Informal System- Factional Politics
Informal vs formal politics
, formal politics refers to those kinds of political activi ties that are organized according to the principle of impersonality, whereas informal politics is identified by the elements of face-to-face relationships of either traditional authority or charismatic authority. In addition to the criterion of personal specificity, informal politics is de fined in terms of its working relationship to the legal bureaucratic order: informal politics may be either functional or dysfunctional for the organization's formally defined tasks. Exemplars of the functional informal type involve an effective "leadership core" (a Chinese version of the Fbhrerprinzip), opinion groups, and a personnel reward system; examples of the dysfunctional informal type are the cult of personality, factionalism, and a spoils system or "independent kingdom."3 Only the latter, Lee implies, is "factional" behavior. It is certainly true that formal politics usually appears impersonal, while informal politics often incorporates traditional or charismatic el ements. But in a political system that is essentially traditional or charismatic, such as Maoist China, legal-rational aspects tend to be subverted by the infor mal political environment. The boundaries of informal politics are thus to some extent coincident with the political culture of the macrosystem and do not accord with Weber's ideal types.
Another way of defining informal politics, as argued previously by Dittmer, is through an understanding of "relationships." According to this conceptualization, there are two types of relationship, the one value-rational and the other purpose-rational. (A
A value-rational relationship is one that is valued as an end in itself; it is typically built upon various connections (guanxi) that include shared kinship ties, common geographic origin, former classmates, teachers, or students, or some other bonding experience. A purpose-rational relationship, by contrast, is instrumental to the achievement of other ends and is formed with those colleagues, subordinates, and superiors with whom one has routine occupational contacts. Whereas the aggregation of one's value-rational connections constitutes an informal power base from which to exert informal power (shili), one's occupational or "busi ness" connections together comprise the formal power base from which one can exercise official power (quanli).
CONCEPTUAL SYNTHESIS: A REVISED FACTIONALISM MODEL
Actions pursued in informal politics include conspiratorial maneu vers to effect a coup d'etat or some other such political skulduggery, the formation of networks outside or beyond officially sanctioned channels of command and control in order to mobilize political back ing for policies in the interests of that faction, and the accomplishment of other tasks or functions not explicitly provided for by formal institu tions. In terms of a positive definition, the common element is the pursuit of personal or particularistic ends
three economic and political cycles to be of par ticular importance
BUSINESS, REFORM, AND MOVEMENT CYCLES
NONFACTIONAL APPROACHES
Bureaucratic models assign official agencies pride of place in their analyses, assum ing that "where you stand depends on where you sit.""3 Bureaucratic leaders compete for greater power, prestige, and financial resources and take policy stances accordingly.14 They also protect their major con stituencies; for example, the PLA reflects the interests of the peasantry from which it draws most of its recruits.
Corruption to meritocracy
However, such institutions consume a tremendous amount of social resources, and any lapse in the enforce ment of universalistic rules immediately results in a phenomenon called "walking through the back door" (zou houmen). Though widely criticized, zou houmen is nonetheless practiced at all levels in Chinese societies. Small wonder that with Mao's revolutionary politics gone, guanxi-based particularism seems to have surged in reformist China.
Final Thoughts
In addition, many unforeseen events and developments may change the trajectory on which political succession is set. This could include a military conflict in the East China Sea or South China Sea, the economic performance of the Xi-Li administration, the ongoing campaign against official corruption, increased social unrest exacerbated by environmental pollution, public health and food safety issues, growing public demand for political reform and constitutionalism, central-local tensions over tax division and local debts, problems with civilian control over the military, and the ever-changing international economic environment. All of these factors will play a role in determining China's political future, including who emerges on top in the next round of political succession. Yet well-positioned members in the Politburo and rising stars in the CCP leadership will always be important players regardless of whether the Chinese political landscape changes in any manner, be it drastic or incremental.
What is a faction?
