Phil 3 Final
(16) Present a maxim that, according to Kant, gives rise to a contradiction in conception. Explain why, according to Kant, the maxim gives rise to this contradiction.
*"A maxim suffers from a contradiction in conception if it's conceptually impossible to accomplish its goal with these means once it becomes a universal law"* > contradiction in general arises when you can't coherently will that maxim becomes a universal law at the same time you will your maxim (in this case bc self-defeating; undermine your own will to achieve your goal if means becomes universal ) > Example: making a lying promise - in order to have some extra money, make a lying promise > if everyone did this and you knew it, you could no longer achieve your goal with these means (people would know that no one who borrowed their $ would pay them back to they wouldn't loan $ at all) >> contradiction: it's conceptually impossible to accomplish goal of saving money since the means of making a lying promise to pay it back would no longer work if everyone adopted them
12) At one point in the Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro consider the hypothesis that an action is pious if and only if it is beloved by all the gods. Socrates then argues that this could be true for two very different reasons. What are these two reasons?
*2 reasons are that the action could be pious because it is beloved by the gods or an action is beloved by the gods because it is pious: this asks the question of whether the gods dictate or detect morality (make rules qualifying what is moral vs. identify what is moral after action occurs)* > dif btw the "if and only if" condition meaning action is moral if and only if it is god-beloved (gods = detectors or something being moral) vs. "if and only if because" condition meaning action is moral "if and only if because" it is god-beloved (gods = make it the case that something is moral) > *Euthyphro Contrast* : dif btw one being of nature to be loved bc it is loved vs. being loved bc it is of a nature to be loved
(11) What, according to Longino, is a bias? Why, according to Longino, is the ideal of inquiry as freedom from bias flawed? (You need not go so far into the argument as to discuss the relevance of inference to the best explanation.) *
*According to Longino, a bias is a proposition accepted by a subject that is idiosyncratic to the subject (not shared by all rational agents) who accepts the proposition not due to evidentiary support and then uses to interpret evidence* & *ideal of inquiry (Descartes - we should investigate world free from bias) as freedom from bias flawed bc objectivity impossible* > Ideal of inquiry as freedom from bias (aka Descartes idea of being objective) is flawed bc bias is unavoidable; Longino disagrees with Descartes/Russell over the structure of evidence bc she is anti-foundationalist (says we have to support all of our beliefs with evidence, there are no background assumptions that do not themselves require justifications) > Implications: no universal common ground (bc no basis of foundational beliefs on which to resolve disagreement) and no objectivity > all of our beliefs are based on background beliefs (bc whenever talking about anything, employing vast range of beliefs about how the world is that are how conceptual framework we're applying presupposes how the world is ) and if we tried to rid ourselves of these/of value judgements in doing science, wouldn't be able to get off the ground bc too many options out there from beginning (couldn't get idea of what data is let alone what it supports)
28) According to Banaji et al., an automatic preference for members of one group over members of another isn't the same as a prejudice. Briefly explain why Banaji et al. hold this position.
*Banaji holds that prejudice and automatic preference are not the same bc one produces overt hostile behavior and the other does not* > prejudice defined as overtly racially hostile actions (ex: using racial slurs, violence) > automatic preference defined as hidden racial bias (automatic means not available to introspection or under control of the agent while preference means difference in valence); can lead to differential behavior (ie in interracial interviews) but UNCONSCIOUSLY (auto. preference = unconscious; prejudice = conscious) > Banaji maintains this difference bc thinks IAT only shows auto preference not prejudice, can be connection btw higher auto preference and prejudice level but not necessarily (different inputs, interactions, and outputs); Banaji could be appealing to white readership here by saying IAT only measures auto preference
(17) Present a maxim that, according to Kant, gives rise to a contradiction in the will. Explain why, according to Kant, the maxim gives rise to this contradiction
*Contradiction in the Will: "A maxim suffers from a contradiction in the will if no rational agent can will to live in a world in which the maxim is a universal law"* > in this case, universalizing the maxim results in something contrary to the principal you're implicitly relying upon when you're willing the maxim (have to will that whatever means are necessary for you to fulfill your end remain available to you when maxim is universalized) >ex: maxim "I won't help anybody in need in order to save time and energy." > this maxim presents a contradiction in the will bc you're implicitly relying upon the possibility of help when you do anything, including trying to bring about this maxim as a universal law, which runs counter to the result of the maxim being a world in which no one helps anybody else (you never know when you're going to need help with anything so it's a contradiction to will that nobody helps)
(20) Please present hooks' diagnosis of ethically problematic cultural appropriation that turns on commodification.
