NIS Realism

Rationalism Critique

Humans and states are NOT rational actors like realism assumes.

Realism and Change

Imperialism and power cycles.

Generalizability

A theory that can explain a broader aspect of international politics. There is also a trade-off between generalizability and goodness of fit.

Levels of Analysis: Human

• Individual characteristics of leaders of states • Human nature

Characteristics of Good Theories

• Parsimony • Goodness of Fit • Generalizability • Manipulability

Levels of Analysis: Structure of the International System

• Relative power of states • Geography: location of states, access to resources, borders, distance from each other, etc. • International governing institutions: any rules or institutions that states have set up to govern the interaction between them.

Copeland

• Rising Power • Declining Power • Preventive War • Offensive Realism • Builds on Gilpin • Argument: the declining power will start a preventive war while it still has a chance to win (since victory is pretty much guaranteed). If it waits, the rising power might surpass the declining power. • However, this assumes a bipolar system. In a system with multiple great powers, the declining power may not start a preventive war because victory is no longer guaranteed. If the declining power is big enough to beat all of the other powers, then it will initiate a preventive war.

Readings on Rationality and Misperception: When Our Brains Short-Circuit

Evidence is accumulating that the human brain systematically misjudges certain kinds of risks. In effect, evolution has programmed us to be alert for snakes and enemies with clubs, but we aren't well prepared to respond to dangers that require forethought. Consider America's political response to these two recent challenges: >President Obama proposes moving some inmates from Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to supermax prisons from which no one has ever escaped. This is the "enemy with club" threat that we have evolved to be alert to, so Democrats and Republicans alike erupt in outrage and kill the plan. >The climate warms, ice sheets melt and seas rise. The House scrounges a narrow majority to pass a feeble cap-and-trade system, but Senate passage is uncertain. The issue is complex, full of trade-offs and more cerebral than visceral — and so it doesn't activate our warning systems.

Readings on Soft Power: Cultural Revolution: How China is changing global diplomacy.

>Australia treated the Chinese president better than U.S. president at the time (George W. Bush). Australia's leaders were simply following their people's lead. Recent polls suggest that, despite decades of close American-Australian relations, Australians generally have a more favorable view of China than of the United States. China has also scored diplomatic successes in Latin America, long thought to be within Washington's sphere of influence. Beijing's inroads with Australia and Latin America, two vastly different regions of the world, signify aspects of the same sea change. >For the first time in centuries, China is becoming an international power, a nation with global foreign policy ambitions. In fact, China may become the first nation since the fall of the Soviet Union that could seriously challenge the United States for control of the international system. >As it develops, China has several key interests in the world. Because of China's booming economy and lack of domestic resources, securing stable supplies of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources--as well as safe passage for these resources--is of primary interest to Beijing. >Second, as China's leading companies continue to grow and improve the quality of their products, Beijing clearly needs access to foreign markets. >Less obviously, but no less significantly, China seeks to demonstrate that it is an international power, worthy of the same respect as the United States and capable of projecting enough power to limit U.S. intentions in Asia and other parts of the developing world. >And, perhaps most important, Beijing wants to bring its own socioeconomic and political models to other developing countries, just as the United States historically has been committed to-at least rhetorically-the spread of democracy. >Beijing is pursuing these interests through a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, China appears to be building a string of alliances across the globe with nations shunned by the United States-nations like Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe. At the same time, China appears to be wooing non-rogue developing nations-both democracies like Brazil and stable pseudo-authoritarian states like Malaysia. Beijing does so by championing a vision of international relations centered on national sovereignty-one that contrasts sharply with recent U.S. doctrine, by leveraging China's economic successes to win over foreign leaders and by using Chinese soft power to win hearts and minds even in places like Australia, once considered firm American allies.

Readings on Rationality and Misperception: Russian Report Says Moscow Will Halt Missile Deployment

A news report that Russia is putting off its plan to deploy missiles near the Polish border raised speculation that the Kremlin is seeking ways to lower tensions with the United States now that a new administration has taken office. The official was quoted as saying Russia had taken the step because Washington was not "pushing ahead" with the Bush administration's proposal to deploy an antimissile system in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend against what the Bush administration had said was a threat from countries like Iran. The Kremlin has sharply criticized the Bush antimissile system, contending that it was aimed at Russia. The Obama administration is, in fact, only reviewing the plan and has not publicly rejected it. It would seem unlikely that the Kremlin would offer the concession of shelving the missile plan without first obtaining a promise from the Obama administration that the American plan had been canceled.

Manipulability

A theory that allows for manipulation so that you can manipulate variables in order to lead to better/desired outcomes.