In contemporary China factional politics is the core of informal poli tics.6 According to Andrew Nathan, a faction is a vertically organized structure composed of face-to-face (rather than corporate) clientelist ties between leaders and led.7
Provincial Leadership Experience: A Key Credential for Politburo Membership
In what appears to be an emerging political norm, the party secretaries of the four major cities that are under the direct leadership of the central government—Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing—are apparently now entitled to seats on the Politburo. This also seems the case for Guangdong Province, where three current PSC or Politburo members (Zhang Dejiang, Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua) have currently or previously served as Party boss. Two other PSC members, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli, also served as vice governor of Guangdong Province earlier in their careers. Local demand for an even distribution of membership seats across provinces and regions in both the Central Committee and the Politburo has become increasingly institutionalized. Although provincial and municipal leaders in economically advanced coastal regions were chosen for more seats in the new Politburo, their advantage is far less evident on the Central Committee, for which membership seats are more evenly distributed as previously discussed. In an important way, the dynamics and tensions among local leaders and between the center and provinces in terms of elite selection contribute to a more pluralistic and collective leadership in the country
Institutionalized Norms vs. Patron-Client Ties
Informal networks, such as the taizi (太子, princelings), tuanpai (团 派, Youth League faction), tongxiang (同乡, fellow provincials), tongxue (同学, fellow schoolmates), and the so-called Shanghai bang (上海帮, Shanghai Gang) are ubiquitous in the formation of the new leadership.2 Such nepotism and favoritism have, however, caused a growing demand—even within the political establishment—for a more representative leadership However, the selection of the most important leadership bodies, such as the PSC and the Politburo, still comes about through the traditional "black-box" manipulation on the part of either departing PSC members or powerful retired leaders such as former party chief Jiang Zemin. The leadership change at the 18th Party Congress primarily followed the extant rules and norms regarding age limits, and all members and alternates of the previous Central Committee who were born in or before 1944 no longer serve on the new Central Committee. The incomplete nature of this generational leadership transition reveals that there has been a lengthy, constant, and excessive power struggle at the top. This intense elite contention reflects the strong desire for many senior leaders to stay in power—even if their victory comes at the expense of the Party's ability to present to the country a fresh new leadership team for the next decade. The poor representation of the fifth generation in the PSC will likely also increase the political anxiety and resentment of the younger generations of elites. Due to age limits, five of the seven members of the PSC will retire at the 19th Party Congress that will take place in 2017. In a sense, the recent leadership change at the 18th Party Congress can be seen as a prelude to the full-fledged generational transition of power that will take place at the 19th Party Congress. Apparently, the upcoming round of vicious fighting for seats on the PSC will begin much earlier than expected. In fact, it has likely already begun. In terms of gender, ethnicity, and birthplace of the members of the Politburo, for the first time since the 13th Party Congress in 1987, there are now two female members (Vice Premier Liu Yandong and Tianjin Party Secretary Sun Chunlan) serving on the Politburo.
2 party factions
One of the two intra-party camps in China is the "elitist coalition" (or the "Jiang camp"), which emerged in the Jiang Zemin era. This coalition was originally headed by Jiang and is currently led by new party chief Xi Jinping. The core group of the elitist coalition consists mainly of princelings: leaders who come from families of either veteran revolutionaries or high-ranking officials (both Jiang and Xi are princelings). T he other camp is the "populist coalition" (or the Hu camp), which was led by President Hu Jintao prior to the 18th Party Congress and is now headed by his protégé Li Keqiang. The core group of the populist coalition are tuanpai: leaders who advanced their political career primarily by way of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), as did both Hu and Li. It is particularly worth noting that in each and every of the nine most important leadership organs in the PRC, namely the PSC, PRC presidency (president and vice president), State Council, CMC, CCP Secretariat, NPC, CPPCC, Supreme People's Court, and Supreme People's Procuratorate, the number one (第一把手) and number two (第二把手) leaders come from the two competing coalitions (see table 3). This suggests that under collective leadership in present-day China, there is a deliberate effort on the part of the top leadership to maintain factional balance of power in various forms
What is a clientelist tie?
Perhaps the single most culturally distinctive component of Chinese factionalism is the clientelist tie. Generally speaking, a clientelist tie in a faction has at least three dimensions: shared attributes, hierarchy, and reciprocity. Reciprocity is the goal, hierarchy the form, and shared at tributes the glue. Patron and clients enter into reciprocal relations to exchange patronage and deference/services. The mode of exchange is governed by the relative status of the two parties vis-A-vis each other, that is, by establishing a hierarchical tie. Before all this can happen, shared attributes have to be stressed to create a minimally affective bond. It is this bonding process that sets Chinese factionalism apart from comparable phenomena in other countries.
New Forms of Factional Balance of Power?
Since the late 1990s, two main political coalitions within the CCP leadership have been competing for power, influence, and control over policy initiatives. This bifurcation--a dynamic structure of "one party, two coalitions" (一党两派)--has created something approximating a mechanism of checks and balances in the decision-making process.5 One of the two intra-party camps in China is the "elitist coalition" (or the "Jiang camp"), which emerged in the Jiang Zemin era. This coalition was originally headed by Jiang and is currently led by new party chief Xi Jinping. The core group of the elitist coalition consists mainly of princelings: leaders who come from families of either veteran revolutionaries or high-ranking officials (both Jiang and Xi are princelings). T he other camp is the "populist coalition" (or the Hu camp), which was led by President Hu Jintao prior to the 18th Party Congress and is now headed by his protégé Li Keqiang. The core group of the populist
Reform comes out of stability and conservatism out of havoc. Again, reform was accompanied by expansion and, soon enough, overheating.
