international conflict exam 1

Alliance:

A formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force

Peaceful Dyads (factors that reduce risks of war)

Alliances, Democracy, Trade, International Organizations, Border Settlement, Nuclear Weapons, Domestic politics/leaders' resolve

COW Alliance Types

Defense pact• Neutrality/Non-aggression pact• Entente

issues with rivalry

• Thompson's critique: some pairs of states that fight 6 or more MIDs are not really rivals, especially when there is significant capability asymmetry (e.g. US-Haiti).• Goertz and Diehl (2001) report that 30% of their total 63 enduring rivalries involve a major-minor power dyad (18% are major-major, 52% are minor-minor).

How Can We Make War Less Likely?

•Raising the costs of war-e.g. nuclear weapons•Increasing transparency-e.g. IAEA •Providing outside enforcement of commitments-e.g. US post WWII security guarantees •Dividing apparently indivisible goods-e.g. joint/shared control of territory or compensation

Issue Approach Assumptions

#1: Foreign policy is issue directed. #2: Cooperative and conflictual foreign policy tools are substituable means to pursue issue-related ends .#3: Actors' preferences and decisions regarding issue management are influenced by desires to maximize the probability of achieving issue-related goals and minimize the costs that are incurred in doing so, as well as by the saliencethey attach to the issue.

Trends in Interstate Warfare

-Increasing severity (until recently) but decreasing intensity (% of population killed) -Decrease in number of great power wars (16thcentury-22; 19thcentury-5; 20thcentury-5) -Decline in frequency of interstate wars since 1945, but increasing frequency of civil warsShift from wars fought in Europe to other regions -Warfare is increasingly asymmetricIncreased diffusion of conflict

What makes deterrence successful?Success depends on credibility, which depends on:

1) Capabilities 1)You can achieve a battlefield victory 2)You can inflict other unacceptable losses (e.g. through nuclear attacks)2) Intentions1) Long term reputation for resolve2) Strong defender-client ties in extended deterrence

Interstate War (Small and Singer)

1) Fatalities: minimum 1,000 military personnel battle deaths among all participating system members 2) On each side, there must be at least one participant that is a memberof the international system:-Minimum 500,000 population-Diplomatic recognition by France and UK through WWI-After 1920, UN or League of Nations member or received diplomats from any two major powers 3) To be a warparticipant, a state must suffer 100 battle deaths orhave a minimum of 1000 armed personnel engaged in active combat.Note that the COW threshold for battle deaths is higher than what Lewis Fry Richardson used in his study (317).

Types of Deterrence

1) General deterrence: threat by the attacker is not immediately imminent 2) Immediate deterrence: the potential attacker's threat to use force is imminent 3) Direct deterrence: the defending country is trying to prevent an attack on its own territory 4) Extended deterrence: the defending country is trying to protect a 3rd party (protégé)

Dangerous dyads (the seven factors that make conflict most/least likely & why theoretically; Bremer's empirical findings)

1) Geographical Proximity-War and militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are more likely between states that share a land or water (up to 150 miles) border-War is more likely between states whose capital cities are closer to each other-Causal explanations•Proximity creates contentious issues•Military reach•Territorial disputes-Measure: land contiguous, sea contiguous (up to 150 miles of water), or non-contiguous 2) Power Parity and War-Systemic level: balance of power versus power transition/long cycle theories-Dyadic level: parity (pairs of countries with similar levels of military, economic, and demographic capabilities) increases chances for MIDs and wars-Relates also to the bargaining model of war•In parity, both sides overestimate chances of winning-Measure: CINC score, states' global share of military (personnel & expenditures), economic (iron & steel production & energy consumption), & demographic (population & urban population)-Large difference (dyadic capability ratio > 10), medium difference (ratio between 3 & 10), small difference (< 3) 3) Power Status and War-Major powers (as defined by COW) are more likely to engage in war than minor powers. 4) Alliances and War-Deterrence: if states have credible commitments of defense from allies, they are less likely to be attacked (Leeds)-Escalation: alliances constitute a step to war and increase the risks of conflict (Vasquez)-Allies may have incentives to fight each other (Bueno de Mesquita): e.g. USSR vs. China, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia-Measure: COW categories of defense pacts, neutrality agreements, ententes or no alliances 5) Democracy and War-Democratic dyads are less likely to experience wars than non-democratic or mixed regime dyads.-Measures for both democratic, one democratic, or none democratic from Chan & Gurr 6) Development and War-Leninist thesis: economically advanced states will have more conflict due to competition over resources.-Dependency thesis: conflict is more likely in asymmetric dyads involving a developed and a less developed state.-Measure: A state is economically advanced if its share of systemic economic capabilities > its share of demographic capabilities 7) Militarization and War-Deterrence theory: militarization makes for less war (e.g. nuclear weapons in the Cold War: Waltz)-Escalation: militarization/arms races constitute a step to war and increase tensions/escalation of disputes (Vasquez, Wallace, Sample)-Bremer: pairs of more militarized states are more likely to fight wars than other states.•A state is militarized if its share of systemic military capabilities > its share of demographic capabilities

in Sample's study, which historical period shows the strongest relationship between arms races (mutual military buildups) and escalation of militarized disputes to war?