Readings on Soft Power: Indonesians Seek Words to Attract China's Favor

As China's economic power grows, the study of Mandarin is surging around the world. Indonesia may be one of the most telling examples of how China's influence is overflowing even the steepest of barriers. The policy goes against decades of anti-Chinese hostility in Indonesia, which has the world's largest Muslim population. But things are changing, and the Chinese government is now sending hundreds of teachers to Indonesia.

Readings on Balancing: Australia Said to Play Part in Effort of N.S.A

Australia is one of the so-called Five Eyes countries that share highly classified intelligence and agree not to spy on one another; the other four are the United States, Britain, Canada and New Zealand. The US, UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia formed an alliance in which they agreed to share confidential information and not spy on each other. This event can be explained by the birds of a feather theory because these countries all share a common language, racial majority, and sort of a common culture.

Readings on Soft Power: Live from Nairobi, China Puts its Stamp on News in Africa

Chinese media is expanding in Africa (specifically Kenya) and across the developing world in an effort to bolster their image (which they say has been distorted by Western news) and expand their influence around the globe (particularly in regions rich in the natural resources required to fuel China's industries and population needs).

Readings on Balancing: India, Japan draw closer, with an eye on China

During a three-day visit to Japan this week, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed several major infrastructure and defense-technology deals, and agreed to speed up dialogue on nuclear cooperation and conduct more joint naval exercises. His host, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, called Singh a "mentorlike leader." But the bonhomie appeared calculated, at least in part, to send a not-so-subtle diplomatic message to Beijing in the wake of a border row between India and China last month, as well as the dispute between Japan and China over resource-rich islands in the East China Sea. The goal, analysts say, is to isolate China with a view to limiting its territorial ambitions in the region.

Rational Realism

States are rational actors.

Readings on Rise of China: 3 European Powers Say They Will Join China-Led Bank

Ignoring direct pleas from the Obama administration, Europe's biggest economies (Germany, France, and Italy) have declared their desire to follow Britain and become founding members of a new Chinese-led Asian investment bank that the United States views as a rival to the World Bank and other institutions set up at the height of American power after World War II. The announcement called into question whether the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which grew out of a multination conference in Bretton Woods, N.H., in 1944 and established an economic pecking order that lasted 70 years, will find their influence diminished. These three countries came to the same conclusion that Britain did: China is such a large export and investment market for them that they cannot afford to stay on the sidelines. American officials have fumed that China never approached the Group of 7 - the consortium of economic powers that the United States has led - but rather decided to pick off individual members, setting a deadline of the end of March for them to decide whether to join the new organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China, in turn, has long chafed at the idea that the World Bank's president is traditionally an American, and that France appoints the head of the I.M.F.

Readings on Rationality and Misperception: Russia Assails West Over Yemen

In an outburst of diplomatic finger-pointing, Russia on Friday blamed the West for blocking a Security Council statement that sought ''humanitarian pauses'' in the Saudi-led airstrikes on Yemen to allow the delivery of food, fuel and medicine. Emerging from an emergency session of the Council, the Russian ambassador, Vitaly I. Churkin, said Yemen was running out of food and medicine and sharply suggested that the United States, which supports the bombings, is responsible for their humanitarian consequences. The criticism was in sharp contrast to Russia's response to efforts by Western countries over the last couple of years to force the Syrian government, which Russia supports, to allow aid convoys into rebel-held areas. In a statement, an American official said Washington supported the idea of a humanitarian pause and was working with its Saudi allies to facilitate the delivery of aid.

Readings on Soft Power: For Putin, hard power lives

In this age of soft power, great countries can win friends not through the use of brute force but through their books and movies, their sophisticated economies, their technological innovations and, above all, through their attractive and inspiring national ideals. That may be true some of the time, but for those who find soft power difficult to wield, hard power is still available. For example, after three years of negotiation, Armenia decided to drop their trade deal with the European Union at the last minute and decided to align with Russia instead (by joining the Eurasian Customs Union). No one pretends that Armenia was attracted by Russia's soft power. Armenia has been made anxious in recent weeks by Russian diplomatic overtures to Azerbaijan, Armenia's main rival, as well as by anti-immigrant rhetoric from Russian officials. The Armenians took the hint: If they signed the trade deal with Europe, Russia might sell more arms to their rival and expel the Armenians who live in Russia.

Readings on Balancing: At Asian Security Meeting, Russia and Iran Criticize the U.S.

Iran used the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to lash out at American plans for a missile defense shield, while President Vladimir Putin of Russia took an indirect swipe at what he calls Washington's unilateral foreign policy. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established six years ago, brings together Russia and China, as well as the former Soviet republics of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, under the banner of combating terrorism and fostering regional collaboration. Iran has observer status in the group. Beyond its security aspect, the organization has provided a forum for criticism of United States policies. At its 2005 meeting in Kazakhstan, members demanded that Washington provide a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia.

