Political Psychology Final

Reducing intergroup prejudice & conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda

A field experiment is carried out in the "real world" rather than in a laboratory The experimenter assigns different "units" in the real world to different "treatments" and measures real-world effects Green & Gerber 2000: randomly assigned households to different Get Out The Vote tactics (door-to-door, mail, telephone, nothing) and measured effect of these tactics on turnout Wantchekon 2003: randomly assigned villages to different political party campaign strategies ("public goods" vs "clientelistic (aka handouts) - with the cooperation of the parties!) and measured the effect of these tactics on party vote share For obvious reasons, Rwandans face a monumental crisis of trust in their communities, as survivors, returned refugees, and accused killers all live side-by-side Radio is the most important form of mass media in Rwanda The Paluck experiment measured the effect of radio programs on Rwandan citizens' personal beliefs and social behaviors Can well-designed radio programs lessen intergroup tensions and aid in reconstructing society? The experiment attempts to address this question Musekeweya (moo-say-kay-way-ah), or "New Dawn," is an entertainment-education soap opera designed to address the mistrust, lack of communication and interaction, and trauma left by the genocide Fictional story of two "communities" (proxies for Hutu and Tutsi; not referred to as ethnic groups because of "divisionism" laws) Tensions arise from a land shortage, unfair treatment by the government Woven into the story are messages about the root causes of vilence Demonstrates importance of critical thinking, open dissent (as opposed to repressing feelings or blindly following leaders), active bystanders (as opposed to "bystander effects"), and intergroup communications Also includes (through story) advice for dealing with trauma A sample of communities were randomly assigned to one of two treatments: Exposure to the "New Dawn" soap opera over the course of about a year Exposure to a "control" soap opera aiming to change beliefs, norms, and behaviors about reproductive health and AIDS Exposure to soap operas was through Rwandan research assistants who visited each community once a month to play four 20-minute episodes over a portable stereo People in communities listened to the programs in groups, as is typical in Rwanda; research assistants could therefore be sure that "subjects" had actually listened to the programs (usually a big problem in "real-world" media studies) The experiment compared community members' individual interview responses and focus group behaviors across treatment groups No difference between "New Dawn" group and control group in terms of "personal beliefs" about The origins of mass violence Bystanders' responsibilities to intervene when others are promoting violence or intergroup conflict Whether people who suffer from trauma are "mad" However, people in the "New Dawn" group were More likely to reject norms that people must marry only in-group More likely to deny that "it is naïve to trust people" More likely to disagree with "If I disagree with something that someone is doing or saying, I should keep quiet" More likely to agree that people should talk about traumatic experiences More likely to express empathy for people in different roles (prisoners, survivors, poor people) in individual interviews In addition, the experimenter cleverly observed the dynamics of how the group "deliberated" when faced with a controversy: how to manage a stereo and cassettes given to the community Groups in the "control" communities tended to propose putting the village authority in charge; such proposals were accepted without discussion Groups in the "New Dawn" communities tended to have debates about what to do, with multiple people making suggestions: elect a caretaker for the stereo, leave it under communal control Higher likelihood of expressing dissent Less willingness to defer unthinkingly to authorities

Motive Theory

Motives are those aspects of personality concerned with goals and goal-directed actions Motives "energize, direct, and select behavior"

Breakup of Yugoslavia: Nationalism Case Study Background

Yugoslavia (1918-2003) was a multi-national state that has since broken into seven pieces, corresponding to the different national groups (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo) Most of these peoples had had their own independent state at some point in history (esp. in the Middle Ages), but were eventually bundled together via the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and so on Yugoslavia was founded as a single South Slavic state in 1918, in the aftermath of WWI, in part for security reasons Political boundaries did not match geographic distribution of different ethnicities Slovenia (1991 census): 88% ethnic Slovene, 3% ethnic Croat, 2.5% ethnic Serb Croatia (1991 census): 78% ethnic Croat, 12% ethnic Serb Bosnia (1991 census): 44% ethnic Bosniak, 31% ethnic Serb, 17% ethnic Croat Serbia excluding Kosovo (1991 census): 80% ethnic Serb, 4.5% ethnic Hungarian, scattered small groups Kosovo (2000 estimate): roughly 87% ethnic Albanian, 7% ethnic Serb, scattered small groups Slovenes and Croats tend to be Roman Catholic; Serbs to be Eastern Orthodox; Bosniaks to be Muslim Yugoslavia fell apart during WWII, with the different nationalities ending up on different sides of the conflict: Croatia's fascist military forces (Ustashe) allied with the Nazis and perpetrated mass violence against Serbs Serbian royalists formed a military force (Chetniks) who fought against the Nazis & Ustashe The "partisans" under Tito were a Communist-affiliated military force who fought (against all of the above) to preserve the Yugoslav federation In the aftermath of WWII, Tito became head of state and Yugoslavia was a Communist dictatorship into the 1980s Tito attempted to run Yugoslavia in a way that minimized tensions among the nationalities (he himself was half-Croatian, half-Slovenian) Rhetorical Strategy: a campaign of "brotherhood and unity", stressing common Yugoslav national identity but recognizing Serbian/Croatian/etc. ethnic identities Attempt to lead population to adopt "Yugoslavia" as the entity to which they would give primary loyalty Tried to use Communist ideology as component of this identity Institutional Strategy Yugoslavia was relatively decentralized, divided into six "republics" (the current post-Yugoslav nations minus Kosovo) that imperfectly traced the populations of the different nationalities Tito took care not to favor any one nationality and not allow the largest (Serbs) to dominate Nationalism was a crime punishable by long prison terms Tito was extremely effective and popular, but died in 1980 Tito's death left a void in the role of national unifier Was replaced by a rotating federal presidency - a different republic got to choose the president each year Made it virtually impossible for a unifying figure to emerge Meant that politicians had to appeal only within their own republic to gain power Fueled the rise of nationalism among the separate nationalities

Rwandan Genocide Case Study Background

Between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people killed in the space of about 3 months (from a population of less than 10 million) Rwanda has two major ethnic groups Hutu (85% pre-genocide) Tutsi (14% pre-genocide) Small Twa ("pygmy") population (1%) In pre-colonial times, Hutus and Tutsis lived in relative harmony: same language, same religion, economic interdependence Non-rigid caste system, by which Tutsis were usually herders and Hutus were usually farmers Tutsi came to mean "rich" (someone with many cows); Hutu came to mean "servant" (someone with fewer than 10 cows) Under certain circumstances, a Hutu could become a Tutsi Tutsi (mixed with a few Hutus) became the economic & political elite German colony, then Belgian after WWI Belgians chose to administer power through the Tutsi (partly because of who the pre-existing elite was, partly because Tutsis are stereotyped as having closer-to-"European" appearance: lighter skin, more aquiline features, taller) Belgians strongly favored Tutsis in jobs and education, issued identity cards with individual ethnicities immutably recorded Hutus came to view Tutsis as an elitist class and an arm of the colonial state Ethnicity became politicized in a way it had not been before Rwanda won independence in 1959; Hutus overthrew the colonizers and many Tutsis went into exile in neighboring countries (esp. Uganda) Many Tutsis lived in refugee camps for decades Relations between Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda were generally bad-tempered, with intermittent violence, but not catastrophic By the late 1980s, exiled Tutsis pressed for return to Rwanda & permanent resettlement The Hutu government under long-time Pres. Juvenal Habyarimana said that Rwanda was already overpopulated & couldn't take the refugees back Amid stalled negotiations, Tutsis in Uganda formed the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) under Paul Kagame and began incursions into Rwanda in 1990 with an eye towards overthrowing the regime (or forcing concessions) Habyarimana (who came to power in 1973) had been losing popularity anyway Rwanda was desperately poor; 95% of land under cultivation, genuinely overpopulated; hunger was rampant; average woman had 9 children; one of the poorest countries in the world Habyarimana developed a strategy of playing on ethnic loyalties, emphasizing the Tutsi threat, and dividing Hutus who supported him from Tutsis and "collaborationist" Hutus ("moderate Hutus") As part of this, anti-Tutsi sentiment and anti-Tutsi behavior was encouraged (actively or tacitly) in a variety of different ways Media (Kangura, RTLM) Formation of militias (Interahamwe)

Cognitive Complexity

Degree of attentiveness to information and detail in making decisions More distinct ideas or thoughts on a subject

The Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game

Economists & other social scientists sometimes use experimental "games" as metaphors for social interactions Studying behavior in simple experimental games can shed light on basic behavioral tendencies These insights can then be exported to the study of more complicated real-world settings Ultimatum Game: Experimental subjects are randomly paired In each pair, one subject is assigned the role of "proposer"; the other is assigned the role of "responder" In the ultimatum game: The "proposer" makes a proposal as to how to divide a fixed sum of money (say, $10) For example, the proposer might propose to keep $6 for herself, giving $4 to the responder The "responder" decides whether to "accept" or "reject" the offer If the responder "accepts", then each person gets the amount specified in the proposal If the responder "rejects", then both the proposer and responder get $0 Typical experimental setting: US university college students Proposer Most common proposals are something like $6 to proposer, $4 to responder Even split ($5 to each) proposals also fairly common Responder Responders frequently reject low offers (roughly speaking, offers of around $3 or less) Responders generally accept fair or "reasonably fair" offers (around $4 or up) What accounts for this pattern of behavior by the Responder? Inclined to reject offers that were unfair What accounts for this pattern of behavior by the Proposer? Proposers might anticipate rejections, therefore give reasonably fair amount Proposers may care about fairness themselves The Dictator Game In the dictator game: The "proposer" makes a proposal as to how to divide a fixed sum of money (say, $10) as before However, the "responder" has no ability to "accept" or "reject" the offer Each person simply gets the amount specified in the proposal If proposers' offers are about the same as they were in the ultimatum game, suggests ultimatum game offers were due to "altruism" or a desire to be nice to the responder If proposers' offers are now 0, suggests ultimatum game offers were purely due to fear of being rejected by the responder The answer: on average, proposers offer about $2 in the dictator game (roughly half as much as in the ultimatum game) Ultimatum game offers reflect some combination of "altruism" and strategic concern for being rejected The results I just described come from laboratory studies using US college students. There is variation across cultures in what fairness means, and when fairness concerns are triggered.