1816-1944

Future Power Transitions?

2016 GDP for US is about 18.57 trillion versus 11.2 trillion for China. China is projected to overtake the US due to its growth rate being 2-3 times current US growth.Predictions imply that this transition is likely to occur between 2025-2040.Also possible for a future US overtaking by India.China already surpassed the US in 2014 in purchasing power parity (combining GDP with cost of living).

how many total rivalries did Klein, Goertz, and Diehl identify empirically in chapter 5?

290

Alliance-War Relationship

Alliances make war lesslikely- Balance of Power theory• Alliances deter war by enhancing the credibility of military intervention; aggressors know who they could face after attacking.- Deterrence• A potential challenger is less likely to attack if it knows it will face two or more enemies in battle.• If alliances are attacked, they must be judged to be unreliable by potential challengers (Smith 1996).- Alliances reduce uncertainty in the system & reduce chances for war based on misperception. • How do alliances serve as costly signals?- Sunk costs in alliance formation- Audience costs for abrogation of commitments- Allies do as promised 75% of the time (Leeds, Long, & Mitchell 2000).- Major powers intervene more often in minor power disputes when they have alliance ties to the disputants.•Hypothesis (defensive): Potential challengers are lesslikely to initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target if the target has one or more allies committed to intervene on behalf of the target if attacked by the challenger. • Alliances make war morelikely- They generate counter alliances and arms races- Expand bilateral conflicts to multilateral ones- Permanent alliances reduce the number of potential coalitions against the aggressors- Alliances encourage restraint in adversaries but may embolden alliance partners towards increased aggression (Smith); entrapment•Hypothesis (offensive/neutrality): A potential challenger is morelikely to initiate a MID against a potential target if the challenger has one or more allies who have promised offensivesupport or committed to remain neutral.

Definition of Deterrence

An attempt to preventsomething undesirable (war) by threateningto retaliate and cause unacceptable damageto the enemy if he goes through with it. Deterrence involves more than defense. Deterrence is achieved through the ability to punish(Waltz)

issue salience findings

As within issue salience increases, militarized disputes and peaceful attempts to settle issues are more likely. A history of militarization & failed settlement attempts increases likelihood of future conflicts & peaceful attempts. Some variation across issues too.

Stage 2: Construct a Theory

Assumption #1: Leaders want to stay in office, and doing so depends on public support.Assumption #2: International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Assumption #3: When faced with a displeased public, democratic leaders are more likely than non-democratic leaders to lose power, due to regular, competitive elections. Implication: Democracies will initiate war only when they are relatively certain of victory. Democracies may also place more effort into war fighting:"We examined the link between institutions and policy choice in the context of international disputes. We demonstrated that democratic leaders, when faced with a war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocratic leaders. This follows because...the prospects of political survival increasingly hinge on successful policy performance." Bueno de Mesquita et al (1999: 804)

Brinksmanship: The "Slippery Slope"

Crucial problem in crisis bargaining is to ensure one's threats are credible.-A credible threat is a threat that the target believes will be carried out.-Problems•Carrying through on threats is costly•Incentives to get the best deal increases motives for states to conceal information about their true strength•Two mechanisms for making threats credible:-Brinksmanship and tying hands•Thomas Schelling: -While it was understood that no state would bring about its own destruction by starting a total nuclear war, weapons could be used for diplomatic effect through the strategy of brinksmanship. State could signal their resolve in a crisis by approaching the "brink" of war through provocative actions. -Must decide whether to step onto the "slippery slope" and increase the risk of starting a war-Example: Cuban Missile Crisis (Kennedy's use of naval blockade)•It is the willingness to risk war that separates the resolved from the bluffers.

Issue Approach

Diplomatic issues vary considerably in importance/salience which influences the chances for issue militarization (Mansbach& Vasquez 1981; Diehl 1992; Hensel et al 2008) Territorial issues (border disputes) identified as particularly contentious (Vasquez 1993; Hensel, 2001; Huth and Allee, 2002)Territory important for defense, economy, psychological/historical reasons, etc.