*Cultural appropriation is ethically problematic when it does not lead to political solidarity and action towards greater social justice* > commodification problematic bc can stymie meaningful political action (commodification robs cultural symbols of their meaning) >> can deceptively promise cultural reward/recognition to minorities but really, often leads to greater marginalization bc deprives them of ability to use cultural symbols as effective political tools to express solidarity > disconnects symbol from political context, cultural output orients itself around white culture, cultural output reproduces problematic patterns (ex: rap - now super mainstream, produced for white America too, perpetuated stereotypes/trends of misogyny, etc) > cultural appropriation ethically unproblematic if and only if leads to political solidarity and action toward greater social justice aka express genuine solidarity and regard for self-determination for relevant group whose symbol you're using (do more than recognize cultural origins of symbol; allow members of culture to have a relationship w it beyond your terms)
(3) How does Descartes use the method of doubt as part of the process of finding a universal common ground?
*Descartes uses the method of doubt as part of finding a universal common ground by using doubt to model a potential disagreement that appealing to a universal common ground could solve* > Disagreements over proposition happens if it's possible to doubt bc disagreement requires one person to believe something and other to not believe aka doubt it > Rational certainty: what's open to doubt is that about which there can be reasonable disagreement > anything that's not open to rational doubt is the basis for resolving disagreements aka part of UCG >> "To establish certainty, he tests his belief by doubt" (has one foundational belief, can build . up belief system) > Descartes is critical of whether any of his beliefs at moment can be part of universal common ground; tries to show w evidence they can become part of it >> Does so by undermining the foundation of his beliefs which call all of his beliefs into doubt (whatever he can't throw out = UCG)
(27) Briefly explain why Functionalism about the Mind does not imply Materialism.
*FATM does not imply Materialism because FATM can be true while materialism is false* > Materialism says there is nothing over and above the material (substance materialism: all substances are material substances & property materialism: only properties are material properties) > FATM: all mental states are functional ones (functionalism doesn't say anything about what kinds of things can realize functional states aka material or non-material things) > Ex of how FATM can be true w/o materialism being true: Nearly Headless Nick ghost from Harry Potter realizes functional analyses but is not a material substance (so FATM holding does not imply materialism holding true bc in this case FATM true, materialism is false)
(18) Briefly present Glaucon's Challenge.*
*Glaucon's Challenge: give an agent who doesn't already acknowledge an interest in acting in accordance with moral laws a reason to do so anyways* > Glaucon's concern is that there is no inherent reason to not behave unjustly -- only reason to not get caught doing so (thinks rational agents prioritize certain desires and will act to satisfy those desires, regardless of whether doing so entails moral laws) > Kant - there is a reason to not behave unjustly; challenge answerable bc agents have a reason to act morally regardless of having antecedent aim of doing so since an agent acts freely ONLY if he acts morally, meaning his actions meet the test of the ULCI (a rational agent has an interest in acting freely; therefore, he has an interest in acting morally)
(26) Please explain the Interaction Problem for Cartesian Dualism about the Mind.
*Interaction Problem for Cartesian Dualism about the Mind is that it's unclear how the mind and body can interact / affect one another as distinct substances* > Cartesian Dualism: 2 different kinds of substances aka thinking, non-extended substances (mind) and non-thinking, extended substances (body) > Descartes believes mind physically affects the body but nature of how it does so is unclear which produces the INTERACTION PROBLEM (if mind is non-extended, meaning it is distinct from physical matter and cannot exert physical force, how/where does interaction take place) > contact (surface) and gravity (mass) are requisites for physical substances acting upon one another but mind lacks both (can't push or pull / question of causing or being caused by) > mystery of how mind affects body also works in reverse; how body affects mind is unclear (how can physical substance act upon mind when it's non-physical, non-extended)
40) Give an example in which a key notion needs to be disambiguated, and explain how different ways of disambiguating that notion make a difference to the dialectic in which it appears. (10 sentences)
*Key notion needs to be disambiguated where a single world or expression impacts the meaning and the meaning is open for reasonable interpretation, different interpetations make a difference to the argument you're making meaning they shape the dialectic* > When you need to disambiguate you can do 1 of 2 things: argue one interpretation is correct or argue that argument you're interested in will work, no matter how you disambiguate crucial notion > Frankfurt takes the second strategy re the principle of alternative possibilities: he doesn't offer Jones-4 as a single counter-example to "could have done otherwise" but instead, uses Jones-4 as a recipe for constructing a counterexample in response to any way of interpreting what it means to be able to do otherwise > RECIPE: 1) situation where agent deliberates, chooses to perform an action, and follows through on it 2) Backup in background to ensure agent couldn't have done otherwise even if decided to do otherwise (regardless of how this is interpreted) 3) Presence of backup doesn't make agent unfree, since agent acted on her deliberation (Jones-4 made choice to do what Black wanted him to independent of Black's existence, so he acted freely and is morally responsible for his action despite 'not being able to do otherwise') > disambiguating the key notion in this way allows Frankfurt to craft dialectic that disproves claim that agent is unfree if could not have done otherwise > instead, Frankfurt could have gone other route of arguing that one interpretation of "could have done otherwise" is correct, such as complete absence of external threats or that an agent "could not have done otherwise" if had any alternative action available, even if a seemingly bad option or instead of pushing the principle that far he could have shown it not as physically impossible but just emotionally impossible for agent 'to be able to do otherwise' > following through on any one of these interpretations could shape his argument differently, leading him to come up with a single counter-example instead of using Jones 4 as a catch-call recipe that does not require him to pick an interpretation, and thus affect the dialectic
(30) Briefly present the Knowledge Argument as illustrated by the thought experiment of Mary in the black-and-white room.
