Legal Reasoning Final Review

Due Process

(law) the administration of justice according to established rules and principles

N.B. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983)

1983. P brought claim for injunction against LAP when choked by police officer. Court held P could not seek an injunction because he failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would be choked in the future.

N.B. City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) - Remedies

Allowed for punitive damages against a municipality by a private actor.

N.B Armstrong v Exceptional Child Center, Inc

An implied right of action is not implied under the Supremacy Clause and Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement in the courts.

N.B Memphis School District v Stachural

Compensatory damages not available under Section 1983. A teacher showed photos of his wife during pregnancy + approved SexEd films. Parental confusion and uproar led to his suspension with pay. SC reversed Appellate Court ruling.

Smith v. Robinson (1984)

Concerned reimbursement of attorney's fees for parents who win litigation under IDEA. At the time of this case, IDEA did not provide for such reimbursement. Following this ruling, Congress passed a law awarding attorneys' fees to parents who win their litigation.

Home Telephone & Telegraph v. Los Angeles (1913)

Cited in Monroe Facts The appellant, a California corporation furnishing telephone service in the City of Los Angeles, sued the city and certain of its officials to prevent the putting into effect of a city ordinance establishing telephone rates for the year commencing July 1, 1911. It was alleged that, by the Constitution and laws of the Page 227 U. S. 281 state, the city was given a right to fix telephone rates, and had passed the assailed ordinance in the exercise of the general authority thus conferred. It was charged that the rates fixed were so unreasonably low that their enforcement would bring about the confiscation of the property of the corporation, and hence the ordinance was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conclusion One whose rights protected by a provision of the federal Constitution which is identical with a provision of the state constitution are invaded by state officers claiming to act under a state statute is not debarred from seeking relief in the federal court under the federal Constitution until after the state court has declared that the acts were authorized by the statute. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are generic in terms, and are addressed not only to the states but to every person, whether natural or judicial, who is the repository of state power. The reach of the Fourteenth Amendment is coextensive with any exercise by a power, in whatever form exerted.

42 U.S. Code § 1983

Civil action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

1st Ammendment of the US Constitution?

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

N.B Rizzo v. Goode

Court ruled supervisors may be held personally liable for a violation of Section 1983 if the plaintiff proves that the supervisor: 1) Received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates 2) Demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the offensive acts 3) Failed to make sufficient remedial action; 4) And his/her failure to act proximately caused the claim for injury.

N.B. Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill

Decision: court has no authority in enforcing the acts of Congressional corporations. Having to do with the Snail Darter fish in small river systems that would have been affected by the construction of a dam by the TVA in the region.

N.B. Carlson v Green (1980) - Remedies

Did the prison officials violate the decedent's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide proper medical attention to his personal injuries in the prison? If so, were the damages claimed by the decedent's mother insufficient to meet 28 U.S.C. 1331(a) jurisdictional-amount requirements? - There was a Eighth Amendment violation and the jurisdictional-amount requirement was met.

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Established judicial review; "midnight judges;" John Marshall; power of the Supreme Court.

