MDY Comp Exam

(Dorronsoro 2009)

forcibly meddling in local affairs (Dorronsoro 2009: 9) might be the undoing of both the international community and the Karzia government efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. An effective collaboration should reflect the needs of the people and the international community

Keohane (1984)

"After hegemony" Deterministic view of hegemony is incorrect; hegemony can facilitate a certain type of cooperation, but it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperative relationships After international regimes have been established, cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader Theories of hegemony should seek not only to analyze dominant powers' decisions to engage in rule-making and rule-enforcing, but also to explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon (legitimacy? cooperation within hegemony?) Many relationships in US-hegemonic international policy economy post-WWII actually approximated the ideal type of "complex interdependence" (Keohane and Nye (1977)), with multiple issues, channels of contact among societies, and inefficacy of military force for most policy objectives • So, military power was only a background condition, not a variable explaining US hegemony Common interests in the leading capitalist states, bolstered by the effects of existing international regimes (mostly created during the time of American hegemony), are strong enough to make sustained cooperation possible, though not inevitable

o Ohmae (1993)

"Borderless world" - differences between countries matter less Economic activity has become global less susceptible to state intervention Logic of market competition has caused economic processes to transcend national circumstances (TNCs)

Krugman (1979)

"First-generation crisis model" - speculative attack against a currency peg is the deterministic outcome of an unsustainable fiscal expansion pursued by a narrow-minded government and financed by excessive money creation depleting foreign currency reserves; when reserves fall below a critical threshold, rational agents, in anticipation of the peg's future collapse, buy the government's remaining reserves forcing an immediate devaluation; this thus restores the exchange rate to a value consistent with purchasing power parity • Often called a "fundamental crisis" since it is the existence of a large fiscal deficit - a fundamental reason - that makes it impossible for the central bank to further stabilize the exchange rate • Problem: represent government's policy in a very simplistic way

Anderson (1983)

"Imagined communities" - a nation is an imagined political community; it is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign • It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, yet in the minds of each lives the image of communion • The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them has finite boundaries, beyond which lie other nations o That is, size, communication by way of shared symbols, and exclusiveness mark the nation as different from other political constructs What makes the shrunken, national imaginings of recent history generate such huge sacrifices? • The answer lies in the cultural roots of nationalism. Religion has the ability to turn fatality into continuity - this was affected by developments in 18th century Western Europe • Secularization (religion declined due to explorations of the non-European world and due to print capitalism - this demoted the sacred language; idea of "divine right of kings" faded) • Disenchantment with the world o Thus, needed to recreate the ideas of community by means of a secular transformation of fatality into continuity - the idea of a nation is very well suited for this purpose because the nation looms out of the immemorial past and stretches into the limitless future The concept of time changed: from simultaneity along time homogenous empty time • The novel and newspaper (confidence that everyone was reading the same paper, even if couldn't actually know all of them) provided the technical means for representing the nation - they created a remarkable confidence of community in anonymity Effect of print capitalism - consolidated and standardized the different vernaculars spoken by the masses in order to gain profits (developed unified communication systems) • So, the interaction between capitalism, print, and the fatality of linguistic diversity were crucial factors in creating the nation o "imagined communities" were linguistically unified fraternities of equals Critiques: unclear terms like "imagined" and "sovereign"; exaggerates the importance of cultural nationalism while underestimating the political dimension

o Obstfeld (1996)

"Second-generation currency crisis model" - honoring or abandoning an exchange-rate peg commitment is the outcome of a loss minimization problem solved by a fully rational government; to decide optimal course of action, government balances the credibility cost incurred by defaulting on the peg against the macro-economic cost arising from deviating from the equilibrium exchange rate implied by the peg's maintenance; below a critical over-valuation threshold, abandoning the peg is costlier than maintaining it, so the government finds it optimal to honor it; above this critical threshold, the opposite holds; peg's cost is endogenous to private sector's expectations; so, defending the peg is less costly under credible commitment; there are also self-fulfilling crises, in the multiple-equilibria zone, where a shift in expectations from credible to non-credible commitment tilts the government's optimal response from maintaining to abandoning the peg (so peg collapsed because market expects it to) • Devaluation here (unlike in first-generation) is a political decision, not the unavoidable result of policy inconsistencies • Crises can also occur when there is no bad development in the fundamentals forcing a country to abandon the currency peg

Minsky (1972, 1977, 1978)

"financial instability hypothesis" - fragile financial markets are prone to a non-sustainable boom, ending in financial distress or even a recession • Ponzi schemes are located at the extreme end of a spectrum of financial markets, classified according to their "fragility" • Views about the future can undergo marked changes in short periods of time, generating instability (financial commitments are made in the face of intractable uncertainty - not able to calculate risks) o "Hedge finance" - assets with cash flow revenues equal to or larger than cash flow commitments in both the short and long run o "Speculative finance" - capital assets with short-term cash flow revenues that fall short of short-term commitments; met by rolling over or refinancing debts in the expectation that long-run revenues will be large enough to meet outstanding commitments (example: banking) o "Ponzi finance" - assets characterized by cash flow commitments that are larger than cash flow revenues in both the long and short run, and hence need perpetual rolling over, which is naturally not sustainable

o Rodrik (1997)

Argues that globalization is incompatible with domestic stability. Tensions: • Among groups: group asymmetries exacerbated by reduced barriers to trade and investment; workers bargaining power erodes • Among/within nations: domestic norms/institutions are questioned since the nations are trying to compete for the same thing; different development models make this difficult • Within nations: difficult for governments to provide social insurance "race to the bottom" (declining tax revenues are a result of governments having to lower taxes to retain MNCs within their borders) Need: systemic-level social insurance • Governments can no longer maintain welfare state-progressive taxation mix; future of welfare state can only be secured by shifting tax burden from mobile to immobile asset holders (which stunts redistributive effects)

Kaufmann (2004)

Bush administration's arguments to the public to generate support for preventive war shows successful "threat inflation" (examples: Saddam as undeterrable, Saddam as terrorist, existence of WMDs, chemical and biological threats); the "marketplace of ideas" failed - why? • Democratic political systems may be inherently vulnerable to issue manipulation by elites • Control over government's intelligence apparatus selective publicizing • White House seen as having credibility • Countervailing institutions - like the press - failed to check the ability of those in power to control foreign policy debate • Shock of 9/11 atrocities created crisis atmosphere that may have reduced public skepticism

Hard Balancing and soft balancing

But, in reality, neither "hard" balancing nor "soft" balancing has occurred • "hard" balancing - traditional balancing through internal defense buildups or external alliance formation o Wohlforth: US enjoys such a large margin of superiority over every other state in all the important dimensions of power that an extensive balancing coalition is infeasible o This fact, however, is less the result of rigid constraints than of much more malleable budgetary choices (example: despite coordination problems, EU does have more troops at their disposable than US and a higher total GDP) So, if there were a will to balance against US, there would be a way o "internal balancing" - states invest heavily in defense by transforming their latent power into military capabilities See this only in China, but this has been going on for decades (not since 9/11) o "external balancing" - states seek to form military alliances against the predominant power Little visible change in the alliance patterns of the late 1990s o "diplomatic red lines" - send clear signals to the aggressor that states are willing to take costly actions to check the dominant power if it does not respect certain boundaries of behavior Extensive criticism, like of invasion of Iraq, but no ultimatum • "soft" balancing - states seek to undermine and restrain US power in ways that fall short of classic measures o States make efforts to entangle the dominant state in international institutions No, the most powerful states exercise the most control in these institutions; no attempt to block US campaign in Afghanistan o States make efforts to exclude the dominant state from regional economic cooperation No, US has been one of the primary drivers of trade regionalization, not excluded from it o States make efforts to undermine the dominant state's ability to project military power by restricting or denying military basing rights Maybe in Turkey or Saudi Arabia, but US has established new bases, negotiated landing rights, and updated existing bases in many new regions of the world o States make efforts to provide relevant assistance to US adversaries such as rogue states Examples are South Korean aid to North Korea and Russian aid to Iran in building nuclear power plants; but, this isn't unambiguously driven by a strategic logic of undermining US power • Should also be skeptical of soft balancing claims because the criteria for predicting this behavior are conceptually flawed - how to tell soft balancing from just routine diplomatic friction between countries? Example: one trading partner often seeks outcomes that the other doesn't prefer, without balancing being relevant Why aren't countries balancing against US? • Strategy in post-9/11 world is ambitious, assertive, and backed by tremendous offensive capability, but it is also highly selective and not broadly threatening o Focus is on threats emanating from nuclear proliferator states and global terrorist organizations That is, the US isn't seen as a threat worth balancing against because of shared interests in nonproliferation and the war on terror

o Keohane and Nye (1977)

