PHIL 002 Final Exam

The Meaningful Hypothesis

"our moral talk and thought is meaningful, that is, it purports to be about something." SEMANTIC CLAIM

Singer's view on Moral Standing

--Any creature that can feel pain has moral standing. (if you draw the line any other way, it would be arbitrary and therefore morally objectionable) ----->Lobsters feel pain, therefore have moral standing --Moral standing: means we need some positive reason to cause them harm --CRUCIAL PREMISE: being able to feel pain/pleasure is sufficient for having an interest

the argument(s) from queerness for the Always False Hypothesis

--METAPHYSICAL -there can't b anything intrinsically motivating...nothing in science has showed something like that 2 exist -Instead, must always be some background fact/ psychological trait about a person that aids in the motivation --EPISTEMOLOGICAL -objective moral values r so different...there's no way we can guarantee that we have the proper faculties to investigate them or truly discover them

Kagan's argument against the epistemic value of intuitions about cases: (DEFENDS SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE EPISTEMIC (relating to knowledge and the degree of its validation) VALUE OF CASES)

--Main interest = intuition about cases --->wants 2 debunk value of cases --->wants 2 debunk the thought that intuitions take priority (he is a consequentialist and this would be v good for consequentialists if we can't trust our intuitions) 1) unlike empirical observation, it's unclear if we have some sense organ which functions to track moral truth [counterargument: just b/c we don't know how something works doesn't mean we shouldn't trust it: we trusted our vision forever b4 knowing how it works] 2) we're justified in sticking to our intuitions if we can systematize them 3) there's no moral theory that can systemize moral terrain and vindicate most of our intuitions: no matter what theory you hold, you're committed to thinking that many intuitions are misleading Conclusion: we're not justified to use intuitions about cases

a priori vs. a posteriori

--a priori: knowledge or justification that is independent of experience [math, tautologies, ontological proofs]; can be derived from reason alone --a posteriori: knowledge or justification that is dependent on experience or empirical evidence (science, history, personal knowledge)

Singer's argument that many of us are speciesist

--anything that can feel pain has interests --assumes that anything with interests has moral standing (and thus deserves equal moral consideration) P1- we/our practices treat animals unequally, and don't respect the moral consideration that they deserve from their moral standing P2- Speciesists treat animals w/out the due moral consideration (treat creatures that demand equal treatment in unequal ways) C- Because of this, many of us are speciesist because we treat animal's interest unequally

Railton's proposed solution to the alienation problem

--being an extreme partials is extremely alienating for a person, not from their intimates and from ppl in general --to value one's intimates non-instrumentally and act well towards them for their own sake --non-sintrumental concern that's sensitive to whether or not the relationship makes one happy --suggests that we ought to be sophisticated consequentialists (who is sensitive to whether or not the relationship promotes the greater good)

Moral Equality vs. Factual equality

--moral equality = NOT grounded in factual equality (just b/c women can vote and pigs can't DOESN'T rule out that humans and non-humans are morally equal) --speciesism doesn't give equal weight to people's interests, same way that sexism and racism don't

the argument from disagreement for the Always False Hypothesis

--there's widespread disagreement about moral matters --differences seem to be unresolvable b/c neither party of disagreement is being unreasonable and both have all the necessary information supports the idea that there are no objective moral properties...ONLY multiple justifiable positions on certain moral q's

Whiting's virtue-theoretic theory of the justification of friendship

--type of virtue theory that justifies friendship --virtuous creatures provide reasons to be partial towards them: PARTIALITY IS JUSTIFIED TO VIRTUOUS PPL b/c they provide reasons why they should b treated differently --ur closest w/ ur friends & therefore know them the best, so ur in the best position to help them out and appreciate them --having friends helps u love humanity & not treat ppl as ends (semi-consequentialist)

The analogy between intuitions about cases and scientific/emperical observations

-Kagan's focus: intuitions are analogous to empirical observations when developing a scientific theory (case intuitions are inputs into scientific theories the same way observations are).

terrorism vs state terror

-STATE TERROR: typically seeks to KEEP certain domestic SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN PLACE or to keep new ones from developing -TERRORISM: seek to destroy/destabilize social structures or keep new ones form developing

*Does going to war/closing our borders/become more of a security state mean ISIS wins? (Scheffler)