Hunter v. Bryant (1991) - Immunity

Facts H., in contemplation of marriage with B., gave a bond for $5,000 and interest, to trustees, to secure to B. a support during the marriage, and after the death of H., in case she should survive him, and to their child or children in case he should survive her, with condition that if H. should, within the time of his life or within one year after marriage (whichsoever of the said terms should first expire) convey to the trustee some good estate, real or personal, sufficient to secure the annual payment of $300 for the separate use of his wife during the marriage, and also sufficient to secure the payment of the said $5,000 to her use in case she should survive her husband, to be paid within six months after his death, and in case of her death before her husband, to be paid to their child or children, or if H. should die before B. and by his will should, within a year from its date, make such devises and bequests as should be adequate to these provisions, then the bond to be void. H. died, leaving his widow B. and a son, having, by his last will devised a tract of 1,000 acres of land in the Mississippi Territory, to his son in fee; a tract of 10,000 acres in Kentucky, equally between his wife and son, with a devise over to her in fee of the son's moiety, if he died before he attained "the lawful age to will it away." And the residue of his estate, real and personal, to be divided equally between his wife and son, with the same contingent devise over to her as with regard to the tract of 10,000 acres of land. The value of the property thus devised to her, beside the contingent interest, might have been estimated, at the time of H.'s death, at $5,000. B. subsequently died, having made a nuncupative will by which she devised all her estate, "whether vested in her by the will of her deceased husband or otherwise," to be divided between her son and the plaintiff below (Bryant), with a contingent devise of the whole to the survivor. The son afterwards died, and the plaintiff brought this bill to charge the lands of H. with the payment of the bond for $5,000 and interest, to which the plaintiff derived his right under the nuncupative will of B. Conclusion the provision made in the will of H. for his wife, must be taken in satisfaction of the bond, but subject to her liberty to elect between the provision under the will and the bond, and that this privilege was extended to her devisee, the plaintiff. Actual maintenance is equivalent to the payment of a sum secured for separate maintenance, and therefore interest upon the bond during the husband's lifetime was not allowed. Under all the circumstances of the case, it was determined that the bond was chargeable on the residue of the estate, and of this the personality first in order.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinatti (March 25, 1986)

Facts Petitioner, a physician and the proprietor of a clinic in Cincinnati, Ohio, that provided medical services primarily to welfare recipients, was indicted by a grand jury for fraudulently accepting payments from state welfare agencies. During the grand jury investigation, subpoenas were issued for the appearance of two of petitioner's employees. When the employees failed to appear, the Assistant County Prosecutor obtained capiases for their detention. But when two County Deputy Sheriffs attempted to serve the capiases at petitioner's clinic, he barred the door and refused to let them enter the part of the clinic where the employees presumably were located. Thereafter, Cincinnati police officers, whom petitioner had called, appeared and told petitioner to allow the Deputy Sheriffs to enter. Petitioner continued to refuse. The Deputy Sheriffs then called their superior, who told them to call the County Prosecutor's Office and to follow his instructions. The Deputy Sheriffs spoke to the Assistant Prosecutor assigned to the case. He in turn conferred with the County Prosecutor, who told him to instruct the Deputy Sheriffs to "go in and get" the employees. The Assistant Prosecutor relayed these instructions to the Deputy Sheriffs. After the Deputy Sheriffs tried unsuccessfully to force the door, city police officers obtained an axe and chopped down the door. The Deputy Sheriffs then entered and searched the clinic, but were unable to locate the employees sought. Although petitioner was acquitted of the fraud charges, he was indicted and convicted for obstructing police in the performance of an authorized act. His conviction was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court. Petitioner then filed a damages action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the county, among other defendants, alleging that the county had violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court dismissed the claim against the county on the ground that the individual officers were not acting pursuant to the kind of "official policy" that is the predicate for municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner had failed to prove the existence of a county policy because he had shown nothing more than that, on "this one occasion," the Prosecutor and the Sheriff decided to force entry into petitioner's clinic. Conclusion 1. The "official policy" requirement of Monell was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of the municipality's employees, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to actions for which the municipality is actually responsible. Monell held that recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, "of the municipality," i.e., acts that the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered. With this understanding, it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. If the decision to adopt a particular course of action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly. Pp. 475 U. S. 477-481. 2. It was error to dismiss petitioner's claim against the county. Ohio law authorizes the County Sheriff to obtain instructions from the County Prosecutor. The Sheriff followed the practice of delegating certain decisions to the Prosecutor where appropriate. In this case, the Deputy Sheriffs received instructions from the Sheriff's Office to follow the orders of the County Prosecutor, who made a considered decision based on his understanding of the law and commanded the Deputy Sheriffs to enter petitioner's clinic. That decision directly caused a violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. In ordering the Deputy Sheriffs to enter petitioner's clinic to serve the capiases on the employees, the County Prosecutor was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county, and the county may therefore be held liable under § 1983. Pp. 475 U. S. 484-485. Not every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability.