*Knowledge Argument illustrated by the thought experiment of Mary in the black-and-white room shows why physicalism is incomplete* >Knowledge Argument is an argument against physicalism (all facts are physical facts) >Setup: Mary is investigating the world from a B&W room using a B&W television monitor with all physical facts known to her; it seems clear to Jackson that when she leaves the room or uses a colored TV monitor she will learn something new about the world and ppl's visual experience of it; that she learns something new despite having all physical info shows that physicalism is incomplete so there is more than physical info to know and thus, physicalism is false > Physicalism does not account for the existence of qualia, which are epiphenomenal (not causally efficacious in physical world)
(32) Briefly present Locke's objections to Cartesian Identity, repeated here: [Cartesian Identity] Person A existing at time t1 is the same person as person B existing at time t2 iff A and B have the same Cartesian soul. Be sure to offer one objection against the sufficiency of the criterion and one against its necessity. (4-5 sentences)
*Locke objects to Cartesian Identity because he believes that having the same consciousness, not having the same soul, is the condition for being the same person* > 1) argues against NECESSITY: counter-example to show that the same person can exist over time but with a different soul so same soul is not necessary for same person (persons can survive the loss of their souls) > 2) argues against SUFFICIENCY: counter-example shows that the same soul can exist without existing in the person so having the same soul is insufficient for being the same person (two people can be distinct even if they have the same soul) >> *reincarnation* (Nestor & Thersites): if God refurbishes George Washington's soul and gives it to Bernard, none of GW's experiences or life are still in that soul because it was refurbished
(37) Briefly present and explain Nagel's example (in the paper Death) of the severely brain damaged person, and explain what that example is supposed to show.
*Nagel uses example of severely brain damaged person to show that person can be harmed even when he does not exist so death can be a harm post-existence* > brain damage case questions the premise of existence as necessary for a person to be harmed (answering in context of whether death is harm for person who died/ceases to exist) > Nagel wants to set up a counter-example of when an agent no longer exists but the agent is clearly harmed > counter-ex: adult receives severe brain injury reducing him to mental condition of infant whose desires are always satisfied by a custodian; seen as misfortune not only for adult's family & friends but for adult himself > adult is subject of misfortune not contented infant - question of whether adult exists anymore (Nagel says intelligent adult has disappeared > this can be a harm for the adult even though he does not exist)
(35) Please explain Schechtman concept of a person-space.
*Schectman's concept of a person-space is the social/cultural infrastructure in which one must be included to be a person* > social and cultural infrastructure within which persons interact and which supports personhood*** > being a person requires being accorded a place in person-space > to give someone a person-space is to endorse certain ways of interacting with them that wouldn't be how you would interact with something not a person (ex: treat person as reasonable, subject to the law, expected to fulfill cultural norms like going to school until at least a certain age, asking someone's name upon meeting him, etc.) > note: person-space is matter of convention so can vary as people's social/cultural norms vary bc set defining features of personhood (these contrast w expectations for pets) > person-space is self-sustaining bc enables entrance into personhood but also requires persons to establish it in the first-place (ppl develop attributes by being in person-space but first need certain forensic capacities to create/maintain the person-space bc shaped by persons w place in it) -- relationship btw persons & person-space is mutually reinforcing
(19) Briefly explain the way in which Taylor's position on moral deliberation embodies a rejection of the existence of universal moral laws.
*Taylor's position on moral deliberation embodies rejection of existence of universal moral laws because authenticity is individual* > imperative to be authentic is guide to help us deliberate/orient us to the right kinds of considerations but doesn't establish bright lines/dictate how people make those considerations (imperative to be authentic is guide to help > when ppl make their own moral deliberations, make different choices unique to them, and become the people for whom those are the right choices and others wrong
23) Briefly present Wolf's argument for her sane deep self view over Frankfurt's Freedom?
