 9.3.2., apply the following additional measures for SCI configured aircraft. (T-3) NOTE: When possible, SCI material will be removed from the aircraft when personnel complete a mission or at unscheduled stops. (T-3) Aircraft are considered SCI configured when they are "mission loaded" for SCI operations. Aircraft can have pallets onboard and not be "mission loaded." 9.3.2.3.1. SCI aircraft with airborne SCIF accreditation require an EAL at all times. (T-3) SCI mission aircraft without airborne SCIF accreditation require an EAL only when parked in temporary restricted areas. (T-3) Aircraft commanders or maintenance supervisors provide SF with the EAL for authentication. (T-3) NOTE: Aircraft commanders must notify SF when SCI material is placed onboard. (T-3) 9.3.2.3.2. If the aircraft is located within a US-controlled area and the information is not encrypted or the removal of SCI is not possible, the AF Cognizant Security Authority (AF-CSA), accrediting official, may waive the requirement for SCI-indoctrinated security personnel provided the aircraft is equipped with or stored within a structure that has IDS approved by the accrediting official. 9.3.2.3.3. All aircraft hatches and doors shall be secured with GSA-approved locks and tamperevident seals. (T-3) The maintenance supervisor or aircrew installs the seals. (T-3) Record the seal number(s) in the SF blotter. (T-3) A SRT must be capable of responding to an alarm within 5 minutes for open storage and 15 minutes for closed storage. (T-3) The SRT shall possess US Secret clearances and be armed and equipped with emergency communications devices. (T-3) If a cleared SRT is not available, the CSA may, with additional mitigation, grant an exception. Personnel locking and sealing or opening accredited aircraft must have authorized SCI access IAW the EAL. (T-3) 9.3.2.3.4. For unscheduled landings at non-United States Air Force (USAF) installations, aircrew members or mission essential ground personnel (MEGP) must control entry and maintain surveillance of the aircraft. (T-2) 9.3.2.3.4.1. When SCI material cannot be removed or when suitable storage locations are not available, ensure SCI-indoctrinated personnel remain with the aircraft and control entry into the SCI compartment. (T-2) 9.3.2.3.4.2. Arrange security support, if necessary. 9.3.2.4. Deployed AF Special Operations Forces (SOF) Aircraft (COMMANDO SOLO missions only). The mission commander ensures appropriate security measures are applied throughout the deployment. 9.3.2.4.1. Strive for the same level of security at deployment locations. 9.3.2.4.2. Mission planning and site survey activity will help determine deployment security needs (see paragraph 9.5.). 9.3.2.5. B-2 Aircraft on Static Display. Post an armed ID force member at the front and rear of the aircraft. (T-3) Additional sentries may be posted based on local conditions. Provide a twoperson response element (armed and equipped IAW Chapter 11), capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP, to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs. (T-3) NOTE: These aircraft are touch sensitive. While on static display, erect a barrier around the aircraft (a minimum of 20 feet and no further than 60 feet). (T-3) 9.3.2.6. PL-2 Aircraft and UAS. The following aircraft and UAS systems are examples of PL-2 assets: 9.3.2.6.1. B-2 bombers and alert (non-nuclear) aircraft (i.e., fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, air support and air refueling aircraft) as defined in paragraph 9.3.2.1. NOTE: B-2 bombers in depot maintenance or test status will always be provided PL-2 security. 9.3.2.6.2. All airborne warning and control system aircraft. 9.3.2.6.3. AF Special Operations Aircraft. Any AF SOF aircraft permanently or temporarily configured with SCI. See paragraph 9.3.2.3. for more information. NOTE: Local or aircraft commanders determine and designate SCI mission configuration NLT 24 hours prior to the requirement for PL-2 security. (T-3) 9.3.2.6.4. Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and C2 Aircraft. 9.3.2.6.4.1. U-2S aircraft located OCONUS, not including Alaska and Hawaii. 9.3.2.6.4.2. Back-up alert COMNORTHCOM, COMPACOM, COMEUCOM and airborne command post (ABNCP) when preflight and maintenance ready, and off-alert NAOC E-4B aircraft. 9.3.2.6.4.3. RC/WC-135 and C-130 (SENIOR SCOUT) aircraft when SCI configured (see paragraph 9.3.2.3.) or OCONUS; and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. NOTE: At contractor facilities, these aircraft must receive the same level of security as required for PL-2 resources. (T-2) 9.3.2.6.4.4. Alert Compass Call (EC-130H) aircraft. 9.3.2.6.4.5. Global Hawk UASs and Common Ground Segment when outside CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam. Exception: Protect as PL-4 when in depot maintenance, training or test status (non-operational). (T-3) 9.4. Securing PL-3 Resources. As stated in Chapter 4, security for PL-3 resources must result in a reasonable degree of deterrence against hostile acts. Failing the ability to deter, defensive measures will provide maximum means to detect, assess, warn, delay and defeat a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. Owners/Users of PL-3 resources must be actively involved in security of their assets. Security response is provided by SF. (T-3) NOTE: The following paragraphs describe the baseline ID capability required to secure PL-3 resources. However, unique circumstances may make it necessary to deviate or adjust these requirements. In these instances, Installation Commanders may make risk-based decisions to reasonably reconfigure ID forces to secure the resource after completing a thorough risk analysis as part of the IDRMP. 9.4.1. PL-3 Security Measures. Secure PL-3 resources in the following manner. 9.4.1.1. Owner/user personnel provide internal control and surveillance for aircraft parking areas. (T-3) 9.4.1.2. Provide intrusion detection capability at the restricted area boundary or individual resource IAW Chapter 6. (T-3) 9.4.1.3. Provide dedicated response elements (armed and equipped IAW Chapter 11) as follows: 9.4.1.3.1. At least two trained and equipped ID members dedicated for immediate internal response. (T-3) 9.4.1.3.2. An external two-person response team capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP. (T-3) 9.4.1.4. MAJCOMS prescribe supporting ID forces responsibilities and entry control procedures for restricted areas containing PL-3 resources. 9.4.2. NAOC Helicopter Support. Owner/user personnel control entry to aircraft, alert hangars, and crew billets. (T-3) 9.4.3. The following aircraft, UASs and ground control stations are examples of PL-3 assets: 9.4.3.1. Non-alert air support, fighter, and air refueling aircraft. 9.4.3.2. U-2S aircraft located in CONUS, Alaska and Hawaii. 9.4.3.3. United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) dual-capable aircraft. 9.4.3.4. Non-alert ABNCP. 9.4.3.5. Airlift and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft. NOTE: CRAF aircraft are designated when assigned to support military operations. 9.4.3.6. Most AF SOF aircraft when not configured or on alert. 9.4.3.7. E-4B and ABNCP aircraft undergoing contract maintenance at civilian contractor facilities. NOTE: These aircraft do not maintain a PL while undergoing depot maintenance, but contractors must ensure security support is received commensurate with PL-3 standards, as a minimum. (T-2) 9.4.3.8. Alert helicopters specifically designated to support NAOC operations. 9.4.3.9. Non-alert bomber aircraft (except B-2s). 9.4.3.10. RC/WC-135 and C-130 (SENIOR SCOUT) aircraft unless SCI-configured (see paragraph 9.3.2.3) or OCONUS. 9.4.3.11. HC-130 rescue aircraft. 9.4.3.12. Non-alert Compass Call (EC-130H) aircraft. 9.4.3.13. Test aircraft. See paragraph 9.7. 9.4.3.14. UASs . All assembled and mission ready UASs and ground control stations located OCONUS. (NOTE: Protect IAW PL-4 resource standards when disassembled OCONUS or in shipping containers; and assembled, mission ready or disassembled in CONUS) Exception: Global Hawk UAS and Common Ground Segment is PL-3 when inside CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. Protect IAW PL-4 standards when in depot maintenance training or test status (non-operational). 9.4.3.15. MQ-1/9 Ground Control Stations (GCS) and Primary Predator Satellite Links (PPSL) will be protected as PL-3. (T-1) Consistent with the AF approach to PL designation for other conventional weapon systems in CONUS, the PL designation for a weapons-loaded MQ-1 and MQ-9 in CONUS is PL-4. MQ-1/9 GCS, PPSL, and aircraft located OCONUS are designated PL-3 based on threat and mission factors. 9.4.3.16. CONUS-Based Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) Fighter Aircraft and Alert Tankers. ACA fighter and tanker aircraft tasked under the OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) standing deployment order (DEPORD) are PL-3. ACA alert aircraft may be located in PL-3 restricted areas with non-ACA alert aircraft. If possible, establish a separate restricted area and/or segregate ACA alert aircraft from other PL-3 resources. If ACA aircraft are co-located with non-ACA aircraft, the restricted area will be secured to the ACA standard. (T-3) 9.4.3.16.1. As a minimum, apply the following security standards: 9.4.3.16.1.1. Physical Security. Provide PL-3 restricted area fencing, lighting, and restricted area warning signs IAW Chapter 6. Employ barriers, anti-ram cabling or other means to deny unimpeded vehicle access to the restricted area and individual resources. (T-3) 9.4.3.16.1.2. Manpower. Provide automated or manned entry control at a single ECP to the restricted area. Provide a dedicated one-person internal security patrol and a two-person external SRT capable of responding immediately, as defined in the IDP, to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs. Ensure procedures to preannounce personnel requiring authorized entry to the restricted area are included in local instructions. 9.4.3.16.1.3. Procedures. Alarms generated from ACA aircraft areas take precedence over all other PL-3 alarms. ISRT and ESRT must be armed and equipped IAW Chapter 11. 9.4.3.16.2. MAJCOM and local security planners should ensure effective use of available security technology and must tailor protection schemes in close coordination with resource owners/users to adequately address the local threat and correspond to the current air defense alert posture level outlined in the standing ONE DEPORD for ACA fighter and tanker aircraft. (T-2) Local commanders are authorized to increase the level of security at any time to mitigate the threat. 9.4.3.17. OC-135 Open Skies aircraft located at CONUS and OCONUS locations. 9.4.4. Classified Material on Aircraft. Do not assign a PL based on the presence of classified information, installed classified equipment, or classified material carried as cargo. Protect classified material and components IAW DoDM 5200.01-V3 and AFI 16-1404. 9.4.5. Entry Control Procedures. Use the guidance in Chapter 7 as a minimum. MAJCOMs may prescribe additional entry control procedures and supporting forces responsibilities when deemed appropriate. Additional procedures are recommended, to include: 9.4.5.1. Randomly manning ECPs. 9.4.5.2. Conducting random credential checks in the area. 9.4.5.3. Notifying BDOC when duty hours begin and end for maintenance personnel. 9.5. Aircraft Away from Home Station. This paragraph addresses security for AF aircraft when in a transient status. If aircrew responsibility for aircraft security is not prescribed in the applicable aircraft operational procedures manual, follow the provisions below. 9.5.1. Security Measures. Security for aircraft should be equivalent to the basic standard (based on assigned PL) when aircraft are away from home station. Additional security should be considered, based upon mission location and threat. In certain cases, standard security measures may need to be tailored to unique mission requirements as determined by the aircraft commander (see paragraph 9.5.2. for tailored security measures). In determining the appropriate level of security, the command exercising C2 of the mission will accomplish the following: (T-2) 9.5.1.1. Assess the threat and check the availability of a security presence, detection capability, entry control, and alarm response capability for enroute stops and those in place at the final destination. 9.5.1.2. Events such as air shows and aircraft displays attract large numbers of people, all of whom may pass in close proximity to aircraft. This makes the aircraft extremely vulnerable to vandalism, damage or destruction. Consider the use of additional ID forces and owner/user personnel to increase flightline security. In situations where a threat appears likely or available security may not be adequate to protect the aircraft, owning commanders may choose not to provide aircraft for the air show or display. NOTE: MAJCOMs must approve use of host SF (US or foreign forces, when country-to-country agreements exist), military and civil police, or other DoD personnel to provide response for aircraft deployed away from home stations. (T-2) 9.5.1.3. Enroute Security. The command exercising C2 of the mission will pre-plan enroute security. (T-2) Aircraft commanders are responsible for their asset and, when necessary, coordinate civilian and/or military police security assistance. Aircrews must contact home station SF immediately when issues arise with security of the aircraft. (T-3) Home station SF will coordinate security for these aircraft with the nearest military installation or respond and provide security as soon as possible. 9.5.1.4. Procedures for Inadequate Security. Do not leave aircraft unattended when in-place security measures are not adequate. Security for aircraft is considered inadequate when it does not meet the security standard of its assigned PL. 9.5.1.4.1. Responsible aircrews or MEGP must secure aircraft until adequate security is in place. (T-3) 9.5.2. Tailored Security Measures. Standard physical security measures in this Instruction may be impractical at times due to mission, terrain, climate, sociopolitical sensitivities, or other factors. (For example, some countries do not allow armed security personnel. Other times, the mission may rely on maintaining a low profile and attracting as little attention as possible.) When added security would detract from mission success, tailor security measures to meet unique requirements when necessary. As a minimum, lock aircraft entry points and hatches. When locking the aircraft is not possible, secure entry points and hatches in a manner that indicates unauthorized entry (i.e., taping hatch release handles or using seals). NOTE: MAJCOMs and Combatant Commands also provide additional guidance. When MAJCOM and Combatant Command security standards are lower, follow this Instruction. 9.6. Aircraft in Maintenance. If aircraft remain within an established restricted area, no additional measures are required. However, thorough IDRMP and METT-TC analysis should occur when aircraft are removed from the restricted area for maintenance. Consider the following procedures when securing PL aircraft undergoing maintenance. Exception: These guidelines do not apply to B-2, Presidential and SPECKLED TROUT aircraft that already have mandated procedures for maintenance operations. 9.6.1. Home Station Maintenance. Consider the following guidance for home station maintenance: 9.6.1.1. If the aircraft can be upgraded to mission capable (flyable) status within 72 hours, retain its PL accordingly. If it cannot be upgraded to mission capable within 72 hours, consider temporarily lowering its PL designation if removed from the restricted area. 9.6.1.2. Owner/User personnel secure aircraft undergoing maintenance in maintenance hangars and notify SF of the location of aircraft, when and where they are moved to, and when aircraft are unattended. 9.6.2. Depot Maintenance. Use the following guidance for aircraft undergoing depot modification at an air logistics complex, contract maintenance center, or which have been turned over to a TDY depot maintenance team for repairs at the operational location. These aircraft do not retain their PL unless required by the systems security standard. Installation commanders will ensure appropriate security is provided to maintenance environments based on the risk of theft, loss or damage to AF assets. As a minimum, protect aircraft IAW PL-4 standards. 9.6.2.1. In such cases where an aggregation of aircraft, engines, parts and/or industrial equipment is determined to require additional protection, these depot maintenance areas may be designated as controlled areas IAW paragraph 5.5. and protected IAW PL-4 standards. At COCO locations, document depot level security arrangements in support agreements, contract requirements documents and other appropriate documents. 9.7. Test Aircraft. AF aircraft undergoing testing or being used to conduct tests of aircraftsupported systems are typically designated PL-3. However, a higher or lower PL is sometimes warranted. The owning and supporting MAJCOMs and the test organization must coordinate to ensure appropriate security measures are applied in the test environment based on the threat. (T2) 9.7.1. Protect test aircraft accordingly if a higher PL is designated based on sensitivity of the aircraft involved; is required by the SSS for the aircraft involved; or is required based on uniqueness or importance of the test. 9.7.1.1. Systems still in pre-operational acquisition phase often require operational testing at AF installations. Program Managers (PM) determine PPP requirements IAW DoDI 5200.39, AFI 63- 101_20-101, and AFPAM 63-113, when information, technologies, and/or systems contain CPI. Protect assets in pre-operational status IAW the PM's approved PPP. NOTE: Owning MAJCOMs coordinate with the PM if there is a difference in the level of protection being afforded to the asset(s). 9.7.2. If the test does not justify implementing PL-3 measures, or the aircraft must be placed in an austere location where there is little or no threat, protect it as follows: 9.7.2.1. Make every effort to park the aircraft adjacent to existing restricted areas or in existing controlled areas to take advantage of the security afforded these areas. If this is not possible, park the aircraft in a fenced or lighted area, in a hangar, or mark the boundary with an elevated boundary marker. 9.7.2.2. Owner/User and test personnel provide internal controls during duty hours. 9.7.2.3. ID forces make periodic checks of aircraft and provide armed response. 9.8. Alert Crews and Billets. Although not designated as PL resources, alert crews and alert crew billets should be afforded some degree of protection. 9.8.1. Determining Security Requirements. MAJCOMs determine security requirements for alert crews and billets based on the threat. Of particular concern are alert crews and billets during deployments and contingencies. Local plans should identify specific security measures. 9.8.2. Billets Inside of Restricted Areas. If possible, alert crew billets should be located within a restricted area to receive the benefits of protection afforded the restricted area. 9.8.3. Billets Outside of Restricted Areas. For billets not located within a restricted area, apply prudent physical security measures such as: 9.8.3.1. Lock or alarm facility doors and windows. 9.8.3.2. Use supporting forces or AECS to control entry. 9.8.3.3. Use cipher locks on entry doors. 9.8.3.4. Light the billet and billet parking areas. 9.8.3.5. Have security patrols make periodic checks. 9.9. Standards for Presidential Aircraft and Executive Airlift (EA) Missions Directed by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (AF/A3). 9.9.1. Overview. This section prescribes PLs, physical security requirements, and special procedures for Presidential aircraft and executive airlift operations. See Chapter 8 for guidance on the protection of all other DV and mission support aircraft not specifically addressed in this chapter. Detailed security requirements for the EA mission can be found in AFI 11-2VIP, Vol 3, VIP Operations Procedures. NOTE: If conflicts exist, the standards in this chapter take precedence. 9.9.2. PLs. PLs are assigned as indicated in Figure 9.1. Figure 9.1. PLs for Presidential and Executive Aircraft. Restricted Areas Containing These Types of Facilities and Equipment Protection Level Presidential aircraft. NOTE: Presidential aircraft retain their PL regardless of operational status or location, including COCO depot maintenance or modification facilities. 1 Any aircraft designated as Vice Presidential, First Lady, or Foreign Head of State- tasked aircraft are upgraded to PL-1 status after the Executive Aircraft Security Team Member, explosive detection MWD Team (when available), and flying crew chief/flight engineer conduct a joint sweep. Sweeps are conducted at least two hours prior to departure. These aircraft will retain their PL-1 status until mission completion. 