Readings on Rationality and Misperception: China's Linked Struggles for Power

The Chinese military is expanding disputed islands under its control in the South China Sea, alarming its neighbors. How worried should the world be that supreme leader Xi Jinping is making China into an expansionary power? The history of the People's Republic offers some useful clues. Leadership transitions within the Communist Party have often been settled by internal power struggles. And even after one man emerges on top, he still has to jockey to move opponents out of important positions and install his own allies. The domestic turmoil repeatedly spilled over into foreign conflict, and that may be happening again today. Rather than balancing among party factions, Mr. Xi is consolidating power at their expense in a manner reminiscent of Mao and Deng. He has rallied domestic support through confrontations with China's neighbors, purged party and military rivals through an unprecedented anticorruption campaign, and taken control of the "leading small groups" initially created to spearhead collective leadership. To assert his authority over the army, Mr. Xi has donned a military uniform, gushed jingoist rhetoric, advocated the concept of "Asia for the Asians," and expanded island reclamation in the South China Sea. Such bellicosity has precipitated crises with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands. These aggressive moves help Mr. Xi gain the support and assert his authority over the military, which remains a central actor in Chinese politics. Meanwhile, his continuing crackdown on corruption, bureaucracy and foreign influence is reminiscent of the techniques of the late 1960s and 1989-90.

Readings on Balancing: Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power

The Chinese military is seeking to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast, from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force, military officials and analysts say. China calls the new strategy "far sea defense," and the speed with which it is building long-range capabilities has surprised foreign military officials. The strategy is a sharp break from the traditional, narrower doctrine of preparing for war over the self-governing island of Taiwan or defending the Chinese coast. Now, Chinese admirals say they want warships to escort commercial vessels that are crucial to the country's economy, from as far as the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, in Southeast Asia, and to help secure Chinese interests in the resource-rich South and East China Seas. The overall plan reflects China's growing sense of self-confidence and increasing willingness to assert its interests abroad. But China, now the world's leading exporter and a giant buyer of oil and other natural resources, is also no longer content to trust the security of sea lanes to the Americans, and its definition of its own core interests has expanded along with its economic clout.

Readings on Rise of China: The Illusion of 'Managing' China

The idea that we can manage China's rise is comforting because it gives us a sense of control and mastery, and of paternalistic superiority. The phrase itself is soothing, implying gradualism, predictability and time (enough time to think and prepare). The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power. The most successful "management" of a rising power in the modern era was Britain's appeasement of the United States in the late 19th century, when the British effectively ceded the entire Western Hemisphere (except Canada) to the expansive Americans. The fact that both powers shared a common liberal, democratic ideology, and thus roughly consonant ideas of international order, greatly lessened the risk of accommodation from the British point of view.

Parsimony

The law of parsimony (Occam's razor) dictates that a theory should provide the simplest possible viable explanation for a phenomenon. For example: A causes B. When you add more variables like C, D, and F, you make the theory less parsimonious. A parsimonious theory is easier to use but a non-parsimonious theory will predict the outcome more accurately.

Readings on Balancing: Concerned about China's rise, Southeast Asian nations build up militaries

The nations of Southeast Asia are building up their militaries, buying submarines and jet fighters at a record pace and edging closer strategically to the United States as a hedge against China's rise and its claims to all of the South China Sea. Weapons acquisitions in the region almost doubled from 2005 to 2009 compared with the five preceding years.

Levels of Analysis

These pertain to the causal variable, not the outcome variable. The outcome variable in this course is always international politics (how states interact). We are going to analyze the causal variable. • Human • Internal Characteristics of States • Structure of the International System

Readings on Balancing: Bowing to Putin's power

To grasp how Vladimir Putin is progressing in his campaign to overturn the post-Cold War order in Europe, it's worth looking beyond eastern Ukraine, where the Kremlin is busy consolidating a breakaway puppet state. After all, Ukraine, as President Obama likes to point out, is not a member of NATO - which has extended Western security and democratic governance to a dozen nations that had been dominated by Soviet dictatorship. Obama has been congratulating himself on leading a "unified response" by the West that, he claims, has isolated Putin. In reality, a big chunk of the NATO alliance (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Serbia, and Poland) has quietly begun to lean toward Moscow. These governments do so in part for economic reasons: Dependent on Russia for energy as well as export markets, they fear the consequences of escalating sanctions. But some also seem to be hedging their security and ideological bets. They figure it's not worth testing whether Putin's reported threat to invade former Soviet-bloc countries was really in jest - or whether a NATO led by Obama would really come to their defense. Why else preemptively announce, as did the Czech prime minister Bohuslav Sobotka, that his country did not want the troops NATO dispatched to Poland and the Baltic States as a deterrent to Russia?