*Wolf argues for her Sane Deep Self View over Frankfurt Freedom because she believes Frankfurt Freedom is a necessary but insufficient condition for free action, since agents for whom the facts of deliberation are not under their voluntary control may still be seen as free and morally responsible by Frankfurt's definition* > Frankfurt Freedom entails that an agent is free iff agent wants to perform the action and wants to want to perform the action aka first and second-order desires fit together > Wolf adds the necessary condition of sanity, defined as the ability to tell objective right from wrong > Wolf's added criterion solves the problem of dictatorial JoJo who is free by Frankfurt Freedom but not by Wolf's Sane Deep Self view since he cannot tell right from wrong > Difference between plain Deep Self View and Sane Deep Self View is the difference between self-revision and self-correction, with self-correction being the appropriate measure of moral responsibility (when people can correct their view of world in light of more deeply held beliefs) > Sane Deep Self View entails that an agent can evaluate his actions sensibly and accurately (requires sanity), and that the agent can transform himself in so far as his evaluations tell him to do so (requires control over superficial self by deep self)
41) Please explain why, according to Parfit, there is an increased scope for principles of fairness to apply if what he calls the Complex View of personal identity is true.
*according to Parfit, if Complex View of personal identity is true, increased scope for principles of fairness to apply because have to apply such principles not only across persons but also to stages within single persons* > Complex View of personal identity: sameness of self is based on facts about psychological continuity (not further facts) that obtain in degrees > this means that difference between persons is a less important fact than difference between stages of persons (Parfit thinks that the relevant kinds of connections are both bodily and psychological) > Parfit says that what matters to moral principles concerned with relations among stages is not whether stages are part of same person but how closely related stages are > analogy of stages of person being like members of family bc related to different degrees; degree of relation determines moral obligation > 2 ideas: 1) if the CV is true, selves are like members of a family in that they can be more or less closely connected 2) If CV is true, principles like fairness are determined by how connected those stages are : as stages within persons can be less connected, broader scope for principles of fairness to apply According to Parfit, there is an increased scope for principles of fairness to apply if what he calls the Complex View of personal identity is true because one has to apply such principles not only across persons but also to stages within persons. The Complex View of personal identity holds that the sameness of persons is based on facts about their psychological continuity, not on any further facts, which obtain in degrees. On this view, the distinction between persons is not as important a fact as the distinction between person-stages, since Parfit thinks the relevant kinds of connections are both bodily and psychological. Parfit compares stages of a person to members of a family in order to show that these stages can relate and connect to one another to varying degrees. Just as one's moral obligation to one's family members is affected by how related they are, the same goes for one's moral obligation to person-stages. What matters for determining the application of principles of fairness is not whether such stages are part of the same person but how closely connected the stages are. Thus, if the Complex View of personal identity is true, then stages of a person are connected to differing degrees and the application of principles of fairness is determined by how closely connected these stages are, then there is an increased scope to apply such principles because there are more stages than there are merely persons to which one has to be fair. For instance, one cannot simply be fair to Bernard and Zach. If Bernard and Zach's present selves are importantly different from Bernard and Zach's current selves, then one must apply the principle of fairness to both present Bernard and present Zach and future Bernard and future Zach, instead of just to Bernard and Zach. Hence, the scope for applying principles of fairness is increased.
(29) Briefly present and explain the argument against functionalism that turns on the conceivability of zombies.
*argument against functionalism that turns on conceivability of zombies uses the potential for philosophical zombies to illustrate how functional terms cannot capture everything essential to conscious experience or to the mind* > philosophical zombies are physically/functionally identical to people but lack conscious experience > if philosophical zombies exist, mind can't be described in purely functional terms & FATM false (can't account for phenomenal experience of consciousness) >> it's conceivable that there are zombies & if a situation is conceivable then it's possible > it's possible that there are zombies & if zombies are possible then something can realize the functional analysis of pain without being in pain > the functional analysis of pain does not capture everything that's essential to pain > this shows that just stating all the physical or functional properties leaves something further to be explained; fails to capture the essence of what it is to be a thinking thing and creates an explanatory gap*
(21) Briefly present the argument The Clash.
*argument in the Clash is the tension between freedom and determinism* (idea of them being incompatible) >Freedom: At least sometimes, some agents act freely. Determinism: The universe is a deterministic system. > Can show how a belief in determinism leads to a denial of freedom/free will: universe is a deterministic system > no agent could ever perform an action besides the one she actually performs & an agent performs an action freely only if she could have performed another action besides the one she actually performed ("could have done otherwise") > no agent ever acts freely > Stakes of the Clash are moral responsibility: No agent ever acts freely & an agent is morally responsible for an action only if she performs that action freely > no agent is ever morally responsible for any action she performs
(15) Briefly state the central problem for deontological ethical theories, and illustrate it with an example.
