INR4011 Final Exam Study Guide

Are their findings consistent with the economic anxiety hypothesis? Are they consistent with the status threat hypothesis?

they are consistent with the status threat hypothesis - in conjunction with the voting results indicating a strong preference for Trump among white voters in localities with higher manufacturing job losses, one possible interpretation of the survey analysis is that some whites perceive deindustrialization as a status threat

What is the primary reason people in the top of the "trunk" of the elephant have seen the most benefits under globalization?

they can take advantage of global markets

what has happened to the 1.1 billion people on the "back" and "head" of the elephant graph?

they have been lifted out of extreme poverty

In order to achieve very high levels of economic integration ("hyperglobalization"), what fundamental choice do countries need to make?

they must choose between national sovereignty and democracy (or "mass politics")

According to Hainmueller & Hiscox (2010), do Americans in general prefer low-skill or high-skill immigration?

they prefer high-skill immigration

Video: Why do people risk their lives to come to Europe?

- Root causes of migration: conflict, political insecurity, and economic insecurity - Most of the migration is south-south: if you are an Afghan who needs a job, you will go to Iran and get a job in a week - you won't come to Europe just for a job - A German passport gives visa free access to 157 countries, an Afghan passport to 23 - for most migrants, Europe is a land of rights - people really believe in the discourse of human rights that is used for political purposes and that's what drives them to come to Europe - those who aspire to leave will leave, but not all aspire to leave - research has shown that social welfare is not part of the initial decision to migrate - what they want is to contribute

What are some of the main historical examples of international regimes/arrangements that represent the different choices made by national governments along the dimensions defined by the globalization trilemma?

- The Bretton Woods-GATT regime - countries were free to dance to their own tune as long as they removed a number of border restrictions on trade and generally did not discriminate among their trade partners - international finance, countries were allowed to maintain restrictions on capital flows - trade, the rule frowned upon quantitative restrictions but not import tariffs - agriculture and textiles were left out of the negotiations - developing country trade policies were effectively left outside the scope of international discipline - Western Europe integrated within itself - Japan caught up with the developed economies using its own distinctive brand of capitalism - china grew once it recognized the importance of private initiative - east Asia generated an economic miracle relying on industrial policies that have since been banned by the WTO - countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa generated unprecedented economic growth rates until the late 1970s under import-substitution policies that insulated their economies from the world economy

Why have recent populist movements in Western Europe taken a different form than previous populist movements in Latin America? In other words, why have populist movements in Europe typically been of the right-wing variety, while in Latin America they have been mostly left-wing historically?

- a major source for far-right parties in Europe has been the fear that immigration will erode welfare state benefits (easier to mobilize along the ethno-national/cultural cleavage when society is experiencing an influx of immigrants and refugees with dissimilar cultural and religious identities) - In Latin America, populism turned left-wing due to the salient shocks associated with globalization which took different forms there. - Latin Americans who were affected negatively by globalization experienced it as a rapid trade opening, financial crises, IMF programs, and entry by foreign corporation in sensitive domestic sectors - the anger to be mobilized was against these forces and the domestic groups that supported them

How do international trade and financial integration foment populist backlash against economic globalization?

- as globalization advances and policy makers go after the remaining, low barriers, trade agreements become more about redistribution and less about expanding the overall economic pie

What looking at the level of public opposition to immigration in the US, are attitudes perfectly consistent with economic logic? What are the main patterns found by Goldstein & Peters with respect to the overall level of opposition to immigration?

- attitudes are not perfectly consistent with economic logic - if they were, then people's preferences on trade and immigration would be strongly correlated: low skilled natives should oppose low skilled immigrants and high skilled natives should oppose high skilled immigrants - however, we see non-economic factors, such as natives, come into play and have an effect on people's views - overall levels of opposition are negative, especially among low skilled immigrants - but we see non-economic factors such as level of education/skill level effect behaviors and make them out of line of traditional economic thought - Goldstein exemplified this with his data showing high skilled natives supporting all levels of immigration the most, when they should be opposing the same skilled (high) immigrants

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled Immigration - Evidence from a survey experiment

- both low-skilled and highly-skilled natives strongly prefer highly skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants, an this preference is not decreasing in natives' skill levels (goes against the labor market competition model) - rich and poor natives are equally opposed to low-skilled immigration in general (goes against the fiscal burden model) - the concerns among poor natives about constraints on welfare benefits as a result of immigration are more relevant than concerns among the rich about increased taxes - economic self-interests does not explain voter attitudes toward immigration - noneconomic concerns associated with ethnocentrism or sociotropic consideration about how the local economy as a whole may be affected by immigration

What is the "migration hump?"