Intolerance/Tolerance of Ambiguity

Extent to which individuals are motivated to resolve ambiguity versus happy to tolerate it "Black and white" versus "gray scale" thinking

Labelling Something a Conspiracy Theory Experiment

Experiment 1: General and Historical Conspiracies 150 online participants rated the likelihood of a list of speculative and historical conspiracy theories. Measure of speculative theories from the "Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale" (GCB) (items that do not refer to specific incidents, e.g., "The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism upon its own soil, disguising its involvement.") Respondents randomly assigned to one of these: Idea treatment: referred to these conspiracy theories as "ideas." Conspiracy theory treatment: referred to these conspiracy theories as "conspiracy theories." Experiment 2: Fictitious Conspiracy 802 online participants read a mock news article about a fictitious political scandal in Canada, asked to endorse (or not) the credibility of the accusations. Respondents randomly assigned to one of these: Corruption treatment: headline was "Corruption Allegations Emerge in Wake of Canadian Election Result" Conspiracy treatment: headline was "Conspiracy Theories Emerge in Wake of Canadian Election Result" Also measured subjects' GCB responses, after the fact Labels often have a meaningful effect on how information is processed But not here: Labeling something a "conspiracy theory" had no significant effect in either experiment. Experiment 2: the "conspiracy theory" label had no effect, regardless of respondents' GCB responses (i.e., no effect whether or not people are more or less conspiratorially inclined) Researchers had expected an effect, with the idea that the "conspiracy theory" label might be stigmatizing and cause people to disassociate themselves from an idea. Why do you think a "conspiracy theory" label nonetheless had no effect on respondents? Does this result seem in conflict with the apparent success of fake news "inoculation" strategies? Why or why not? *The label may be in opposition to the apparently plausibility of the conspiracy theory itself, thus canceling *This is sort of like an inoculation, but much weaker, not explaining motives behind the conspiracy theory, etc. *Conspiracy theories are interesting, and labeling them as conspiracy theories is less interesting *Maybe beliefs in conspiracy theories are strong where they exist, distancing effects of negative label may just be too weak

Factors of culture in Political Psychology

History / historical events Climate / resources Geography (mountains vs sea, location near trading routes or not) Conditions of scarcity / plenty Habitual modes of economic exchange Long-run effects of political institutions Exposure to trade Demographic mix of peoples And many others "Culture of Honor" Lab experiment Southern and non-southern US subjects Treatment: Just outside the lab, a confederate bumps into the subject and says: "a**hole" Control: no confederate, no bumping, no "**hole" All subjects then complete a lexical task: fill in words with blanks, e.g. -UN Treatment group: southerners more likely to fill in blanks to form words evoking violence (e.g., GUN, instead of FUN) Control group: no difference between southerners and northerners Insulted southerners also had higher levels of cortisol (stress/arousal), testosterone Field experiment Employers across the US were sent letters from job applicants who had allegedly killed someone in an honor-related conflict. Southern and western companies were more likely than their northern counterparts to respond in an understanding and cooperative way. Culture Affects Perception Using eye-tracking software, compare what people from different parts of the world "look at" when they are studying a photograph or movie People from western countries tend to focus more on individuals; people from eastern countries tend to spread their attention more evenly between people in the foreground and background scene elements

Media and Dehumanization: Depictions of Jews in Nazi Germany

Hitler considered Streicher's 'primitive methods' to be effective in influencing the man on the street. He told a senior Nazi politician in the mid 1930s that: "Anti-Semitism ... was beyond question the most important weapon in his propagandist arsenal, and almost everywhere it was of deadly efficiency. That was why he had allowed Streicher, for example, a free hand. The man's stuff, too, was amusing, and very cleverly done. Wherever, he wondered, did Streicher get his constant supply of new material? He, Hitler, was simply on thorns to see each new issue of the Stürmer. It was the one periodical that he always read with pleasure, from the first page to the last". Streicher was sentenced to death by the Nuremberg tribunal and hanged on 16 October 1946 Anti-Semitic imagery of the kinds we have just seen are again being deployed in political arguments, especially (but not only) on the internet. Consider recent images of Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist George Soros (who is Jewish).

Accountability

If judgments about elected officials' performance are merely automatic partisan reflexes, it is no longer possible to reward politicians for doing well or punish them for doing badly.

Hutu Ten Commandments (Rwandan Genocide)

Hutu Ten Commandments: Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, whoever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman befriends a Tutsi woman employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine. 2. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 3. Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason. 4. Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor: makes a partnership with Tutsi in business invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise lends or borrows money from a Tutsi gives favours to Tutsi in business (obtaining import licenses, bank loans, construction sites, public markets, etc.). 5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted only to Hutu. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu. 7. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October 1990 war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi. 8. The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi. 9. The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Hutu brothers. They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy. 10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for having read, spread, and taught this ideology is a traitor. In the context of our discussions in class, these "commandments" and the related propaganda can be thought of as: Defining behavioral prescriptions for (Hutu) group membership Systematically dehumanizing the Tutsi (calling them inyenzi, or cockroaches)

"Situational Factors" and Liberalism/Conservatism Experiment

Imagine an experimental condition (Jost, Fitzsimons, Kay 2004) that (1) primes people with images evoking death and then (2) asks about opinions on issues (taxation, same-sex marriage, stem cell research) Relative to a control group, individuals primed with images evoking death reported more conservative positions across a wide range of issues Presidential approval ratings increased each time the US terror alert level was raised between 2001 & 2004 (Willer 2004) Subliminal 9/11 and death images led college students to show increased support for Bush & decreased support for Kerry (Landau et al 2004, Cohen et al 2005)

Extremism and social identities

In Social Identity Theory, there is importance to belonging to groups & seeing those groups positively in comparison to others One theory about much extremist violence is that when this is not possible, people look for some out-group to blame Intergroup conflict over resources is always a fact of life, but under conditions of severe socioeconomic/political depression, the environment is often conducive to the identification of one group as a scapegoat that is blamed for all of society's ills Negative stereotypes of the scapegoat are propagated, and the poor treatment of the scapegoat group undergoes social justification (is rationalized as proper) This process may proceed all the way to dehumanization of the scapegoat, wherein members of that group are described as less-than-human Under certain circumstances, social identity pressures can lead "ordinary" people towards "extremist" behavior Individuals have social identity needs that can be served by scapegoating/dehumanizing out-group members Group membership typically involves conformity pressures that can help intensify and consolidate negative feelings about out-group members As individuals form more extreme attitudes or participate in extreme behaviors, "escalation of commitment" problems make it harder to withdraw from group membership For example, committing acts of violence can intensify one's commitment to a group, because it would be impossible to justify those acts of violence outside the context of the group's ideology

Interahamwe (Rwandan Genocide)

Literally, "those who work together" or "those who fight together" A Hutu paramilitary organization set up & tacitly encouraged by the government; allowed to attack Tutsis in the population without repercussions Began openly "rehearsing" for genocide, carrying out drills and such Mostly poorly armed - machetes were the most common weapon held by militia members

Social Contact and Political Polarization

Literature on social contact and political polarization has mixed results Uses different kind of social contact and communication, different kinds of issues, different kinds of measures (policy views, partisanship, etc.) Some persuasive work suggests face-to-face discussion of policy issues in a mixed partisan discussion group can moderate participants' views... ...while discussion in a homogeneous partisan group can tend to intensify them (e.g. Klar 2014, American Journal of Political Science) Our discussion of homophily suggested that political discussion groups may be becoming increasingly homogeneous, potentially reinforcing polarization

Personality

Many different definitions. A reasonable one: One's acquired, relatively enduring, yet dynamic, unique, system of predispositions to psychological and social behavior Personalities tend to be very stable Personalities influence behavior and predispositions on an ongoing, constant basis Personality affects behavior and the thought process non-consciously

Causes of Nationalism: Social Identity Theory

Members of a group tend to accentuate positive attributes and seek positive comparisons with out-group members When the comparison is unsatisfactory, individuals can (sometimes) Switch to a new group ("social mobility") Engage in "social creativity" strategies Engage in "social competition" For nationalists, switching to a new group is out: attachment to the national group is intense Social creativity & social competition are both feasible, but social competition is especially prominent & strength of nationalistic sentiment leads individuals to reach this point more quickly Stronger nationalists are more likely to believe themselves "better" than out-group members, and so are more likely to believe that social competition will have a positive outcome Stronger nationalists are more likely to be sensitive to things such as insults or frustrations, and are therefore more likely to need to seek out new grounds for positive comparisons Social competition is not always a bad thing, but it can go badly wrong Desire for social competition can spur positive achievements - innovation, new discoveries, etc. However, the pride of in-group attachments can make it difficult to look critically at one's own country's behavior As a result, when things go wrong, there is a propensity to assume that someone else is responsible (since own failures are not recognized) The search for the "someone else" can lead to scapegoating More generally, many of the group dynamics we observed previously are relevant to the study of nationalism: Group loyalty, obedience, conformity.... How exactly nationalists respond to other countries (or nations) depends upon the image of other countries (or nationalities within a single multinational country). Your book describes a number of case studies of nationalism: read them.

Why are extremists extreme?

Most scholars: extremism is not some kind of mental illness Case studies indicate that individuals committing "extremist" acts are generally not "insane" Is there an "extremist personality"? Basically, not really Studies of torturers, bombers, terrorists, and other extremists suggest there is no clear "personality profile" for extremism Of course, there are some features typical in extremists People who commit extremist actions are typically lacking in empathy for others and tend to dehumanize their victims Tend to have more of an "external locus of control" (believe the external environment determines what happens to them) than an "internal locus of control" (believe they have considerable control over their own fate)

Breakup of Yugoslavia: Nationalism Case Study Nationalism in Other Republics

Nationalist passions were on the rise in the other republics as well, aided by fear of what was happening in Serbia Croatians and others shared a "barbarian image" of Serbia (superior in capability, inferior in culture, aggressive in intentions) Milosevic: "If we have to, we'll fight. I hope they won't be so crazy as to fight against us. Because if we don't know how to work and do business, at least we know how to fight."

The "Big Three" Motivators

Need for Power Need for Affiliation Intimacy (concern for close relations with others) Need for Achievement

Rwandan Genocide

Not just the militia: many hundreds of thousands of people, ranging from ordinary citizens to mayors, members of the clergy, .... (from the textbook): The main agents of genocide were the ordinary peasants themselves....Even in the cases where people did not move spontaneously but were forced to take part in the killings, they were helped along into violence by the mental and emotional lubricant of ideology. We can see it for example in the testimony of the 74 year-old "killer" captured by the RPF: "I regret what I did...I am ashamed, but what would you have done if you had been in my place? Either you took part in the massacre or else you were massacred yourself. So I took my weapons and I defended the members of my tribe against the Tutsi." The rallying cry to the killers during the genocide was: "Do your work." Hundreds of thousands of Hutus worked as killers in regular shifts over a period of weeks. In the massacre at Nyarubuye Church, Tutsis asked the mayor how they might be spared. He suggested they sanctuary at the church. They did, and a few days later, the mayor came at the head of a pack of policemen and villagers. All were killed, often purposely slowly. About 75% of the Tutsis in Rwanda were killed within a month; killing continued for three months. The genocide ended partly because there were so few Tutsis left; partly because the RPF took the country in July. The RPF leader Paul Kagame is president today. With the return of Tutsi refugees from Uganda, and some Hutus remaining in exile in eastern Congo, the Hutu/Tutsi mix in the current population is ironically close to what it was pre-genocide It is now a serious crime in Rwanda ("divisionism") to draw any ethnic distinctions whatsoever in speech Some analysts claim that Rwanda was especially fertile ground for genocide because of a "culture of obedience."