Classical Realism

Emphasizes the role of human nature as a source of aggressive behavior and war.•Assumes state seek to increase power•Focuses on foreign policies or grand strategies best designed to prevent war.•Problem: a constant like human nature cannot explain the obvious variations in war and peace over time.

Stage 1: Identify generalizations

Empirical Finding: No two democracies have ever fought an interstate war against each other . This result is referred to as the democratic peace.

Defensive Realism

Focuses on states' perceptions of other states' intentions•Walt's (1979) balance of threat theory argues that states balance against the greatest threats to their interests, rather than against the strongest power in the system.•Geographical proximity increases threat -Impact of military power declines over distance; loss of strength gradient (Boulding1962)-Importance of technology; offense-defense balance War is more likely when military technology favors the offense (ease of conquest, first strike advantage).•Aggressive foreign policy is a function of domestic factors (e.g. hostile leaders, decision-making pathologies), not the systemic power distribution.•Problem: relies on domestic politics to explain anomalous behavior even though theory focuses on interstate interactions-Development of neoclassical realism to explicate role of domestic politics, esp. mobilization of societal resources

Long Cycle Theory

Focuses on the cycles between five global wars (Modelski1961)-The Wars of Italy and the Indian Ocean (1494-1516)-The Spanish-Dutch wars (1580-1609)-Wars of the Grand Alliance (1688-1713)-Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1792-1815)-World Wars I and II (1914-1945)•Distinguishes between rise and fall of land & sea powers, which tend to be in opposition-European land powers tend to be at their strongest when global sea powers are at their weakest European land power peaks (based on army personnel) -Spain (1585)-France (1692)-France (1805)-Germany (1sthalf of 20thcentury)•Conclusions of the theory1)Global wars occur in roughly 80-100 year cycles. 2)Each global war leads to a significant increase in sea power concentration (Dutch, UK, US).3)Hypothesis: Unipolar systems are more peaceful than bipolar and multipolar systems.4)States with superior naval capabilities win global wars.

Stage 3: Derive a Testable Hypothesis

Hypothesis: Democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight because:-they are cautious initiators, selecting themselves into those wars they think they can win-because they put more effort/resources into fighting wars.

Michael Wallace's StudyHypothesis: (arms race)

Hypothesis:Disputes which are accompanied by arms races are more likely to result in war.Data: Great Power disputes from 1816-1965Arms races:both sides averaging at least 10% growth in military expenditures over a 10 year period (arms index >90).

Conflict Recurrence

If nations fight repeated crises or militarized disputes, they become more likely to fight a war.- Wallensteen: 75% of major powers between 1816-1976 that had repeated MIDs went to war- Leng: war is increasingly likely by the third crisis- Hensel (1994): stalemates in previous MIDs increased chance for future MIDs in Latin American dyads

Levels of Analysis for Studying Warfare

Individual level -Focuses on foreign policy decisions made by leaders Nation-state level- Focuses on characteristics of the state such as regime type, economic system, public opinion Dyadic level -Focuses on history of interactions (rivalry), issues at stake (territorial disputes)

War from Indivisibility

Indivisible good: a good that cannot be divided without destroying its value.-An example; the difference between 100 pennies and a $1 bill•What goods are truly indivisible?-Indivisibility is usually not a physical property, but rather due to the way it is valued-Intangible aspects of issue salience less divisible (e.g. historical homeland, sacred sites, ethnic kin)•An example: the city of Jerusalem.-Contains some of the holiest sites of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism-How to divide the city has defied resolution

intangible

Intangible Values Culture/Identity: Related to one's cultural, religious, or ideological beliefs or identity Equality/Justice: "Fairness" or impartiality in the distribution of other values Independence: Ability to formulate and implement one's own policies Status/Prestige/Influence: The degree of respect one is accorded by others

Measuring Rivalry

Isolated conflict1 or 2 militarized disputes Proto-rivalry3 to 5 militarized disputes Enduring rivalry6 or more militarized disputes

Alliances and Deterrence Failure

MV, Chapter 4 (Leeds)- On the one hand, alliances were known a priori and thus should not alter the bargaining process.- On the other hand, an ally may reveal more information about her preferences once war is underway, which could alter bargaining.- Alliances turn bilateral wars into multilateral ones, which makes cooperative solutions more difficult to achieve.