N.B. Sheuer v. Rhodes (Apr 17, 1974) - Kent State

Facts Petitioners, the personal representatives of the estates of students who were killed on the campus of a state controlled university, brought these damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor, the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, various other Guard officers and enlisted members, and the university president, charging that those officials, acting under color of state law, "intentionally, recklessly, willfully and wantonly" caused an unnecessary Guard deployment on the campus and ordered the Guard members to perform allegedly illegal acts resulting in the students' deaths. The District Court dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction without the filing of any answer and without any evidence other than the Governor's proclamations and brief affidavits of the Adjutant General and his assistant, holding that respondents were being sued in their official capacities, and that the actions were therefore in effect against the State, and barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed on that ground and on the alternative ground that the common law doctrine of executive immunity was absolute, and barred action against respondent state officials. Conclusion 1. The Eleventh Amendment does not in some circumstances bar an action for damages against a state official charged with depriving a person of a federal right under color of state law, and the District Court acted prematurely, and hence erroneously, in dismissing the complaints as it did without affording petitioners any opportunity by subsequent proof to establish their claims. Pp. 416 U. S. 235-238. 2. The immunity of officers of the executive branch of a state government for their acts is not absolute, but qualified, and of varying degree, depending upon the scope of discretion and Page 416 U. S. 233 responsibilities of the particular office and the circumstances existing at the time the challenged action was taken. Pp. 416 U. S. 238-249.

Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority (1987)

Facts The Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937 imposed a ceiling on rents charged to low-income persons living in public housing projects, and, as later amended, provides that a low-income family "shall pay as rent" a specified percentage of its income. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has consistently considered "rent" to include a reasonable amount for the use of utilities. Petitioners, tenants living in low-income housing projects owned by respondent, brought suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that respondent overbilled them for their utilities and thereby violated the rent ceiling imposed by the Brooke Amendment and implementing regulations. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent, holding that a private cause of action was unavailable to enforce the Brooke Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, while the Brooke Amendment confers rights on tenants, these rights are enforceable only by HUD. Conclusion 1. Nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude petitioners' § 1983 claim against respondent. Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD, but also both congressional and agency actions have indicated that enforcement authority is not centralized, and that private actions were anticipated. Neither are the remedial mechanisms provided by the statute sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants' rights secured by federal law. Pp. 479 U. S. 423-429. 2. There is no merit to respondent's argument that the provision for a "reasonable" allowance for utilities is too vague and amorphous to confer on tenants an enforceable "right" within the meaning of § 1983, and that the matter of utility allowances must be left to the public housing authorities, subject to HUD's supervision. The benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify Page 479 U. S. 419 as enforceable rights under § 1983, and are not beyond the judiciary's competence to enforce.

N.B. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik (Mar 2, 1988)