Social Learning Theory

SLT focuses on the role of political socialization in maintenance of prejudice/stereotypes Children learn & are rewarded for discriminatory behavior by prejudiced parents Prejudice can be sustained by in-group norms Attitudes are a result of both socialization and experience; socialization of prejudice matters more for individuals with limited or negative contact with members of minority groups

Fake News

People may rely more on the judgments of co-partisans, or others deemed "close" to them, even when "experts" are available whose judgments would be more reliable. Potentially misinforms electorates, increases political polarization. What, if anything, can / should be done about it? Improved filtering by social media organizations (e.g., recent efforts to "downweight" fake news) Labeling of fake news via fact-checking organizations, etc Improving education about logic and the acquisition of knowledge Imposing consequences on social media providers or campaigns for falsehoods

Affective Polarization

Separate from policy polarization, our society is experiencing affective polarization. Intensification of partisan in-group vs out-group dynamics

Correctives to Political Polarization

Regulation of social media, to limit "fake news" and promote fact-based discourse. Promotion of superordinate national identity (and acceptance of political differences as consistent with a healthy democracy) Promotion of norms of civility, election of politicians who will be civil Productive use of future opportunities for national unity (crises etc) Fight back against foreign provocation in elections Institutional change Primary system: open ("jungle") or non-partisan primaries Ranked-choice voting (makes it easier for third-party or unestablished candidates) Campaign finance laws Move to more referendum-based governance, where citizens vote on issues directly Reduce gerrymandering (panels of judges drawing legislative lines)

Multinational state

Several groups of people, who think of themselves as separate nations and who actually have the capacity to establish viable independent states, live together in a single country Primary identity group is the nationality they belong to rather than the population of the country as a whole

Cognitive Roots in Extreme Suspicion

Social context (surrounded by believers or not?) Degree of evidence for or exposure to the conspiracy theory Degree of knowledge of the topic, amount of knowledge Education level Social identity & the group that the conspiracy theory is relevant to (e.g. out-group attitudes) Economic deprivation Individual motivation to find information about it Emotional state, especially anxiety Emotional stability Age, Developmental State Pre-existing beliefs

Contexts for Extremism

Terrorist Organizations Ideological splinter groups Race-based splinter groups Paramilitary organizations Organizations of state terror (e.g. torture & "disappearances" in Latin America) Acts of genocide

April 6, 1994 (Rwandan Genocide)

The Habyarimana government had been compelled to negotiate with the RPF due to successful RPF advances Progress was being made on a power-sharing agreement Habyarimana's helicopter was shot out of the sky upon his return from a negotiating session on April 6, 1994 To this day, unclear who was responsible However, a well-organized program of genocide broke out almost instantly after the assassination RTLM began broadcasting a call to "cut down the tall trees" Roadblocks were thrown up almost instantly People who were known to be Tutsi, who records showed were Tutsi, or who appeared Tutsi were killed Also killed were "moderate Hutus" who were known to have opposed anti-Tutsi propaganda (and the regime), Hutus who tried to stop the killing, and even Hutus who tried to avoid taking part in the killing Who took part in the killings?

Why do people stereotype & discriminate?

There are several different kinds of explanations; we have already seen some but not all of these: Social Identity Theory Realistic Conflict Theory Social Learning Theory Social Dominance Theory No one explanation accounts for all aspects of discrimination; putting explanations together yields more complete picture

Cognitive Roots of Extreme Suspicion Experiment

This study looks that the following hypotheses: Anxiety will make people more likely to perceive a conspiracy other research shows that insecurity causes people to believe that forces outside of their control are shaping events; the loss of control triggers a need to compensate by imagining that they have a grasp on an otherwise complex situation, allowing them to reassert control. This study looks that the following hypotheses: 2a. When the potential conspirator is the government, conspiracy perceptions should be higher the more conservative a person is. 2b. When the potential conspirator is a corporation, conspiracy perceptions should be higher the more liberal a person is. 2c. African Americans are more likely to see a conspiracy when it involves the government. 2a and 2b are meant for contexts where, e.g., the "government" is meant in a more general sense than e.g. George Bush - e.g., not for partisan conspiracies 2c: "because race has been associated with distrust of the government (but not of corporations) [in other studies] This study looks that the following hypotheses: 3. Perceptions of a conspiracy are more likely when victims are multiple and anonymous than when a victim is named. Studies of altruism have found that information that personifies the victim(s) makes a greater emotional impact by eliciting sympathy than when the victim(s) are not personally identified. A recognizable victim - and only one - provokes greater charitable donations than when viewers are presented with a tragedy that affects unidentified hundreds. Sympathy for the victim has in turn been linked with a desire to identify and punish the perpetrator....[but] we expect that while a named victim might generate greater sympathy, a larger number of fatalities should heighten conspiracy perceptions based on a rule of thumb that events of greater magnitude require more ambitious explanations. Experimental Scenario Subjects in the study read a fictional 'conspiracy vignette' that excludes reference to actual actors and events, but retains realism by conforming to a common template for conspiracy theories. Presented as a news article within an internet-based survey, the vignette describes a mysterious illness that afflicts a small Midwestern town, causing fatalities. A biochemical plant in the town is identified as a potential source of the illness, but its spokesman denies responsibility, suggesting the possibility of a cover-up. This scenario contains all the elements of a conspiracy as defined above: a secretive plot (production of some lethal chemical; a coverup) carried out by a small number of actors (operators of the plant; see below) for personal gain (whatever was being produced at the plant; to evade responsibility for the fatalities) and at the expense of the common good (the local victims). A number of details are deliberately left vague, such as what the plant is producing and why, and whether the release of chemicals is deliberate or accidental. This is precisely the point: where people want to see a conspiracy, they fill in the blanks to fit their explanation of the motives Measures: whether the company did something wrong; whether there is a cover-up; whether there is a connection between the company/government and the victims Experimental Treatments ...designed to test the hypotheses described above. For instance: Anxiety Treatment: uses the Macroeconomic Anxiety Prime, in which subjects are asked to read a statement about the negative consequences of the US financial crisis and presented with a text box in which to describe how the downturn has affected them personally. Government vs Corporate Treatments: who operates the biochemical plant Different treatments affecting the identifiability and number of victims. Results Anxiety indeed increased belief in a conspiracy. The corporate hypothesis was right for liberals, but there was no difference between liberals and conservatives on government conspiracies, and no difference between blacks and whites. Multiple and unidentified victims indeed led to higher belief in a conspiracy.

Genocide

UN definition: Acts committed with the intent to destroy in part or in whole a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. Historically, tends to result from an intense feeling of frustration and threat, usually operating in the context of difficult social economic and political circumstances

Socioeconomic Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants Experiment

"Conjoint" experiment - varies a number of different dimensions, across many different treatments. "Conjoint" experiments are meant to be richer in detail, and to some extent, more realistic. Also allows for better inferences, in this case, about the specific effects of different immigrant characteristics. Better able to extract the effect of being "Mexican" per se, controlling for other factors that might be stereotypically associated with Mexicans, but which are explicitly delineated here. Preference for immigrants who are: More educated Speak better English Are not from conflict countries Have higher-skilled jobs Have more job experience Have prearranged job or interviews Have been to the US before, but not illegally What explains respondent attitudes toward immigration? Economic self-interest theories would suggest that individuals would be less favorable to those immigrants who would compete with them in the job market. Sociotropic theories would suggest that individuals would be more favorable to immigrants who would be perceived as favorable for the country as a whole, regardless of the respondent's class/occupation. The authors break down the results on the previous slide by respondent's educational attainment: Preferences about whom to admit as an immigrant are broadly similar between lower- and higher-education Americans. What if we instead break things down by respondent's political party? What patterns might you expect to see? Here, there are some differences (predictably) in which nationalities are more preferred as immigrants. Also, people who score highly on ethnocentrism don't seem to care much about the occupation of the immigrant. Most of the other results are quite similar though. Further analyses show that a number of other things don't matter much: Demographics of ZIP code where respondent lives (few or many immigrants) White vs non-Hispanic minority respondents Support for "sociotropic" and "norm-based" explanations of support for immigrants, rather than theories of economic self-interest

Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far Right Experiment

"Natural experiment" in Upper Austria (an Austrian state) in 2015. Large number of refugees had to be housed (mostly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) Communities were selected to take refugees, based in large part on the presence of available "group accommodations" (e.g., underused dormitories, homes for the elderly, etc.) These "group accommodations" were built before the refugee crisis, and their presence in a community is uncorrelated with attitudes about immigration. 42% of all Upper Austrian communities accommodated refugees by the September 2015 state elections (housed refugees equaled about 1.4% of local population) "Natural experiment": analyze as though refugees were randomly assigned to towns (because the presence of available accommodations is unrelated to attitudes toward immigrants) Researchers looked at support for the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), a prominent "far-right" party (in 2018, junior partner in Austrian governing coalition, third largest party) 2015 state elections, data on refugees and FPÖ vote share at the community level In Upper Austria as a whole, FPÖ vote share increased from around 15% to 30%, capitalizing on the refugee crisis But the increase was dampened (4.4% less) in communities that hosted refugees. Consistent with "contact hypothesis" about intergroup contact being (in many circumstances) good for intergroup relations and attitudes.