1 Fuel designated for use on Presidential aircraft is PL-1 from the time samples are taken for analysis until it is put in the aircraft. 1 C-32A aircraft unless upgraded to Presidential or PL-1 status. 2 C-20, C-37 and C-40B/C aircraft unless upgraded to Presidential or PL-1 status. 3 9.9.2.1. AF/A3M is the primary coordinating agency for executive airlift. Aircraft executing an AF/A3M mission will receive a PL rating per this chapter. (T-1) 9.9.2.2. Non-SF personnel will not be posted in or around facilities and areas containing Presidential or PL-1 executive aircraft, nor will they perform close-in-sentry (CIS) or entry control duties for Presidential or PL-1 executive aircraft. (T-1) These duties will only be performed by SF members or approved law enforcement-trained US citizens. (T-1) 9.9.3. Executive Airlift Security. 9.9.3.1. The wing executing an OCONUS executive airlift mission will conduct a missionspecific security RA, e.g., Mission Assessment Group (MAG), to provide security recommendations. (T-2) See AFI 11-2VIP, Vol 3 for additional guidance. NOTE: If the cumulative "security required" or in-flight duty time during a mission exceeds 96 hours, the MAG must determine if the SF team size needs to be increased for safety and welfare of the teams. Support from law enforcement-trained US citizens counts towards the required total. 9.9.3.2. Executive Aircraft Security personnel are authorized to carry concealed weapons in the performance of their official duties and maintain responsibility for the security of assigned aircraft and personnel at all times. SF members will remain armed during flight. 9.9.3.3. The security waiver authority for Vice Presidential and First Lady tasked aircraft is the Director, White House Military Office (WHMO). The security waiver authority for Foreign Head of State tasked aircraft is the AF/A3. All security waiver requests for these aircraft will be provided via written notification to AF/A3M, who will then notify the 18 AF/CC and the tasked WG/CC. 9.9.3.4. SF will conduct executive airlift operations with a minimum of two members posted at the aircraft. (T-2) Support may be provided by law enforcement-trained US citizens. When aircraft are collocated at an airfield and parked wingtip to wingtip, SF may consider protecting the aircraft with one SF member posted at each aircraft. This will be coordinated with each aircraft commander and the Executive Aircraft Security Team Leader for each aircraft. A risk assessment will be conducted prior to executing operations in this manner. (T-3) See Table 9.2. Aircraft Security Requirements: Table 9.2. Aircraft Security Requirements Aircraft PL-1 Non PL-1 Augmented C-32 4 4 4 C-40B 3 2/3 4 C-40C 3 2/3 4 C-37/C-20 2 2 4 C-17 3 N/A 6 C-5 3 N/A 6 C-130 3 N/A 6 9.9.3.5. SF will ensure all foreign Personal Security Details are unarmed. (T-0) Additionally, all weapons/ammunition will be stored unloaded in a locked weapons case while transiting on USAF aircraft. 9.9.4. Presidential Aircraft Security. Air Mobility Command (AMC) (asset owner), in conjunction with the WHMO; US Secret Service (USSS); the Air Force District of Washington; and the Commander, Presidential Airlift Group (PAG/CC), and Chief, Presidential Aircraft Security (CPAS); has established the following detailed procedures for securing Presidential aircraft and for allowing unescorted and escorted entry to Presidential aircraft. AMC must provide this information to passengers, home stations, and deployed agencies as necessary. AMC, in conjunction with AF/A3M, must distribute Air Force Petroleum Agency (AFPET) instructions to supporting units outlining specific procedures for analyzing fuel used on Presidential aircraft IAW T.O. 42B-1-1, Table 4-2, Secure Fuel Test Limits. NOTE: Personnel who have regular and frequent contact with or access to Presidential assets must be the subject of a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)/Tier 5 Investigation IAW DoDD 5210.55, Department of Defense Presidential Support Program, excluding contractor personnel whereby the asset is undergoing maintenance or modification, unless specifically identified in the DD Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification. 9.9.4.1. A single badge system supported by an EAL will be used to control initial entry for home station personnel at all times. (T-3) Procedures for subsequent entry after initial access verification will be detailed in the IDP. (T-3) During mission situations, the senior Presidential Aircraft Security NCO (ASNCO) will validate mission crew orders against the current EAL. (T3) Aircraft crews are authorized unrestricted access once the aircraft commander and senior Presidential ASNCO authenticate mission orders. For Installations frequently supporting Presidential aircraft, the IDC may determine additional entry control requirements and publish them in the IDP after coordination with the PAG/CC. 9.9.4.2. Photographic identification supported by a manifest provided by the WHMO will be used to control passenger entry. (T-3) Presidential ASNCOs are authorized to utilize personal recognition to identify passengers who frequently travel aboard Presidential aircraft. 9.9.4.3. The PAG/CC retains ultimate responsibility for the security of all Presidential aircraft and associated resources. The PAG/CC, in full coordination with AMC/A4S, AFDW/A4S, the WHMO, and USSS, will determine entry control procedures for vehicles and personnel entering/exiting the restricted area. (T-3) 9.9.5. Chief, Presidential Aircraft Security (CPAS). The CPAS directly supervises Presidential aircraft security operations at all times. 9.9.5.1. During all facets of a Presidential mission, responsibility for entry control and close-in security rests with the CPAS or the senior Presidential ASNCO. 9.9.5.2. The PAG/CC, in conjunction with the CPAS, will identify and implement additional security requirements when Presidential aircraft are parked outside of their respective home station restricted areas. (T-3) 9.9.6. ID Plan Requirements. Installations frequently supporting Presidential aircraft, as determined by MAJCOM/A4S, are required to publish security procedures in their IDP. Security procedures at installations frequently supporting Presidential aircraft will be compliant with paragraphs 9.9. - 9.9.9. and localized procedures will be included in the IDP. (T-2) See Chapter 12 for a list of IDP requirements for Presidential aircraft security. 9.9.7. Host Installation Commanders. Provide SF explosive detection capability (if available), equipment, and facilities for Presidential aircraft and aircraft upgraded to PL-1, when the Director of the WHMO, AF/A3M (AF-1 Advance Agents), CPAS/senior Presidential ASNCO, or USSS request them. NOTE: If an actual emergency arises on an installation where Presidential aircraft are located, a host SF representative will immediately report the incident to the Presidential ASNCO on duty. 9.9.7.1. U.S. military installations provide and accomplish the following : 9.9.7.1.1. Establish a temporary restricted area for each aircraft (within a hangar, if available). Designate a single ECP to the aircraft area. 9.9.7.1.2. Provide enough rope, stanchions, and restricted area signs to establish a temporary restricted area for each aircraft. 9.9.7.1.3. Provide four light-all units, as a minimum, for each aircraft. 9.9.7.1.4. Provide two close boundary sentries (CBSs) at the rear of each aircraft, armed with an M4 and M9. 9.9.7.1.5. Provide a two-person armed security response element armed with an M4 and equipped with night vision devices at all times, capable of responding immediately to defeat the adversary. 9.9.7.1.6. Provide portable intra-base radios to the EC and SF members posted at the aircraft. 9.9.7.1.7. Provide a vehicle or sentry shelter for each EC. 9.9.7.1.8. Establish a temporary restricted area with rope, stanchions, and restricted area signs for Presidential aircraft fuel supplies, if space in existing restricted areas is unavailable. 9.9.7.1.9. Provide two light-all units for Presidential fuel supplies. 9.9.7.1.10. Provide a Close-In-Sentry to secure the Presidential fuel supplies and external response armed with an M4 capable of responding immediately to defeat the adversary before any negative effect against the Presidential fuel supplies occurs. 9.9.7.1.11. Dispatch an SF E-7 or above to Presidential aircraft arrivals to brief the accompanying Presidential ASNCOs of local threats/FPCON, flightline/restricted area circulation, shift changes, radio protocol/call signs, emergency phone listing, duress words, and any further pertinent security information. 9.9.7.2. Presidential Aircraft Commanders. Ensure advance security arrangements are made prior to departing home station (e.g., point vehicle [regardless of location or duration of ground time], lights, ropes and stanchions). NOTE: Aircraft commanders may waive or modify requirements based on mission needs. The CPAS/senior Presidential ASNCO will provide Presidential aircraft commanders detailed security guidance and recommendations prior to aircraft commanders waiving any security requirements. 9.9.7.3. Fuels Security and Analysis. Fuels personnel or Air Force One Advance Agents take test samples from fuel sources utilizing prescribed PAG and AF/A3M procedures. JB Andrews personnel responsible for providing, analyzing or securing fuels designated for Presidential aircraft must meet the requirements of DoDD 5210.55, Department of Defense Presidential Support Program, and AFI 31-501. Air Force One Advance Agents provide seals, an access list, and are responsible for ensuring the seals are attached to the vehicle containing tested fuels in such a manner that unauthorized tampering would be evident. They also arrange security (at least one CIS) for designated fuel trucks until delivery is made to Air Force One. Secure fuel is not required for the Air Force One back-up aircraft. NOTE: Fuel trucks designated for Presidential usage may be parked in existing restricted areas. 9.9.7.4. Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) Security. Inspect equipment with an explosives detection dog team or a qualified EOD team before using it. Place AGE in a restricted area or keep it under constant surveillance after the inspection is completed. Presidential ASNCOs will visually inspect all equipment and vehicles entering the close-in security area if no explosive detection dog team or qualified EOD team are available. 9.9.7.5. Baggage and Cargo Security. Aircraft commanders approve all aircraft cargo. USSS, Presidential ASNCOs and White House Transportation Agency representatives inspect and approve all personal and hand carried articles of passengers and aircrew with an explosive detection dog team or a qualified EOD team. 9.9.7.6. Security for Aircraft Arrival and Departure. Presidential ASNCOs coordinate security activities for arrival and departure with USSS personnel and maintain security responsibility for controlling entry to aircraft during all facets of the Presidential mission. 9.9.7.7. Photographs of Presidential Aircraft. Exterior photographs of aircraft are not permitted when parked within their respective home station restricted areas unless approved by the PAG/CC. Exterior photos of Presidential aircraft while outside their home station restricted area have no restrictions. However, Presidential ASNCOs will limit circulation around the aircraft and contain exterior photographs to areas where visibility is not obstructed. (T-3) Interior photographs of Presidential aircraft suites and offices are prohibited without permission of the Director of the WHMO. Presidential aircraft commanders must authorize any photographs of the remainder of the interior of the aircraft, including the conference room. Presidential ASNCOs will review all authorized photographs before release. 9.9.7.8. Physical Security Exercises. Physical security exercises will not be conducted while Presidential aircraft are temporarily located on an installation, or within two hours of arrival or departure. (T-1) 9.9.8. Security for Vice Presidential, First Lady and Foreign Head of State Tasked Aircraft. 9.9.8.1. Installations Commanders hosting Vice Presidential, First Lady or Foreign Heads of State tasked aircraft will provide the same security support outlined in paragraphs 9.9.7. - 9.9.7.1.11., with the following exceptions. (T-1) 9.9.8.1.1. Only one (1) close boundary sentry (CBS) at the rear of the aircraft is required. 9.9.8.1.2. Yankee White-cleared SF are only required to maintain the integrity of Vice Presidential missions once the aircraft is upgraded to PL-1. Other PL-1 missions do not require Yankee White-cleared personnel, and security support may be provided by law enforcementtrained US citizens. 9.9.8.1.3. Fuel selection and analysis is not required, therefore the additional Close-In-Sentry and response forces for fuel supplies are not required. 9.9.8.1.4. When an aircraft is designated as a Vice Presidential backup aircraft for the duration of a mission and is configured for Vice Presidential operations, the aircraft will be subjected to the same security requirements as the primary aircraft. (T-1) Yankee White SF will upgrade the aircraft to PL-1 status and maintain the integrity of the aircraft for the duration of the mission. This aircraft is commonly referred to as the "shadow" aircraft and is normally used for OCONUS Vice Presidential missions. The "shadow" aircraft may be another designated mobility aircraft. The Military Aide to the Vice President and WHMO will provide guidance regarding the status of backup aircraft. (T-0) 9.9.8.1.5. The Vice Presidential Aircraft Security Team will coordinate with the Office of the Vice President and Department of State to authorize the wear of concealed weapons at foreign airfields. (T-0) 9.9.9. Security for Presidential Aircraft in Contractor Maintenance or Modification Facilities. HQ AMC develops and approves the security requirements for Presidential aircraft in depot maintenance and modification. These requirements are contained in an AMC Supplement to this instruction. Contractors performing depot maintenance or modification of Presidential aircraft at COCO facilities will comply with these requirements when specified by contractual agreement. 9.10. Standard for Space Launch Complexes and Space Launch Systems, DoD Space Control, Detection and Warning, Space Surveillance, and Support Systems. 9.10.1. Overview. This section outlines PLs and guidelines for space system assets located on AF installations or in the control of AF personnel. AF space assets provide a unique force application to support the warfighter globally. This diverse set of space systems requires very specific SSSs tailored to each weapons system and how they apply force in support of Component Commanders worldwide. Owning MAJCOMs will develop and document these variances to baseline SSSs in their supplements to this Instruction and will be considered to meet baseline requirements for protection. (T-2) 9.10.2. Protection of Spacelift and Space Launch Systems. PLs for Space Launch Complexes (SLC) and Space Launch Systems (SLS) are assigned in Figure 9.2. System-unique security standards will be developed by and documented in the AFSPC supplement to this Instruction. (T2) Figure 9.2. PLs for DoD Spacelift and SLSs. Restricted Areas Containing These Types of Facilities and Equipment Protection Level SLC 37 and Vertical Integration Facility at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station SLC 3E and SLC 6 at Vandenberg AFB Essential AF command and control, communications, or computer facilities engaged in direct support of critical space launch operations 2 2 2 Essential payload processing facilities with backup capability AF flight hardware storage areas when hardware is present Hypergolic fuel storage and processing areas 3 3 9.10.3. Protection of Space Control and Other Space Support Resources. PLs for Space Control Systems and other space support resources are assigned in Figures 9.3. and 9.4. System-unique security standards will be developed by and documented in the AFSPC supplement to this Instruction. (T-2) NOTE: AFSPC PL resources located on sister service installations will follow the host service Physical Security instructions or program. (T-2) Figure 9.3. PL for Space Control Systems. Restricted Areas Containing These Types of Facilities and Equipment Protection Level 4th Space Control Squadron when deployed off-station 76th Space Control Squadron when deployed off-station 2 2 4th Space Control Squadron when in garrison, Holloman AFB, NM 76th Space Control Squadron when in garrison, Peterson AFB, CO Ground-Based Surveillance System at 20th Space Surveillance Squadron at Eglin AFB FL 3 3 3 Controlled Areas. Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance Systems (GEODSS) 4 Figure 9.4. PL for Other Space Support Resources. Restricted Areas Containing These Types of Facilities and Equipment Protection Level DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM (DSP) CONUS ground station (CGS) and OCONUS ground station (OGS) and associated support equipment as determined by the owning MAJCOM 1 Mission Capable AN/MSQ 118* 1 Mission Capable AN/TSQ 180* 1 The mobile ground system main operating base 1 *When AN/MSQ 118 and AN TSQ/180 trailers are not mission capable 4 *Non-mission capable for these assets is defined as removal of all cryptographic equipment, cryptographic keys and operational software from the vehicle. MILSTAR/AEHF Constellation Control Station and Ground-Mobiles when operational Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System Central Operating Location Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System Transportable Ground 2 3 3 Ground-Mobile MILSTAR/AEHF when not operational Ground-Mobile MILSTAR/AEHF in depot maintenance 3 4 9.10.3.1. Securing PL-1 and PL-2 Ground Mobile Space System Assets. Owning MAJCOMs will develop security standards for these assets assigned to their command when deployed. (T-2) These standards will outline the specific security requirements for the systems identified in Figures 9.3 and 9.4. (T-2) 9.10.4. Protection of Satellite C2 Systems. PLs for satellite C2 systems are assigned in Figure 9.5. System-unique security standards will be developed and documented in the AFSPC supplement to this Instruction. (T-2) NOTE: AFSPC PL resources located on sister service installations will follow the host service Physical Security instructions or program. (T-2) Figure 9.5. PL for Satellite C2 Systems. Restricted Areas Containing These Types of Facilities and Equipment Protection Level Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) earth and ground terminals located OCONUS, unless otherwise designated DSCS Sun East and Sun West antenna complexes at Vandenberg AFB, CA DSCS terminal at Schriever AFB, CO Space Based Infra-Red System Mission Control System (MCS) Buckley AFB, CO 1 1 1 1 NOTE: DSCS earth and ground terminals located in CONUS have the same PL as the C2 or warning systems they support. 50th Space Wing Operations Center Single-point-of-failure mission communications in support of PL-1 and PL-2 resources Global positioning systems (GPS) master and alternate master control stations AEHF/MILSTAR fixed operations centers Remote tracking site complexes at Vandenberg AFB, CA and New Boston AF 2 2 2 2 Remote tracking sites at: Thule AB, Greenland; Andersen AFB, Guam; Schriever AFB, CO; Diego Garcia, BIOT; Kaena Point, HI; and Oakhanger, UK. Satellite Operations Centers 21 CS Milstar Satellite Operations Complex (SOC) AFSCN Network Operations Center GPS Monitor Stations and Ground Antennae 3 3 3 3 9.10.5. Protection of Detection and Warning Systems. PLs for Detection and Warning Systems are assigned in Figure 9.6. System-unique security standards will be developed and documented in MAJCOM supplements to this Instruction. (T-2) 9.10.6. Protection of Cyber and Other Cyber Support Resources. System-unique security standards will be developed and documented in MAJCOM supplements to this Instruction. (T-2) Figure 9.6. PL for Detection and Warning Systems. Restricted Areas Containing These Types of Facilities and Equipment Protection Level Sea Launched Ballistic Missile Detection and Warning and Ballistic Missile Early Warning System Sites Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS) PAVE Phased Array Warning System sites North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Cheyenne Mountain Complex 1 1 1 1 Distant Early Warning line sites North Atlantic Defense System, including command and control centers at Keflavik Naval Station, IC; Alaska Regional Operations Control Center (ROCC), Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK 2 2 AFSPC Space Operations Center (AFSPC SOC) CONUS ROCC, Tyndall AFB, FL Sector Operational Control Centers at Griffiss Business and Technology Park, NY; Tyndall AFB, FL; March ARB, CA; and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA 3 3 3