Since high growth is the paramount consideration of the leading reformist faction under Deng, one would expect expansionary policies to be taken once stability had been achieved.
The End of Technocrat Dominance
The CCP actually reformed its leadership from one consisting of peasants and soldiers during the revolutionary era to one consisting primarily of engineers during the 1990s and early 2000s. The rapid rise--and subsequent swift decline--in power and influence of technocrats over the past three decades has been a remarkable development in Chinese elite politics. One may define technocrats as political elites who received higher education in engineering (or the natural sciences) and practiced as engineers (or engaged in scientific research). In 1982, technocrats constituted just two percent of the Central Committee, but by 1987 they made up 25 percent of the Central Committee. By 1997 they comprised over half (52 percent). The percentage of technocrats on the Central Committee then began to decline in 2002 (46 percent) As a result of Deng Xiaoping's policy initiatives, in 1977 China resumed the use of college entrance exams. Many fifth-generation leaders entered college then in their mid- or late 20s. They majored in a wide range of newly resumed or established academic disciplines rather than concentrating on engineering and natural sciences as the third- and fourth-generation leaders had. A significant number of 18th Politburo members later pursued postgraduate studies on a part-time basis. Among the 16 current Politburo members who obtained advanced degrees, 14 (87.5 percent) did so on a part-time basis (see chart 4). More interestingly, eight Politburo members (32 percent) received their undergraduate degrees on a part-time basis. It is widely believed in China that many of these part-time degree programs, especially those offered to party officials, do not meet high academic standards. Some of these part-time academic degrees may turn out to be a political liability. It also remains to be seen whether the growing diversity in educational and occupational backgrounds of China's leaders will contribute to political pluralism and a more accountable decision-making process. The fact that some top leaders hold law degrees may also improve the prospects for legal and judicial development in the country.
BUSINESS, REFORM, AND MOVEMENT CYCLES -> lead to faction shifts
The business cycle consists of two distinctive phases: boom and bust.23 The reform cycle likewise has two stages: reform and retrenchment. The movement cycle registers periods of relative social tranquillity and those characterized by bursts of protest
Outline
The first section of this paper evaluates some of the more promising paradigms for conceptualizing informal politics, including both fac tional and nonfactional approaches, and culminates in a preliminary attempt at synthesis. The second section applies this model to factional behavior during the reform era, in an attempt to demonstrate the dy namic interplay of economic variables and factional political maneu vers. The major purpose of the study is to reconceptualize factional politics to enable factions to pursue policy goals, thus making it possi ble to map out the relations between factional dynamics and political economic cycles. As such, we will not go into the details of events but will instead offer a fresh theoretical perspective for analyzing China's new political economy under reform.
Lowell Dittmer and Yu-Shan Wu, "The Modernization of Factionalism in Chinese Politics." World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July, 1995), pp. 467-494
This was the case when Mao Zedong was in command, and it remains the case under Deng Xiaoping, despite all attempts to minimize its impact. It may be argued, nevertheless, that the nature of informal politics has changed significantly in the course of reform. How should we approach this phenomenon? With the People's Re public of China (PRC) moving to a new stage of political development, can we provide an analysis that is valid for both histor
Top Contenders for the 19th PSC and Politburo
Two norms in CCP leadership selection are very helpful for identifying who will be in or out on the next PSC. The first norm is the age requirement for retirement from the CCP Central Committee. At the 2007 party congress, all leaders born before 1940 were barred from continuing to serve on the Central Committee. Similarly, at the 2012 Party Congress, all leaders who were born before 1945 retired. Extrapolating from this norm, leaders who were born before 1950, including five of seven current PSC members, will not be considered for the next Central Committee and are therefore also out of the race for a seat on the Politburo or PSC in 2017. The second norm, primarily based on the 18th Party Congress, is that all new PSC members will be promoted from the previous Politburo. Based on these two norms, there will be 14 eligible candidates for the 19th PSC (see table 4, next page). Barring something entirely unforeseen, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will likely stay on for another five-year term.