Affective Polarization Experiment

"We define affective polarization as the tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and copartisans positively." Iyengar and Westwood (American Journal of Political Science, 2015) measure affective polarization in a number of different ways. Iyengar and Westwood pose a hiring scenario, in which respondents are shown the (hypothetical) resumes of two recent graduates who are applying for a job. The job candidates' partisanships, as signaled by relevant campus activities, are randomly assigned. For comparison, the job candidates' races, as signaled by the use of names that are racially stereotypical, are also randomly assigned. Important to note: these are hypothetical hiring decisions, with respondents who are not (for the most part, presumably) experienced in making hiring decisions. Economists have performed "audit studies" that send out fictitious resumes to real job searches, varying only the race of the job candidate (again, proxied by name): for identical qualifications, white candidates typically get substantially more interview offers than black candidates Similar studies have sometimes found parallel results in other spheres, e.g. some representatives' responsiveness to constituent requests for assistance or services Another measure: the "Dictator Game" An individual is given an amount of money (here, $10), to split between themself and another person Used as a common measure of altruism or fairness, and how these vary depending on the situation and the characteristics of the counterpart A completely "selfish" individual would give their counterpart $0; a completely "fair" individual would give their counterpart $5 Here, given basic information about a counterpart, of which partisanship was one factor among a number Similar measure: the "Trust Game" An individual ("sender") is given an amount of money (here, $10), to split between themself and another person The amount sent to the other person ("recipient") is then tripled The "recipient" can then choose to "send back" whatever amount they wish to the "sender" Used as a common measure of social trust, and how these vary depending on the situation and the characteristics of the counterpart If the sender doesn't trust the recipient at all, should just keep the $10 If the sender trusts the recipient completely, should send all $10, which is then tripled to $30; both can profit handsomely if the recipient returns a "fair" amount ($15, or another amount >$10, might be considered "fair") Here, given basic information about a counterpart, of which partisanship was one factor among a number

RTLM (Rwandan Genocide)

(free radio/television of the thousand hills; Rwanda known as the "Land of a Thousand Hills") Much of the population illiterate, so radio propaganda was a crucial part of the regime's plans Constant sensationalized stories about the threat posed by the Tutsi RTLM repeatedly stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks and called upon Hutu to prepare to 'defend' themselves against the Tutsi Constant warnings about how RPF combatants dressed in civilian clothes were mingling among displaced people fleeing combat zones. These broadcasts gave the impression that all Tutsi were necessarily supporters of the RPF force fighting against the government.

"Nation without a state"

A group of people who are physically dispersed across multiple states, in none of which they are the dominant group

Analogical Reasoning

An analogy can serve as a decision-making heuristic The Vietnam analogy 1960s/1970s US war in Vietnam Invoked to suggest that any US military intervention will result in an open-ended, damaging commitment to a losing cause The Munich analogy Munich agreement (1938) in which western powers gave Hitler permission to annex the Sudetenland (part of Czechoslovakia) in exchange for an agreement by Germany not to expand further Invoked to suggest that attempts to appease an aggressor to keep the peace will lead to further aggression and, ultimately, war on worse terms The Guns of August analogy The story of how European powers who did not really want war fell step by step into WWI Invoked to suggest that taking steps escalating a crisis can easily lead to events spiraling out of control

Extremists

An extremist is a person who is excessive and inappropriately enthusiastic and/or inappropriately concerned with significant life purposes, implying a focused and highly personalized interpretation of the world. Politically, it is behavior that is strongly controlled by ideology, where the influence of ideology is such that it excludes or attenuates other social, political, or personal forces that might be expected to control and influence behavior." That is, extremists are concerned only with the logic of their own behavior and their ideological construction of the world - tending to disregard the lives of others or alternative ways of looking at things. Extremists "believe what they prefer to be true", making their worldviews very resistant to change (to a greater-than-usual extent)

Cognitive-Motivational Analysis of Political Ideology

An interpretation of what we have seen: "Ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual's needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated."

Social identity theory and discrimination

As we have seen, social identities can form even around arbitrary groups in the absence of competition (minimal group paradigm) SIT: People have basic tendency to engage in social categorization Once categories are formed, people strive for a positive sense of social identity This motivation causes perceptual biases and discriminatory patterns of behavior However, this framework does not explain in much detail why prejudices are very strong in some cases but weaker in others, or why some individuals are more prejudiced than others.

Other Research on Empathy for target groups

Batson et al (JPSP 1997) Inducing empathy for members of a stigmatized group (AIDS patients, homeless, murderers) can improve attitudes toward the group as a whole. Sternadori (Contemp Read Law Soc Justice 2017) News stories that evoke empathy toward minorities (African Americans, Native Americans) weakly attenuate implicit bias in before-and-after IAT measures.

Social Dominance Theory

Claim: human societies tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies "Dominant" group (or groups) possesses disproportionate share of positive social value (material & symbolic things for which people strive) Aspects of individual personality may be key to understanding prejudicial attitudes and behavior. Some people may have an inherent desire for social relations to be either more hierarchical or more equal Some people may have a stronger inherent desire for their in-group to dominate out-groups

Core Community non-nation-state

Countries with a dominant ethnic or sectarian community who believe that they are the primary nation embodied in the country, identify with that nation in the strongest terms, and generally control the government Other communities, which give primary loyalty to their own ethnic groups, are also present within the territorial state. Such groups may desire independence, but would not have the capacity to establish a viable state In many cases, the "core community" advocates the integration and assimilation of the other groups, encouraging the minorities to speak the dominant group's language, abandon their customs, etc.

Breakup of Yugoslavia: Nationalism Case Study Spread of War

Croatia and Serbia fought initially, in large part over Croatian territory where Croatian Serbs lived Spread to Bosnia in 1992 Initially Bosnian Croats and "Bosniaks" (Bosnian Muslims) against Serbs and Bosnian Serbs Eventually Croatian nationalists turned on Bosnia as well, hoping to incorporate Croatian-populated parts of Bosnia into Croatia For a brief period, a three-way war Fierce sieges of Sarajevo, Srebrenica by Serb forces; some massacres and explicit attempts at "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnian Serb forces against Bosniaks; CIA report: 90% of atrocities by Serbs (but not 100%) Peace eventually brought about by Dayton Agreement after NATO begins air strikes against Bosnian Serb military positions Today Bosnia is an awkward patchwork of a Bosnian-Croat Federation and "Republika Srpska," a Bosnian Serb region Montenegro declares independence peacefully, 2006 Kosovo declares independence, 2008.

Effect of Narrative News Format on Empathy for Stigmatized Groups Experiment

Does the way in which news stories are written affect reader interest and attitudes? Study compares narrative vs non-narrative descriptions of health-care-related dilemmas for three different groups (immigrants, prisoners, and the elderly). Each subject reads one article about one of these three groups, randomly assigned to either the narrative or non-narrative version. Result 1: News stories about stigmatized groups were more effective at inducing transportation when the story was presented in a narrative as opposed to non- narrative format. Transportation: "an integrative melding of attention, imagery, and feelings, focused on story events." Basically, getting involved in / swept away in a story. Measured using a narrative transportation survey scale. Result 2: News stories about members of stigmatized groups were more effective at inducing compassion toward the stigmatized group when the story was presented in a narrative as opposed to non-narrative format. Result 3: The intensity of compassionate feelings for members of stigmatized groups showed a positive association with attitudes toward the stigmatized group. Attitudes measured using survey measures of importance of helping stigmatized group, etc. Result 4: Attitude toward stigmatized groups was positively associated with intentions to perform behaviors that are beneficial to the group. Result 5: Attitude toward stigmatized groups was positively associated with increased interest in more information about the stigmatized group. Behavioral intentions were measured with survey questions about willingness to donate money, sign a petition, discuss the stigmatized group's situation with friends and family. Interest in further information was measured via rates of clicking a link to further information that was provided.

Image theory

Emotional and cognitive categories into which out-groups are organized (generally countries, in the context of Int'l Relations) Images are a form of stereotype, encapsulating a view of a country's capabilities, culture, intentions, threat level, and decision-making process Responses to images can be both emotional and strategic in nature

Morality and Conspiracy Theorizing Experiment

Experiment 1: 189 British undergraduates... Completed a scale for Machiavellianism (MACH-IV), rating agreement with items such as "never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so" For a series of historical conspiracy theories (e.g., "The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist action but a governmental conspiracy"), rate "the likelihood that, if they were in the position of the alleged conspirators, they would have participated in the actions" For this series of historical conspiracy theories, also rate degree of belief in each conspiracy theory. Respondents higher on Machiavellianism were more likely to have a higher personal willingness to conspire Respondents with a higher personal willingness to conspire were in turn more likely to endorse conspiracy theories The relationship between Machiavellianism and endorsement of conspiracy theories is accounted for ("fully mediated by") the intervening variable of personal willingness to conspire. Experiment 2: 60 British undergraduates... were randomly assigned either to... ...a Moral Recall treatment, in which subjects had to think of, and write about, a time when they behaved in a moral and decent manner ...or a Control group, that did not perform the Moral Recall task ...and then read the conspiracy theory statements from Experiment 1, rating their willingness to engage in each conspiracy and how much they endorse each conspiracy theory. Experiment 1 included a measure of morality (Machiavellianism); Experiment 2 instead manipulates subject morality directly. Subjects in the experimental (Moral Recall) group were less likely to be willing to participate in conspiracies, and less likely to believe in them The decrease in endorsement of conspiracy theories was due to ("fully mediated by") decreased personal willingness to conspire, when reminded of own morality.

Integrative Complexity

Extent to which legitimacy of contradictory points of view is recognized, & these points of view "integrated" (synthesized) Point-counterpoint style of thinking

Media and Mass Political Violence

Historically, international tribunals have held publishers/broadcasters responsible The ICT for Rwanda prosecuted the leaders of Kangura and the RTLM for genocide, incitement to genocide, and crimes against humanity. Several key figures received either life or very long prison sentences At the post-WW II Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals, Julius Streicher, the editor of propaganda newspaper Der Stürmer, was among the defendants (examples of anti-semitic propaganda portraying Jews as "demon money," etc.)

Science Denial Across the Political Divide

How can motivated cognition about science be measured in a comparable way across different political issues? One approach: come up with a standard way of presenting (hypothetical) data, and simply change the labels for what policy the data applies to In percentage terms: In cities that did enact CO2 standards, CO2 emissions increased in 223/(223+75) = 75% of cases In cities that did not enact CO2 standards, CO2 emissions increased in 107/(107+21) = 84% of cases So, the CO2 standards are effective in reducing emissions (given this hypothetical data). But, how might people relate to a problem of this kind heuristically? Far more cases where CO2 emissions increased in places where CO2 standards were increased, compared to places they were not [(A)>(C)] This is logically irrelevant because of the unbalanced sample sizes, but it is something that people might reach for if they are looking to fight back against the effectiveness of standards. In places where CO2 standards were increased, CO2 emissions went up more often than they went down [(A)>(B)] This is logically irrelevant because there is no comparison to a control group People who begin with one of these heuristics, but who are motivated to seek evidence for the effectiveness of standards, are likelier to look deeper and find the logically correct answer. People who are happy with the heuristic answer are likely to stop there Issue manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven different issue areas. Six were politically polarized (immigration, gun control, climate change, health-care reform, nuclear power, same-sex marriage), one was an unpolarized control "issue" (skin rash treatment). Results manipulation. The column labels were randomly assigned to be "increase" or "decrease" (so the direction of the "scientifically correct" answer was randomly varied). Political orientation. Measured on conservative-to-liberal scale. Attitude stance and strength. e.g., "do you support or oppose immigration reform making it easier for undocumented immigrants to attain citizenship in the United States," on a scale from very much oppose to very much support. "Simple Strategy Consistent": the simple heuristic [e.g., (A) > (C) or (A) > (B)] points to an answer consistent with attitudes. "Complex Strategy Consistent": the simple heuristic [e.g., (A) > (C) or (A) > (B)] points to an answer inconsistent with attitudes. Across issues, both liberals and conservatives are likelier to get the problem correct in "complex consistent" cases than in "simple consistent" cases. There aren't any significant differences between liberal and conservative response patterns.