Complex interdependence is a relationship characterized by costly effects, which may reduce costs, impose costs, or provide benefits, caused by rapid technological change and continued importance of state interests/power (liberalism + realism) • States fall on a continuum from realism complex interdependence • Interdependence does not imply cooperation

Rise of China - Constructivism

Constructivist optimists • International relationships are "socially constructed" and shaped to a considerable degree by subjective factors, by beliefs and ideas • Identities - collective self-perceptions of political actors and their shared perceptions of others • Strategic cultures - sets of beliefs about the fundamental character of international politics and about the best ways of coping with it, especially as regards the utility of force and prospects for cooperation • Norms - beliefs not only about what is efficacious but also about what is right or appropriate in the international realm o Each of these strongly shaped by prevailing interpretations of a society's shared historical experiences; tend to be highly resistant to change; beliefs evolve/transform through interaction with others o Implies there is always the possibility that people can change the world by changing how they think • International politics tends to be competitive and violent, not because some immutable principles of human behavior require that it be so but rather because, across the centuries, national leaders have tended to believe this to be the case o By acting in accordance with their pessimistic expectations, leaders have helped to make them come true ("realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy") o If widely shared, a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for, and benefits of, international cooperation could achieve similar status • China's increasing participation in international institutions will lead to shifts in strategic culture, in the norms of international behavior accepted by its leaders, and ultimately in their conceptions of national identity • Process of socialization reflecting China's desire to be accepted as a modern, advanced country - Chinese leaders may be moving toward much broader embrace of what are essentially liberal norms and expectations regarding international behavior o So, participation and norm change are mutually reinforcing mechanisms Constructivist pessimists • No reason that the beliefs of China's leaders/people will necessarily evolve in ways conducive to long-term improvements in US-China relations • Existing mental constructs/social structures are deeply rooted o Pending some truly dramatic shift, Americans likely to continue to regard China as illegitimate and potentially dangerous o Unless US draws back, Chinese likely to regard it as intrusive bully • While repeated interaction can erode old identities, it can also reinforce them

o Things to consider: contagion and herding

Contagion - a crisis in one country may conceivably trigger a crisis elsewhere; a currency crisis in one country makes a currency crisis in another country more likely (can be due to actual linkages between countries and "spillover," to an international liquidity shortage of investors, to "irrational" reasons like assuming a group of countries are similar in some way, or to "membership" contagion, like being in EMU) Herding: market participants mimic the behavior of other participants, which can lead to a currency crisis (Krugman's "bandwagon effect")

Sagan (1994)

Contradiction: nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the "long peace" in the Cold War, but the continuing spread of nuclear weapons is believed to greatly increase the risks of nuclear war (new nuclear powers considered unlikely to maintain stable deterrence)

Lake (1992)

Democracies not only fight wars against each other less often, but also tend to win the wars that they do fight This is because autocratic states typically earn rents at the expense of their societies ("state rent-seeking") and thus possess an imperialist bias and tend to be more expansionist (hence, more war-prone) Democracies are constrained by their societies from earning rents, so they devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming counter-coalitions against expansionist autocracies ( propensity for victory in war)

Russett (1993)

Democracies rarely fight each other because they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and they perceive that democracies should not fight each other; by this reasoning, the more democracies there are, the fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of peace

Mearsheimer (1990)

Democratic peace - domestic political factors are the principal determinant of peace; the presence of liberal democracies in the international system will help produce a stable order; democracies do not go to war against other democracies - why? • (1) authoritarian leaders are more likely to go to war because they are not accountable to their publics, which carry the main burdens of war, while democratic leaders are • (2) citizens of liberal democracies respect popular democratic rights, even of those in other states, so they won't wage war against other democracies (democracy seen as most legitimate)

Mansfield and Snyder (1995)

Democratic peace may hold in the long run, but not in the short Countries do not become mature democracies overnight - more typically, they go through a rocky transitional period in which they become more aggressive and war-prone and do fight wars with democratic states Democratizing states (or states going through reversals) more likely to fight wars than mature democracies or stable autocracies • See this for almost every great power - combination of incipient democratization and material resources of a great power produced nationalism, defiance abroad, and major war

Huntington (1993): "The Clash of Civilizations?"

Dominant source of conflict will be cultural Civilizations, not states/nation-states, are the key units • A civilization is a cultural entity, the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of what distinguishes humans from other species • Differences among civilizations are basic - history, language, culture, tradition, and most importantly, religion; these differences are more fundamental and less easily compromised than among political ideologies or economic ones • "The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe." Gives primacy of place to Christianity as the distinctive positive influence in the making of Western civilization Western culture's key contribution has been the separation of church and state, something that he sees as foreign to the world's other major religious systems Due to the growing importance of "kin cultures" and "civilizational fault-line conflicts," the world's religious civilizations are increasingly unitary and change-resistant Democracy (1) emerged first within Western civilization and (2) other great religious civilizations of the world lack the unique bundle of cultural characteristics necessary to support Western-style democracy

Collier (2000)

Economic perspective on causes of civil war (uses statistical analysis of civil wars from 1965-1999) - risk related to dependence upon primary commodity exports, low national income, slow growth, rapid population growth, ethnic dominance, and diasporas; things like inequality, lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions have had little systematic effect on risk (maybe because they make organization more difficult) • Primary commodity exports are the most lootable of all economic activities, which leads to opportunities for predatory rebellion • Low incomes advantage the rebels because governments take in less tax revenue, which reduces the capacity of the government to spend on defense • Slow growth and rapid population growth assist rebel recruitment While a discourse of grievance appeals to many as an explanation of civil wars, Collier advances the following: civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially viable (able to raise revenue, like the FARC in Colombia which earns a huge amount of money from drugs and kidnapping) • Rebellions are not the ultimate protest movements, but the ultimate manifestation of organized crime (use grievance discourse simply because they need to motivate their recruits) What to do? • If accept grievance account, try to promote democracy or equality or redraw boundaries - this is counter-productive • Instead, need to make it harder for rebel organizations to get established (conflict prevention) • Post-conflict, though, the organizations have been established, so will need to figure out a way to address the subjective grievances of the parties to the conflict

o Williamson (1997)

Effects of globalization across time are the same: a rise in inequality in rich countries and a fall in inequality in poor countries Mexico and the US: unskilled workers from poor countries emigrate to wealthy countries, thus flooding the rich country's labor market at the bottom • US: unskilled wages lowered relative to skilled wages and white collar incomes, thus increasing labor inequality • Mexico: unskilled labor, once superfluous and flooding the market, is fleeing, thus decreasing labor inequality These inequality trends were in part responsible for rich industrialized countries' interwar retreat from globalization

Rise of China - Liberalism

Liberal pessimists • China is authoritarian regime of dubious legitimacy with uncertain grip on power - ideology has lost most of its appeal, heavily dependent on military/domestic security services for preservation of domestic order; government's claim to rule now comes from promise of continued increases in prosperity and appeals to nationalism unstable, especially if economic progress falters, which could lead to hyper-nationalism • Transitional states (where pressures for participation increasing, but effective democratic institutions haven't yet emerged) seen as most likely to initiate conflict with neighbors - typically appeal to nationalism • For US, democratic peace suggests hostility/atmosphere of suspicion (example: conflict over human rights issues - for US, this shows regime is illegitimate); US more likely to assist polities that it perceives to be democratic if they are threatened by China possibility of stable relationship is remote • Some groups in each state will favor more confrontational policies and these will make it harder to achieve stable relations