1.22 know and perform building and area searches

5.18. Building and Area Searches . The same techniques used for searching buildings (with the addition of the grid/strip search) can be used when searching areas. 5.18.1. General Inspection Prior to Search. Before beginning any area search, there are certain steps to take. 5.18.1.1. Make an overall observation of the area to be searched. 5.18.1.2. Consider the size of the area, terrain and the items or personnel being sought. 5.18.1.3. Determine the amount of people needed to conduct a search of the area. 5.18.1.4. Determine the systematic search pattern to use. 5.18.2. Item-to-Item Search. Enter the scene and go to the first apparent item of evidence, visually observe the item, then move to the next closest item. Repeat this process until the room or area has been systematically scrutinized. 5.18.3. Concentric Circle (Spiral) Search. This search is conducted in small outdoor areas when patrol persons believe evidence has been dropped or placed a distance from the crime scene. The search can be done in a counter-clockwise direction, but the clockwise direction is recommended to ensure uniformity. Begin at the crime scene and work outwards. When searching a large area, such as fields or woods, conduct the search in ever-widening circles from a central point. 5.18.4. Zone or Sector Search. If a large area such as an office building or warehouse must be searched, subdivide the scene into sectors. Assign individuals to each designated sector for searching. Start searching the sector or zone in which the incident occurred and work outward. The search should be conducted, not only of the area in which the crime or incident occurred, but also the area beyond the scene, when possible. 5.18.5. Strip and Grid Searches. Strip and grid searches are normally used in large outdoor areas. 5.18.5.1. When using the strip search, divide the area into strips approximately four feet wide. The search starts at one end and moves back and forth across the area from one side to the other. 5.18.5.2. By following a strip search with another strip search conducted at right angles to the first, a grid search (sometimes called the double strip search) is performed. It covers the same area twice, helping ensure no areas are missed.