Framing or "Problem Representation" in the Security Context

How policymakers frame or represent a given policy problem - how they perceive it, or see it as similar or dissimilar to previous events - can be critically important in determining how they will behave

Long-run Effects of Historical Events/Eras

In contemporary Africa, variations in trust within societies are partially explained by the level of penetration of the slave trade 100-500 years ago In India, cities that were ports centuries ago (but silted up) exhibit lower levels of Hindu-Muslim violence than similar cities that were never ports In Ukraine and Poland, voting behavior and many political attitudes differ discontinuously across

Inoculation Against Misinformation Experiment

Inoculation against disease: exposure to a weakened form of a virus, stimulating production of antibodies Protects inoculated individuals directly, but also uninoculated individuals indirectly ("herd immunity") "Attitudinal inoculation" follows a similar logic: A threat is introduced by forewarning people that they may be exposed to information that challenges their existing beliefs or behaviors One or more (weakened) examples of that information are presented and directly refuted ("prebunking" or "refutational pre-emption") That is, highlighting false claims, and refuting potential counterarguments Online study of public opinion Pre- and post-measures of public belief in scientific consensus about climate change Respondents assigned to a number of different treatment groups Consensus treatment: 97% of scientists agree that climate change is happening Counter-message: 31.2 thousand scientists have signed a petition that climate change is faked General Inoculation: scientific research shows that climate change is happening and 97% of scientists agree Detailed inoculation: extremely long explanation that encapsultes everything about scientific research on climate change, why there are people trying to proven it incorrect, and why those people are wrong Consensus Treatment (CT) only Counter-Message (CM) only Consensus Treatment + Counter-Message General Inoculation (In1) + Counter-Message Detailed Inoculation (In2) + Counter-Message Control

Kangura (Rwandan Genocide)

Kangura was a state-owned newspaper that launched an anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi campaign in October 1990 Became infamous for anti-Tutsi propaganda and propagating "Hutu Power" ideology Perhaps most famous for the "Hutu Ten Commandments" Constant tales of Tutsi plotting to "re-enslave" the Hutu upon their return Cover of Kangura, December 1993 Top: "Tutsi: Race of God" Next to the machete: "Which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?" Pictured: Grégoire Kayibanda, founder of a Hutu political party & first elected Hutu president

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just. Because of legitimacy, people feel that they ought to defer to decisions and rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward. Being legitimate is important to the success of authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult to exert influence over others based solely upon the possession and use of power. When governing power is effective, citizens "relate to the powerful as moral agents as well as self-interested actors; they are cooperative and obedient on grounds of legitimacy as well as reasons of prudence and advantage." Central to the idea of legitimacy is the belief that some decision made or rule created by these authorities is valid in the sense that it is entitled to be obeyed by virtue of who made the decision or how it was made. A legitimating ideology is a set of justifications or "legitimizing myths" (Major1994, Sidanius & Pratto 1999) The social theorist Weber distinguished several distinct sources of legitimacy: Legitimacy based upon deference to customs and values (traditional authority) Legitimacy based upon devotion to the actions or character of an authority (charismatic authority) Legitimacy linked to the process of rule creation and interpretation (rational bureaucratic authority) Weber's work makes clear that the legitimation of authority and institutions through "the rule of law," while widespread in modern societies, is only one of many ways in which social arrangements might potentially be justified. The legitimacy of institutions can be immensely valuable for society - think about the difference between a society where election results are accepted without a second thought, versus one where any election result might potentially be contested with violence

Inoculation Against Misinformation in the real world

Might not work practically speaking on people with strong prior beliefs Doesn't this just mean that people who wish to spread fake news can "inoculate against the truth"? ...or couldn't people who wish to spread fake news counter-inoculate against the inoculations? Would the inoculation actually reach, in the real world, people who would be helped by the inoculation? In real world, how do we know that the inoculator will be trusted? In the real world, people encounter a jumble of lots of information over and over again....a less simple, clinical environment than what is studied here, and the effect of the inoculation is measured right away. Inoculation will take place in a competitive political environment, not administered by a "neutral" respected source

Causes of Political Polarization

More media outlets, which offer fringier opinions, which people like because of confirmation bias Internet - people can express, and gain access to, ideas that would have been absent or forbidden before; communities can cohere around these ideas Globalization Social Media - people want to stand out, need to be more outspoken to do so in a heavily-networked era (e.g., emotionally-laden political tweets are retweeted much more often) Media companies have profit motive to amplify polarization to win market share Rise of Income Inequality (not unrelated to globalization and internet) Politicians' behavior may have become more polarizing and eroding of norms of civility/unity Reduced social stigma (interpersonally among citizens) to expressing extreme views (Overton window has expanded) Conformity pressures among partisan elites -> more polarized policy offerings During Cold War, external enemy -> increases national cohesion; post-1991, no universally recognized state-level geographic foe Demographic changes, unease among some whites about losing majority status Internet allows for anonymity, freedom from social constraints -> less civil, more extreme opinions Sorting of party elites -> clearer, polarizing signals to the masses Celebrity culture (different sorts of role models, who are less constrained) Seeping of politics into every aspect of national life Few political issues remain non-partisan Money in politics funding interest groups with an incentive to push wedge issues Shift to primaries -> party elites lost control of nominating processes Gerrymandering has become more aggressive -> helps fuel elite polarization because most representatives are more afraid of primaries than general elections Economic decline -> lead to search for scapegoats 24/7 News Cycle -> lots of time for loudmouths Decay of Local news organizations -> gap filled by national cable TV

Variation in Nationalism

Nationalists form social identities around the membership in the nation Motivated to have a strong, positive attachment to their nation Committed to the unity, independence, dignity, and well-being of the national community Love the nation itself even when they dislike their government There is substantial variation across countries in the strength of nationalistic identification. "How proud are you to be _____?" Fraction answering "very proud" (2003-4 World Values Survey): 70%-79%: USA (79%), Chile, Philippines, Ireland, India, South Africa 60%-69%: Nigeria, Turkey, Canada, Brazil 50%-59%: Slovenia, Mexico, Argentina, Iceland, Portugal, Austria 40%-49%: Romania, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Britain, Japan, Italy 30%-39%: Russia, Switzerland, France, Norway, Latvia, Sweden 20%-29%: Belgium, South Korea, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands There is also substantial variation within countries in the strength of nationalistic identification. The poor tend to be more nationalistic than the rich. Minority groups tend to be less nationalistic than majority groups.

Effects of Nationalism

Nationalists tend to be more sensitive to (perceived) threats to the nation-state, and to view the source of the threat through a more extreme image Nationalists are also more sensitive to opportunities to advance their country's influence & are more likely to support expanding state influence at the expense of others Nationalists are more concerned with their country's prestige and dignity than are non-nationalists, and are more willing to take action to rectify perceived affronts Leaders of nation-states, compared to non-nation states, are better able to make effective appeals to the citizens to make sacrifices to enhance state power The public is more willing to serve in the military and to have a more intense commitment to the defense of the state These effects can be understood in social identity terms Leaders of nation-states can use nationalistic symbols to arouse passionate feelings of devotion to the nation Flags Reference to historic events such as success in great battles The idea of the "motherland" or "fatherland" Nationalists respond readily to the use of such symbols, and are mobilized to achieve national goals Nationalists are often deeply concerned with the objective of gathering together communities existing outside the borders of the state whom they regard as a part of their national community Irridentism = the desire to join together all parts of a national community within a single territorial state Members of the community who live outside the territory of a nation-state are called the diaspora

Immigration Attitudes: Anxiety and Threat

Nationally representative experiment. Visual ethnic cue about the immigrant (picture and name): white European versus Latino. Mock New York Times report about immigration, focusing either on positive consequences (strengthening economy, increasing tax revenues, cultural enrichment) or on negative ones (driving down wages, consuming public resources, cultural division) Respondents asked opinions on immigration, belief in the extent of an "immigration problem," and self-reported levels of emotions regarding increased immigration (anxiety, pride, anger, hopefulness, excitement, etc) News about the costs of immigration (relative to the benefits) boosts white opposition far more when Latino immigrants, rather than European immigrants, are featured. These group cues appear to influence opinion and political action by triggering emotions -- in particular, anxiety -- not simply by changing beliefs about the severity of the immigration problem

Big Five Personality Types

Neuroticism High: people who worry and are nervous and insecure Low: people who are calm, secure, and unemotional Extraversion High: people who are sociable, optimistic, fun loving, and affectionate Low: people who are quiet, reserved, and aloof Agreeableness High: people who are trusting, good natured, helpful, and soft-hearted Low: people who are cynical, rude, irritable, and uncooperative Openness to Experience High: people who are curious, creative, and have many interests Low: people who are conventional and have narrow interests Conscientiousness High: people who are organized, hardworking, and reliable Low: people who are aimless, unreliable, negligent, and hedonistic Big Five (and other) personality studies are conducted using questionnaires tapping into how high or low a person is in a particular trait Scales like we saw earlier in class