Readings on Rationality and Misperception: Why Obama needs a red line on Iran

While red lines have been mischaracterized as automatic triggers or even deadlines for war, their purpose is to facilitate diplomacy. Generally speaking, such lines set bounds for action by indicating what Washington will and won't tolerate. Red lines set by the United States are crucial for determining the "rules of the game" in geopolitics - not the formal rules set by multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, but the informal rules that just as clearly guide action by states. Red lines create predictability and can also foster stability by heading off avoidable conflicts and forming the context for diplomacy. To work, red lines must possess two characteristics: enforceability and credibility. Enforceability means the line must correspond to an action that can be detected and then countered or prevented; credibility means that others believe we will enforce the line once it is trespassed. For example, the U.S. red line on Iran - that Iran simply cannot have a nuclear weapon - falls short on both counts. It is not enforceable because once Tehran gets sufficiently close to possessing a nuclear weapon, such as by producing a stockpile of weapons-grade enriched uranium, the final steps required to make a nuclear weapon can probably be done relatively quickly and in secret - and thus are not detectable. The U.S. red line also, regrettably, lacks credibility. Washington did not move to halt the North Korean or Syrian nuclear programs; we did so in Iraq but at so high a price that "avoiding another Iraq" has practically become a mantra of U.S. foreign policy. Other states are understandably skeptical that we would move to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if and when the moment finally comes.

Readings on Rise of China: The Real China Threat

Will China overtake the United States as the world's biggest economy? Well, stop worrying. It almost certainly will. The real threat from China lies elsewhere. It is that China will destabilize the world economy. It will distort trade, foster huge financial imbalances and trigger a contentious competition for scarce raw materials. At first, China pursued its ambitions within the existing global framework. Indeed, the United States supported China's membership in the World Trade Organization in 2001. But as it grows richer, China increasingly ignores old norms, Bergsten argues. It runs a predatory trade policy by keeping its currency, the renminbi, at artificially low levels, which stimulates export-led growth.

Goodness of Fit

• A theory that predicts outcomes correctly a lot of the time. • How well a theory describes the real world. • There is a trade-off between parsimony and goodness of fit. A non-parsimonious theory has more goodness of fit. No theory has perfect goodness of fit, and if we are smart we will be aware of the imperfections. Theories are there to provide some guidance. Having an imperfect theory is better than no theory.

Aspects of Theories

• Analytic component: X causes Y. • Normative component: implies that something is good or bad. E.g., "The walls of that room are hideous in that shade of green." • Prescriptive component: suggests a course of action. E.g., "The walls of that room should be painted a different color than green."

Mearsheimer

• Argument: the anarchy of the international system pushes states to maximize their power all the time. There is no leviathan to protect you, so if you don't maximize your power by conquering other states, they will try to conquer you. • In international politics, there is no hierarchy, no "night watchman" to turn to when one state attacks another. So states are forced to rely only on themselves for survival. Thus, states seek to expand their power both militarily, geographically and economically in order to increase their security. • States are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals because of the anarchic system in which they operate. The mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. • In addition to their principal goal which is survival, great powers seek to achieve three main objectives: (1) achieve regional hegemony, (2) maximize their share of the world's wealth because economic strength is the foundation of military strength, and (3) achieve nuclear superiority over their rivals.

Machiavelli

• Argument: the ruler's primary responsibility is to keep the state strong and secure for the sake of protecting its citizens. If doing bad things like lying and killing will achieve that end then, the leader is being ethical and doing his duty. • Machiavelli does not advocate cruelty for the sake of cruelty. He argues that a ruler should know when to be merciful and when to be cruel. Excess of tenderness allows for disorder, which can result in violence and hurt the whole community. A certain amount of cruelty only hurts individuals and is necessary to maintain power and dominance in a state.

Waltz

• Balance of Power • Argument: He advances the balance of power theory, which says that countries will almost always ally with the weaker of two states because the more powerful state poses a threat to their autonomy and sovereignty. By aligning with the weaker state they can join forces and protect themselves against more powerful states. If you align with a less powerful state and then you are attacked by a more powerful state, at least you have an ally that can help you preserve your sovereignty. • States seek to achieve their goals either through internal balancing (increasing economic capacity and military strength) or external balancing (strengthen their own alliances and weaken opposing ones). • Waltz contrasts balancing with bandwagoning, in which weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz argues that "because power is a means not an end, states may prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions." Again, the structure of the international system and the necessity of survival dictate this behavior. However, there are certain circumstances in which a state might bandwagon: if they are really weak or if there is no one nearby to ally with (so basically when they have no other choice).