*central problem for deontological ethical theories is what one should to do be moral/what is it right to do* > deontology: an action is morally permissible iff it conforms to ethical rules > deontologists approach action being right by starting with the question of what the rules are for moral action as opposed to what the consequences of the action/the outcomes are > ex: forced organ harvesting might be acceptable to a utilitarian who only cares about the consequences - ie if it saves more people than it harms, producing max net happiness - whereas it could be wrong for a deontologist who says that people have fundamental rights and respecting those rights is a moral rule
(22) Briefly present the counter-example Frankfurt offers to the principle we've called Could have done Otherwise that turns on Jones4 and Black.
*counter-example Frankfurt offers that turns on Jones4 and Black works by showing a situation in which an agent who could not have done otherwise nonetheless acts freely, as shown by us holding him morally responsible for his actions* > could have done otherwise: an agent performs an action freely only if she could have performed another action than the one she actually performed > Jones 4 could not have done otherwise but still acts freely (morally responsible) > setup: Black will ensure that Jones 4 will do what he wants regardless of Jones 4's decision but Jones 4 chooses to do what Black wants him to do independently and does it, so he is equally morally responsible for his action as if Black had not been there (made a free choice) > example shows how could have done otherwise can be sufficient for making an agent do an action but not for why they do the action, which determines moral responsibility (shouldn't absolve ppl in cases where they couldn't have done otherwise but still act freely) > Frankfurt freedom: an agent acts freely iff the agent wants to perform the action and wants to want to perform the action (first and second order desires align)
(36) Consider the position we called Experientialism. Offer one possible counterexample to this claim. [Experientialism] Being in a state can be good or bad for a person only if being in that state causes the person to have good or bad sensations.
*counter-example to experientialism is betrayal bc that is still a harm for an agent even though the agent is not in a bad state as a result* > experimentalism is a theory of benefit and harm > simple theory of harm: an event e harms an agent if and only if the event is bad for the agent > this could be wrong if an event can be bad for an agent without being a harm or if an agent can suffer a harm from an event without the event being bad for him > counter-example: betrayal - If Person A says only nice things about Person B to B's face but terrible things about Person B behind B's back and B never finds this out, then B still suffers a harm without ever being in a bad state or experiencing bad sensations > experientialism is thus false (act of discovery or non-discovery does not define the harm; the act of betrayal itself is the harm)
(8) Briefly explain the difference between being a situated knower and occupying an epistemic standpoint as Wylie articulates these notions. Please give an example of each. (7-8 sentences)
*difference between being a situated knower and occupying a standpoint is that being a situated knower just means that your knowledge is shaped/limited by your social situation while occupying a standpoint requires having a theory about how knowledge works aka a critical consciousness about how your social situation shapes/limits your knowledge* >being a situated knower: being in a situation/social location that systematically shapes/limits what you know (all situated knowers to different degrees, subject matter-dependent) >> ex: Carmita Wood who knows shes in bad situation when sexualized by boss BUT can't interpret situation as being objectively wrong, lacks consciousness > to gain a standpoint requires developing theory about how knowledge works/consciousness of how your situation plays into what's easy/hard for you to know aka nature of your social location and difference it makes epistemically (not automatic product of being situated knower) >> ex: Blanche from on the Lam realizes she's privy to info that makes her a threat to her employers; uses info to try to reclaim power in political situation depriving her of power/recognize role in larger racial power structure/survive .
(31) What is an epiphenomenon? Please illustrate the notion using the human heart.
*epiphenomena are phenomena that occur alongside systems in which they do not operate; human heart illustrates how an epiphenomenon occurs* > Epiphenomenon: a phenomenon X is an epiphenomenon of system S if and only if X is not part of the way S operates but sits alongside its operation > qualia are epiphenomenal: mental properties not causally efficacious in physical world > ex of human heart: to understand the circulatory system, need to account for the fact that the heart pumps blood: as it happens, heart also beats but heart beating is irrelevant to understanding the circulatory system - it just 'comes along for the ride (just happens to be there) ; therefore, heartbeat is epiphenomenal
*(10) Please explain why, according to Mills, memory is an important concept to take into account in doing social epistemology.
*memory is important to take into account in doing social epistemology bc it's a key component of our epistemic location; it shapes our conceptions* > Mills thinks that conceptions are basis of cognitive process of understanding the world (cognitive functions intertwined: conceptions shape belief and perceptions, are shaped by testimony and memory) > memory is relevant in so far as it shapes our conceptions > memory is naturally selective; filtration of memory is not just individual but social practice bc heavily influenced by our personal identity > filtration of memory can lead to perverted conceptions of the world: whitewashing (ie romanticizing slavery) can lead white Americans to see themselves without differential white privilege and need to compensate for it (white ignorance)
(24) Please explain and illustrate the notions of circumstantial and resultant moral luck.