Formation of a State - Cohen, et al. (1981)

Entire historical process of creating a national state was a long and violent struggle pitting the agents of state centralization against myriad local and regional opponents; by 1900, there were 20 times fewer independent polities in Europe than there had been in 1500 - they did not disappear peacefully or decay as the national state developed; they were the losers in a protracted war of all against all Many new states of today are engaged in similar struggles of primitive central state power accumulation - they are competitive political conflicts for control over the power resources of the respective territories and populations • Collective political violence, in and of itself, indicates neither order nor political decay (decay is standard argument) Newly established states are likely both to exacerbate old conflicts and to create new ones by financing the expansion of the state apparatus through increases in the tax burden on the major producers of agrarian societies: the peasants • One of the crucial differences between eruptions of peasant resistance in new states and that in early modern Europe is that the former are more integrated into national power struggles • But, similar in that until these states accumulate the amount of power resources that will make the costs of anti-state action prohibitive, their opponents will fiercely resist their extractive claims (to reach this point, must pass through the violent phase of primitive accumulation of power) • The extent to which an expansion of state power will generate collective violence thus depends on the level of state power prior to that expansion o It is the progression toward greater order itself that produces much of the relatively greater violence we find in new states

Lake and Rothchild (1996)

Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, "ancient hatreds" and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy; moreover, ethnic passions, long bottled up by repressive communist regimes, were not simply uncorked by the end of the Cold War Ethnic conflict is caused by the "fear of the future, lived through the past" • Intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future; as groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence; as information failures, problems of credible commitment (arise whenever the balance of ethnic power shifts), and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens (which further exacerbates information problems), and conflict becomes more likely o Strategic interactions between groups create the unstable social foundations from which ethnic conflict arises • State weakness allows ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, to build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society • "Non-rational" factors like political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart What to do? • Ethnic conflict can be contained, but it cannot be entirely resolved. • Effective management seeks to reassure minority groups of both their physical security and, because it is often a harbinger of future threats, their cultural security; demonstrations of respect, power-sharing, elections engineered to produce the interdependence of groups, and the establishment of regional autonomy and federalism are important confidence-building measures that, by promoting the rights and positions of minority groups, mitigate the strategic dilemmas that produce violence • International intervention may also be necessary and appropriate to protect minorities against their worst fears, but its effectiveness is limited; non-coercive interventions can raise the costs of purely ethnic appeals and induce groups to abide by international norms; coercive interventions can help bring warring parties to the bargaining table and enforce the resulting terms; mediation can facilitate agreement and implementation Key issue in all interventions, especially in instances of external coercion, is the credibility of the international commitment - external interventions that the warring parties fear will soon fade may be worse than no intervention at all

Kaufmann (2006)

Existing theories: • Rational choice - claim that extreme ethnic violence (war and genocide) can be explained either as the result of information failures and commitment problems or as the utility-maximizing strategy of predatory elites (Fearon (1994), Lake and Rothchild (1996)); alternative is that predatory elites are the key cause of ethnic war and genocide because they provoke violence as a way of maintain power and misleading their supporters into thinking the other side is to blame for the violence (de Figueiredo and Weingast (1994)) • Symbolic politics (Kaufmann) - asserts that such violence is driven by hostile ethnic myths and an emotionally driven symbolic politics based on those myths that popularizes predatory policies (media important here); hostile myths produce emotion-laden symbols that make mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and make extremist policies popular ethnic security dilemma in which growing extremism of leadership on at least one side results in radicalization of leadership on the other(s) spiral of escalation

Minsky

Financial crisis thus occurs if units need or desire more cash than is available from their usual sources and they resort to unusual ways of raising cash, such as liquidating positions

Keynes (1937)

Financial markets are periodically unstable - money is a financing "veil" between the real asset and the wealth owner, which explains why capitalist economies are "so given to fluctuations" The monetized economy is inherently dynamic, since the key economic transaction is the exchange of money today (current goods) for money tomorrow (financial assets) • If too much money is in savings, we are returning society less than it gave to us, so cumulative fall in everyone's income depression (vulnerability to savings and investment)

Sagan, Waltz, Betts (2007)

Iran and nuclear weapons • Waltz: Iran wants nuclear weapons because of its geographical location (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq as neighbors); because US included Iraq in the axis of evil and then invaded it (Iran, North Korea as the other two) - no way to deter the US other than by having nuclear weapons (US can overwhelm any country if they rely only on conventional weapons); not a problem if Iran gets nuclear weapons - deterrence has worked 100 percent of the time o Note: "proliferation" hasn't happened, just spread • Sagan: in reality, nuclear weapons are not controlled by states or statesmen, they are managed by imperfect, normal human beings inside imperfect, normal organizations; dangers of new nuclear states emerging: o Nuclear weapons promoting conventional aggression in state which holds them ("stability-instability paradox" - more aggressive conventionally because protected from nuclear retaliation by nuclear shield; example: Kargil War between Pakistan and India) o Problem of terrorist theft ("vulnerability-invulnerability paradox" - for weapons to have deterrent effect, must be invulnerable to first strike from adversary to allow for the possibility of retaliation; if threatened, move weapons to countryside, but then they are more vulnerable to theft) o Problem of potential loose controls and sales of nuclear weapons to terrorists All three occurred when Pakistan got nuclear weapons

Meyer, et al. (1997)

Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated through global, cultural, and associational processes Nation-state is culturally constructed and embedded, where culture is substantially organized on a worldwide basis, not simply built up from local circumstances and history • This is why it routinely organizes and legitimates itself in terms of universalistic models like citizenship, socioeconomic development, and rationalized justice Nation-states must be understood as, in part, constructions of a common wider culture (not self-directed actors responding rationally): • Exhibit a great deal of isomorphism in their structures and policies (example: see an increase in rates of women in higher education everywhere, not just in developed economies) • Make valiant efforts to live up to the model of rational actors (uniform definition of goals as enhancement of collective progress, individual rights, and development) • Marked by considerable decoupling between purposes and structure, intentions and results (nation-states modeled on external culture that cannot simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system) • Undergo expansive structuration in largely standardized ways (example: impoverished countries routinely establish universities producing overqualified personnel) If a nation-state neglects to adopt world-approved policies, domestic elements will try to carry out or enforce conformity (nation-states tend to copy one another)

o Garrett (1998)

Markets may not be completely global, but have "globalized" Globalization constraints on policy choice are not pervasive • OECD countries (up to mid-1990s) - industrial countries are NOT similarly integrated into most international markets (pace of globalization varies); fiscal policies (government spending or changes in government spending) have NOT converged; NOT a race to the bottom • Market integration is more constraining than trade or multinationalization of production - but still, it has not only increased the exit options of producers and investors, it has also heightened feelings of economic insecurity among broader segments of society, which has given politicians incentives for wealth redistribution • Although there are costs for an interventionist government, numerous government programs generate economic benefits attractive to mobile finance and production; this has the effect of reducing inequality, which leads to an increase in social stability, thus stimulating growth

Sagan (1996/7)