Walt

• Balance of Threat • Balance of Power (Waltz) • Bandwagoning • Birds of a Feather (Haas) • Argument: states' alliance behavior is determined by the threat they perceive from other states. Walt contends that states will generally balance by allying against a perceived threat. • He identifies four criteria that states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state: > Power (size, population, and economic capabilities) >Geographic proximity >Offensive military capabilities >Intent Perceived as Offensive • Walt argues that the more other states view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and balance against it. • He compares his theory to three other theories: (1) Balance of Power (Waltz): In balance of power theory, states balance against more powerful states because greater power is assumed to reflect offensive intentions. Walt argues that this is not borne out by empirical evidence, and that balance of threat theory (states will not balance against greater powers unless they display offensive intentions) is a better account of the evidence. For instance, the United States rose in power during the Cold War, but many other states (e.g., the NATO nations) allied with it because it did not display aggressive intentions toward them. (2) Bandwagoning: very weak states are more likely to bandwagon with the rising threat in order to protect their own security. Walt disagrees. (3) Birds of a feather (Haas; not a realist theory): this theory says that states align together because they share a certain affinity or common cultural factor (language, religion, political affiliation, etc.). He calls this "birds of a feather" because birds of a feather flock together. • Balance of Threat theory is incorrectly labeled as structural realism by the author and others. It is NOT structural realism because Walt's theory of balance uses all three levels of analysis (human, state, and international system). It's less parsimonious (which isn't bad). The correct label for this theory is classical realism because it uses all three levels of analysis.

Allison and Halperin 1

• Bureaucratic Politics • Related to Cognitive Bias • Argument 1: the behavior of states in international relations is largely decided by domestic factors. Why? Because decisions are not always centralized, they can be the result of bureaucratic mischief. Because of bureaucratic politics, the actions of a state may not reflect its intent. • Pluralism + Conflict inside Government. Where you stand on an issue depends on where you sit. The interests of the CIA are different from that of the Defense Department, which are different from the interests of big banks, etc. The institutional interests of different agencies diverge and contradict each other, causing the national interest to disappear along the way. • Rather than design a policy recommendation based on the national interest, a member of a bureaucracy might make their recommendation based on personal interests or organizational interests. When it comes to the leader, they might make their decision based on political interests (e.g. reelection) or some other interest that conflicts with the national interest. • We assume that advice going to the leader is based on the national interest (but it's not). Having received the advice, we assume that the leader will make a decision also based on national interest (but they won't), and then the decision goes back down to the bureaucracy for implementation but since they have discretionary power they can decide to do something differently based on interests other than the national interest.

Levels of Analysis: Internal Characteristics of States

• Form of government: autocratic versus democratic regimes • Religion • Conflict versus stability • Etc.

Janis

• Groupthink • Argument: because of groupthink, there is a tendency for groups to make worse decisions than individuals. • A plan seems like a bad idea to multiple members of the group, yet no one in the groups expresses their concern. Even after a plan starts failing, no one in the group will critique it. And rather than questioning the decision (as it appears to be failing), the group decides to double down by sending in more troops, for example. With groupthink, we don't make a rational decision beforehand and we don't make a rational decision during. • The more amiability and sprit de corps among the members of a policy-making in-group, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against out-groups. • For example, the Bay of Pigs. It was pretty clear that the Bay of Pigs was doomed to fail and there was no back-up plan, yet no one in the decision-making group addressed that concern openly.

Nye

• Hard Power • Soft Power • For Nye, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want. There are several ways one can achieve this: you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. • Hard power is coercion: using your resources to order/command/compel someone to do what you want. These resources include military force, economic sanctions, bribes, international aid, etc. • Soft power is not using coercion: Its the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce. Its the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. >The currency of soft power is culture, political values, and foreign policies. >Soft power can accrue naturally to a state based on the characteristics of that state (the state just has to be itself). If people admire your culture and form of government, your way of life, then they may want to ally with you and emulate you. >However, sometimes other states don't know how good you are so you have to get the word out. Soft power doesn't require you to do anything but you can take action to build your soft power. This can be achieved through diplomacy and other non-coercive methods. >For example, during the 60s and 70s the Soviets had a lot of soft power because of the appeal of communism. They had allies in Latin America who found communism appealing and therefore allied with the Soviet Union. • THE THEORY OF SOFT POWER IS NOT A REALIST THEORY.

Ottaway and Lacina

• Humanitarian Interventions and Imperialism • Argument: while we may not have empires anymore by name, there are still activities that are imperialistic in nature. Ottaway and Lacina argue that the motivations of so-called "humanitarian" interventions are more imperial than humanitarian. • Imperialism was in the interest of the colonizing power, whereas "humanitarian" military interventions are in the interest of the recipient of the intervention. So imperialism was selfish whereas "humanitarian" military interventions are altruistic. • However, some of these "humanitarian" military interventions have created an enterprise of nation-building that was used to forward the national interests of the intervening country. • For example, the intervention in Iraq was selfish, not altruistic. The US intervened and took power. It looked a lot like a colony despite not being called one. • So, not only do we still see imperial goals through economic means of international financial institutions and enterprises (like Susan Strange talks about), but we also still see imperial goals through military means.