*notions of circumstantial and resultant moral luck are based on luck of circumstances we encounter providing opportunities for moral or immoral action vs. luck in the way our actions/projects turn out* > moral luck occurs when facts relevant to agent's moral standing are not under agent's voluntary control (differential moral luck leads to differential moral standing of agents) > 1) circumstantial luck: luck in the circumstances we happen to encounter which provide opportunities for excellence and disagree (ex: someone have the opportunity/character to become a heroine or bystander vs. killer or collaborator in Nazi Germany) > 2) resultant luck - luck in the way our projects/actions turn out (ex: negligent driver who happens to hit and kill a pedestrian vs. negligent driver who happens not to)
(13) Briefly present the objection Mill considers according to which utilitarianism is "a doctrine worthy of swine," and present Mill's response
*objection to util: having pleasure be the end of life is degrading/animalistic (tells humans to indulge in base/animal pleasures)* *response: util recognizes different degrees of pleasure* > human pleasures are different from animal ones bc humans have higher faculties; thus, cannot consider human happiness without considering satisfaction of these faculties > consistent with util to recognize different degrees of pleasure (quality not just quantity) > util says to maximize the net of higher-order pleasures before maximizing low-order ones *Epicureans considered mental/emotional pleasures not just bodily/sensational ones
(33) Briefly present and explain the problem that Fission cases pose for the psychological continuity theory of personal identity. [Continuity Identity] Person A at time t1 is the same person as person B at time t2 if and only if A and B are psychologically continuous.
*problem Fission cases pose for psych continuity theory of personal identity is how two people can be psychologically continuous with the same person at once* > Fission cases problematic bc undermine continuity identity in more ordinary cases (being psych. continuous with multiple past/future ppl at once) > ex: Monday Jones is psych continuous with Wed Jones who fissions into Uppy and Downy so Wed Jones is psych continuous with Uppy and Wed Jones is psych continuous with Downy, but Uppy and Downy cannot be psych continuous (contradiction: ex if Uppy hungry while Downy not hungry, can't be same person) > problem of non-transitivity: Person A fissions into A1 and A2 so A=A1 and A=A2 but then A1 not = A2 > problem: have to say one person with two bodies or not both psych cont (neither is psych continuous with A so A dies or only one is but that seems strange)
(34) Briefly present and explain the problem that turns on the distinction between genuine and delusional memories for the view that according to the psychological continuity theory, it's possible to survive the death of one's body. (10-12 sentences) [Continuity Identity] Person A at time t1 is the same person as person B at time t2 if and only if A and B are psychologically continuous
*problem is whether someone can actually survive the loss of their body since doing so requires having genuine memories of being the person in that body which requires causual connections that may be lost when the body is lost* > memory has 2 components: 1) sense-data/impressions 2) causal connections > delusional memory has #1 but NOT #2 whereas genuine memory has both 1 & 2 (distinction btw delusional and genuine memories is in memories having the right causal connections meaning they were formed in the right way) > example involving 2 agents: Jacques has delusional memories of being Napoleon aka he has impressions of being Napoleon but these are not genuine memories bc they are not causally right way (Nap formed his memories by taking the right actions in the right way) > applying to psych cont: need person B to have genuine not delusional memories of being person A in order to be same person as person A, aka need causal connection in memories of present/future state >> Reincarnation - no way to properly identify if genuine bc all causal connections we have in mind have to do with bodily connections and that doesn't exist in reincarnation case / how to distinguish btw genuine/delusional memories w/o bodily connection is the challenge so unsure if reincarnated person is really reincarnated or just person w delusional memories (God makes a denizen of heaven with your memories up in heaven; if genuine that it is you but if its not then it isn't so memories being genuine or delusional determines whether you survived the loss of your body ; cases like body-switching are ambiguous bc hard to tell if memories delusional or real)
(14) How does Mill respond to the objection to utilitarianism that a person who saves another from drowning just in order to garner acclaim is acting wrongly?
*responds to objection by saying that motive doesn't matter; all that matters is satisfaction of utilitarian end of max net happiness, which makes action morally right* > system of ethics doesn't require that people act from feeling of duty; motive has nothing to do with morality of action (only with morality of agent) > person who saves another from drowning does what is morally right regardless of his motivation
(9) What is structural racism? Illustrate the concept with an example.
*structural racism is institutional; it is the "unjust practices that originated in explicit racism and continue to exist because of the organization of social space, even if no one currently has racist attitudes* > result of overt/explicit racism aka causal explanation of creation/persistence of injustice > ex: mass incarceration
(6) Consider the following claim: If a subject has sufficient evidence for a true belief for that belief to count as knowledge according to Descartes' Rational Certainty, then that subject has sufficient evidence for that belief to count as knowledge according to Russell's High Probability. Is this claim true or false? Briefly justify your answer.