- describes countries' transition from being a net sender to a net receiver of international migrants as a function of its level of economic development - as wages in the country increase, more people can assume the costs of migration, and so the country will start sending more migrants to other countries - however, as the age gap between the country and other richer countries closes, emigration starts to fall again

According to Mayda (2008), do individuals in different countries tend to have similar opinions on trade and immigration? Is support for trade higher or lower, on average, than support for immigration?

- each country in the sample displays higher average values for Pro-trade than for Pro-Immigration - individuals are on average more pro-trade than pro-immigration across countries

There is debate on whether the electoral responses to globalization have been driven by economic anxiety or by cultural concerns such as status threat. What evidence do we have for the economic anxiety hypothesis? What evidence do we have for the cultural/status threat hypothesis?

- economic anxiety: whites experience deindustrialization differently than do voters of color. localized manufacturing job losses appear to invoke concerns among white voters about American economic decline and the current course of the country. job losses also appear to lead whites to question the prospects of upward mobility at the individual level, for the "average" American - cultural/status threat: the decline of manufacturing in a locality can create a unique social status threat for some whites in that area. this is because the negative economic and social consequences of deindustrialization upend the settled expectations of whiteness: they challenge whites' privileged status as the dominant group

Rodrik (2018) - Populism and the economics of globalization

- economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash - "populism:" antiestablishment orientation, a claim to speak for the people against the elites, opposition to liberal economics and globalization, and a penchant for authoritarian governance - magnification effect in trade theory: openness to trade creates losers - specific-factors model: each good has a factor that is used only in that sector. the factors that lose are those that are specific to the importable sectors - redistribution is the flip side of the gains from trade - people tend to express preference for equality in small groups, but when asked about the ideal distribution for their country (or large groups), they support an unequal distribution of resources - deep integration is pushed by specific lobbies and special interests - the nature of trade agreements has changed overtime, rendering them more divisive in terms of value and fairness considerations - financial globalization accentuates the weakness of domestic institutions and debt-enforcement mechanisms - strong empirical association between financial globalization and financial crises over time - financial globalization has produced adverse distributional impacts within countries - capital mobility gives employers a credible threat: accept lower wages, or else we move abroad; the decline in the labor share is related to the threat of relocating production abroad - FDI is associated with the rise in inequality - as capital becomes globally mobile, it becomes harder to tax - most populist movements in the current wave are of right-wing variety: they emphasize a cultural cleavage, the national, ethnic, religious, or cultural identity of the "people" against outside groups who allegedly pose a threat to the popular will - the rise of populism as the product of both demand and supply side factors at work - left-wing populism: emphasize the income cleavage target the wealthy and large corporations - the best contribution global arrangement can make is to make the nation state work better - key role for global institutions: enhance key democratic norms of representation, participation, deliberation, rule of law, and transparency - without prejudging policy outcomes or requiring harmonization - the rules that need to be developed in globalization are those that prioritize fairness, address concerns of social dumping, and enhance policy space in both developed and developing nations

Eduction might be related to attitudes towards immigration in different ways. What are the potential economic and non-economic effects of education on individual preferences for more or less immigration?

- economic hypothesis: known as the labor market hypothesis, people will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own, but will be less opposed (or more supportive) of immigration of workers with different skills, since the latter are assumed to not pose a direct threat to one's job - non-economic hypothesis: anticipates that higher levels of education will lead individuals to have higher levels of ethnic and/or racial tolerance, as well as a more cosmopolitan worldview. in turn, this should make highly-educated individuals less opposed to immigration

Has local exposure to international trade had any discernible electoral consequences in the US?

- electoral districts with high trade exposure experience: growing ideological polarization (increased support for strong-left and strong-right views) and a higher likelihood of electing a Republican in Congress

Hainmueller and Hiscox consider the hypothesis that education might affect cultural values, which in turn might affect attitudes toward immigration. What evidence do they find for it?