Measurement Levels

Nominal(discrete categories that distinguish cases) War initiation (0=no, 1=yes) Ordinal(categorizes and rank orders cases) MID hostility level (0=none, 1=threat of force, 2=show of force, 3=use of force, 4=war) Interval(categorizes, rank orders, and has some standard unit of comparison) Military spending

Bargaining Model of War

Sees war as politics all the way down; war is a continuation of bargaining; it ends when a deal is struck.•Conflicts involve some kind of issues; bargaining is the process of arriving at mutual agreement involving the issues at stake.•Common issues that are related to war include territorial disputes, policy disputes, and regime disputes.

Key Hypotheses (Bones of Contention)

States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force or pursue peaceful settlement strategies: over issues that are generally more salient than over issues that are generally less salient (across-issue salience) when the specific issue under contention is more salient (within-issue salience)

Tying Hands

States can send credible signs of their willingness to fight by making threats in a way that would make backing down difficult.-Example: Operation Desert Shield (deployment of over 500K US troops in the Persian Gulf in 1990) •Audience costs: negative repercussions that arise in the event that a leader does not follow through on a threat.-International audience costs•Other states doubt future threats-e.g. lack of Chinese resolve on Taiwan led US to believe they would not intervene in Korea-Domestic audience costs•Voters and political opponents may punish a leader who makes empty threats•Democratic leaders face higher costs for foreign policy failure and hence make more credible threats. Tying hands separates the resolute from the irresolute. -Both brinksmanship and hand-tying are strategies for communicating resolve.-Example: tie hands by forming a military alliance and placing troops on your ally's soil.•Incomplete information can be overcome if states can find costly ways to signal their intentions.

War from Commitment Problems

States may have difficultly in making credible promises notto revise the terms of a deal/treaty l a t e r.-This is called a commitment problem.•Commitment problems are common in the absence of any enforcement mechanism.•Examples: strategically important pieces of territory and weapons programs.-States will be reluctant to make concessions if the adversary, who is made stronger by the deal, might press for more concessions in the future. This aspect of bargaining helps to explain:-Preventive war: a war that is fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future.-Power transition/long cycle theory: why changes in power can be dangerous-Preemptive war: why first strike advantages are dangerous-Why peace tends to fail when states' power and regimes change over time•Example: alliance partners more likely to renege on agreements in wartime after power and regime changes occurred (Leeds 2003)

Hegemonic Stability Theory

Strong concentrations of power in the hands of a single power are the most stable and peaceful systems (Gilpin 1981).•Power transition theory•Long cycle theory•Dyadic version: power preponderance in a pair of states predicts to a lower probability of militarized conflict (Bremer-MV Chapter 2).

Wallace's Findings

Strong relationship between arms races and dispute escalation to war 23 of 26 crises during arms races (88.5%) escalated to war; only 3 of 71 non-arms-race crises (4.2%) escalated to war 23 of 28 wars (82.1%) began during arms races Criticisms of this study (Diehl 1983) Only 25% of disputes preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war (one case is WWI, the other two are WWII) Arms races may help bring about large global wars

tangible

Tangible Values Security: Safety from external danger (absence of threats or protection from threats) Survival: Provision of basic human needs (food/water/shelter) Wealth: Accumulation of resources, goods, or money (beyond basic human needs)

Competing Explanations for the Contiguity-War Relationship -- TERRITORY

Territoriality (Vasquez)Wars arise from specific territorial disputesProximity provides the opportunityfor war, while a territorial dispute provides the willingnessfor warHumans have an inherited tendency towards territoriality, the tendency to occupy and defend territoryLearned behavior: the use of force to resolve territorial disputes

Dangerous Dyads (factors that increase risks of war)

Territory, Rivalry, Alliances, Arms Races, Power Parity, Power transitions (e.g. rise of China), Domestic turmoil

Issues & Interstate Conflict

Territoryis often a "good" that may:-Contribute to the wealth of state through industrial or agricultural resources•Example: Iraq coveted Iran's oil fields in 1980-1988 war-Have military or strategic value•Example: tactical value of Golan Heights between Israel & Syria-Be valuable for ethnic, cultural or historical reasons•Example: India & Pakistan's conflict over Kashmir•Conflicts over regimetype or the composition of another's government.-Example: US condemnation of Assad's regime in Syria•Conflicts over specific policies(e.g. Iraqi pursuit of WMD in Iraq War)•Conflicts may spring from concerns about relative power.-Example: power transition theory (e.g. Germany & UK prior to WWI)•Other issues (Holsti-e.g. dynastic succession)

Dissatisfaction

The dominant power establishes the status quo (SQ). •Some great powers are satisfied with the SQ, others are dissatisfied. •Dissatisfaction can be based on historical, ideological, religious, territorial, personal, or cultural factors•Dissatisfied states want to change the SQ, or the rules of the game.