Models of why states decide to build or refrain from developing nuclear weapons: • Security model (neorealist "consensus model," Waltz, Mearsheimer)- states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign, especially nuclear, threats o Restraint is caused by the absence of the fundamental military threats that produce positive proliferation decisions o NPT seen as a way to overcome a collective action problem • Domestic politics model - nuclear weapons are political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests o Even if don't serve national interests, likely serve interests of some individual actors within the state, like the military or politicians o Bureaucratic actors are not passive recipients of top-down politician decisions, but they create conditions that favor weapons acquisition by encouraging extreme perceptions of foreign threats, promoting supportive politicians, and actively lobbying for increased defense spending o Security threats are merely windows of opportunity through which parochial interests can jump Evidence: India - no consensus among officials that is was necessary to have a nuclear deterrent as a response to the 1964 Chinese nuclear test (prolonged bureaucratic battle; way for Indira Gandhi to increase her domestic support in 1974 with nuclear test when it was very low due to recession) o Reversals of weapons decisions should occur not when external threats are diminished, but when there are major internal policy changes Evidence: South Africa - de Klerk decided to dismantle before the Berlin Wall fell o NPT also helps to empower domestic actors who are opposed to nuclear weapons development • Norms model - nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state's modernity and identity o Military organizations and their weapons seen as part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate modern states (like airlines or flags); seen as giving prestige Evidence: French decision to build and test nuclear weapons (predated 1956 Suez Crisis, which neorealists claim was the cause; didn't see similar reaction to Soviet threat in other states like West Germany; needed grandeur after being one of the liberators in WWII, but not having comparable armed forces) o Norms are sticky - individual and group beliefs about appropriate behavior change slowly, and over time norms can become rules embedded in domestic institutions So, norms can be a brake on nuclear chain reactions o Sagan, Waltz, Betts (2007) Iran and nuclear weapons • Waltz: Iran wants nuclear weapons because of its geographical location (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq as neighbors); because US included Iraq in the axis of evil and then invaded it (Iran, North Korea as the other two) - no way to deter the US other than by having nuclear weapons (US can overwhelm any country if they rely only on conventional weapons); not a problem if Iran gets nuclear weapons - deterrence has worked 100 percent of the time o Note: "proliferation" hasn't happened, just spread • Sagan: in reality, nuclear weapons are not controlled by states or statesmen, they are managed by imperfect, normal human beings inside imperfect, normal organizations; dangers of new nuclear states emerging: o Nuclear weapons promoting conventional aggression in state which holds them ("stability-instability paradox" - more aggressive conventionally because protected from nuclear retaliation by nuclear shield; example: Kargil War between Pakistan and India) o Problem of terrorist theft ("vulnerability-invulnerability paradox" - for weapons to have deterrent effect, must be invulnerable to first strike from adversary to allow for the possibility of retaliation; if threatened, move weapons to countryside, but then they are more vulnerable to theft) o Problem of potential loose controls and sales of nuclear weapons to terrorists All three occurred when Pakistan got nuclear weapons

Rise of China Christensen (2001)

Most existing debates about China surround its future military power compared with that of the US and other East Asian regional powers • China as a "peer competitor" or "near peer competitor" of US - realist notions of how international politics works; power matters, relative capabilities compared with those of other great powers matter o This debate misses many of the important questions regarding a China with increasing, but still limited, military capabilities o With certain new equipment and strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretense of catching up with the US by an overall measure of national military power • China as "regional hegemon" - towering over its cowed neighbors and threatening American interests in a region of increasing importance to the US o China will not be able to develop the capabilities to match or defeat US military power, so takes more realistic approach: develop the capabilities to dominate most regional actors, to become a regional peer competitor or near peer competitor of the other great powers in the region (including Russia and Japan) and to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict of great interest to China In the near term, China seems devoted to developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan's diplomatic policies, and to threaten or carry out punishment of any third parties that might intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf (US/Japan) China sees more advanced countries as being vulnerable precisely because they depend on more advanced, high-tech systems than do less advanced countries (so can target with things like information warfare; can also use blockade because US and Taiwan don't have good defensives for sea mines) • Idea is to use asymmetric tools to coerce technologically superior foes

Milliken and Krause (2002)

Must distinguish between state failure and collapse (otherwise blurring the different processes that lead to the two things); state maintenance (in whatever weakened or destroyed capacity) is the norm, state collapse is the exception; must also not confuse state failure or collapse with political conflict or civil war For every claim that a state has collapsed, is failing, or is going to fail, contains two usually implicit definitions or benchmarks: • "Stateness" against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed (institutional dimension of state collapse) • Normative and practical implications of such a failure (functional dimension of state failure)

o Haas (1986)

Nationalism as rationalization - that is, nationalism may well be a rational response to certain social upheavals and frustrations, not a throwback to barbarism

Jervis (1976)

Perception and misperception in international politics: foreign policy decision-makers' perceptions of their environment and of other actors often diverge from reality, which has important consequences for their and others' subsequent actions Three questions that often face decision-makers clearly bring out the importance of correctly assessing the other sides' goals and beliefs: • Can an issue in dispute be treated in isolation? • How will the other carry out his undertakings? • What threats and promises will be most effective? Intentions - the actions an actor will take under given circumstances • Differing perceptions of the other state's intentions often underline policy debates (example: deterrence) • Both prisoner's dilemma (spiral debates) and chicken games (deterrence) show us the deep concern with the danger of misunderstandings and the consequent importance of states' making their intentions clear o Deterrence model (chicken) - having so great a preponderance of power as to convince the adversary that you mean what you say; worry is that aggressors will underestimate the resolve of the defenders o Spiral theorists (prisoner's dilemma) - having just enough to stay ahead; worry is that each side will overestimate the hostility of the other • A major determinant of the effect of threats is thus the intention of the other side - but this depends to a large extent on the other's intentions and its perceptions of the first state • These perceptions are often incorrect - this is because (1) decision makers cannot process all available facts and facts are chosen that are most conducive to fitting current perceptions (for rational decision making), (2) context within which information is received is crucial, as most recent events set the stage for the interpretation of the next pieces of information, and (3) decision makers typically use history for drawing generalizations that can be applied to current policy issues not to rationalize policy decisions o Types of misperceptions: (1) see others as being more centralized, more planned, and hence more devious than is in fact the case, (2) exaggerate the degree to which one is a factor in another's policies, to believe that one's importance and influence are greater than is the case o How to minimize misperceptions? Expose implicit assumptions, be aware of the potential for misperception

Back to Layne (2009)

Problems with "unipolar stability" theory: based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system; hegemons sprint to the front because economic leadership is based on productivity and technological innovation, but over time this diffuses and other states catch up Problems with idea that international system becoming bipolar or multipolar: trends that show a rise in China, India, Russia, and/or the EU do not conclusively demonstrate that the international system is becoming multipolar; merely aspiring to great power status doesn't assure success (must take into account issues of state capacity like the effectiveness of administration and political machinery and the quality of leaders); measuring state power is hard; though China has experienced double-digit annual growth rates through 2006, this doesn't necessarily mean it can sustain similar growth over the next two decades, especially since the long-term effects of current crises are unknown Problems with claims for the importance of "soft power": crisis discredited one of the pillars of US soft power - American free-market capitalism; US is not the only country that possesses soft power

Snyder (2004)

Properly understood, policy implications of IR theories are subtle and multifaceted • Realism - pragmatic appreciation of role of power, but warns states will suffer if they overreach • Liberalism - cooperative potential of mature democracies, especially through institutions, but notes democracies' tendency to crusade against tyrannies and the propensity of emerging democracies to collapse into ethnic turmoil • Idealism - consensus of values must underpin any stable political order, but recognizes forging this consensus often requires ideological struggle with conflict potential