Carr

• League of Nations • Collective Security • Argument: the League of Nations failed because collective security failed. Even though it is in the world's interest for countries to protect each other, it is not in each country's national interest to protect another country. • The League of Nations was based on the idea of collective security. Members of the League of Nations were legally required to protect other member nations against any attack. • He proceeds to demonstrate how rational, well-conceived ideas of peace and cooperation among states were undermined in short order by the realities of chaos and insecurity in the international realm. • Carr predicted that the League of Nations would fail because states act on the basis of perceived short-term self-interest, and not on the basis of legally binding commitments. His prediction was correct. It fell apart and WW2 began. • If states followed their legal responsibilities, war could have been avoided but they did not. They didn't come to the aid of member nations when they were attacked, they increased the size of their militaries despite signing treaties pledging not to. • He concludes his discussion by suggesting that "elegant superstructures" such as the League of Nations "must wait until some progress has been made in digging the foundations".

Theucydides

• Melian Dialogue • Argument: the worst thing a state can do is take actions that undermine its own interest. "Right is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

Jervis 2

• Misperception of Intent • Fundamental Attribution Error • Cognitive Bias • Historical Trauma • Argument 2: it is very hard to assess intent due to misperceptions. Jervis examines several common misperceptions of decision-makers. • Fundamental Attribution Error: when you judge other's actions differently than you would judge yourself doing the same thing. >When we do something it's because we are good, and if we do something bad it's because we had no other choice. But when another country does the same bad thing, it's because they are bad. >For example, when North Korea and South Korea were at war, the US sent help. The US military forced the North Korean army out of South Korea and almost all the way up to China. China then sent its troops because the US was dangerously close to its borders. The US was shocked at China's reaction. They claimed to genuinely believe that China would not feel threatened. This could be political spin or fundamental attribution error. >A secondary aspect of this error is when you judge another's actions based on your preconceptions of them. So two countries take the same action yet you judge their intentions differently because you have different preconceptions of them. • Cognitive Bias: the misperception that all decisions are centrally decided (i.e. that the leader of a nation is responsible for all their nation's actions). • The last cause of misperception that Jervis discusses is when historical traumas caused by our decisions heavily influence future perceptions. A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger. While this sensitivity may lead the state to avoid the mistake it committed in the past, it may also lead it mistakenly to believe that the present situation is like the past one. For example, Germany (a revisionist state) was appeased in 1938 but Germany did not follow the treaties and tried to invade other countries again (rise of Nazi Germany). This led to the holocaust and WW2 (a horrible historical trauma). Because of that trauma, appeasement was considered a bad foreign policy, even though it can be bad or good depending on the circumstances. The best you can do to prevent this misperception is to be aware of it.

Morgenthau

• Morgenthau puts forward two theories in his book: (1) States are always seeking to maximize their power all the time. (2) There are imperial states seeking to increase their power at the expense of others and there are status quo states who are seeking to protect their current amount of power (they don't want to change their relative power within the system). • Professor argues that his two theories are contradictory.

Offensive Realism

• Offensive realism tells us how states act • All states are trying to maximize their power all the time. • How? Internal balancing (grow your economy and turn your economic power into military power) and then external balancing (conquering other states). • This type of realism does not use the human nature level of analysis. So even in a world where everyone is an angel, states will try and protect themselves by always seeking to maximize their power.

Jervis 1

• Other State's Intent: Revisionist or Status Quo • Security Dilemma • Argument 1: if you can correctly identify the intent of another state then you can develop an effective foreign policy that avoids unnecessary war. • The other state's intent can be revisionist (accumulate more power) or status quo (be left alone). • My state's foreign policy has two choices: threaten or appease (make concessions). • If I threaten a revisionist state there will be peace. If I appease a revisionist state there will be war. • If I threaten a status quo state there will be war. If I appease a status quo state there will be peace. • Security Dilemma: We have two status quo countries, A and B. Country A increases it's military for defensive purposes. Country B now expects an attack from A so it decides to build up its military too. Country A sees this and thinks it was right that other countries are out to get them and decides to build its military even more. We end up with a war between two status quo countries that just wanted to be left alone. So the key to a good foreign policy is to identify intent and act accordingly.