-These responses give ISIS a partial victory because they atleast partially destroy our classically liberal social structure

She's Argument from controversy and contingency to skepticism about the justification of moral beliefs

-if your views don't track the truth, it's hard to imagine why your moral beliefs are epistemically better than reasonable people who disagree -given that your views come from your background, you have no reason for having your views that's related to truth content: YOUR VIEWS DON'T TRACK THE TRUTH BRO THEREFORE UR MORAL BELIEFS AREN'T EPISTEMOLOGICALLY BETTER THAN ANY OTHER PERSON'S U RNT SPECIAL DEAL W IT

Tooley's cats/super-cats Example

-imagine there's a chemical that can turn cats (DON'T have right to life) into super-cats (DO have right to life) -imagine that Cuddles, a normal cat, just got injected w/ the chemical -If potentiality principle is true, then Cuddles has the right to life

Features of Scheffler's standard cases

-not trying to define terrorism or see if it can be justified -involve someone maiming/killing a more/less arbitrarily chosen group of people in order to induce fear in a broader range of people -purpose: use the fear to destroy/destabilize some social structure

Tooley's Moral Symmetry Principle

-part of Tooley's argument against the Potentiality Principle -there's no moral difference between refraining from stopping an action and performing the action yourself if the motivations are the same/outcomes would be the same

SL's arguments against the sufficient claim of desire satisfafction

-sometimes desires can b satisfied w/out any apparent benefit to that person

SL's argument against the necessity claim of desire-satisfactionsim

-sometimes things can bring u joy even tho u didn't originally have a desire for that thing -sometimes frustrating ur desires can actually make u better off

Anatomy of Scheffler's standard cases

-terrorism = different moral anatomy than acts of violence -sets off a moral cascade -terrorists don't just harm the people that they maim and kill, they intentionally harm a wider group of people by introducing fear on purpose -Looks at cases that kill arbitrarily to induce fear to destroy social structure. He thinks something is wrong with these acts -Widespread fear makes social relations unsustainable (which is why terrorists induce fear) -Widespread cannot be extinguished w/o stable social structures (this is terrorist's goal) -A symmetric responses to different acts of terrorism (impartialist reasoning vs. us being plausible victims of one but not another)

*Arthur thinks an action is right...

...if and only if the IDEAL moral code says it's right

*According to Tooley, in order to have the right to life, we must desire...

...not to be killed

On Kagan's view, if the best scientific theory fails to vindicate the majority of our observations, then...

...we should stop relying on observations full stop (i.e. past and future observations)

Enoch's 3 Tests for seeing whether or not we're objectivists about morality

1) the spinach test: ---kid h8s spinach, says he's glad he h8s it. Someone asks him why...he says "because if i liked it i would have eaten it, and it's GROSS" ---if something's funny, we think it's b/c of something subjective. If it's unfunny, we think it's b/c of something objective 2) The disagreement test: ---is the disagreement an outside matter of fact? ---if disagreement seems to be about facts instead of preferences, then we're disagreeing about something that's held 2 b an objective truth 3) The counterfactual test: ---"Had our beliefs/practices been very different, would it still have been true that______?" ---Subjective matters: NO (i.e. fashion, wearing top hats) ---For Objective Matters: YES (i.e. cigarettes were bad 4 u then and they're still bad 4 u now ---application to moral issues (even if people socially accepted gender-based discrimination in the past, doesn't mean it was morally ok then)

Jesse's Brute Theory of the justification of friendship

1) we don't need special justification for being friends with some people rather than others 2) the fact that someone is our friend gives us an intrinsic reason to continue caring about that person (reason for continuing friendship can b independent of why u became friends in the first place)

3 overdemandingness objections to consequentialism

1. DELIBERATION- says we always should deliberate about all of the consequences of all of our actions---->not reasonable, shouldn't have to devote so much of our cognitive lives to thinking about all the consequences 2. MOTIVATION- requires us 2 care most about the general good at expense of local good 3. ACTION: superogeration, requires too much of us