Facts Two years after respondent, a management-level employee in one of petitioner city's agencies, successfully appealed a temporary suspension to petitioner's Civil Service Commission (Commission), he was transferred to a clerical position in another city agency, from which he was laid off the next year. In respondent's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the jury found petitioner liable on the theory that respondent's First Amendment rights had been violated through retaliatory actions taken in response to his suspension appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment entered on this verdict, finding that the jury had implicitly determined that respondent's layoff was brought about by an unconstitutional city policy. Applying a test under which a "policymaker" is one whose employment decisions are "final" in the sense that they are not subjected to de novo review by higher ranking officials, the court concluded that petitioner could be held liable for adverse personnel decisions made by respondent's supervisors. Conclusion 1. Petitioner's failure to timely object under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 to a jury instruction on municipalities' § 1983 liability for their employees' unconstitutional acts does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to determine the proper legal standard for imposing such liability. The same legal issue was raised by petitioner's motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict, was considered and decided by the Court of Appeals, and is likely to recur in § 1983 litigation against municipalities. Review in this Court will not undermine the policy of judicial efficiency that underlies Rule 51. Pp. 485 U. S. 118-121. 2. The Court of Appeals applied an incorrect legal standard for determining when isolated decisions by municipal officials or employees may expose the municipality to § 1983 liability. The identification of officials having "final policymaking authority" is a question of state (including local) law, rather than a question of fact for the jury. Here, it appears that petitioner's City Charter gives the authority to set employment policy to the Mayor and Aldermen, who are empowered to enact ordinances, Page 485 U. S. 113 and to the Commission, whose function is to hear employees' appeals. Petitioner cannot be held liable unless respondent proved the existence of an unconstitutional policy promulgated by officials having such authority. The Mayor and Aldermen did not enact an ordinance permitting retaliatory transfers or layoffs. Nor has the Commission indicated that such actions were permissible; it has, on the contrary, granted respondent at least partial relief in a series of appeals from adverse personnel decisions. The Court of Appeals' findings that the decisions of respondent's supervisors were not individually reviewed for "substantive propriety" by higher supervisory officials, and were accorded substantial deference by the Commission on appeal, are insufficient to support the conclusion that the supervisors had been delegated the authority to establish transfer and layoff policy. When a subordinate's discretionary decisions are constrained or subjected to review by authorized policymakers, they, and not the subordinate, have final policymaking authority. Positing a delegation based on their mere acquiescence in, or failure to investigate the basis of, the subordinate's decisions does not serve § 1983's purposes where (as here) the wrongfulness of those decisions arises from a retaliatory motive or other unstated rationale. Pp. 485 U. S. 122-131.

N.B. Owen v. City of Independence - Immunity Doctrine (April 16, 1980)

Facts After the City Council of respondent city moved that reports of an investigation of the city police department be released to the news media and turned over to the prosecutor for presentation to the grand jury and that the City Manager take appropriate action against the persons involved in the wrongful activities brought out in the investigative reports, the City Manager discharged petitioner from his position as Chief of Police. No reason was given for the dismissal, and petitioner received only a written notice stating that the dismissal was made pursuant to a specified provision of the city charter. Subsequently, petitioner brought suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city, the respondent City Manager, and the respondent members of the City Council in their official capacities, alleging that he was discharged without notice of reasons and without a hearing in violation of his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court, after a bench trial, entered judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, holding that, although the city had violated petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless all the respondents, including the city, were entitled to qualified immunity from liability based on the good faith of the city officials involved. Conclusion A municipality has no immunity from liability under § 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability

Siegert v. Gilley

Facts In seeking to become "credentialed" in his new job at an Army hospital, petitioner Siegert, a clinical psychologist, asked his former employer, a federal hospital, to provide job performance and other information to his new employer. Respondent Gilley, Siegert's supervisor at his former job, responded with a letter declaring that he could not recommend Siegert because he was inept, unethical, and untrustworthy. After he was denied credentials and his federal service employment was terminated, Siegert filed a damages action against Gilley in the District Court, alleging, inter alia, that, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, Gilley had caused an infringement of his "liberty interests" in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "by maliciously and in bad faith publishing a defamatory per se statement . . . which [he] knew to be untrue." Gilley filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, the defense of qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, and contending that Siegert's factual allegations did not state the violation of any constitutional right "clearly established" at the time of the complained-of actions, see id. at 457 U. S. 818. The court ultimately found Siegert's allegations to be sufficient, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that the case be dismissed. Although assuming that bad-faith motivation would suffice to make Gilley's actions in writing the letter a violation of Siegert's clearly established constitutional rights, the court held that Siegert's particular allegations were insufficient under its "heightened pleading standard" to overcome Gilley's qualified immunity claim. Conclusion The Court of Appeals properly concluded that the District Court should have dismissed Siegert's suit because he had not overcome Gilley's qualified immunity defense. Siegert failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right -- indeed, of any constitutional right at all -- since, under Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 424 U. S. 708-709, injury to reputation, by itself, is not a protected "liberty" interest. He therefore failed to satisfy the necessary threshold inquiry in the determination of a qualified immunity claim. See, e.g., Harlow, supra, at 457 U. S. 818. Thus, although the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, it should not have assumed without deciding the necessary preliminary Page 500 U. S. 227 issue and then proceeded to examine the sufficiency of Siegert's allegations. Siegert's claim failed at an analytically earlier stage of the inquiry.