1.51 know probable cause/reasonable belief

5.5. Probable Cause/Reasonable Belief. Probable cause to apprehend exists when there is a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed and the person to be apprehended committed or is committing it. Reasonable belief means that there is reliable information that a reasonable, prudent person would rely on, which makes it more likely than not that something is true. Reasonable beliefs are also a logical and rational evaluation of the circumstances of an offense and of the suspect's connection with the offense. Apprehend or detain any suspect, military or civilian, whom there is probable cause to believe has committed a violation of the UCMJ (Military) or U.S.C. (Civilian) equivalent. A Probable Cause statement may be captured on the AF Form 1176, Authority to Search and Seize, or on bond paper and attached to report. SF members can establish reasonable belief through one of the following: 5.5.1. The SF member actually sees the person commit the crime. 5.5.2. The SF member gets the description of a person or vehicle from another SF member. For example, if the SF controller directs that a particular person be apprehended or detained for assault on another person, the SF member now has reasonable belief. 5.5.3. The SF member receives a statement by a reliable person. SF members must use their judgment and/or past experience to determine the validity of this information. Be sure of sources before action is taken. 5.5.4. A superior in the SF member's CoC orders an apprehension. Remember, all NCOs and commissioned officers have the authority to apprehend anyone violating any section of the UCMJ. 5.5.5. Complainant or victim identifies the alleged perpetrator. 17.3. Probable Cause/Reasonable Belief: Probable cause to apprehend exists when there is a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed and the person to be apprehended committed or is committing it. Reasonable belief means that there is reliable information that a reasonable, prudent person would rely on, which makes it more likely than not that something is true

1.60 know escorted/unescorted entry to restricted/controlled areas

7.11. Escorted Entry to Restricted/Controlled Areas. Escorted entry applies to individuals who must perform official duties within restricted/controlled areas and have not been granted unescorted entry authority. A person with a RAB for the appropriate area must escort these personnel into restricted/controlled areas. (T-1) Escorted entry also applies to personnel visiting restricted/controlled areas for non-official business. 7.11.1. All personnel who possess a RAB will be trained on the following: 7.11.1.1. The threat and how it applies to their area of responsibility. 7.11.1.2. General responsibilities of RAB holders to the ID effort as outlined in the IDP. 7.11.1.3. Methods of reporting all known or suspected security incidents to BDOC. 7.11.1.4. Entry control procedures, including verification of the authorization and official duty to be in a restricted area. 7.11.1.5. Responsibilities and duties of an escort official. 7.11.1.6. Methods used to gain authorized entry to a restricted area. 7.11.2. Escort Briefings. SF work with owners/users to develop an escort briefing that covers security and safety requirements. The escort briefing will be provided to all escorted individuals prior to entering the restricted/controlled area. (T-1) Persons providing escort are responsible for providing this briefing. 7.11.3. Escorted Entry Procedures. Escort officials assume responsibility for the safe and secure conduct of their visitors and are required to maintain constant surveillance and control of their visitors at all times while in the restricted/controlled area. NOTE: MAJCOMs may require departure inspections and prescribe search policies for visitor's hand-carried possessions. ECs and escort officials are responsible for accomplishing the following actions when allowing entry. 7.11.3.1. Positively identify individuals being escorted before allowing entry. 7.11.3.2. Inspect vehicles and hand-carried items and certifying to the EC that an inspection was conducted. 7.11.3.3. AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log. Unless directed by HHQ guidance, the IDC will determine (through the IDRMP) whether or not restricted/controlled areas will be manned by an on-duty EC. When posted, ECs will use the AF Form 1109 to maintain a record of entry into the restricted/controlled area. (T-1) All blocks on the AF Form 1109 must be filled in. (T-1) Maintain the AF Form 1109 IAW AFMAN 33-363. AFIMSC/MAJCOMs may specify additional requirements as necessary. In order to expedite entry for large groups, a document containing the same information as the AF Form 1109 may be used in lieu of filling in the AF Form 1109. Exception: In situations where the Installation Commander personally escorts visitors, it is not necessary to annotate the AF Form 1109. Personnel performing entry control must be able to positively identify the commander. Establish procedures to ensure the Installation Commander can signal duress. The Installation Commander may determine who else is granted this level of escort privileges.

1.13 know and perform installation entry/exit point checks

8.12.1. Installation Entry/Exit Point Check (IEPC) General Requirements: The 36 WG/CC has delegated the responsibility of implementing random checks of vehicles or pedestrians at installation entry points to the 36 MSG/CC. The 36 SFS/S3L produces a random IEPC matrix on a quarterly basis. This matrix is generated using a formula approved by the 36 MSG/CC and primary magistrate. The quarterly IEPC matrix is forwarded to the 36 MSG/CC for approval and authentication. The intent of this inspection is to protect the security of the command and to protect government property. Checks are not conducted merely to establish probable cause. SOI 31-118, 15 Feb 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 70 8.12.1.1. SF personnel can only deviate from the specified count under the following circumstances: 8.12.1.1.1. When a serious traffic jam, an accident, or other short term circumstance occurs, the checks may be suspended by the Flight Chief only long enough to correct the situation. Reinitiate the count once traffic is clear. 8.12.1.3. When forces respond to alarm activations or incidents, the Flight Chief can cancel the inspections. A blotter entry will reflect the reason for termination. 8.12.1.4. When inclement weather would unnecessarily discomfort vehicle operators or damage the interior of a vehicle. Notification to the Flight Chief must be made for approval to terminate.

1.55 know DUI/DWI and implied consent SOI

Chapter 14 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (DUI)/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (DWI) 14.1. DUI/DWI: No person shall drink any alcoholic beverage or consume a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle upon any highway, Guam's Local Code indicates the Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) or Breath Alcohol Content (BrAC) for person under the age twenty-one (21) years = 0.04%. 14.1.1. Definitions/General Information: 14.1.1.1. DUI: BAC/BrAC of .08% or higher. 14.1.1.2. DWI: BAC/BrAC of .05% - .079%. 14.1.1.3 BAC/BrAC less than .05% presumes the person is not under the influence of alcohol IAW AFI 31-218 NOTE: Guam Code §18119, Drinking While Driving a Motor Vehicle upon Any Highway. 14.2. Implied Consent: Drivers give consent to evidential test for alcohol or other drug content of their blood, breath and/or urine as a condition to accepting installation driving privileges. This consent also applies when lawfully detained, apprehended, or cited for any impaired driving offense committed while driving or in physical control of a motor vehicle on an Air Force installation. 14.2.1. Implied Consent Warning: "I request that you submit to a test of your blood/breath/urine for the purpose of determine the presence of alcohol/drugs. I have determined that there is probable cause to believe you were in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol/drugs. You are advised that refusal to submit to or complete this test will result in revocation of base driving privileges for 2 years. Further, under the implied consent policy, you have no right to consult with an attorney before deciding to submit or refuse a test of your blood/breath/urine. Do you consent?" NOTE: Items in bold: Choose applicable clause 14.2.2. Breath Testing: Administer breath tests using Intoximeter on all persons detained for intoxicated driving. Only qualified operators (those personnel who have received the approved training and whose training records are annotated) will conduct these tests. 14.2.2.1 Observe the person to be tested for at least 15 minutes before collecting the breath specimen. During this time, the person must not drink alcoholic beverages or other fluids, eat, smoke, chew tobacco, or ingest any substance. 14.2.2.2. When a breath test is not feasible due to injury or unconsciousness contact medical personnel. Contact US Magistrate for a search authorization to extract a sample of blood. If problems arise, contact SJA for further guidance. 14.2.2.3. In situations where a breath test indicates BAC/BrAC of .049% or less and the individual failed the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST), evaluate the situation to determine if another cause (medical condition, drugs, etc.) may be the source of the impairment. Either make arrangements for a courtesy ride or obtain the necessary search authorization or consent for additional chemical testing. In all matters regarding search authorizations/consent, contact SJA for advice. 14.2.2.4. When a breath test indicates blood-alcohol content of .3% or higher, immediately arrange for medical transport. Serious injury or death is possible. 14.2.3. Preliminary Revocation of Base Driving Privileges: Installation driving privileges will be immediately suspended via SFAR Form 13 pending resolution of an intoxicated driving incident in the following cases: 14.2.3.1. Refusal to take or complete a lawfully requested chemical test to determine BAC/BrAC or the presence of other drugs. Automatic 2 years revocation. 14.2.3.2. Apprehension for intoxicated driving for substances other than alcohol. 14.2.3.3. Arrest for intoxicated driving by civilian authorities. 14.3 On Base Drunken Driving Processing Procedures: Establishing probable cause is critical in initiating a stop for drunken driving. In doing so, the patrolman must be observant for any unusual act by the operator during the individual's operation of the vehicle and/or during police contact. NOTE: The observation period begins when a violation occurs. Examples are swerving or failure to stop. 14.3.1. Notify BDOC upon initiation of the traffic stop and request a backup ID patrol to assist and act as a witness. 14.3.2. If the vehicle attempts to exit the installation, entry controllers should attempt to safely stop the subject's vehicle (secure installation gates) without placing themselves in a dangerous situation. 14.3.3. Do not allow a subject to move their vehicle off the roadway once it has been stopped. 14.3.3.1. If the subject operating a vehicle is at an installation entry control point, and you suspect they are driving under the influence, have them place the vehicle in park, turn off the engine, and set the parking brake. 14.3.3.2. As soon as possible, place traffic cones behind the vehicle and reroute traffic around the vehicle. 14.3.4. If no one is available to move the vehicle off the roadway, ask permission from the subject to move the vehicle out of the flow of traffic. Accomplish this in the presence of at least one witness. If permission is not granted, inform the subject the vehicle may be towed or impounded at owner's expense. 14.3.5. Once the operator's identity has been established, contact the BDOC to determine if the individual has been barred from base or is on the driver's revocation list. 14.3.6. The BDOC notifies the Flight Chief on all traffic stops involving suspected drunken drivers. 14.3.7. Whenever civilians, including dependents, are detained, process them in the same manner as active-duty military offenders. 14.3.8. Advise the subject of the reason for the stop and order the subject to exit the vehicle. 14.3.9. Ask the subject if he/she has a verifiable medical condition (Diabetes, Epilepsy, Cerebral Palsy, Missing or Artificial Limbs, etc.) If any condition exists, contact the Flight Chief for guidance. 14.3.10. Request submission to a SFST: Approved tests include Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), if certified, Walk and Turn, and One Leg Stand. 14.3.11. If the subject refuses, contact SJA concerning probable cause to apprehend the individual. 14.3.12. Complete Sections I and II of the DD Form 1920. Indicate in the remarks block of Section II that the results are from "Observation Only." 14.3.12.1. The ID patrol person must remember that the only evidence used, should the subject subsequently be offered judicial action, may be his or her testimony as to the physical symptoms of intoxication. For this reason, the information on the DD Form 1920 may not be sufficient; therefore, all security forces personnel witnessing the behavior will complete an AF IMT 1168 including any and all specific facts which may corroborate intoxication. In accordance with the "Jenks Act," field Notes must be maintained for review, if the case goes to trial. 14.3.12.2. Advise the individual of his/her rights IAW the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution prior to asking questions on the back of the DD Form 1920. 14.3.13. If the subject consents, select a safe area on-scene and administer the tests. Give instructions, observe, and take notes as needed. 14.3.14. The backup ID patrol annotates the forms and acts as "a second set of eyes" for the patrol conducting the SFST. Evaluate the subject on all areas of the SFST. In the event of inclement weather, move the subject to an area with overhead cover to conduct the tests. 14.3.15. If the individual passes the SFST and the patrolman determines the individual is fit to drive, they may be released on scene. Accomplish a blotter entry indicating a "Standardized Field Sobriety Test" was administered and the individual was deemed fit to drive. In addition annotate in the blotter a DD Form 1920 was accomplished. NOTE: Only the front side of the DD Form 1920 needs to be completed. 14.3.16. If the SFST and other observations give probable cause to believe the subject was driving under the influence, apprehend/detain the subject. Conduct a simple frisk for weapons/contrabands prior to transport. Transport the subject to BDOC for further processing. 14.4 BDOC processing procedures: 14.4.1. The subject will be placed in an interview room and a 20 minute observation period starts. Prior to placing subject in interview room, conduct a search for weapons/contrabands. 14.4.2. Holding Cell: Holding cell will only be utilized for combative, belligerent, or personnel who pose an immediate threat to themselves and/or others. 14.4.2.1. The subject's shoes and belt along with his personal belongings (wallets, keys, necklace, etc.) will be taken and secured at the BDOC. The BDOC controller will properly accounted the subject's belongings. 14.4.3.2.2. When a detained person is in the holding cell, ensure they are continuously monitored. 14.4.3.3. Read the subject the Implied Consent Warning and have him/her respond with a "yes" or "no" answer before initiating Intoximeter. Request the subject to consent to a breath test to determine their BrAC. If subject consents administer the test. An AF Form 1364 is not required. Record the 15 minute observation period and the implied consent warning in the incident report and SF blotter. 14.4.3.4. Civilians: If a civilian refuses a breath test, process the individual as a "refusal". The information will be annotated on the DD Form 1805 as a refusal. No blood test will be obtained through the military. If the individual desires, they may have a blood test administered at an offbase medical facility of their choosing at their own expense, after processing is completed. The individual will be detained until they are able to be released on their own recognizance or they will be released to appropriate authorities. 14.4.3.2.1. The offender(s) will be released via DD Form 2708, Annotate the "Remarks" section indicating the individual's physical well-being and complete the "Personal Property" section. 14.4.3.2.2. For on-base incidents pertaining to military affiliated civilians and active-duty family members, issue SFAR Form 13prior to the subject's release from Security Force custody. This notice will take effect immediately from the time of apprehension. For non-military affiliated civilians issue a SFAR Form 10. 14.4.3.2.3. If the civilian is not a dependent (non-military affiliated), escort the offender from the installation after appropriate documentation is accomplished. Refer to Chapter 7. 14.4.3.2.4. Accomplish a complete and factual SFMIS report and/or AF Form 3545 of circumstances leading to the detention of a civilian. Include the time the offender was escorted off base and total time offender was detained. 14.4.4. Military: If the subject refuses to consent, contact SJA concerning probable cause for a search authorization for blood or urine testing. If probable cause exists, complete AF Form 1176, Authorization to Search and Seize, including a statement of probable cause. Military Magistrate may grant authorization to obtain a sample of blood and/or urine to test for drugs or alcohol. After this is completed, record the basics of the conversation in your field Notes. NOTE: Verbal authorization is permissible; however the AF Form 1176 must be followed up in writing immediately. 14.4.4.1. If the subject consents, administer the breath test utilizing the Intoximeter. If the breathalyzers are inoperative or there is no available certified patrolman on duty request for a sample of blood. If the subject consents to providing a blood sample, request the subject give consent to seize their blood for the presence of alcohol, via AF Form 1364 and transport to the Andersen clinic. The breath/blood test will be conducted prior to the questioning. NOTE: Once consent has been granted transport the subject to the Andersen Clinic. Notify Andersen clinic personnel prior to transport. 14.4.4.2. The subject can request a second test be done privately. Follow the guidelines outlined in AFI 31-218. 14.4.4.3. Advise the individual of his/her rights IAW Article 31 prior to asking questions on the back of the DD Form 1920. Accomplish AF IMT 1168. 14.4.4.4. For on-base incidents, issue a SFAR Form 13, prior to the subject's release from Security Force custody. This notice will take effect immediately from the time of apprehension. 14.4.4.5. If an active duty member is charged off base for drunken driving their unit will escort the individual to BDOC for issuance of a SFAR Form 13. Annotate the GPD case number, location of the arrest, and identity of the police official, including GPD ID number, and precinct with telephone number in the SF blotter. 14.4.4.6. Issue the subject a DD Form 1408, for the initial infraction leading to the traffic stop, and a copy of the SFAR Form 13. 14.4.4.7. S5 will provide updated revocation/barment letters to the BDOC and VCC upon issuance of temporary revocation/barment order. NOTE: BDOC will ensure updated revocation/barment letters are distributed to all installation gates. 14.4.4.8. In all incidents when the vehicle cannot be moved immediately after the processing of the subject, the vehicle will be moved from the immediate roadside by a patrol (after the vehicle operator grants permission). The patrol will move the vehicle to the nearest parking lot (visitor center if violation happened at main gate). The patrol will secure the vehicle in the presence of the vehicle operator. The vehicle operator will be instructed to make arrangements to have the vehicle moved within 24 hours. If the vehicle operator fails to do so, the vehicle will be impounded by S2I personnel and towed off base at the vehicle owner's expense. 14.4.4.9. Persons under the age of 21, when in the United States or where legal alcohol consumption age is 21, operating a motor vehicle with a BAC or BrAC level standard of .01 or higher is reason for automatic suspension. 14.4.5. Release of Subjects upon Completion of Processing: Release military members (including guard and reserve personnel on active-duty orders) assigned to AAFB to their Commander, First Sergeant, or anyone designated by their command (SCPO or SDO for Navy personnel). Release the offender via DD Form 2708. Annotate the "Remarks" section indicating the individual's physical well-being and "Personal Property" section. 14.4.5.1. Release Navy personnel not assigned to AAFB to the parent service representative, who in turn will contact their supervisor or commander. Release the offender via DD Form 2708. Annotate the "Remarks" section indicating the individual's physical well-being and "Personal Property" section. 14.4.5.2. Ensure all gates, visitor control center and BDOC revocation/barment letters are updated in ink with the individual's name and SSN. 14.4.5.3. Military Family Members: In instances when the BDOC is notified of a family member being apprehended for intoxicated driving off-base, instruct the sponsor to bring the subject to BDOC when they are released from GPD custody for the issuance of a SFAR Form 14.4.5.4. Notify the CC/CCF of the unit involved. Annotate the GPD case number, location of the arrest, and identity of the police official, including GPD ID number, and precinct with telephone number in the SF blotter.