SL's problems w/ the Principle of Humanity

1. VAGUE: --notion that treating someone as an end is pretty vague 2. WHAT PEOPLE DESERVE: --principle doesn't determine what ppl deserve 3. AUTONOMY?: --justification of the principle turns on the claim that we're autonomous, but it's not clear that we are 4. CASES OF MORAL LUCK: --principle assumes that the moral status of our actions turn on just what we can autonomously control, BUT cases of moral luck raise doubt about this 5. LACKING AUTONOMY/RATIONALITY: --principle can't explain why those who lack autonomy/rationality deserve respect too

argument against expected consequentialism in favor of actual consequentialism

1. cases when expected consequences = good but results = bad 2. cases when expected consequences = bad but outcome = good

The 2 moral ways moral observation and scientific observation are the same

1. in both cases we move directly from perceptions to beliefs [we believe in the existence of science stuff that we can't see b/c it's explanatorily indispensable....in the same way, these moral properties are needed as explanation] 2. in both cases, our observations are theory-laden [beliefs we form = dependent on the theories we hold...a die-hard Kantian forms different opinions than a consequentialist]

SL's arguments against sufficient* and sufficient**

4 cases against: 1. DISAPPOINTMENT CASES --fulfilling desires that don't necessarily make you happier/better off (ex- wanting 2 b famous and then hating it when u r famous) 2. IGNORANCE CASES --desires being fulfilled w/out u knowing that they're being fulfilled --doesn't seem to make you any better off 3. INCOHERENCE OF WANTED SELF HARM --sometimes people desire self-harm, which isn't going to make them better off --demonstrates that satisfying our desires doesn't always make us better off 4. DEFICIENT DESIRE CASES --possible to train a slave to desire to serve his/her master --even tho this doesn't necessarily lead to a good life

contradiction in will

= a way in which a maxim can give rise to a contradiction -the will of a person contradicts the universalization of the maxim implied Example: "In order to be happy, I will not help anyone else." --rational agents have various ends to pursue, and will indeed whatever means are necessary to the pursuit of those ends...they know that sometimes this will require the help of others --therefore they would never will such a mxim

Contradiction in conception

= a way in which a maxim can give rise to a contradiction maxim embodies a contradiction in itself can't b universalized b/c of it's internal contradiction maxim is no longer a viable means to an end when it's universalized Example: "In order to get money, I will tell a lie" --not univeralizable b/c can't be willed by all (if every1 lies, it would never work...there's a contradiction in conceiving)

the logical contradiction interpretation of contradictions in conception

= an interpretation of a maxim's contradiction --says that there's no world where the universalizability of a certain maxim could logically happen --b/c the practice involved would go out of existence --the actions/policies that the maxim suggests would be inconceivable

*The brute view holds that continued partiality towards my friends is justified because... a they're my friends and thus I'm in a better position to appreciate their good qualities than other people. b they're my friends and I'm thus in a better position to promote their interests than other people. c they're my friends. d they're my friends and I'm thus in a better position to promote their virtues than other people. e None of the above

A

The Always False Hypothesis

All of our thoughts/assertions = false the things that our thoughts/assertions are about DON'T EXIST (they don't successfully refer to something real) METAPHYSICAL CLAIM

Arthur's ideal code consequentialism

Arthur: the ideal moral code has entitlements but doesn't have the GMEP he argues that we have certain entitlements like rights and "just deserts" (sometimes people DESERVE to keep what they've acquired b/c bad consequences of GMEP outweigh the good ones

*Contractualism... A) is incompatible w/ consequentialism B) is compatible w/ consequentialism and non-consequentialism C) is only compatible w/ non-consequentialism D) none of the above

B

*Kantian deontology has a problem with partiality because... a it requires us to treat everyone the same way. b it permits partiality only towards a particular feature of other people. c it holds that we can be partial only because partiality is a good way of complying with our imperfect duty to treat others as ends in themselves. d All of the above e None of the above

B

the connection to motivation arguments for the desire satisfaction view of welfare

Basic idea: what is good/bad 4 us is entirely up 2 us Desire-satisfaction theory is valuable b/c it explains our motivation to achieve good welfare ---NEGATIVE ARGUMENT 1- if X is good 4 u, u will b motivated to get it 2. there's lots of ppl who know about x, yet aren't motivated 2 get it C- therefore X isn't good 4 u ---POSITIVE ARGUMENT 1. if x is good 4 u, it'll satisfy some of ur desires 2. if x will satisfy ur desires, u will b motivated 2 get it 3. if x is good 4 u, u will b motivated 2 get it

*The act that Hursthouse's qualified agent--call her Rosalind-- characteristically performs is the act... a) that Rosalind usually performs. b) that expresses Rosalind's character. c) that is virtuous. d) All of the above e) None of the above

D: all of the above

What is the disagreement argument? what is Enoch's reply to the disagreement argument?