Fairness Judgements Experiment

Of course, psychologists have also studied fairness judgments in more "real-world" settings In the ultimatum game, a 50-50 split is a clear "fair division" of the money In many real-world settings, what is "fair" may be more ambiguous or may involve more of a judgment call Imagine the following scenario, involving the study of how people form judgments about the "fair" outcome of a court case: Subjects are randomly assigned to the roles of "plaintiff" and "defendant" in a court case Each "plaintiff" will ultimately be paired with one "defendant" All subjects then receive an identical set of materials drawn from an actual court case (in which an injured motorcyclist plaintiff sues a car-driving defendant), including witness testimony, police reports, and so on After reading the materials, all subjects are asked to write down: What kind of award (if any) they think the judge gave to the motorcyclist in the "real" case What they think the "fair" outcome of the trial would have been Then, each "plaintiff-defendant pair" must sit down and try to negotiate a settlement to the court case Subjects were paid depending on the settlement they reached (the "better" the position for each subject in the settlement, the more money they earned) & how long it took for a settlement to be reached (subjects had to pay a "cost" that went up as deliberations lasted longer) Subjects had only 30 minutes to deliberate; if they could not reach a decision, they would have to settle for what the judge awarded in the real-world, and both would have to pay high "court fees" There were systematic differences in plaintiffs' and defendants' fairness judgments. Subjects in the role of plaintiff: Predicted that the judge gave higher awards to the motorcyclist (plaintiff) Identified the "fair" outcome as resulting in larger payments to the plaintiff These differences in judgments were related to "breakdowns" in bargaining: Plaintiff-defendant pairs whose fairness judgments diverged more, were more likely to fail to reach an agreement (thereby ultimately paying high court costs, making both worse off) Plaintiff-defendant pairs whose fairness judgments were closer tended to reach agreements relatively quickly The researchers then ran a study closely related to the first. Specifically, everything was done in the same way, except that the subjects only were told who would be the "plaintiff" and the "defendant" after reading the case materials (but before making their guesses and fairness judgments, and before bargaining) What the researchers found was that the discrepancies between plaintiff and defendant guesses and fairness judgments were much reduced (about 1/3 the size as in the original experiment) Further, only 6% of pairs failed to reach an agreement when bargaining (compared to 28% in the original experiment) Some people argue that this phenomenon helps explain the intractability of conflicts - if different sides form fairness judgments that are biased in a "self-serving" way, this makes it harder for bargains to be struck or peace agreements to be made We can observe the importance of fairness considerations for behavior in the ultimatum game By varying the context in which the ultimatum game is carried out, we can learn more about the determinants of fairness judgments As an example: Suppose that subjects are randomly paired... ...and that both subjects in a pair take a trivia quiz... ...and that whoever gets the higher score on the quiz becomes the proposer (the loser instead becoming the responder) How do you think this affects behavior by Proposers and Responders? On average, proposers offer less than in the original ultimatum game On average, responders are willing to accept lower offers than in the original ultimatum game

Political Polarization and Perceptions of Enterprise

Online participants engaged in two different kinds of trials: "Blap trials" (shape classification task) In each trial, one of 204 coloured shapes was presented on screen. Participants were required to learn through trial and error to classify shapes as 'blaps' or 'not blaps', ostensibly based on the shape's features. Unbeknownst to the participants, whether a shape was a blap or not was not rule based, but rather randomly determined before the beginning of the task, such that half the stimuli were categorized as "blaps". Because participants did not in fact have any means to learn which type of stimulus was a blap, the average performance across participants was around 50% Political trials Participants indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with one of 84 social/political cause-and-effect statements (e.g. "Lowering the minimum voting age would help get young people interested in politics" "Sources" Participants were told that on each trial, they would be able to see the response of a participant ('source') who performed the task earlier. Unbeknownst to the participants, these sources were not in fact other people but algorithms designed to respond in the following pattern. There were four different sources: (i) One source agreed with the subject on 80% of the political trials and was correct on 80% of blap trials (Similar-Accurate). (ii) One source agreed with the subject on 80% of the political trials and was correct on only 50% of blap trials (Similar-Random). (iii) One source agreed with the subject on 20% of the political trials and was correct on 80% of blap trials (Dissimilar-Accurate). (iv) One source agreed with the subject on 20% of the political trials and was correct on 50% of blap trials (Dissimilar-Random). "Choice stage" Goal: assess who the participant wanted to hear from about blaps and how they used the information they received. On each of 120 trials, participants were presented with a novel shape and asked to indicate with a button press whether they thought the shape was a blap ("yes" or "no") They subsequently rated their confidence in this decision (self-paced) on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (extremely confident). They were then presented with a (random) pair of sources and asked whose response they wanted to see Thereafter the shape was presented again and participants were asked again to indicate with a button press whether they believed the shape was a blap ("yes" or "no") Lastly, participants rated their confidence (self-paced) in their final decision. Participants prefer to receive information about "blaps" from politically like-minded sources. Political like-mindedness matters more than performance on the "blap" task: Participants' judgments are also more influenced by sources that are politically like-minded, when chosen:

Milgram Obedience Experiment

Participants were told they were involved in a "learning experiment" Each participant was told that they would be a "teacher" Each participant was told that another participant would be a "learner", but the "learner" was in fact a confederate of the experimenter (an actor) Participants were told that learners had to perform memory tasks, and that the teacher's role was to deliver electric shocks to the learner whenever he made a mistake, as a way of improving the learner's memory Each participant (teacher) sat in front of a machine with a number of dials representing increasing voltages, ranging from 15V to 450V. The highest voltages also had such labels as "Danger: Severe Shock" and "XXX" Teachers were instructed to increase the voltage by one increment every time an additional mistake was made Teachers were told that the learner was hooked up to electrodes in another room; communication was via an audio link; but the "learner" actor was not hooked up to anything As "learners" continued to make mistakes, and voltages increased, the audio feedback included (recordings of) increasingly desperate screams of pain and exhortations to stop, until the "learner" eventually went silent Whenever a participant baulked at delivering a shock, the experimenter (dressed in a white lab coat) ordered them to continue with escalating intensity: Please continue. The experiment requires that you continue. It is absolutely essential that you continue. You have no other choice, you must go on. However, participants could simply stop and walk away at any time. The experiment was stopped if a participant refused four times, or after the maximum voltage (450V) was delivered three times in succession When subjects asked who would be liable if something happened to the learner, the experimenter said that he (the experimenter) would be 63% of participants continued all the way through to the end (to the highest possible voltage) past all the screaming and begging Most everyone questioned the experiment at some point, but most continued when prodded Participants who refused to administer the final shocks did not demand that the experiment be halted and did not go to check on the health of the victim Variations of this study were carried out in a variety of different contexts The obedience rate does appear to vary a bit with features of the setting (e.g., university office vs. a sketchy backstreet office, etc.)... ...but it doesn't vary that much. A substantial fraction of subjects obeys until the end across the different settings that have been explored

Identities, Conformity and Obedience

People conform to group norms for a variety of reasons Desire to be a "good group member" for social identity reasons; discomfort in violating behavioral prescriptions Violating group norms may lead to being disliked by other members of the group At times, violating group norms can also lead to banishment or to punishment or violence from other group members People also, as we have seen, often defer to authority figures, even to the point of committing acts they would never ordinarily commit alone Obedience is enhanced When actions are authorized by authority When actions are routinized, making it possible to do mechanically and with little thought When any victims of the actions are dehumanized in advance When individuals feel compliance pressures from other group members Sometimes, and especially in periods of trouble, the most fanatical members become group leaders, issuing harsher behavioral prescriptions, and acting strongly to prevent dissension within the group

Personality dispositions and ideological preferences

Personality predispositions appear to have some relationship with ideological preferences A study of the political attitudes of monozygotic (identical) and dizygotic (fraternal) twins reared apart reveals that identical twins have more similar attitudes than fraternal twins. -> Most likely interpretation: some genetic basis underlying components of individual personality, that in turn has an effect on political attitudes/ideologies

The Fake News Game Experiment

Players are divided into groups of 2-4 people These groups are then randomly assigned one of four key characters. The characters were developed to reflect common ways in which information is presented in a misleading manner (1) the denier, who strives to make a topic look small and insignificant (2) the alarmist, who wants to make the topic look as large and problematic as possible (3) the clickbait monger, whose goal is to get as many clicks (and by extension ad revenue) as possible (4) the conspiracy theorist, who distrusts any kind of official mainstream narrative and wants their audience to follow suit The goal of each group is to produce a news article that reflects their character's unique goals and motivations. This way, each group approaches the same issue from a different angle. Thus, the fake news game familiarizes players with the techniques used by the purveyors of fake news Active inoculation induced by playing the fake news game reduced the perceived reliability of previously unseen fake news articles Through this, also reduced the persuasiveness of previously unseen fake news articles

Prognosis for Political Polarization

Positive Feedback Loop: Political Hot Cognition: polarization -> issues become more emotional -> implicit biases become stronger -> more polarization Social media may contribute to keeping people in a hot state that is conducive to positive feedback People may be exposed increasingly only to information confirming prior beliefs, based on homophily and media fragmentation Continued increase in inequality (likely in the absence of political action) -> fuel further polarization Increased partisan polarization may lead to decreased attachment to national as opposed to state-level or other identities Out-group is more feared -> reduce exposure to out-group members as individuals -> more susceptible to demonization of out-group members -> more polarization Conformity pressures higher when in-group more salient: more pressure to conform with in-group around you -> more polarization Negative Feedback Loop: People may become more willing to rethink their beliefs as polarization worsens People may learn from experience as anger dissipates Historically the world has never ended Demographic change may move us away from 50/50 situation, which is particularly conducive to polarization A national crisis could cause people eventually to come together (if it doesn't destroy everything first) Historically, public passions around issues (e.g. immigration) tend to be transient Citizens may grow tired of polarizing leadership, replace with less polarizing leadership Likely re-emergence of an external adversary in the international system (Russia, China)

Does Correct Information About Immigration Affect Attitudes? Experiment

Previous research shows that people commonly exaggerate the size of minority populations. Theories of inter-group threat predict that the larger people perceive minority groups to be, the less favorably they feel toward them. Does correcting Americans' misperceptions about immigrant numbers affect related attitudes? Long-term study of experiments in 5 different national surveys from 2006 to 2017. The experiments included combinations of four treatments: 1. Estimate the size of the foreign-born population. ("Out of every 100 people living in the United States, how many do you think were born outside of the country?") [Guess] 2. Estimate the size of the foreign-born population, then be told of a news story giving the correct figure (12 out of every 100). [Correction] 3. Be told of a news story giving the correct figure (12 out of every 100). [Information] 4. Control group with no guessing and no information. [Control] Post-treatment questions about: ideal immigration level (should be increased a lot, increased a little, stay same, decreased a little, decreased a lot) "How likely is it that the immigrants currently coming into the U.S. will take jobs away from people already here?" "How likely is it that current and future immigration will threaten the American way of life?" The experimental manipulation did change perceptions of immigrant numbers. However, correct information did not consistently affect attitudes toward immigration. The overall pattern is one of inconsistent and substantively small effects. Separate study using share of immigrants living in respondents' ZIP code (rather than US as a whole): again, information had no particular effect on attitudes. Does the effect of information vary depending on initial guesses about % of immigrants? No particular effect, regardless of initial beliefs about prevalence of immigration. Information can sometimes change perceptions of facts, without changing attitudes. Attitudes toward immigration are grounded partly in stable predispositions, often established early in life and reinforced by later socialization, that render these attitudes resistant to information that challenges existing beliefs.