1.72 know radio/communication procedure

SOI 31-118 2.1-2.1.3.1 2.1. BDOC Controller Communication: Primary means of communication is the base station radio, secondary is the portable radio and telephone. The BDOC Controller will: 2.1.1. Be thoroughly familiar with the operation of all SF communications equipment located at the BDOC and Alternate BDOC. 2.1.2. Be knowledgeable of all radio/telephone capabilities, i.e., hotlines, primary/secondary crash net, duress warning phone system, 911, etc. 2.1.3. Conduct security status checks with all forces hourly, every 30 minutes during increased Force Protection Condition (FPCON) measures, or as directed by Flight Chief or higher. 2.1.3.1. During routine security status checks, posts/patrols answer with their call sign and "all secure," followed by the phonetic alphabet for the first letter of their last name. For example, if Amn Jones is posted on the main gate and his status is all-secure, his response would be "Fortress 1, all secure, Juliet." Routine security status checks should not exceed 60 minutes during daily operations, and 30 minutes during increased FPCONS. AFI 31-118 3.6-3.7 3.6. Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Systems. The LMR system is the primary means of communication used to control SF operations. AFIMSC determines requirements for "secure voice" equipment (refer to AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, for further information). 14 AFI31-118 5 MARCH 2014 3.6.1. SF use standard practices to ensure the radio net operates smoothly during normal and emergency situations. Do not use slang language; reference Attachment 4 of this publication for SF responses and brevity codes. Military radio transmissions must comply with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. The Allied Communication Publication (ACP) 125 (F), prescribes procedures for SF using two-way radios. (T-0) 3.6.2. Net Control Station. When three or more two-way radios use a single radio net (frequency), establish a net control station according to the local installation communications officer's direction. 3.6.3. Commanders ensure a positive Communications Security (COMSEC) program exists for radio communications when they: 3.6.3.1. Use standard response codes to identify the urgency of each radio dispatch. (See Attachment 4). 3.6.3.2. Devise local duress or signal codes to indicate an emergency or duress situation when they do not wish to alert any unauthorized listeners. 3.6.3.3. Decode data encryption system equipped radios before servicing. 3.6.3.4. Decode vehicle radios before releasing the vehicle to any maintenance activity. 3.6.4. Consider equipping the Base Defense Operation Center/ Emergency Control Center (BDOC/ECC) with a two-way radio capable of communicating on the local civilian police emergency frequency. If a two-way radio is not available or practical, use a mutually agreed upon system that facilitates rapid emergency notification to civilian police like E-911. Negotiate for and fund such equipment at the installation level. Set up operating instructions according to local civilian police regulations. 3.6.5. Personnel utilizing the E-911 system must be trained IAW Federal and state laws. (T-0) 3.7. Telephone Systems. Commercial and tactical telephone systems augment the LMR. Connect all fixed SF posts to BDOC by dial or direct telephone lines. AFI 31-101 11.8-11.8.3 11.8. SF and ID Force Communication Requirements. Of all supporting equipment and systems used in ID operations, the security communications system is one of the most important. The ability to sound the alarm is directly impacted by communications systems. As an element of the ID Desired Effects of detect, warn and defeat, communications allow detected events to be reported to the BDOC so friendly forces can be warned. Subsequently, unimpeded communications can enhance ID force effectiveness in defeating the threat. Installations supporting PL resources must have landline capabilities and radio net, with a minimum of two frequencies, or the system must allow the SF continuous communications during radio net meaconing, intrusion, jamming, or interference (MIJI) conditions. (T-2) 11.8.1. Landline Systems. The telephone service provides lines for calling on and off the installation, connection of special (hot) lines, lines for fixed posts, and DSN capability. Equipment of this type is relatively dependable and, as a rule, is less expensive than radio systems. However, the lack of mobility or portability limits their use to stationary security posts. Landline systems also include intercom systems, voice over internet protocol (VOIP), and secure communications means such as Secure Telephone Equipment (STE). 11.8.2. Radio Net. Units must make the best possible use of systems that provide secure voice capabilities. (T-2) C2 radio system encryption must be commensurate with the level of information to be transmitted over them and be in compliance with National Security Agency (NSA) approved encryption standards. (T-0) Type 3, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the current NSA approved encryption for sensitive but unclassified information. Provide landmobile radios, base stations and repeaters with an uninterruptible power source and to the greatest extent possible, the manual duress systems for handheld radios should be enabled. Ideally, radios equipped with duress buttons display the radio's location graphically on BDOC display terminals. Assign and issue radio frequency authorizations according to AF frequency authorization guidance. See AFI 17-210, Radio Management, and AFI 33-580, Spectrum Management, for complete requirements. 11.8.2.1. LMR System. Radios are the most versatile and effective security communication equipment. The radios used in connection with ID operations include base stations, mobile twoway, and portable. There are many different brands and models currently in use throughout the AF, however planning considerations must include when possible integration with local first responder trunked or otherwise encrypted LMR to allow for rapid communication and coordination during contingency operations. This can include P331 initiatives within the US to share encrypted communications infrastructure between DoD and local, county or state government agencies. Types of radios include: 11.8.2.1.1. Base Stations. Fixed two-way radios, usually located in the BDOC and Alternate BDOC. All base stations should be provided with an emergency power source. 11.8.2.1.2. Base Station Remotes. Fixed two-way radios installed on fixed posts. Remotes are basically amplifiers connected to the base station with telephone lines and use the base station to send and receive calls. 11.8.2.1.3. Mobile Two-Way Radios. Usually installed in SF vehicles. These radios can talk over great distances in dispersed situations. Some models can be easily removed from vehicles, making them mobile-portable radios. 11.8.2.1.4. Portable Radios. Two-way radios, used on walking patrols, SRTs, security patrols, and fixed posts. These radios can talk over short distances and are used for most normal day-today operations. 11.8.2.2. Radio Equipment Distribution. Provide radios to SF and ID forces. 11.8.2.2.1. Give each static post member a portable or fixed two-way radio. 11.8.2.2.2. Equip each SF vehicle used on a regular basis with a mobile or portable two-way radio. 11.8.2.2.3. Install direct or hotline instruments at each permanent static post. 11.8.2.2.4. Devise manual systems at each installation with PL resources to back up the LMR and landline systems. 11.8.2.2.5. Installations with PL resources must back up the LMR system with a land-line system. (T-1) 11.8.2.3. Radio Communication Procedures. Certain procedural practices facilitate transmission and reception of messages. SF and ID forces using radio equipment must know these procedures. (T-3) 11.8.2.3.1. Call Signs. Each post and patrol issued a radio is assigned a call sign, that is a combination of letters and/or numbers, identifying the user without disclosing the users name or location. 11.8.2.3.2. Standard Common Terminology. All posts and patrols entities should use common terminology for communications. Standard common terminology is a key principle of the AFIMS. Because of this, it is important to limit the unnecessary creation of terminology. While joint military communities utilize common pro-words, when responding in conjunction with civilian counterparts, care should be taken to minimize the use of radio pro-words. 10-Codes should not be utilized during radio communications. 11.8.2.3.3. Clear Speech. Keep the message short and use as few words as possible. Talk and speak clearly when sending and transmitting messages. 11.8.2.3.4. Phonetic Alphabet. Used when correct reception is critical, and words, abbreviations, or groups of letters are difficult to understand. 11.8.2.4. Prohibited Radio Practices. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) prohibits certain things from being transmitted. Prohibited radio practices include the following: 11.8.2.4.1. Profane or obscene language. 11.8.2.4.2. Unnecessary, extravagant, false, or deceptive messages. 11.8.2.4.3. Transmissions not IAW station license. 11.8.2.4.4. Transmissions made by unauthorized operators. 11.8.2.5. Backup Systems. Landline and radio systems can be supported with the following: 11.8.2.5.1. Recording capability for telephonic systems are no longer mandated by DoD, however capability generally exist within Enhanced 911 systems. The laws of each state direct when telephonic systems can record. SF units, through their respective communications squadrons, must coordinate with the residing state and responsible SJA office to ensure compliance with local laws and regulations for telephonic recording capability and if it is both available and permitted must be extended into the BDOC. (T-2) Field systems are tactical phone systems, normally manually operated and providing service to stations connected to the system. As an additional back-up, cellular systems may be utilized so long as they are encrypted to the level of information that is communicated on them. 11.8.2.5.2. During emergency situations where landline communications can become saturated, it is suggested that Government Emergency Telecommunications System (GETS) priority access telephone cards be obtained from individual installation communications squadrons. This is a telephone card with a telephone number and PIN that will give priority to the calling entity. Suggested card storage locations for SF units would be at the BDOC, Alternate BDOC, and with the DFC. 11.8.2.5.3. Cellular Systems. These are mobile cellular telephones and associated support systems. Cellular systems should be used only for back-up in case other telephonic systems fail. Additionally, cellular systems should be encrypted to the level of information that is communicated on them. MAJCOMs and installations will provide guidance on cellular use restrictions. (T-2) 11.8.2.5.4. Voice. This method is common to all personnel. The tactical situation, language abilities, and distance between the person talking and the person listening are this system's limitations. 11.8.2.5.5. Other backup communication systems include various means of manual signaling techniques and other signaling methods can be established and implemented at, MAJCOM through a supplement to this instruction, installation within the IDP, and unit level through locally developed OI. 11.8.2.5.5.1. Manual Signal Techniques/Hand & Arm Signals. These are simple standard or locally devised techniques and procedures used if contact by others means cannot be made or if silence is necessary. The only LIMFAC is distance. Regardless of how elaborate other means of communication may be, manual techniques must also be established for SF use. (T-3) 11.8.2.5.5.2. Flares/Smoke. The use of flares/smoke without prior notification is reason alone for investigation by other SF. SF most commonly use slap flares beyond the restricted areas for illumination. 11.8.2.5.5.3. Weapons. Firing of weapons as a means of communication is used only as a last resort and only in cases of extreme emergency. Refer to AFI 31-117. 11.8.3. Other means of communication include mass notification systems, sirens and whistles. Implementation of these devices may be determined locally.