Wight

• Power Politics (territorial expansion) • Offensive Realism • Argument: the natural tendency for states is to expand in order to protect their interests and territory. • Two causes: (1) internal pressure and (2) weakness of external powers. • States will not willingly give up a territory without a struggle, no matter how inconsequential or costly that territory is. • There are some exceptions: >Territorial exchange >State is content with "an economic or moral equivalent for dominion" >State is mature as a neighbor (Niebuhr)

Blainey

• Preponderance of Power • Miscalculation of Relative Power • Argument: War is always the result of "Miscalculation of Relative Power." He says that ALL wars are the result of miscalculation. • The decision to resort to force or diplomacy is based on leaders' assessments of their ability to impose their will on a rival nation. Anything that increases leaders' optimism will promote war. One direct cause of optimism is miscalculation of relative power. • One cause of miscalculation is that the military power of another state may be hard to measure because they either hide it or exaggerate it. The only way to measure relative power effectively is to have a war. • According to Blainey, a high level of miscalculation will result in war. Over the course of the war miscalculation will plummet. When miscalculation is low enough we will have peace. As peace endures, miscalculation goes up again. Basically, he says that war and peace are cyclical and are determined on the level of miscalculation of relative power. • Indirect factors influencing assessment of relative power include economic conditions, perception of internal unity, predictions of how other nations will react to the war, memory or forgetfulness about the realities of war, perception of prosperity and ability to sustain the war, nationalism and ideology, and personality/mental qualities of the leader.

Schelling

• Rational Coercion • Credible Reassurance • Argument: explains the proper use of hard power. Schelling's model is one of rational coercion. • Schelling says that if you want to effectively coerce another state you have to do three things: (1) You have to make a clear and credible threat. It is only a credible threat if you have the necessary capability and perceived real intent. (2) The threatened punishment has to be big and scary enough. (3) There needs to be "Credible Reassurance": the targeted state needs to be sure that it will not be punished if it complies. If it is going to be punished regardless of whether or not it complies then it has no motivation to comply. For example, Saddam Hussein had to no motivation to come clean because the US said that even if he did they would not lift the economic sanctions on Iraq. • There is a use for a theory based on rational action, even though states are not completely rational. Following Schelling's theory of rational action will increase your chance of success, but it will not guarantee it because states are not completely rational.

Gilpin

• Rising Power • Declining Power • Status in the International System (rules of the game, international division of labor, and sphere of influence) • Perceived Intent: Revisionist or Status Quo • There are two states, A and B, where A has a lot of power and status and B has little power and status. B rises in power significantly while A stagnates or only rises a little. B is thus considered the rising power and A is considered the declining power relative to B. Despite its rise in power, A does not reward B with a rise in status. This is the problem that Gilpin lays out. • There are two possible outcomes: (1) war, or (2) A allows B to have higher status. • Status manifests itself in three ways in the international system: (1) the rules of the game: having power in international governing bodies like veto powers in the UN. (2) The international division of labor: countries with less status provide raw materials and countries with more status process the materials to produce finished products. (3) Sphere of influence: one country has power over one region of the world and no one messes with it. • Should you appease a rising state or launch a preventive war? Gilpin says it depends heavily on whether you perceive the rising state to be revisionist or status quo. • For example, Britain appeased the US when it was a rising power because it considered the US a status quo state. Britain considered the US a status quo state because the US did not want to change the system that Britain had created (free trade and free navigation). If the US had wanted to change the system or seek control of trade then Britain would have considered it a revisionist state. • Gilpin does not say who starts the war: whether the rising power or the declining power. Why might the rising power start the war? Because it is not given enough status to match its increased power.

Kuperman

• Standard Operating Procedure • Cybernetic Theory of Rationalism • Prospect Theory • Cybernetic theory takes the standard operating procedure idea further. It says that governments can't think and so they go on autopilot. They do the same thing over and over again until there is a catastrophic failure. After the failure, the government does the exact opposite of what they were doing before. The government continues doing the opposite thing until that leads to disaster, and then they go back to the previous thing. They behave as a pendulum swing instead of taking a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. • Prospect Theory: When two actors have identical things, I value my thing more than I value yours, preserving mine is more important than acquiring yours, even though I should value them the same.

Allison and Halperin 2

• Standard Operating Procedure • Cybernetic Theory of Rationalism • Standard operating procedure allows people to act without having to think much. If A happens I do B.

Hobbes

• State of Nature • State of War • Leviathan • Argument: men live in a state of anarchy until they give up power to a leviathan that rules them • State of Nature: in life without government (state of nature), each person has the right to everything in the world, which leads to a war of all against all. • State of War: life in the state of nature leads to a state of constant war. This doesn't mean that people are always fighting, but rather that they live in a state of constant insecurity. In order to avoid this chaos, people accede to a social contract and establish a civil society. A strong central authority, or leviathan, is therefore necessary to avoid the evil of discord and civil war. • Leviathan: society is a population beneath a sovereign authority (the leviathan), to whom all individuals in that society cede some rights for the sake of protection. • This theory is about humans but it can be applied to states and the international system. Without international laws and governing bodies, the international system would revert to a state of nature. States seek more than what they need even if they don't necessarily want more because they are afraid that another state is going to seek more than what they need. The state of nature leads to resource shortages and fighting for limited resources. In a system with no international laws of governing bodies, the only way to resolve these issues is to fight it out. To get out of this state of nature, states would have to cede some of their rights to an international governing body (e.g., Nato). • Problem: there is no Leviathan in the international system