> *YES, the claim is true: if a subject has sufficient evidence for a true belief for that belief to count as knowledge according to Descartes' Rational Certainty, it does have sufficient evidence for the belief to count as knowledge according to Russell's High Probability because Descartes has a lower threshold for what is open to rational doubt, meaning he has a higher threshold for certainty* The claim is true because if a subject has sufficient evidence for a true belief for the belief to count as knowledge according to Descartes' Rational Certainty, then that subject has sufficient evidence for that belief to count as knowledge according to Russell's High Probability. Descartes' Rational Certainty holds that a belief counts of knowledge if it certain, meaning it is not open to any possibility of rational doubt. Russell's High Probability has a lower threshold for what qualifies as knowledge, since Russell believes a proposition is open to rational doubt only if there is a serious possibility, rather than any possibility, that the thinker is mistaken (coheres with instinctive beliefs - requires us to eliminate as few instinctive beliefs as possible). Thus, Russell relaxes the demand on knowledge since, in addition to belief and truth, he does not require certainty but only high probability for a proposition to count as knowledge. Any proposition that meets Descartes's standard for knowledge will therefore meet Russell's standard for knowledge, although meeting Russell's standard for knowledge is insufficient for meeting Descartes's. For example, Descartes is rationally certain that he is a thinking thing; therefore, it also highly probable that he is a thinking thing. > Ex: Descartes is certain he is a thinking thing which would qualify for Russell since if it is not open to any possibility of rational doubt, it is not open to a serious possibility of rational doubt
(2) Briefly describe the impasse between Galileo and the Church in the debate over the structure of the solar system, and how Descartes tries to resolve it.
> *impasse between Galileo and the church is over the truth of heliocentrism as structure of the solar system; really reflects debate over nature of evidence* > Descartes thinks physical observation should be the basis for evidence; church thinks it should be scripture >Galileo thinks Bible is true but shouldn't be taken as source of evidence bc not meant to be taken literally (ppl should use sense-experience); physical observation not at odds with Bible if true >*Descartes tries to resolve dispute by appealing to universal common ground* (once you find one certain belief, you can build up an edifice of belief - ie being a thinking thing) >UCG = set of propositions that should be accepted by any rational agent and therefore form shared basis to resolve any reasonable disagreements >if Galileo/Church appealed to UCG could come to agreement w/o Galileo risking begging the question
(1) Briefly present the argument Socrates gives that turns on how to get to Larissa.
> *right opinion or true belief is not less useful than knowledge in guiding right action* > Ex: a person who thinks the truth as is good a guide as the person who knows the truth > value problem (was pop belief that knowledge was more valuable) someone who has the right opinion about how to get to Larisa, despite never having been or actually knowing the way, is an equally good guide > Someone can be a good guide to right action without being knowledgeable
(5) Briefly present Descartes' argument for external world skepticism that turns on the dreaming hypothesis.
> External world skepticism bc everything could be a dream > Dreams can feel as real as waking reality; since can't internally distinguish dreaming from waking experience, possible that everything he perceives to be part of external world is really just part of his imagination > Possibility that he's dreaming leads to conclusion that belief is open to reasonable doubt > Dreaming hypothesis - "our experiences are part of an extended dream caused by unknown forces" Vs the "common sense" hypothesis that "our experiences are caused by a world that is basically the way we ordinarily think it is" or external world hypothesis > Mere possibility that the dreaming hypothesis is true provides room for doubt about the existence of the external world (external world is not rationally certain so can't accept)
(4) What is Foundationalism in epistemology? Please explain the role that this theory plays in Descartes' skeptical argument in the First Meditation. (7-8 sentences)
> Foundationalism: all chains of justificatory dependence end in a small, finite number of basic beliefs that don't themselves depend on other beliefs for their justifications > To say foundationalism is true is to say that justification for ALL of my beliefs trace back to foundational beliefs (relation to epist is that once one had foundational belief, can build up edifice of belief from there) > Chains of justificatory dependence are finite/reach an endpoint > Foundationalism allows Descartes to complete his project as articulated in the First Meditation > uses the metaphor of undermining the foundations of a building leading to the collapse of anything built on those foundations if he can undermine the foundations of his belief system aka show that foundational beliefs are open to doubt, he thereby shows that all of his beliefs are open to doubt (beliefs based on testimony of his senses about what world around him is like) > in First Meditation Descartes argues that everything is open to doubt > *relation to epistemology is that once he solidifies one belief, he can build up an edifice of belief*
(38) Briefly present one example of an argument that begs the question. Explain why the argument is subject to this complaint.