Rise of China - Realist View

Realist pessimists • Inescapable laws of nature compel a recurrent struggle for power and survival; persistence of international anarchy; material power, and military strength in particular, is decisive in shaping patterns of relations • Single most important feature of PRC today: rising power o If take aggregate economic capacity as a rough surrogate for overall national power, China's growth has been extraordinarily rapid o This rapidly growing economy brings military expansion - China's spending on arms and military equipment has grown • See China's aims as expansion o Why? Economic development - a more wealthy and more powerful state will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state o Rising power's expansion attempts collide with established counterparts and the resulting disputes are seldom resolved peacefully (example: established power(s) may use preventive war to destroy a rising state before it can achieve its full potential) • Security dilemma is intense - even if the larger political goals of both sides are, in some sense, purely defensive, the measures that each takes to secure its position and achieve its objectives may still arouse alarm and stimulate countermeasures on the other side o Taiwan - even if China only wants to prevent independence and US only wants to prevent forceful reunification, Chinese threats and military buildup may increase fear, so US may increase military assistance to Taipei, which then makes it seem the US would intervene, which leads to Chinese fear more buildup Realist optimists • China's power is not increasing as rapidly as is often claimed and its ambitions are, and are likely to remain, modest, even conservative; a variety of other factors are at work that may help mitigate the effects of the security dilemma and keep US-Chinese relations from spiraling out of control o Chinese economic expansion may be disrupted by domestic social and political turbulence; growth could be slowed by difficulties in creating efficient, equitable, and open legal and financial institutions o China will most likely continue to lag behind US, so likelihood that it will want to mount a serious challenge to US is small o China may not behave in an especially assertive/aggressive fashion because it is not simply a function of China's capabilities, but a reflection of underlying intentions o Structure of post-Cold War East Asian system essentially bipolar and both have nuclear weapons (US and China) so relations likely to be tense but basically stable o Geography will greatly enhance stability - US is maritime power, so interests will likely remain offshore, but China is land power these spheres of influence do not overlap (with possible exception of Taiwan and Korean Peninsula)

Thomas (2000)

Religion as a form of ideology • Emphasizes how differences in religious ideas, difference in religion, hold the potential for conflict and for making existing conflicts more intractable; religion involves core values, defining what is good and bad, which are held as absolute truth and very often also as universal truth (identification with religion perceive the values of one's own religion as superior to other belief systems competition hostility/conflict) • Religious conflicts are more intractable because they exclude - almost by the way the conflict is defined - the possibility of compromise, coexistence, or the finding of common ground to resolve disputes (indivisible)

o Keohane and Nye (1998)

Revisiting "interdependence" in the context of the information revolution: what is new is the virtual erasing of costs of communicating over distance; actual transmission costs have become negligible This has dramatically changed the "multiple channels of contact among society," but not the other two characteristics Types of information: free, commercial (send at a price), and strategic (confers great advantage on actors only if competitors do not possess it) • Altered patterns of complex interdependence by increasing channels, but exists in context of existing political structure free information flows faster without regulation, strategic will be protected, commercial will depend on property rights

Bates (2008 - Failed States

State failure - implosion of the state, meaning (1) the transformation of the state into an instrument of predation (those in power use the state to promote their own interests) and (2) a loss of the monopoly over the means of coercion (political competition takes place between groups bearing arms) • Political Instability Task Force - state failure can include outbreak of ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide, and "adverse regime changes" (collapse of the state - Somalia; revolutionary displacement of elite - Iran; dissolution of a state - Yugoslavia; transition from democratic to authoritarian - Haiti) o In recent years, the stock of failed states has declined State failure is not the same as revolution - revolutions create a new order while state failure yields disorder State failure is not necessarily the same as civil war, but there is a high correspondence (at least in Africa)

Levy (1998)

Theories of the causes of war: systemic-level (typical positions - relative v. absolute gains, etc.) • Realism: key division in realist literature on war is between balance of power theory and power transition, or hegemonic, theory (which downplays importance of anarchy - at a dyadic level, this is the power preponderance hypothesis) • Liberalism - economic interdependence: trade generates economic advantages for both parties and the anticipation that war will disrupt trade and result in a loss/reduction of welfare gains deters leaders from war against trading partners o But, there are numerous historical cases of trade between enemies during wartime need to consider domestic variables Theories of the causes of war: societal level • DPT variations (and see below) Theories of the causes of war: individual level • Assumptions: external and internal structures and social forces are not translated directly into foreign policy choices; key decision-makers vary in their definitions of state interests, assessments of threats to those interests, and/or beliefs as to the optimum strategies to achieve those interests; differences in the content of actors' belief systems, in the psychological processes through which they acquire information and make judgments and decisions, and in their personalities and emotional states are important intervening variables in explaining observed variation in state behaviors with respect to issues of war and peace o Example: role of elites' misperceptions o Central theme is that decision-making is characterized by "bounded rationality"

Gilpin (1975)

There is a fundamental difference in emphasis between economics and politics • Economics (liberal version) emphasizes absolute gains where all participants may benefit, though perhaps to varying degrees • Politics emphasizes relative gains where the distribution of value occurs among participants caught in a zero-sum game o But, economics cannot be understood beside from politics

o Wallerstein (1974)

Traces the development of the European world-economy, a global capitalist system centered in Western Europe and divided into the core, semi-periphery, and periphery; begins in the "long 16th century" and expands to cover the globe; the three "zones" are connected by "world market trade" in bulk commodities A country's ability to modernize depends on its role in the world economy; whereas the core countries are typically on a trajectory toward democracy and increased prosperity (strong states), those in the periphery tend toward authoritarian governments and economic stagnation (weak states) • The world-economy rewards zones differently - surplus flows disproportionately to the core areas o Once empire proved unsustainable and groundwork laid for modern world-economy, it became inevitable that someone would fill each of the system's various roles o This is because the world-economy operates as a coherent system; in the global division of labor, the periphery produces lower-ranking goods, for which labor is less well rewarded than for the higher-ranking goods in the core; the goods produced in the periphery tend to be daily-need goods, making the core dependent on periphery for its existence

Kant (1795):

liberal internationalism; once aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and the habit of respect for individual rights engrained by republican government, people will hesitate to embark on war because it will bring the miseries of war down upon themselves (this doesn't hold where people are not citizens - the head of state owns the state, so he can go to war without sacrificing anything himself); liberal states are morally integrated - as culture grows and men gradually move toward greater agreement on principles, leads to mutual understanding and peace (liberal states assume non-liberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just) • Constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan (meaning ties of international commerce and free trade) sources connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace "a separate peace exists among liberal states" (which doesn't extend to non-liberal states - here, there is still insecurity caused by anarchy)

Support for Classical Realism: Nathan 2002

"Louis XIV's demands for incessant wars seemed to demonstrate the truth that power created its own interest, limited only by the power."

Morgenthau (1948)

- Classical Realist - Divided the world into 3 parts: Status Quo, revisionist, and the prestige seeking states - Status quo states are focused on maintaining power and territory - revisionist states challenges the status quo - Prestige seeking states seek power in order to have greater influence - For Morgenthau power is a currency of politics and should be the first goals of a state

Hobbes

- Classical Realist - individual's life in the state of nature is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; - constituted states can protect individuals from domestic anarchy; - international state of nature is a constant state of war; no moral considerations

Complex interdependence

- financial crises marred the 1990s (Mexico Russia Asian developing countries Argentina

Neo-Realism or Structural Realism

- hold the notion that the international system is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system) -Herold by Kenneth Waltz 1979

Classical Realism

- pessimistic by nature - Assumes that states main goal is to get power - Power defines politics - Power is always the immediate aim of man be it political or military - assumes that states are in permanent competition

Krugman (1998)

-"third-generation crisis model" - introduces default risk; high international liquidity and government guarantees to the liabilities of insufficiently regulated financial intermediaries assumed; currency crisis is one aspect of wider financial crisis caused by the distorting effects of guarantees on investment incentives; under guarantees and lax supervision, intermediaries have both the incentive and ability to borrow short-term funds at low interest rates from international money markets, which are then used to finance highly speculative domestic investment projects (low expected return, but small probability of very large gains); investors bear no downside risk; investors demand a lot of stakes in these projects, which drives up price and value, which increases confidence in project's success, which then leads to more short-term loans to intermediaries, and so on; returns on projects gradually revealed, usually little, which then forces bailouts (circular again, until at some point, the cost of bailout reaches critical level)

(Friedman 2005)

-argues that globalization new phase has become the flattening of the world, -where informational technology has brought together Bangalore, Beijing and Boston into one central location. He argues that the flattening of the world has made it easier for idea sharing as well as creating a more diverse globalization that is controlled by the individual rather than European or American to companies

Khan 2002

.According to Khan, conditions for stable deterrence must be present in order to avoid accidents or miscalculation during a crisis (Khan 2002: 2). Having met CSBM trust building measure measures by participating in nuclear stewardship the US and the Soviet Union demonstrated restraint and trust (albeit often aesthetic trust) with each other. Thus trust through CSBM and nuclear deterrence can be interpreted as co-dependent variables, trust cannot be held without nuclear deterrence.