Disagreement argument: if perfectly objective moral truths exist, then why is there so much disagreement about them? Reply: moral disagreement can be explained by the fact that people tend to accept/reject moral ideas based on their best interests (i.e. the poor believing in a welfare state)

*T/F: According to Harman, mathematics and morality face a similar problem when it comes to explanatory relevance

FALSE

*T/F: Metaethical theories make predictions about which acts are right and wrong.

FALSE

*T/F: philosophical utilitarianism holds that the right actions are the actions that maximize welfare.

FALSE

the worst of crimes argument

FLO account = correct b/c it explains why we think killing is one of the worst of crimes b/c FLO is so precious

the considered judgement argument

FLO account is correct b/c it fits w/ our considered judgment about the nature/misfortune of death ppl with incurable diseases might say that their impending death/suffering is bad b/c they're going to be deprived of a FLO

the appeal to cases argument

FLO can explain why killing is wrong in many cases, as well as when it can start to seem acceptable (i.e. pulling the plug on a dying person)

*Fear always corrodes social structures? T or F? (Scheffler)

False: state terror

Singer's Argument for the conclusion that we ought to donate significant amounts to aid organizations

Greater Moral Evil Principle P1- suffering in the 3rd world is a bad thing. P2- if we can prevent a bad thing from happening w/out sacrificing something of comparable (weaker: significant) moral importance, then we're morally required to prevent the bad thing P3- We can prevent a bad thing from happening w/out sacrificing something of comparable (weaker: significant) moral importance by giving sig. amounts of $ to aid organizations C- We're morally required to give sig. amounts of $ to aid organizations.

The Potentiality Principle (from Tooley)

If organism O has the potential to grow into an organism that clearly has a right to life through normal development, then O currently has the right to life

Sher's Contingency Principle

If we would have had different backgrounds, we would have had radically different moral views (our moral views depend very strongly on our background)

Why biological personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral personhood

In order to be a moral person, you have to have the concept of a subject that has a temporally unified experience AND you have to believe that you're a subject like this "In order to have a right to X, you have to desire X"

What is the intolerance objection? What is enoch's reply to the intolerance objection?

Intolerance Objection: ppl can become dangerously intolerant if they believe in an objective morality (i.e. ppl fighting for social) Reply: that danger doesn't give us a reason to believe that morality isn't objective, just a reason to believe that it could be dangerous for ppl to discover that fact

Inference to the best explanation

Karan thinks we need a moral theory that not only systemizes our intuitions, but also offers at lest the outlines of an explanation of how the moral domain can have particular features as ascribed by our intuitions

Kantian maxims

MAXIM = principle that one acts upon 2 parts: 1.ACTION 2. GOAL

Kantian universalizability

Maxim = universalizable IFF every1 could act on that maxim and achieve the goal of the action if every1 can ACT & ACHIEVE the goal of the maxim

The purported explanatory difference between moral observation and scientific observation

Only in the scientific cases do we need to posit physical properties to explain our observations. DON'T need 2 appeal 2 moral facts 2 explain our moral observations.

Tooley's argument against the potentiality principle

P1- P2- C- Potentiality Principle is false

Tooley's argument that fetuses are not moral persons

P1- In order to have a right to life, you have to desire to continue to exist the way you do now P2- biological claim that fetuses can't have the desire to continue in the way that they currently do C- fetuses don't have a right to life

Singer's Weak Principle

Predicts that we're morally required to give our money to aid organizations until we get to the point where if we gave more money, we'd being sacrificing something of LARGE moral importance.

sophisticated consequentialism

Railton's subjective consequentialist agent accepts objective consequentialism but rejects subjective consequentialism

intuitionism

Scanlon metaethical view that the moral stuff is non-natural (it's a different kind of thing than what science investigates) we intuit the actual moral principles and have INTUITIVE ACCESS to moral principles our intuitive awareness of value forms the foundation of our ethical knowledge

*T/F: Whiting holds that, when friendships are justified, they are justified by the features of the individuals in the relationship.

TRU

*T/F: Both slot's account and Kant's account are motive based accounts of rightness

TRUE

*T/F: Swanton;s account holds that character is more fundamental than rightness.