Cheng Li-A Biographical and Factional Analysis of the Post-2012 Politburo
What does the composition of the post-2012 Politburo tell us about selection criteria, demographic trends in elite circulation, and strengths and weaknesses of these new leaders? What are the challenges for China's political institutionalization, including the degree of political nepotism and various forms of patron-client ties? Does the new Politburo maintain the factional balance of power that has characterized Chinese elite politics since the end of the strongman era in the mid-1990s? Who are the rising stars in the sixth generation of leadership and how do they differ from preceding generations? Based on an analysis of the current Politburo, who within the large pool of power contenders will likely serve on the next Politburo? Who are the leading candidates for seats on the next Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)? This essay aims to shed valuable light on these important questions
Formal politics does not really exist in China
When bureaucracies function according to official rules, they are operating mainly in the realm of formal politics, which need not concern us here. Once bureaucratic officials are mobilized to engage in informal political activities not sanctioned by established rules, the chances are good that personal connections will be invoked and partic ular interests implicated: factional politics is afoot. It is a common strategy for a Chinese politician to convert his or her bureaucratic con stituency into a factional power base, so that an independent kingdom (duli wangguo) or a mountain stronghold (shantou) is created, wherein interests and loyalties are so tightly bound that "you cannot stick a pin in" (zhen cha bujin), as Mao realized in September 1965, when he tried to force Peng Zhen to criticize (his own vice-mayor) Wu Han for the latter's play Hai Ruis Dismissal. In this way, formal bureaucratic orga nizations serve as trellises that support factions. Institutions then are mere instruments; informal factions are the core.
Shili vs Quanli
Whereas the aggregation of one's value-rational connections constitutes an informal power base from which to exert informal power (shili), one's occupational or "busi ness" connections together comprise the formal power base from which one can exercise official power (quanli).
While everywhere, informal politics is unbiquiotous in Chinese politics
Whereas we submit that the premium on and even the specific tech niques for the establishment of factional bonds are relatively distinc tive, neither guanxi nor any other attribute of informal politics can be said to be uniquely Chinese at this early stage of development of com parative political anthropology. Networking, clientelism, and informal mafias are ubiquitous in politics, particularly in less developed systems where formal institutionalization remains at a rudimentary stage of de velopment. Nevertheless, tenacious roots of Chinese informal politics have found more fertile soil in the PRC than in other systems at a comparable stage of economic development, due to the Confucian dis dain for legalism, plus nearly a century of revolution that systemati cally destroyed every attempt at formal institutionalization as being "bourgeois" or counterrevolutionary-culminating in a populist up heaval against the Communist Party-State apparatus itself in the Cul tural Revolution. Where else can one find a political system under the undisputed sway of a man who has "retired" from all formal positions?
What are faction goals?
factions may have three sets of goals, concerning security, material interests, and ideological and policy commitments. These goals constitute a natural hierarchy: security is the top priority, material interests are second, and ideological and policy preferences are last. Factional models, in the narrow sense of the term, were most applicable to the turbulent poli tics of the Cultural Revolution.20 At that time people fell back upon personal connections willy-nilly, to defend their careers and lives.2'
What is guanxixue?
n. A Chinese can choose the suitable items and expand or contract their boundaries at will to create connections with certain individuals, for mutual advantage. This is called la (pulling) guanxi. Guanxi can provide backdoor advantages and privileges, and la guanxi is common wherever Chinese live, whether in mainland China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Anyone with as pirations to success must learn guanxixue (relation-ology). Skillful ma nipulation of shared attributes is thus the primary basis for building one's network of personal connections, through which favors can be exchanged and personal interests advanced.
We argue below that just as Chinese politics as a whole has been changing to reflect the economic shift from plan to market, elite fac tionalism has been evolving as well. Whereas a hybrid model of "par tial reform" is best suited to the current Chinese economy, a modified factional model is the most useful analytical tool to understand elite politics in the Chinese Communist Party (cep) at its present stage of development. Granted this conceptual innovation, not only did fac tionalism not abate during the post-Mao period, but it may actually have increased. Our most basic modification of the original model is to see Chinese factionalism as concerning itself not only with particular istic group and member interests, but also with economic and other public policy issues. This introduces the possibility of analyzing the re lationship between macroeconomic issues in the public arena and fac tional disputes within the leadership core-an analysis we undertake in the second half of this article.
n. In any case, synchronization exacerbated the intensity of the cycle, subjecting reforms to periodic criticism by the moderates and conservatives for having precipitated inflation, overheating, and other macroimbalances. These critics used the opportunity to rein in reform excesses and purge reformers, temporarily stalling reform momentum.
4 types of informal group
s four types of informal group, ranging from bureaucratic politics -(a formal group engaged in public actions consistent with its organiza tional interests) to factionalism (an informal group engaged in self promoting schemes and plots). There are two intermediate cases: the independent kingdom is a bureaucratic unit that functions like an in formal group, essentially because it has been reorganized clandestinely on the basis of factional loyalty; and the opinion group is a faction that does not engage in nefarious activity for the time being, although it reserves the right to do so in the future
Tendency vs bureaucratic vs factional models
s. Actually, all three approaches-factional models, bureaucratic theories, and tendency analyses-have two basic dimensions: actors and goals. The factional approach assumes the cen trality of factions as actors and particularistic interests as main elite goals. The bureaucratic model puts formal bureaucratic agencies at the center and treats resource allocation among them as the major elite concern. Tendency analysis does not specify participants but empha sizes broad policy alternatives as the main motivating forces behind elite actions.