N.B Ex Parte Young (1908)

Facts Minnesota imposed harsh penalties on railroads that violated state limits on what they could charge within the state. Northern Pacific Railway shareholders asserted that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause, that the railroads should be released from the need to comply with the law, and that state Attorney General Edward T. Young should be enjoined from enforcing the law. The federal court granted the request for an injunction, since it was unpersuaded by Young that the Eleventh Amendment removed its jurisdiction over a case in which a state was sued by a citizen of another state (in this case, the shareholders). Having lost the case in federal court, Young brought an action in state court that would have required the railroads to comply with the law. His claim was based on the same argument that had failed in federal court, so Young was held in contempt and taken into custody by a U.S. Marshal. He filed for a writ of habeas corpus for his release. Conclusion If government officials attempt to enforce an unconstitutional law, sovereign immunity does not prevent people whom the law harms from suing those officials in their individual capacity for injunctive relief. This is because they are not acting on behalf of the state in this situation.

N.B. Maine v. Thiboutot (Jun 25, 1980)

Facts Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel's by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7), exhausted their state administrative remedies, and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under § 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court's judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members. [Footnote 2] The court, however, denied respondents' motion for attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A.2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents Conclusion Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase "and laws," the plain language of the statute embraces respondents' claim, and even were the language ambiguous, this Court's earlier decisions, including cases involving Social Security Act claims, explicitly or implicitly suggest that the §1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party (other than the United States) in "any action . . . to enforce" a provision of §1983, inter alia, and which makes no exception for statutory §1983 actions -- authorizes the award of attorney's fees in such actions.

Hope v. Pelzer (1995) - Immunity

Facts of the case As an Alabama prison inmate, Larry Hope was twice handcuffed to a hitching post for disruptive conduct. Both times prison guards handcuffed Hope above shoulder height, and when he tried moving his arms to improve circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists. During the second incident, guards order Hope to remove his shirt and he spent seven hours on the hitching post in the sun. While there, he was given one or two water breaks, but no bathroom breaks. Hope filed a civil suit against the guards. Subsequently, a Magistrate Judge found that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals, while finding that the hitching post's use for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment, concluded that the guards nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. Question Does the Court of Appeals holding of qualified immunity where prison guards' conduct violated the Eighth Amendment comport with United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259? Conclusion No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the defense of qualified immunity was precluded at the summary judgment phase of Hope's trial. The Court reasoned that, although Hope's allegations if true established an Eighth Amendment violation, prison guards could be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Noting that United States v. Lanier makes clear that officials can be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual situations, the Court concluded that a reasonable officer would have known that using a hitching post as Hope alleged was unlawful.

N.B. Brosseau v. Hagen (2004) - Immunity

Facts of the case Brosseau, a police officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried to flee in his vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Question Was a police officer who shot a fleeing suspect entitled to qualified immunity? Conclusion Yes. In an 8-1 per curiam decision, the Court held that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity because the Court's previous cases did not clearly establish that shooting the fleeing Hogan would have violated his constitutional rights.

Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd - Immunity

Facts of the case In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists. The lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution. Question Is the former government official entitled to qualified immunity from the pretext claim based on the conclusions that (a) the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant with the intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject; and (b) this Fourth Amendment rule was clearly established at the time of Al-Kidd's arrest? Conclusion Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Efficient and even-handed application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer," Scalia wrote. Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined as to Part I. Kennedy expressed concern that the court's "holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves unresolved whether the government's use of the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful." Ginsburg filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. Ginsburg also addressed the Material Witness Statute and wrote that Al-Kidd's "ordeal is a grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times." Meanwhile, Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. "Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial is, in my view, a closer question than the majority's opinion suggests," Sotomayor declared. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Anderson v. Creighton (1987) - Immunity

Facts of the case On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual's constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home. Question Can a federal officer who participated in a search that violated the Fourth Amendment be held personally liable for monetary damages if a reasonable officer would have assumed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an officer of the law has qualified immunity from civil liability if the actions that officer took "could reasonably have been thought consistent" with the allegedly violated rights. Because Anderson could reasonably believe that his actions were legal, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court also held that the determination of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity should be determined based on the reasonable belief of the legality of the search, rather than the actual legality of the search. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority's opinion unnecessarily expands the idea of qualified immunity beyond high political officials to police officers, whom it is in the public's best interests to hold accountable for their actions. He also argued that the lower court was correct in holding that summary judgment cannot be granted without resolving the factual disputes regarding the constitutionality of the search. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) - Immunity

Facts of the case On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion. Question Are presidential aides entitled to immunity from civil suits? Conclusion Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity but not absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is only available for specific functions that require a total shield from liability. The Court held that qualified immunity was necessary for the government officials to carry out their jobs and that the courts could adequately determine whether an action falls within the scope of qualified immunity based on whether the official knew or should have known that his/her actions would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the "knew or should have known" standard the majority established would often require discovery to determine what a defendant actually knew. He argued that the issues surrounding discovery of such evidence could be handled by a trial judge pending any motion for summary judgment made on the basis of qualified immunity. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, but emphasized that Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a similar case where they dissented, was wrongly decided. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent where he argued that, based on the Court's previous decisions that granted absolute immunity to legislative aides, presidential aides should also receive absolute immunity. He argued that the degree of immunity for a government official should depend on that official's function rather than that official's place in the hierarchy. Since the President relies on his aides to perform the duties of his office, the aides should be considered "alter egos" for legal purposes and entitled to the same absolute immunity. Without that assurance of immunity for aides, the President's functionality would greatly diminish.

N.B. Monroe V. Pape (Feb 20, 1961)

Facts of the case On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on "open" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney. Monroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. Question 1. Does a person have a valid cause of action under the Civil Rights Act against police officers when the police officers violate that person's due process? 2. Can municipalities be liable under the Civil Rights Act? Conclusion: Yes and No. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the city police officers, in conducting an unreasonable search and seizure, had committed an action which was under the color of law, and that the police could be held liable individually under the Civil Rights Act. However, the majority further held that a municipality could not be liable under the Civil Rights Act. So, the court reversed the lower court's opinion insofar as it dismissed the Civil Rights Act claim against the police officers. Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Potter Stewart joined. In his opinion, Justice Harlan discussed the difficulties in explaining the distinction between authorized or unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent arguing that a police officer who acts outside the law loses his authority under the law, making a state tort claim against individual officers more appropriate than a claim under the Civil Rights Act.

N.B. Brentwood V. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assoc. (Feb 20, 2001)

Facts of the case The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing "undue influence" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action. Question May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school? Conclusion: Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the ostensibly private organization, which regulated school sports, and the state education board's acknowledgment of the organization, indicated that the organization is a state actor for civil rights purposes. "The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it," wrote Justice Souter for the majority. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent.