1.74 know post check/visit procedures

SOI 31-118 4.4 4.4. Post Checks: Conduct post checks/inspections of all personnel while on post at least once per shift. Post checks will be operationally oriented and are intended to ensure personnel remain alert of assigned duties and responsibilities. Determine personnel's knowledge and ability to effectively perform assigned duties, status of equipment, compliance of standards, and cleanliness of the facility/vehicle. Additionally, the Flight Chief should check each posts AF Fm 1800 and AF FM 1801 to ensure each member has conducted a thorough and proper changeover. Be alert for health, welfare, and morale problems during the check. Up-channel any potential negative trends to S3O or higher authorities. AFI 31-118 4.3-4.4 4.3. Post Visits. Post visits are a means for Senior Wing/Base Leaders, First Sergeants, Chaplains, etc., to inspect facilities, take questions, ascertain the welfare of personnel and build morale. Post visits should be conducted during both day and night hours and be documented in the AF Form 53. 4.4. Post Checks. Unit leadership and on-duty supervisory personnel will conduct post checks to ensure posted personnel remain alert and are knowledgeable of assigned duties and responsibilities. Post checks also include inspection of SF facilities and vehicles, as well as individual and post-related equipment. Post checks must be documented in the AF Form 53. (T2)

1.49 know active shooter

SOI 31-118 A12 1.7-1.7.8 A12.1.7. In the event the threat cannot be stopped by the initial responding patrol(s), try to isolate and contain it, and await backup. Backup/support should come in the form of specialized teams that have been specifically trained in the role of Entry Team, Contact Team, and Search/Rescue Team. These teams should deploy in a manner that gets them to the shooter quickly, and offers a tactical advantage. The following is a brief synopsis of each team's capability and role: A12.1.7.2. Entry Team. The primary role of the entry team is to immediately locate and eliminate the threat and minimize the loss of life. All SF personnel should be trained to perform the role of entry team. A12.1.7.2.1. An entry team should be, but is not required to be, composed of two to five SF personnel. Hesitation and indecision may cause unnecessary loss of life. SF members must also understand the scene will be loud and chaotic. The patrolman must use this chaos as cover to move quietly to close on the shooter and take a position of advantage. The sound of the shooting will also help direct the patrolman to the shooter. Upon arriving, if it is an active shooting in progress, patrolmen do not have to announce their presence or intentions if it endangers themselves or others. Use the force necessary, to include lethal, IA W AFI 31-117, to stop the threat. If the patrolman manages to contain the subject in a non-violent pose, initiate a response in accordance with local guidance/procedures A12.1.7.3. Contact Team. The Contact Team's role is to limit the shooters movement, prevent escape, communicate status to the incident commander, provide preliminary assessment (dynamic intelligence), give victim locations and medical needs if time permits, report explosives types and locations, offer descriptions and locations of suspects, describe the shooter(s) weapons, and apprehend the suspect(s) if capable. A12.1.7.4. Search/Rescue Team. The Search/Rescue Team's role is to recover casualties by entering or approaching danger areas to locate victims, extract victims to a safe area and relay medical information to the incident commander and medical personnel. A12.1.7.4.1. Prior to entry, the team must know where to direct the uninjured and ambulatory (who can walk or run) in order to send them to a safe area. In the case of multiple victims, the search/rescue team(s) may need to be expanded or multiplied. Methodical control of the area around them must be emphasized by the search/rescue team and a system of identifying and accounting for victims must be put in place. A12.1.7.5. Neutralize/Apprehend Shooter. Quickly assess the suspect's actions and if he or she is in the process 'of shooting then do not advise, warn, or request compliance; act immediately to stop the threat. Be cognizant of tunnel vision and look for additional threats and innocent bystanders. Communicate all response actions, the situation, and location to the Incident Commander. A12.1.7.5.1. Reload during the lull. This should be done all while watching the downed suspect and looking for accomplices. Disarm the suspect(s), as necessary, take them in custody, assess their medical condition and render emergency care if needed. Secure any weapon(s) or ordinance, in place if possible, as evidence and prevent others from touching it. Remove the injured suspect(s) and any evidence (i.e. weapons, spare magazines, identification, suicide notes) that remained in the suspect's possession and promptly transfer the items to the appropriate law enforcement personnel prior to movement to the medical treatment facility or other location. A12.1.7.5.2. Asking the suspect(s) questions on-scene for safety reasons only, such as locations of any other weapons/ammo, location of explosives, location information of other shooters, etc., without a rights advisement is permitted. Do not ask the suspect(s) any additional questions unrelated to public safety that may constitute a rights violation without properly advising same of their protected rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ or Miranda rights, as applicable. A12.1.7.6. Render Medical Care. Once the threat has been neutralized, render on-scene emergency medical care to all persons prioritized by need. Take care to not move anything that could have evidentiary value (i.e. spent shell casings, bloodied clothing, discarded magazines, personal identification, or furniture). Leave all evidence in place if possible A12.1.7.8. Crime Scene: Once the incident site is safe, it and the surrounding area becomes a crime scene. First Responders, Fire and/or Medical personnel, and all other individuals will have to be cleared by the incident commander before entry into the incident site. Legal jurisdiction and any agreements with outside law enforcement agencies will determine who has the responsibility to collect and store evidence and which agency will take the lead investigative role. Contact the base SJA for guidance. WGI 31-101 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C 36 WING INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN 31-101 (OPR: 36 SFS) ACTIVE SHOOTER (OPR: 36 SFS) 1. SITUATION: Response to violent situations is an emotional event for all involved. In recent years there have been many incidents of violence in schools, work places, and childcare facilities. 2. MISSION: Prevent loss of life, where possible, during an active shooter(s) scenario. Rapidly respond to interdict violence already in progress and prevent escalation or further harm to personnel. In addition, take all prevention steps necessary to identify and report potential active shooters and seek help. The Installation Commander must ensure proper planning and exercises are conducted. Close coordination between base and local officials is essential to successful conclusion(s) to any violent situation(s). 3. EXECUTION: a. During all situations, the following management priorities will apply: (1) Protection of life. (a) Hostage(s). (b) Bystander(s). (c) SF. (d) Suspect(s). (2) Secondary priorities: (a) Release of hostage(s). (b) Apprehension of suspect(s). (c) Protection and recovery of property. (3) The US government policy on hostage negotiations is: (a) Will not negotiate with terrorists. (b) Will not pay ransom. (c) Will not release prisoners. (d) Will not submit to political blackmail by terrorist groups. (e) During a hostage situation involving nuclear weapons, a reasonable attempt will be made to free the hostages; however, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES will the suspects be allowed to gain access to or remove a nuclear weapon/component from a storage container or site. (4) Procedures used for hostage situations must be judged on a case-by-case basis. The IC must weigh the circumstances before committing to a specific course of action. The overall goal is to end the situation through negotiations and time versus armed intervention. (5) The senior SF member on duty will be the initial IC. Upon arrival at the scene, the senior SF member will assess the situation and ensure the CP is notified. The senior SF member on duty will serve as the IC until relieved by higher authority. (6) The IC for all hostage situations will be the DFC or designated representative until relieved by higher authority. This individual will remain detached to concentrate attention to the overall management of the situation. (7) Tasks: (a) DFC will: (1) Notify GPD if situation dictates. (2) The SWAT team field supervisor and hostage negotiation coordinator work hand in hand. The DFC will ensure all recommendations to the IC are routed first through the SWAT team and HNT. (3) Establish inner and outer perimeter positions to control ingress and egress to the hostage site. Establish a parking plan for responding agencies. (4) Relay safe routes for other emergency vehicles. (b) The HNT will: (1) Respond to the staging area for a situation briefing prior to reporting to the onscene operations center. (c) 36 CES/CC will: (1) Provide firefighting equipment and EOD support when requested. (2) Provide personnel and equipment to assist in emergency construction, if required. (3) Provide expertise on building structures and detailed floor plans of buildings. (4) Provide expertise on curtailing utilities (heat, air conditioning, water, electricity, etc.) as required. (d) 36 FSS will: (1) Provide the IC with personnel records (military or civilian employee) if possible, or information therein as requested. (2) Prepare essential personnel to provide support for 24-hr operations. (e) 36 WG/JA will provide legal advice, assistance, and services to the IC and staff at the scene and/or elsewhere as directed. (f) 36 WG/CP will: (1) When notified of a hostage situation, make initial notification to: (a) 36 SFS, 36 WG/CC, 36 WG/CV, 36 WG/CP Chief, 36 MSG/CC and AFOSI. (b) P-3 reports IAW AFMAN 10-206. (c) Relay request for EOD assistance, as required. (d) Request the Alert Photographer to photograph incidents as directed by the IC. (g) 36 WG/PA will: (1) Prepare for release of information about the crisis within one hour of notification to the news media and to base employees. The installation commander is the release approval authority. (2) Utilize Facebook and the Straight Talk Line (366-TALK) to provide base personnel with an authoritative point of contact for current, accurate information about the status of any disturbance and the Commander's action. (3) Assign escorts to accompany media representatives from base entrances to the designated area. Media representatives should be briefed on the situation and any risks that might be involved in the news coverage. (h) 36 CS will provide and maintain adequate communications services, as dictated by the situation, to the IC and emergency personnel at the scene and elsewhere as directed. (i) 36 MX/MOC will: (1) Report incidents involving the airfield to BDOC. (2) Remove aircraft from affected area, if possible, upon request. (j) AFOSI Det 602 will: (1) Coordinate investigative and intelligence gathering activities between SF Investigator, FBI, and other federal and local agencies as necessary. (2) Ensure debriefing of released hostages, bystanders, friends, and relations of hostages and hostage-taker to: (a) Identify and obtain backround/motivation of hostage and hostage-taker. (b) Attempt to obtain recording devices capable of recording conversations between negotiator and hostage-taker if capability does not exist. (c) Ensure examination of criminal and medical records of hostages and hostage-taker. (d) Examine and analyze all notes and messages from hostage-taker. Collect/preserve evidence. (e) Attempt to obtain and provide for 36 CS an instrument to be used on the direct line from the hostage taker to the negotiator to provide a recording capability. (f) Provide all intelligence obtained to HNT for use in negotiations. (k) 36 MDG will provide: (1) Medical support as required. (2) An advisor from Mental Health to provide medical/behavioral information as requested to the HNT & AFOSI Det 602. (l) 36 OSS: (1) In the event of a hostage situation on an aircraft, the primary/secondary crash net will be used to notify all key agencies. (2) Recommend to 36 WG/CC of diverting all local aircraft until situation has been terminated. (9) Communications with the suspects should be established as soon as possible. Until the arrival of the HNT, the senior SF member on duty will initiate contact with the suspect(s) only if contacted by the suspect(s) or if conditions require interim negotiations to prevent casualties. The following information is provided as guidelines. (a) Make every attempt to keep the suspect in a constructive problem solving/thinking stage. (b) Do not volunteer information to the suspects. (c) Weapons are non-negotiable. (e) Do not make suggestions. Likewise, do not "close the door" on demands. (f) Do not make value judgments regarding the suspects and his situation. Be understanding, but do not be a "bleeding heart." (g) When you do not know what to say, repeat what the suspect says. Think before you speak. (h) Make the suspect work for everything he wants. (i) Ensure you keep records of all information for subsequent briefings to the primary negotiator. (j) Notify the 36 WG/CP and CAT of the location of the on-scene control point. (k) If not already notified, recall the SWAT team and HNT. (l) Have the BDOC notify all patrols and have them respond to the staging area for a situation briefing and subsequent dispersal to the on-scene operations center. c. Violence in Workplace and at Child Care Facilities: (1) 36 DFC will: (a) Assume command and control until relieved by a competent authority. Responding units must keep the BDOC informed of the situation. (b) Immediately evacuate all non-essential personnel far enough away so they are in no danger of being taken hostage or hit by a suspect's fire. Do not allow volunteers (wives, husbands, mothers, neighbors, etc.) to start any negotiations. (c) Establish a cordon/outer perimeter outside the maximum effective range of any weapons the hostage takers have, if SF members can establish the type/caliber of the weapon(s) involved. (d) Set up the inner perimeter to contain the immediate scene. Specialized teams may replace SF personnel posted on the inner perimeter if they are available and appropriate for use by the IC. SF can adjust the inner perimeter as needed. Due to the dangers involved, strict control of the area must be maintained. Only key people such as the SWAT team, negotiation teams and the IC are allowed within the inner perimeter. The SWAT team is responsible for searching and clearing the inner perimeter. (e) Coordinate with the SWAT team and childcare facility officials to train within the complex during periods when the center is not in session (weekends, holidays, etc.). (f) Coordinate with officials for periodic walk-throughs with a MWD to familiarize the canine and handlers with facilities. (2) 36 WG Staff Judge Advocate will provide advice on the implications of installation jurisdiction requirements. (3) Officials should immediately lock down the facility and notify SF for immediate response to incidents. The lock-down process is necessary to ensure the safety of the children and accountability of children and personnel. Officials should report violence incidents using the installation's emergency response telephone numbers or alarms, when available. (4) As in other high-risk situations, it is important that SF immediately contain the situation or enclose the scene. (5) Media interest will be high. Ensure the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) is immediately involved in establishing a media reception plan and media center to assist with information flow. (6) For child care facilities, the IC should establish an area for parents to respond to and receive information. The PAO is responsible for all information flow; however, Family Support Center, chaplains and medical personnel can assist with this. Give parents appropriate information for the situation. d. Active Shooter Situation(s): (1) 36 WG/CC will: Ensure Incident Commanders are available to manage Active Shooter incidents. (2) 36 DFC will: (a) Develop Active Shooter training and response procedures for active shooter and other workplace/school violence situations. (b) Develop a training program that includes "LOCKDOWN" procedures for the base populace. (3) 36 MDG/CC will: (a) Ensure medical personnel are trained to respond to mass casualty incidents. (b) Ensure MOU/MOAs are in place for incidents which exceed MDG capabilities. (c) Ensure Disaster Mental Health teams are trained to assist first responders and medical staff. (4) 36 WG/JA will: Develop an installation claim process concerning military and civilian personnel and businesses affected by the incident. (5) 36 CES/CC will: Provide building floor plans and layouts to Fire Emergency Services and Security Forces Squadron to eliminate delays in active shooter situations. (6) 36 CES/EM will: (a) Exercise this appendix a minimum of twice per year. This exercise activity can be combined with other requirements in an effort to consolidate and achieve maximum effectiveness of annual exercise time. Complete an exercise evaluation report for the Installation Commander that identifies the installation's strengths and weaknesses. (b) Like all installation emergency management exercises, pre-coordinate participation with local and state emergency responders at least 3 to 4 weeks in advance to ensure maximum participation by members of their respective agencies. Additionally, ensure local emergency communications centers are aware of the installation exercise to prevent real-world response due to a 911 call by an individual not aware of the exercise. (7) All Commanders and Directors to include Tenant Units and Contracting Officials will: (a) Ensure all unit personnel are aware of this plan, and are trained and drilled regularly on actions to take in the event of an active shooter scenario. The term "LOCKDOWN" means a person will Escape, Cover, Communicate and Mitigate the incident. Ensure all newly assigned personnel are trained as part of in-processing. (b) Ensure personnel are trained on violent behavior indicators and report concerns through the chain of command. (c) Ensure checklists and or unit level operating instructions are developed to cover this plan and any unique circumstances for individual areas of responsibility. (d) Identify limiting factors which impact the ability to communicate and protect personnel. Develop procedures to mitigate these items or seek funding to correct the deficiencies. (e) Develop procedures for personnel accountability, understanding that accountability may take hours to complete. 