TRUE

*T/F: The plausibility of an error theory about witches depends on what we try 2 refer to when we use witch talk.

TRÜ

According to Kagan, perceptual experience is trustworthy only if there's a scientific theory that vindicates the vast majority of our perceptions. (T/F)

TRÜ

*DFW presents what as evidence that lobsters feel pain?

They try to climb out of the pot, and they have nerves (they don't scream)

The Nothing-Always-Wrong problem for consequentialism

Utilitarianism = flexible at explaining how other considerations can be overridden in the name of "promoting the good" BUT ALSO A BAD THING: means that nothing is ever absolutely right or absolutely wrong you can b required 2 do **absolutely anything** as long as it leads 2 the best outcome (even torturing/hurting someone)

Sher's Controversy Principle

We disagree in moral matters with wide swaths of otherwise reasonable people.

the connection between Contractualism and motivation

We seem 2 want to be be able 2 defend our moral actions by justifying them 2 other ppl...contractualism allows us 2 do that by saying we're doing agreed upon actions that no one could reasonably reject to the rules of the subject matter of morality is facts about what can be justified to particular ppl

the analogy with animals argument

Why do we believe that it's wrong to cause animals suffering? ---believe suffering is a misfortune...which would imply that this idea applies to ALL living things, not just specific ones (i.e. white males, just humans, etc) THEREFORE: infliction of suffering is presumptively wrong, no matter on whom it's inflicted and whether or not it's inflicted on persons or non-persons

Does Singer concede that killing animals (even for food perhaps), is sometimes morally permissible? Y or N?

Y

Objective moral properties

[Mackie] = categorical (explicit and direct) intrinsically motivating supposed to move one to their heed just as long as one is acquainted w/ them

the experience machine and the uses that Nozick puts to it

a machine where u could plug in and get all the desirable experiences that u want while ur plugged in u don't know that ur plugged in after a certain amt of time u wake up and get to choose a new pleasure 2 experience he cites ppl's hesitation to want this as an indication that there's more to making one's life go well than pleasure...ppl want something deeper, be a certain type of person, do certain types of things, etc

Slot's agent-based view of rightness

act = right IFF it expresses a virtuous movie (or at least doesn't express a vicious motives

Stanton's target-centered account of rightness

act = right IFF it hits the target of a virtue, whether or not the act itself expresses virtue no algorithm, it's highly dependent on context to b overall virtuous, u must b more virtuous than vicious

Hursthouse's qualified agent view of rightness

act = right IFF it's what the virtuous agent would characteristically do

the universalizability principle

act = right IFF its maxim is universalizable

consequentialism

action that is good is one that produces best consequences we can understand what's good/bad independently from what is right/wrong what is right = to promote the good

The problem of alienation

agents that live by impartial moral theories are alienated from certain values in virtue of being impartial

utilitarianism

all that is good is human welfare and all that is bad is human suffering act is right if it maximizes the good (good = human welfare)

Rule Consequentialism

an act = right if it's sanctioned by a set of rules that maximize the good over the long run

The violinist case (and all of its variants)

analogous 2 pregnancy from rape wake up and connected 2 violinist bad 2 disconnect or nah? if only short time? if 4ever?

the human spores case

analogous to pregnancy from consensual sex spores in house gonna grow 2 a human but i had ur window closed and were tryna prevent them from getting in....still got in do spores have right 2 ur house? think burglars?

Moral Standing

anything w/ interests has moral standing and is thus due equal moral consideration among other things with moral standing

the shape of life argument

argument against hedonism Basic idea = the order in which we have experiences matters overall quality of life ALSO depends on the shape of life therefore hedonism is false

the autonomy argument

argument against hedonism even the most pleasurable experienced aren't good for us when they're caused in certain ways: ESP IN INSTANCES WHERE WE LACK AUTONOMY autonomy can directly lead to a good life even when it doesn't lead to pleasure therefore hedonism is false

Moral Code (in Arthur's Sense)

codified version of what we collectively believe about morality

ends-in-themselves

ends = objects that guide our actions in certain ways ends-in-themselves = ends that every1 is rationally compelled to be guided by, no matter of their other inclinations have something like infinite value (always trump value of other things, just like rationality and autonomy do)

error theory about morality

error theories have 2 parts: 1) SEMANTIC CLAIM: claim that our talk and thought purports to be about something real and existent (the meaningful hypothesis) 2) METAPHYSICAL CLAIM: about whether that something exists or not (always false hypothesis)