Thucydides

1st Classical Realist - Athenian philosopher - Sparta & Athenian War - Contribution to realism: importance of power - the logic of fear and escalation always pushes out the logic of moderation and peaceful diplomacy - "What made war inevitable was the growth of the Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."

Abbott 2001 - part 1

Abbott and others believes that there are variable that controls the degree of legalization of a norm; these degrees includes legal obligation, precision and legal delegation for which the law needs in order to be legalized. "Legalization" according to Abbott et. al "refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) posses" (2000: 401). An institution must then posses characteristics of legal obligation, precision and legal delegation in various degrees for a law to be considered law. Abbott et. al argues that "statutes or regulations in highly developed national legal systems are generally taken as prototypical of hard legalization" (2000: 402). Thus institutions whose laws posses high levels of legal obligations, precision and legal delegations have hard legalization and as a result their laws are followed by other members in the institution. Subsequently, Abbott et al have quantified legalization by putting laws in a hierarchical system for which hard laws fall along the spectrum of laws that possesses high obligation, high precision and high delegation versus ideal anarchical ideal types which possesses low obligation, low precision and low delegation (2000: 406). Laws, depending on their levels along the eight forms of international legalization, can either be hard law which falls from I through III, VI through VII which is soft laws or the complete anarchy of level VII which relies on the balance of power or spheres of influence politics to propel agendas. The eighth level is considered by Abbott et al as the least effective form of legalization although it is used by international institutions through the process of diplomacy. These quantifiable forms of legalization as presented by Abbott et al, only provides a blueprint for what laws are usually followed versus those that are usually ignored by the international system. Although that blueprint in not an exact replica of what occurs in the international system, it provides us when with an outline to the basic understanding of hard laws versus soft law.

Abbott 2001 - part 2

Abbott concludes that "actors combine and invoke varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation to create subtle blends of politics and law;" that law in a sense is a continuum of political intercourse and with additional means (2000: 419).

Isreal

At the time of Israel' s inception, millions of inhabitant in this area were moved from their home to accept an Israel state which is both Jewish and democratic (Eldar, 10). While there is an argument that "the key reason for this failure [of peace] is the Palestinians' refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state (Yosef, 1) ." One cannot dismiss the status of the geographic location, the religious, and cultural disposition of the Israeli state as an admixture factor of violence between Israel and Palestine.

Concept of Law by H.L.A. Hart (1961)

Concept of Law by H.L.A. Hart identifies the salient features of legal systems; which states the features of law includes rules forbidding certain types of behavior under penalty, rules compelling people to compensate those whom were injure, rules specifying the procedures for making wills, contracts, or other arrangements of the such, courts to determine what the rules are and fix the punishment or compensation to be paid when those rules are broke, and a legislature to make new rules and abolish old ones (Hart 1961: 3).

Dambisa Moyo 2010

Dead Aid focuses on criticism of aid; (1) aid does not bring about economic growth, (2) aid encourages corruption, which in turn retards growth, (3) aid corrupts civil society (4) aid undermines social capital, and finally (5) aid and the fight for resources causes civil War. The criticism entails that the there is a vicious cycle of aid in Africa which has brought about monumental injury to the continent. In order to argue that aid is the problem Moyo dismisses important factors that provides explanations for Africa's underachievement. Moyo dismisses 1. Africa's abundance of land and natural resources as a marker for economic success; 2. geography and growth; 3. colonialism; 4. Moyo dismisses the aspect of personal responsibility among Africans to allocate aid properly; 5. ethnic heterogeneity and 6. strong institutions. Why could these all work together to explain why aid is not working in Africa? By dismissing these glaring aspects to addressing why aid fails, Moyo presents a very atomistic approach to the debate on why aid fails. By solely focusing on aid as the primary cause of problems in Africa, Moyo limits the theoretical power and practical utility of her theory. (2010)

Concert of Europe - Elrod 1976

Elrod states that the strength and weaknesses of essential members "posed a serious menace to the system" (Elrod 1976; 166). Therefore when one nation was weak or was under threat of no longer being a great power, it weakens on the whole system. An example of this was the Ottoman Empire, although it was considered a great power, its decline and inevitable demise in 1875 (Black 2007; 120) weakened the international system because the other great powers had to "sustain the Turkish Sultan" and then "scramble over the spoils" after the Ottoman Empire's demise. Exclusivity between great powers ultimately led to the Concert of Europe's demise because it exacerbated the relationship between the great powers.

LTTE negotiations

Essentially my viewpoint is that there are no "legitimate" terrorist organizations especially when it pertains to intra-state conflicts. However, what would have help with the LTTE-Sri Lankan government mediation is holding off labeling the LTTE a terrorist organization until the negotiation was over.

Jervis (1978)

Even if states satisfied with status quo and have a common goal, difficult to reach it (example: Stag Hunt - incentives to defect) • One state may become dissatisfied with status quo at future date • Due to self-help, for protection, states seek to control resources outside their territory or in "buffer zones," but this can alarm others • Security dilemma - many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others o The fear of being exploited drives the security dilemma o This implies that, all else equal, a world of small states feels the effects of anarchy more than a world of large states. However, if one state is invulnerable, it can exploit others, so the security dilemma remains. o The best situation is "passive invulnerability," where defending is easier than attacking or there is mutual deterrence Notes that vulnerability is subjective and depends on decision-makers, but that if offensive and defensive weapons differ, it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others less secure • Measure = does state have to spend more or less than one dollar on defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by other side on forces used to attack High costs of war and gains from cooperation will lessen security dilemma competitive bargaining

Ikenberrry (2008)

Existing "descent of the West"/reorientation toward the East view - as China gets more powerful/US position erodes, China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests and other states in the system - especially declining hegemon - will start to see China as a growing security threat tension, distrust, conflict (power transitions) This view, however, is not inevitable - China faces fundamentally different international order than those that past rising states confronted (Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based with deep political foundations; nuclear revolution made war among great powers unlikely) US - needs to use its leadership of the Western order to shape the environment in which China will make critical strategic choices (strengthen rules/institutions to make them harder to overturn) • US "unipolar moment" will inevitably end: if struggle between China/US, then China wins; if struggle between China and revived Western system, West will win Postwar Western order historically unique: • US-led order has been more liberal than imperial - legitimate, rules/institutions reinforced by democracy/capitalism, barriers to economic participation are low and potential benefits are high • Coalition-based character of leadership - coalition of powers arrayed around US (not US alone) • Has a widening array of participants with an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions (basis for cooperation and shared authority over global system) o These give incentives for China to integrate into liberal international order and, in fact, it is increasingly working with - rather than outside of - the Western order (example: UN Security Council permanent member) o At the same time, gives Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers o The road to global power runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions

Why concert of europe failed

Failure to solve important and pressing issues at times due to the lack of good will amongst members consequently stripped the relevant powers of the Concert of Europe and attributed to its demise. Despite the ultimate failure of the Concert of Europe, there were some beneficial residue of the Concert which included a period of peace, a rise of diplomatic relations and international procedures for dealing with conflicts.

Intra-state conflict's origin (Yilmaz 2007)

Historical trauma "refers to events that invoke in the members of a group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group" (Yilmaz 2007: 21).

Craig 2008 - the need for diplomats in times of war

In wartime, heads of states brought "foreign policy under their personal control" (Craig 2008; 218) thus there was a lack of need for diplomacy and for diplomats. In wartime, diplomacy were personally handle by chief executive who at that time would rather use special agents and spies (Craig 2008; 220) who solely reported to the chief executive. This kind of executive diplomacy by many nations during wartime had its disadvantages, Craig state that executive diplomacy was the greatest disadvantage to a nation because the last analysis rest solely on the chief executive (Craig 2008; 237). Thus conflicting views on Germany's strength and intentions pre-WWII was often summed up as folly. Thus President "Roosevelt tended to give Hitler the benefit of the doubt" (Craig 2008; 238), as did other world leaders until Hitler's violation of the Versailles Treaty. Subsequently the decrease use of diplomats during wartime resulted in lack of structure and procedural diplomacy.