- exposure to university education seems to be the critical contributor to the generally positive relationships between education and support for immigration - the predicted probability of supporting highly skilled immigration is about 0.15 higher than the probability of supporting low-skilled immigration - education is strongly associated with higher levels of racial tolerance and stronger preferences for cultural diversity among individuals - the observed association between education and support for immigration is driven by cultural and ideational mechanisms

What are the possible distributional consequences of financial globalization, according to Rodrik? Who is likely to lose and who is likely to win?

- financial globalization accentuates the weakness of domestic institutions and debt-enforcement mechanisms - strong empirical association between financial globalization and financial crises over time - financial globalization magnified the impact of underlying distortions, such as inadequate regulation of credit markets and banks - financial globalization appears to have complemented trade in extorting downward pressure on the labor share of income - low-skilled workers and those that are least able to move across borders (and domestic firms) are more likely to lose - high-skilled workers and those that are most likely to move across borders (and FDI's) are more likely to win

Across the world, which groups have gained the most in the contemporary era of globalization? Which groups seem to have benefitted the least?

- gained: the top 1% and emerging countries - lose - lower and middle classes of rich countries and the bottom 50%

According to Rodrik (2018), what are the international economic sources of populism?

- globalization - changes in technology - rise of winner-take-all markets - erosion of labor-market protections - decline of norms restricting pay differentials

Baccini Weymouth (2021) - Deindustrialization, white voter backlash, and US Presidential voting

- globalization and automation have contributed to deindustrialization - deindustrialization threatens dominant group status, leading some white voters in affected localities to favor candidates they believe will address economic distress and defend racial hierarchy - white voters were more likely to vote for Republican challengers where manufacturing layoffs were high - black voters in hard-hit localities were more likely to vote for Democrats - in survey data, white respondents, in contrast to people of color, associated local manufacturing job losses with obstacles to individual upward mobility and with broader American economy decline - group-based identities help explain divergent political reactions to common economic shocks - for voters of color in hard-hit localities, deindustrialization may increase support for progressive candidates offering policies designed to address racial and economic injustice - whites were less likely than non-whites to vote for Clinton in counties that had experienced more manufacturing layoffs - manufacturing layoffs depressed the turnout of voters of color relative to white voters - localized manufacturing decline heightens economic anxiety among whites - some whites perceive deindustrialization as a status threat

Video: Are there winners and losers of Globalization?

- globalization has been good to mainly everyone, but some have better effects than others - "biggest winners:" the wealthy and the super wealthy - people in the middle have gained, but not nearly as much though when it comes to percentage scale - elephant curve - middle class workers in developed countries are competing against immigrants working for cheaper labor and automated devices replacing them = lowest part on the elephant curve - 88% of manufacturing jobs in the US are being displaced by robots, not foreign workers - the elephant graph shows the effect of globalization on income growth for people of various incomes

Goldin et al. (2012) Leaving Home - Migration Decisions and Processes

- globalization sets in motion economic and social forces that are shaping the structures and networks that impact upon the migration decision - the migration decision is nested within a broader set of family considerations, social networks, and political and economic decisions - migration processes are shaped by a range of interacting factors at the micro-, meso-, and macro- levels - at the micro-level, migration is a choice. to the extent that potential migrants are free to choose, their decision is a cost/benefit calculation that takes stock of both the promises of migration and its psychological and financial risks - at the mesh-level, networks and social capital inform the decision to migrate, lower barriers, and facilitate cross-border mobility for certain individuals and groups - individual choices and social networks are created within the context of macro-level structures - demographic, economic, and political conditions that exert "push" and "pull" factors - migration can be part of a "livelihood strategy" for families to diversify sources of income, not just the pursuit of personal gain - while the migration decision itself is complex, contemporary globalization is generally leading to increasing pressures on the borders of developed countries