N.B. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York (Jun 6, 1978)

Facts of the case The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred. The district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Question If sued in their official capacity, are local government officials and organizations such as a school board considered "persons" for the purpose of liability for back wages? Conclusion Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and specifically the Sherman Amendment, indicated that municipalities could be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights. Additionally, by 1871 there was a clear legislative and precedent-based history for municipal corporations — such as a school board — to be considered a "person" for the purpose of lawsuits and liability. The Court held that this liability only existed when the constitutional infringement was the direct result of an official policy. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the Court's decision to overrule Monroe v. Pape was an unusual but crucial one. The Court was able to rely on the precedents that established the liability of school boards for suits dealing with civil rights issues such as segregation. Given these precedents, the decision in this case allowed the Court to correct an error and create a more consistent stance on municipal liability. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the sections of the Court's opinion that explain the decision and not in those that serve purely as background. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that there were too many precedents that supported the immunity of municipalities to summarily dismiss with this decision. Since this decision represents such a huge departure from the previous understanding of municipal immunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court should require evidence "beyond doubt" that the previous decision was incorrect. The majority based its decision primarily on the debate surrounding a rejected amendment to the Act, which he argued is not strong enough evidence to overrule Monroe v. Pape. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.

N.B. Paul v. Davis (Mar 23, 1976)

Facts of the case A flyer identifying "active shoplifters" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights. Question Did the distribution of the flyer violate Davis's right to privacy and liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of any constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The Court also emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover Davis's claims. The Court argued that the constitutional right to privacy was limited to matters relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." The publication of records of official acts, such as arrests, did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights.

Alden v. Maine (Jun 23, 1999)

Facts of the case A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996) which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court. Question May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts? Conclusion No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

Blessing v. Freestone (1999)

Facts of the case Cathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements. Question Can parents sue states under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to force overall compliance with federal efforts under Title IV-D to collect child-support payments from ex-spouses? Conclusion No. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that parents cannot sue merely because a state fails to be in "substantial compliance" with federal collection standards.

Saucier v. Katz (2001) - Immunity

Facts of the case Donald Saucier, a military police officer, arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate. Question Is the reasonableness inquiry into claims of qualified immunity by a police officer accused of using excessive force in an arrest the same as the reasonableness inquiry on the merits of the excessive-force claim? Conclusion No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "the ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest." "The approach the Court of Appeals adopted -- to deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim -- could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to 'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. The majority then concluded that the military policeman was entitled to qualified immunity.

N.B Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971)

Facts of the case In 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens' home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question (1) Does violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure give rise to a federal claim for damages? (2) Does governmental privilege extend to federal agents who clearly violate constitutional rights and act outside their authority? Conclusion Yes, No answer. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Sixth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Bivens does have a cause of action for damages arising from the federal agents Fourth Amendment violations. Bivens must provide proof of his injuries in order to recover. The Court did not reach the privilege question because the Court of Appeals did not consider the question. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment, writing that federal courts have the power to award damages for constitutional violations. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers is better served by leaving the question to Congress. He also argued that the doctrine of suppressing evidence obtained in illegal searches is insufficient to deter law enforcement. Justice Hugo L. Black also dissented, arguing that Congress could create the cause of action Bivens stated, but has not, so the majority's decision is an unconstitutional extension of judicial power. Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, supporting the idea that the question in this case is better left to Congress.

N.B. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services (Feb 22, 1989)

Facts of the case In 1984, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney became comatose and then profoundly retarded due to traumatic head injuries inflicted by his father who physically beat him over a long period of time. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services took various steps to protect the child after receiving numerous complaints of the abuse; however, the Department did not act to remove Joshua from his father's custody. Joshua DeShaney's mother subsequently sued the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, alleging that the Department had deprived the child of his "liberty interest in bodily integrity, in violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father's violence." Question Does a state's failure to protect an individual against private violence constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No. The Due Process Clause does not impose a special duty on the State to provide services to the public for protection against private actors if the State did not create those harms. "The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; while it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means."

Castle Rock v. Gonzales (June 27, 2005)

Facts of the case Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated. Question Can the holder of a restraining order bring a procedural due process claim against a local government for its failure to actively enforce the order and protect the holder from violence? Conclusion: No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally-protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a "property interest" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that "This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created." The Court concluded that since "Colorado has not created such an entitlement," Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

N.B. • Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown (Apr 28, 1997)

Facts of the case Jill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns. Question May municipalities be held liable for hiring employees who injure someone? Conclusion No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for hiring employees who violate someone's rights unless a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the "plainly obvious consequence . . . would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected rights. Thus, the county was not financially liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening because Brown had not proved that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of her federally protected rights.