Early example that helped formed neorealism

NeoRealism is heavy influence from the emergence of ""two superpowers" following WWII: the U.S. and the Soviet Union -"Their own weight created the balance of power between them" (Morgenthau 1951)

Lake 2003 - BOP

The New Sovereignty in International Relations, David Lake establishes a point that hierarchy in international relations is hardly mentioned by using the metaphorical idiom of the "dead horse." In the metaphoric use of the "dead horse," Lake states that the concept of hierarchy has been a concept that scholars have refused to acknowledge. Yet, despite the arguably taboo nature associated with acknowledging hierarchy, Lake argues that hierarchy is an ephemeral concept in the realms of international relations. In his argument Lake "discusses the fundamental nature of sovereignty, reviews classical perspectives on sovereignty, survey new constructivist alternative, examines important now works on the problematic nature of sovereignty, identifies continual of hierarchic relationship and lastly argues for the importance of studying alternative hierarchy relationships in international relations" (Lake 2003, 303).

(Diehl and Balas 2014) Traditional peace keeping

Traditional peacekeeping efforts are general peacekeeping missions where forces are sent to an area of conflict to monitor, moderate or intervene in order to limit the violent conflicts that occur in the area (Diehl and Balas 2014)

Craig 2008 - problems with appeasement

The most problematic aspect of appeasement was that western powers assumed that by giving into Hitler's demand that he would be pleased. However, "it never seems to have occurred to him (Neville Chamberlain) that he might be dealing with people whose voracity had no limits" (Craig 2008; 173). The Munich Agreement was the means to which European appeasement policy was used to quell the aggressive moves of Germany. The Munich Agreement sign on September 30th, 1938, "gave Hitler what he demanded without a finger being lifted in the interest of the Czechs (Bartlett 1998; 40)." This very appeasement of letting German troops enter Czechoslovakia aided Hitler's plan for European conquest. In less than a week after avoiding war and appeasing Germany, Czechoslovakian was no longer a republic and became part of Germany's territory. This foreshadowed the Hitler's goals and the persistent fear by world powers to relinquish bits and piece in order to avoid a world war. However, the determination by western power's (namely France and Britain) to reserve peace, abandonment of honor would result in the both dishonor and war "in a more fearful form" (Craig 2008; 177).

Murphy 2012 Source of international law

The sources on international law are (1) treaties: (2) international custom; (3) general principles of law; (4) judicial decisions and the teachings of scholars (Murphy 2012 77)

Definitions of conflict (Thomas 1992)

Thomas's definition of conflict as "the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate some concerns of his" (1992 265)

Contribution to IR from CoE

Three systemic changes in diplomacy after 1918 included the need for a more structural diplomatic process amongst the world's leading powers. Structure depended heavily on non state actors such as the League of Nations. League of Nations and other international organizations were put in place to provide collective security for nations contracted to peace.

Kimberly Process (Orogun 2004)

What contribute to the success of the Kimberley Process was the innovative way in which measures are taken to secure the diamond process through tamper-proof containers, counterfeit-proof documentation and a database of the shipments of rough stones from areas of primary extractions (Orogun 2004: 160).

Huntington 1993

With regards to the event following 9/11, Huntington model was helpful in that he predicted that the military interactions between the West and Islam will not subside, rather it did "become more virulent" (1993: 32). In fact while the United States and other societies in the West became more liberal overtime, the Islam society did not grow more liberal. The stagnant difference between the West an Islam is further evidence in support that "cultural characteristics and differences" are indeed "less mutable" (1993: 27)

Hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger 1973, Gilpin 1975, Krasner 1976)

discriminatory trade arrangements are outgrowths of the economic instability fostered by the lack or decline of a hegemon (which can provide economic stability); current wave of regionalism triggered or accelerated by US decision to pursue regional arrangement in early 1980s when its economic power waned and multilateral trade negotiations stalled; erosion of US hegemony over past 50 years has stimulated rise in number of PTAs and states entering them

Morgenthau (1948): maintaining peace

notes that in order to maintain peace, the status quo must be greater than (or stronger) than the revisionist

Critiques of democracy equals peace

o Democracies have gone to war very often against non-democratic regimes, democratic citizens can become very nationalistic o International and domestic norms often induced from observed patterns of behavior in international conflicts; empirically, there are many cases where democratic states followed policies at variance with the norms argument (imperialism - wars were about subjugation, not self-preservation)

Recent financial crisis Greece

o Overview 2001 - Greece joins Eurozone (drachma Euro) Troika = EC, IMF, ECB 2009 - S&P cuts Greece from A A-, Papandreou/PASOK win, Finance Minister Papakonstantinou reports new deficit statistics, new budget, S&P downgrades again 2010 - plan to bring within EU deficit limit (3%) by 2012, EU Commissioner: "Greece will not default. In the euro area, default does not exist," austerity package, emergency loans from EU decided upon (30 billion euros over a year, IMF adds 15 billion), revised statistics, Moody's cuts Greece's rating, Papandreou asks for the 45 billion euro bailout, S&P gives Greece junk status, agrees to 110 billion euro rescue package-Greece agrees to 30 billion in austerity cuts over next three years, protests, 750 billion euro rescue mechanism set up (European Financial Stability Facility), Greece receives first of bailout, Moody's downgrades to junk, budget plan to cut deficit to 7% of GDP by 2011 2011 - Fitch cuts Greece to junk, EU agrees to cut rates on emergency loans, Papandreou announces 78 billion euros of austerity measures with 50 billion from state asset sales, more downgrades, EU finance ministers discuss idea of extending Greece's debt-repayment schedule (May), Greece passes another six billion Euros in austerity measures, S&P cuts Greece to worst rating for any country it reviews in the world, Papandreou announces Cabinet reshuffle and confidence vote, he survives, approve 78 billion in austerity despite protests, EU passes second bailout, bankers agree to take losses of 21 percent on net present value of Greek bond holdings, draft budget for 2012 agreed with targeted deficit of 8.5% (missed 2011 target), more austerity including wage and pension cuts and laying-off 30,000 state workers, EU decides to force private investors to take a 50% haircut and will extend new aid package of 130 billion euros, Papandreou calls referendum, stocks/bonds plunge, EU cuts off aid payments, Papandreou backs down and calls for government of national unity led by Papademos 2012 - biggest sovereign debt restructuring in history, S&P downgrade to "selective default," but then 95.7% investor participation in restructuring puts them back up; elections - Samaras doesn't form coalition, Tsipras doesn't form coalition; new elections - Samaras forms coalition (ND, PASOK, Dem Left) and calls for renegotiations of austerity measures

1970-1986-present

o Overview: in 1960s/70s, countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico borrowed huge sums of money from international creditors for industrialization (especially infrastructure); public loans were typically through the World Bank or private banks that had an influx of funds from oil-rich countries (after 1973); when oil prices skyrocketed in 1970s/80s (world economy in recession), interest rates increased, which meant debt payments also increased, making it more difficult for borrowing countries to pay back their debts; deterioration of exchange rate with US dollar meant Latin American governments owed huge amounts of national currencies; contraction of world trade in 1981 made prices of primary goods fall; August 1982 - Mexico's Finance Minister declares they can't pay back debt and requested renegotiation of payment periods; after Mexico's default, lending halted to Latin America, so refinancing refused and crisis ensued (billions of dollars of short-term loans were due immediately); IMF intervened to give new loans with very strict conditions; World Bank also came in to encourage open markets; finally, US/IMF pushed for debt relief