Jeske's argument that the brute theory captures reality's egalitarianism

every1's interests count equally: no one deserves 2 b cared about more than any1 else --U CAN PICK FRIENDS FOR ARBITRARY REASONS! (if there were specific qualifications, you would b giving ppl unequal consideration, valuing one person more than another etc...this is wrong) every1's welfare matters equally 2 morality...her partials view can still capture the insight that motivates the imperialist views

Desire-satisfaction view of welfare

good 4 u = fulfilling all ur desires bad 4 u =frustrating ur desires **does include the stranger on a train example, says this WOULD make ur life go better

the objective list theory

good 4 u = things on a list of objectively good things (good 4 every1) bad 4 u = things that are objectively bad (being betrayed, being deceived, losing dignity)

Arthur's argument that we should drop Singer's principles

he says that the bad consequences of adopting the GMEP outweigh the good consequences of adopting it "Suppose we adopted Singer's code..." 1- everyone would adopt it (he sees this as near impossible/highly unlikely) 2- everyone would be less productive 3- everyone would keep being productive, but would live w/ lots of guilt

Nozick's diagnosis of why we have the intuitions we have to the experience machine

he thinks that we think this machine is abhorrent b/c what's important to ppl is that they actually DO certain things...experience machine cuts us off from a deeper reality WE THINK A CAUSAL HISTORY OF OUR ACTIONS IS IMPORTANT

philosophical Utilitarianism

holds that the most fundamental stuff is welfare connects morality and motivation that Scanlon sees

the paradox of hedonsim

idea that living a life where ur just trying to get as much pleasure as possible might not be the way to actually get the most pleasure 4 urself C: it's rational to aim at something that isn't "fundamentally" set on getting the most pleasure 4 u

the henry fonda case + its variants

if someone has a fatal illness and the only person that can help is henry fonda, then henry fonda still isn't obligated 2 help them right 2 life doesn't necessarily mean u have a right 2 the things that sustain life

The Pond Case

if you walk past a pond and see a child drowning it, you morally ought to jump in and save the child you might get your clothes muddy but this is morally insignificant compared to the death of the child distance & # of people available to help doesn't matter in this case ---"Are you less obliged to help the child just b/c you see lots of other people standing around and also doing nothing?

Parfait's Stranger on the train case and the argument that uses it

is outcome of stranger on a train's life relevant 2 ur life? Parfait says NO uses as support for success theory of desire-satisfactionsim

Enoch's View of Moral Objectivity

less committal than Mackie morality = mind-independent (objectivity) Moral facts don't depend on our thoughts/feelings about morality

analogy between scientific observation and intuitions about cases

makes an analogy b/t using empirical observations to support scientific theories and using intuitions to support cases it's bad for scientific theories if they incorrectly predict empirical observations...same for intuitions in philosophical theorizing ---->this would seem to justify our use of intuitions and intuitions about cases --->DIFFERENCE: unclear whether or not we have organ to detect moral truth, intuitions only valid if we can systemize them

The fanatic problem for the universalizability principle

maxim of a fanatic CAN BE universalized, yet what he's doing is wrong -----> therefore, universalizability is NOT SUFFICIENT for something 2 b right Example: fanatical gardener who says he's going 2 shoot every1 that comes in his garden...still seems like a bad maxim even tho it can b universalized

SL's sufficient* and sufficient**

modifications made to handle the cases of desires based on false beliefs sufficient* = if X fulfills one of ur INFORMED DESIRES, X is good 4 u sufficient** = if X fulfills one of ur INFORMED DESIRES ABOUT UR OWN LIFE, X is good 4 u

Kantian Dignity and what grounds it

moral agents have dignity b/c they're AUTONOMOUS AND RATIONAL these 2 attributes ground our dignity and these principles are priceless (can't b weighed against other goods or outweighed by them...hence their moral power)

Moral vs. Biological Persons

moral persons have the rights that fully capacitated adults have: they have a right to life being biologically human isn't enough to have a right to life

contractualism

offers a view about wrongess act = wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement can explain why welfare = important...ppl would reject a system of rules which gave no weight to their welfare metaethical view that morality is about justifying ourselves to particular ppl...must act in a way which no group would object to, please every1

the principle of humanity

one should always treat persons as ends and never as mere means every1 thus has dignity that has respect