N.B. City of Canton v. Harris (1989)

Facts of the case Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized. Harris sued the city of Canton for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in police custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions. Question Is a municipality liable for failure to provide adequate training to an employee that resulted in a deprivation of constitutional rights? Conclusion Yes. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that municipalities may be liable for inadequate training of employees, but only when "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference" to the constitutional rights of the people with whom the employees will interact. A municipality is then only liable when the failure to train is a deliberate choice on the part of the city. In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. makes clear that the Court of Appeals may remand the case for a new trial. In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor agreed with the majority's holding regarding the municipality's liability for a conscious failure to train. However, she argued that it was unnecessary to remand the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court should simply apply the "deliberate indifference" standard to the facts of the case. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion.

Anderson v. Creighton (1987) - Immunity

Facts of the case On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual's constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home. Question Can a federal officer who participated in a search that violated the Fourth Amendment be held personally liable for monetary damages if a reasonable officer would have assumed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an officer of the law has qualified immunity from civil liability if the actions that officer took "could reasonably have been thought consistent" with the allegedly violated rights. Because Anderson could reasonably believe that his actions were legal, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court also held that the determination of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity should be determined based on the reasonable belief of the legality of the search, rather than the actual legality of the search. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority's opinion unnecessarily expands the idea of qualified immunity beyond high political officials to police officers, whom it is in the public's best interests to hold accountable for their actions. He also argued that the lower court was correct in holding that summary judgment cannot be granted without resolving the factual disputes regarding the constitutionality of the search. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Hudson v. Palmer (1984)

Facts of the case Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State. Question Are postdeprivation remedies adequate in cases of intentional harm? Did the search of Palmer's locker and cell violate the Fourth Amendment? Did prison officials deprive Palmer of his property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Court held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches did not apply "within the confines of the prison cell." Noting that privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance, the Court found that "the paramount interest in institutional security" outweighed all privacy concerns. The Court further held that "random and unauthorized" deprivations of property did not violate the Due Process Clause, so long as postdeprivation remedies were available.

N.B. MCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

Maryland state legislature passed a 15k tax on all banks not chartered in the state. McCulloch was the branch manager of the 2nd Bank of the US. The US Government is supreme yet limited by popular sovereignty.

N.B Smith v Wade

Punitive damages under Section 1983 available only for malicious intent or reckless indifference.

N.B. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. (2015)

Question Does the Supremacy Clause give Medicaid providers a private right of action against a state when Congress chose not to create enforceable rights under the Medicaid Act? Conclusion No. An implied right of action is not implied under the Supremacy Clause and Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement in the courts. The Court held that the Supremacy Clause instructs courts to defer to federal law when federal and state law contradict each other, but it does not create a private right of action. If the Supremacy Clause were interpreted to include a private right of action, it would mean that the Constitution would require Congress to allow private actors to implement its laws, which would curtail Congress' ability to guide implementation of federal laws. Although judicial precedent allows for suits to prevent state and federal officers from violating federal laws, that precedent stems from a long history of the jurisprudence of the courts of equity, not the Supremacy Clause. The Court also held that the Idaho Medicaid Providers could not circumvent Congress' exclusion of a private right of action under the Medicaid Act. In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that federal courts may not grant injunctive relief against state officers who violate federal law when the relevant statute does not provide for that kind of relief. In this case, the Medicaid Act does not do so because such relief could result in increased litigation, inconsistent results, and the disorderly administration of complex federal programs, which Congress could not have intended.

14th Amendment to the US Constitution

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Alexander v. Sandoval (2001)

The Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination." (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

11th Amendment to the US Constitution

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

4th Amendment of U.S. Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Gonzaga University v Doe 2002

held that individuals cannot sue universities that disclose information protected under FERPA, but the school will face sanctions from the government