MID Data Set (Small and Singer)

This dataset codes over 2,580 threats, displays, and uses of military force from 1816-2010. This data is often employed in dyadic form, where each case records a MID between two states in a given year. We can study escalation from dispute to war with the MID data.

Defining Arms Races

Two or more states increase their military more rapidly than norma lThe buildup occurs in peacetime The race is a result of external competition, not domestic politics

States involved in the greatest number of rivalries

UK, Germany, USA, USSR, and France

in the movie "the fog of war", which war was Robert McNamara discussing when he talked about the lesson that "proportionality should be a guideline in war."?

WW11

in bremers bivariate analyses, which of the following facts decreases the chances for war in a dyad?

both states in the dyad are democratic

_______ is a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risks of accidental war, with the hope the other side will "blink", or lose its nerve first and make concessions.

brinkmanship

in "bones of contention" (MV chapter 3), the authors collect data on each of the following contentious :

cross -border rivers, and maritime areas

if the expected numbers of wars is significantly higher than the observed number of wars, historically, we would conclude that this factor _______ the probability of dyadic war?

decreases

according the Hensel et al (MV chapter 3), what is the effect of previous militarized disputes on conflict management?

if a pair of states experienced previous militarized disputes, they are more likely to experience militarized conflict and more likely to use peaceful settlement tools

in her analysis of all militarized disputes from 1816-1993, Sample finds that mutual military buildups significantly ______ the chances for escalation to war, while nuclear weapons significantly _______ the chances for escalation to war.

increase, decrease

hensel et al (MV chapter 3) note that if a disputed territory contained a sacred religious site and was claimed as an historial homeland for a group living in the area, this would be evidence the issue has high....

intangible salience

according the Hensel et al (MV chapter 3), which of following facts reduces the chances for militarized conflict in issue claims?

joint democracy

in his study, "dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816-1965 (MV chapter 2), professor stuart bremer finds that _________ is the factor most likely to lead pairs of states to fight wars

land/sea contiguity

fearon argue that each of the following factors could lead to war in the bargaining model of war except...

leaders incentives to re-elected...... commitment problems and private information= right answer

analyzing all years in her dataset, Sample finds that arms races (mutual military buildups) significantly increase the chances for dispute escalation to war in each type of power pairing:

major power- major power minor power- minor power

according the Hensel et al (MV chapter 3) what happens to the chances for militarized conflict (within) issue salience increases?

militarized conflict is more likely

a war in which one country is trying to stop another country from becoming stronger in the future, such as the US war against IRAQ in 2003, is an example of

preventive war

Sample defines _______ as growth rates in military expenditures that exceed a country's historical average in a 10 year period

rapid military buildup

bremer identifies each of the following variables as a factor that can help to predict the onset of war except....

rivalry

which issue is most likely to result in interstate war?

territory

in bremers bivariate analyses, which of the following factors increases the chances for war in a dyad?

the dyad contains one or more major powers

what three types of power distributions were covered?

unipolar, multipolar, bipolar

which of the following assumptions is most important for the bargaining model of war?

war is costly

in her study "the outcomes of military buildups: minor states vs major powers", Susan Sample (MV CHAPTER 6) uses which world war to illustrate how arms buildups can lead to war:

ww1

ATOP Alliance Types

• Defensive cooperation • Offensive cooperation • Neutrality • Non-aggression • Consultation

Issue Rivalry (Mitchell & Thies 2011)

• Focuses on density of geopolitical issues in contention, using ICOW data • Rivalry: - Issue dimension: dyads with two or more territorial, maritime, or river claims ongoing at same time- Militarized dimension: dyads with two or more previous MIDs over issue • Issue rivalry increases the chances for militarized disputes:- Some issues are multidimensional which raises the stakes of winning (e.g. Falkland Islands).- Handling of one issue can lead to further challenges to SQ (e.g. Cod Wars) • We compare issue rivalries & militarized rivalries to see which process increases risks for war the most.

rivalry hypotheses

• H1: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future crises.• H2: The greater the number of past crises, the higher is the propensity for future violent crises.• H3: The greater the number of past crises, the lower is the propensity for future crises (war weariness).

alliance hypothesis

• H1: When a conflict initiator has an offensive alliance in place when a dispute begins, the potential for more dispute participants increases.• H2: When a conflict target has a defensive alliance in place when a dispute begins, the potential for more dispute participantsincreases.• H3: Neutrality pacts decrease the number of dispute participants. • H4: Multilateral conflicts are more likely to escalate to war than bilateral conflicts.