Mayda (2008) - Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration

- governments have been much more willing to open up their borders to trade and capital flows than to migration - while opinions on trade and immigration are positively correlated at the individual level, respondents are on average more pro-trade than pro-immigration - each country in the sample displays higher average values for pro-trade than for pro-immigration - individual preferences on trade and immigration should be positively correlated and similar impacted by the level of individual skill - the impact of individual skill on pro-trade attitudes is higher in countries which are more skill-abundant - the impact of individual skill on pro-migration attitudes is higher in countries that receive unskilled immigrants - working in a non-trade sector increases the likelihood of being pro-trade by 3%, while it does not affect migration attitudes - workers in non-traded sectors feel shielded from foreign competition working through trade but not from labor-market competition of immigrants - while immigrants can contribute to and benefit from the welfare state, imports of goods and services can do neither of these - if immigrants are perceived as a net burden for public finances, as in the US, the welfare state is a good explanation of differences in attitudes - another explanation of the gap in the difference in the size of the impact of non-economic factors, given that the social and cultural effects of immigration are more pronounced relative to trade

Do they find any marked differences in the support for low- and high-skill immigration?

- high-skilled respondents were much more likely to increase their opposition to high-skill immigration during the Great Recession than were low-skill respondents

What are the trade-offs entailed by the trilemma?

- if a government choose fixed exchange rates and capital mobility, it has to give up monetary autonomy - if it wants monetary autonomy and capital mobility, it has to go with floating exchange rates - if it wants to combine fixed exchange rates with monetary autonomy, it had better restrict capital mobility

Do they find any marked differences in the support for immigration from different countries/regions of the world?

- immigration from Mexico was opposed the most - Immigration from Europe was most popular

Video: Wage effects of immigration in the US

- immigration increases the supply for labor, while also increasing the demand for labor (common misconception) - more migrants to a country = more immigrants that can/are willing to work = supply increase for labor - more migrants to a country = more immigrants/people in general that need to be taken care of = demand increase for labor - immigration does not lower wages, it can only change them - comparative advantage example: working longer hours to pay an immigrant to do the job > working less hours and doing the job yourself rather than an immigrant - Boros theory: immigration increases returns to capital and returns to land - immigrants create new jobs and new economic sectors - David Card theory: immigration does not affect wages for natural born citizens - Giovanni Peri theory: immigrants may increase the wages of native-born Americans - Immigration leads to economic benefits mostly, and does not have significant downward effects of wages for native-born workers - Immigration tends to benefit innovation and economic growth

Why is further trade liberalization in already open economies likely to be contentious and generate a populist backlash?

- in already open economies, any additional liberalization will entail significant redistribution from losers to winners - however, the efficiency gains from this additional liberalization will be small - therefore, the focus shifts from the aggregate gains from trade (which are now small) to disputes over the distribution of gains and losses - political conflict over trade policy thus intensifies

In the contemporary era of globalization, what has been the effect of international economic integration on global income inequality?

- income inequality has increased since 1980 in English-speaking countries (but not in continental Europe) - In the US, income growth since 1980 has been largely captured by the top 1% - poverty levels have dropped dramatically in Asia, Africa, and Latin America - more inequality between countries

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) - Educated preferences - explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe

- individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, we find that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question - higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants - the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor-market competition - income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small - a large component of the link between education and attitudes toward immigrants is drive by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs - anti-immigration sentiments appear to be far more powerfully associated with cultural values that have more to do with conceptions of national identity than they do with the concerns about personal, economic circumstances

What are Hainmueller and Hiscox's (2007) main findings regarding the effect of education? Are these findings consistent with conventional arguments about labor-market competition?

- individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to support immigration regardless of the characteristics of the immigrant in question - the relationship between education and immigration attitudes is almost identical for people who are in the active labor force and for those who are not - this is no consistent with the labor market hypothesis, since views on immigration seem to be weakly related to concerns about competition in the job market

Does economic globalization tend to increase or decrease within-country income inequality? In what types of countries has it led to more inequality? Are there countries where globalization is likely to have led to less inequality?

- inequality between countries is much higher than inequality within countries. the trend of global inequality is mostly driven by what happens to inequality between countries.