1. Develop procedures for accounting for personnel during Lockdown Phase II conditions. Ensure procedures do not place personnel in further jeopardy to conduct accountability. (Example: email accountability or calling members' cell phones while they are attempting to hide and conceal themselves.) (f) Assign/designate unit personnel to lock exterior doors and post signs on customer service facilities. The ORM process will be used to determine if it is safe to post signs and lock exterior doors. 1. Have signs readily available to post on exterior doors, if safe to do so, indicating "Lockdown in Progress. You will not be able to leave the base at this time." (g) Ensure procedures for sponsored guests (both military and civilian) are incorporated into lockdown plans and checklists. These procedures also need to address accountability. d. ACTIVE SHOOTER LOCKDOWN PROCEDURES AND RESPONSE. (1) LOCKDOWN PHASE I: (a) In the event of an Active Shooter, the CP has the authority to initiate "LOCKDOWN" without prior approval from the 36 WG/CC. Personnel in the immediate threat area may be alerted to the threat from hearing gunshots or loud voices. Personnel outside the immediate area may be alerted in the same manner or via mass notification system. In the event of an Active Shooter incident, the installation Giant Voice will announce three times "LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN. This announcement will be repeated every 30 seconds until the EOC Director is notified by the DFC or senior SF member on scene that the threat has been neutralized. The AAFB AtHoc, and Emergency Radio and will be used to alert personnel of an active shooter incident. All personnel must quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect themselves from the shooter and take action to run, hide or fight. (b) Unless otherwise directed, "LOCKDOWN" is base-wide. Personnel in the immediate area of the shooter will need to take different actions than those away from the shooter. If in doubt, act with caution and assume you are in the shooter's immediate area and take appropriate action until directed otherwise. This does not include SF first responders. Fire and medical first responders will respond to the staging area that is directed by the IC until the scene is declared safe. (2) LOCKDOWN PHASE I ACTIONS: (a) Personnel in the immediate area where the shooter is located will: 1. Run. Evacuate the immediate area, if possible. Identify an escape route and primary and alternate rally points beforehand. If an escape route is available, evacuate the premises. If in a customer service area, remember, customers will follow the lead of office personnel during an active shooter situation. Follow developed plans to ensure special needs personnel are not left in the service area. While moving, personnel should alert others of the incident by shouting "LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN" if safe to do so. a. Evacuate whether others agree to follow or not. b. Leave belongings behind. c. Help others evacuate if possible. d. Prevent others from entering an area where the shooter may be located. e. Keep your hands visible. f. Follow the instructions of Security Forces when encountered. g. DO NOT attempt to move wounded personnel. h. Conduct personnel accountability as personnel arrive at the rally point. i. Call 911, if or when safe to do so. 2. Hide. If evacuation is not possible, personnel in the immediate area must find a place to hide where they are less likely to be discovered by the shooter. Take immediate cover to minimize exposure. Move quickly away from the threat and seek shelter inside the nearest room/building which can be locked. Relocate as many personnel from hallways and common areas to an area which can be secured and locked. While moving, personnel should alert others of the incident by shouting "LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN." a. The hiding place should: (1) Be out of the shooter's view. (2) Provide protection if shots are fired. (3) Be in an area that does not trap or restrict options for movement, if possible. b. To prevent the shooter from entering the hiding place: (1) Lock the door. (2) Blockade the door with heavy furniture if available. (3) Turn off the lights. c. If the shooter is nearby, personnel must: (1) Silence cell phones. (2) Turn off any source of noise (e.g. television or radio). (3) Hide behind large items if possible. If not, lie flat on the floor. (4) Stay clear of windows and doors. (5) Remain quiet. 3. Communicate a. When in a safe location, call 911 only: (1) If you have pertinent information report in S.A.L.U.T.E. format: (a) Name of individual reporting the situation (b) Contact phone number to make further contact with individual reporting the situation. (c) Size: Number of personnel. Shooter and Injured. (d) Activity: What are they doing. (e) Location: Where they were last sighted (f) Uniform: Uniform or description of clothing. (g) Time: Start of Hostilities. (h) Equipment: Type and number of weapons. (2) Ensure lockdown procedures are initiated. (3) Alert first responders. (4) Provide current/updated information regarding the threat. b. If in a group, choose one person to call 911 and follow the directions of the 911 operator. c. Do not assume others have alerted 911 operators until that action is confirmed by the activation of mass notification systems (e.g. Giant Voice, etc). d. If you are connected to the 911 operator, stay on the phone and answer all questions. Do not hang up until told to by the controller/operator or if it is necessary to protect your location from the Active Shooter. e. Fight. Take action against the shooter. Take action only as a last resort, if the opportunity presents itself and only when your life (or others) is in danger. (1) Personnel should use whatever means possible when able to overpower the subject to save further lives. EXAMPLE: When the shooter is reloading the weapon or when the shooter has his/her back turned to you. (2) Use the minimum force necessary to subdue the threat, however, deadly force is authorized when an individual reasonably believes he/she, or others in the area, is/are in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm. (a) Attempts to rescue people or treat the injured should be made only if it can be done without further endangering yourself or others. Personnel should use all means available when contemplating such actions. The shooter may bang on the door and yell for help to entice you to open the door. Remember the safety of the masses versus the safety of a few. If there is any doubt to the safety of the individuals inside the room, the area should remain secured. This also applies for personnel wanting to gain access to a locked room. (b) If shots are heard or "LOCKDOWN" is ordered, disregard fire alarms unless instructed to evacuate by a known/credible source (e.g., Security Forces/Law Enforcement personnel or Fire Emergency Services). The shooter may engage fire alarms to entice personnel out of lockdown. EXCEPTION: If an actual fire or smoke threatens lives, evacuation may be the only alternative. When evacuating, remain vigilant to the active shooter threat and seek other shelter as soon as possible. (c) Personnel outside the immediate area to include within the restricted area where the shooter is located will: (1) Find the nearest cover and stay there. Stay vigilant for potential threats. Move to a safe location away from the threat area when you receive further updates from mass communication systems. (2) Follow directions given by identified SF or LE personnel or by mass notification systems. (d) Actions personnel should take when encountering SF or other LE personnel: (1) Remain calm and follow instructions. (2) Place items in your hands on the ground. (3) Raise your hands and spread your fingers. (4) Keep hands visible at all times. (5) Do not make any quick movements toward Security Forces personnel. (6) Provide any information that may assist them in countering the threat. (7) Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling. (8) Do not grab them or make any quick movements towards them. Allow them to pass by, because they are trying to get to and neutralize the shooter. (e) Security Forces' mission is to neutralize the shooter as soon as possible. Responding Security Forces members will proceed directly to the area where the shots were heard. Normally, the response team will consist of at least two personnel; however, it may vary from as few as one to as many as four. (1) The first SF personnel on scene will not stop to assist the injured. Rescue teams comprised of follow-on emergency service personnel will treat and remove injured personnel when the area has been secured. (2) Move quickly to the assembly point. Expect to stay there until the situation is under control and all personnel have been identified and questioned. Do not leave the assembly point until instructed by Security Forces personnel. (3) LOCKDOWN PHASE II: (a) Lockdown Phase II will be implemented at the direction of the Installation Commander once the Active Shooter threat has been neutralized as determined by the senior SF member on scene. (b) The implementation of Lockdown Phase II provides limited freedom of movement for CAT/EOC members, First responders and support personnel. (4) LOCKDOWN PHASE II ACTIONS (a) All personnel remain indoors. Emergency Responders and CP or WG CC directed personnel are exempt. (b) Implement single entry point procedures and 100 percent ID checks into all facilities. (c) Inspect hand carried items. (d) Identify all visitors within work areas. (e) Controlled area monitors inspect all packages prior to entry into area. ALL GATES REMAIN CLOSED. SF will implement actions to facilitate entry/exit of off base emergency response personnel. BDOC will coordinate with the IC for desired ingress/egress routes. (f) All personnel caught outside during Lockdown Phase II should proceed to the nearest facility and present ID card for entry. (g) All units need be prepared to initiate local unit accountability. f. 36 WG/CP will: (1) Upon notification of a "LOCKDOWN" by BDOC, Fire Emergency Services Telecommunicator, or by initial direct phone calls complete the following actions: (a) Immediately announce over all mass notification means available (Giant Voice, etc.) "LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN". (b) After announcing "LOCKDOWN" over the Giant Voice, send the predetermined "LOCKDOWN"message via AAFB AtHoc and Emergency Radio system. (c) Repeat and update "LOCKDOWN" messages every 30 seconds using all mass communications available until the EOC Director is notified by the DFC or senior on scene SF member that the threat has been neutralized. (2) Notify the 36 WG/CC or designee. (3) Activate the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and/or EOC upon direction from the Installation Commander or designee. The Installation Commander's decision to activate the CAT/EOC will be based on the ability to recall personnel during Lockdown Phase II and the safety of personnel moving to those locations. (4) Ensure Public Affairs is notified/recalled to the appropriate location as determined by the IC. (5) Ensure required reports are submitted. Develop checklists to cover all Command Post actions. g. 36 DFC will: (1) Close installation Entry Control Points (ECPs) except to prior announced first responder personnel. Ensure personnel are trained on procedures. (2) Issue a Be On the Look Out (BOLO) and coordinate with local authorities concerning known or suspected threats in the event the suspect(s) have departed the initial scene. (3) After confirming with the Incident Commander, up channel to EOC that the incident scene is "SECURE." The DFC will then ensure a sweep for other potential suspects or incident sites is conducted throughout the installation. Only after these two actions have occurred can the 36WG/CC or designee release personnel from LOCKDOWN. RELEASE FROM LOCKDOWN means that it is confirmed that there are no additional threats at the incident site or other locations on the installation. NOTE: Due to the potential large-scale search that must be conducted, the RELEASE FROM LOCKDOWN signal may not be issued for hours after the initial incident. Releasing personnel prematurely will indicate to all innocents hiding that it is safe to walk around, which could create another target-rich environment for a secondary shooter or IED. (4) Assist AFOSI or other agencies with crime scene preservation. h. Incident Commander will: (1) Establish incident command and incident command post (ICP). (2) Recommend EOC activation to the Installation Commander. (3) Establish immediate incident priorities. (4) Request allocation of primary and alternate Public Affairs personnel to serve as installation spokesperson and ensure all information given to them is deemed authorized and appropriate for public release. i. 36 CS/CC will: (1) Ensure AAFB has an effective mass notification system to provide real-time information during hostile incidents. Along with PA, establish info hotline that gives personnel locked down in unaffected areas of base the appropriate information they will need. This will alleviate their desire to call the Security Forces hotline to request status updates from the controller/operator. (2) Ensure priority lines are available to communicate with outside agencies. (3) Establish "hot lines" per direction of the EOC Director. (5) Maintain the ability to shut down all telephone, computer network and communication equipment lines inside the incident scene if directed by the Incident Commander. j. Det 602, AFOSI, with support from other AFOSI resources, will: (1) Support by gathering additional intelligence on suspect(s) and potential hostages to facilitate negotiations. (2) Interview and debrief witnesses. (3) Provide technical service support, such as sound recordings and digital zoom photography, as requested by the Incident Commander. (4) Provide liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) as needed for crime scene security/processing. (5) Upon resolution of the situation, negotiate control of witnesses, subjects, suspects and crime scene with federal and local law enforcement agencies as necessary. k. All Commanders, Directors, and tenant units will: (1) Conduct facility sweeps as directed by the EOC Director. No less than two-person teams will be used to conduct exterior sweeps of owner/user facilities. Look for suspicious persons, packages and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) similar to a Random Antiterrorism Measure. These teams will be used only when directed by the EOC and only after SF has declared the incident site "Secured." Sweep teams will help expedite sweeping the entire installation and the process for releasing personnel from LOCKDOWN. l. Sweep Teams will: (1) Have a means to communicate such as a radio or cell phone. (2) Not transmit or use cell phone within 25 feet of a suspected IED. (3) Report findings to UCC (UCC will relay information to EOC). (4) Conduct 100 percent accountability on assigned personnel when releasing personnel from LOCKDOWN, as directed by the 36 WG/CC. m. 36 LRS will: (1) Provide all necessary vehicles to SF or IC upon request. (2) Place buses with drivers on standby for mass personnel movement. n. 36 FSS will: (1) Arrange temporary lodging to witnesses as needed, responding personnel and displaced personnel as directed by the EOC Director. (2) Provide food services for all personnel as directed by the Installation Commander or EOC Director. (3) Provide Mortuary Affairs/Search and Recovery personnel as needed. (4) Collect personnel accountability information from Unit Control Centers (UCCs) and ensure accountability updates are provided to the EOC. NOTE: Accountability may take hours to complete and should only be accomplished when safe to do so. This would normally take place after the "RELEASE FROM LOCKDOWN" is declared. (5) Provide Casualty Affairs support/assistance as needed. (6) Provide family member support for wounded and deceased military and civilian personnel. (7) Develop a mortuary affairs plan that includes private citizen fatalities on the installation and the release of their remains to the local coroner's office. (8) Develop installation specific guidance concerning memorial services held on the installation; military and civilian. o. 36 WG/JA will: (1) Provide legal guidance and coordination when requested by the IC, CAT, or EOC Director. p. 36 WG/PA will: (1) Provide active shooter/lockdown information as appropriate for public notification when directed and safe to do so. Messages may be posted on the installation's official website or transmitted via other channels. Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) for the media. Establish the JIC in a safe area outside of the Outer Perimeter and where it will not interfere with emergency responders. (2) Release information to the news media, as appropriate after approval of the EOC Director and the 36 WG/CC. (3) Develop procedures to escort media to and from the installation entry points. NOTE: SF will not be available to provide escort capability. 4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT: Refer to Basic Plan 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: (a) The decision to implement these lockdown procedures may be made by the on-duty SF Flight Chief, BDOC, 36 WG/CP or AAFB Fire Dispatcher based on information they receive from the initial call. Any control center initiating lockdown procedures will immediately notify other control centers. (b) Command relationships. SF and Fire and Emergency Services Flight will establish a unified command. (c) Communications. Radios used in support of this situation will operate on approved frequencies.