Approaches to study of personality

Psychoanalytic theories Highlight the role of the unconscious in human behavior Personality as an "energy system" motivating people to satisfy basic drives (the "pleasure principle") Behavior is a product of these drives and individuals' unconscious efforts to suppress and/or channel basic drives Three elements of personality Id - instincts and responses to bodily functions; follows pleasure principle Ego - moderates between the id and the realities of the social world; follows "reality principle" Superego - conscience or moral arm When the ego is threatened, people feel anxiety People use defense mechanisms to defend the ego Unconscious techniques used to distort reality and avoid anxiety Repression (e.g., eliminating an unpleasant memory) Projection (attributing one's own objectionable impulses to others) Rationalization (reinterpret own objectionable behavior in a more favorable way) Denial (of reality, of an impulse) Trait theories Traits are personality characteristics that are stable over time and across situations Traits produce predispositions to think, feel, or act in particular patterns toward people, events, and situations Psychologists have sought to develop a taxonomy of personality traits. Most famous is the "Big Five"

Social Dominance Scale

Psychologists use "scales" to measure aspects of individuals' personalities Scales generally consist of a series of questions that tap into different facets of a given personality feature Psychologists then attempt to relate behavior to aspects of personality measured by the scales 16 questions comprise the "Social Dominance Scale." Answers can be used to calculate a "Social Dominance Orientation," a feature of personality relevant to prejudice and intergroup relations. Social Dominance Scale. All individual questions on seven-point scale. (Part I: High score = higher social dominance orientation) Some groups of people are just more worthy than others. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. Inferior groups should stay in their place. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. Social Dominance Scale. All individual questions on seven-point scale. (Part II: High score = low social dominance orientation) 9. It would be good if all groups could be equal. 10. Group equality should be our ideal. 11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 13. Society is better when social equality is increased. 14. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally. 15. We should strive to make incomes more equal. 16. No one group should dominate in society. To calculate a social dominance orientation score: (1) adjust the scales to make 7 the highest social dominance orientation and 1 the lowest for all questions (flip the scale for questions in part II, keep it as it is in part I) (2) take the average of responses to all questions in the scale.

Conspiracy Theories and Mass Opinion

Public agreement with each of these conspiracy theories is a minority position, but some of the minorities are considerable (up to around 25%). However, over 55% of respondents agreed with at least one of the conspiracy theory items. Only 12% of respondents endorsed three or more conspiracies. Response patterns suggest that some conspiracy items are highly correlated with ideology ("ideological conspiracies") Liberal: Iraq War, Truther Conservative: Birther, Soros But others ("general conspiracies") were not nearly so ideological Financial Crisis, CFLB, ChemTrails Biggest predictors, by far, are high scores on the Manichean, End Times, Secret Cabal, and Paranormal belief scales. The End Times variable is the strongest; despite the correlation between conservatism and religiosity, people high on the End Times scale often believe many or all of the conspiracies, even the "liberal" ones. Members of disempowered groups have somewhat higher propensities toward conspiracy theory beliefs (low education individuals, African Americans) Some variables are surprisingly unrelated to belief in conspiracy theories (interpersonal trust, political efficacy, authoritarianism) If government operated with more transparency, conspiratorial thinking might become less attractive with time More pushback in the media (though conspiratorialists may just think "thou dost protest too much") Regulation of media / accountability for spreading fake accounts / conspiracies

Realistic Conflict Theory

RCT sees prejudice/discrimination/stereotyping as a result of competition over scarce resources As competition becomes more severe, those involved tend to view the other in increasingly negative terms Predicts individual variation: prejudice more likely in those more directly involved in competition for resources with out-group members (working-class vs upper-class whites) Predicts across-country variation: prejudice more likely in countries where resources are scarce and competition for resources is organized around ethnic/racial groups

Extremist connection to the Milgram Obedience Experiment

Recall the Milgram experiments: most subjects were willing to defer to authority by turning the dial all the way up Milgram argues: these are not sadistic individuals; what drives their behavior is a "person-situation interaction effect" This relates to the finding that extremist acts of violence are "nearly always fostered by groups, as opposed to individuals. When someone kills for the sake of promoting a higher good, he may find support and encouragement if he is acting as part of a group of people who share that belief."

Social Media and Political Polarization

Recent study of self-identified Republicans and Democrats who regularly use Twitter Measures of attitudes on policy issues both at "baseline" (beginning of study) and "endline" (end of study) Subjects in a treatment condition were assigned to follow a political Twitter bot that retweeted messages from the opposite political party Subjects in the control condition were not assigned to any such Twitter bot Subjects in the treatment condition received 24 retweets per day for one month, completed weekly quizzes to check for "compliance" (make sure they were reading the content) The asymmetric effect between liberals and conservatives is uninterpretable because there's no measure of the content of the tweets. Why might a partisan become more partisan when exposed to communications from the other side? Negative emotional response to tweets -> hardens in-group/out-group boundaries -> reinterpreting policy from the perspective of being a more committed partisan

Milgram Obedience Experiment Results

Relevant concepts: "blind obedience to authority" and "mindlessly taking the first small step" Milgram wrote about the results in terms of The "theory of conformism" (remember the Asch line experiments) "Agentic state theory," which holds that when a person comes to view himself as the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes, he no longer sees himself as responsible for his actions

Breakup of Yugoslavia: Nationalism Case Study Onslaught of War

Slovenia and Croatia were moving towards independence Slovenian Independence Referendum: 23 December 1990 (94.8% yes) Croatian Independence Referendum: 19 May 1991 (94% yes, boycott by ethnic Serbs) Serb minority in Croatia (Krajina, then elsewhere) didn't want to be in an independent Croatian state, and had preemptively revolted (beginning around April 1991) The Croatian police tried to crush the Serb revolt The Serb-dominated Yugoslav military intervened Slovenia and Croatia both formally declared independence on 25 June 1991 Milosevic: secession is fine, but Serbs living in either republic (in practice, Croatia) had the right to live in Serbia -> so if you go, borders have to be redrawn Satisfying Serb irridentist sentiment Serbia let Slovenia go after "Ten-Day War" of June & July 1991 (geographically more distant; no Serb minority in Slovenia to speak of; much less past historical tension)

Empathy and Political Polarization Experiment

Study 1 Empathy Measure: * Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) * Dispositional measure of empathy * Scale measures such as: - "When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them" - "Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems" (reverse coded) Polarization Measure: * for R's: Favorability Toward R Party - Favorability Toward D Party * for D's: Favorability Toward D Party - Favorability Toward R Party Social Distance Measure: * How upset would you be if a family member married a member of the opposite party * How upset would you be if a neighbor placed a sign for the opposite party's presidential candidate in his or her yard What do you expect the relationships between these variables to look like? Higher empathy lowers salience of out-group divides, so more empathetic people will be less affectively polarized Higher empathy may make people more polarized, if higher empathy is associate with a more moralistic approach to politics Higher empathy decreases social distance but not polarization (because polarization is so engrained) Higher empathy may be associated with more narrative modes of thinking, which might be more conducive to "good" vs "bad" -> more affective polarization Higher empathy may be disproportionately towards your in-group rather than out-group, then more empathetic people would be more affectively polarized Higher empathy means greater inparty favoritism and higher likelihood of rating opposite party as "very unfavorable." However, empathy also leads to lower social distance (being less upset by e.g. opposite party marriages). How do these pieces fit together? Dispositional empathy leads to more negative feelings towards partisan opponents. But the approach-oriented aspect of empathic concern seems to encourage contact with outparty members. Perhaps this suggests a goal of altering behavior that is seen as harmful (opposite party support). Study 2 Subjects were randomly assigned to receive one of two versions of a short article describing a recent protest on a college campus. In both versions: * Campus police had to shut down a group of partisan students who were protesting a speech to be given by an individual known for making inflammatory comments about that party. * A bystander who was attempting to hear the speech was struck by a protestor. * The protestors succeeded in getting the speech canceled. The partisan implications were randomly varied: * Either the speaker criticized Democrats and was protested by the College Democrats; * Or the speaker criticized Republicans and was protested by the College Republicans. Study 2 Censorship measure: whether the speaker should have been invited in the first place whether the protesters were justified whether the speech should have been allowed despite the protest and whether the university should have done more to protect speech. Level of support for punishing protestors: banning the group from holding future events suspending the students involved expelling the students involved Reactions to the student struck by a protestor: Measure of sympathy Measure of schadenfreude (amusement/finding humor) Empathy Measure: IRI, same as above. Higher empathy means greater interest in censoring opposite party views and higher likelihood of experiencing schadenfreude when injured student is from the opposite party. (Empathy had no effect on desire to punish or ability to sympathize based on party.) So: contrary to what one might have naively expected, empathy can potentially exacerbate polarization rather than diminish it. This could be true when those with higher dispositional empathy are disproportionately likely to exhibit that empathy toward in-group members ("parochial empathy").

Personality in political psychology

Study of political leadership How do leaders' personality traits influence their behavior or effectiveness? Study of political ideologies/orientations How are individuals' personality traits related to their ideologies (e.g., liberal vs conservative) or orientations (e.g., social dominance) Study of political behavior How do individuals' personality traits affect their predispositions to behave in the political sphere?