> begging the question is a form of circular argument: occurs when an argument offers a reason to accept a conclusion that only someone who already accepts that conclusion would accept > ex: we can say that smoking causes cancer because cigarette smoke is carcinogenic (subject to complaint bc the argument that smoke is carcinogenic is a reason for smoking causing cancer would be accepted only by someone who already accepts the conclusion that smoking causes cancer > someone who does not already accept the conclusion would see this reason as a form of circular logic not acceptable w/o further justification)
(39) Briefly present a proposed solution to a problem that (plausibly) only labels the problem. Explain why the solution is subject to this complaint.
> labeling the problem is a means of objecting to a proposed solution to a philosophical problem; when philosophers label the problem, they introduce a concept or notion to solve the problem that does not represent any advance in our understanding > ex: libertarians & agent causation >> libertarians do not believe in casual determinism and posit agent causation as a solution to the problem of how to disprove determinism >> agent causation says that somehow, agents are free to cause actions without being caused to do so, implying indeterminism >> however, libertarians do not offer a theory of why agent causation is true, nor do they offer a theory of what agent causation is >> one could argue against agent causation by saying that the concept of causation is rooted in the material world, where physical events cause one another in deterministic ways, and outside of the context, it's not clear what causation would be >> thus, without a clear theory of what agent causation is or why it is true, libertarians only label the problem when posing agent causation as disproving determinism because they are offering a solution that does not, in fact, advance our understanding how how determinism could be false
Philosopher / Topic
EPISTEMOLOGY Meno - value of knowledge (Socrates -how to get to Larissa) Galileo/Descartes Med 1 - argument about nature of evidence; universal common ground/rational certainty Russell - sense-data high probability/IBE Wiley - standpoint epistemology (feminist) Mills - White Ignorance (importance of memory) Fricker - epistemic/hermeneutical injustice Longino - bias; freedom from bias impossible bc no objectivity; anti-foundationalist ETHICS Euthyhro, Republic, Midgley - Euthyphro contrast Mill - utilitarianism; consequentialism Kant - deontology; universal law categorical imperative (2 contradictions) Taylor - cultural appropriation; no universal moral laws Hooks - cultural appropriation; needs to advance political action/social justice; idea of Otherness FREE WILL Van Inwagen - compatabilism/incompatabilism free will/determinism Frankfurt - Frankfurt freedom (idea of second-order desires; want & want to want) Wolf - Sane Deep Self; criterion of sanity (ability to discern right from wrong) Walker - Moral luck (circumstantial, resultant) Strawson - objective, participant, impersonal reactive attitudes MIND Descartes - Turing/Lewis - Banaji - IAT; automatic preference vs. prejudice Chalmers - philosophical zombies; anti-FATM Jackson - epiphenomenal qualia; anti-FATM; Knowledge Arg (Mary) IDENTITY Descartes - Cartesian Identity; same person if same soul Locke - consciousness characterizes same personhood Williams - body-switching; memory/psych continuity identity Parfit - complex vs. simple view (increased scope for fairness) Schectman - personhood defined by being accorded person-space DEATH Epicurus - experientialism; death not a harm bc not in a state when we're dead Nagel - death can be a harm even w/o people existing
(7) Briefly present one example of an argument that makes use of inference to the best explanation. Explain what makes the argument of this type.
For Russell, serious possibility = fairly high probability which is determined by Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 1) identify the known facts that need to be explained 2) identify the competing explanations and 3) ask which explanation is simpler > use criteria defining best explanation x4 (simplicity, explanatory depth, unifying phenomena, stable patterns) > Example: question of why Bernard's milk went missing last night >> Using IBE we would say that it's more likely that Bernard's daughter used the milk to bake rather than that the pixies stole the milk (argument is of this type bc it appeals to aforementioned criteria aka pattern of daughter using milk vs not ever seeing pixies, could be baked goods in the fridge that weren't there last night, etc) >> Reason to take the hypothesis about the daughter seriously bc high probability that it happened whereas very low probability that the pixies stole the milk so we shouldn't see it as a serious possibility > proposition is open to doubt
(25) Please explain what makes something • a participant reactive attitude • an impersonal reactive attitude • an objective attitude Please also illustrate each with an example.
Objective attitude = treat a person as an object, absolve them of moral responsibility; adjust your behavior toward them or try to manipulate their behavior (ex: don't feel resentment toward an addict who uses the money you loan him for drugs; adjust actions for future aka just don't give him $ for drugs) Participant Reactive attitude = an attitude you adopt when you are a participant in the interaction; first or second personal bc take it toward you or person you're in interaction with (ex: if someone harms you, you feel resentment toward them and they may feel guilt about harming you in return) Impersonal Reactive attitude = attitude you take when you judge other people's actions but are not a direct participant in the interaction; third personal (ex: *indignation* see A harm B, feel INDIGNANT about it because don't want to live in world where these interactions are okay; indignant bc not personally harmed but member of moral community)