Rodrik (2000) - How far will international economic integration go

- international economic integration (globalization) remains remarkably limited - while formal barriers to trade and capital flows have been substantially reduced over the last 3 decades, international markets for goods, services, and capital are not nearly as "thick" as they would be under complete integration - exchanges that cross national jurisdiction are subject to a wide array of transaction costs introduced by discontinuities in political and legal systems - contract enforcement: national sovereignty interferes with contract enforcement, leaving international transactions hostage to an increased risk of opportunistic behavior (most severe in the case of capital outflows) - "impossible trinity:" countries cannot simultaneously maintain independent monetary policies, fixed changed rates, and open capital account - the three nodes of the extended trilemma are international economic integration, the nation-state, and mass politics - global federalism would align jurisdictions with the market, and remove the "border" effects - an alternative to global federalism in order to achieve complete international economic integration is to maintain the nation-state system largely as is, but to ensure that national jurisdictions do not get in they way of economic transactions - the overarching goal of nation-states in the world would be to appear attractive to international markets - the golden straitjacket narrows the political and economic policy choices of those in power to relatively tight parameters - once the rules of the game are set by the requirements of the global economy, the ability of mobilized popular groups to access and influence national economic policy-making has to be restricted - we are nowhere near complete International economic integration

Which variety of populism has been on the rise more recently, and why?

- left-wing populism - it is easier to mobilize along income/social class lines when the globalization shock takes the form mainly of trade, finance, and foreign investment

The Economist - Shooting an Elephant

- measures global income inequality - created by ranking the world's population, from the poorest 10% to the richest 1%, in 1998 and in 2008 - at each rank, the chart showed the growth in income between these two years, an era of "high globalization" from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of Lehman Brothers - the chart showed big income gains at the middle and very top - the era of globalization seemed to offer little for the people in between: households in the 75th to 85th percentile of the income distribution (who were poor than the top 15% but richer than everyone else) seemed scarcely better off in 2008 than they had been 20 years before - faster population growth among people in the lower reaches of the income distribution will automatically shunt everyone above them further up the income ranks, even without any improvement in their fortunes - the flat incomes reflect a comparison between the original Latin American and Western occupants of this income bracket and the Chinese who jumped into it 20 years later - both charts show that China's middle classes and the world's rich have gained handsomely in the era of globalization

What are the main micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors that drive migration flows?

- micro - cost/benefit calculation of promises and psychological and financial risks - meso - networks and social capital facilitate cross-border - macro - demographic, economic, political, environmental conditions; push and pull factors

Video: Rodrik, The Trade-Offs of Globalization

- new employment opportunities for people - many Americans fear for their economic future because of the presence of countries like China - engineers, managers, accountants are high-skilled workers who can expand internationally - less-skilled workers in advanced countries do not have a great impact from globalization - the globalization trilemma (you can have 2/3): hyper-globalization, national sovereignty, democratic politics - Hyper-globalization + National sovereignty = golden straightjacket, enforced the rights of investors and ensured the free flow of capital around the world - National sovereignty + Democratic politics = Bretton Woods compromise, needed a regime that would combine a national sovereignty with democratic politics - Democratic politics + Hyper-globalization = global governance and global federalism - an economist's first job is to understand the tradeoffs of the different choices

Why are national sovereignty and mass democracy potentially at odds with each other under very high levels of global economic integration?

- once the rules of the game are set by the requirements of the global economy, the ability of mobilized popular groups to access and influence national economic policy-making has to be restricted - national sovereignty interferes with contract enforcement, leaving international transactions hostage to an increased risk of opportunistic behavior - if we want tru international economic integration, we have to go either with the nation-state, in which case the domain of national politics will have to be significantly restricted, or else with mass politics, in which case we will have to give up the nation-state in favor of global federalism - known as the political trilemma of the world economy

Also, how do economic and political conditions help explain migration patterns?

- people move away from areas of economic contraction toward areas of growth - the movement of people is expected to follow the movement of capital - increased international capital flows, notably in the form of FDI's, have been associated with the expansion of export manufacturing and export agriculture - political conflict destroys livelihoods, threatens lives, spreads disease, and leads to refugee flows (all helps explain migration) - government policies that try to shut down channels for labor migration can lead to an explosion in undocumented migration, through visa overstaying, or migrants taking perilous journeys

What are the authors' main findings with respect to changes in opposition to immigration in response to the Great Recession? Are these patterns consistent with an economic explanation? What is the role of perceptions of economic threat?