Formation of a State - Tilly 1990

o Tilly (1990): the state is a coercion-wielding organization, distinct from households and kinship groups; the state exercises clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within subnational territories "National state" - state governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures (note: this is not necessarily the same as a "nation-state," where people share linguistic, religious, and/or symbolic identities) • Note that, historically, national states have appeared only rarely (most have been non-national, like empires or city-states)

Formation of a State - definition

o Weber: the state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory; states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them; they include administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations From Jackson and Rosberg (1982): Definition of means, not ends (where distinctive means are force) This emphasizes the empirical rather than the juridical - the de facto rather than the de jure attributes of statehood (that is, he doesn't explore the idea that jurisdiction is an international legal condition rather than some kind of sociological given) The de facto emphasis implies that two concurrent monopolies of force cannot exist over one territory and population; in situations where one of several rival groups - claimant states - is unable to establish permanent control over a contested territory, Weber would maintain that it is more appropriate to speak of "statelessness" From Fukuyama (2004): The essence of stateness is enforcement: the ability, ultimately, to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state's laws

six points of contention between Wallerstein and Brenner as stated by Denemark and Thomas (1988)

six points include: the definition of capitalism, the growth of capitalism, the nature of underdevelopment, the roles of the individuals, the appropriate levels of analysis (state level or world), and lastly the practical implications of Wallerstein and Brenner's work. - While Wallerstein suggest that "production for sale in a markets in which the object realizes the maximum profit" (Wallerstein, 1974b: 398) is "the defining element of a capitalist world-system" (Denemark and Thomas, 1988, 50). - Brenner on the other hand argues that the limits the definition of capitalism to a trade-based division of labor and that is ultimately fueled by profit motives. Brenner subsequently argues that Wallenstein's definition of capitalism makes the broad assumption that capitalistic dynamics existed before the capitalist system (Denemark and Thomas, 1988: 50). 2. Wallerstein and Brenner differ in their argument of the growth and development of capitalism. Brenner argues that growth and development occurs when labor is removed from the means of subsistence and production (Denemark and Thomas, 1998:50) and thus unlike Wallerstein, Brenner believes that trade does not play an important role in capitalistic growth. 3. Wallerstein believes that underdevelopment is a result of external demand, Brenner contends that underdevelopment is a result of class structure rather than that of external demand (Brenner, 1977:85-86). 4. deals with the roles of the individuals and their ability to recognize and act in their best interest. Wallerstein believes that individuals would act according to economic rationality while Brenner views these assumptions as ahistorical and incoherent (Denemark and Thomas, 1988:53). 5. deals with the appropriate level of analysis; while Wallerstein addresses critical events outside the boundaries of a country, Brenner does not view outside events as relevant to a country's capitalist development. 6. deals with the practical implications of Wallerstein's and Brenner's argument, in which Brenner contest that Wallerstein's argument is a result of backward reasoning, drawing from a conclusion rather than to a conclusion.

Grossman and Helpman (1995)

whether a country chooses to enter a regional trade agreement is determined by how much influence different interest groups exert and how much the government is concerned about voters' welfare; political viability of PTA often depends on the amount of discrimination it yields; agreements that divert trade will benefit certain interest groups while creating costs borne by the populace at large; if these groups have more political clout than other segments of society, then a PTA that is trade diverting stands a better chance of being established than one that is trade creating; by excluding some sectors from a PTA, governments can increase domestic support for it, thus helping to explain why many PTAs do not cover politically sensitive industries (example: EEC's exclusion of agriculture)

Crisis of 1929-1949

• After economic depression spread, universal policy response was the classical position that deflation produces the best result in the long run: cut all costs to encourage sales and investment, which meant cutting wages, taxes, and spending • Deflation failed to produce desired results - agriculture and labor everywhere turned desperate early, seeking state aid coalitions • Demand stimulus experimented with by Nazi Germany, Sweden, and US o Policy preferences and coalitional proclivities of economic actors strongly affected by situation in international economy; growth in role of associations in mediating relations among social forces (example: Nazi party was able to mobilize a wide range of groups including numbers of people working for wages through populism laden with racism and nationalism) o State structure also played a role, but there are no characteristics of associations or state structure that can stand independently of societal factors in explaining policy outputs

Crisis of 1873-1896

• Free trade had spread, then in 1873 prices slumped protectionism; alliances formed in some cases (German example: coalition of iron and rye in support of tariffs), but nearly everywhere, agriculture and labor found it difficult to cooperate; international economy played considerable role in shaping domestic politics

Three characteristics:

• Multiple channels of contact among society - interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational relations (MNCs) • Lack of clear hierarchies of issues - as new actors are incorporated into the system, it is unclear which issues are most important • Irrelevance of military force - increasingly costly for major states due to risks of nuclear escalation, resistance by people in poor or weak countries, uncertain and possibly negative effects on the achievement of economic goals, and domestic opinion opposed to the human cost of the use of force

how do theories perform in post-9/11 world?

• Realism - continued centrality of military strength and persistence of conflict even in age of economic interdependence; US used its power to expand sphere of domination o But, how can it explain US war on terrorism against non-state actors? Where is the balancing against the US? • Liberalism - democracy promotion (problem is policy makers are ignoring the part about democratization chaos/violence), but Bush administration ignored institution building • Constructivism - in offering advice, points in two incompatible directions; highlights need for dialogue across cultures about appropriate rules of the game, but many idealists think they already know right and wrong o Basically, these theories can be many things to many people o None of the theories has a strong ability to explain change Because of these weaknesses, need to have the theories act as a powerful check on one another (they are all irrationally exuberant in their own way); deployed effectively, they reveal weaknesses in arguments that can lead to misguided politics

What accounts for change in international system - why do dominant powers decline?

• The spread of economic growth and industrialization cannot be prevented and, in the long run, diffusion of industry and technology undermines the position of the great power

Brooks and Wohlforth (2008)

• The world will remain unipolar for a long time - there are no structural constraints that impinge seriously on US power • Attack neorealist balance of power theory - states have not formed a counter-hegemonic coalition to balance US unipolar power, nor have other states engaged in internal balancing by undertaking major military buildups aimed at countering US military preponderance o States will not balance against the US because the threat posed by a hegemonic - but geographically distant - US pales in comparison to the regional security threats that they confront in their own neighborhoods • US uniquely combines overwhelming economic and military power, so it has an unchallenged preeminence in the international system

Roubini and Mihm (2010)

• innovation in this crisis is new kinds of securitization in financial sector itself o Mortgage-backed securities, MBSs, structured in complex ways, bundled together, sold/traded worldwide divided and repackaged together again into collateralized debt obligations, CDOs o New derivatives: credit default swap (CDS) - allowed for speculation on the likelihood of default on specific bonds o So basically, there was rapid growth in the trading of credit risk, which market players believed were boosting the stability and resilience of the financial system by dispersing risk and deepening markets for risk o Note, however, that the crisis was not indiscriminate in its effects; only countries whose financial systems suffered from similar frailties fell victim to it (example: Canada was fine - tougher regulations) Differentiated experiences show that national financial systems remain regulated in distinct ways, despite globalization. o Problems of securitization: investors frequently lacked full understanding of complex securities they purchased or the quality of the loans underlying the asset-backed securities in which they invested; relied on credit-rating agencies; increased the number of financial actors who fell outside of traditional prudential regulations covering commercial banks; the large-scale buying and selling of complex securities and derivatives had increasingly taken place among a very small number of financial institutions (it had concentrated, not dispersed, risk); approximately half of the MBSs and CDOs created by Wall Street were sold to foreigners, especially European banks and hedge funds, but there was no transparency • Explanations for the crisis: "international financial standards regime" o Regulators worked intensively to build and strengthen internationally coordinated prudential standards following the Mexican and East Asian financial crises; Basel I/II (1996/2004), Financial Stability Forum (1999) o Problems: common international capital standards were developed for banks, but those standards did not apply to the institutions that were becoming more important because of securitization trends, like investment banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds; trend toward "market-friendly" approaches to regulation that trusted private actors to self-regulate