Alliance Reliability

• Initial findings by Sabroskysuggested alliances were "scraps of paper"; most were violated.• Once we take into account the obligations in treaties, we find that allies do what they promise 75% of the time (Leeds, Long, Mitchell)• MV Chapter 4 (Leeds) also shows that allies enter into conflicts more often when alliances are in place at the start of a MID, consistent with partners being reliable.

Rivalry Lock-in

• M&T results are consistent with KGD findings that most wars happen early on in a rivalry (50% by 3rd; 90% by 6th). • Also a function of increasingly stalemated outcomes as rivalries progress.

Alliance Issues

• Many alliance studies treat alliances as "blank checks", yet they vary considerably in terms of obligations.- Against specific adversaries- In specific geographical locations• We need to match obligations more carefully to potential conflicts.• Timing issues: may be hard to disentangle causal relationship if events are close together.

Alliance Violations

• Prof. Leeds finds that alliance violations are explained well by conditions that changed since the time of the treaty signing:- Change in state's power- Change in state's regime- Consistent with the bargaining model of war• Democratic states make more credible alliance commitments.

The Context of Rivalry

• Relations between rivals can be seen as a context that comes out of the past and shapes their relations into the future. • The rivalry context may be more escalatory than the non-rivalry context. • Many theories of conflict assume a conflict of rivalry.- Arms races- Power transitions- Deterrence• Rivalry has been used as a case selection mechanism to test such theories .• The rivalry context has also been used to more fully develop other theories of conflict (e.g. diversionary theory).

Enduring Rivalry Characteristics (KGD)

• Spatial consistency- Dyadic relationships• Duration- Isolated conflict vs. rivalry • Militarized competition - Foreign policy conceived of/conducted in military terms- Can involve tangible or intangible issues • Linked conflict- Conflicts are related over time/space- Expectation of future conflicts

Strategic Rivalry Characteristics (Thompson)

• Strategic rivals must be independent states.• Evidence for/timing of rivalry is based on leaders' statements/perceptions about their enemies .• No minimum duration- E.g. Goertz & Diehl used 6 MIDs over 20+ years as criteria for enduring rivalry. • Positional (e.g. great power) vs. spatial (e.g. border disputes) rivalries

Stage 4: Test the Hypothesis

Collect data for key conceptsRegime type (Polity project's data)War (Correlates of War data)Make sure we have variation on the independent and dependent variables.Consider wins & losses in wars Avoid spurious correlations by controlling for other relevant variables.Example: initiators might win more wars

Components of a Causal Hypothesis

1)Dependent Variable (DV)-effect 2)Independent Variable (IV)-cause-bivariate analysis (one IV)-multivariate analysis (> one IV) 3)Statement of causal direction- positive relationship (as X ↑, Y ↑)- negative relationship (as X ↑, Y ↓)

scientific approach to studying warfare

1)Identify generalizations 2)Construct an explanation, or theory, of the observed generalizations 3)Derive a testable hypothesis 4)Test the hypothesis against empirical evidence

Para Bellum (Preparedness) Model (armsrace)

1)If you desire peace, prepare for war 2)Anarchic self-help system; nations must be ready to defend their sovereignty 3)In this model, arms races can deter the onset of war, especially if both sides have nuclear weapons with second strike capability (Waltz).

Bremer's Criticisms of War Literature

1) Inappropriate unit of analysis-In the early 1990s, most studies of war had been conducted at the systemic or monadic level of analysis.-Example: democratic peace (Maoz & Abdolali1989)•Systemic: Does the level of international conflict in the system decline as the number of politically free states increases? (Yes for war, no for MIDs)•Monadic: Are politically free states less conflict prone than states that are not free? (No)-Bremer argues that we should instead focus on dyads or pairs of states given that most theories of war focus on questions of who fights whom. 2) Limited spatial-temporal domain-Many studies limit the spatial domain to major powers only.•Example: Levy's study of alliances and war (1981) that focuses on great powers from 1495-1975-Other studies limit the temporal domain (e.g. post WWII)•Example: Oneal & Russett (1997) democratic peace study, 1950-1985-Bremer argues that this is problematic given how rare wars are in history.•1816-1965 for all possible pairings of countries (N = 202,778)•85 cases of war onset (baseline probability = .000419) 3) Faulty case selection strategy-Many war studies select on the dependent variable and fail to examine cases of no wars.•Example: Stoessinger'sWhy Nations Go To War-This approach is only valid for testing necessary conditions.-Bremer includes a lot of "no war" cases (202,693 of 202,778)•Issue: does not control for states' opportunities to fight•Issue: Treats all 0's as the same even though the quality of peace varies across dyads 4) Bivariate analytical methods-Many earlier studies of war focus on relationships between a single variable (e.g. arms races) and war (e.g. Wallace's 1982 study).-Problems•Could be a spurious relationship•Does not consider correlations between risk factors (e.g. militarized and alliance)-Solution: Bremer estimates the effects of seven major risk factors on interstate war using both bivariate and multivariate models. 5) Questionable measures of war-Tendency to equate the onset of war with the duration of war; e.g. include all years of an ongoing war in the analysis-Failure to separate the originators of wars from the joiners; the processes by which wars spread to a larger number of states could be distinct from the original motivations for war.-Solution: Bremer includes only the original warring dyad•Problem: excludes all WWII cases except Germany-Poland•Question: What predictors (variables) does Bremer include in his model of the onset of dyadic warfare?