- respondents largely oppose immigration - especially low skill - opposition to high-skill immigrants increased during recessions - low skill immigrants are always unpopular, but became even more so during the 6 year surveys during recession (2007-2008) - those who felt more threatened by economic hard times were more likely to increase their opposition to immigration of all types as they view immigrants as job and opportunity stealers - this is not particularly consistent with economic logic because trade, immigration, and an open economy work hand-in-hand to help boost the GDP of an economy and ultimately help advance it - people are more worried about their financial stability and wages that they don't want immigrants migrating here to increase wage competition

Economic logic suggests that trade and immigration policy have similar material and distributional effects. Is public opinion in the US similar with respect to trade and immigration? What are the main differences?

- respondents who work industries directly threatened (helped) by trade and immigration will oppose (favor) openness - more Americans than ever think international trade is good for the U.S. economy, but see immigration as a threat - immigration attitudes/policy reflect a set of non-economic factors (nativism) and economic anxiety amplifies nativist sentiment

Many studies conceive of economic self-interest and cultural bias as competing - and sometimes mutually exclusive - explanations of immigration attitudes. According to Goldstein & Peters (2014), are these factors independent of each other? How does their interaction help us explain individual attitudes toward immigrants?

- self interest and cultural bias are not mutually exclusive, rather they work together to form a persons preference - cultural bias helps establish someone's baseline preference, while self-interest helps explains how our preferences may change

Goldstein Peters (2014) Nativism or economic threat - attitudes toward immigrants during the Great Recession

- separated the nativist sentiment and economic position and was able to focus on how economic hardship - that of respondents and that of other in their community - interacts with nativism and changes attitudes - Americans have a baseline preference for some immigrants over others (they like immigrants who are high-skill and/or come from a country that sends many high-skill workers) - Americans still dislike immigrants who are more culturally dissimilar - high-skill respondents were much more likely to increase their opposition to high-skill immigration during the Great Recession than were low-skill respondents - low-skill respondents were equally likely to increase their opposition to low-skill immigrants as high-skill respondents - education is measuring both tolerance and skill level - those who felt more threatened by economic hard time were more likely to increase their opposition to immigration of all types - changes in social spending did not affect opinions on immigration, nor did changes in the level of fiscal exposure - the public is far less critical of America's policy of open trade borders than is often portrayed in the popular press - support for trade openness, in part, may reflect how trade is portrayed by politicians and the media - a component of immigration attitudes that is based on prior cultural beliefs, there is an important - and perhaps the most important - component of an individual's attitudes that is associated with the economic position - cultural factors influence attitudes on immigration, and in particular, the public finds immigration from Mexico deeply problematic - US attitudes toward globalization are more robust when global forces are not seen to impede economic well-being - while low-skill immigrants were problematic precession, all immigrants became a problem during the recession

If the evidence is not consistent with the labor-market competition argument, how else might we interpret the effect of education?

- some evidence that supports the non-economic/cultural hypothesis - education is strongly associated with individuals' cultural values and beliefs - specifically, individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to value cultural diversity and tend to display lower levels of racial prejudice - individuals with more education are also more likely to think that immigration is good for their country's economy

According to Hainmueller & Hiscox (2010), what are the expected distributional consequences of immigration?

- the "factor-proportions" model derives the distributional effects in the native economy from the impact that immigration has on the relative supplies of factors of production - natives should oppose immigrants with similar skill levels but favor immigrants with different skill levels - wages of native low-skilled works will fall as new (low-skilled) immigrants price themselves into employment; and, as more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of the other factors, the real wages of highly skilled workers will rise

At the macro level, how does demography influence migration flows?

- the demographic differences between rich countries and their neighbors Crete incentive for both migrants and policy-makers to increase labor flows - a country's distribution of age groups in the population (its demographic profile) can influence both its supply and its demand of migrants

Why do people migrate to another country?

- the family is the main unity of decision-making when it comes to migration - the migration of a family member is the family's response to economic risk where social safety nets are not available - migration can be an effective strategy to diversify the family's sources of income

Who loses and who wins according to the fiscal burden hypothesis?

- the fiscal burden hypothesis suggests that rich natives will oppose low-skill immigration and favor high-skill immigrants more than low-income natives, but this is not supported - rich and poor natives prefer high-skilled immigrants - rich natives are less opposed to low-skill immigration in states with high fiscal exposure

Who loses and who wins from immigration according to theories of labor market competition?