Sher's 3 opinions for responding to his skepticism

only 3 ways to respond to the fact that your ideas/beliefs aren't any better than anyone else's 1) reevaluate the evidence for my moral views in an attempt to further justify them 2) give up on justifying them and resign to the claim that i can't act rationally on my moral beliefs 3) give up on justifying them but insist that I can still rationally act upon them

perfect and imperfect duties

perfect duties = --independent of the context or agent performing them --must always be done by any rational agent imperfect duties = --require interpretation for what a rational subject is supposed to do and depend on the subjective experience of humanity --you can't blame the agent for not doing the duty, but it's praiseworthy for them to do it

the practical contradiction interpretation of contradictions in conception

practical contradiction test = whether one could achieve what one wanted to achieve if the maxim is universally willed acting on a maxim that can't be universalized is unfair

Singer's Strong Principle

predicts that we're morally required to give money to aid organizations until we get to the point where if we gave more money, we'd be sacrificing something of COMPARABLE moral importance

Korsgaard's argument for why ends-in-themselves have infinite value (from Denis)

rational actions have a certain type of conditional value something needs to have unconditional value in order for rational actions to have their value USE HER ARGUMENT FOR WHY HUMANITY HAS UNCONDITIONAL VALUE: thinks that this thing with unconditional value is humanity, the capacity to set ends

Objective Consequentialism

relates to the ACTUAL probability of a particular bad outcome, is independent of the individual's knowledge or thoughts about this outcome moral evaluation = dependent on what a person would have known if they were better informed...NOT what they actually knew

The Ideal Moral Code

the ideal moral code is the one that leads to the best consequences (something that Singer agrees w/)

the success theory (from Parfit)

the only desires that're relevant in the desire-satisfaction theory are the ones about ur own life DOES NOT include stranger on a train example

*Distinct features of Scheffler's cases are?

the perpetrator's induce to destroy stable social structure through fear by killing an arbitrary group (none of the above on clicker MC question)

preference hedonism

there's not one feature that all pleasures/pains have in common what's good for you are things that you experience as wanted, what's bad for you are things that u experience as unwanted

Parfait's Hybrid Theory of Welfare

thinks good life is achieved both by doing things from an objectively good list AND by taking pleasure in doing the stuff u wanna do

means, mere means, ends

to treat someone as a MEAN = to use them in order to further ur own interests/ends to treat someone as a MERE MEAN = to treat them as a means in a way that's inconsistent w/ respecting their dignity [it denies their humanity if u use them merely as a means to ur own ends and not theirs whatsoever] to treat someone as an END = to act in a way that respectss their dignity as a rational agent

the partiality problem for consequentialism

utilitarianism seems to suggest that sometimes we're morally required to set aside interests of our nearest and dearest in order to promote the interests of complete strangers

hedonism

view that what's good for a person's life is pleasure/happiness and what's bad for them are pain/unhappiness

Thomson's Arguments that Uses which cases

violinist (rape) human spores (consensual sex) henry fonds (right to life vs. right to things that sustain life)

the virtuous act vs. an act expressing virtue

virtuous act = one that hits the target of that virtue (has virtuous consequences) --CAN BE DONE W/OOUT EXPRESSING VIRTUE (aka helping your neighbor only to gain their trust in order to take advantage of them later) act expressing virtue = an act from the agent's virtuous character or motive; stable character traits, but fails to hit the target (doesn't have virtuous consequences)

SL's response to the purported counterexamples to actual consequentialism

we need to separate distinctions between praise/blameworthy (Expected consequences) and right/wrong (actual consequences)

the FLO theory of wrongful killing

what makes killing ppl wrong? the thing that makes it wrong is that we're depriving them of a "Future Like Ours" any killing that deprives a FLO = morally objectionable

actual consequentialism

what matters in morality is the actual consequences

expected consequentialism

what matters is the consequences that u expected

subjective consequentialism

you ought 2 deliberate in a consequentialist way u have to b fully oriented towards maximizing the good ------ relates 2 the individual and what they intended/foresaw they could b wrong about the consequences of their actions but we would still applaud them for their intentions if they thought it would have good consequences