alliance empirical findings

1)Alliances were associated with peace in the 19thcentury, but war in the 20thcentury (COW project) 2)Findings since 1980s show support for both positions: alliances increase/decrease chance for conflict. 3)Alliances make the expansion of war more likely 4)Findings on reliability show support for both positions: allies are not reliable during war (Sabrosky); allies are reliable during war (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell)

Armaments-Tension Spiral Model (armsrace)

1)Arms races increase tension and hostility (security dilemma) 2)Arms races increase uncertainty 3)This produces a spiral of arms buildups and tensions, which can lead to conflict Note: this will be part of the steps to war modelSusan Sample (MV Ch6) notes that arms buildups could deter attacks (reduce dispute onset) but be associated with escalation to war once deterrence fails (like alliances; Ch4)!).

Power Transition Theory

Assumptions (Organski1958; Organski& Kugler 1980)-The international system is hierarchical.-A dominant nation sits at the top.-Potential challengers: those with 80% or more of the dominant country's power-There are also regional hierarchies (Lemke).-States experience S shaped economic growth rates and at varying historical times. Definition of power -The number of people who can work and fight-Economic productivity-Effectiveness of government in extracting resources•Hypothesis: war is most likely when there is parity(equality) between the dominant power and (dissatisfied) challenger. Problemsin explaining the timing of war-Why no preventive war by the declining state in most cases?•Note: preventive war is distinct from preemptive war (Levy & Thompson p. 46)-Can nuclear weapons alter the possibility of war?•PT theorists say no•Distinctions between realists' focus on land-based military power and power transition theorists' focus on economic power.-L&T argue that each theory could be correct within their own domains (Europe more stable with military BOP while global system more stable with a dominant economic/naval power)-Why declines in naval power combined with rises in land power are dangerous (e.g. Napoleonic wars, WWI, WWII)

Offensive Realism

Benign intentions can change if countries undergo changes in power or regime.•Aggression sometimes pays and the accumulation of power leads to further aggression.-In 63 wars between 1815 and 1980, the initiator won 39 times, for a 60% success rate (Mearsheimer).•The best way for states to provide for their security is to achieve regional or global hegemony (Mearsheimer2001)-Stopping power of water-Balancing fails because it is costly and states free ride-Impossible to distinguish offensive/defensive weapons•Problem: cannot account for decline in territorial revisionism

Disaggregated Effects

Breaking the analyses into separate issues (MV Ch3) Issue salience significantly increases the chances for militarized conflict for each issue type separately. Issue salience only significantly influences the chances for peaceful settlements involving territorial issues. For territorial issues, higher tangible and intangible salience levels result in more militarized disputes (Hensel and Mitchell 2005), although intangible territorial issues also produce more peaceful agreements than tangibly valued territories.

Three mechanisms for making threats credible:

Brinksmanship (Crisis bargaining)Sinking Costs (Arms spending, nukes) Tying hands (Alliances) We discussed brinkmanship, which involves the willingness to escalate disputes to demonstrate resolve in an effort to get the adversary to back down, and tying hands via alliances.

Realist Theories

Origins-Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in the 5thcentury BCE-Morgenthau's 1948 book, Politics Among Nations•Key assumptions -Sovereign states are the key actors in world politics.-States seek power as an end in itself (Morgenthau-human nature) or as a means to other ends (e.g. survival-Waltz)•Revisionist intentions (e.g. Hitler initiation of war in 1939) vs. SQ maintenance (e.g. USA in Cuban Missile Crisis)-States act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in an anarchic international system.-States have two means for seeking power: •Internal efforts: moves to increase military and economic capabilities•External efforts: moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink the opposing one The distribution of power in the system has an important influence on international interactions.-Balances of power form in the international system.-Balance of power theory: war is least likely when there is a balance of power among multiple poles (major powers plus allies)-Role of an offshore balancer (e.g. Great Britain, US)•Security dilemmas can arise (spiral model).-Most weapons serve offensive & defensive functions•But deterrence is possible, especially in a system of nuclear weapons.•Realists have disagreements about which balances of power are best and to what extent domestic politics influences outcomes.