Subliminal Exposure to National Flags Experiment

Subject pool: Israeli citizens Subjects in a treatment group were exposed to subliminal images of an Israeli flag before answering a questionnaire Subjects in a control group answered the same questionnaire but were not exposed to subliminal images of an Israeli flag A measure of all subjects' extent of "Identification With Israeli Nationalism" (IWIN) was obtained before they took part in the experiment With respect to several different dependent variables, exposure to the flag reduced polarization among subjects: Voting Intentions. In the control group, subjects with a high level of IWIN on average expressed preference for right-wing parties; subjects with a low level of IWIN on average expressed preference for left-wing parties. In the treatment group exposed to the Israeli flag, both subjects with high and low levels of IWIN expressed more moderate preferences (for more centrist parties) compared to people with similar levels of IWIN in the control group. Issue positions. Similar moderating effects were observed for attitudes regarding the Israeli pull-out from the Gaza strip Use varying methodologies Subliminal exposure to flags (or not); Filling out a survey in a room with a huge flag (or not) Surveys to measure attitudes; "Lexical Tasks" designed to test the accessibility of different ideas Some summary findings on US flag experiments Exposure to the US flag makes accessible norms of egalitarianism Subjects who are high in "nationalism" report less hostility towards Arabs and Muslims when primed with flags before answering a survey; for subjects who are low in "nationalism", the flag makes no difference (hostility towards Arabs and Muslims was already low) The second finding is mediated by a pathway defined by the first Exposure to the US flag has relatively little effect on "patriotism" (defined as "love and concern for one's country and major symbols) but a significant positive effect on "nationalism" (defined as a belief that Americans are superior to others) These studies suggest that exposure to flags evoke in-group social norms as well as emphasizing in-group versus out-group identities

Bystander Effect Experiment

Subjects were invited to a lab under the pretext of taking part in a discussion of "personal problems" Subjects were strangers to one another; either 2, 3, 4, or 5 subjects took part in any given session Communication took place over an intercom, allegedly to ensure privacy, and subjects couldn't physically see the others they were talking to At some point, a confederate subject started faking an epileptic seizure: "I-er-um-I think I-I need-er-if-if could-er-er-somebody er-er-er-er-er-er-er give me a little-er-give me a little help here because-er-I-er-I'm-er-erh-h-having a-a-a real problem-er-right now and I-er-if somebody could help me out it would-it would-er-er s-s-sure be-sure be good . . . because-there-er-er-a cause I-er-I-uh-I've got a-a one of the-er-sei er-er-things coming on and-and-and I could really-er-use some help so if somebody would-er-give me a little h-help-uh-er-er-er-er-er c-could somebody-er-er-help-er-uh-uh-uh (choking sounds). . . . I'm gonna die-er-er-I'm . . . gonna die-er-help-er-er-seizure-er-[chokes, then quiet]." Experimenters measured the time it took for somebody to come to the aid of the seizure victim The more people that were involved in the group, the longer it took for somebody to come to the victim's aid Similar bystander effects have been found in a wide variety of different settings Other studies of diffusion of responsibility show that, in many settings, individual people put less effort into a common task when there are more people carrying out that task (e.g., how hard each person pulls on a rope in a simulated tug-of-war)

The Security Dilemma

Suppose that national leaders perceive (correctly or incorrectly) a threatening security environment A natural response is to take defensive actions (arms buildups, increased defense spending, etc.) A given leader may know that her own motivations are peaceful, and tends to assume that her peaceful intentions are transparent to their neighbors The kinds of defensive actions involved tend to be similar to the kinds of actions that would be taken by those preparing for aggression One's neighbors may in fact be uncertain about one's own intentions.... ....and, in forming judgments, may rely on visible indicators of behavior.... ....so may interpret one's defensive actions as potentially hostile in nature Positive feedback loop may lead to arms race or even to war Think about the Security Dilemma in terms of the Actor-Observer Distinction; Dispositional vs Situational Attributions; Fundamental Attribution Error Policymakers often fail to understand how their actions are likely to be perceived (or misperceived) by neighboring states The Security Dilemma dynamic can help entrench "the enemy image" or other negative stereotypes Easily leads to an "inherent bad-faith" perspective on perceived adversaries, through which "Bad behavior" by the counterparty is seen as evidence that she is of bad faith "Good behavior" by the counterparty is seen as having been coerced; serves as "evidence" supporting the wisdom of a "hard-line" policy "Cognitive rigidity" = when an actor becomes unwilling/unable to update their beliefs about a counterparty, regardless of the events that take place "Belief perseverance" Cognitive rigidity/belief perseverance can exacerbate tensions between states

Homophily

Tendency for people to form social or other ties with others who are similar to themselves. Homophily in social networks: people tending to have friends/contacts who agree with them politically Residential homophily: people tending to live near others who agree with them politically

Breakup of Yugoslavia: Nationalism Case Study Serbian Nationalism

The Serbs were the most numerous nationality and were prominent in the officer corps Serbian nationalists were irked by their belief that Serbs were relatively deprived within the federation, given the size and importance of their group Serbs were more geographically dispersed across the different Yugoslav republics than the other groups Slobodan Milosevic came to power in the Serb Communist Party in part through manipulating Serb nationalist sentiment Nationalistic Serb intellectuals held out an ideal of a "Greater Serbia" - a geographically expanded, ethnically "clean" Serbia. Circulated maps of what Greater Serbia might look like, uniting areas where Serbs live, used to live, once did great things, etc. Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1986) was the most important document associated with 1980s Serbian nationalism. Written by highly influential intellectuals: Yugoslavia is a Croatian-Slovene hegemony Serbs are, in Yugoslavia, oppressed as a nation. This oppression is especially brutal in Serbian Autonomous Province of Kossovo-Metochia and in Croatia, where their status is "the worst ever as far as recorded history goes" Serbia is economically exploited, being subjected to the political-economical mechanisms that drain much of her wealth and redistribute it to Slovenia, Croatia and Kossovo-Metochia Borders between Yugoslav republics are arbitrary, drawn by dominant Croatian and Slovene communists (motivated, supposedly, by anti-Serbian animus) and their Serbian political lapdogs Milosevic rigidly controlled the media, organized a propaganda campaign emphasizing ideology like the Memorandum Milosevic.... "was deeply convinced that citizens formed their view of the political situation on the basis of what they were presented and not on the basis of their real material and political position. What is not published has not happened at all - that was Milosevic's motto." Endless repetition of national myths and history, negative stereotypes of out-groups, false claims about violent actions taken by out-groups and minimization or distortion about violent actions taken by in-group members "Project your own faults onto others" Brutal siege of Sarajevo (at this point, largely Bosnian Muslim population) by Serbs. How reported in Serb media? Allegations that besieged Muslims of Sarajevo were feeding Serbian children to the municipal zoo's starving animals. Of course, the ethnic group populations were intermingled in Yugoslavia, an obstacle to the creation of a Greater Serbia Loads of negative propaganda about members of other nationalities (especially Croatians and Bosnian Muslims), focusing on past historical injustices (back to 1389), etc. etc.

Nationalism

The nation is a community of people who feel they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future....The nation is today the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands...loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society.... A nation is a potentially powerful in-group "Nationalists" are individuals who give their primary loyalty to their perceived nation A nation-state exists when, on the whole, citizens of a country are nationalists (for the same perceived nation) "Nations" are not necessarily co-terminous with "countries" Some countries function as nation-states, while in others, citizens' primary political loyalties may be directed elsewhere (such as towards ethnic groups, rather than the community of the nation-state as a whole)

Fake News: Climate Change Case Study

The scientific community has reached a near‐unanimous consensus on the reality of human‐caused climate change But the general public is polarized on the issue. This is problematic because addressing climate change will require large-scale changes in human behavior and decision making Public opinion on climate change can be mercurial, even changing with the weather: Polarization can be amplified when the inherent uncertainty of science itself is used to cast doubt on the existence of a scientific consensus. "Disinformation campaigns" have publicly disputed the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change One promising way to counteract the politicization of science may be to highlight the strong scientific consensus about an issue when a scientific consensus exists: In a complex and uncertain world, people often look to experts for guidance In the absence of motivation to cognitively elaborate on a message, people tend to heuristically rely on consensus cues to form judgments about sociopolitical issues ("Consensus implies correctness")

Diffusion of Responsibility

Two kinds: In hierarchical organizations, underlings claim that they were following orders, superiors claim they were just issuing directives and not doing anything per se In a group of peers, individuals engage in activity they otherwise would never engage in alone ("groupthink"), or fail to act when they would never fail to act alone ("bystander effect")

Validation

Validation is the recognition and acceptance of another person's thoughts, feelings, sensations, and behaviors as understandable. Validation of an opinion does not imply agreement. Validation is thought to reduce defensiveness and perceived threat, increase attentiveness to and openness to counterarguments. Werner et al (Basic & Applied Soc Psych 2002): Validation of the inconvenience of recycling, coupled with a persuasive message ("validate-persuade"), increased cognitive elaboration and increased recycling behavior.

Political Implications of the Bystander Effect

Voter mobilization efforts may be more successful when they make individuals feel like their effort is pivotal ... ...bystander effects may lower rates of voting or other kinds of political participation Many big problems that require input from the mass public may be harder to solve because people devalue the importance of their own contribution (e.g. climate change) Negative affective associations with members of opposite political persuasion (in-group / out-group dynamics) Strength of identification with political party Extent of acceptance of deviations from party orthodoxy Willingness (or lack) of citizens to potentially switch sides / split their votes between parties How many options people have (two-party system may be more liable to be polarized than a seven-party system) To what extent are parties' ideologies or policies "extreme"

Fairness judgements

We can think of at least two distinct kinds of fairness: "Procedural fairness" Focuses on the fairness and the transparency of the processes by which decisions are made An institution exhibits procedural fairness when everyone with a "like case" is treated in the same way by the institution Related concepts: "due process", "procedural justice", "equality of opportunity" "Outcome Fairness" Focuses on the fairness of the ultimate outcomes of a decision making process Related concepts: "distributive justice", "equality of outcomes"

Media and Reconciliation in Recent Years

We have seen that the mass media can play a role in facilitating mass political violence by stirring up resentment, issuing false propaganda, and dehumanizing members of a minority group Can mass media, used much differently, play a positive role in preventing conflicts or contributing to reconciliation at the end of conflicts?

Implications of Political Polarization

What do you think some of the implications of policy polarization might be? Concerns about representation: polarized politicians many not accurately reflect the national interest Polarization could mean gridlock, inability to work together to address problems Concerns about participation: moderate citizens and young people may feel uninspired by extreme choices High policy polarization -> bigger stakes in political debates -> further inflame passions and division among citizens Very few remaining facilitators of compromise at elite level Makes it harder for moderates to remain moderate, or be elected Policies may become more extreme, and may oscillate back and forth more wildly as parties alternate in power -> policy, economy become less predictable Chaos and hedging in function of government Will this lead to more political alternatives (e.g., new groups in the middle)? Stay tuned Less incentive to invest in original policy ideas (which won't be enacted anyway) How can politicians be held accountable (e.g., for scandals) if everybody is just voting for their party? ...end up with lower quality elected officials Purity wars within political parties Reduced trust and belief in political institutions -> weakening of democracy

Attribution Theory

When people try to explain the behavior of others, they make attributions. That is, they "attribute" the behavior of others to some particular cause. To simplify, there are two main kinds of attributions that individuals can make: Situational attributions: Another person did what she did because some feature of the situation led her to do so or made her do so Dispositional attributions: Another person did what she did because that is simply the kind of person that she is "Attribution Theory" is the study of how people make attributions The "Actor-Observer Distinction": Individuals tend to attribute their own actions more to situational factors, and individuals tend to attribute others' actions more to dispositional factors The Fundamental Attribution Error: People tend to place far too much weight on dispositional factors when attributing the actions of others The nature of attributions can vary, depending on whether we are attributing the actions of in-group vs out-group members