- the labor market competition hypothesis suggests that natives will oppose immigrants with similar skill levels to their own (low-skilled natives will oppose low-skilled immigrants), but this is not supported - both low-skill and high-skilled US natives prefer high-skill immigrants over low-skilled immigrants - the higher the respondent's skill level, the higher their support for both high- and low-skill immigrants

According to Rodrik (2000), even though formal barriers to trade and capital flows have been drastically reduced over the last four decades, we are still far from a world in which markets for goods, services, and factors of production are perfectly integrated. For Rodrik, what explains this lack of international economic integration?

- the main remaining barriers are the transaction costs that result from the fact that contracts are not fully enforceable across borders - limits the potential for some international transactions (trade and investment) that would have occurred if contracts were fully enforceable because economic agents may fear the risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of others

What are the authors' main results? Are they consistent with the main economic explanations of attitudes toward immigration? What other types of explanation, if not economic is the evidence consistent with?

- the results from the survey experiment challenge the predictions made by the standard political-economic models - concerns about labor market competition are not a powerful driver of anti-immigrant sentiment in the US - labor market competition model is proven to be false because support for both highly skilled and low-skilled immigration is strongly increasing in respondents' skill levels - the standard fiscal burden model is proven to be false because rich and poor natives are equally opposed to low-skilled immigration in general, and rich natives are actually less opposed to low-skilled immigration in high-exposure states than in low-exposure states - other types of explanations: higher education levels is associated with higher levels of racial tolerance and stronger preferences for cultural diversity among individuals and attitudes toward immigration stem largely from people's perceptions of the collective impact of policy on a nation as a whole

Do the authors find evidence in favor of the labor market competition hypothesis?

- this hypothesis is rejected by the data - the labor marker competition hypothesis is not a significant motivator of anti-immigrant sentiment - both highly skilled and low-skilled respondents strongly prefer highly skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants - support for both highly skilled and low-skilled immigration is strongly increasing in respondents' skill levels

At the individual level, how does a neoclassical economic approach explain the decision to migrate?

- through basic utility maximization - individuals want to seek their highest utility, or well-being, and typically this involves pursuing higher wages - according to this approach, migration flows between two countries are the product of aggregated individual moves undertaken in response to individual cost/benefit calculations of this sort

According to Mayda, why are people more pro-trade than pro-immigration in general?

- while immigrants can contribute to and benefit from the welfare state, imports of goods and services can do neither of these - if immigrants are perceived as a net burden for public finances, the welfare state is a good explanation of differences in attitudes - the gap is the different in the size of the impact of non-economic factors, given that the social and cultural effects of immigration are more pronounced relative to trade

According to Baccini & Weymouth (2021), how have different social groups in the US responded to job losses in the manufacturing sector?

- white Americans experience deindustrialization as a threat to their status - while for African Americans, the voting response to manufacturing job loss suggests the repudiation of a reactionary brand of politics centered on industrial revival and the reaffirmation of racial hierarchy

How have white and non- white voters responded to deindustrialization at the ballot box?

- whites: manufacturing job losses are associated with increased voting for the less redistributively-oriented part - non-whites: black voters were more likely to vote for Clinton where manufacturing job losses are high, Trump's message of white grievance repelled Black voters, manufacturing layoffs depressed the turnout of voters of color

What is the role of social networks in explaining migration?

can help transform potential migration into actual migration by transmitting information, finance, accommodation, and job prospects from individuals in the destination country to individuals in the source country

What is the globalization (or augmented) trilemma?

countries cannot simultaneously maintain independent monetary policies, fixed exchange rates, and an open capital account

Does economic globalization tend to increase or decrease global income inequality between countries?

increase global income inequality between countries

pull factor for immigration

induce people to move into a new location

push factor for immigration

induce people to move out of their present location

What is the economic role of migration for families?

it can be part of a "livelihood strategy" for families to diversify sources of income

What are the different varieties of populism?

left-wing and right-wing

Do they find similar levels of support for trade and immigration in the US?

more Americans than ever think international trade is good for the US economy

why have the working and middle class in rich countries seen little to no growth?

outsourcing and automation

What is populism?

support for the concerns of ordinary people - antiestablishment orientation - a claim to speak for the people against the elites - opposition to liberal economics and globalization - a preference for authoritarian governance

According to the new economics of labor migration (NELM), what is the primary unit of decision-making with respect to migration?

the family (as opposed to the individual) is the main unit of decision-making when it comes to migration.