Players

Potential attacker: state that is trying to change the status quo Defender: the state that wants to prevent the attack Protégé: A state that has ties to a defender, where the defender is trying to prevent any attacks against it

Competing Explanations for the Contiguity-War Relationship -- PROXIMITY

Proximity Neighbors fight because they can reach each other (loss of strength with distance)Problem: contiguity remains fairly constant, but war is infrequent Technology alters military reach over timeYet influence of contiguity on war has increased since 1870, not decreased.Interaction Borders provide more opportunity for conflict Problem: we cannot account for cooperation in some contiguous dyads and conflict in others

Waltzian Neorealism

Waltz (1979) develops a more rigorous theory that builds upon ideas in macro & micro economics•Assumptions-States are unitary actors and are the system's constituent units-The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy-States seek survivalnot power as an end in itself-States behave rationally-Focuses on the structureof the international system Elements of the structure of the international system-Ordering principle: anarchyvs. hierarchy-Functional differentiation of units (none)-Relative capabilities: only dimension that varies given that the international system is always anarchic and has like units•Balances of power will emerge; states will imitate each other and become socialized (e.g. realist culture). •Hypothesis: bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity-Less uncertainty & risk of war via miscalculation-Contrary to arguments that multipolar systems were more stable due to greater # of counter coalitions that could form, divided attention among poles (fewer arms races), and cross-cutting cleavages (Deutsch & Singer 1964) Mixed evidence-Some periods of multipolaritythat are peaceful (Concert of Europe) but others that are violent (WW I & WWII)-Some periods of bipolarity that are peaceful (Cold War) and others that are violent (Ancient Greece-Peloponnesian War; French-Hapsburg rivalry in 16thcentury)-More major power wars in bipolar systems, but they are lower magnitude wars (Wayman 1984)-Role of nuclear weapons is believed to increase prospects for peace in bipolar systems•Criticisms-Unable to predict specific events: "Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war 's dismal recurrence through the millennia " (Waltz, 1988 :620).-Difficulty explaining why power/polarity changes

Overview of the Bargaining Model of War

War occurs when the bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement.•The model focuses on 1) preferences of actors, 2) their beliefs about outcomes & other actors, 3) structure of the system, & 4) information available.•Bargaining can fail when (Fearon1995):-There is incomplete information-Commitment to terms of deal is questionable-Disputed good is hard to divide

Continuing Cycle of Scientific Research

We can use these results are empirical generalizations for future theories.Because democratic leaders pay costs for failure in war, they may implement strategies to increase success rates (Valentino et al 2010).Build larger military capability Join wartime coalitionsAvoid attrition & guerrilla strategies (high casualty risks) and use maneuver strategies insteadFight wars farther away from home territory

Control Variables

We must take into account other factors that could affect our dependent variable (winning or losing a war).War initiators might be more likely to win wars than targets because initiators make calculations about whether they can win, and launch a war when they believe their chances for success are high. Perhaps we observe a relationship between democracy and victory in war only because democracies initiate wars more often than non-democracies.

War from Incomplete Information

When states have poor information about one another's willingness and ability to go to war, two mistakes are possible:-A state confronted by demands may mistakenly yield too little or not at all•Example: Kuwait not believing Iraq's threat of war in 1990-A state may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will accede•Example: Iraq's belief Kuwait would forgive debt from Iran-Iraq war•States have incentives to hide their true capabilities and resolve whether they are weak (would get a worse deal) or strong (could evoke counterbalancing or weaken first strike potential) Two broad classes of unknowns:-Capabilities: the state's physical ability to win (e.g. Hitler's misperceptions about Russia's capabilities)•Troops, armaments, economic resources, military strategies-Resolve: a state's willingness to fight (e.g. US underestimating North Vietnamese resolve to fight)•This helps to explain:-Why states of equal capabilities are more war-prone than are states of unequal power-Why decisive victories tend to be followed by longer periods of peace (Blainey)-The logic of the security dilemma

Bargaining and War

Why do some diplomatic issue conflicts become wars while others do not?•Consider a conflict over territory worth $100 million. If a state is certain of victory, but costs of war are equal to $20 million,the expected valueof going to war is:-$100 million - $20 million = $80 million•A state will accept a bargain that gives it at least as much as it expects from war.•Key assumption: war is costly; there is always some peaceful deal preferable to fighting

Measures of Association

Yule's Q (for cross-tabulations)Q = [(a*d) -(b*c)]/ [(a*d) + (b*c)]