1.78 know victim/witnesses procedures

SOI 31-118 PARA 7.8-7.8.3 7.8. Initial Information for Victim and Witnesses of Crime Program: AFI 51-201, Public Law 97-291 and Public Law 101-647, Sections 401-612 requires witnesses and victims be informed of their rights as a victim or witness. Since Security Forces are required to handle numerous incidents involving all aspects of the community, we are the people most likely to encounter victims and witnesses of crimes. A DD Form 2701, Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime will be issued to ALL victims and witnesses of a crime. See Attachment 5 for further specifications, information and guidance. 7.8.1. Incident reports that refer to victim/witness cases must be "flagged." Add a "VW" suffix to the case number. (Flight Chiefs, ensure a "VW" is placed on the top right margin of the SFMIS report or AF Form 3545) 7.8.2. Flight personnel and investigators are responsible for identifying victims/witnesses during incident responses/investigations. Patrolman will carry an ample amount of DD Form 2701s. 7.8.3. Remember not all situations are offenses that require a DD Form 2701. Only crimes that is punishable under the UCMJ, state or federal law. For example: Failure to Control Pets, Traffic Complaints, and Traffic Accidents are offenses that do not require a DD Form 2701. It is prudent to say any crime against persons would fall into the DD Form 2701 guidelines. Good judgment, common sense, and training will assist in making a determination. AFI 31-118 6.9-6.9.7 6.9. Victim/Witness Assistance Program (VWAP). According to DoDD 1030.01, Victim and Witness Assistance, and DoDI 1030.2, Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures, identification of victims and witnesses is the responsibility of the agency that investigates the crime (e.g., SF). The term "investigates" also applies to first responders. These two DoD publications and AFI 51-201provide guidance on the implementation of these programs in the USAF. 6.9.1. Scope. VWAP applies to all cases in which criminal conduct adversely affects victims or in which witnesses provide information regarding criminal activity. Pay special attention to victims of violent crime, but ensure all victims and witnesses of crime who suffer physical, financial or emotional trauma receive the assistance to which they are entitled. 6.9.2. SF Role in VWAP. SF members are critical members of a multi-disciplinary team. As first responders and SF investigators/detectives, SF members contribute to the success of other team members (e.g., AFOSI, SJA, Chaplains) who follow during resolution of the incident. 6.9.3. SF Goals in VWAP. SF goals are more far-reaching than effective first response. They are: 6.9.3.1. Immediate and permanent termination of the harmful act(s). 6.9.3.2. Favorable resolution of the incident. Incidents are considered favorably resolved when offenders have been identified and held accountable, and the victim has been referred to the appropriate agencies for assistance in recovering from the incident. 6.9.3.3. Recovery of the victim. Complete recovery from an incident is largely dependent upon a victim's willingness to participate in the recovery process. SF will inform the victim of the resources available to assist in recovery. (T-1) 6.9.4. Providing Information. Every SF member on-duty must carry a supply of DD Forms 2701, Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime. Distribute the DD Form 2701 to any person meeting the requirements of paragraph 6.10.1. When in doubt as to whether a person meets the requirements to be issued a DD Form 2701, issue the form. Annotate on the AF Form 3545A whenever a DD Form 2701 is issued. If an AF Form 3545A is not completed, the AF Form 53 must reflect a DD Form 2701 was issued. In addition to the pre-mentioned guidance, SF and SJA may develop local procedures to track DD Forms 2701. (T-1) 6.9.4.1. Provide all victims with reasonable ideas for protection. Examples of reasonable ideas for protection would be properly securing homes, work places and property. For victims of domestic violence or abuse, staying with family members or friends would be an example of a reasonable idea for protection. 6.9.4.2. Brief all victims and witnesses on the four phases of the judicial process (response, investigation, prosecution and confinement) and provide them with information on what may be expected from them during each phase. (T-1) 6.9.4.3. VWAP training requirements are covered in AFI 51-201. 6.9.5. If in the course of an investigation, either a victim or witness is threatened, S2I will advise the local AFOSI field unit commander or Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) and together they will assess if specific protective actions are necessary. If so, AFOSI will assist and coordinate with appropriate local, state or federal law enforcement authorities to take action IAW AFI 36-2110, Assignments, to mitigate the threat. SF must also notify the SJA when they identify a victim. This allows the SJA to administer the victim/witness assistance process. (T-1) 6.9.6. Units must "flag" incident reports to indicate it is a "victim/witness" case. Adding a prefix or suffix to the case number aids in the SJA auditing process of victim/witness cases. (T-3) 6.9.7. Per DoDI 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures, all SF personnel are required to complete initial and periodic recurring training concerning response to sexual assault incidents. This training will be completed annually and be documented on AF Form 1098, Special Task Certification and Recurring Training, in the individual training record using the Air Force Training Record (AFTR) system. AFSFC has created a standardized Sexual Assault Prevention and Response for First Responders (SAPR-LE) Computer Based Training module. This training is located in the Security Forces Center of Training Excellence website, https://sf-cte.csd.disa.mil. (T-1)

1.52 know & recite SF general orders

Security Forces duties/responsibilities vary from one location to another the General Orders overarch the entire spectrum of SF duties and serve as an important guide while in the performance of those duties. The number of posts as well as their limits and responsibilities are determined locally. However, the basic General Orders remain the same. The general orders are: I will take charge of my post and protect personnel and property for which I am responsible until properly relieved. SF members have been entrusted with the protection of personnel and resources and, as such, will not leave nor abandon any post. SF personnel will stay within post limits, until proper relief has occurred. This is true regardless of how long one has been posted and regardless of conditions. In the event of an extenuating circumstance, the second General Order below provides further guidance. 2.4.2. I will report all violations of orders I am entrusted to enforce and will call my superior in any case not covered by instructions. SF members have the authority to apprehend anyone violating those orders. If any situation arises that is not covered by written instructions, SF personnel will contact their superiors for guidance. If an SF member cannot contact superiors, they must exercise discretion and act according to training, best judgment and common sense. 2.4.3. I will sound the alarm in case of disorder or emergency. SF members must report any event threatening security of the installation or endangering life or property. Additionally, they will take reasonable actions to save lives and property.

1.90 know the 8 preconditions of deadly force

Self Defense, Assets vital to National Security, Defense of others, Inherently dangerous property, National Critical Infrastructure, Serious offense against others, Escape, Arrest or apprehension.