Niebuhr

• States Never Learn • Mature Power • Balance of Power (Waltz) • Defensive Realism • Argument: states never learn. • States are selfish, which is why they seek to continue expanding. Even when that expansion does not make sense morally or intellectually. • Niebuhr argues that it's fine for states to grow in power, but they need to stop before it's too late. States will continue expanding until it backfires on them and eventually leads to their decline. • Mature power: states will balance against aggressive and/or growing powers (balance of power theory). Balances lead to defeat of great power and then the great power becomes "mature." I.E., the state reaches a point of being status quo.

Defensive Realism

• Tells us how states should act • The best way for a state to protect itself is NOT by always seeking to maximize its power, but rather to form balancing alliances against more powerful states. • Always seeking to maximize a state's power can end up undermining that state's power because the more they try to increase their power, the more that other states will oppose them and balance against them.

Waltz 2

• Theory of Nuclear Deterrence • Preventive War • Preemptive War • Argument: nuclear proliferation will promote peace and reinforce international stability because it dissuades war for rational actors. • How does it dissuade war for rational actors? He explains that if miscalculation is the cause of war then more nukes will eliminate this miscalculation because measuring of force is done up front before the fighting. • He distinguishes between two types of war: preventive and preemptive. >Preventive War: if two countries are unequal in strength and the weaker is gaining, the stronger may be tempted to strike before its advantage is lost. This would be preventive war, a war launched against a weak country before it can become disturbingly strong. >Preemptive War: the logic of preemption is different. Leaving aside the balance of forces, one country may strike another country's offensive forces to blunt an attack that it presumes is about to be made, IF there is a perceived first-mover advantage. If each country believes it can eliminate or drastically reduce the other's offensive forces in one surprise blow, then both of them are encouraged to mount sudden attacks, if only for fear that if one does not, the other will. Mutual vulnerability of forces leads to mutual fear of surprise attack by giving each power a strong incentive to strike first. • Waltz says that the growth of nuclear power will NOT lead to preventive strikes because it reduces the risk of miscalculation. Otherwise, if you launch a preventive strike and you are wrong about the other country's intentions then you end up with an angry enemy who is now likely to attack you back. It is possible Waltz was wrong because nuclear power has increased and yet we still see preventive strikes. • He also says that the growth of nuclear power will NOT lead to preemptive strikes because it is suicidal. Unless a state is absolutely sure that they can eliminate all of the enemy's nuclear arsenal, then they won't launch a preemptive strike. This is why countries hide the location of their nuclear arsenals strategically. • He then says that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future. • Professor says that Waltz looks at all the reasons why nuclear proliferation is good but ignores the reasons why it might be bad. Waltz was mistaken in saying that the increase of nuclear power will not lead to preventive and preemptive war. He also did not consider terrorism nor did he consider a world full of nuclear states (if we don't know where the nuke came from, how do we retaliate?).

Strange

• Transnational Empire • Bretton Woods: IMF and World Bank • Washington Consensus • Argument: by setting up the rules of the international system, the US does not have to conquer other countries or establish a sphere of influence because it achieves the same goal of benefitting itself. • For example, Bretton Woods institutions: the IMF and the World Bank are based in the US and the Washington Consensus was established in the US. • The Washington Consensus says that in order for countries to get financial assistance they have to participate in free trade by removing trade barriers with the US, selling off government owned enterprises to the private sector, and promoting foreign investment in their countries. • This system makes it more difficult for small and developing economies to nurture their emerging industries and it creates dependency on the US for trade and loans. The US benefits from this because other countries have to make their economies vulnerable to the US in order to have access to IMF and World Bank aid.

Classical Realism

• Uses all three levels of analysis (human nature, state, and structure of the international system). • The goal of states is to survive in an anarchic international system. There is Leviathan to protect you, all states must look out for themselves.

Neorealism or Structural Realism

• Uses the third level of analysis (structure of the international system). • This theory argues that states do not make choices based on internal factors or human nature. Instead, they make choices based on relative power and under the assumption that there is anarchy in the international system. • Two types: offensive realism tells us how states act and defensive realism tells us how states should act.

What makes a state powerful?

•Economic strength •Military capability •Industrial capability •Geography >Mineral and agricultural resources >Size of the territory: the larger the state, the harder it is to conquer >Access to oceans >Neighbors • Alliances • National moral • Quality of Diplomacy • Quality of Government